Siman 100

There are matters in which the sages were stringent regarding their nullification, and these are: a biryah, a piece worthy of being served to guests, a thing that has a way to become permitted, and a thing that is counted—these three because of their importance; and a thing that has a way to become permitted because we will be able to eat it in a permitted manner, and it will be explained in siman 102. And they were further stringent regarding a leavening agent, a seasoning agent, and a stabilizing agent, not because of their importance but because they impart significant flavor. And there are those where they were stringent regarding their nullification in more than sixty, but not in any amount, such as terumah, whose nullification is in one hundred and one, and orlah and diverse seeds of the vineyard in two hundred, and they based the measure of their nullification on verses as is explained in their respective laws. And there are others where, because of the severity of the prohibition, they were stringent to prohibit in any amount, such as chametz on Pesach, wine used for idolatry, and idolatry, and everything related to this.

The reason they were stringent regarding a beryah, the poskim wrote, is because regarding the matter of lashes, the Torah forbade a beryah even if it does not contain a kezayit, and even a beryah of any size at all, if one ate it, he is liable for lashes due to its importance [Rashi, Shevuot 21b]. The Rambam also holds this reason, as he wrote in siman 29, section 6, and in the Gemara this reason is explicit [Makkot 17b], that when the Torah warned not to eat it, it is as if it specified whether large or small [Issur Ve-Hetter, Klal 25]. Since it carries lashes for any size at all, the sages were also stringent regarding its nullification [ibid.]. However, according to the Torah, it is nullified like other prohibited items, and therefore, when there is a doubt whether it is called a beryah or not, it is a rabbinic doubt and one follows the lenient path in its doubt [Taz, subsection 1]. And so too, in all things that are not nullified due to their importance, one follows the lenient path in its doubt because according to the Torah they are nullified like all prohibited items [ibid., and so wrote the Issur Ve-Hetter there, siman 7].

Most of our teachers agreed that a beryah is not nullified even in a thousand, and this is not found explicitly stated in the Gemara, only that this is the implication of the plain meaning of the sugya [100a]. Therefore, even though it is the opinion of our teacher Shimshon, the author of the Tosafot [Terumot 10:8], and the Rashba, of blessed memory, in his book Torat HaBayit [Bayit 4, Shaar 1], based on the Yerushalmi, that a beryah is nullified in close to a thousand—which is one in nine hundred and sixty—and the reason for this measure is because it is explained there in the Mishnah that the brine of an impure fish forbids up to sixteen times in the brine of a pure fish, as we learned there: "The brine of an impure fish is forbidden... one in sixteen of it," and since the brine forbids sixteen times, they were stringent regarding the body of the beryah sixteen times sixty, and sixteen times sixty is nine hundred and sixty; however, most of our teachers agreed that it is not nullified even in a thousand. And they interpreted the Yerushalmi regarding the nullification of its discharge and not the nullification of itself. And such is the opinion of the Rambam in chapter 15, and the Tur, and the Shulchan Aruch, and so we rule.

It is called a biryah, for example, an ant or a worm, even a flea or a louse [Pri Megadim], or an impure bird, or a fly, and the gid hanasheh, and a limb from a living animal, and an egg that contains a chick, and things similar to them. And even though the biryah died, as long as it is whole, it is called a biryah. But if a limb is missing from it, the status of biryah is nullified from it, and even if a limb is missing that the soul does not depend upon; for regarding the matter of lashes it is a legal doubt [Nazir 52a], but regarding the matter of nullification, it is nullified in sixty [Shach, subsection 6], as I wrote in section 2, for in any case where there is a doubt we follow the lenient view, and there is no difference between a factual doubt and a legal doubt. But a pure bird that became nevelah through slaughtering or that is a terefah, and likewise a stoned ox, and likewise chelev, and likewise an egg that contains a speck of blood—this is not a biryah for the reasons that will be explained. And we have already explained in siman 29, section 6, that according to the opinion of the Rambam, even a pure animal is a biryah when it is alive, and the difference between an impure one and a pure one is only when it is dead; for in an impure one it is a biryah even if the whole of it is not a kezayit, and in a pure one it requires a kezayit, and the status of biryah is effective for it to combine the bones and the sinews to a kezayit. And the reason for the matter we explained there with the help of Heaven; see there.

Among the conditions of a beriah is that it must be a creature with a soul or that which comes from it, to the exclusion of something that comes from the growth of the ground, such as prohibited wheat or barley, for example, kilayim of the vineyard. Similarly, it must be something that is prohibited from its beginning, to the exclusion of a pure bird that became nevelah or terefah, or the stoned ox. Even a terefah from the womb is not called "prohibited from the beginning of its creation," for we require it to be from a species that is prohibited from the beginning of its creation. And according to the opinion of the Rambam, while alive even a pure creature is called a beriah due to its importance, as I wrote in siman 29. Similarly, it must be something that only while it is whole is its name applied to it, and upon being divided its name is lost, such as a bird which in its wholeness is called a "bird" and upon being divided is called a "piece of bird meat." And so it is with every beriah. Also, the gid hanasheh in its wholeness is called a "gid" and upon being divided is called a "piece of gid," to the exclusion of chelev, for both a large piece is called "chelev" and likewise a small piece. Furthermore, the chelev is not formed in one place and is not like a beriah which is gathered in one place. Similarly, the beriah must be in its wholeness, but if it was crushed or melted or a limb was removed from it, the status of beriah is nullified from it. And know that the essence of the gid hanasheh is only upon the spoon-shaped muscle alone, and it is like the width of four fingers in a large ox and in a sheep two fingers, and if it is whole it is called a beriah.

Regarding that which has been explained, that an egg containing a chick is a beriah, some say that the chick is the beriah [Beit Yosef in siman 110], and some say that the egg is the beriah [Shach siman 86, subsection 16]. The practical legal difference is in a case where the chick inside it was crushed: if the beriah is the chick, its status as a beriah is nullified; but if the beriah is the egg, it is not nullified. However, an egg containing blood is not a beriah according to everyone, as it does not yet possess vitality [Shach subsection 2], and it is not comparable to the gid hanasheh because sinews are the vitality of the living creature. And some say that even when it contains a chick it is not a beriah, for while it is inside the egg it is not called vitality, and when it emerges it is immediately permitted [Pri Chadash subsection 2, and the Shach also inclines toward this, and so wrote the Rashba in Responsa 46].

And there is a question regarding this: how can you find this law that it should be a beriah when it contains a chick? For in any case, if they recognize from the outside that it contains a chick, they should remove it from there; and if they do not recognize from the outside, how do we know that it contains a chick? And if we say that it broke and we saw that it contains a chick, it has already been nullified from the status of a beriah [see Pelati subsection 14]. It is understandable if we say that the egg is the beriah, for it can be said that previously we recognized from the outside that it contained a chick, and afterward the chick was crushed within it while the egg remained whole, so that now it is impossible to recognize it when it is mixed with many eggs [Havvat Da'at subsection 3]. But if we say that the chick is the beriah, it is difficult, for by its crushing it was nullified from the status of a beriah, as I wrote in section 6 [see Be'er Heitev subsection 3 who answered, but did not descend to the depth of the difficulty]. And it is possible to say that actually, with careful examination, it can be recognized from the outside, but when it is mixed with many hundreds of eggs, there is great toil to check all of them with careful examination from the outside; and if we were to say that it is nullified, one would not need to toil in this, but now that it is not nullified, he is forced to either forbid all the eggs or check all of them until they find it [however, from the Responsa of the Rashba there, it truly implies that you cannot find it, for he wrote, and this is his wording: First, for behold you recognize it and you are not nullifying its substance but rather its discharge, etc. Thus far his words. But according to what I wrote, it can well be found, and delve into it].

A thing that is a biryah and was cooked with permitted food—if one does not recognize it, everything is forbidden, and the sauce is forbidden if it imparts flavor; one should strain the sauce. And if one recognizes it, he should throw it away, and the others and the sauce require sixty against it. This applies to a biryah such as an impure bird or the like, but an ant or a fly and the like, which are repulsive things, do not require anything to nullify their discharge, and only they themselves are forbidden and are not nullified. This matter will be further explained in this siman. And the gid hanasheh—its flavor does not forbid, for we maintain that sinews do not impart flavor, but its fat and the membranes within it forbid, and one requires sixty against them to permit the sauce.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote: Therefore, a thigh that was cooked with its gid, if he recognizes it, he throws it away and all the rest is permitted if there is sixty against its fat; and if he does not recognize it, all the pieces are forbidden, and if there is sixty in the pot against the fat, the broth is permitted, and if not, it is forbidden; and if the gid was dissolved and is not discernible, one also needs sixty against it. Thus far their words. For when it is dissolved, its importance as a biryah departs, but nevertheless one needs sixty against it; even though it does not provide flavor and is like mere wood, nevertheless, since the Torah forbade it, one needs sixty. And in truth, some say that it is nullified by a majority even in a case of a different species, since it never provides flavor [Torat HaBayit]. And this is a simple matter, that in a case where it was spilled and it is not known if there was sixty there, if it is only known that there was a majority there, one may rely on this opinion even in a case of a different species [Taz, subsection 5].

And there is a question regarding this: this thigh that was cooked with its gid, whichever way you look at it—if it was salted first, it was already forbidden by means of salting and does not require the prohibition of cooking; and if it was not salted first, the whole of it is forbidden due to the law of meat that was cooked without salting. And the answer to this is that it was certainly salted first, but the salting only forbids a k'dei klipah, and even according to that which we forbid in salting with sixty, this is all due to the concern of a fatty prohibition, but the fat of the gid is a lean prohibition, and it will be explained in siman 105. And from here is a refutation to those who hold that every type of salting is with sixty. And know that according to that which we established that "the piece itself becomes forbidden" regarding other prohibitions, if the gid was attached to the thigh, one requires sixty against the entire thigh [and it is not difficult according to this view how you find that which we learned in the Mishnah [96b]: A thigh that was cooked with the gid hanasheh in it, if there is enough in it to impart flavor, etc., for one can say, for example, that only this thigh was cooked and it is not dealing with the broth; and the end of the Mishnah, which states: A gid hanasheh that was cooked with gidiym, etc., and the broth imparts flavor, deals with a case where the gid hanasheh was by itself in the pot and not in the thigh. And see Tosafot there, beginning with the word "Im," and reflect on this].

A pot of soup into which a biryah fell and was lost, everything is forbidden when it is impossible to rectify it through straining, such as when the soup is thick or the biryah is small such that it passes through the holes of a strainer. Therefore, a flea that fell into the food is forbidden according to the law since it was lost in the sauce and it is impossible to strain it, and also the meat is impossible to inspect, for perhaps it adhered to it and is not recognizable due to its smallness. And when it fell into the spoon, one must pour out the sauce that is in the spoon; this is the simple law according to the principles of the laws of biryah. However, more will be explained regarding this with the help of Heaven in section 17.

Cooked vegetables in which three worms were found, the vegetables are forbidden, but the cooking water—one strains it and it is permitted. And similarly the meat—one shall wash it and inspect it and it is permitted, for a worm is a recognizable thing and is not similar to the flea in the previous section. And with fewer than three worms one does not concern himself, for with three times it becomes a chazakah. And even though sometimes we concern ourselves even with two times, that is in a matter of danger as is explained in Yevamot [64b], but regarding a prohibition and regarding monetary matters, only with three times does it become a chazakah [and so wrote the Taz in subsection 3]. And this is even regarding a Torah prohibition, and all the more so here where it is only rabbinic, for this rule that a creature is not nullified is rabbinic, as I wrote in section 2. And in siman 84 many laws of worms were explained, and there in section 76 it was explained that some say that this rule that it is established with three worms applies to worms that come from the fruit itself or to mites that form in the fruits, but regarding worms that come from the outside, it is not established even with three; and there are those who disagree on this, see there.

And know that in all the countries known to us during the summer months, vermin are found in all types of food, and especially those ants called "milbin" are found extensively in all types of flour and in all types of groats, and it is almost impossible to be spared from this. Certainly the diligent are meticulous as much as possible to be spared from this, and yet even so it is "perhaps," and all the more so the masses of the House of Israel who are not meticulous and eat from whatever comes to their hand when they do not explicitly see the "milbin." Heaven forbid to say that the community of Israel would stumble in such a great prohibition, and it is not pleasing to their Master that you should say this about them, and it is proper to seek a merit. Great ones in the generations before us have already been aroused to find a merit in this great matter, and we will explain with the help of Heaven what they said and what appears in my humble opinion:

The Gaon, the Kereti U-Peleti, at the beginning of this siman, said that one may rely on the opinion of our teacher Shimshon and the Rashba, whose words we brought, that a biryah is nullified in close to a thousand, and it is certain that this measure and much more will always be present. Also, the Behag, all of whose words are words of tradition, holds this way, as is written in the Hagahot Ashri on the Rosh, chapter HaSokher, siman 11. This is his wording: The Behag explained that a sheretz is not nullified except in a thousand, and so it was stated in the Yerushalmi. Thus far his words. The author of the Or Zarua also holds this way, as is written there. This is his wording: And even though we maintain that a biryah is not nullified, such that one may eat the body of the biryah when it is mixed and not recognizable, these words apply to sixty like other prohibitions, but in nine hundred and sixty it is nullified, as is implied in the Yerushalmi, etc. Thus far his words.

And also the Rif holds thus, for behold, he omitted this entire Mishnah of gid hanasheh that was cooked with the tendons and the entire sugya of the Shas. His reasoning is that he holds like the explanation of Rashi in the chapter "HaSokher," page 74a, regarding the Mishnah there which states: "These are forbidden and they forbid in any amount etc." and they explained in the Gemara that this Tanna holds that specifically a thing that is counted and prohibitions of benefit are not nullified, but if only one of them is present, it is nullified; and it disagrees with the Mishnah in Chullin. The Rif ruled according to the Mishnah there, as he wrote there. Behold, according to this, the opinion of the Rif is also thus, and we can also include the opinion of Rashi in this. Also the Rashba in his novellae to Chullin, page 97b, wrote in the name of the Ra'avad that a "biryah" is nullified in one thousand and two hundred, see there. According to this, the opinions for leniency have increased: the Bahag, the Rif, the Ra'avad, our teacher Shimshon the author of the Tosafot, the Rashba, and the Or Zarua, and it is possible that the opinion of Rashi is also thus. As for what the Rosh questioned against this system from the sugya of the Shas, it can be resolved, see there. Behold, the words of the Gaon do not need reinforcement; for behold, at the beginning of Niddah they said: "An incident occurred and Rabbi acted according to Rabbi Eliezer," and after he remembered that the many disagree with him, he said: "Rabbi Eliezer is worthy to rely upon in a time of pressing need," see there. Behold, even regarding an individual against the many, we rely upon him in a time of pressing need regarding a rabbinic prohibition. Here too, it is a rabbinic prohibition, as I wrote in section 2. If so, even if there were a majority of opinions for prohibition, in a time of pressing need such as this, which is impossible to imagine otherwise unless we do not eat bread and groats, we certainly rely upon them; and all the more so when there are many of our early teachers upon whom we can rely in a time of pressing need.

The Gaon, the author of Mishkenot Yaakov, in siman 31, after writing that one may rely on all those authorities we have cited, wrote an additional leniency. This is his wording: Behold, the Gemara compares a biryah to a piece fit to be served to guests and establishes a mutual necessity between them, and the reason is due to importance, and an important thing is not nullified. If so, it appears that this is specifically if the biryah or the piece remains intact and is recognizable, only that it is not known which one is the forbidden one, such as a sciatic nerve or a piece whose substance is actually recognizable on its own and their importance remains upon them. But if due to their extreme smallness their substance is lost, and it is something that is actually mixed and adheres to the bread or was mixed into a cooked dish and it is impossible to separate them at all, like the small mites, and it will never be intact on its own but is always in a mixture where its location is unknown, the rule "a biryah is different" is not said regarding it, since it has no place of its own for its importance to remain upon it, etc. Thus far his words. However, a challenger may challenge this, for in any case the Torah mandated lashes for it, as it is stated in the Shas: one who eats an ant is lashed five times. And as has been explained, the reason the sages were stringent regarding their nullification was because the Torah mandated lashes; if so, as long as one is lashed for them when they are on their own, they are not nullified in their mixture.

In my humble opinion, there is another permission according to all views. For behold, at the end of siman 104, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote: Loathsome things that a person's soul finds repulsive, such as ants, flies, and gnats, which every person distances himself from due to their loathsomeness—even if they were mixed into a cooked dish and their bodies were dissolved into it, if the permitted substance is greater than it, it is permitted, etc. Thus far his words. And now, it is an argument a fortiori: if in a case of a different species, where according to most poskim "taste is like the substance itself" is a Torah prohibition, nevertheless regarding loathsome things that a person's soul finds repulsive one does not require sixty, how much more so regarding the nullification of a biryah, which is only a rabbinic prohibition, that it is simple that they did not decree upon loathsome things like ants and flies. And it is true that for eating them on their own one is liable for lashes; nevertheless, when the sages decreed for this reason that they should not be subject to nullification, it is impossible that they would decree upon loathsome things. Furthermore, is this reason—that the decree is because of the liability for lashes—stated in the Gemara? Behold, only some of the poskim wrote this, and the plain meaning of the language implies it is because of importance, like a piece worthy of being served to guests and a thing sold by number. And just as the Torah obligated lashes for a biryah because of its importance, as is stated in Makkot, so too the sages decreed regarding its nullification because of its importance. But when the Torah obligated lashes, it obligated even when the biryah has become putrid, as the Rambam wrote at the end of chapter 2 of Ma'akhalot Assurot; see there. If so, loathsome things are no worse than a putrid biryah, for the reasons for the mitzvot are hidden from us and "her paths are unstable, you do not know them." But regarding the providing of reasons, even from the Torah a "deteriorating taste" is permitted, and how much more so the rabbis would not forbid a putrid thing; if so, also regarding loathsome things they would not decree that there should be no nullification for it [and some permit even a kezait in the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread, as the Beit Yosef wrote there].

And there is clear proof for this from the words of the author of the Issur V'Heter HaAruch, principle 32, law 6, and this is his wording: And even a whole creature that is putrid which was mixed in, even its body is nullified in its own kind by a majority, such as an ant, and in a different kind by sixty like other prohibitions; for even though it is still significant even for lashes, etc., as the Torah did not distinguish between a putrid creeping thing and one that is not putrid, nevertheless regarding nullification, its significance is nullified. Thus far his words. And our teacher, the Rema, wrote likewise in siman 103, section 1, and this is his wording: However, significant things such as a creature or the like, if they are not defective in themselves, even though they spoil the cooked dish, they are not nullified even in a thousand. Thus far his words. But when they are defective in themselves they are nullified, and behold, you have nothing more defective than an ant, a fly, a worm, and the like, for they are loathsome and a person's soul is repulsed by them as I have written, and therefore the matter is simple that they are nullified. And I saw one who wrote to distinguish between putridness that comes from elsewhere and their own putridness, that with their own putridness they are not nullified [Pri Megadim in Shiftei Da'at, subsection 1]. And I wonder, for either way: if he compares it to lashes, then even with putridness that comes from elsewhere one is liable for lashes as long as it is fit only for eating with difficulty; and if we do not compare it to lashes, then it is only because of significance—would it enter the mind that with their own putridness there is significance? And from where does he have the authority to say something against logic and against the wording of the Issur V'Heter and the Rema? And I saw in his words that he cited that the Gaon, the author of Panim Me'irot, also wrote that a creature that is defective in itself, its significance is nullified, and the Gaon, the author of Chavot Yair, agreed with his words. And if so, the matters are clear with the help of Heaven, and may the Omnipresent judge us favorably just as we judge the community of Israel favorably.