Siman 99

<b>Whether bones combine to nullify a prohibited substance, and how one measures the permitted and prohibited substances, and the law of nullifying a prohibited substance intentionally. And it contains 49 seifim:</b> It is stated in the Yerushalmi, chapter 5 of Terumot [halacha 3], that the peels of a prohibited substance raise the permitted substance; that is to say, that a prohibited substance that was mixed with a permitted substance and one needs to nullify the prohibited substance—such as with orlah and kilayim of the vineyard which are nullified in two hundred—not only the peels of the permitted substance combine for the count of two hundred, but even the peels of the prohibited substance combine for the count to nullify the food of the prohibited substance in two hundred. And likewise, the refuse of terumah, such as the fine bran and the coarse bran, combine with the chullin to nullify the terumah when it fell into chullin in one hundred and one, according to the law of terumah whose nullification is in one hundred and one. And all the more so that the refuse of chullin combines with the chullin to nullify the terumah [and so it is in the Yerushalmi, chapter 1 of Orlah (halacha 3) and chapter 7 of Nazir (halacha 2), see there].

And based on this, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch ruled in section 1 that the bones of the forbidden substance combine to nullify the forbidden substance in sixty. This is his wording: A piece of nevelah that has meat and bones that fell into a pot of permitted substance, the bones of the forbidden substance combine with the permitted substance to nullify the forbidden substance, and it goes without saying that the bones of the permitted substance combine with the permitted substance. However, the marrow that is within the bones of the forbidden substance combines with the forbidden substance, and the body of the pot itself does not combine with either the forbidden substance or the permitted substance. Thus far his words. And our teacher, the Rema, wrote regarding this: And there are those who are stringent not to combine the bones of the forbidden substance with the permitted substance to nullify, but in a case of loss, one may rely on those who are lenient and permit, for such is the primary ruling. Thus far his words.

The early authorities have two other opinions regarding this matter. Some say that soft bones combine with the forbidden substance because of their softness and the moisture within them, but dry bones or eggshells and the like—even those of a forbidden substance—combine to nullify the forbidden substance. There are some among the great later authorities who decided in accordance with this opinion [the Bach and the Shach, subsection 1], for there is a great proof for this from the Gemara in Chullin [98b, in the sugya of the cooked shoulder, that according to the one who says it is nullified in sixty, we count the bones of the shoulder together with the shoulder as forbidden, and the bones of the ram together with the ram as permitted; see there. And the Yerushalmi is explicit there that this is according to the one who says all forbidden substances are nullified in one hundred, and we do not rule accordingly. The proponents of this opinion are the Ran in the chapter "Gid HaNasheh" and the Ra'ah in Bedek HaBayit, but the Re'em explains there that it is a mere asmachta, and so wrote the Rash in chapter 5 of Terumot; see there and examine closely].

And some say that this matter of bones, even of permitted matter, joining together is specifically regarding a kind with its own kind, such as the nullification of orlah and kilayim of the vineyard, and likewise regarding the ram of a nazir, the nullification of the foreleg within the ram, which by Torah law is nullified by a majority; therefore, we also join the bones for nullification. However, in a case of a kind with a different kind, which by Torah law requires sixty, how can we join the bones? For it still imparts flavor. And just as we do not join the pot to the nullification, so too we should not join the bones; and we require that there be sixty from the things fit for eating and drinking, in which the flavor of the forbidden matter spreads, and when divided into sixty parts, the flavor is nullified [the Beit Yosef brought this opinion in Bedek HaBayit from Rabbeinu Yerucham in the name of the Ra'ah, and his intention is as our words; see there and examine closely]:

And there are some of the great later authorities who decided in favor of this opinion because of a great question that exists in this matter; for whichever way you look at it: if the bones contain any moisture and through the cooking it is emitted outward, how can the bones of the forbidden substance join for the nullification? On the contrary, we should have required sixty even against the bones. And if they contain no moisture at all, how can the bones join to nullify the forbidden substance? For they do not emit anything to nullify the forbidden substance. And if we say that the emission of the forbidden substance is distributed equally to the meat and to the bones, if so, then from the emission of the meat there also remains in the bones, and this amount is missing for the nullification; for just as they absorb from the forbidden substance, so too they absorb from the permitted substance, and it is missing from the measure of sixty. Rather, certainly this law applies only to its own kind, for in that case there is not such a great concern since from the Torah it is nullified by a majority, but not in a different kind. Therefore, he decided in favor of this opinion [Pri Chadash, subsection 1]. And this is also obvious, that soft bones join to the forbidden substance, for they contain much moisture [ibid.].

And there is one who answered that they always have an emission of their own, and if it is difficult, if so, we should require sixty also against the bones of the forbidden substance themselves, it can be said that their emission is a weak flavor and does not forbid, as with gidim where we hold that they do not possess the ability to impart flavor, even though they certainly have some emission [Peleti, subsection 1]. And since they have an emission, it is effective to nullify the forbidden substance. And furthermore it can be said that they never have an emission of their own, but what they absorb from others they do emit; and therefore, what they absorbed from the permitted substance they then emit, and automatically there is sixty against the forbidden substance. And one should not say that according to this they also emit what they absorbed from the forbidden substance, for it is not so; for that measure of the forbidden substance that was absorbed was nullified by sixty in the bones and in what they absorbed from the permitted substance. And when they emit afterwards, it is all permitted, for they do not absorb the entire emission of the kezayit of the forbidden substance but rather according to the proportion, as is understood. And in this, the bones together with what they absorbed from the permitted substance constitute sixty.

And behold, if we say that the bones have an exudation of their own and the exudation does not forbid, it would not be difficult for us why the bones combine for nullification and the pot does not combine, because the pot has no exudation of its own. And even if we say that the bones have no exudation of their own, it is also not similar to a pot, because the pot is saturated from absorbing and does not absorb much more of the forbidden substance. And even a new pot that is not yet saturated from absorbing, the sages did not distinguish. And furthermore, since bones are placed inside the pot with the meat, the exudation is distributed equally, which is not the case with the pot itself, where on the inside there is broth and on the outside it is exposed to the air, the exudation is not distributed equally and therefore it does not combine [Pri Megadim in Mishbetzot Zahav subsection 1 in the name of Pri Chadash]. However, according to this excuse, if shards are placed inside the broth, they would also combine for the measure of sixty, but according to the previous excuse, the shards do not combine [ibid.].

And behold, the opinion of our teacher, the Rema, is not to include the bones of the forbidden substance to nullify the forbidden substance, but the bones of the permitted substance are included to nullify the forbidden substance [Shach subsection 2]. And there are those who wondered at this reasoning, for since the bones of the forbidden substance are not included in the prohibition, if so, what reason is there to distinguish between the bones of the forbidden substance and the bones of the permitted substance [Pri Megadim ibid.]. And in truth, from the language of our teacher, the Rema, who wrote "and there are those who are stringent etc." it implies explicitly that it is not from the essential law but merely a stringency. And so it implies in the source of the law in the Sha'arim [siman 55 in the gloss]. This is his wording there: Bones of a forbidden substance do not join with the forbidden substance, but bones of a permitted substance join with the permitted substance; however, one should not join the bones of a forbidden substance with the permitted substance to nullify the forbidden substance. And if any posek permits it, he has not transgressed the words of the sages, but it is not proper to permit to such an extent. Thus far his words. And the reason for the stringency, it can be said, is because most often the bones are attached to the meat, and they were slightly concerned for an attached forbidden substance, as will be explained further regarding this with the help of Heaven.

In my humble opinion, it appears that the Rambam holds this way as a matter of law, for he wrote in chapter 13 of Hilkhot Terumot, law 7: The waste of terumah does not join with it to forbid the chullin, but the waste of chullin joins with the chullin to neutralize the terumah, etc. Thus far his words. Behold, this is exactly like this opinion. The Ra'avad disagreed with him, for in the Yerushalmi it is explained that even the waste of terumah joins to nullify. Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote there in his book Kesef Mishneh that from our Gemara it is proven like the words of the Rambam, see there. According to this, I wonder why he did not bring his opinion here at all. It appears that because most of our teachers hold like the Ra'avad, he therefore omitted his opinion.

However, in any event, the Rambam holds this according to the essential law and not as a stringency, and the wonder remains as to what the difference is between this and that. It appears to me that his reasoning is from that which we learned in Terumot chapter 11 [mishna 4]: The stems of figs and dried figs etc. are forbidden to non-kohanim; the pits of terumah, when one gathers them, are forbidden etc. and so too the bones of holy offerings, when one gathers them, are forbidden. And so too in chapter 3 of Eduyot we learned that the trimmings of vegetables are forbidden to non-kohanim, see there. Behold, it is explicit that all refuse of terumah, when they are together with the terumah, have the status of terumah. If so, granted that they do not create a mixture of demai to require nullification against them, nevertheless, there is no logic that they should also assist in the nullification. And so too regarding bones of forbidden matter, the reasoning is as we learned regarding bones of holy offerings and as with terumah. And the Yerushalmi perhaps holds like Rabbi Dosa who disagrees in Eduyot there, and the halacha is not like him, as the Rambam ruled in chapter 11 of Terumot.

However, according to the resolution we wrote that the bones have moisture of their own but they do not forbid, the reason is simple: for all the moisture of the bones of the forbidden substance is forbidden, as everything that emerges from the impure is impure. If so, the flavor that enters them is not nullified by the moisture, since the moisture is forbidden; and how could they nullify the forbidden substance? And when it later emits, it emits a forbidden substance. This is not the case regarding bones of a permitted substance, which join together because their moisture is permitted and they nullify the flavor of the forbidden substance that enters into them [Chavat Da'at, subsection 2]. And the first opinion holds that even the moisture of the bones of the forbidden substance is completely permitted, for since they themselves are not fit for eating, the moisture is also not of a forbidden substance; therefore, they assist in nullifying [ibid.].

And there is one who asked according to the first opinion, how is it possible to include the bones of the forbidden matter to nullify the forbidden matter? For it is a "connected forbidden matter," and we say regarding this "the forbidden matter itself becomes a carcass" (chanan). And even though the bone is not fit for eating, nevertheless, according to that opinion which we brought in siman 98, section 65, that even regarding earthenware vessels we say chanan, all the more so regarding a bone connected to the meat [Bach]. And they answered that behold, that opinion admits that regarding other vessels for which hagalah is effective, we do not say chanan, as is explained there, and for bone vessels hagalah is effective, as is written in Orach Chaim siman 451 [Shach subsection 3 and Taz subsection 1]. And even if we say that there is moisture in the bones that they emit, it is not relevant to say that the moisture should become a carcass, for just as we explained that their emission does not forbid because it is a weak flavor, so too it does not become a carcass [Chavat Daat]. And also one need not fear lest when they pour from the pot, the piece of forbidden matter will remain with the bone in a manner that there will not be sixty in the pot to nullify the forbidden matter, as we fear for this in siman 106, and then that which is absorbed in the bone will become a carcass, and this is among the reasons for "connected forbidden matter." For indeed, because of this, there is one who wishes to say that here we are dealing with a case where the bone is not connected to the forbidden matter [Peleti 162] but only placed in the pot by itself. But it does not imply thus from all the Rishonim and from the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, for behold, they learned this law from the Yerushalmi that the peels of forbidden matter raise the permitted matter, and there the peels are connected, and presumably here too it is so. However, in truth, this concern is only when the forbidden matter is connected to a piece of permitted matter, for therefore we forbid the permitted matter connected to the forbidden matter; but here the forbidden matter is connected to the forbidden matter, and there is only a concern here for another piece of permitted matter, and for another piece we have not found this concern, and we do not presume a prohibition [see Chavat Daat who elaborated in the answer to this difficulty, and in my humble opinion the matter is simple as I have written, and the Beit Yosef in siman 106 wrote only that ab initio one should be careful in this, and examine it closely].

There is one who says that even according to the first opinion that the bones of the forbidden matter join together to nullify, this is when there is no inherent prohibition in the bones, such as nevela and terefa where the prohibition is upon the meat alone and not upon the bones. However, regarding a limb from a living animal where the bone joins to the olive-sized volume to make one liable for a limb from a living animal, as written in siman 62, certainly the bones do not join together to nullify the forbidden matter. These are words of reason. However, to require sixty against the bones is unnecessary, for ultimately they contain no flavor. And even though there is one who is uncertain regarding this, nevertheless, so it appears primary. And all the more so, the view of one who holds that one requires sixty against the bones of a limb from a living animal does not appear correct [see Pri Megadim siman 62, Siftei Da'at subsection 10]. And know that the law of the bones is the same as the law of the sinews, and likewise the skin attached to the forbidden matter. And regarding salting and soaking, the law is as in cooking:

And this, that the bones of the forbidden substance combine with the permitted substance according to the first opinion, in what case does this apply? When it fell into the pot while it was raw, such that the bones had not yet absorbed from the forbidden substance. But if it was cooked first by itself and afterwards fell into a pot of permitted substance, the bones within it combine with the forbidden substance, because they absorbed from the forbidden meat when it was cooked alone, and sixty is not sufficient against the forbidden meat, for perhaps the meat diminished during its cooking and entered into the bones [Tur]. And according to this, if they saw the forbidden substance first while it was raw, and now they see it as it was before, one only needs sixty against the meat [Bach]. And this is when it was cooked alone, but if it was cooked with other forbidden pieces, even in such a case one needs sixty also against the bones, for perhaps the bones absorbed from the other forbidden pieces [ibid.]. However, all this is according to the one who does not hold of chanan in other forbidden substances; but according to what we establish that there is chanan in other forbidden substances, even if it was cooked alone and we saw it while it was raw, one needs sixty against the bones, for the bones have become nevelah from the absorption of the meat [Chavat Da'at]. And similarly, that which was explained that the body of the pot does not combine, neither with the forbidden nor with the permitted, this refers to that pot in which one is currently cooking forbidden and permitted substances. But a pot that was already forbidden and one currently cooked permitted substance in it, it is simple that one must measure against the pot, as was written in siman 98 [Taz, subsection 2], and it is simple. And it has already been explained that there is not in that which is in the pot sixty against the pot.

A piece that has absorbed a prohibited substance which fell into pieces of permitted food: according to the one who does not hold that "the piece itself becomes a prohibited entity" regarding other prohibitions, one only requires sixty times against the absorbed substance, and the piece in which the prohibition is absorbed also joins to nullify the prohibition. However, the piece itself remains in its prohibited state because it is not clear to us that all of the prohibition was squeezed out of it, for we hold that "it is possible to squeeze it out, yet it remains prohibited," as was written in siman 92. However, for us, as we hold "the piece itself becomes a prohibited entity," the matter is simple: one requires sixty times against the entire piece.

When estimating sixty against the forbidden substance, one also estimates with the broth and the sediment—which is the finely crushed meat and spices that gather at the bottom of the pot—and so too all types of food that are in the pot; all of them join together for the sixty. However, one estimates everything as it is now before us, even though we knew that before the cooking there was much more and it contracted and shriveled through the cooking; nevertheless, one should not estimate as it was previously, for perhaps the forbidden substance was also previously more and it shriveled. And even regarding what the pot absorbed, one does not estimate. According to this, if we saw that the forbidden substance did not change from the quantity it was, we would estimate from the permitted substance what was absorbed in the pot [Taz, subsection 4]. And there is one who hesitates even in this to be stringent, for it is difficult to ascertain the root of the matter; therefore, in any case, one estimates as it comes now before us [ibid. in the name of the Rashal, and so wrote the Shach, subsection 10]. However, to the contrary, certainly one should not be lenient; for example, if we saw the forbidden substance decreased and the permitted substance did not decrease, certainly one must consider the forbidden substance as it was previously [according to the Pri Megadim there], and even regarding a rabbinic prohibition, since we saw that the forbidden substance was more.

The Rambam, of blessed memory, in chapter 16, law 24, wrote: When we measure regarding all forbidden substances, we measure with the broth, the spices, and everything that is in the pot, and with what the pot absorbed after the forbidden substance fell in, according to an estimation of the mind, for it is impossible to determine exactly what it absorbed. Thus far his words. He follows his reasoning which we wrote in siman 98, section 9, for he holds that "taste is like the substance" is rabbinic, and therefore even in a case of a different species we are lenient in this, and all the more so in a case of the same species, which according to the Torah is nullified by a majority. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch in section 4 ruled that in a case of the same species one should rule accordingly, but not in a case of a different species, see there. They follow their reasoning in siman 98 that "taste is like the substance" is from the Torah, and therefore one should not be lenient in a different species; and this is the opinion of the Rashba, of blessed memory. Know that even in this, one should only measure with what the pot absorbed, for we view this as if it is present, but what was consumed by the fire does not join, for it is completely lost. Even in this, there is one who hesitates, as I wrote in the previous section [the Tur ruled accordingly in the name of the Rashba, of blessed memory].

And one should not ask, according to the opinion of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch that "taste is like the substance itself" is from the Torah, how can we measure it as it is before us? We should be concerned that perhaps the forbidden substance has diminished. For it can be said that we do not presume a prohibition where we do not see the opposite. And for this reason, even bones, which combine to nullify the forbidden substance as has been explained, even though presumably the bones did not diminish while the forbidden substance did diminish, nevertheless, since we did not see that the forbidden substance was previously greater than it is now, we do not have to presume a prohibition [Taz, subsection 5].

However, one must understand the opinion of the Rambam, the Tur, and the Shulchan Aruch; for while it is true that this is a rabbinic matter, nevertheless, it is certainly true that just as the pot absorbed from the permitted substance, so too it absorbed from the forbidden substance. In the Gemara it is explicitly stated so [98a]: A certain olive-sized piece of fat fell into a pot of meat; Rav Ashi thought to measure it against what the pot absorbed. The rabbis said to Rav Ashi: Does it absorb the permitted and not absorb the forbidden? And if so, granted that their source is from what is found in the Gemara [97b] that we measure by what the pot absorbed, see there; nevertheless, how is it possible to say so? And in truth, Rashi, of blessed memory, ruled there accordingly based on this reasoning, that one should not measure by what the pot absorbed for this reason. And perhaps the Gemara there is dealing with a case where we saw that the forbidden substance did not diminish.

And in truth, there is one who wishes to say regarding the intent of the Rambam that it refers to when we knew that the forbidden substance was not diminished [Lechem Mishneh], but it does not imply thus, neither from the words of the Rambam, the Tur, and the Shulchan Aruch, nor from all the poskim. And it appears to me regarding the opinion of our teachers, when we examine closely what was the opinion of Rava Ashi: indeed, in truth it can be said that since the forbidden substance fell at the time of the pot's boiling, and presumably it falls in its center, and the pot is already occupied with the absorption of the permitted substance, it will not leave the absorption of the permitted substance which is close to it and in which it is already occupied with absorbing, to absorb from the forbidden substance. However, the rabbis of the academy of Rav Ashi answered him that we should not rely on this reasoning in a case of a different species which is a Torah prohibition, for fat in meat is a species in a different species, as is written in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch at the beginning of siman 98. Therefore, the Rambam, who holds that "taste is like the substance itself" is rabbinic, ruled like Rav Ashi and like the previous sugya; and the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch ruled thus in a case of the same species which is rabbinic [and perhaps also Rav Ashi and his rabbis disagreed on this, for Rav Ashi holds "taste is like the substance itself" is rabbinic and therefore he was lenient in this, and they hold "taste is like the substance itself" is from the Torah, and the previous sugya which said "with what the pot absorbed" will be explained for each one according to what he holds, and this sugya will not contradict that of Rav Ashi, and also all the poskim will be equal in the reasoning, each one according to what he holds; and examine this].

It is a decided halacha in the Shas that one may not nullify a prohibited substance le-chatchila. For even though according to the Torah one is nullified in two, this is specifically where they were mixed on their own; but to mix them by hand is prohibited. For so we have learned in Terumot [Chapter 5, Mishna 9]: A seah of terumah that fell into ninety-nine seahs of chullin, and subsequently a seah of chullin fell into them and increased over them—if done unintentionally it is permitted, but if done intentionally it is prohibited, for one may not nullify a prohibited substance le-chatchila [Rashi and Tosafot, Beitzah 4b]. And similarly, in a case of a different species, it is prohibited to nullify in sixty. And even if he wishes to remove the prohibited substance afterward, for the taste will remain there; and even though beyond sixty there is no taste, nevertheless, he is acting so that the taste of the prohibited substance remains there, for if not so, why is he doing this? [In the Yerushalmi there, it is so regarding all prohibitions: that if done unintentionally it is permitted, and if done intentionally it is prohibited].

And we learned from the Mishnah in Terumot that not only is it forbidden to nullify an issur in its original state ab initio, but even if the issur fell on its own into a permitted substance and there is not a sufficient amount in the permitted substance to nullify it, it is forbidden to add to the permitted substance and nullify it. And if one transgressed and nullified the issur—whether he threw an issur in its original state into a permitted substance and there was enough in it to nullify it, or whether an issur fell into a permitted substance that did not have enough for nullification and he increased the permitted substance until there was enough for nullification—if he did so unintentionally, meaning he did not know at all that this was an issur and this was a permitted substance and did not intend to nullify it or to add to the permitted substance, it is permitted. And if he did so intentionally, it is forbidden. And such is the law regarding all types of issurim, as is explained in the Yerushalmi there.

Some say that "unintentional" is defined even if he intended to nullify, but did not know the law and thought it was permitted to nullify or to add [Taz subsection 8, and the Pri Megadim agreed with him, see there]. However, this is not implied by the Rambam in chapter 5 of Hilkhot Terumot regarding the law that one may not separate terumah from the impure for the pure, where in an unintentional case his terumah is valid; and he wrote that if he knew but erred in thinking it was permitted to separate from the impure for the pure, he is considered as one who acted intentionally, see there. And so wrote the Terumat HaDeshen [siman 216] regarding one who married a nursing woman of another within twenty-four months, that one who erred regarding the law is called intentional, see there. Furthermore, we establish that one who says "it is permitted" is close to intentional and is not included in the category of unintentional [Makkot 7b]. And behold, even more than this is explained in the Gemara, that even one who committed a transgression under the impression that he was performing a mitzvah, there is a reasoning to disqualify him from testimony; and even according to the one who qualifies him for testimony, this is because his intention was not to commit a transgression [Sanhedrin 26b], but on the contrary, his intention was for a mitzvah, see there. Certainly, in a case where there is no mitzvah at all in his view, it is impossible to judge him as unintentional. However, if he acted based on the ruling of a sage, where the sage erred in the law, it is called unintentional [Magen Avraham siman 318 subsection 3]. Similarly, one who forgets is called unintentional [ibid.]. Likewise, if they coerced him to mix, his law is as one who is unintentional [Pri Chadash subsection 11]. And similarly, if at first he knew of the mixture and afterwards forgot and added, his law is also as one who is unintentional [ibid.], for forgetting is completely unintentional. And such is the primary ruling [and the proof that the Taz brought from Tosafot Bekhorot 23b has already been rejected by the Pleiti subsection 5; and I wonder at the Pri Megadim who cited the Magen Avraham there, for what is the connection between them? And see Mishneh LaMelekh chapter 15 of Ma'akhalot Assurot].

And there is a question regarding this: why do we permit here in a case of inadvertence even when he increased [the volume] with his hands, whereas in siman 110 regarding a matter that is not nullified due to its importance, where if one of them fell into the sea they are all permitted, we maintain there that this is specifically if it fell on its own, but if he threw it, it is forbidden even if he threw it inadvertently, for they decreed inadvertence on account of intent? And one can distinguish that regarding one who nullifies, we do not decree on account of intent [Beit Yosef], for we do not suspect him that he would mix a prohibited substance with his hands, whereas regarding casting away the prohibited substance, we certainly suspect him. Therefore, also regarding a prohibited substance that fell into a permitted substance that does not have enough to effect nullification, even though in this case there is a concern that he might add permitted substance, nevertheless, since regarding the primary law of nullifying a prohibited substance we do not suspect him, therefore even in such a case they did not decree [this appears to be the explanation of the words of the Beit Yosef].

Furthermore, here we are dealing with a case where he increased [the quantity] before the mixture became known, as will be explained; if so, it is not relevant to decree on account of a willful act, since it still stands with the presumption of permissibility. This is not the case in siman 110, where the mixture was already known and stands with the presumption of prohibition [Issur Ve-Heter, Klal 54, siman 10]. Furthermore, here, when the matter comes before us, it is permitted, for there is enough to effect bitul; it is only that the inquirer says that he increased it inadvertently, and had he remained silent, it would have been permitted. If so, it is not relevant to suspect him that he would do so willfully, for if so, he should have remained completely silent if he wished to practice deception. This is not the case in siman 110; when the matter comes before us, it is in our eyes with the presumption of prohibition, and it is only the words of the inquirer, who says that he dropped one of them into the sea, that permits them, and had he remained silent, it would have been prohibited. Therefore, we suspect him that he acted willfully and says that he acted inadvertently [this is the intention of the Taz in subsection 8, who wrote at great length, and many labored over his intention and thought it was based on the reason of migo, as the Kereti U-Peleti wondered in subsection 6; but according to what I have written, his reasoning is good and straightforward, and with this reasoning one may distinguish many things where the Sages in the Gemara decreed regarding an inadvertent act on account of a willful act; and examine it carefully].

That which has been explained, that when one increased intentionally it is forbidden, this prohibition is for the one who nullified it himself or for the one for whom it was nullified, so that the prohibition he performed, or that was performed for him, should not benefit him; for if we permit to him what others did for him, there is a concern that he will command others to do so [Beit Yosef]. However, for all other people it is permitted, provided that this individual does not benefit, such as by selling and taking money for the prohibited substance; rather, he must give it to another for free, or sell it to a non-Jew if it is not among the prohibitions of benefit, or sell it to a Jew for the price that a non-Jew would give and no more, so that he does not profit from this fact that he nullified the prohibition or increased upon it. Consequently, if this prohibition was among the prohibitions of benefit, it is forbidden to sell it at all [as is implied from Shach, subsection 12]. Similarly, if the object was not his and he did not intend to nullify it for himself, it is permitted even for him [ibid. subsection 10]. And know that this which we prohibited for the one for whom it was nullified, this is specifically when he knew it was nullified for him and it was pleasing to him, even if he did not command him to nullify it; but if he did not know of this at all and it was not pleasing to him, you have no greater case of inadvertence than this, and it is permitted to him and to the members of his household, for wherever it is forbidden to him, it is also forbidden to the members of his household [Taz, subsection 10 in the name of Yam Shel Shelomo].

The opinion of most poskim is that the rule that one may not nullify a prohibited substance l'chatchilah is only by rabbinic decree. However, the opinion of the Ra'avad, of blessed memory, is that it is from the Torah [Ran, chapter Gid HaNasheh, in his name]. And there is one who says that even according to all the poskim, it is only permitted from the Torah to nullify the taste of a prohibited substance but not the substance of the prohibition itself, such as a dry substance in a dry substance which is nullified by a majority based on the reasoning of "follow the majority." And if they recognize the prohibited substance, it is indeed prohibited from the Torah, and if Elijah were to come and say that this piece is the prohibited piece, it would be prohibited from the Torah [see the beginning of chapter HaCholetz and Tosafot, starting with "Tagli"]. And the entire permission is only because they do not recognize the prohibited substance; if so, how is it possible to say that at a time when they recognize the prohibited substance, one may mix it l'chatchilah so that he will not recognize it [Noda BiYehudah, Tanina, siman 45]. And these are words of reason. And according to this, even from the Torah it is only permitted when the prohibited substance was already mixed and there is not enough to nullify it, to add to the permitted substance and nullify it, but not to nullify the prohibited substance itself by hand. And perhaps even regarding the taste of a prohibited substance it is not permitted according to the poskim who hold that "taste is like the substance" is prohibited from the Torah, except in such a case of adding and nullifying, but not to nullify l'chatchilah the taste of the prohibited substance.

And it appears to me that there is a practical legal difference, for if this prohibition that one may not nullify a prohibition l'khatchila is from the Torah, then even in a case of a doubtful prohibition, it would be forbidden to nullify or to increase, for a doubt regarding a Torah matter is ruled stringently. But if it is rabbinic, a doubt regarding a rabbinic matter is ruled leniently. Nevertheless, I have seen one who is stringent in this in all cases, for this is not called a rabbinic doubt; for when we say a doubt regarding a rabbinic matter is ruled leniently, it is without performing an action, but to perform an action and through this create a rabbinic doubt, we do not say the doubt is ruled leniently [Pri Megadim, subsection 10]. And so too, one who holds that it is a Torah prohibition, nevertheless, from the Torah, if one transgressed and nullified it, it is nullified even intentionally, and only by rabbinic decree is it forbidden, but from the Torah it is permitted. And in this, it is not relevant to say "any matter that the Merciful One said do not do, if one did it, it is not effective," for since when it is nullified on its own it is permitted, it follows that it is also permitted through his action, for even without his action it could be so, and therefore it is only forbidden by rabbinic decree [ibid.].

This rule that one may not nullify a prohibited substance lechatchila applies when his intention is to nullify the prohibited substance; however, if his intention is not for this, but rather his intention is to repair the food and it is impossible in any other way except through the nullification of the prohibited substance—such as in siman 84 regarding the legs of bees in honey or ants that fell into honey, where it was explained there that he should melt the honey over the fire and strain it—the poskim wrote there [Shach subsection 38 and Taz subsection 18] that this is not considered nullifying a prohibited substance lechatchila, since his intention is not to nullify. Furthermore, it is permitted lechatchila to do so when his intention is not to nullify the prohibited substance but rather to repair the food or the drink, such as with wine dregs that they repair by means of wheat milk, and they were not concerned that they would come to drink them on Pesach because it was nullified before Pesach by sixty and his intention was not to nullify the prohibited substance but only to repair the drink [Magen Avraham siman 447 subsection 45]. And even though there is no absolute proof from this, because in that case there is a permit for it before Pesach, and on Pesach it is automatically permitted because it was already nullified, and there is no proof from this for a complete prohibition to do so lechatchila—and just as there is one who prohibits doing so lechatchila, nevertheless, since several great ones permitted making brandy from wormy fruits and likewise to make wine vinegar from wormy fruits [Tzemach Tzedek siman 51 and Shev Yaakov siman 29], we learn from this that even in such a case it is permitted. And there is a doubt whether it is permitted to taint a prohibited substance in order to mix it into a permitted substance, as there is one who prohibits and there is one who permits, and there is no clear decision in this [see there what was written in the name of the Chacham Tzvi and the Shiyurei Knesset HaGedolah], and it requires further study for the halacha. And in my humble opinion, it seems that if he taints it until it is not fit for human consumption at all, it is permitted, but with a mere tainting, it is prohibited.

It is a simple matter that in everything that has been explained regarding this matter, that the nullification of a forbidden substance by adding a permitted substance to it and nullifying it does not apply at all in a case where we say "the forbidden substance itself becomes a carcass" (chanan), for all the permitted substance has already become forbidden. As our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 5, and this is his wording: And specifically when dry was mixed with dry, or even liquid with liquid according to the one who says we do not say chanan regarding it, as above in siman 92; but a piece that absorbed a forbidden substance, it does not avail that permitted substance was added afterward, for we say regarding it chanan. Thus far his words. And even according to the one who does not hold of chanan regarding other forbidden substances, nevertheless the piece itself remains in its forbidden state as was written in siman 92, even if there is sixty against the piece. And that which he made dependent on chanan, this is regarding the addition, for according to the one who says chanan, the addition also becomes forbidden when there is not sixty against the entire piece. And this is regarding other forbidden substances, but regarding meat and milk, it was explained there that even in liquid we say chanan according to several of the poskim. And according to this, you do not find this law in meat and milk to add to the forbidden substance and nullify it, but rather to nullify all the addition with sixty, and if so, this is not an addition [see Shach subsection 14 and Pri Megadim and Chavat Daat].

He further wrote that some say that even in a case where we do not say chanan, the permit does not avail to nullify unless it was added before the mixture became known; but if the mixture became known beforehand, that which was added afterward does not avail. According to this, the posek who is ruling to nullify a forbidden substance would need to investigate whether the permit was added after it became known, but they have not practiced so. Thus far his words. And regarding why they have not practiced so, they wrote that we do not presume a prohibition, for we need not concern ourselves that perhaps it was added afterward; therefore, if it is known to the posek that it was added afterward, it is forbidden [section 6, siff katan 11, and Shach siff katan 67].

And the matters require clarification, for since he wrote that even in a place where we do not say chanan etc., it implies explicitly that certainly in a place where we do say chanan. And so it is explicitly explained in its source in the Issur V'Heter [Klal 24, Din 10]. And according to this, we only say chanan when it is known, but when it is not known we do not say chanan; and also in a place where we do not say chanan, it is forbidden when it is known and when it is not known it is permitted. If so, what difference is there between a place where we say chanan and a place where we do not say chanan? For both in this case and in that case, when it is known it is forbidden and when it is not known it is permitted. Furthermore, what reasoning is it to say regarding a matter that according to the law is chanan, that if it was not known we do not say chanan? For against its will it becomes neveilah, as indeed many disagree with this entire law [Shach, subsection 6 and Pri Chadash, subsection 16].

However, in truth, the reasons differ between a case where we do not say chanan and a case where we do say chanan, and according to this, the laws also differ, as we will explain with the help of Heaven. For behold, in a case where we say chanan, we say that the knowledge causes the prohibition, and we judge every matter according to the time of knowledge when it was appropriate to ask a sage, and according to the answer he would have responded, the matter was established, whether for prohibition or for permission. But as long as it was not known and the permitted substance increased, we say "a species found its own species and was awakened," and we do not reckon the matter after the first fall, but only after the second fall [and this reasoning was brought by the Issur V'Heiter from the Mordechai, Chullin chapter 6, see there]. And once it became known, the piece becomes neveilah, and then even if the permitted substance increased on its own, the piece remains in its prohibition, and everything that was added is prohibited if there is not sixty against the entire piece; and all the more so if he added it manually, it is prohibited for another reason, as will be explained.

And in a place where we do not say chanan, knowledge also causes the prohibition, but for a different reason, namely, by way of a penalty. That is to say, when the prohibition became known and one manually added the permitted substance in order to nullify the prohibition, they penalized him by prohibiting everything. And even if he added it inadvertently, they penalized the inadvertent act on account of the intentional act. And this is all regarding a manual addition, but if the permitted substance was added on its own, it is permitted even after knowledge. This is the primary distinction between a place where we say chanan, where it is prohibited after knowledge even if the permitted substance was added on its own, and a place where we do not say chanan, where it is permitted if it was added on its own. And where it was not known, even if he added it manually it is permitted, for "intentional" is not applicable here since the prohibition was not yet known, and consequently it is not applicable to penalize the inadvertent on account of the intentional. [And according to this, the primary difficulty of the Shach and the Pri Chadash from the Mishnah in Terumot is answered, where it is taught: "Inadvertent is permitted and intentional is prohibited," for it must deal with a case after it became known, for certainly so it is, as this Tanna does not hold that they penalized the inadvertent on account of the intentional, but we established that they did penalize, as wrote the Kreiti U'Pleiti and the Chavat Da'at]:

However, it appears clear to me that even our teacher, the Rema, only cited this opinion to be stringent in a case where we do not say chanan, for when the mixture became known, that which he added afterward inadvertently does not avail, due to the reason that we decree on account of a willful act. But to be lenient when the mixture was not known, such that we would not say chanan, he did not cite this opinion at all. And that which he wrote, "that even in a place where we do not say chanan etc.," his intention was not that it is certainly so in a place where we do say chanan; rather, this is what he meant: that when the mixture was known, we are stringent even in a place where we do not say chanan, but when the mixture was not known, we do not say to be lenient regarding chanan. And there is clear proof for this, for in siman 109 regarding a dry-in-dry mixture when one wishes to cook them together, our teacher, the Rema, cited the opinion of the Rosh to be lenient when the mixture was known, and he wrote there that in a case of loss one may rely on those who are lenient, see there. Behold, he did not permit even in a dry-in-dry mixture except in a case of loss, and certainly one should not be lenient in a place where we say chanan, and all the more so regarding meat and milk where chanan is from the Torah, as I wrote in siman 92, for this law is not relevant at all. According to this, that which he wrote, "and they did not conduct themselves so," is settled simply: for in a case of chanan it is forbidden in any event, and in a place where we do not say chanan there is no concern even if the mixture was known beforehand. For since the entire essence of this reason is due to a penalty when they mixed it manually, it is a double doubt: a doubt lest it was mixed on its own, and if you say it was mixed manually, perhaps it was inadvertent, and the halacha follows the one who does not penalize an inadvertent act on account of a willful one, for in this itself there is a dispute among the poskim and our teacher, the Rema, was concerned for the stringent opinion; however, at any rate, it is a legal doubt. If so, they rightly conducted themselves not to ask, because it is a double doubt [and with this, all that the later authorities questioned and labored over regarding the reason for the custom is settled, and examine it closely].

However, conversely, when more of the forbidden substance is added, then certainly there is no distinction between whether it became known or did not become known, and the prohibition is "reawakened," as our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 6. This is his wording: A forbidden substance that was nullified—for example, where there was sixty against it—and more of the original forbidden substance was subsequently added to it, it is reawakened and becomes forbidden; it makes no difference whether it is of the same species or of a different species, whether it is dry or whether it is liquid, and whether it became known in the interim or did not become known in the interim. Thus far his words. And the reason is simple, for even regarding a permitted substance there is a line of reasoning to say "species found its own species and reawakened," as written in section 33, and all the more so regarding a prohibition. And even regarding tumah we say "tumah awakens tumah" in Bekhorot [22b]; all the more so regarding a prohibition where there is the imparting of flavor, or where it can come to the point of imparting flavor. Therefore, even though there are places in the Shas where we say "the first, the first is nullified," that is regarding a minute prohibition and not regarding a prohibition that can come to the point of imparting flavor [the Gra, subsection 15]. Therefore, even though regarding terumah we find in the fifth chapter of Terumot that the knowledge causes the permission, such that the terumah that falls after the knowledge does not join with the terumah from before the knowledge, this is also because regarding terumah we do not follow the imparting of flavor, as its nullification is in one hundred and one. And even though in two instances it would be, according to the calculation, one in fifty, and it could come to the point of imparting flavor, nevertheless, since its primary nullification is not because of the imparting of flavor, they were not concerned for this. Furthermore, in truth we rule there like the Sages that the lifting causes the permission [as the Rash wrote there on Mishnah 8, see there], and since they lifted one seah from there and we say that the seah that arose is the seah that fell, behold there is no longer an imparting of flavor here, and so it is always [as it appears to me in my humble opinion]. And see what I wrote in siman 134, section 15.

Even though one may not nullify a forbidden substance lechatkhila, nevertheless the sages, of blessed memory, said [Beitzah 4b] regarding trees of muktzeh that fell into an oven on Yom Tov, that one may add to them trees that are not muktzeh and kindle them, because there is only a rabbinic prohibition here. Based on this, the Rambam wrote in the fifteenth chapter of the laws of Yom Tov that regarding a rabbinic prohibition, such as milk that fell into a pot of poultry meat, one may add poultry meat to it until the milk is nullified in sixty, and similarly in all such cases; see there. He wrote explicitly that the rule that one may not nullify a forbidden substance applies only to a Torah prohibition. However, all of our teachers disagree with him on this and hold that there is no distinction between a Torah prohibition and a rabbinic prohibition, and only regarding muktzeh did they permit it because this prohibition has no root in the Torah. And there are those who said that even in those cases that have no foundation in the Torah it is forbidden to nullify, and only regarding trees of muktzeh did they permit it because the forbidden substance is burnt and becomes ash, and the benefit from this comes after it has become ash; but regarding other forbidden substances, they did not permit it at all.

This is the wording of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 6: A prohibition of their words—one may not mix it by hand in order to nullify it, and if one did so intentionally, it is forbidden. But if it fell on its own and there is not enough in the permitted substance to nullify it, one may increase upon it and nullify it. Thus far his words. And this is a kind of compromise between the opinion of the Rambam and all the poskim: that to nullify the essence of the prohibition is forbidden just as with a Torah prohibition, but to increase upon it in order to save the prior permitted substance into which the prohibition fell is permitted due to loss. Its source is from the Rashba in his book [Torat HaBayit HaAruch]. And even though the Tur wrote in the name of the Rashba this law only regarding a prohibition of their words that has no root in the Torah, such as the fat of the gid and the cooked foods of Egyptians and their cheeses and the like, and not regarding all rabbinic prohibitions—and so his words indicate in his book [Torat HaBayit HaKatzar]—nevertheless, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, ruled according to his large book. And since he stated his words without qualification, it is explicitly clarified that to nullify a prohibition that is present in its own right into a permitted substance is forbidden even regarding a prohibition that has no root, except for terumah of the diaspora as he wrote in siman 331, but to add is permitted. And that which he was stringent regarding the leftover oil of a Chanukah lamp in Orach Chaim siman 677, that even to add is forbidden, is because it is a davar sheyesh lo matirin, as he can use it for the Chanukah lamp for the following year, and regarding a davar sheyesh lo matirin they were more stringent [Magen Avraham there to answer the difficulty of the Taz and the Shach, siff katan 19].

But our teacher, the Rema, wrote that there are those who say that one may not nullify a rabbinic prohibition or add to it just as with a Torah prohibition, and so it appears, and one should not deviate. Thus far his words. And this is according to the opinion of the Rosh and the Tur, that even a rabbinic prohibition that has no root in the Torah is forbidden even to add to it, for they only permitted it with wood of muktzeh because the benefit comes after it is burned, but with a Torah prohibition even in such a case they did not permit it, such as with wood of asherah and orlah and the like [Bach]. And even regarding terumah from outside the Land, they hold that they did not permit it to a non-kohen, only to a kohen during the days of his impurity [Tosafot, beginning of the fourth chapter of Bekhorot]. And know that in the Yerushalmi at the beginning of the second chapter of Kilayim, it is explicitly explained that a prohibition that is only due to appearances, one is permitted to nullify it ab initio; see there.

And know that in siman 299 it was explained that one whose wool became mixed with linen brings another species and mixes it with them and nullifies one of them, and this is before they were made into threads; but when they were made into threads, even one thread is not nullified in a garment, see there. And this is exactly the opposite of the laws that were explained here, for here one may not nullify a prohibition le-khatchilah, yet there one may nullify; and conversely, a prohibition that fell into a permitted substance here is nullified according to the measure of nullification, yet there one thread is not nullified in an entire garment. And certainly one thread is not due to the importance of a "beriah" or "chatichah hareuyah lehitchabed," but rather due to another reason it has no nullification. And a reason is required for these two opposites from what is here.

However, our teachers, the Rishonim, have already explained that the matter of bitul is only relevant regarding a prohibited substance that fell into a permitted substance, for in this case the Torah decreed "follow the majority." But a permitted substance that fell into a permitted substance, where an issur is created when they meet one another—such as kilayim of wool and linen, where the joining creates the issur—bitul is not relevant. This is the wording of our teachers, the authors of the Tosafot [Niddah 61b, s.v. Beged]: Bitul is only relevant when a prohibited substance is mixed with a permitted substance; but kilayim, where both are permitted and they become prohibited through the mixture, the majority is just as prohibited as the minority. Thus far their words. Meaning to say, it is understandable that a minority of prohibited substance in a majority of permitted substance, the permitted substance increases over the prohibited substance and nullifies it. But regarding an issur created through a mixture where both are individually permitted, it is not relevant to say that the majority shall nullify the minority; for who is to say that the minority prohibits the majority and the majority nullifies it? Perhaps, on the contrary, the majority prohibits the minority. And so wrote the Rashba in a responsum [Siman 259], and this is his wording: But in any case where this and this are permitted and their mixture prohibits them, who shall nullify whom? Thus far his words. And his intention is as we have said. And that which meat is nullified in milk or milk in meat when there is sixty, this is because the Torah prohibited them by way of cooking, and when there is no taste, it is not by way of cooking and is permitted [ibid.].

And one should not ask: granted that from the law of "forbidden within permitted" the concept of nullification is not applicable for the reason we have written, but in any case, the minority should be nullified by the majority? One may state two reasons regarding this. The first is according to what several of the poskim agreed upon, that "permitted within permitted" is not nullified; certainly the concept of nullification does not apply there without the status of "forbidden and permitted." But even according to the one who does not hold this, as will be explained with the help of Heaven, nevertheless nullification is not applicable in such a case, for the Torah forbade this very thing—that in the joining of both of them as one there is a prohibition. And how can we say nullification applies to that which the Torah explicitly forbade? For if we say regarding this that there is nullification of the minority by the majority, we would have to say that the Torah only forbade kilayim in a half-and-half ratio, and this is certainly not a logical position. Furthermore, the Torah permitted kilayim in tzitzit and in the priestly garments, and there it is not half-and-half. And this is the intent of the Rosh in Niddah there [chapter 9, section 10] who wrote, and this is his wording: But permitted matter that was mixed with permitted matter and through the mixture became forbidden, nullification by the majority is not applicable to it, for there is nothing here but a single piece of prohibition. Thus far his words. Meaning, that this itself is the prohibition—that this was mixed with that. And so wrote Rashi, of blessed memory, at the end of Temurah; see there.

And there is still a great question regarding this: for regarding shaatnez of seeds, we learned in the Mishnah that any seah which contains a quarter-kav of another species, one must reduce it, but less than a quarter-kav is nullified. And what is the difference between shaatnez of seeds and shaatnez of garments? For both this and that, each is permitted on its own, and through their joining a prohibition is created. And the answer to this is because with seeds it is impossible that there would not be found in the field a single seed of another species, and the Torah was not given to the ministering angels; therefore, anything that was mixed is nullified, though to mix initially even a single seed is forbidden. But with shaatnez of garments, another species does not become mixed in it except by happenstance, and therefore it was not permitted to be nullified [Responsa of the Rashba ibid.].

Furthermore, it appears in my humble opinion that regarding shaatnez of seeds, we do not approach it from the perspective of bitul, for it is proven in Tractate Kilayim [Chapter 5] that the prohibition of shaatnez of seeds only applies when it is pleasing to him. For we learned there: One who sees a vegetable in his vineyard and says, "When I reach there I will pick it," it is permitted; "When I return there I will pick it," it is forbidden. Behold, it is explicit that when he does not desire its existence, there is no prohibition of shaatnez [Tosafot Bava Kamma 100b s.v. "Nityayesh"]. And the reason is because it is written, "You shall not sow your vineyard with kilayim," implying a sowing that is pleasing to him [ibid.]. However, regarding shaatnez of garments, it is written, "You shall not wear shaatnez," and it is not written, "You shall not make shaatnez," which implies directly that there is no distinction between whether it is pleasing to him or not pleasing to him.

And regarding that which they permitted there in a mixture of wool with linen to bring a species and mix with them, this is not in the category of nullifying a prohibition, but rather that he does not allow it to come to a state of prohibition at all. The essence of the prohibition of shaatnez in garments is the joining of the wool with the linen, and we certainly have the authority to nullify the joining by means of the third species that he mixes with them [Taz ibid. end of subsection 1], for when he mixes the third species with them while they have not yet been made into threads, there is no longer a joining of shaatnez here. Therefore, even according to the one who holds that "permitted with permitted" is not nullified, it is permitted here, for we do not approach it through the law of nullification, as I have written [see Noda BiYehuda Tinyana Yoreh Deah siman 186, who brought a proof that "permitted with permitted" is nullified, and according to what I have written it is not a proof; and delve into this].

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote at the end of section 6: A kezayit of chelev that fell into water and was nullified in sixty, and afterwards some of the water fell into a pot of meat, it is permitted even though there is not sixty in the meat against the chelev, for it was already nullified in the water, and so too anything similar to this. Thus far his words. And even l'chatachila it is permitted to put the water into the pot of meat since it was already nullified [Shach, s'if katan 22]. Nevertheless, l'chatachila to mix the water with the chelev in order to put it into the pot of meat is forbidden, for this is like nullifying a forbidden substance [Pri Megadim, ibid.]. And there are those who inferred from here that a permitted substance is nullified in a permitted substance, but there is no proof from this, for here nullification is not applicable since it provides no taste at all; but in a case where nullification is applicable, such as dry in dry, one could say it is forbidden in such a case. And one should not ask why a permitted substance should not be nullified in a permitted substance, for behold it is written, "follow the majority," because one could say that the matter of nullification of a minority in a majority is when there is a practical difference at the time of the act if the minority is nullified in the majority, such as a forbidden substance in a permitted substance, or even a permitted substance in a permitted substance, like the blood of the bull and the blood of the goat on Yom Kippur, where the Torah revealed that the blood of the bull does not nullify the blood of the goat due to the reason of "those that ascend" or due to the reason of "kind in its own kind," as I wrote in siman 98. And had the Torah not revealed this, I would have said that the blood of the goat is nullified in the blood of the bull, and there would be no sprinkling here from the blood of the goat and it would be necessary to slaughter another goat, and there is a practical difference in its nullification, and "follow the majority" would be applicable to this even though both are permitted. Or where there is a practical difference in monetary matters, such as at the end of Beitzah where a kav of wheat was mixed into ten kavs of his fellow's, see there. But when for the time being there is no practical difference in its nullification, how is "follow the majority" applicable to this—why should it incline and what is the benefit in the inclination? Therefore, even though afterwards there will be some practical difference in the law, nevertheless now nullification is not applicable [as appears to me regarding the reason for the matter, but regarding the law, it requires further study].

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 7: If a small amount of forbidden substance was absorbed into a kosher vessel, if the manner of that vessel is to be used with an abundance of permitted substance, it is permitted to use it ab initio, since the forbidden substance is minimal and it is impossible for it to come to provide flavor. Therefore, a minute amount of forbidden substance that was absorbed in a pot or inside jugs and the like, it is permitted to use it ab initio, and even within its day, because it is impossible for it to come to provide flavor. However, if it was absorbed in a vessel whose manner is to sometimes be used with a small amount, such as a bowl and the like, it is forbidden to use it even with an abundance, as a decree lest one use it with a small amount and it will come to provide flavor. Thus far his words. And in his great book, he brought this law in the name of the Ra'avad and in the name of the Rashba and the Rivash; see there.

The Tur in siman 122 brought this law in the name of the Rashba and challenged this, and this is his wording: And it does not seem correct to permit this based on an a fortiori argument, for even a pot that is not "of its day," which is permitted, is forbidden due to a decree lest one use a pot "of its day"; all the more so regarding this same vessel itself, even though it is not the way to use it with a small amount of permitted food, we must decree lest one use it with a small amount of permitted food. Thus far his words. And this is not a challenge, for the reason for the permission is because it is not common to use that vessel for a small amount, and anything that is not common, we do not concern ourselves with it; and what relevance is there to a pot "of its day" and one not "of its day," for it is the way to cook in this one and in that one [Beit Yosef]. And furthermore, from where does the Tur know that when the sages decreed regarding a pot that is not "of its day" due to a decree of a pot "of its day," the intention was regarding another pot? Perhaps the intention was regarding this same pot itself, that one might err and think it is not "of its day" when in truth it is "of its day" [Bach]. However, even so, it would not be an a fortiori argument, but nevertheless one should learn to forbid it. And regarding the first difficulty, it seems to me that the Tur's intention is this: that every vessel that is "of its day" will necessarily not be "of its day" tomorrow, and one only needs to be careful from using it for one day, and this is also like an uncommon matter, and even so the sages of blessed memory decreed because they were not lenient regarding the pot; therefore, in this case as well one should decree, and one should not return to the permission of the pot. However, from the words of the Tur it appears explicitly that if it is impossible at all to use it without abundance—for example, if the drop fell in the middle of the height of the pot in a manner that even if they do not fill it completely, but only up to the drop, there will also be sixty—even the Tur admits to the permission, for it is impossible to come to a prohibition at all.

And there are some of the great later authorities who disagree with this law and maintain that they only said this regarding a foul-tasting prohibited substance [Taz, subsection 15, and Shach in siman 122]. And there are those who upheld this law [Pri Chadash there, subsection 3, and Pri Toar]. However, regarding a foul-tasting prohibited substance, everyone agrees that it is permitted. Therefore, one should instruct in such a case to wait twenty-four hours, and we do not go so far as to decree lest he use it within those twenty-four hours, since according to most poskim it is permitted even in such a case. Furthermore, there is no issue of nullifying a prohibited substance here, for his intention is not to nullify, but rather to cook in it.