Siman 5

It is a known matter that one who slaughters consecrated offerings outside the Sanctuary is liable for kareth, even in this time, as the Rambam wrote at the end of the Laws of the Act of Offerings, and it is forbidden for benefit. Therefore, if one consecrated an animal for an offering in this time, it is forbidden for benefit, and if he slaughtered it, he is punished with kareth. There is one who says that if at the time of slaughtering he designates it for consecration, it is not a valid designation, for it is like a vow and its opening is with it, and it is like one who says, "Behold, this is consecrated to offer it outside," which is nothing; for specifically when he consecrated it initially and afterwards slaughtered it does it constitute consecrated offerings outside, and not when he consecrated it at the time of slaughtering [Tevu'ot Shor, subsection 2]. But this is not clear at all, for certainly it is a complete consecration and he is liable for kareth. And even in one who says, "Behold, this is consecrated to offer it outside," it appears to me also that it is consecrated and he is liable for kareth. And how is this inferior to that which we hold established [Menachot 109a]: "Behold, this is a burnt-offering to offer it in the House of Chonyo," and he offered it there, that he is liable for kareth, as the Rambam wrote there in chapter 14, see there. And if it is because the House of Chonyo was built like the structure of the Sanctuary, nevertheless, what does this avail? Ultimately, it is slaughtering outside, and what difference is there to me between the House of Chonyo or any other place in the land. [And regarding what he brought as proof from Tosafot, Menachot 103a, that when he said "Behold, incumbent upon me is a burnt-offering" it became a burnt-offering, and afterwards when he said "that I shall offer it outside" it no longer lapses, see there; I am wondered, for from there is proof to the contrary—for are they two utterances? Behold, he said them in one utterance! And what difference is there to me between this utterance or the utterance "Behold, this is consecrated to offer it outside"? And it is an a fortiori argument when he says plainly "Behold, this is consecrated" or "Behold, this is a burnt-offering" and slaughters it immediately, that he is liable for kareth and it is forbidden for benefit by the Torah. And this is the opinion of the Maharshal which the Bach brought, and so appears the opinion of the Taz, subsection 5, and in vain did he reject their words; and delve into this]:

And this is specifically when he actually consecrated it at the time of the act, but when he says at the time of shechitah, "I am slaughtering it for the sake of a sacrifice," this is nothing according to the Torah, for he did not consecrate it beforehand and even now he does not consecrate it, and these are merely empty words. However, the sages forbade it because of marit ayin, for the observer will say that he consecrated it as a sacrifice, and consecrated items outside are permitted [Rashi 41b]. And the Tur wrote that there is a concern lest he consecrated it now, and there are those who explained his intention that in truth there is a concern for this [Beit Yosef], but this is not a necessity, for his intention is also that there is a concern that they will say that he consecrated it now [Bach]. And since the prohibition is only because of marit ayin, they only forbade it for eating and not for benefit, and this is the opinion of several of the great authorities, and it is also clear from the wording of the Rambam at the end of chapter 2, see there [Rashal and Bach and Tevuot Shor].

And regarding this itself, the sages of blessed memory made a distinction: that if he stated a matter that comes as a gift-offering, such as an olah or shelamim, where he said, "Behold, I am slaughtering it for the sake of an olah," or "for the sake of shelamim," or "for the sake of a todah," or "for the sake of a pesach" (which throughout the year has the law of shelamim), his slaughtering is invalid for the reason that has been explained. However, if he stated it for the sake of a matter that comes only as an obligation and not as a gift-offering, such as a chatat or an asham, and he said, "Behold, I am slaughtering it for the sake of a chatat," or "for the sake of an asham," his slaughtering is valid. For there is not even a concern here for marit hayin, since if he had sinned with such a prohibition, the matter would be known and there would be a rumor regarding it. Therefore, even the observer will understand that these are words of wind, and he will not come to err by permitting kodashim. And thus the sages taught in the Mishnah [41b]:

Regarding an asham talui, there is a dispute whether it may be brought as a voluntary offering or not [Keritot 18b]. The opinion of the Rambam is to be lenient, as he ruled that it is not brought as a voluntary offering, while the opinion of the Tur and the Rema is to be stringent due to the doubt. Similarly, if one said "for the sake of a bechor" or "for the sake of ma'aser," his slaughtering is valid, for it is known that it is a falsehood, since he has no bechor or ma'aser behemah in his house, and it is impossible to bring them as a voluntary offering. Similarly, if he said "I am slaughtering for the sake of a temurah," it is also valid, for a temurah is based on a sacrifice, and everyone knows that he has no sacrifice in his house. Therefore, in the time of the Temple when he has a sacrifice in his house, his slaughtering is forbidden. Similarly, when he says "for the sake of a woman's childbirth burnt-offering," it is permitted, for everyone knows that his wife did not give birth; for if she had given birth, there would be a rumor of it. Therefore, if she truly gave birth or miscarried a fetus for which she is obligated in a sacrifice in the time of the Temple, his slaughtering is forbidden. Similarly, if he slaughtered for the sake of another woman's childbirth offering who is not his wife, his slaughtering is forbidden [Tevuat Shor], for such is our established law, that another person can bring the sacrifice without the knowledge of the one attaining atonement. Similarly, if he said "I am slaughtering for the sake of a nazir's burnt-offering" or "for the sake of a nazir's sin-offering" or "a nazir's peace-offering," his slaughtering is invalid, for the observer will say that he vowed in private to be a nazir. Similarly, if he slaughtered for the sake of a zav's sacrifice, it is forbidden, as they will say that he truly has a discharge. But if he said "for the sake of a metzora's sacrifice," it is valid, for without the inspection of a kohen it is impossible to bring a sacrifice, and everyone knows that in this time we do not inspect nega'im.

If it was known that he committed a transgression for which he is liable for a chatat or an asham, and he said, "Behold, I am slaughtering this for my chatat" or "for the sake of my chatat," his slaughtering is invalid. However, if he did not conclude with the letter yod and said "for the sake of a chatat," it is valid, as it does not imply the sin that he committed, but rather a voluntary chatat [Shach and Taz]. And so too regarding an asham. And so too regarding a bechor, when he has a firstborn animal in his house and said, "Behold, I am slaughtering for the sake of a bechor," it is forbidden; and in this case it is simple that he does not need to say "my bechor." But regarding ma'aser this is not applicable, for nowadays there is no ma'aser behemah.

It is a simple matter that with geese and chickens, when one says it is for the sake of a specific korban, his slaughtering is valid, for they are not brought for any korban. It is only with turtledoves and young pigeons that it is disqualified, and even this is only with large turtledoves and small young pigeons, for the reverse are not fit for a korban. However, with animals of all species, it is forbidden regarding something that comes as a gift-offering, for all species are fit for this. And so too regarding a chatat and an asham, when one committed a transgression for which he is liable for a chatat or an asham and said, "this is for my chatat," it is forbidden even though this species is not fit for this korban, for not everyone is learned in the law [it appears to me]. But small turtledoves and large young pigeons, everyone knows that they are not fit for a korban. And so it appears to me that this is specifically when he specified the name of the korban, such as an olah or shelamim and the like; but if he said generally "for the sake of a korban," it is nothing, for even in the Temple when he does not specify the korban, it is not in the category of a korban at all. And one must deliberate on this, for we established regarding korbanot that when one slaughtered them without specification he has fulfilled the obligation, as we learned at the end of the fourth chapter of Zevachim and as the Rambam wrote at the end of the fourth chapter of Ma'aseh HaKorbanot. Saying "for the sake of a korban" is no worse than without specification, which implies for the sake of a korban that he vowed or pledged or for which he is liable, and if so, one who slaughters with this phrasing should also be forbidden. However, from the wording of the Shas and the poskim it does not appear so, and the law requires further study.

And one should not ask regarding the essence of this law what concern there is in this time that they will say he is slaughtering for the sake of some sacrifice, for behold we are all impure from contact with the dead and an individual sacrifice does not override impurity; for it can be said that not everyone is learned in the law. Furthermore, since we maintain that the tzitz effects atonement for impurity, and even for an individual sacrifice the tzitz effects atonement according to the Torah [Yevamot 90a], therefore even though nowadays there is no tzitz to effect atonement, nevertheless since in any event there is a manner in which during the time of the Temple the sacrifice would be accepted, it is forbidden even in this time. [However, regarding the matter of menachot, such as if one takes fine flour and performs kemitzah and says "this is for kemitzah," it is nothing, for kemitzah requires the priesthood; but slaughtering is valid by a zar. And a kohen who said this, it appears to me that the fine flour is forbidden for eating, and similarly with wine and oil, since we maintain at the end of the chapter "Kol HaTadir" that one may volunteer wine and oil, it is forbidden for eating].

The Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote at the end of the second chapter: Two people holding a knife and slaughtering, one intending for something that causes the slaughtering to be forbidden for the one for whom he slaughters, and the second etc. intended for a permitted matter, it is invalid. And similarly, if they slaughtered one after the other and one of them intended for the sake of a disqualifying matter, he disqualifies it. In what case does this apply? When he had a partnership in it. But if he has no partnership in it, it is not forbidden, for no person of Israel forbids a thing that is not his, as his intention is only to cause him distress. Thus far his words. And his words refer to all that he explained previously regarding the laws of slaughtering for stars and the laws of slaughtering for sacrifices, see there. And we have already explained his words in the previous siman, section 11, see there. And the Tur did not mention a distinction between whether he has a partnership in it or does not have a partnership in it.

And one should wonder about him, for in the previous siman he cited the opinion of the Rosh that even when he has a partnership in it, we say "he intends to cause distress" and he does not forbid it; if so, regarding two people, in any case he should not forbid it. Why, then, did he write here regarding two who slaughtered, that when one intended for the sake of an offering, he forbids it? And it can be said that he holds that here "he intends to cause distress" is not relevant at all, for regarding the sake of kodashim there is no distress, and perhaps he thought that he is performing a mitzvah, and therefore in any case he forbids it even when he has no partnership in it. Thus wrote the great Acharonim, and our teacher, the Rema, in section 3 was concerned for this opinion; see there. Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, transcribed the wording of the Rambam, and in his view, even according to the Rosh, he does not forbid it without partnership, for regarding kodashim, since he has no portion in it, there is no reason that he should forbid it [Levush and Shach]. And it is obvious that after one has slaughtered the majority of the simanim, it is not within the power of the second to forbid it through kodashim, for the entire essence of the prohibition is only because of marit ha'ayin [Tevu'ot Shor].