Siman 3

The sages taught in the Mishnah [31a]: If a knife fell and performed shechitah, even if it performed shechitah in its typical manner, it is invalid, as it is said, "And you shall slaughter and you shall eat"—that which you slaughter, you may eat, for we require shechitah from human force [Ran]. And this is specifically when it fell on its own, such as if the knife was in his lap and he stood up and the knife fell from his lap and slaughtered the animal. But if the person dropped the knife with the intent of throwing, such that he wanted to throw it to stick it into a wall or the like, and in the course of its movement the knife slaughtered the simanim with a proper shechitah, the shechitah is kosher, since it came from human force. And one should not ask: just as we require human force from the verse "and you shall slaughter," if so, let us also require intent for slaughtering, that he should intend to perform shechitah as it is written "and you shall slaughter"? For our sages, of blessed memory, explained [ibid.] that since the Merciful One revealed regarding an "unintentional actor" (mitasek) with kodashim that it is invalid—meaning, when he slaughtered the offering without intent for slaughtering it is invalid, as it is said, "to be accepted for you, you shall slaughter," meaning with your knowledge you shall slaughter, that the slaughterer should intend to perform shechitah—consequently we have heard that regarding chullin, intent for slaughtering is not required at all. For if it were not so, why would the Torah need to inform us regarding kodashim? Since if it were invalid in chullin, it would certainly be so in kodashim. For one cannot say that in kodashim we require intent for the specific offering, such as for the sake of an olah or for the sake of shelamim, as it is impossible to say so, for we established that all offerings slaughtered not for their own sake are kosher. Rather, it is certain that only intent for slaughtering is required, and we learn from this that in chullin even this is not required. And one also cannot say: granted that intent for slaughtering is not required, let us at least require intent for cutting—that he should throw the knife to cut something, and then when it cut the simanim it would be kosher, but when he intended to throw it for mere dropping it should be invalid. For indeed, there is one who holds this view. However, regarding this too, our sages, of blessed memory, replied: Is it written "and you shall cut and you shall eat"? Behold, "and you shall slaughter and you shall eat" is written. And if so, whichever way you go: either we require intent for slaughtering or we do not require any intent for cutting. And since we learned from kodashim that we do not require intent for slaughtering, consequently we also do not require intent for cutting. And that which is written "and you shall slaughter and you shall eat," the meaning is that the slaughtering must be via human force alone, as has been written. [And similarly regarding the immersion of a niddah: for terumah and kodashim one requires intent for immersion, but for her husband she requires no intent at all because her law is like chullin, as I have written later in siman 201, see there].

There are those who say that even though we do not require intent for slaughtering, nevertheless, if he explicitly intended not for the sake of slaughtering—that his intent was to perform stabbing or strangling, and it happened that it was a proper shechitah—the shechitah is forbidden, for it is not included in "and you shall slaughter" [Yam Shel Shlomo, chapter 2, siman 13]. In my humble opinion, this law requires further study, for we certainly find that the opposite of intent is not like silence; however, this is only regarding a matter that requires intent, such as in consecrated offerings where we require "for its sake" (lishmah), and we establish in the first chapter of Zevachim that their silence is considered as if they were for their sake—in this, we say correctly that if he explicitly intended not for their sake, it is invalid, and so too in anything similar to this. But in a matter that does not require intent at all, why would intent for the opposite be effective? And if we say that intent for the worse would be effective to ruin even a matter that does not require intent, if so, a niddah who was thrown into a river and immersed, and she cries out that it is not her will to become pure through this immersion, we should also say that her immersion is nothing and she should be forbidden to her husband, for in the Gemara there we compare them to one another. And this is certainly not a logical position at all, for regarding immersion for servitude it is effective against one's will, as is explained later in the Tur, siman 267, and we do not find in the Gemara a distinction between one immersion and another. It is clear to me that for this reason the Acharonim did not cite this law, and in practice it requires further study.

It is a simple matter that with such a shechitah that was performed without intent for shechitah, one must examine if there was no chaladah between one siman and the other or under the skin. Therefore, if he found the feathers of the bird or the hair of the animal cut, certainly there was no chaladah. And it is obvious that one must see that there was no derasah, such as if there was a forward and backward motion, or with a large knife where a forward motion alone is sufficient [Rashi 12b, s.v. "she-halchah"].

Since we require human strength in shechitah, therefore, if they taught a monkey to slaughter, its shechitah is nevelah, for the requirement of "and you shall slaughter" is not present here. And even if a person assisted it, an assistant is of no consequence. And since we hold that intention is not required for shechitah, therefore, a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor who slaughtered, even though they have no intention at all, nevertheless, if others stood over them and saw that they performed a proper shechitah, their shechitah is kosher, as was written in siman 1. However, regarding a complete minor who has no manual dexterity at all, some say that this is not considered human strength at all and is similar to the shechitah of a monkey, as was written there in section 40; see there.

One of the great authorities wrote: If one threw a stone and it struck a knife, and the knife went and slaughtered, it appears to me that it is invalid due to doubt, for it is a secondary force, and perhaps it is not considered like his force. Thus far his words [Tevu'ot Shor]. And perhaps this law is similar to what is written below in siman 7 regarding one who slaughters with a wheel, where in a second force it is invalid, see there; even though one can distinguish from there as is understood, nevertheless one should not validate a slaughter of a secondary force. But a returning force, such as if one threw a knife at a wall and from the force of the strike it returned backward and slaughtered, it is like the first force and is valid [ibid. and Pri Chadash]. And also one is liable for exile in such a case for killing unintentionally [Sanhedrin 77b]. And similarly, when one threw the knife upward and it went to the sides and slaughtered, it is called his force, for were it not for his force, it would have descended straight down and not to the sides. And when it descended downward and slaughtered, its slaughtering is invalid, for it is not from his force, as is proven there in the Gemara [ibid.].

The Rashba, of blessed memory, in his book Torat HaBayit at the end of the first gate, is uncertain whether that which the Torah required human strength for shechitah requires intent for this strength or not. The practical legal difference is, for example, if a person stepped with his foot or pressed with his hand upon the knife, and from this strength the knife fell and slaughtered the simanim, for human strength exists but the person did not intend for this strength. And so too regarding falling from his lap which we wrote, there is room for uncertainty in this, for perhaps the Torah only disqualified it when it fell not from human strength, such as if the knife fell on its own from some place, but not when it came from human strength. And he wrote that even though his reasoning inclines toward this, nevertheless our teachers the authors of the Tosafot wrote that it is specifically when the person cast the knife with the intent of throwing, but when it fell from his lap or he stepped with his foot it is disqualified. And even though regarding damages this is called human strength, this is because even indirect damage is liable in damages, for a person is always forewarned, but not regarding shechitah [the Ra'ah]. And so it is explained from the words of the Rosh, see there. And the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch who wrote "and even if he dropped the knife with his hand or his foot without intent etc. it is kosher," their intent was without intent for shechitah or cutting, but forever intent for throwing is required, as is proven from the end of their words, see there. And a clear proof for this is from the Tosefta [chapter 2] where it is taught there: If a knife fell and slaughtered, or if he stepped upon it and it slaughtered etc. it is nevelah and imparts impurity through carrying. Thus far his words. And "stepped upon it" perforce is like this case where he stepped on the knife and through the stepping it slaughtered, and it disqualifies the shechitah. And see the Peri Chadash and Tevuot Shor, and their words were not clarified to me, and the one who examines will see that all the words of the Rishonim are one; however, for the practical law they also agreed thus, see there and delve into this.

There is one who says that regarding shechitah without intent, even when the shechitah is valid, nevertheless it is not appropriate to recite a blessing over such a shechitah, for a blessing is only appropriate when one acts with intent [Magen Avraham siman 158, subsection 14]. And this requires further study, for according to what our teacher, the Rema, wrote below in siman 19, that close to the shechitah one may recite a blessing even afterward, why should he not recite a blessing? For behold, the essence of the blessing is over the holiness of Israel, who do not eat without shechitah, and behold, this holiness is before us. And it is not similar to what he wrote there in Orach Chaim regarding the matter of netilat yadayim, where if one washed his hands without intent for eating and afterward changed his mind and ate, he should wash a second time without a blessing because he fulfilled his obligation with the first washing, see there; that is certainly so, for some time has passed since the first washing and it is not appropriate to recite a blessing. But immediately after the washing, when he changes his mind to eat, it appears to me that even there he must recite a blessing. And this requires deliberation [and this is somewhat implied by the wording of the Taz there, subsection 11].