Siman 4

It is a known matter that idolatry is forbidden for benefit, and its offering that is sacrificed to it—the animal is forbidden for benefit, its meat, its hide, and its dung, as will be explained in siman 139. Therefore, one who slaughters an animal or a bird and says that he slaughters it for the sake of such-and-such an idol, it becomes an offering and is forbidden for benefit, and certainly for eating, and it also imparts impurity. And even if he did not say regarding the slaughtering itself that he slaughters for this sake, but rather said, "I am slaughtering on the condition that I will sprinkle its blood or burn its fat for idolatry," it is forbidden for benefit. And similarly, "on the condition that another will burn and sprinkle," it is also forbidden for benefit. And so we maintain [39a] that just as regarding the slaughtering of sacrifices one calculates from one service to another service with the thought of pigul—where one says, "I am slaughtering this sacrifice on the condition to sprinkle its blood outside its time," which is the essence of pigul—so too regarding the thought of idolatry, one calculates from one service to another service.

And know that the services of star-worship are explained in the Shas [Sanhedrin 60b] as being three: slaughtering, as it is written, "He who sacrifices to the gods shall be destroyed"; and sprinkling, as it is written, "I will not pour out their libations of blood," and libation is the same as sprinkling; and burning, as it is written, "Who ate the fat of their sacrifices." However, receiving and conveying the blood, as in the case of holy offerings, are not included in them. Therefore, one who slaughters with the intent to receive its blood for the stars or to convey its blood, this is not an offering to be forbidden for benefit. And it appears to me that it is forbidden for eating, for in any event he is a min and his slaughtering is a nevelah, as I wrote in siman 2, and perhaps he did so several times, which according to everyone is forbidden.

From the words of Rashi, of blessed memory [Chullin 39b, s.v. Chullin], it is explained to me that just as one who slaughters to stars or with the intent to sprinkle its blood to stars, it is forbidden for benefit, so too if at the time of slaughtering he says, "Behold, I am sprinkling its blood to stars," it is also forbidden for benefit, for the blood that exits at the time of this slaughter is their sprinkling of vapor. But if at the time of slaughtering he said nothing, and afterward he sprinkled its blood to stars, the slaughter was not forbidden except by the reasoning that "the end proves the beginning," as will be explained before us with the help of Heaven [and with this, the difficulty of the Tosafot there, s.v. Makom, is answered, see there; and a proof for this is that if it were not so, how would you find "two services"? And delve into this].

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote: If one slaughtered without intent and afterwards intended to sprinkle its blood or to burn its fats to the stars, this is a case of questionable "sacrifices of the dead." Thus far their words. The doubt is explained in the Gemara there, because there is a dispute whether we say "his end proves his beginning"—that during the slaughter he also intended thus—or we do not say so. And behold, regarding matters of monetary law, the Rambam also holds in the fourth chapter of Zechiyah that it is a doubt; however, the Rosh ruled there that we do not say "his end proves his beginning," as the Tur wrote in Choshen Mishpat at the end of siman 245, see there. Nevertheless, regarding the prohibition of idolatry, the Tur was stringent here, though there is one who permits even here for this reason [Beit Yosef in the name of Rabbeinu Yerucham]. Nevertheless, he did not permit the animal except for benefit and not for eating. However, it is certain that if another person sprinkled or burned, the meat is permitted even for eating. And so too, if he himself said at the time of slaughtering that he slaughters for the sake of slaughtering and afterwards sprinkled or burned, it is also permitted for eating [Bach], for in this case it is not relevant to say "his end proves his beginning."

And know that the thought of pigul regarding consecrated offerings is not by thought alone but by speech, as our teachers the authors of the Tosafot wrote in Pesachim [63a] and in Bava Metzia [43b], and so wrote Rashi, of blessed memory, in Zevachim [41b]. And regarding the thought of idolatry, it is not clarified if we specifically require speech, and therefore one must forbid even by thought alone [and so ruled the Tevuot Shor and the Pri Megadim], for behold, from the language of the Rambam, of blessed memory, in the thirteenth chapter of Hilkhot Pasul HaMukdashim, it appears that he holds even regarding pigul that thought alone is sufficient, see there. And also from the Tosafot themselves, it appears that there are those who are uncertain about this [Zevachim 4a, s.v. Machshava, and Chullin 39, s.v. Ella]. And likewise from the previous law it is proven that it is forbidden by thought alone, for if not so, how would "the end proves the beginning" be relevant since he did not speak at the beginning.

The intention follows only the one who performs the shechitah and not the owner of the animal. Therefore, an Israelite who slaughtered the animal of an idolater, and the idolater intended or spoke for the sake of stars, it is not forbidden even for eating. However, when the Israelite intended, it is forbidden for benefit even though the animal is not his. And even if he did not intend for himself, but rather intended at the time of shechitah that the idolater would sprinkle its blood or burn its fat for the sake of stars, the Rashba, of blessed memory, ruled [in Torat HaBayit] that it is forbidden for benefit. And although there are those who hesitate regarding this, nevertheless, this is the primary ruling [see Bach and Shach, subsection 4]. And there is room for doubt if he intended regarding another person who is not the owner of the animal that he should sprinkle its blood or burn its fat for the sake of stars, whether it is forbidden for benefit. And even regarding eating there is room for doubt according to those who hold that on the first occasion the animal is not forbidden, as was written in siman 2, and one should be stringent [see Tevuot Shor, section 8, and see Rashi 39a, s.v. "lizrok," which implies also that he holds like the Rashba; and examine this carefully].

The Tur wrote: An Israelite who slaughtered his fellow's animal for the stars did not forbid it, for he certainly did not intend to forbid it but rather to cause him distress. However, if it belongs to both of them, the Rambam wrote that he forbids even the portion of his fellow. And my father, my teacher, of blessed memory, wrote that even if he is his partner he does not forbid it, for he only intends to cause distress to his partner. And if a transgressive Israelite slaughters another's animal, or if they warned the Israelite and he accepted the warning, then he certainly intended to forbid it and it is forbidden. Thus far his words.

The explanation of the matters is that we hold [Chullin 40a] a person cannot forbid something that is not his without an action, such as one who prostrates himself to the animal of his fellow; he has not forbidden it for the altar as a "worshipped object," and similarly in other cases. However, if he performed an action with it, such as slaughtering it for idol worship or pouring wine between its horns, it is a dispute where Ulla and Rav Huna hold that through an action he forbids even that which is not his, and Rav Nachman, Rav Amram, and Rav Yitzchak hold that even through an action he does not forbid that which is not his. And even in this there is a dispute, for Rabbeinu Chananel explained that specifically through a minor action he does not forbid, but through a significant action he forbids even according to Rav Nachman, Rav Amram, and Rav Yitzchak; and Rashi explained that even through a significant action he does not forbid according to them. The Rosh there agreed with the explanation of Rashi, see there. And there is a dispute among the poskim as to whom the halacha follows, for the Ra'avad [in chapter 8 of Laws of Idol Worship in the Hassagot], the Rashba [in Torat HaBayit, gate 1], the Tur, and the Shulchan Aruch later at the end of siman 145 ruled like those who forbid through an action, and the Ra'ah [in Bedek HaBayit there] and the Ran [at the end of the chapter "HaShochet"] ruled that he does not forbid, see there.

It is further stated there in the Gemara that even according to the one who holds that a person can forbid that which is not his through an action, this is specifically regarding a known transgressor, or one who accepted a warning upon himself, or a gentile, for his intent is certainly to worship stars; but an Israelite who was established in fitness until now, we say that he did not intend for worship at all, but rather he intended to cause distress to the owner of the animal, and this is nothing, and it is permitted even for eating [Rashba in Mishmeret there]. And some forbid it for eating [Ra'ah and Ran there]. The opinion of most of the poskim is to permit it even for eating [Shach, subsection 5], and no one disputes the essence of this law. And it is stated there in the Gemara that when the slaughterer had a partnership in this animal, then we do not say "he intends to cause distress," since he also has a portion in it, and it is forbidden even for benefit. This is the opinion of Rashi there and the Rambam in chapter 2 of Hilkhot Shechitah, law 21; see there. However, the opinion of the Tosafot and the Rosh there is that according to the conclusion of the sugya, even when he has a partnership we say "he intends to cause distress" and not to forbid; see there. With this, the words of the Tur have been explained, as well as the words of the Shulchan Arukh in section 4; see there. And as for why they did not mention here that through an action a person forbids that which is not his, it is because we understand it automatically; for since they wrote the permission because "he intends to cause distress," we automatically understand that were it not for this reason, he would forbid it. And they explicitly wrote this law below at the end of siman 145.

However, the words of the Rambam and the Rosh, of blessed memory, are puzzling regarding this matter. For in the eighth chapter of Avodat Kochavim he wrote, and this is his wording: But if one slaughtered his fellow's animal for an idol or exchanged it, it is not forbidden, for a person cannot forbid something that is not his. Thus far his words. Behold, he ruled that even through an action one cannot forbid that which is not his. Yet at the end of the second chapter of Shechitah he wrote, and this is his wording: If two people hold a knife and slaughter, and one intends for something that renders his slaughter forbidden, and the second had no intention at all, or even if he intended for something permitted, his slaughter is disqualified. And so too if they slaughtered one after the other and one of them intended for something disqualifying, he disqualifies it [it seems to me simple that when the second intended to disqualify, it is only when he began before the first finished the slaughter]. In what case does this apply? When he had a partnership in it. But if he has no partnership in it, it is not forbidden, for a person of Israel does not forbid something that is not his, as his intention is only to cause him distress. Thus far his words. And it implies explicitly that if not for this reason, he would forbid even something that is not his. And so the great Acharonim understood his opinion [the Pri Chadash and the Kereti U'Peleti]. But behold, he explicitly ruled there that he does not forbid. And besides this, his wording is not well-ordered: "for a person of Israel does not forbid something that is not his, as his intention is only to cause him distress." Since the primary reason for the permission is because he only intended to cause him distress, what is this that he said, that one does not forbid something that is not his? And one must say that his intention is this: that a person of Israel does not want to forbid something that is not his; but it is difficult to say so. Also, the words of the Rosh are puzzling, for previously he brought the dispute of Rashi and the Rabbeinu Chananel, of blessed memory, regarding the matter of "a person cannot forbid something that is not his" even through an action, and he decided like Rashi that even through a significant action he does not forbid. Behold, he ruled like those who permit. Yet at the end of his words he wrote that an Israelite intends to cause distress, and where he has a partnership he forbids. Behold, if not for this reason, he would forbid something that is not his through an action [and the Yam Shel Shlomo already raised this difficulty in the second chapter, section 22, and remained in wonderment].

And it appears clear to me that the Rambam and the Rosh, of blessed memory, both hold as the halacha that a person does not forbid something that is not his even by means of an action. However, regarding shechitah, this is of no benefit, for it is still forbidden for eating since he is a transgressor and his shechitah is nevelah. And even if we say that the first time it is not forbidden, this is regarding the prohibition of benefit, but for eating it is forbidden. And even according to what we explained in siman 2, section 16, that the Rambam holds that the first time it is not forbidden, that is regarding the desecration of Shabbat; but regarding one who explicitly slaughters for the stars, there is no reasoning to permit it for eating [and so wrote the Ran]. Therefore, here in the laws of shechitah, where the main point is to permit the meat for eating, the Rambam could not rely upon the permission that a person does not forbid something that is not his, for it would still be forbidden for eating. Consequently, he was forced to conclude "because he only intended to grieve him," and therefore it is permitted even for eating. And the measure of his words is this: that a person from Israel does not forbid something that is not his, and it is permitted for benefit; and since his intention is only to grieve him, it is permitted for eating. And in the laws of idol worship, for there the main law is the prohibitions of benefit, he wrote the primary law. And so too the Rosh, of blessed memory, initially decided like Rashi because his opinion is to rule like the one who holds that a person does not forbid something that is not his even by means of an action, and this is regarding the prohibition of benefit. And at the end he says the reason is "to grieve him" regarding the permission for eating [as appears clear to me, and the Tur does not hold like the Rosh in this; and the reason he did not mention his opinion in siman 145 is because the words of the Rosh did not come out so explicitly to the contrary, for such is the way of the Tur, as is known].

In siman 145 it will be explained that anything in which there is no grasp of human hands—meaning that man did not make it, but rather it was created so—the object is not forbidden as a ne'evad. This is a decree of the Torah, as it is written: "You shall surely destroy all the places where the nations whom you shall dispossess served their gods, upon the high mountains," etc., and we expound: their gods which are upon the mountains, and not the mountains themselves as gods. This means that if they worshiped the mountains, they are not forbidden, for it is not within the power of man to forbid through his folly the handiwork of the Holy One, Blessed be He. And although the worshiper is liable for the death penalty, nevertheless, the object is not forbidden. Since the ne'evad itself is not forbidden for benefit, all the more so its offering is not forbidden for benefit. This is what the sages taught in the Mishnah [39b]: One who slaughters in the name of mountains, in the name of hills, in the name of seas, in the name of rivers, or in the name of deserts—his slaughtering is invalid, but their law is not like "sacrifices of the dead" that would be forbidden for benefit. However, it is forbidden for eating, since it was slaughtered for worship. Such is the law when one slaughters in the name of the sun, the moon, the stars, or the constellations, for their law is like that of something attached, since there is no grasp of human hands in them and they are like things attached to the sphere of the firmament [as appears to be the intent of the Tosafot there, and examine it closely]. But one who slaughters in the name of the ministers appointed over the mountains, the hills, the seas, the rivers, the deserts, the sun, the moon, the stars, and the constellations, or who slaughters to Michael the great minister, or to a small worm in the sea—behold, these are "sacrifices of the dead" and are forbidden for benefit, for they are considered like detached things [Tosafot ibid.], even though the grasp of human hands does not apply to them, because this is the essence of avodah zarah. Furthermore, the sun and the moon have angels that lead them, as is stated in the Midrash [ibid.]. From the words of Rashi, of blessed memory, [ibid.] it is explained that one who slaughters even in the name of the sun and the moon themselves, and likewise in the name of the stars and constellations themselves, it is also "sacrifices of the dead" and forbidden for benefit, see there; and he holds that they are like detached things, as I have written.

The Rambam, the Rashba, and the Ran, of blessed memory, have another approach in this matter, and they hold that if one intends it for worship, it is like any offering and is forbidden for benefit, for what logic is there that the Torah would not forbid them? Furthermore, if so, regarding one who slaughters to the ministers, why are they forbidden as their offerings? Behold, they too should not be forbidden since no prohibition applies to them. And that which we learned, that one who slaughters to mountains and hills, etc., it is merely disqualified but they are not forbidden for benefit, this refers to where he did not intend it for worship at all, but rather he did this for the sake of healing or for another intention, in the manner of the foolish and mad who lean toward vanities; and the prohibition of eating is due to appearances alone, because it appears as if he intends it for worship [Ran]. Nevertheless, when he slaughtered to the ministers, even if he also slaughtered only for healing, where by the letter of the law it should not need to be forbidden for benefit, nonetheless, since it is the way of the idolaters to worship them, they treated them as a complete offering and it is forbidden for benefit [ibid.]. And some say that the intention of the Rambam is also thus [Beit Yosef and Bach]. And some say that specifically regarding actual worship, but for the sake of healing, in any case it is not forbidden for benefit [Tur in the name of the Ri], and the plain meaning of the words of the Rambam, of blessed memory, incline thus, and it appears explicitly so from his words in the Commentary on the Mishnah, see there. [And it appears to me that one who slaughters to the ministers for healing, this is actual idolatry since he designates this power to them, and this is the intention of the Rambam there; but in one who slaughters to a mountain, he is only acting in the manner of a segulah according to the opinion of the fools, and this is the resolution of the Gemara there, "this is where he said 'to the mountain,'" and the difficulty of the Bach is settled, who questioned why it did not resolve it as "this is for healing and this is for worship," and delve into this.]

In the lands of the Ishmaelites, they do not allow an Israelite to slaughter unless he turns his face toward the east, which is called in their language Al-Qibla. The Rashba, of blessed memory, wrote that this is not similar to one who slaughters for the sake of mountains, for there the one who slaughters intends it himself, but here we do not say "this one thinks and that one performs the act." Furthermore, there is no concern for the appearance of impropriety, for the observer will say that the eastern side happened to be available to him. Nevertheless, since the Ishmaelites are particular about this, it is proper to abolish it and to rebuke one who does so. Thus far his words in the Responsa, siman 345; see there. It is implied from his words that if it is impossible for the Israelite to evade this and they compel him to do so, there is no prohibition in this, since the Israelite intends nothing and slaughters in his usual manner, and what does it matter to him if he slaughters in the east or in other directions.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in siman 2, section 2: One who slaughtered and a treifah emerged from under his hand one time, if he has not established a presumption in this matter, it is permitted to eat from his slaughtering afterwards; nevertheless, one judges in this matter according to the perception of the judge regarding the person slaughtering—if he has already stumbled and there are grounds for the matter, he is removed. Thus far his words. The explanation of his words is that certainly if we knew that he intentionally produced a treifah one time, he is removed until he performs proper teshuvah. And similarly, if we knew clearly that it was unintentional, it is obvious that there is no concern regarding him for the future. And here it deals with a case where we do not know if it was unintentional or intentional, and it is explained later in siman 119 that he is not believed to say "I was unintentional," see there. And this is what he comes to teach us: that if he has not established a presumption in this matter, and we have never seen him deviate from the path of instruction, it is permitted to eat from his slaughtering afterwards and we believe him that it was unintentional. However, if on another occasion he also stumbled and there are grounds for the matter that he does not care to supervise the kashrut well, he is removed. [So it appears to me to explain his intention; and see Shach subsection 11. And the Rema is not dealing at all with a single witness, for this was explained at the end of siman 1. And from the words of the Gra it is explained that he interprets that even if it was intentional, it is permitted to eat from his slaughtering, see there; and this is a great difficulty from siman 119. And his proof from page 18 regarding "his knife was not found to be good," see there, I am astonished, for on the contrary, the opposite is proven as is evident from Ravina there, and this is not out of respect for the sage. And if the intention of the Gra is regarding an unintentional act, it is even more difficult from Ravina; and it requires further study].