Siman 306

The Rambam wrote in the first chapter of Bekhorot: It is a positive commandment to set aside every male that first opens the womb, whether among humans, or among pure animals, or of the donkey species, whether they were unblemished or whether they were terefot, as it is said: "Sanctify to Me every firstborn, whatever opens any womb among the children of Israel, among humans and among animals." And all of them belong to the kohanim; the firstborn of a human and the firstborn of a donkey are redeemed and their redemption price belongs to the kohanim, and the firstborn of a pure animal is slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, its blood is dashed, its sacrificial parts are burned, and the rest of the meat is eaten by the kohanim. Thus far his words. And behold, that which he wrote, "whether they were terefot," perforce does not refer to the firstborn of a human, for a terefah is exempt from redemption, as is written in siman 305, section 47, and as the Rambam himself wrote in the eleventh chapter of Bikkurim, law 17.

And a bechor of a pure animal that is blemished, whether it was born with its blemish or it developed afterwards, it belongs to the kohen, as it is written: "But the bechor of an ox etc. you shall not redeem..." and "their flesh shall be yours," both an unblemished one and a blemished one (Zevachim 37). And the kohen may do with it whatever he desires; he may eat it in any place, or sell it, or feed it to whomever he desires, even to a Cuthean, because it is chullin, as it is written: "Every bechor etc. and if there be a blemish in it etc. the impure and the pure shall eat it together, like the gazelle and like the deer," and it is the property of the kohen like a gazelle and like a deer. And only by rabbinic decree were they stringent that he should not sell it in a butcher shop, and it is not weighed by the litra, and this refers to fixed weights; but it is permitted to weigh part against part, and likewise it is permitted to weigh against a vessel, even against the cleaver with which they chop the meat, for there is no disgrace in this as there is with a weight. And this applies only to its flesh, but its fat, its blood, its tendons, and its horns are sold in a butcher shop and weighed by the litra. And the fat of the tendon has the status of flesh; even though they were stringent regarding it not to eat it, nevertheless, since it is permitted by the Torah as I wrote in siman 65, its status is like flesh. And since there is no sanctity in it, he is permitted to flay its skin in the manner that he flays chullin, to begin from the legs and in whatever manner he desires (Temurah 24). And this is the law of a blemished animal even in the time of the Temple, but the Tur forbids it, and it will be explained in siman 307.

But a pristine bekhor during the time of the Mikdash is forbidden to be sold because it is holy, and if one sold it, the transaction is not valid, for it is designated for a sacrifice and the kohen has no right in it until after its offering. Similarly, one does not redeem it, as it is said, "you shall not redeem," but rather he offers it as a sacrifice. And a kohen who ate a kezayit of a pristine bekhor outside of Jerusalem, whether before the sprinkling of the blood or after the sprinkling, is lashed according to the Torah, for it is written: "You may not eat within your gates etc. and the bekhorot of your cattle and your flocks," "before the Lord your God you shall eat it," like all kodashim kalim which are eaten in Jerusalem inside the wall. And from the oral tradition they learned that this is also a warning to a non-kohen who ate a bekhor, whether before the sprinkling or after the sprinkling (Makkot 17). And all this is during the time of the Temple, but a bekhor in this time, even if pristine, since it is not designated for offering, although it is forbidden to eat it, nevertheless the kohen is permitted to sell it even to an Israelite when he desires to purchase it to keep it until a defect falls upon it, since it is designated for eating and not for offering. And it is understood of itself that a pristine one may only be sold alive, for if they slaughtered it while it was pristine, it is forbidden for benefit. And one with a defect is permitted to be sold whether alive or slaughtered. And it is permitted in this time to betroth a woman with a pristine bekhor because it is the property of the kohen like other property, as I have written. And we do not give it to a female kohen for the reason we explained at the beginning of siman 305, see there, and see in section 13 and section 20.

According to the opinion of the Rambam, it is a mitzvah to sanctify the firstborn of a pure animal, as it is written: "Every firstborn... you shall sanctify to Hashem your God," that he should say "this is hereby holy." And if he did not sanctify it, it is sanctified on its own, for its sanctity is from the womb. The Tur wrote in the name of the Rosh that there is no need to sanctify it. This is a dispute at the end of the eighth chapter of Arachin: Rabbi Ishmael holds that there is no need to sanctify it, and the sages hold that it is necessary. The Rambam ruled like the sages. One could say the reason of the Tur is because the words of the sages were not taught in the Mishnah at all (Ma'adanei Yom Tov). Furthermore, there regarding unspecified dedications, it appears like Rabbi Ishmael (Lechem Mishneh), and likewise in Chullin (137) it appears so (Mishneh LaMelech). However, in Nedarim (13) it implies explicitly like the Rambam, see there (for if it were not so, when it asks "and the one who permits etc.," let it say that he holds like Rabbi Ishmael; and examine this). Also the Bartenura in his commentary on the Mishnah there ruled like the Rambam. According to this, why is it not the custom to do so? Perhaps this is only during the time of the Temple, but from the Rambam and Shulchan Aruch it is clear that even in this time it is a mitzvah to sanctify it. One could say that since in this time there is a mitzvah to sell it to a gentile so as not to come to a stumbling block, as I wrote in section 2, therefore it is not the custom to sanctify it.

The Tur wrote: The firstborn of a pure animal applies to males and not to females, as it is written: "Every first issue of the womb, the males." It applies both during the time of the Temple and not during the time of the Temple. The Rambam wrote that it only applies in the Land, and even if they were brought from outside the Land to the Land, they shall not be offered, for they are complete chullin. The Ramban wrote that it applies outside the Land, and such is the conclusion of my father, our teacher, the Rosh, of blessed memory. Thus far his words. The Ra'avad also, in the first chapter of Bechorot, contested him and wrote that it is an error, see there. Similarly, the Rashba in a responsum contested him, asking how it is possible to say so, for behold, all the Amoraim in Babylonia observed the sanctity of firstborns, as is explained at the beginning of Bechorot. Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in his great book and in his book Kesef Mishneh, wrote that an error occurred for them in the books of the Rambam, and before us it is written in this wording: The commandment of the firstborn of a pure animal applies in the Land and outside the Land, but they do not bring firstborns from outside the Land to the Land, as it is said etc. "From the place that you bring grain tithes, you bring the firstborn" etc. Rather, it is like chullin and shall be eaten in its blemished state, and if he brought it, they do not accept it from him, but it is eaten in its blemished state. This commandment applies both in the presence of the Temple etc. like grain tithes, and it does not apply to consecrated items while they are in their sanctity before they are redeemed, whether they are items consecrated for the altar or items consecrated for the upkeep of the House. Thus far his words. Behold, he only says so regarding the matter that they shall not be offered, for he ruled like Rabbi Akiva at the end of the third chapter of Temurah, see there (and the Mishnah in Temurah is like Rabbi Yoshiyah, and the Mishnah at the end of Challah is like Rabbi Akiva, see there; however, in the Yerushalmi at the end of Challah, it equates the Mishnayot, that the reason they did not accept from Ben Antigonus was so as not to establish it as an obligation, see there, and according to this, both Mishnayot are like Rabbi Yoshiyah and not like Rabbi Akiva).

It is a great wonder that the Ra'avad, who was in the time of the Rambam, and the Ramban, and the Rosh, and the Rashba, and the Tur, who were close to his time—that for all of them an error in the version of the Rambam should have occurred. Furthermore, from his words in the Sefer HaMitzvot, positive commandment 79, it is explicitly proven like their words. This is his wording: It is that He commanded us to sanctify firstlings etc. and this law etc. that he shall bring it to the kohanim and they shall offer its fat and its blood etc. and it was explained at the end of Challah that this commandment is only practiced in the Land etc. Thus far his words. Behold, it was explained that this commandment is only practiced in the Land, whether the Beit HaMikdash was standing or not, as it is now in our time, like the tithe of grain etc. Thus far his words. And if it should enter your mind that this is only regarding the offering and not regarding the sanctity of the firstling, behold, even in the Land now there is no offering, only mere sanctity. Furthermore, he compares it to the tithe of grain, which does not apply at all in chutz la'aretz (and know that there is a great error there in what he concludes, "and the Levites are not obligated in this commandment," see there, and there is no understanding for this; for if it refers to the offering, it is obvious, and how is the language of "obligation" relevant? It is clear to me that it should be in commandment 80, which he wrote afterward regarding the redemption of the firstborn, see there).

Furthermore, even according to the version of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in his words it is difficult: since he ruled regarding a bekhor according to Rava that we do not offer sacrifices from outside the Land, why did he also rule regarding ma'aser behemah in chapter 6 of Bekhorot according to Rava, and there he ruled that outside the Land and the Land are equal? See there. Rather, it is certain that he ruled according to the anonymous Mishnah of ma'aser behemah at the beginning of chapter 9 of Bekhorot, and he holds that it follows not according to Rava. And that which the Gemara there rejects—"even if you say it is Rava, here it is to be offered, here it is to be sanctified"—is merely a rejection. And regarding a bekhor, he ruled according to the anonymous Mishnah at the end of Challah, and not like the Mishnah in Temurah which is not anonymous, and Rabbi Shimon said it, as is explained there. And this fact that in Babylonia they conducted themselves like Bekhorot, this is rabbinic. And the Sifrei supports this view, for there in Parshat Re'eh, siman 106, on the verse "And you shall eat before Hashem your G-d," the Sifrei brought, and this is its wording: Rava says, I might think a person should bring up bekhorot from outside the Land etc., the verse teaches etc., from the place where you bring ma'aser dagan etc. But this derivation of Rava regarding ma'aser behemah from the verse "And you shall bring there," there previously in siman 63 the Sifrei says: Rava says, "your tithes"—the verse speaks of two tithes, one is ma'aser dagan and one is ma'aser behemah. Thus far the words of the Sifrei. And it does not conclude "just as ma'aser dagan etc." as in our Gemara, see there. However, in any event, however it may be, the opinion of the Rambam is a lone opinion, and we hold according to the majority of the poskim, and the Yerushalmi at the end of Challah supports them, as I wrote at the end of section 5, and so we hold.

And that which we wrote at the end of section 5 in the name of the Rambam, that bekhorah does not apply to kodashim while they are in their state of sanctity before they are redeemed, the intention is not that after redemption—meaning when they became blemished and were redeemed—that they are then liable in bekhorah. Rather, the Rambam explained this matter in chapter 5 of Bekhorot, law 8, and this is his wording: All kodashim whose permanent blemish preceded their consecration and were redeemed are liable in bekhorah; but if a transitory blemish preceded their consecration, or if he consecrated them while unblemished and afterwards a permanent blemish occurred to them and they were redeemed, they are exempt from bekhorah, for they have not emerged into non-sacred status in every respect, since they are forbidden regarding shearing and labor. Thus far his words. And according to this, that which he wrote there is well-settled, whether regarding kodshei mizbe’ach or kodshei bedek habayit. And how is it possible for there to be an animal for bedek habayit? For one who consecrates unblemished animals for bedek habayit violates a positive commandment and a negative commandment, as is found in Temurah (7b), and it also never leaves the jurisdiction of the altar, as is found at the end of Temurah. But when a permanent blemish preceded their consecration, he can certainly consecrate them for bedek habayit, as is explained there.

He further wrote that one who purchases an animal with ma'aser sheni funds in Jerusalem, it is liable for bechorah. This is from the Yerushalmi, the first chapter of Ma'aser Sheni. This is the wording of the Yerushalmi: An animal of ma'aser sheni in Jerusalem, according to Rabbi Meir (who holds it is sacred property), it is exempt from bechorah; according to Rabbi Yehuda (who holds it is private property), it is liable for bechorah; see there. His words are astonishing, for we establish the law according to Rabbi Meir, as is found in Kiddushin (54b), and as the Rambam himself wrote in the third chapter of Ma'aser Sheni, law 17. It appears that the Rambam had another approach to this, for also regarding challah of ma'aser sheni in Jerusalem, he ruled in the sixth chapter of Bikkurim that dough of ma'aser sheni in Jerusalem is liable for challah (and there the Kesef Mishneh elaborated on this, see there; also the Pnei Moshe and the Maharit Algazi in the laws of challah elaborated on this, and the mind is not at ease with all of their words, see there).

And behold, also in the seventh chapter of the laws of chametz and matzah, he ruled that one fulfills the obligation with matzah of ma'aser sheni in Jerusalem, and in the eighth chapter of the laws of lulav, he ruled that one fulfills the obligation with an etrog of ma'aser sheni in Jerusalem. And in the third chapter of the laws of ma'aser sheni, when he ruled that ma'aser sheni is sacred property, he did not mention Jerusalem. And the truth is evident that he holds like Rav Chisda at the end of Sanhedrin, who said that the dispute between Rabbi Meir and the Rabbis is in Jerusalem, but in the provinces, all agree it is sacred property; see there. And according to this, the Rambam rules like the Sages and not like Rabbi Meir, and that which he ruled regarding ma'aser sheni that it is sacred property, this is in the provinces and like the Sages (Lechem Mishneh in the laws of chametz there). Therefore, he was precise in all places to say "in Jerusalem," but in the provinces it is not so (and according to this, that sugya in Kiddushin there is completely rejected, for all the proofs from Mishnayot that he brought there according to Rabbi Meir, according to Rav Chisda there is no proof, for in the provinces all agree; see there and examine carefully).

In Bekhorot (12b), Rav Chanan said: An animal of shevi'it is exempt from the law of the firstborn. What is the reason? "For eating," and not for burning, and if he were obligated in the law of the firstborn, the sacrificial parts would go up to the Most High (Rashi). However, the Rambam there wrote: One who purchases an animal with the fruits of shevi'it, it is exempt from the law of the firstborn, because he is not permitted to do business with the fruits of shevi'it, for it is said regarding it, "for eating," and not for business. And if it were to be obligated in the law of the firstborn, he would be profiting from the firstborn, for it has left the status of shevi'it. Thus far his words. And it appears that his version in the Gemara was thus: "for eating," and not for business. And it is not understood what business is relevant here and what he profits from this. And the Kesef Mishneh wrote that since he is not obligated to destroy it at the time of bi'ur, and he gives it to a kohen and has the benefit of discretion. Thus far his words. And it is very puzzling, for the Rambam ruled in the second chapter of Laws of Theft that the benefit of discretion is not considered monetary value. Therefore, it seems to me that this is the explanation: Behold, when one purchases a food item with the fruits of shevi'it, it becomes seized with the sanctity of shevi'it, as the Rambam wrote in the sixth chapter of Shemittah, see there. And here, when he purchased the animal, it was seized with the sanctity of shevi'it, and behold, the firstborn has left the status of shevi'it, since he is obligated to give it specifically to a kohen, and in shevi'it there is no such obligation; perforce it has left the law of the fruits of shevi'it. And this itself is the profit, meaning to say, that he purchased an animal that should be entirely shevi'it and it is not so. And this is why he was precise to say "for it has left the status of shevi'it," and the purchase of the animal is like business in that he profits the firstborn.

We learned in the seventh chapter of Shevi'it (mishnah 3): One may not conduct trade with the produce of Shevi'it, nor with bechorot, nor with terumot, etc., for we fear perhaps he will keep it with him and come to a stumbling block. And specifically regarding a live bechor did they decree, but a slaughtered one is permitted to be sold even according to the Rabbinic laws, provided that he does not sell it in a butcher shop (Bartenura), and as I wrote in section 2. And it is simple that this refers to a kohen, for the bechor is his. And ostensibly it seems that it refers to an unblemished one, for in this time the kohen is permitted to sell even an unblemished one, as I wrote in section 3, and regarding it a stumbling block is relevant. But a blemished one, what stumbling block could there be in it, for it is complete chullin? But it does not imply so. And it must be said that it is because perhaps he will work with it before the permit of a sage. Furthermore, if we permit selling a live blemished one, he will keep it in its state of being unblemished, perhaps a blemish will fall upon it and he will sell it alive. But to fear that he will keep it in order to sell it slaughtered, there is no fear in this, for there is not much profit in this and he will not keep it. And we learned there: If one bought a bechor for his son's feast or for a festival and does not need it, it is permitted to sell it. And they treated it like one who happened upon nevelot and terefot above in siman 117, see there. And it was taught in the Tosefta of Bechorot (chapter 3): One may not appraise unblemished bechorot for an Israelite, but one may appraise for them blemished ones; and one may appraise for kohanim unblemished ones, and it is unnecessary to say blemished ones. And the Rambam ruled this at the end of chapter 5 of Bechorot. And this is its explanation: to appraise them for their debt from the borrower if the borrower is a kohen. And it is simple that this refers to this time, for during the time of the Temple, the unblemished one does not belong to the kohen and he must sacrifice it.

And there is a question regarding this: since we learned in a Mishnah that one may not engage in commerce with firstborn animals, as has been explained, how did we learn at the beginning of Maaser Sheni that regarding the firstborn, one may sell it unblemished while alive and blemished while alive or slaughtered, as I wrote in section 3? And it must be said that in Maaser Sheni, it takes the primary law of the Torah in contrast to the animal tithe, about which it is written "it shall not be sold"; regarding this, it says that a firstborn is permitted. And even according to the rabbis it is permitted when not intended for commerce, such as if one purchased it for food or for a feast and it remained over, and so it is in what we explained in section 3, and it will be explained in siman 307. And know that in the Tosefta of Shevi'it (chapter 5) it is taught regarding this case of one who purchased a firstborn for a feast or for a festival that it is permitted to sell it, for Rabbi says that one may not profit from it and he should sell it for the same price as he purchased it. The Rambam did not cite this, but the Rash in Shevi'it there cited it. And it must be said that the Rambam holds that Rabbi disagrees and the halacha follows the first Tanna. And so it appears, for even in siman 117 regarding carcasses and torn animals that happened to come to hand, we did not stipulate this condition; see there. And in the Or Zarua HaGadol, siman 503, he ruled according to the Yerushalmi that it is forbidden to sell the meat of a firstborn at a high price; see there.

One does not give the bechor to a kohen immediately when it is born, for this is not a distinction for the kohen; rather, its owner must attend to it until it grows a bit. And for how long is the Yisrael obligated to attend to it? With small livestock, thirty days, and with large livestock, fifty days. And if he does not have a kohen available, he is obligated to attend to it until a kohen is found for him. And if the kohen says to the owners, "Give it to me within this time and I will attend to it," he is not permitted to give it to him, for this is like a kohen who assists in the threshing floors; since it is unblemished and he cannot yet eat it during this time, why is he taking it? Rather, his intention is that he should assist him so that he will give him all the priestly gifts, and regarding this it is said, "You have corrupted the covenant of Levi," etc. Therefore, if it was blemished and he said to him within this time, "Give it to me so that I may eat it now," he is permitted to give it to him, provided it is after seven days, for before this it is forbidden for consumption, as I wrote above in siman 15. And according to this, if its months of gestation were complete, according to the one who permits eating it there immediately, it is permitted even immediately after birth.

If the kohen refuses to receive it because there is great exertion in this time to attend to it until a defect falls upon it, he is not permitted, because it appears as if he is disparaging the priestly gifts. It is the obligation of the owners themselves to see which kohen is more capable, such that it can be raised there, for example, if his residence is outside the city, as a kohen in the city certainly finds it difficult to raise it, and so too anything similar to this. It is a great prohibition for the owners when they give to a certain kohen and their intention is to annoy him or to take revenge upon him; and if it is known that he acted because of this intention, the kohen does not need to receive it (Shach, subsection 4), for they were given for greatness and not for revenge. In the Or Zarua HaGadol, siman 497, he ruled that one does not compel the kohen to receive it, for the Merciful One called it a "gift." See there.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 4 that even a doubtfully-born bekhor, the kohen must receive it from the hand of the one giving it to him, and specifically regarding a doubt that arose on its own, but in a case where the Israelite was negligent, such as if he purchased a milking cow from a gentile or if he was able to sell the bekhor to a gentile before it was born and did not do so, the kohen does not need to receive it. Thus far his words. And his words are not understood at all, for this is not a case of a thing and its opposite; and furthermore, what negligence is there when he purchased a milking cow? And furthermore, if he was negligent, even for a certain bekhor he should not need to receive it (Shach, subsection 3). And furthermore, is it because of his negligence that the kohen should disparage the priestly gifts, even with a doubtfully-born bekhor? And what reasoning is this (Chut HaShani, siman 106).

And it appears in my humble opinion in the explanation of his words that behold, the Terumat HaDeshen in his rulings, siman 118, cited from the responsa of the Rosh in the name of the Maharam that even a doubtful bekhor, if he does not receive it, it is a degradation. And the Terumat HaDeshen wondered: behold, a doubtful bekhor the Yisrael may withhold for himself, and even if a kohen seized it, one removes it from his hand according to most poskim; if so, how is it possible that the Yisrael should have power in both directions and the kohen should be forced to receive it? On the contrary, it is a degradation to the kohen. However, his heart did not embolden him to disagree with the Maharam, and he proceeded to distinguish between a standard doubt and a doubt of a legal dispute, see there. And this too is difficult, as is understood. Therefore, our teacher, the Rema, proceeded in this matter in a different way, as we will explain (and know that before us, both in the Rosh at the end of Bekhorot and in the responsa, siman 49, a doubt is not mentioned at all, and likewise the Tur did not mention a doubt, and it requires further study).

And the matter is thus: certainly according to the essential law, if the kohen does not wish to receive it, even a certain bekhor, we do not compel him to receive it, for the Torah called it a "gift," and do we compel one to receive a gift? And as I wrote at the end of section 15 in the name of the Or Zarua, and all the poskim do not disagree on this; only the Rosh says that the kohen should be concerned for his soul, for since the Torah gave it to him, he should not treat it with contempt. And consequently, a doubtful bekhor is also thus; for it would be well if it were from the perspective of the essential law that he was forced to receive, then there would be a distinction between a doubt and a certainty, but since this is a concern of contempt for the priestly gifts, what is the difference to me if it is certain or if it is a doubt? However, this is certainly when the Yisrael gives it to him in an honorable manner according to the commandment of the Torah, for then the kohen should not look at his own trouble; but when it appears somewhat that he gives it to him to provoke him or to take revenge on him, the kohen does not need to receive it, as I wrote in section 15, for in such a case the Torah did not command. Therefore, in every doubtful bekhor where the matter is clear that the Yisrael did not sin in this—such as if he was not in his house, or he had no one to whom to sell, or he bought a milking cow according to the method of our teacher, the Rema, later in siman 316, that we do not permit this without some supporting factor like "speaking in innocence" and the like, and he inquired of the seller about this indirectly and found no answer, or that there is a dispute of the poskim in this and what is the Yisrael to do—we rightly say to the kohen: do not treat the priestly gifts with contempt. But in a place where he could have rectified it—such as if he bought a milking cow and did not exert effort so that the seller would speak in innocence that she is not a first-born, or that he could have easily sold the animal to a gentile in the manner of the children of Israel, which is a mitzvah to do so as will be explained in siman 320—therefore, in a doubtful bekhor, the kohen can assume that he did so intentionally in order to distress him, and not in a certain bekhor. Because in a doubtful bekhor, just as there is a doubt whether he intended to distress him or not, so too there is a doubt regarding the essence of the bekhor, and we say in this a sort of double-doubt: perhaps he intended to distress him, and if you say he did not intend, perhaps it is not a bekhor. And for this our teacher, the Rema, concludes: and even in a place where he must receive it, it is forbidden for the Yisrael to give it to provoke him, etc., meaning that all this is in a case of doubt if he intended to distress him, but in a place where he certainly intended to distress him, then even a certain bekhor he does not need to receive from him. And so it appears to me as the primary ruling. (And according to our words there is no dispute between the Rosh and the Or Zarua, and in the Darkhei Moshe, letter 1, it appears that he understood that they are in disagreement, see there, but this is not necessary, and examine it carefully).

A poor kohen who has a firstborn and gives it to a wealthy kohen does not need to receive payment (Darkhei Moshe in the name of Mahari), for the Torah did not command this. It is permitted to hand over the firstborn to a gentile to watch over it, and we do not fear that he will inflict a blemish upon it; and if he did inflict a blemish upon it, it is permitted (Perisha sign 7 in the name of Or Zarua and Terumat HaDeshen). In siman 313, our teacher, the Rema, ruled accordingly. And they wrote that any kohen who has the means to care for firstborns and does not accept them acts very improperly (ibid.). It is proper to hand it over to a kohen who has fields and dwells outside the city, for in the city, when it grows, it will cause damage because it is forbidden to perform any labor with it, and consequently it will cause damages and lead to a desecration of the Name of Heaven. The main point is that anyone who has an animal is obligated to sell it before it gives birth, as will be explained in siman 320; see there.

Our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, wrote in section 5: The bechor in this time, one keeps it until a mum falls upon it and slaughters it based on an expert, and nowadays specifically based on three, and eats it in any place and feeds it even to an Egyptian or to dogs. Thus far their words. And there are many who prohibit giving it to dogs, and such is the primary ruling [Shach, subsection 8]. They further wrote: The bechor in this time, the kohen may sell it even to a Yisrael, unblemished while alive, and with a mum while alive or slaughtered, and he may betroth a woman with it, for it is like the rest of his property; but it is not sold in a butcher shop and it is not weighed, etc. Thus far their words. And we have already written this in section 2. And he may weigh it portion against portion; according to the explanation of Rashi, against chullin, and according to the Rambam, to divide it into parts and weigh part against part; and regarding the law they do not disagree, and the Rambam also admits that it is permitted against chullin (see Shach, subsection 10). And that which they ruled that one may betroth a woman with it, in Even HaEzer at the end of siman 28 they ruled that she is doubtfully betrothed, and there it has been explained with the help of Heaven.

The bechor is eaten within its year, whether it is unblemished or blemished, as it is said: "Before Hashem your God you shall eat it year by year," and "if there be a blemish in it... in your gates you shall eat it." And from when does one count for it? If it is unblemished, one counts for it from the eighth day, as it is then fit for offering. And if it was born blemished, one counts for it from the day it was born, provided that its months of gestation were complete, such that it was fit for eating on the day of its birth. But if one does not know for certain that its months were complete, one counts for it from the eighth day. And the same law applies if it was born unblemished and afterwards became blemished; one counts from the eighth day. For the general rule of these matters is that one only counts from the time it is fit for eating. Therefore, in this time, if it was unblemished, it is not in the count until it becomes blemished. However, there are specific laws in this, as will be explained, for in this the primary count is thirty days.

How so? If a blemish appeared on it within its year, he is permitted to keep it for the full twelve months. If a blemish appeared on it at the end of its year, he is permitted to keep it for thirty days from the time of the blemish, even though it dies after its year. How so? For example, if a blemish fell upon it fifteen days before the completion of its year, they complete for it fifteen days after the completion of its year. And similarly, when a blemish appeared on it after its year, he is not permitted to keep it except for up to thirty days and then he must eat it. And this case where within its year he counts twelve months, this is from the eighth day even if its months were complete, for since it was born unblemished, it was not fit for eating on the day of its birth (Shach, subsection 14). And there are those who even in this regard distinguish between one whose months were complete and one whose months were not complete (Beit Yosef and Levush), for so it is implied from the wording of the Tur, see there. But it appears more likely that there is no distinction, for so it is implied from the wording of the Rambam, see there. And the year of a bechor is a lunar year of twelve months from day to day, and if it was a leap year, it is intercalated for it and he counts thirteen months; and see what I wrote in siman 15, section 13.

Therefore, there are times when one born later has his year completed earlier. For example, if two lambs were born to him, one on the fifteenth of Adar Rishon and one on Rosh Chodesh Adar Sheni: the one born on Rosh Chodesh, once the first day of Adar in the following year arrives, his year is completed; and the one born in the middle of Adar Rishon, his year is not completed until the middle of Adar of the following year. For since he was born in the intercalated month, we count it toward Adar and not toward Shevat. And such is the law regarding two children concerning bar mitzvah, as is written in Orach Chaim siman 55, see there. And even though it is a mitzvah to eat the bekhor within its year, whether for the altar or for a commoner as has been written, nevertheless, if he transgressed this and delayed it even intentionally long after its year, it is nonetheless not disqualified even for the altar; the prohibition was committed, but it remains valid. And in Rosh Hashanah (5b) this is derived from a verse, see there.

The Rambam wrote there: A bechor in this time, as long as it has not appeared fit to show it to a sage, one may keep it two or three years. Once it has appeared fit to show it to a sage, if a mum was born in it within its first year, he is permitted to keep it all twelve months; and if a mum was born in it after its year, he may keep it thirty days. Thus far his words. And so it is in the Shulchan Aruch, section 9. And this is the explanation: "As long as it has not appeared fit to show it to a sage" means until a sage happens to be available to him, even though the mum has already been born in it, and he is not obligated to seek out a sage from afar (Tosafot, Bekhorot 28a, s.v. "ad"). And "three years" is not exact, and the same applies to more, and it is merely an exaggeration (and so wrote the Beer HaGolah). The Tur did not write this law at all, and the reason seems to me to be that nowadays there is no expert and we permit by means of three people, as I wrote in siman 309, and if so, it is not relevant to say "until it has appeared fit to show it to a sage." And I am wondered at the Shulchan Aruch and the commentators who did not write that nowadays this law is not relevant.