Siman 98

The halacha was decided in the Gemara [Pesachim 44] that in the entire Torah, a permitted substance does not join with a forbidden substance except regarding consecrated items and a nazir. However, "taste is like the essence"—that is, to treat the taste of the forbidden substance like the essence of the forbidden substance—we say in the entire Torah. And there is a dispute of the authorities regarding this, whether this is from the Torah or from the rabbis, as will be explained with the help of Heaven. And the practical difference is regarding a case of doubt: for if it is from the Torah, we follow the stringency in a case of doubt, and if it is from the rabbis, we follow the leniency, as will be explained. And we must explain what is "a permitted substance joins with a forbidden substance" and what is "taste is like the essence."

Permitted matter combines with forbidden matter—for example, if one ate a half-kezait of meat and a half-kezait of milk together, and they did not absorb from one another, the permitted matter does not complete the forbidden matter such that we should consider them as if he ate an entire kezait of milk. Only regarding the prohibitions of a nazir is the law such, that if he ate a half-kezait of bread and a half-kezait of grapes at once, he is lashed for it, and similarly regarding kodashim, for there the Torah included it; but not regarding all other prohibitions. And "taste is like the substance" is called such when the taste of the forbidden matter has spread throughout all the permitted matter, as will be explained, and they are not related to one another. For it is possible that one who holds "permitted matter combines with forbidden matter" does not hold "taste is like the substance," as "permitted matter combines with forbidden matter" is more stringent to him because there is, in any event, the substance of the forbidden matter; even though there is not a full kezait of it, the permitted matter combines with it. This is not so regarding "taste is like the substance," where there is no substance of the forbidden matter at all. And similarly, it is possible that one who holds "taste is like the substance" does not hold "permitted matter combines with forbidden matter," and "taste is like the substance" is more stringent to him because the taste of the forbidden matter spreads throughout the entire kezait, which is not so regarding "permitted matter combines with forbidden matter" [Rashba, Chullin 99a, in the name of the Ramban, of blessed memory]. However, for the halacha, we hold as I have written: that regarding all prohibitions we say "taste is like the substance" but not "permitted matter combines with forbidden matter," and regarding a nazir and kodashim, both exist.

According to what has been explained, one should not ask those who hold that "flavor is like the substance" is rabbinic: what did the sages see to be stringent regarding "flavor is like the substance" and not regarding "permitted material joining with forbidden material"? For it can be said that "flavor is like the substance" was more severe to them than "permitted material joining with forbidden material" because of the reason we have written. However, even without this, it is not a question at all; for regarding "permitted material joining with forbidden material," since there is a half-measure of forbidden material present, we did not require the stringency of the sages, as a half-measure is forbidden by the Torah. This is not the case with "flavor is like the substance," where from the Torah there is no prohibition here at all, since the forbidden material is not present in its substance; therefore, the sages were stringent regarding it. Furthermore, regarding "flavor is like the substance," we find that the Torah was also stringent regarding it in the purging of the vessels of Midian, as will be explained with the help of Heaven, and therefore the sages were stringent regarding all prohibitions.

Regarding "taste is like the substance," there are two types. The first is where nothing from the forbidden substance was absorbed into the permitted substance except for the taste alone, without any of the substance of the forbidden item, as is explained in the Gemara there regarding a nazir who soaked grapes in water and the water absorbed the taste from the grapes; and similarly regarding other prohibitions, such as one who soaked or cooked non-kosher meat in water, where the water absorbed the taste of the meat. The second is where the substance of the forbidden item was absorbed into the permitted item, but it is not recognizable on its own, such as the fat of non-kosher meat that was absorbed into kosher meat; for even though the substance of the fat entered the meat, nevertheless, ultimately it is not recognizable on its own and is called "its taste and not its substance." And regarding a nazir in such a case, where he soaked his bread in wine and the substance of the wine was absorbed into the bread, nevertheless this is only "its taste and not its substance." And so Rashi explained explicitly in the chapter HaSokher Et HaPoel [67b] regarding that which we say there, "its taste and not its substance," such as milk that fell into a pot of meat, or milk that fell and melted so that its substance is not visible. Thus far his words.

And proof for this matter, that even when the substance of the forbidden item is absorbed it is only called flavor, is from what they said in Chullin [108] regarding meat, that this is its flavor and not its substance. And meat that fell into boiling milk when there is no sixty, both are forbidden; and in the milk there is only the flavor of the meat, but in the meat there is the essence of the milk, except that it is not recognizable, and even so, it is called its flavor and not its substance. And even though regarding meat and milk it is not similar to all other forbidden items—for even according to the one who holds that regarding all forbidden items "flavor is like the essence" is Rabbinic, nevertheless regarding meat and milk it is certainly from the Torah, since this is the primary prohibition of meat and milk, for the Torah forbade it by way of cooking [Tosafot ibid.]—however, at any rate, regarding the term "flavor is like the essence," it is clear proof that even when the body of the forbidden item is absorbed, it is only called its flavor and not its substance. And this is the opinion of most of the poskim.

Nevertheless, there are some of our teachers who hold that if the forbidden substance is absorbed into the permitted substance, it is not called "taste is like the substance" but rather the substance of the forbidden itself. And in meat and milk, we do not consider its taste nor its substance except regarding the milk and not regarding the meat [Rashba ibid.]. And the opinion of the Rambam is like Rashi, as will be explained. However, there are some of the Rishonim who wrote that according to Rashi, as long as the body of the forbidden substance is dissolved within the permitted substance and is not recognizable, even if there is so much that there is a kezayit of the forbidden substance within the volume of eating a pras, it is also only called its taste and not its substance [Mordechai at the beginning of the chapter "HaSocher" and Hagahot Maimoniyot at the beginning of chapter 15 of Ma'achalot Assurot, and so the Lechem Mishneh wrote there, and so it appears from the Bach]. And this is not the opinion of the Rambam and most of the poskim, as we will explain with the help of Heaven.

The opinion of Rashi is that "taste is like the substance" is not prohibited by the Torah but only by rabbinic decree. This is what the Sages, of blessed memory, said [ibid.]: For anything that has its taste but not its substance, one does not receive lashes for it. And even though we derive "taste is like the substance" from verses in Pesachim there from "mishrat," the later Amoraim hold that it is a mere asmachta, because we derive it from a nazir and from the purging of Midianite vessels, and they are two verses that come as one, and they do not teach [Rashi, Chullin 98b]. For according to the Torah, every prohibition is nullified by a majority of permitted substance, as it is written, "follow the majority," and even a species in a different species where it imparts taste, we are not concerned with it. On the contrary, according to Rashi, a species in its own species is more stringent, as will be explained. It was only the Rabbis who prohibited the imparting of taste in a species in a different species and estimated it up to sixty. According to this, if a prohibited substance fell into a permitted substance of a different species and was spilled in a manner that it is impossible to know if there was sixty or not, we follow the lenient path according to the law of any rabbinic doubt.

And also the opinion of the Rambam at the beginning of chapter 15 of Ma'akhalot Assurot is so, for he wrote, and this is his wording: A forbidden thing that was mixed with a permitted thing, a different species by the imparting of flavor, and the same species etc. it is nullified by a majority. How so? Kidney fat that fell into crushed beans and everything was dissolved, one tastes the beans; if the flavor of fat is not found in them, behold these are permitted. And if the flavor of fat is found in them and its substance was present, behold these are forbidden by the Torah. If its flavor was found in them but its substance was not present, behold these are forbidden by the words of the Scribes. How is it "its substance"? For example, if there was an olive's bulk of the fat in every three eggs of the mixture; if he ate three eggs' bulk of the beans, since there is an olive's bulk of the fat in them, he is lashed, for the flavor of the forbidden substance and its substance are present. But for less than three eggs' bulk, they strike him with a rabbinic lashing. And similarly, if there was not an olive's bulk in every three eggs of the mixture, even though they contain the flavor of fat and he ate the entire pot, he is not lashed except for a rabbinic lashing. Thus far his words. And he holds that an olive's bulk in the volume of eating a piece of bread is in three eggs, and Rashi and the Tosafot hold it is in four eggs, and such is the opinion of the Rosh and the Tur in this siman, see there.

And we learned from his words that he holds "taste is like the substance" is rabbinic, and whenever the forbidden substance is dissolved it is only taste; however, when there is a kezayit within the time of eating a pras, it is called the substance of the prohibition. And it appears to me that regarding what he wrote—that when one ate less than three eggs, they strike him with a rabbinic lashing of rebellion—his intention is not that there is no Torah prohibition here, for according to his view, when there is a kezayit within the time of eating a pras, it is called the substance of the prohibition. If so, even when one ate less than the required measure, it is forbidden by the Torah according to the law of a partial measure, and they lash him rabbinically as he wrote in chapter 14, and we brought this in siman 85, see there. But when there was not a kezayit within the time of eating a pras in the mixture, there is no Torah prohibition here at all, for it is its taste and not its substance. The Rambam equated them only regarding the matter of a lashing of rebellion, but in the essence of their prohibition they are not similar to one another. It emerges according to this that the Rambam holds like Rashi regarding the primary law that "taste is like the substance" is only rabbinic, but regarding a kezayit within the time of eating a pras, he disagrees with him [and that which the Kesef Mishneh wrote, that he holds like Rashi, his intention was regarding the primary part of his words, and the difficulty of the Lechem Mishneh is resolved, see there].

And know that there is a great question regarding this: how is it possible to say that "taste is like the substance" is not a Torah law, given that the Torah commanded to purge the vessels of Midian because of the absorption of forbidden substances? And how is it relevant to say regarding this that "we do not derive [one law from another]," for that applies to another derivation, but regarding that very derivation itself, the Torah perforce taught us that the taste forbids. The Ramban, of blessed memory, answered that the Torah established a stringency regarding vessels that absorbed a forbidden substance, that the vessel should be forbidden and its discharge should be forbidden, just as it established a stringency regarding the vessels of heathens that they require immersion, so too it established a stringency regarding vessels of forbidden food that they require purging [the Ra'ah in Torat HaBayit, House 4, Gate 1]. According to this, the forbidden substance absorbed in a vessel is more stringent than that absorbed in permitted food. But one cannot answer that the purging of the vessels of Midian was because of the absorption of meat and milk, for in meat and milk "taste is like the substance" is certainly a Torah law as I have written, for it is impossible to say so, as the Rambam already wrote in chapter 9 of Ma'akhalot Assurot, law 6, that the prohibition of meat and milk does not take effect regarding eating upon a carcass because a prohibition does not take effect upon a prohibition, and we explained it in siman 87, section 12; and in Midian, their slaughtering was carcass and the prohibition of meat and milk did not take effect upon them.

But the opinion of our teachers the authors of the Tosafot, and the Rashba, and the Rosh, and the Tur, is that "taste is like the substance" is from the Torah, for in the entire Shas it is proven that we derive this from verses and it is not merely an asmachta. And a great proof is from the vessels of Midian, for the Torah forbade taste like the substance, since once the forbidden substance imparted taste into the permitted substance, the permitted substance is transformed into being entirely forbidden, and one is lashed for every kezayit within it [Rosh, Perek Gid HaNasheh, section 31 in the name of Rabbeinu Tam]. And that which they said regarding "its taste and not its substance" that one is not lashed for it, this is in a case of "kind with its kind" [ibid.]. However, several of our teachers wrote [ibid. and in Tosafot] that even in "kind with a different kind," as long as there is not a kezayit of the forbidden substance within a k'dei achilat pras of the permitted substance, even though it is a Torah prohibition, nevertheless one is not lashed for it because there is no explicit negative commandment regarding this, and we only derive it from a Nazir or from the vessels of Midian, and this is only a positive commandment. And regarding this they said: "its taste and not its substance," one is not lashed for it [ibid.]. And "its taste and its substance" for which one is lashed, this is when there is a kezayit within a k'dei achilat pras, and then one is lashed for every kezayit within it. And as the Tur wrote, and this is his wording: And in "kind with a different kind," it is forbidden from the Torah up to sixty, except that one is not lashed for it until there is so much of the forbidden substance that there will be within every four eggs of the permitted substance a kezayit of the forbidden substance, and then he is liable for each and every kezayit of it. Thus far his words. Because the permitted substance is transformed into being entirely forbidden.

And this is not according to the opinion of the Rambam that we cited in section 8; for even though regarding the matter of a kezayit within the time of eating a pras he holds like the Tur and the poskim we cited, nevertheless, he wrote explicitly that one is not liable for malkot unless he eats three eggs, whereas they hold that for every kezayit one is liable for malkot. For the Rambam does not hold that the permitted substance is transformed into forbidden substance, and therefore one must eat the entire pras so that there will be a kezayit of the forbidden substance within it; but they hold that the entirety of the permitted substance is transformed into forbidden substance, and therefore for every kezayit of it one is liable. And this is not within the category of "permitted substance joining with forbidden substance," since the taste of the forbidden substance is present in all of the permitted substance. And this is the primary difference between them, as I wrote in section 2. And there is one who rejected the words of the Rosh and the Tur who obligate for every kezayit, for if so, this would be "permitted substance joining with forbidden substance"; but this is no rejection at all, for the reason we wrote [see there, Piskei Ha-Rosh, end of siman 46]. And in section 17 more will be explained regarding this, see there.

The sages taught in the third chapter of Challah: One who makes a dough from wheat and from rice, if it has the taste of grain, it is liable for challah and a person fulfills his obligation with it on Pesach, and even if the rice is the majority and the wheat is the minority [Zevachim 78]. And behold, according to the one who holds that "taste is like the substance" is from the Torah and one is liable for every kezayit within it, it is well-understood. But according to the one who holds that "taste is like the substance" is Rabbinic, it must be said that here it is not merely taste but its substance. And even though we have explained that whenever the forbidden substance is not recognizable on its own it is called its taste and not its substance, and here, since he made a dough, they have been mixed together and the wheat is not recognizable on its own—for even though the dough increased by means of the wheat, behold, with fat that is absorbed into permitted food, the sauce also increases through this, and nevertheless we consider it taste and not substance—and here too it is so [the Rosh there]. Nevertheless, it is not comparable, for there the substance of the fat that was already melted was nullified, but here the mixture is its substance just as it was at first, only that its state changed slightly, for initially it was flour and now it is dough; ultimately its substance has not changed from what it was at first, and it is its taste and its substance [Yam Shel Shlomo there]. And this fact that he fulfills the obligation with a kezayit of the dough, certainly it is so, for since the taste spread throughout the entire dough, and according to the one who holds that "taste is like the substance" is from the Torah, so too regarding a mitzvah "taste is like the substance" and he fulfills his obligation with every kezayit. And even though regarding lashes one does not receive lashes until he eats a kezayit of the forbidden substance itself, this is a decree of the verse [ibid.]. And automatically, since here there is its taste and its substance, therefore with every kezayit he fulfills the obligation even according to the one who does not hold that "taste is like the substance" is from the Torah, since there is here its taste and its substance, and it is not comparable to lashes [so it appears in my humble opinion].

However, in truth we do not need all of this, for in the Yerushalmi there in Challah, it brings a dispute regarding this, where Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says there that it is never obligated in challah until there is a majority of grain, and consequently, also regarding the matter of fulfilling one's obligation on Pesach, it is also only with a majority of grain. It is stated there that the halacha follows Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and perhaps the opinion of Rashi is indeed so. And so it appears to be the opinion of the Ra'avad in the sixth chapter of Chametz U-Matzah, see there. However, even according to the Rambam there, who ruled according to the anonymous Mishnah, there is also another reason for this explained in the Yerushalmi in the first chapter of Challah [halacha 1], that the wheat drags the rice and transforms the rice as if it were wheat. And such is the opinion of the Ramban, of blessed memory, as the Maggid Mishneh wrote there. And if so, one may not learn from this law for other laws [and it is a great difficulty regarding the Rosh and the Yam Shel Shlomo that they did not write this reason which is explained there explicitly, see there and examine carefully].

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch adopted as the primary view that "taste is like the substance itself" is a Torah prohibition in a mixture of different species, and sixty is required by Torah law. However, a mixture of the same species is nullified by Torah law by a majority, and only by rabbinic law is sixty required, as will be explained. Therefore, they ruled in section 2 that if a mixture of the same species occurred and it was spilled in a manner that they cannot determine its measurement, if it was known that its majority was permitted, it is permitted; and if it was not known that its majority was permitted, it is forbidden. But if it was mixed with a different species and was spilled in a manner that they cannot determine its measurement, even if it was known that its majority was permitted, it is forbidden. Thus far their words. Meaning, until we know clearly that there was sixty against the forbidden substance, for this is a doubt regarding a Torah law, and we follow the stringent path regarding it.

There is one who says that that which was explained, that for a kezayit within k'dei achilat pras one is lashed, this is regarding its taste and its substance; but its substance without its taste, such as where it does not impart taste, one is not lashed, and it is like a kind in its own kind which is nullified by a majority [Pri Chadash, Orach Chaim, siman 442]. And logic dictates this, for the primary stringency of a kind in a different kind is because of the imparting of taste, and therefore, anything that does not impart taste is like a kind in its own kind. And so it is clear from the wording of the Rambam that we brought, who wrote: "for its taste and its substance remain." And such is the wording of the Shas, and automatically it is implied that the obligation is only for its taste and its substance; and just as taste without substance carries no obligation, so too substance without taste. And therefore, even though from the words of the Tur in Orach Chaim, siman 442, it is implied that when there is a kezayit within k'dei achilat pras we do not require taste, see there, nevertheless, it can be said that he was only stringent regarding chametz and not regarding other prohibitions, or perhaps even there his intention was not precise, because this is an uncommon matter, that there should be a kezayit within k'dei achilat pras and it should not impart taste; and it requires further study for the law.

And know that regarding the dispute of the Rambam with the Rosh and the Tur that we wrote in section 12, it is clarified in the Yerushalmi, chapter 6 of Nazir [halakha 1] and in chapter 2 of Orlah [halakha 4] like the Rambam, for thus it is stated there: R. Zeira said, regarding all instances of imparting flavor, one does not receive lashes for them until one tastes the flavor of the substance of the forbidden matter, but a nazir, even if he did not taste the substance of the forbidden matter. R. Ba bar Mamal said, regarding all instances of imparting flavor, the forbidden and the permitted do not combine, but for the nazir, the forbidden and the permitted combine. A baraita supports this one, etc. A baraita supports R. Zeira: A kezayit of wine that fell into a pot, and one ate a kezayit from it, he is exempt until he eats the whole of it; according to the opinion of R. Ba bar Mamal, once he ate a kezayit from it, he would be liable. Thus far his words. Behold, it is explicit that only because the permitted combines with the forbidden is he liable for every kezayit from it, but because of "flavor is like the substance," he is not liable until he eats a kezayit of the forbidden matter, and we do not say that the permitted is entirely transformed into forbidden matter. And this is regarding "flavor is like the substance" by a nazir, and automatically the same applies to a kezayit in the time of eating a half-loaf regarding all forbidden matters, for what is the difference? And furthermore, for the Rosh wrote this regarding "flavor is like the substance," see there [and so wrote Rashi in Pesachim 44a, s.v. "u-meshani" etc., that if he ate a peras from it, the measure of four eggs, etc. Thus far his words, see there].

This measurement that the sages estimated for the nullification of prohibited substances in sixty is not explicit in the Torah; rather, thus the sages, of blessed memory, estimated, that even a sharp prohibited substance like an onion or a radish imparts flavor in that amount and no more. Therefore, even though there are certainly cases where even in less than this they do not impart flavor, the sages did not differentiate, and they decreed and said all Torah prohibitions are in sixty. They found a support for this from the Scripture from the "boiled shoulder" set aside from the ram of the nazir, which is given to the kohen and is forbidden to an Israelite, and nevertheless they boil it with the rest of the ram which is permitted to an Israelite, and the Torah was not concerned that the ram received flavor from the shoulder. They estimated that the shoulder is one of sixty of the ram; hear from this that it is nullified in sixty. This is not a complete derivation, for behold, this is a case of "kind in its own kind" and we learn it for "kind in a different kind," rather it is a mere support [see Tosafot 98b, beginning with "And who," and the Rosh there who wrote so, and so wrote all the Rishonim].

And know that according to the opinion of Rashi [ibid. s.v. "the taste is as the substance"], there is that which imparts taste in more than sixty, but it is a weak taste even if it imparts taste, and therefore, ordinarily we are not concerned for it; but if they taste that there is some taste in it, even if there is sixty, it is forbidden, and in less than sixty, tasting is of no avail. However, our teachers the authors of the Tosafot and all the Rishonim disagree with this and hold that more than sixty is not in the category of taste at all and does not require tasting; and on the contrary, in less than sixty, when they taste and there is no taste from the forbidden substance, it is permitted. And such is the consensus of all the poskim and the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, as we will explain with the help of Heaven.

This is the wording of the Tur: And Rashi explained that this which we rely upon a kapila is specifically when there is sixty, and even so it is not permitted until a kapila tastes it; but a kapila without sixty, or sixty without a kapila, no. And these words apply when a kapila is present, but in a case of the same species, tasting by a kapila is not applicable; or even in a case of different species and there is no kapila, one does not need to seek him out, and if there is sixty, it is permitted. And the Ramban distinguished: in a case where we recognize the forbidden substance and only its juice and flavor were mixed in, since by law we should only have to estimate its flavor, except that we do not know how much it is, in this we rely upon a kapila even though there is no sixty against the essence of the forbidden substance. But when the essence of the forbidden substance was mixed in and we require sixty to nullify it, then we do not rely upon a kapila with less than sixty; but with sixty, in any event, it is permitted and one does not need to seek out a kapila at all. And Ri explained that in every case we rely upon a kapila even with less than sixty, and with sixty one does not need a kapila at all even if he is before us. And to this my father, the Rosh, of blessed memory, agreed. Thus far his words.

It emerges that according to Rashi, the kapila is for stringency when there is sixty, and without sixty the kapila is not effective; rather, only when there is no kapila do we rely on sixty. This follows his reasoning that even in more than sixty it is forbidden if it imparts any flavor whatsoever, and therefore regarding a complete flavor, which exists up to sixty, we do not rely on a kapila. However, the opinion of Ri and the Rosh is that in more than sixty there is no flavor at all, and even if some flavor is perceived, it is a faint flavor and does not forbid. Therefore, it is impossible to say that the Sages required a kapila when there is sixty, for even if he says there is a flavor, it does not forbid. Perforce, that which they required a kapila was for leniency when there is not sixty, because several things do not impart flavor even in less than sixty, as has been written, and only when there is no kapila is it necessarily required to have sixty, and if not, it is forbidden. The Ramban, of blessed memory, is like a decider and holds like Rashi that in less than sixty we do not rely on a kapila, and when there is sixty and a kapila tastes it and says it has flavor, it is forbidden, except that one need not seek out a kapila because for the most part there is no flavor in more than sixty. And only regarding flavor without the substance of the forbidden item do we rely on a kapila even when there is not sixty, because this itself is merely a stringency to require sixty against the entire substance of the forbidden item; therefore, we rely on a kapila in any case. However, it is implied from his words that even in more than sixty, if a kapila tastes it and says it has flavor, it is forbidden, even when the substance of the forbidden item was removed and only its flavor remains in it.

And from the words of the Rambam in chapter 15 it is explained that all the measurements of the sages apply when it is not possible to determine the taste, such as a species in its own species, or if it was mixed with its own species and a different species, or if it is impossible to obtain a kapila. However, the primary principle is the tasting of a kapila, for if he tastes it and says that there is a taste of the prohibited substance in this, it is forbidden even in more than sixty; and if he says that there is no taste in this, it is permitted even in less than sixty [and see the Beit Yosef]. And this is the opinion of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, who wrote in section 1: A prohibited substance that was mixed with a permitted substance, a species in a different species, such as milk that was mixed with meat, a gentile should taste it; if he says that there is no taste of milk in it, or if he says that there is a taste in it but that it is defective, it is permitted, provided that its end will not be to improve. And it is necessary that he does not know that they are relying upon him. And if there is no gentile there to taste it, we measure it by sixty. And likewise if it is a species in its own species, since it is impossible to determine the taste, we measure it by sixty. Thus far his words. Behold, he made the primary law dependent upon tasting, and from the fact that he wrote without qualification, it implies that tasting applies in all manners, whether for prohibition even in more than sixty, or for permission even in less than sixty.

And behold, regarding that which he wrote that chelev, meaning fat, in meat is considered a different species, there are those who disagree with this, and it will be explained before us with the help of Heaven. And regarding that which he wrote that we rely on the tasting of a non-Jew when he does not know that we are relying on him, this is because he holds that the kapila of whom the Gemara spoke, whom we rely upon, is even when he knows that we are relying on him, because he would not damage his reputation by telling a lie, as a craftsman does not damage his craft; but regarding an ordinary non-Jew, it specifically requires speaking offhandedly. And many have raised an objection against him, for we maintain that a non-Jew speaking offhandedly is not believed in matters of Torah law, except in the testimony of a woman whose husband died because of the regulation for agunot, and not in any other matter. And now, according to those who hold that "taste is like the substance itself" is a Torah law, how can we rely on one speaking offhandedly? [Shach and Taz subsection 2]. However, in truth, it is not a difficulty at all, for besides the fact that this is like a case where the status of permissibility was established, as the food has a presumption of kashrut, and only its presumption was weakened by the fact that the forbidden substance fell into it—and any presumption that is weakened does not lose its status until the opposite is clarified, as written in siman 51, see there—but even without this, this is not in the category of testimony at all such that the beit din would receive testimony on this, and it is nothing more than a mere revelation of the matter [Yam Shel Shlomo, Perek Gid HaNasheh, section 33], for this is a matter that is prone to be revealed immediately [Pri Chadash subsection 2], as the Jew will eat it immediately and his lie will be revealed if he deceives, and it is unlikely that he would lie. And furthermore, even according to those who hold "taste is like the substance itself" is a Torah law, there is no concern of a Torah prohibition here, for when the Jew tastes it after him, the truth will be known. Therefore, even if he lied and the Jew tastes the flavor of the forbidden substance, he will not eat it further, and the concern remains only regarding the small amount of tasting that the Jew will taste after him, and tasting is not a Torah prohibition [Kreiti U'Pleiti].

There are those who asked: why do we require the tasting of a non-Jew? Behold, in siman 42 regarding the absence of the gall bladder, we permitted an Israelite to lick with his tongue to see if there is a bitter taste in the liver. However, this is no question at all, for there a mere licking is sufficient, but here a bit of tasting with swallowing is required to understand the taste of the forbidden substance; therefore, it is forbidden for an Israelite to do so [Taz, subsection 2]. And there is one who learned from here that when one takes meat from the butcher and it is not known if it is salted or not, it is forbidden to lick it with his tongue to understand if it is salted or not, just as it is forbidden here to taste [Derisha]. And according to what we explained, they are not comparable, for licking should be permitted as with the gall bladder, since the tasting here is greater than licking [ibid.]. And above in siman 42 we explained further regarding this, that there are those who say that even licking should not be permitted, see there. And one should withhold oneself from this even with a foul-tasting substance like soap and the like [according to Pitchei Teshuva, subsection 1]. And that which he wrote, that its end should not be to improve, will be explained with the help of Heaven in siman 103, see there.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote that we do not practice nowadays relying upon tasting, and we measure everything by sixty; thus far his words. Several reasons can be said for this from the essential law: First, that there is concern for the view of Rashi that tasting only avails for more than sixty, and since we establish the law according to the opinion of the majority of the poskim that at sixty tasting is not required, and at less than sixty we are concerned for the reasoning of Rashi and the Ramban that we wrote in section 2, and also the Rashba and the Ran, of blessed memory, hold thus [Beit Yosef], consequently they nullified tasting. Furthermore, there are concerns regarding the essential reliance upon a non-Jew, as I wrote, and a kapila is not found in every place. Furthermore, according to what he himself ruled later, that in min bemino we follow the name and not the taste, as will be explained with the help of Heaven, if so, consequently tasting is not relevant, for tasting is only regarding the taste [and according to this, one must look into the Gemara where they relied upon a kapila, and one must say it was only in those that are also distinct in taste, and examine this].

A mixture of a forbidden substance with a permitted substance of the same species is nullified by a majority according to the Torah. Some wished to say, based on the wording of the Rambam at the beginning of chapter 15, that we require two parts of the permitted substance, and likewise from the wording of the Shas in several places which says "one is nullified in two," but it is not so; for such is the phrasing, but in truth, if the permitted substance is only slightly greater than the forbidden substance, the forbidden substance is nullified in the permitted substance. Thus the great Acharonim have decided, and in several places in the Shas it says, "and let it be nullified by the majority," which proves that only a majority is required. There is one who wishes to distinguish between liquid and dry [Pri Chadash siman 109, subsection 4], but it is not the primary view, and one who disagrees in this is like one who errs in a matter of Mishnah [ibid.]. According to the Torah, there is no difference between liquid and dry in a case of the same species, for since it does not impart flavor, it is nullified by a majority; however, the sages forbade liquid until sixty, and this matter will be explained in siman 109 with the help of Heaven. In a case of different species that is dry in dry, the opinion of the Tur there is that it is also nullified according to the Torah by a majority, but the sages decreed sixty because when one cooks it and it imparts flavor, it is forbidden according to the Torah until sixty. But in the same species, they did not decree in a dry case because it will never lead to a Torah prohibition. However, the opinion of the Tosafot in Pesachim [44a] is that in different species, even in a dry in dry case, it is forbidden according to the Torah until sixty [and see Shach there, subsection 10].

The opinion of Rashi, of blessed memory, in many places is that min be-mino is forbidden by the Torah in any amount (mashehu), because in Zevachim [78a] Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages argue, as Rabbi Yehuda holds that min be-mino is not nullified and the Sages hold that it is nullified, and several Amoraim hold like Rabbi Yehuda; therefore Rashi ruled like him [Chullin 109a]. However, all our teachers disagreed with him and hold that the halacha follows the Sages. Such is also the opinion of the Rambam in chapter 15 of Ma'akhalot Assurot, see there. From his words there, it is implied that in eino mino, even in yavesh be-yavesh, it is not nullified by a majority according to the Torah, unlike the opinion of the Tur that we cited. Furthermore, he explained there that there are prohibitions such as yayin nesech and tevel where they were more stringent regarding its nullification, and it forbids in any amount in min be-mino; for regarding yayin nesech they were stringent because of the severity of the prohibition, and regarding tevel the reason is because it is a davar she-yesh lo matirin. Thus wrote the Rambam. And in the Gemara [Avodah Zarah 73a] the reason is stated that "as its permission, so is its prohibition," meaning that since one wheat grain exempts the entire pile, therefore its prohibition is also in any amount. The Rambam's reason is in the Yerushalmi, chapter 6 of Nedarim [and also in our Shas, Nedarim 59a, it is implied so, and the Tosafot there already wrote that both reasons are necessary, see there].

The reason that a substance mixed with its own kind is nullified by a majority is explained in the Gemara [Menachot 22a], where we derive it from the service of Yom Kippur, as it is written: "And he shall take of the blood of the bull and of the blood of the goat," and he mixes them and sprinkles upon the altar. It is a known matter that the blood of the bull is more plentiful than the blood of the goat, and nevertheless the Torah called it "the blood of the goat"; learn from this that the blood of the bull does not nullify the blood of the goat. For this reason, Rabbi Yehuda expounds from here that a substance mixed with its own kind is not nullified. But the Rabbis hold that the reason is because all things that ascend to the altar do not nullify one another due to their sanctity. And they explained the reason: that if we were to say the reason is because a substance mixed with its own kind is not nullified, the Torah should have informed us regarding a matter that does not ascend to the altar; since it wrote it regarding a matter that ascends to the altar, learn from this that were it not so, even a substance mixed with its own kind would be nullified, see there. And it is implied in the Gemara that the sages learned from this verse that a substance mixed with its own kind is nullified. So too wrote the Semag, Prohibitions, end of commandment 138, and so too wrote the Rashba in Torat HaBayit [House 4, Gate 1]:

However, Rashi, of blessed memory, wrote that the reason is from "follow the majority" [Beitzah 3b; Chullin 98b], and the Tosafot wrote likewise in Avodah Zarah [67a], and the Rosh wrote likewise in Chullin [Chapter 7, Siman 37]. This is his wording: For it is a scriptural decree, as it is written, "follow the majority"; therefore, one is nullified in two and the forbidden is transformed to become permitted, and it is permitted to eat them even all as one, and by rabbinic enactment they were stringent, etc. Thus far his words. And in my humble opinion, the matter is not understood at all, for what is the relevance of "follow the majority" to a mixture of forbidden and permitted? For in the Gemara [Chullin 11a] we derive from "follow the majority" regarding a majority that is before us, such as a Sanhedrin and nine shops. And behold, in a Sanhedrin it is obvious that the Torah nullified the minority as if they do not exist, for the minority says the opposite of the majority and both things cannot be, and the Torah said that the truth is with the many. But here, of necessity, both exist in the world. And similarly with nine shops, we say that the found item is from the majority of kosher ones and there is no treif here; but that the treif should be nullified within the kosher, from where do we have this? And so it is with all types of majority in the Shas, that we attribute it to the majority and there is no prohibition here, and what is the relevance of this to a mixture? It would be well according to the opinion of the Rashba, which will be explained in Siman 109, that it is forbidden to eat them all as one, only one by one; it can well be said that the one he eats we attribute to being from the majority, and regarding the last one we say it is from the majority and the forbidden was already eaten, as will be explained there. But the Rosh, who permits eating them all as one and that the forbidden is transformed to become permitted, from where do we have this to say so? And furthermore, from where do our teachers have it to say a different reason from what is explained in the Gemara, and who compelled them to this?

It appears to me that certainly the primary derivation is from the blood of the bull and the goat, but because in the Gemara there they challenged the Rabbanan: "And say [it is not so] until there is both 'kind with its own kind' and 'ascending'—the difficulty remains." Thus far its words. Meaning, that perhaps even "ascending" without "kind with its own kind" they nullify one another, and similarly "kind with its own kind" without "ascending," and only when there are both "ascending" and "kind with its own kind" they do not nullify one another. And there is a tradition in the hands of the Geonim that wherever the Gemara says "the difficulty remains," it is not an absolute difficulty. And also, even without this, one must scrutinize according to the Rabbanan how it can be learned from here that "kind with its own kind" is nullified; behold, the Torah was required here to teach that "ascending" [items] do not nullify one another, but from where do we have [the basis] to infer that conversely, without "ascending," even in "kind with its own kind" they nullify one another? And if it is because if so, let it inform us of "ascending" in "kind with a different kind"—it is impossible to say so, for all "ascending" [items] are "kind with its own kind" according to the Rabbanan, as will be explained. And also, regarding the primary learning of Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbanan from this verse, it must be understood: did the Torah not command to do so? And what redundancy is there in this verse that comes to teach [this]?

Therefore, it appears that our sages of blessed memory were precise, for it should have written "and he shall take from the blood of the bull and the goat," and since it is written "and from the blood of the goat," we learn from this a derivation to teach that the blood of the goat is not nullified in the blood of the bull. And if so, we must understand why we need a teaching for this, and from where would we say that it should be nullified such that the Torah required saying it is not nullified? Rather, certainly this too is included in "follow the majority," and for this it informs us that here it is not nullified. And behold, there are two things here upon which we can attribute why it is not nullified: one, because it is a species in its own species, for two things that are equal to one another, one adds strength to its fellow and does not nullify it, as the Ran wrote in Nedarim [52a]; and the second, because both are equal in being "ascending" offerings, meaning in their sanctity, and both are permitted. And by law, we should have said that specifically when these two things are together it is not nullified, but one without the other—such as "ascending" offerings without being the same species, or the same species without being "ascending" offerings—it should be nullified, like the question of the Gemara there regarding the Rabbis and regarding Rabbi Yehuda, see there. However, there is yet another derivation in Zevachim [81a] like this derivation, and thus it is stated there: "They are holy," that if it was mixed with the blood of other holy offerings, they shall be offered, see there. And perforce, the other derivation comes to teach that even one of them is not nullified; if it is not relevant to both things, apply it to one thing, according to the way of the Shas in every place [like the question of the Tosafot there, see there].

And according to this, the matters will be explained very well with the help of Heaven: The Rabbis hold that from here we learn regarding sacrificial offerings that they do not nullify one another, for since they are equal in their sanctity and in their permitted status, each one strengthens its fellow and does not nullify it. However, a species with its own species where one is forbidden and one is permitted, even though they are identical in essence, nevertheless, since this is permitted and this is forbidden, it is like a species with a different species. And Rabbi Yehuda learns for a species with its own species because of the equality of the essence, which he considers superior to the equality of the permitted status and the sanctity, similar to what the Ran, of blessed memory, wrote there. And the Gemara asks according to the Rabbis: perhaps the intention of the Torah is regarding a species with its own species? And it answers that if so, it should have informed us of a species with its own species without sacrificial offerings. And it objects: perhaps the intention of the Torah is specifically regarding both of them? And it remains with the objection. And the answer is as I wrote from the exposition in Zevachim. And according to Rabbi Yehuda, the Gemara asks the opposite: perhaps the intention of the Torah is regarding sacrificial offerings and not regarding a species with its own species? And it answers that if so, it should have informed us of sacrificial offerings in a species with a different species. And it objects: perhaps the intention of the Torah is specifically regarding both of them? And it remains with the objection. And the answer is also from the exposition in Zevachim. It turns out according to this that for the Rabbis, all sacrificial offerings are a species with its own species, and even though they are two different species, nevertheless, because of the equality of their sanctity and their permitted status, it is like a species with its own species. And this is what we wrote in section 30, that all sacrificial offerings are a species with its own species according to the Rabbis [and that which the Gemara in Zevachim there says: "and what does it come to teach us, that sacrificial offerings do not nullify etc., this is derived from 'and he shall take from the blood of the bull' etc., it is a dispute between Tannaim, there is one who derives it etc." Thus far the wording of the Gemara. And the intention is regarding the primary exposition, but in truth both are necessary, and the objection of the Gemara in Menachot is settled, and according to the general rule of the Geonim, and with this the objection of Tosafot in Zevachim is also answered; and examine it closely].

And according to this, the words of our teachers Rashi, Tosafot, and the Rosh are explained, that the primary derivation is from "incline after the majority," for the Torah itself, regarding the blood of the bull and the blood of the goat, revealed to us that all types of mixtures are included in "incline after the majority," except for what the Torah excluded, such as for the Rabbanan "those that ascend" and for Rabbi Yehuda "kind in its own kind." And since we rule like the Rabbanan, it follows that kind in its own kind is nullified, and according to Rashi, kind in a different kind is nullified from this verse [Chullin 98b, s.v. "le-ta'am"]. And there is more to explain the matter, for in a mixture it is easier to be nullified than when not by way of a mixture, for in a case of kava'u the Torah was more stringent, that it is considered like half and half, and biblical kava'u is only called such if the forbidden item is by itself and the permitted item is by itself; but when they are mixed together, we do not say it is considered like half and half, but rather it is nullified in the majority, as will be explained in siman 110. And now it is a kal vachomer: if regarding a majority and a minority where each is by itself the Torah said "incline after the majority," all the more so when they are together in a mixture that the minority is nullified in the majority.

However, what the Rosh wrote—that the forbidden substance is transformed into being permitted, and consequently it is a fortiori that in a case of a majority of forbidden substance and a minority of permitted substance the permitted substance is transformed into being forbidden and one is liable for every kezayit of the mixture—he follows his reasoning that even regarding "taste is like the substance itself" in a mixture of different species, he holds that the permitted substance is transformed into being forbidden, as has been written in section 11. But according to the opinion of the Rambam there, who does not hold that the permitted substance is transformed into being forbidden, if so, here too he does not hold so regarding a majority of forbidden substance and a minority of permitted substance. And if so, it is a fortiori that he does not hold regarding a majority of permitted substance and a minority of forbidden substance that the forbidden substance is transformed into being permitted. And if so, according to him, even from the Torah it is forbidden for one person to eat it all at once. And in siman 109 we will explain further with the help of Heaven [as mentioned above].

Since the opinion of most poskim is that taste is like the substance itself according to the Torah, and like in like is nullified by a majority according to the Torah, they therefore ruled in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch that if like in like was mixed and it was spilled, and it became known that the majority was permitted, it is permitted. However, in like in unlike it is forbidden, as I wrote in section 15. And they wrote further that if it was mixed with its own kind and with a different kind and it was spilled in a manner that they cannot determine its measure, and it became known that the majority was permitted from its own kind, we view the unlike kind as if it is not there, and the remainder of its own kind increases over it and nullifies it. Thus far their words. For just as they said in the Gemara according to Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that like in like is not nullified, that if it was mixed with its own kind and with a different kind, "remove its own kind as if it is not there, and the different kind increases over it and nullifies it" [100b], so too for us, conversely, we also say: remove the different kind as if it is not there, and its own kind increases over it and nullifies it.

And many disagree with this, for certainly regarding its own kind, when we say "as if it is not there," we have no concern since it does not impart a flavor into the permitted substance; but how can we say to remove that which is not its own kind as if it is not there? And how shall we remove it? For behold, since the prohibited substance is not the same kind as the permitted substance, it has imparted flavor into it and prohibited it, and what will the abundance of its own kind avail for this? [Shach subsection 8, Yam Shel Shlomo siman 46, and Pri Chadash]. However, it can be said that since its own kind is greater than it, there is no prohibition here at all, and it is not relevant to say that the prohibition imparted flavor into the permitted substance [Taz subsection 5]. And it appears to me that this is the intention of the Tur who wrote regarding this law, and this is his wording: And the Rashba wrote, if it was mixed with its own kind and not its own kind and was spilled, we view that which is not its own kind as if it is not there, and we rely on saying that its own kind was the majority and it was nullified, etc. Thus far his words. And our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wondered at this language, for it implies that it is not known if there was a majority of its own kind, and it is impossible to say so, see there. However, his intention appears as I have written, for ostensibly it is difficult: how can we say regarding that which is not its own kind "as if it is not there," for perforce it received flavor from the prohibition? And for this he says that we rely on saying that the kind of the permitted substance, since it was the majority and the prohibition was nullified, behold there is no prohibition here at all.

However, this resolution is effective only according to the approach of the Tur and the Rosh, that the forbidden substance is transformed into a permitted substance and there is no prohibition here at all. But according to the approach of the Rambam that we cited, the reason is insufficient, for the forbidden substance remains in its prohibited state, except that it was nullified in a majority of permitted substance. Nevertheless, in any case, the different species absorbed from the forbidden substance. And there is one who resolved that the absorption which the different species absorbed from the forbidden substance was nullified in a majority of what it absorbed from the permitted substance, and this is "species in its own species"; that is to say, that in the broth into which the forbidden and permitted substances discharge, the forbidden substance was nullified in a majority of its own species of permitted substance [Palti, subsection 5]. Yet even this is only according to the one who holds that the forbidden substance is transformed into a permitted substance, as is understood. Therefore, it appears to me in practice that according to the one who does not hold that the forbidden substance is transformed into a permitted substance, and "taste is like the substance itself" is a Torah law, it is impossible to permit in such a case [and the Rashba, of blessed memory, even though in Torat HaBayit he ruled "taste is like the substance itself" is a Torah law, this is because of the stringency, but his opinion does not incline so, as he wrote in a Responsum].

Since it has been explained that the reason why in a case of different species, when it was spilled, it is forbidden until it is known that there was sixty against the forbidden substance, is because a mixture of different species is a Torah prohibition; according to this, regarding a rabbinic prohibition, even in a case of different species—and likewise poultry meat that fell into milk and was spilled—if it is only known that there was a majority, it is permitted, according to the law of the same species that was spilled [Shach, subsection 7]. And there are those who say that regarding poultry meat in milk, one should be stringent as with animal meat, for in all matters we equate them [Taz, subsection 5]. And one who relies on the first opinion has lost nothing and has that upon which to rely, and one who is stringent, a blessing shall come upon him.

All that has been explained applies to where it was spilled; however, an forbidden substance that was mixed with a permitted substance and is before us, and there is a majority against the forbidden substance, but we are in doubt whether there is sixty against the forbidden substance or not, such that it is impossible for us to determine and clarify this even in a case of like-with-like and even regarding rabbinic prohibitions, it is forbidden. For every doubt that arises from a lack of knowledge is not within the category of doubt and is considered a certain prohibition. But where it was spilled, the doubt came about due to the spilling and not from a side of our lack of knowledge; for if we were to say that every doubt from a lack of knowledge is a doubt, all prohibitions would be in doubt and each person would estimate according to his lack of knowledge, and therefore the sages established that this is not a doubt. But where it was spilled, it is a mere happenstance and it is not relevant to decree anything regarding it [Shach, subsection 9 in the name of the Ran, of blessed memory]. And so too, any matter that is uncommon, and through this a doubt fell, even though the doubt is due to a lack of knowledge, it is possible to join it to a doubt [according to the Pitchei Teshuva, subsection 7 in the name of the Atzei Shitim]. And one should deliberate on this. And a doubt that exists for most people is certainly considered a doubt [Taz, subsection 6], and so it is proven in several places.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 2: Regarding "kind with its kind," we follow the name; if it is the same, it is "kind with its kind," but we do not follow the taste, whether it is the same or not. Thus far his words. The great later authorities challenged him, for since the reason for "kind with a different kind" is because "taste is like the substance" which forbids up to sixty, and "kind with its kind" is nullified by a majority based on the verse "follow the majority" because the imparting of taste is not discernible in them, if so, what does it matter to us if they are equal in name or not? And how is it possible to say that when they are equal in name but not equal in taste it is "kind with its kind" and nullified by a majority? Behold, it imparts taste! And likewise the opposite, when they are equal in taste but not equal in name, that it should be called "kind with a different kind"? Behold, it does not impart taste! And this that we maintain, that we follow the name, this is regarding things that are forbidden in any amount, such as tevel and wine of idolatry, for since they did not follow the imparting of taste in this, it properly depends on the equality of the name. But regarding things where the prohibition is up to sixty because of the imparting of taste, the equality of the name has no relevance to this, and they rejected his words from the halacha [Shach subsection 6, and Pri Chadash subsection 7, and Kereti u-Peleti subsection 7]. And even though regarding tevel and wine of idolatry we also maintain that with a different kind it is by the imparting of taste, and nevertheless we follow the name, yet it is not comparable; for since we measure by sixty, there is no longer taste here, and we need not concern ourselves with the fact that we follow the name, for even if we follow the taste, there is no taste in more than sixty. But regarding all prohibitions where "kind with its kind" is by a majority, how is it possible to follow the name? For when the names are equal it is nullified by a majority, but since the taste is not equal, the prohibition necessarily imparts taste into the permitted substance.

And behold, certainly the reasoning is good and straightforward, but what is to be wondered at is why the earlier authorities did not mention anything of this. For since the halacha was ruled like Rava at the end of HaSokher Et HaPo'alim that we follow the name, and the Rif wrote that we establish the law like Rava, why did he not explain that regarding all Torah prohibitions the halacha is like Abaye that we follow the taste? And similarly, the Rambam in chapter 15 did not mention anything of this. However, it can be said that they hold that even dry in dry requires sixty; for this rule that dry in dry is nullified by a majority in "kind in its own kind" is from the Torah, but according to rabbinic law it always requires sixty, like the opinion of the Ra'avad brought in the Beit Yosef in siman 109, see there, who wrote that in truth the opinion of the Rambam is so. And according to this, there is no practical difference, since sixty is always required; if so, even if we follow the name, it will not provide a taste, as I wrote in the previous section. But the essence of the matter is astonishing, that we would need to distinguish between them and all our teachers, the earlier authorities, who hold that it is nullified by a majority even according to rabbinic law, and as we establish the law later in siman 109, for according to them we follow the name and according to all our teachers we follow the taste. And furthermore it is difficult, for behold, according to Rabbi Yehuda who holds "kind in its own kind" is prohibited by any amount, certainly we follow the name, and we would need to say that the dispute of Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages is not of one subject—that Rabbi Yehuda calls "kind in its own kind" and "kind in a different kind" those that are divided by their name, and the Sages call them those that are divided by their taste—and yet they argue in the same case [see the Peri Chadash who raised this difficulty and his answer is forced, see there].

Furthermore, in the Mordechai at the end of "HaSokher Et HaPoel," it is explicitly like our teacher, the Rema, for this is his wording there: And the halacha is like Rava in all of them; therefore, dough and leaven are two names, etc., and ram, ox, and goat are three species, etc., and similarly two species of birds or two species of fish are nullified in sixty, whether they are impure or pure, etc. Thus far his words. And so our teacher, the Beit Yosef, cited in his great book in the name of the Agur; and see there that he also cited the Or Zarua thus, and so wrote the Issur VeHeter [siman 23], and so wrote the Yam Shel Shlomo [chapter 7, section 32]. And Heaven forbid to say that they all erred in this halacha. However, against this, it is very difficult, for all of them, when they spoke regarding the reasons for these laws, wrote that because in a different species there is taste, and in the same species there is no taste here. And this is explicitly like the opinion of those who disagree with our teacher, the Rema. And so it is explicitly proven in the Gemara from Rava himself who said [Chullin 97a]: The sages said by taste, and the sages said by a specialist, and the sages said by sixty; therefore, a species in a different species of permitted matter is by taste, of forbidden matter is by a specialist, and the same species where it is impossible to stand upon the taste, or alternatively, a species in a different species where there is no specialist, is by sixty. Thus far his words. Behold, Rava himself makes the matter dependent only on the taste.

However, it must be understood what is meant by saying "min be-mino where one cannot stand upon the taste is in sixty," for min be-mino is nullified by a majority, and Rava himself says so in Zevachim: "The Rabbis spoke of taste and the Rabbis spoke of a majority, etc., min be-she'eino mino by taste and min be-mino by a majority," see there. And it is true that the Ra'avad, of blessed memory, says that this "majority" is not literal, for for this reason he holds that even yabash be-yabash requires sixty; but for all our teachers it is difficult. And one must say either that in Zevachim it deals with yabash be-yabash and in Chullin it deals with lach be-lach, or that in Zevachim it deals with the law of the Torah and in Chullin it deals with the Rabbinic law. And it would seem more correct to say that in Zevachim it deals with absolute min be-mino, both in name and in taste, and in Chullin it deals with min be-mino in taste but not in name. And this is what it means by saying "min be-mino where one cannot stand upon the taste," meaning a min be-mino such as this, namely that in taste they are equal, but legally it is like min be-she'eino mino, such as when they differ in their names. And from this there is support for our teacher, the Rema, and all this requires further study.

And know that from the precision of the wording of the Mordechai that we brought, it implies that they only said this as a stringency; that is to say, that even those that are equal in taste, if they are divided in their names, it is considered min beshe'eino mino and requires sixty. And also the intention of our teacher, the Rema, should be explained thus, and this is the explanation: Regarding the matter of min bemino we follow the name, etc., but we do not follow the taste, etc. That is to say, regarding the matter of min beshe'eino mino, we certainly follow the taste, for anything that is not equal in taste requires sixty even when they are equal in name; however, regarding the matter of min bemino, we do not follow the taste to say that when they are equal in taste, a majority is sufficient. Rather, even when they are equal in taste, if they are only divided in name, it is like min beshe'eino mino and requires sixty. However, according to this, he should have said "we also follow the name."

And the main point appears to me to be that regarding any two things that are distinct in their names, it is impossible at all that the taste of both of them would be completely equal. And the proof for this matter is from that which our sages, of blessed memory, said in HaSoker ibid.: "New wine in grapes is one taste," and we are witnesses that the explanation is not that they are completely equal in their taste, but rather it means to perform an examination by way of a kapila, for through tasting he would understand it is impossible because the tastes are close to being equal. And this is the intent of Rashi there who wrote: "And everywhere that it is stated 'gives flavor and its flavor is not discernible,' the measure is in sixty." Thus far his words. Meaning, that its flavor is not discernible in a mixture to distinguish if there is flavor in them because the tastes are not distant from one another, but nevertheless there is a difference in their taste. And so, for example, that which the Mordechai wrote, that a hart, an ox, and a goat are three species because of the change in their name even though they are equal in taste; and behold, we are witnesses that the taste of the meat of an ox is not completely equal to the meat of a hart or a goat, but rather the intent is that to distinguish the taste when they are in a mixture is not within one's ability, but nevertheless they are also distinct in their taste. And according to this, anything that is distinct in name is distinct somewhat also in taste. However, conversely, there is a thing that is equal in name and distinct in taste, like in the Gemara there, leaven of wheat and leaven of barley, for it is explained there that if we follow the name it is min be-mino even though they are distinct in taste. And so it is proven there in the Gemara that new wine and old wine are distinct in taste and equal in name, and a leniency would result from this as is understood. But in truth, from this no ruin will come to the law, for behold, regarding lakh be-lakh we established that even min be-mino is in sixty; and so too even a dry thing if it was mixed well, like flour in flour and leaven in leaven, their law is like lakh be-lakh, as will be explained with the help of Heaven in siman 109.

And according to this, the words of our teacher, the Rema, are well-founded, and this is the reasoning of all our teachers who ruled that we follow the name and not the taste. This is only a stringency in a matter where they differ in name, that it should be considered min beshe'eino mino. In truth, they also differ somewhat in taste, but tasting is not applicable to them because in a mixture the difference is not so recognizable, as we have explained. A matter that differs in taste but is equal in name consists only of either liquid items like wine and water, or those that mix completely together like flour with flour, where even in mino it is nullified in sixty. [And the source for this is from the change in the statement of Rava from Chullin to Zevachim; and in Zevachim it deals with cases where they are equal in taste and in name, and therefore it is nullified by a majority, as I wrote at the end of section 43, and such is the primary view in my humble opinion. And know that in the Issur V'Heter, siman 23, section 17, he wrote: We established the law like Rava that we follow the name etc., therefore new wine and old wine are two species, and all the more so wine and vinegar etc. Thus far his words. And it is perplexing, for on the contrary, they are equal in name and differ in taste; and examine this carefully].

There are some of the poskim who explained regarding several things what is called its own kind and what is called not its own kind. Fat and meat are two kinds according to the opinion of several poskim and our teacher, the Beit Yosef, but meat and suet are one kind, and similarly suet with fat is one kind. It follows that suet is one kind with meat and with fat, even though fat and meat are two kinds [Issur V'Heter there]. And know that fat refers to the fat of the kidneys, the fat of the intestines, the omentum, and the fat of the heart; and suet refers to the suet of the ribs, the breast, and the fat tail [ibid.]. And the difference is not only because this is kosher and this is forbidden, for if so, we would also say regarding a carcass and a slaughtered animal that they are two kinds, and the poskim have already rejected whoever wished to say so [Issur V'Heter and Pri Chadash there]. Rather, the taste is different from one another, and also the names are different from one another, for even the idolaters who are not commanded regarding fat call this fat and not suet [Yam Shel Shlomo there] and also refrain from eating them. However, the opinion of the Ra'avad, the Rashba [103b], and the Ran, of blessed memory, is that fat and meat are one kind.

The meat of an ox, a ram, and a goat are three species [Mordechai], and a lamb and a ram are one species [Issur V'Heter]. And specifically when they are whole, but when they are cut, all of them are called "meat" and are one species [ibid.]. Our teacher, the Rema, in his book Darkhei Moshe, letter 5, disagrees with this, see there. And one of the great Acharonim ruled according to the first opinion [Pri Chadash ibid.]. However, there are some among the great ones who disagree with this entire law and hold that even when they are whole they are one species, for granted that the verse divided them regarding sacrifices, but all of them are the species of meat and all are called by the name "meat" without specification, except for one who needs to distinguish them to say specifically this is ox meat, this is ram meat, and this is goat meat, like one who wants to distinguish between lean meat and fat meat [Yam Shel Shelomo ibid.]. But most of the poskim do not hold so. However, poultry meat and animal meat are certainly two species, and similarly regarding species of poultry they are divided, such as a chicken, a goose, turtledoves, and the like, all of them are separate species. And all the more so that fish with meat, whether of an animal or of poultry, are two species. But all species of fish, it appears that all of them are one species. And there is reason to doubt regarding fish and salted fish or dried fish, whether they are one species or two species, and it appears they are one species, just as fresh fruits with pickled ones are one species.

Eggs of this bird with eggs of another bird are all one species, for they are all called by the name "eggs" [Pri Chadash]. However, the egg, even with its own chicken, are two species. Similarly, fish roe with their own fish are two species. But all types of fish roe are one species, as with birds. And such is the law regarding fish entrails, that they are all one species, but with the fish they are two species. Similarly, fish roe with fish entrails are two species [it appears to me]. But fish entrails that have dissolved with fish entrails that have not dissolved are one species. And in all matters the law is so, as is understood.

Meat, heart, liver, and udder are all separate species [ibid.], for they are distinct in their names and in their tastes. There is one who wishes to say that the chelev of the kidneys and the chelev of the intestines are two species, but this is not clear, for every type of chelev is one species, and likewise every type of fat is one species. It appears to me that also the fat of a beast and the fat of a bird are species with its own species, but the fat of the intestines with the fat of fish are two species [Issur V'Heter]. Old wine and new wine are one species, since they are equal in name [Gemara]. Likewise, wine dregs and beer dregs are one species [ibid.]. Grapes and new wine are two species even though they are equal in taste [ibid.]. Likewise, leaven of wheat and leaven of barley are one species [ibid.]. Dough of wheat and dough of barley are two species. Regarding dough and leaven, some say they are one species when they are of the same species [Yam Shel Shelomo and Pri Chadash], and some say they are two species [Issur V'Heter]. There is one who wrote that the intent of this latter opinion is when the leaven is from a different species, but it is a wonder to say so, for if so, even dough and dough would also be two species when they are from separate species. Nevertheless, the primary ruling is like the first opinion, for the reason that the dough is also fit to become leaven when it is fermented.

That which has been explained, that to nullify a forbidden substance one requires sixty, it is not only necessary regarding a forbidden substance that was mixed with a permitted substance and dissolved within it, but even when the forbidden substance did not dissolve and one recognizes it and throws it out, one requires sixty against the entirety of the forbidden substance. We do not say that it is sufficient to have sixty against that which was emitted from the forbidden substance, for behold, we do not know how much was emitted from it, and an estimation is not effective in this matter. For so said our sages, of blessed memory, [97b] regarding a kachal that fell into meat, that one requires sixty against the kachal, and one throws out the kachal; nevertheless, one requires sixty against the whole of it because we do not know how much was emitted from it. There is no correct reasoning to distinguish between kachal and other matters. Even regarding rabbinic prohibitions we say this [Beit Yosef in the name of the Rashba]. We do not establish the law thus as a stringency, but rather from the essential law it is so, for since it is among the impossibilities to know how much the emission was, and it is impossible to ascertain this, one must perforce measure against the whole of it.

Therefore, one who cooks a large amount of forbidden matter in a pot, and when it is a ben yomo they cooked permitted matter in it, one must measure sixty against the entire pot. In most vessels, that which is within them does not contain sixty against the vessel, and therefore the food is treif. We do not say to measure against what the pot absorbed, for we do not know how much it absorbed; therefore, sixty is required against all of it. So too, one who thrusts a forbidden spoon into permitted matter requires sixty against the entire spoon, as I wrote in siman 94, and all is for the reason that has been explained. This requirement of sixty against the entire spoon applies when he thrust it all or in an unspecified case, but when he knows how much of it he thrust, he only needs to measure until the point of thrusting, as I wrote there. There is one who is stringent regarding a metal spoon to measure sixty against all of it even with a partial thrusting, because with metal, if part of it is hot, all of it is hot, and its discharge travels even above the point of thrusting; but the custom is not so. All of this was explained there, that there is no difference whether they are of earthenware or of wood or metal. There is also one who wishes to say that with wood and metal, since hagalah is effective for them, we do not measure against the entire spoon and the pot, but rather we estimate with a good estimation how much they absorbed; but we do not rule accordingly, but rather as I wrote [see Shach subsection 12, who wrote that they cited this opinion in the name of the Ra'avad].

And the matter is simple, that all of this is when the pot and the spoon absorbed by way of the boiling of the fire or from the heat of a kli rishon; but when their absorption was by way of melichah or by way of irui from a kli rishon, for they only absorb to the thickness of a klipah, therefore when one cooked permitted food in it, one does not need to measure sixty against the whole of it, only against the klipah. And even though we hold that even regarding melichah one requires sixty, this is regarding foods and not regarding vessels; but regarding the absorption of kavush, one must measure against the whole of it, for kavush is like cooked [ibid. subsection 13].

And also it has already been explained that even when there is sixty, nevertheless, if the forbidden substance is recognizable, one is obligated to remove it from there, even though its taste has already been nullified in sixty. For the nullification of a forbidden substance in a permitted one is only when the forbidden substance is not recognizable, such as when it is dissolved into the permitted substance or if they are thin pieces like flour where it is impossible to separate the forbidden substance. But when the forbidden substance stands on its own, nullification does not apply to it. And even according to the opinion of the Tur that was explained, that the forbidden substance is transformed into being permitted, this is regarding the nullification of a minority in a majority from the verse "follow the majority," but regarding nullification in sixty, which is because of the taste, it is impossible to permit the forbidden substance itself when it is recognizable. And even regarding the nullification of a minority in a majority, it is only when the forbidden substance is not recognizable on its own, for then it is transformed into being permitted; but when the forbidden substance is recognizable, nullification does not apply, for behold, we see it, and how can it be permitted? And it will be explained further with the help of Heaven in siman 109.

And for this reason, our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 4, and this is his wording: Therefore, if chelev fell into the cooked food and its taste was nullified in sixty, one must place cold water there, and the nature of the chelev is to congeal and float up to the surface of the water, and he shall remove it from there; for since it is possible to remove it, it is as if he recognizes it, and he must remove it from there. Thus far his words. Ostensibly, it seems that the intention is regarding chelev with a tzeirei, meaning fat, for regarding this it is applicable that its nature is to congeal and float upward, as such is the nature of fattiness. But chalav with a kamatz, meaning animal milk, this law is not applicable, for it mixes very well into the cooked food. However, in the Issur V'Heter HaAruch [siman 24, section 10], he wrote in the glosses, and this is his wording: Nevertheless, a drop of chalav that fell into meat gravy, the Mordechai wrote etc. that he should pour cold water upon it and remove all the fat floating on top, and the remainder is permitted even if there is not sixty etc. for the chalav does not mix into the gravy, and any forbidden substance that can be separated, we do not say regarding it chanan, and "it is possible to squeeze it out" is forbidden, and there is no concern here regarding nullifying a forbidden substance, for he is not nullifying it but rather removing it outside entirely etc. and therefore he must remove it even if there is sixty, since he can recognize the forbidden substance and remove it etc. Thus far his words. Behold, he wrote "a drop of chalav that fell into meat gravy," and so it was brought in the Bach, see there. Conclude from this that the intention is regarding chalav with a kamatz. And it must be said that their intention is regarding the upper milk which is called smant, and it is the fat of the milk, and its nature is also to rise to the top because it is very oily, and from this butter is formed, as is known.

And behold, from the words of our teacher it is explained that this law is only as a stringency, namely when there is sixty, for then one must add cold water so that it congeals on top, as has been explained. However, to permit by means of this when there is not sixty here, it is impossible to permit. And so the great later authorities [Shach subsection 16, Taz subsection 7, and Pri Chadash] decided, and they took issue with the author of the Bach who wishes to permit for this reason even when there is not sixty here. And they wondered at him, for the taste of the forbidden substance has already been emitted, and it is no better than if a piece of forbidden substance fell in and he recognizes it and it is whole and he throws it out, and nevertheless sixty is required against it. Therefore, they rejected his words and the words of the author of the Issur V'Heter, see there. And in my humble opinion, it appears that both are true in halacha, for they interpreted it regarding tallow, which is initially a solid substance and melts within the cooked food, and in this, the law is certainly with them. But the intention of the Issur V'Heter and the Bach is regarding animal milk that fell into a meat dish, which is liquid in liquid, and there is no emission of taste from one to the other except because of the mixture; and when they are separated from one another, no taste remains from one to the other, and the law of "it is possible to squeeze it out" does not apply here, for they are separated from one another entirely [in the new Yoreh Deah, the Gaon Rav Baruch Fraenkel wondered at the Taz and the Shach, see there, and he also did not consider all that I have written, see there and examine carefully].

And know that there are some of the great authorities who wrote regarding this law, that one must remove the grease as has been written, that if the food will be spoiled by this, one does not need to remove it. And he brings proof from what is written in siman 102 regarding a prohibited vessel that was mixed with permitted vessels, that it is nullified by a majority; and even though it is possible to perform hag'alah to extract the prohibition, since there is a monetary loss in this, as one must incur expenses to perform hag'alah, it is not required, see there. And all the more so in a case where the food will be spoiled [Palti, subsection 6]. And I do not know what the connection is between one and the other, for there it is regarding a swallowed prohibition where the prohibition is not discernible, and it is only prohibited due to the reasoning of davar she-yesh lo matirin; and for this we maintain that since one must incur expenses, this is not included in davar she-yesh lo matirin. But here, we compare it to a prohibition that is present in its essence, and what does it matter to me if the food is spoiled? For shall we permit a prohibition present in its essence because of the spoiling of food? Therefore, it appears to me that in every case one is obligated to remove it.

Our teacher, the Rema, further wrote that a prohibited item that was nullified in a pot, and they removed it from there and it fell into another pot, one must return and nullify it with sixty against all of it, and so on forever. However, if it fell into the first pot two times, one only needs sixty one time against it. Thus far his words. For in another pot, even though we required sixty in the first pot because we consider the prohibited item to have emitted everything within it—this is a stringency because we do not know how much emerged from it—but the prohibited piece remains in its prohibited state as before. Furthermore, even if it emitted entirely, the permitted substance was absorbed into it, and that which was absorbed becomes a prohibited carcass (nevelah) according to us, as we hold regarding all prohibitions that "a piece itself becomes a prohibited carcass" (chanan). Therefore, even if it fell into several pots and all of them were in one lapse of awareness, nevertheless, one needs sixty in every pot [Issur Ve-Heter, rule 24, siman 2]. And all the more so if it was in two lapses of awareness, for even in one pot there is a line of reasoning to say one should require sixty against each time, as is written in siman 94 regarding the insertion of a spoon, see there. However, our teacher, the Rema, decided there that with the insertion of a spoon two times, one only needs sixty one time, and the instances of knowledge do not divide it, for the reason explained there. Therefore, he ruled here as well that if it fell into the first pot two times, one only needs sixty one time, just as there regarding a spoon [and see what I wrote there in section 10, that what is absorbed in a spoon does not become a prohibited carcass, but what is absorbed in food certainly becomes a prohibited carcass, and examine this closely].

And know that there is one who wondered about this law, and what comparison is there to the insertion of a spoon two times? For there, we do not consider that which is absorbed in the spoon as nevelah, but here, in the food itself, it is certainly simple that even if the forbidden substance emitted all of it previously, nevertheless, everything it absorbed from the permitted substance becomes nevelah, as we have explained that what is absorbed into food certainly becomes nevelah. And if so, it is simple that one requires sixty two times: one against the emission of the forbidden substance itself, and one against the second emission, which is the emission of what it absorbed the first time from the cooked food and became nevelah. And this is like two olive-bulks of forbidden substance that fell, where one requires sixty against each olive-bulk [Pleti, subsection 7]. And certainly this is a great question:

It appears to me that the reasoning of our teacher, the Rema, is this: Certainly, if we knew with certainty that the first time it expelled the issur from it entirely and it was absorbed by the cooked food inside the pot, then it is obvious that we would require sixty twice. However, in truth, the matter is a doubt to us, for perhaps the first time it only expelled half of it, and likewise the second time it only expelled half of it. According to this, even in the two times, there is no issur here except according to the volume of the issur and no more. This is the essence of the distinction between this pot and another pot; since the matter is a doubt to us regarding the manner of its expulsion, we must therefore require sixty against the volume of the issur. Therefore, in this pot, we indeed have sixty against its volume, and in another pot, we would also require sixty against its volume. And one should not say that since there is a doubt regarding the manner of its expulsion we should follow the stringent view, for we hold that "taste is like the essence" is a Torah law and a Torah doubt is judged stringently—for this is not so, as according to many poskim we do not say "the piece itself becomes prohibited" regarding other prohibitions, and even regarding meat in milk, after it is prohibited its law is like other prohibitions, as I wrote in siman 92. Therefore, we should not be so stringent in a case of doubt. Furthermore, at the time the piece of issur was inside the pot, it is not relevant to say that what was absorbed in it became prohibited, for the whole of it was nullified in sixty and there is no issur here at all, and that which was absorbed in it was also included in the whole pot. Therefore, even after we removed the issur from the pot and the status of "prohibited piece" fell upon what was absorbed, nevertheless, when it returned and fell into this same pot and the absorbed part rejoined all the cooked food in the pot—granted that if we knew with certainty that previously it expelled all of it and now too it expelled all of it, we would have to require sixty twice—but in a case of doubt it is impossible to be so stringent. [And the source of the law is from the Issur VeHeter there, and he wrote the reason that the absorbed part should not be more stringent than the body of the issur itself, and the Pleiti wondered at him, see there; and according to what I wrote, this is the depth of his intention, and examine it closely].

There is a dispute among the Rishonim whether we say regarding food absorbed in a vessel "chanan," for example, a meat spoon that has much meat absorbed within it and one thrust it on that same day into a kezayit of milk, and afterwards he thrust the spoon into a pot of meat. For the Ramban holds that one does not require sixty except against the kezayit of milk, and we do not say that all the meat absorbed in the spoon becomes nevelah; for we only say chanan regarding the food itself and not regarding food absorbed in a vessel. For just as we establish that absorbed impurity does not defile absorbed purity, so too absorbed forbidden matter does not forbid absorbed permitted matter, and also this is not the manner of cooking [Pri Megadim in Mishbetzot Zahav, subsection 8]. And that which was explained, that one requires sixty against the entire pot and the entire spoon, that is when it absorbed much forbidden matter, or a milk vessel that absorbed much meat, and likewise the reverse; but when it is known how much of the forbidden matter or the milk it absorbed, one does not require sixty except against that, and not against the rest of the food absorbed within it, even if the absorbed matter is also ben yomo. But the Rashba holds that we say chanan even against the absorbed matter, unless the absorbed matter is not ben yomo. And the Tur in siman 107 brought this inquiry, and it appears from there that his opinion tends toward leniency, see there. But our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, it appears from their words that their opinion tends toward stringency. And not only that, but there is one who wishes to say that even the vessel itself becomes nevelah, to require sixty against all of it even if that which is absorbed within it is a small amount; and this matter is certainly against reason, for how is it relevant that a vessel should become nevelah [see the Bach who cried out against this]. And there is one who wishes to distinguish between an earthenware vessel, for which hagalah is not effective and therefore we say chanan regarding it, and vessels of rinsing for which hagalah is effective; for since it is possible to remove the forbidden matter, we do not say chanan regarding them. And our teacher, the Rema, in section 5, was concerned for this opinion.

The words of the Tur in this matter require clarification, for after he wrote that one who cooks in a vessel that was used for a prohibited substance within its day, or one who inserts a prohibited spoon into a permitted substance, and similarly regarding meat and milk, one requires sixty against the entire pot and the entire spoon because we do not know how much they absorbed, he wrote, and this is his wording: And if it is known how much the prohibited substance is, such as a new spoon with which one stirred a kezayit of milk and afterwards on that same day stirred a pot of meat, one only requires sixty to nullify the kezayit that it absorbed; but an old spoon with which one stirred many times, we do not know how much it absorbed and we measure against all of it. Thus far his words. And his words contradict one another, for at the beginning of his words where he said "such as a new spoon with which one stirred a kezayit of milk etc." it is explicitly clear that if it were an old spoon of meat, even if one did not stir a kezayit of milk with it, nevertheless one requires sixty against all of it when he subsequently inserted it into meat, and this is according to the opinion of the Rashba that we cited, that even regarding an absorbed substance we say chatichah na'asait nevelah. But from the end of his words where he said "but an old spoon with which one stirred many times etc." it implies explicitly like the Ramban, that specifically when one stirred the milk many times such that it absorbed much of the milk one requires sixty against all of it, and not when it was absorbed with meat and he inserted it into a kezayit of milk.

And there are those who explained his words that he holds like the Rashba [Beit Yosef and Bach and D.P.] and that which he wrote "that one stirred with it several times," the intention is that one stirred meat several times, and afterwards it swallowed a kezayit of milk and one thrust it into meat, it requires sixty against all of it because the swallowed substance becomes nevela. And that which he wrote the reason is because we do not know how much it swallowed, this is the explanation: that if we knew how much meat was swallowed in it, we would not require sixty except against the meat swallowed in it and against the kezayit of milk; but since we do not know how much meat it swallowed, it requires sixty against all of it because of the principle of "the piece becomes nevela" [Bach]. And they brought proof for their words that it is impossible to say that the Tur holds like the Ramban, for if so, that which he wrote "an old spoon that one stirred with it several times" and his intention is regarding milk that one stirred, because we do not know how much it swallowed—what is he coming to teach us? For he already previously wrote this law, that one who thrusts a spoon of prohibition into permission requires sixty against all of it because we do not know how much it swallowed [ibid.]. And there are those who explained his words that he holds like the Ramban, and that which he wrote "an old spoon etc.," although he wrote this previously, but since he wrote the law of a new spoon, he also wrote this law even though he already explained it [Rema in Darkhei Moshe and Terumat HaDeshen siman 183]. However, according to this, it is not understood why he needs to say "a new spoon," for even an old spoon of meat that swallowed a kezayit of milk and they thrust it into meat, it only requires sixty against the milk and not against the swallowed substance. And also according to the first explanation, it is not understood why we need a new spoon, for even with an old spoon, as long as it is not "of the day," it does not require sixty against the swallowed substance, for so all the poskim agreed, and so the Rashba wrote explicitly in Torat HaBayit [brought in the Beit Yosef]. And there is one who wrote that in truth it is not specifically a new one, for anything that is not "of the day" is called "new" [Taz subsection 8], and the forced nature of this is evident.

In my humble opinion, a different intent appears in the words of the Tur when we examine closely why in the previous law he wrote both regarding meat in milk and regarding other prohibitions, yet in this law he wrote only regarding meat in milk. In this, it appears that he follows his own reasoning in siman 92, that regarding all other prohibitions we do not say "the piece itself becomes a forbidden entity" (chanan) except regarding meat in milk. Furthermore, we have already explained in siman 87, section 3 and section 33, based on the words of the Rambam, that meat in milk has a stringency beyond all other prohibitions, for one is liable even not in the manner of their pleasure; and even if there is a defect in the food, it is prohibited by the Torah, and only the formation of the meat in milk must not be through a defect, see there. According to this, his words are clarified: specifically with a new spoon, one only needs sixty against the olive-sized volume of milk. However, an old meat spoon, even if it is not "of the day" (ben yomo), if it absorbed an olive-sized volume of milk, all that is absorbed becomes a forbidden entity. Even though it is a defect, nevertheless, afterwards on that same day of the absorption of the milk, when you insert it into a meat dish and it becomes an absorption of meat in milk where both are "of the day," then automatically even the absorption that is not "of the day" becomes prohibited by the law of meat in milk. This is as the Rambam wrote explicitly in chapter 9 of Ma'achalot Assurot, that even if one placed wormwood or gall in meat in milk, it is prohibited by the Torah, see there. Therefore, it follows automatically that one needs sixty against all of it. Thus, the Tur did not mention that we are dealing with a case where it is "of the day." Consequently, in siman 107, which deals with other prohibitions, he ruled that the absorption does not become a forbidden entity because regarding other prohibitions he does not hold of "the piece itself becomes a forbidden entity," as he wrote in siman 92. Therefore, in this law as well, he mentioned only meat in milk alone. And it is not a wonder that we say the absorption becomes a forbidden entity even though the absorption is not "of the day," for there are those who hold even regarding the vessel itself that it becomes a forbidden entity, as I have written; and all the more so that the absorption becomes a forbidden entity, for it is a type of food, and afterwards through the formation of the meat in milk, it becomes completely prohibited like that which is "of the day," as I have written. [So it appears in my humble opinion].

And the approach of our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, in section 5 is like the words of the Rashba, for they wrote: If it is known how much the forbidden substance is—for example, a new spoon or one that is not a ben yomo with which one stirred and it absorbed a kezayit of milk, and afterwards one stirred a pot of meat with it—one only requires sixty to nullify the kezayit that it absorbed, and we do not say regarding a vessel "chanan" even if they stirred a forbidden substance with it. But with an old spoon that is a ben yomo, we measure against the whole of it, for everything it absorbed has become forbidden and we do not know how much it absorbed. And there is one who says that even in this case one only requires sixty to nullify the kezayit that it absorbed, and the first reasoning is primary, etc. And there are those who do not distinguish between an old spoon and a new one, but only between an earthenware vessel and other vessels, and they say that regarding an earthenware vessel, where it is impossible to separate the forbidden substance by means of hagalah, we say the vessel becomes neveilah, but not with other vessels; and it is good to be concerned for the stringent view. Thus far his words.

The explanation of their words is that they ruled like the Rashba, that we say chanan regarding what is absorbed, and only when it is ben yomo. Therefore, in a new spoon or one that is not ben yomo, one only needs to nullify the kezayit that it absorbed. Consequently, according to what we established in siman 92, that in all prohibitions we say chanan, this law applies to all prohibitions. However, the vessel itself never becomes nevelah. And it is not only necessary to say this regarding the absorption of meat or milk, where it is still entirely permitted, but even regarding the absorption of a prohibition, such as if it absorbed nevelah, whereby the vessel became prohibited; nevertheless, we do not say chanan regarding it to require sixty against the vessel. For even regarding what is absorbed when it is not ben yomo we do not say chanan, certainly not against the vessel itself. Afterward they wrote that there is one who says, etc., and this is the opinion of the Ramban, that even regarding what is absorbed and is ben yomo we do not say chanan. And they wrote that the primary view is like the first opinion, which is the opinion of the Rashba. Afterward they wrote another opinion, that they do not distinguish between an old spoon and a new one, but only between an earthenware vessel and other vessels. That is to say, one who distinguishes between an old spoon and a new one certainly does not hold of chanan regarding the vessel itself, since even regarding what is absorbed in a vessel that is not ben yomo we do not say chanan, as I have written. However, the proponents of this opinion hold that regarding what is absorbed we always say chanan, even when it is not ben yomo, as I wrote regarding the opinion of the Tur; rather, they hold to distinguish between an earthenware vessel and other vessels. That is to say, even in an earthenware vessel we say chanan, and certainly regarding what is absorbed when it is not ben yomo, and only in other vessels do we not say chanan. And although according to the essential law they did not agree to this, nevertheless they wrote that it is good to be concerned for this stringency [so it appears to me in the explanation of the words of the Rema, who wrote "and there are those who do not distinguish, etc.," and the Taz at the end of subsection 8 exerted himself greatly to settle his wording, and according to what I have written it is well-settled, and examine it].

It is a simple matter that even when a half-olive's bulk of a prohibited substance falls into a permitted substance, sixty is required to nullify it; and even with a rabbinic prohibition, a half-olive's bulk requires sixty, and if not, it prohibits. It has already been explained in siman 86 regarding an egg that contains a chick or a drop of blood in a place that certainly prohibits, that when they are cooked with others, sixty-one is required to nullify its discharge. They were more stringent regarding it to add one because there are large and small ones, and some say because of the importance of a biryah. This is only to nullify its discharge, but the egg itself, when it contains a chick, is not nullified at all because of the rule of biryah, as I wrote in siman 100, see there. In siman 90 it was explained that regarding a kachal, the sages were lenient to nullify it with the imparting of flavor, see there. According to the opinion of the Rambam, this is the case for all rabbinic prohibitions, but we do not rule accordingly, for there is no difference regarding the matter of nullification between Torah prohibitions and rabbinic prohibitions. All prohibitions in this time are all nullified in sixty, except for chametz on Pesach, wine used for idolatry, tevel, orlah, and kilayim of the vineyard, as is explained in their respective laws. Even these are not equal to one another, for there are those whose nullification is in two hundred and there are those whose prohibition is in any amount.

This is the wording of our teacher, the Rema, in section 8: All prohibitions etc. are nullified in sixty etc. provided that the prohibition does not impart flavor to the pot; but if it imparts flavor to that pot and it is prohibited in its own right, even in a thousand it is not nullified as long as its flavor is sensed. Therefore, salt and spices, which are items made for flavoring, if they are prohibited due to themselves, they are not nullified in sixty. Thus far his words. And even regarding rabbinic prohibitions it is so [Taz and Shach]. But if their prohibition is due to having absorbed from a prohibition, even from a Torah prohibition, nevertheless they do not prohibit more than sixty; and even though they impart flavor, it is because their own flavor is not prohibited except due to the absorbed prohibition, and their power is no greater than the prohibition itself absorbed within them, which does not prohibit more than sixty. And similarly, if we knew clearly that the salt and the spices do not impart flavor, such as if a grain of salt or spice fell into a large cauldron, it is also permitted [Shach subsection 28 and Pri Chadash]. And only in an unspecified case do we say that they impart flavor, for that which we said—that an item made for flavoring is not nullified—is not due to importance like a biryah or a piece fit for presentation, but rather due to the imparting of flavor; and since it does not impart flavor, it does not have the power to prohibit.

And know that there are some among the great commentators who explained his words in this manner: that which is nullified in sixty is in an ordinary case, but when the forbidden substance imparts flavor even in more than sixty, it is forbidden regarding all forbidden substances. Therefore, salt and spices are not nullified because they ordinarily impart flavor even in a thousand [Shach, subsection 28]. And I wonder, for we have already written in section 19 that it is the opinion of the Tosafot and several of the Rishonim that in more than sixty it does not forbid because it is a weak flavor, and according to this, even a thing made for flavoring should be nullified. And it is impossible to say so, for this is explicit in the Gemara. Rather, certainly a thing made for flavoring imparts a strong flavor like any substance in less than sixty. And that which he said, "provided that the forbidden substance does not impart flavor," his intention was a strong flavor like spices and salt, and his intention was not regarding all forbidden substances. And this is the explanation: "provided that the forbidden substance does not impart flavor," meaning, like all forbidden substances in more than sixty; but that which imparts flavor in more than sixty, like salt and spices, is forbidden [and see what I wrote in section 75].

And that which he wrote, that only with an internal prohibition it is not nullified, his intention is not that when the spices and the salt have absorbed from another prohibition one does not need to measure against them at all, for it is impossible to say so, as he himself ruled in siman 92 that we say regarding all prohibitions "the piece itself becomes a carcass," and consequently one must also measure against them; rather, his intention is that one must measure against them in sixty according to the law of the prohibition absorbed within them.

And know that our teachers, the authors of the Tosafot [Chullin 108b, starting with the words "Amai"] and several of the Rishonim wrote this law. However, there are some of our teachers who disagreed on this, as the Tur wrote at the end of siman 105 in the name of Riva and the Rash, that even salt that has absorbed blood must be measured as if the blood were entirely salt; that is to say, it is not nullified even in a thousand. Our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch and the Acharonim, did not cite this opinion at all. Apparently, they have a compelling proof from that which we say in Chullin [99b]: Not all measurements are equal, for the measurement of brine is close to two hundred, as we learned in Terumot [Chapter 10]: A forbidden fish, its brine is forbidden; Rabbi Yehuda says: a revi'it in two se'ah, and this is close to two hundred, see there. And yet the prohibition of the brine is only because of the fat, and even so we measure with the vinegar and salt that is within it [the Gra, subsection 34]. And there is one who answered that in truth Rabbi Yossi disagrees there and we rule like him [ibid.], but it is not understood, for the Gemara does not cite his words at all, and furthermore, the Rambam in the end of Chapter 15 of Ma'akhalot Assurot ruled like Rabbi Yehuda, see there [however, it can be said that the Tosafot disagree on this, as was written in the name of the Mordechai, see there].

And in my humble opinion, it appears that, on the contrary, from here there is a proof to the opposite; for if it should enter your mind that even regarding what is absorbed from a prohibited substance we judge it like the prohibited substance itself, if so, here where there is salt, it should not be nullified even in a thousand because it is made for flavoring, as has been written. Rather, it is certain that they only followed the absorbed prohibited substance. Nevertheless, one must also measure against the salt and the vinegar because of the principle of chanan, for the salt and the vinegar became prohibited by power of the fat, as has been written in section 70, and they estimated that this taste extends up to two hundred. However, those who disagree can say that they hold that we do not say chanan except regarding meat and milk, or that in a liquid-in-liquid mixture we do not say chanan. However, according to the Tosafot there is no difficulty at all [see Turei Zahav siman 69 subsection 8 who wishes to distinguish between a species in its own species and a species in a different species, and this is against the words of the Tur at the end of siman 105]:

It is written in the Issur V'Heter HaAruch: A thing made for flavor—how so? Any sharp thing, such as spices and salt, etc. Thus far his words. And his intention is this: that which the sages, of blessed memory, said, "a thing made for flavor is not nullified," the intention is not according to its literal sense, for if so, the majority of prohibited substances would not be nullified even in a thousand, since most oils and most foods are made for flavor. As indeed there are those who asked that prohibited fat should not be nullified in sixty, for you have nothing made for flavor more than fat, and similarly with butter or wine and the like. And for this he explains that the intention is for a sharp flavor like salt and spices [see Taz subsection 11]. And that which was explained in Orach Chaim siman 513 regarding an egg, that if they glazed the food with it, it is not nullified, see there, this is due to the appearance [as the Magen Avraham wrote there, and see the aforementioned Taz subsection]. Furthermore, there it is due to the reason of a "thing that has permitters," see there.

There is one who says that this which we say, that a matter made for flavoring is not nullified even in a thousand, this is in a case of a kind with a different kind where they are not equal in taste, and even if they are equal in name it is not nullified; but when they are equal in taste, it is nullified in sixty [Shach, subsection 30 in the name of Torat Chatat]. And so wrote the author of the Issur V'Heter [Rule 25], that if spices fell into their own kind, it is permitted in sixty like other prohibitions. And he brought a proof from brine which is nullified in two hundred, whereas if it fell into a different kind, salt is made for flavoring and is not nullified even in a thousand; see there. And according to what I wrote in section 72, there is no proof from there [and perhaps in this the Tosafot disagree with Riva and the Rash whom we brought in section 71, and examine this]. And there is one who disagrees in this [Pri Chadash, subsection 26]. However, regarding the essence of the matter, it is not understood, for if it were its own kind and they are also made for flavoring, then of necessity there is some cooked dish in which they give the flavor, and it would be a different kind, unless we say "remove the different kind as if it is not there" and its own kind increases over it and nullifies it; and it requires further study.

There is one who says that this rule, that a matter made for flavoring is not nullified, is only rabbinic, but from the Torah it is nullified [Issur V'Heter there]. Therefore, if it is not known whether it imparts flavor or not, it is permitted to feed it to a gentile who is speaking according to his innocence [Shach subsection 29]. And there is one who disagrees regarding this and holds that it is from the Torah according to the one who holds that "flavor is like the substance itself" is from the Torah [Pleihti subsection 10]. And it appears to me that certainly when the flavor is well-perceived it is from the Torah, and the intention of the first opinion is regarding that which we established that even in a thousand it is not nullified; and regarding this we are witnesses that certainly it is only a faint flavor, and in this it is certainly only rabbinic, just as in more than sixty in all prohibitions when the flavor is perceived according to the method of Rashi that we brought in section 19, see there. And even according to those who disagree with Rashi, of blessed memory, and hold that in more than sixty it does not prohibit because it is a faint flavor, as I wrote there, nevertheless, in a matter made for flavoring it is prohibited even with a faint flavor, and according to this it certainly is nothing but rabbinic [and see what I wrote in section 69 and examine it closely].

Any place where there is sixty against the forbidden substance, we nullify it, even if the sixty is not entirely comprised of permitted substance; for in any event, the forbidden substance has spread throughout the sixty times its volume that is with it, and its taste has been nullified. How so? For example, a pot that contains fifty-nine olives' volume of permitted substance, and two olives' volume fell into it simultaneously—one of milk and one of blood—each one joins with the fifty-nine of permitted substance to nullify the other, and the taste of each is nullified in the sixty that is with it in the pot. And logic dictates this, for every forbidden substance is nullified when it cannot impart taste to the permitted substance, and the tastes of milk and blood are not the same; thus the taste of the milk was nullified in sixty and the taste of the blood in sixty. For what does it matter to me if it is a forbidden substance that nullifies a forbidden substance, or if it is a permitted substance that nullifies a forbidden substance? We require only that the taste of the forbidden substance be nullified so that it does not have the power to impart taste to the permitted substance. And this law applies even according to the one who does not hold that forbidden substances nullify one another, as will be explained, for we do not approach it from the perspective of nullification, but rather from the perspective that each forbidden substance lacks the power to impart taste. And so too, this law follows well even according to that which we establish that "the piece itself becomes forbidden" regarding other forbidden substances, since the two forbidden substances fell simultaneously. And certainly, if one forbidden substance fell previously, the second forbidden substance no longer avails to save the permitted substance, for the permitted substance has already become "nevelah" from the first forbidden substance. However, according to the one who does not hold "the piece itself becomes forbidden" regarding other forbidden substances, one could say this law applies even in two fallings one after the other, as is understood. [And therefore the Levush wrote "simultaneously," see there and examine carefully].

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote in section 9: Similarly, twenty-nine olives of permitted food into which a kezayit of chelev fell, and in another pot there were thirty of permitted food and a kezayit of blood fell into it, and they were mixed inadvertently, it is permitted. Thus far their words. But if done intentionally it is forbidden, for one may not nullify a forbidden substance initially, as will be explained in siman 99. Our teacher, the Rema, added that all the more so in the case of two olives, one of cheese and the other of meat, that each one nullifies the other. Thus far his words. This means to say: when the cheese fell into a pot by itself and the meat into a pot by itself and afterwards they were mixed, there is no prohibition of basar be-chalav here, for behold, each one was nullified in sixty. But if previously the cheese fell into the meat, behold, it became basar be-chalav, and if they fell afterwards into a pot, one requires one hundred and twenty olives to nullify the two olives, which is not the case when each one fell by itself.

It is found according to this that for one who holds that "the forbidden substance itself becomes a carcass" (chanan) in other prohibitions, there is a law in meat and milk that is the opposite of all other prohibitions in this matter. For in meat and milk, this law applies only when each fell individually, as has been written, whereas in other prohibitions, this law applies only when both fell at once; for if each fell individually, it would have already become a carcass, as has been written in section 76. And according to this, they wondered about our teacher, the Rema, since he wrote "all the more so with two olive-bulks, one of cheese, etc.," which implies that he agreed with the previous law. Yet he himself holds that "the forbidden substance itself becomes a carcass" in other prohibitions, as has been written in siman 92. And according to his view, in other prohibitions involving two pots, you would not find this case, for they would have become a carcass, unless it was liquid in liquid and in a case of great loss where he ruled there that we do not say "the forbidden substance itself becomes a carcass," or if the mixture was not known until afterward, and he holds that in such a case we do not say "the forbidden substance itself becomes a carcass," as will be explained in siman 99 [Shach, subsection 34].

And in truth, one can find several instances where it is not relevant to say chanan, such as dry in dry, or where in both of them there was a defective taste and when they were mixed it became an improved taste, such as where one was lacking salt and the other had excess salt and they were not forbidden, as will be explained in siman 150, and when they were mixed it was equal [the Gara]. And likewise, when in the initial falls the permitted substance had not yet absorbed from the forbidden substance, such as where the forbidden substance was outside of the broth and afterwards when they were mixed together they both fell into the broth [and I saw the Dagul Mervavah who questioned the essence of this law, to say that in a simultaneous fall one forbidden substance does not raise the other, and his proof is from the Mishnah in Orlah chapter 2, that orlah raises kilayim, and specifically when they fell one after the other as is explained by the commentators and from the Rambam chapter 16; and I wonder at him, for that is like in like and because of the imparting of taste, and not in like in unlike, and as I wrote in section 76 that this is not relevant to the nullification of prohibitions, and with what I wrote there all is well, and understand this]:

There is a further practical difference in this law between basar be-chalav and other prohibitions, and in basar be-chalav there is a leniency compared to them. For in all other prohibitions, when two prohibited items fell into sixty times the permitted substance, they nullify one another as has been written; but if one prohibited item was removed from there, everything becomes prohibited, for now the remaining prohibited item imparts flavor and there is no sixty to nullify it. This is not the case regarding basar be-chalav; even if one removed the meat or the cheese, everything is permitted, for there is no prohibition here, as when they were together it was nullified as has been written, and upon the removal of one of them, it is entirely permitted [Pri Chadash, subsection 32]. And there is one who says that if a kezayit of cheese fell into sixty kezayitim of vegetables and they removed it from there, and afterwards a kezayit of meat fell into there, it prohibits, because previously the vegetables received the flavor of the cheese and afterwards the flavor of the meat; for specifically when they fell simultaneously the flavor is not perceived, which is not the case when they fall one after the other [Pri Megadim in Mishbetzot Zahav, end of subsection 15]. And I wonder: is the flavor more potent than the substance itself? Regarding the flavor as well it should be said that when the meat fell and the flavors met one another, one flavor nullified the other. This requires further reflection.

And such is the law if a kezayit of meat became nevelah because of milk and a kezayit of meat became nevelah because of blood, also each one joins to nullify the other [Chavat Da'at], for since the prohibition of the meat is by virtue of the absorption of the prohibition, we judge them like the prohibition itself. And therefore also the opposite, such as two things whose taste is not equal, like meat and fish that were both prohibited by virtue of one prohibition, they do not nullify one another and we require sixty against both of them [ibid.]. And so too in dry-in-dry, prohibitions do not nullify one another [ibid.], since they do not impart taste into one another nor into the thing into which they fell. And these laws are only regarding falling into a hot liquid substance from a kli rishon.

The Issur Ve-Heter wrote [Rule 24] that such is the law regarding two spoons of two different prohibitions that were inserted into a pot of permitted food, and there is not sixty in the cooked food to nullify each one of them except by combining the second spoon, they combine with one another and the food is permitted. And one need not be concerned and say perhaps one spoon emitted and the second did not emit. [And there are those who disagree on this, see Ma'adanei Yom Tov, Perek Gid HaNasheh, Siman 182, and Pri Chadash, subsection 32, that just as the pot does not nullify the prohibition, so too the second spoon; and in my humble opinion it appears that they are not comparable, for here, since both of them came at the same time, the power of both of them is equal, and one should deliberate on this, and suffice with this].

And know that the Tur, after he wrote these laws that every prohibition assists in nullifying the second prohibition, wrote, and this is his wording: And so too, three types of prohibited substances of dry matter that were mixed with one another, a kezayit from each—any two types are more numerous than the third and nullify it, and one is exempt for all three. Thus far his words. And this matter is explained in Zevachim [78a]: Resh Lakish said, pigul, notar, and tamei that one mixed together and ate, he is exempt; it is impossible that one type will not be more numerous than its fellow and nullify it. And the intention is not that it is permitted to eat them, for behold, they are all prohibited, but rather the intention is to exempt from lashes. And as Rashi wrote there, because there is no certain warning here, for regarding whichever prohibition he is warned about, we can say that the other two nullified it, and it is a doubtful warning; see there. And the Tosafot explained in another manner. And at the end of the sugya there, Rabbi Eliezer disagrees with Resh Lakish and says that just as mitzvot do not nullify one another, so too prohibitions do not nullify one another. And the Rambam in chapter 18 of Hilkhot Pesulei HaMukdashin ruled like Rabbi Eliezer, that prohibitions do not nullify one another, and the Tur ruled like Resh Lakish. But it is not the way of the Tur to bring laws that are not practiced in this time, and the commentators wrote that he brought this law because from it we learned the first laws, that prohibitions assist in nullifying one another [Beit Yosef and Bach]. And even though the laws are not equal, for here it is forbidden to eat and there it is permitted to eat, this is because here the prohibitions are intact, and there the prohibitions were mixed into permitted matter, and there is enough permitted matter to nullify each prohibition in combination with the second prohibition [Derisha and Perisha].

And I am very wondered by these words, for this law applies to a single species, such as pigul, notar, and tamei, which are all the species of meat and the reasons are identical, and the exemption from lashes is due to the warnings, as I have written. This is not the case with the previous laws, which involve a species in a different species, and because there is no imparting of flavor from each prohibition to the permitted substance, as I wrote in section 76; and what is the connection between them? Therefore, there are those among the great authorities who wrote that the Tur informed us of a great matter in this: that just as with dry-in-dry, a prohibition in a permitted substance is nullified one in two, as I wrote in siman 109, so too a prohibition in a prohibition is nullified one in two. For example, a loaf of kilayei hakerem that was mixed on Pesach with two loaves of chametz, the loaf of kilayei hakerem is nullified in the chametz; and if Pesach passed and one of them was lost, it is permitted to eat them [Kereti U-Peleti, subsection 12] when the chametz did not belong to an Israelite. Furthermore, it appears to me regarding his intention that there is a practical difference regarding the matter of disqualification for testimony, as we established in Choshen Mishpat siman 34, that we do not require a "wicked man of violence," and anyone who intentionally transgresses a Torah prohibition that carries lashes is disqualified for testimony. And now, if a kezayit of tereifah was mixed into two kezaytim of meat absorbed with milk which contain the prohibition of basar be-chalav, and he knew that there was a tereifah here but regarding the two kezaytim of basar be-chalav he did not know and imagined that they were all tereifot and intended to eat tereifah, and had he known that there was basar be-chalav here he would not have eaten—it turns out that regarding the tereifah he was intentional and regarding the basar be-chalav he was unintentional—he is not disqualified for testimony because the tereifah was nullified within the basar be-chalav. But it is impossible to say that he thought regarding the two kezaytim of basar be-chalav that they were kosher, for if so, even without this he would not be disqualified, since according to his error, it was nullified in a majority of permitted substance.