Siman 305

It is written in Parashat Korach regarding the gifts of the priesthood: "But you shall surely redeem the firstborn of man... and their redemption from a month old you shall redeem according to your valuation, five shekels of silver, according to the shekel of the Sanctuary, which is twenty gerah." For the firstborn were sanctified during the exodus from Egypt, as it is written: "And you shall set apart every firstling of the womb for Hashem... and every firstborn of man among your sons you shall redeem." And in Parashat Tissa it is written: "Every firstling of the womb is Mine... all the firstborn of your sons you shall redeem." And so too in the wilderness, when the Holy One, Blessed be He, commanded to sanctify the Levites in place of the firstborn, it is written: "Take the Levites in place of every firstborn among the children of Israel... and for the redemption of... those who exceed the Levites from the firstborn of the children of Israel, you shall take five shekels apiece for each head," etc.

Therefore, it is a positive commandment upon every man of Israel to whom a firstborn son is born from his Israelite wife, even if he is not a firstborn to his father, since he is a firstborn to his mother, he is obligated to redeem him for five sela'im from a kohen. And conversely, if he is not a firstborn to his mother, even if he is a firstborn to his father, he is not obligated to redeem him, for the Torah made it dependent upon the opening of the womb; when this offspring opens the womb of his mother, he is obligated in the law of the firstborn. This is the opposite of a firstborn for inheritance, which depends only on the firstborn of the father and not the firstborn of the mother, for such is the decree of the Torah regarding pidyon haben. Therefore, even if he had several wives and they gave birth to firstborn males, he is obligated to redeem them all, and he may give the redemption money to a kohen against his will, for in this matter a giving against his will is considered a valid giving.

The redemption is from a kohen and not from a kohenet. And even though regarding the gifts of the priesthood it was explained in siman 61 that one may give even to a kohenet, for in every place where "kohen" is written, "kohenet" is also implied, as we say in Chullin (131b), and such is the law regarding the first of the shearing, that one fulfills the obligation even when giving to a kohenet, as will be explained at the end of siman 333; nevertheless, regarding the redemption of the firstborn it is not so. And the reason is that we say there that while it is true that "kohen" implies even a kohenet, nevertheless, wherever it is written "Aaron and his sons," it means specifically kohanim. And regarding the redemption of the firstborn in the wilderness, it is written: "And you shall give the money to Aaron and to his sons" (Rosh, end of Bekhorot). And the Tosafot in Kiddushin (8a, s.v. "r"k") wrote that even regarding the redemption of the son, one may give to a kohenet, see there, and it requires further study. (And also for future generations, it is written in Parashat Korach: "And Hashem spoke to Aaron: And I, behold, I have given to you... and to your sons," see there. And the gifts of the priesthood and the first of the shearing are not written there, but only in Parashat Shoftim, and there only "kohen" is written).

The obligation is upon the father and not upon the mother, and in a case where the father did not redeem him, he is obligated himself to redeem himself from the hand of a kohen, as it is written "you shall surely redeem" (Kiddushin 29a). And his mother is not obligated to redeem him, for since the Torah linked his own redemption to his father's redemption, it follows that a woman, since she is exempt from her own redemption—for her father is also exempt from redeeming her, as it is written "every firstborn of your sons you shall redeem," and not the firstborn of your daughters—it follows that she is exempt from the redemption of her son. And it is obvious that there is no obligation upon the beit din to redeem him, for specifically regarding milah is there an obligation upon the beit din because it is written "every male among you shall be circumcised," but not regarding pidyon haben; rather, he himself, when he grows up, is obligated to redeem himself (see Rashi there, "you shall be redeemed, you shall redeem," meaning read it as "you shall be redeemed." Thus far his words. And in my humble opinion, the intention is regarding "you shall surely redeem," from which he previously derived the redemption of oneself; see there and examine carefully).

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote at the end of section 10 that the father cannot redeem through a messenger, and also the beit din does not redeem him without the father. Thus far his words. And all the giants of the world rejected his words, for in the entire Torah a person's messenger is like himself, and why should he not be able to redeem through a messenger? And so all the giants ruled in practice, and such is the simple custom, that the father, when he is not at his home, writes to his wife or to others that he makes them messengers to redeem his son from his property. And although he could redeem him in the place where he is, as we do not require that the child specifically be there—and he would not say "this is my firstborn son" but rather "I have a firstborn son whom I wish to redeem"—nevertheless, the giants wrote that it is better through a messenger than to redeem not in the place of the child. For how shall he redeem him? Perhaps the child died, and behold, he does not yet have a presumption of life as long as thirty days have not passed over him (Dagan Mereish). And although the majority of births are viable, nevertheless, behold we see that the Torah itself did not give permission to redeem him before thirty days, and in all matters we are stringent regarding man and beast: as long as thirty days have not passed for a man and seven days for a beast, they are held by us under the law of a nefel for all laws, as is known. And how shall he redeem him not in his presence? However, if he redeemed him not in his presence, the redemption is valid. And so it appears to me, that if they informed him from his home after thirty days that the infant is alive, he can again redeem even ab initio not in his presence, for he has a presumption of life, and it is better than redeeming him through a messenger; but before he had knowledge, it is better through a messenger (as appears in my humble opinion).

And behold, in truth, one must wonder about our teacher, the Rema, what he saw in this to rule such a surprising law; and that which he wrote, that its source is in the Rivash, it is not there at all. And it is clear to me that if he did not have some reason for this, he would not have ruled so. Therefore, it appears in my humble opinion that justice is with him, for any mitzvah where the Torah stated explicitly that "you" shall do it, it seems to me that there is no ability to appoint a messenger for this. Just as regarding vows (72b) in the husband's annulment for his wife, we establish in siman 234 like Rabbi Yoshiyah there, who expounds "her husband shall confirm it and her husband shall annul it," and not a messenger. And here too, since it is written "all the firstborn of your sons you shall redeem," and not a messenger. And it is not similar to milah, which was not mentioned explicitly in the Torah regarding the father, and the obligation of the father we learn there from "and Abraham circumcised Isaac his son," as is explained in Kiddushin there. But here it is similar to annulment; and even according to the Ran there, who explained that it is because it is written "her husband" twice, see there, here too it is written "redeem, you shall redeem." And if because it was needed for the exposition regarding his own obligation as I wrote above, behold, regarding vows too there are several expositions in the juxtaposition of confirmation to annulment. Furthermore, at the beginning of the second chapter of Kiddushin, it says that agency for divorce we learn from "and he sends" and "and she is sent," and it is not written "and he divorces." And regarding Kiddushin, because it is juxtaposed to divorce. And regarding terumah, because it is written "you, even you" to include the messenger, see there. And from this we learn that wherever it is written explicitly in the second person that "you" shall do it, it requires a derivation for agency. And in any event, it depends on that of vows in the dispute of Rabbi Yoshiyah and Rabbi Yonatan there, and we establish like Rabbi Yoshiyah. And according to the words of the Ran, whenever the language is doubled (and that which we learn from there for the entire Torah, that is that the concept of agency exists in the world, and delve into this).

There is further evidence to bring for his words, for behold it is written in Ki Tisa: "Every firstborn of your sons you shall redeem, and they shall not appear before Me empty-handed." The Torah juxtaposed it to the appearance [at the Temple], and the appearance of one's face in the courtyard is not performed via an agent, according to the law of all commandments that are incumbent upon his body to perform. And even though we do not have the ability to derive juxtapositions on our own, like a gezerah shavah which a person may not derive on his own, nevertheless, regarding this we find in Kiddushin ibid.: to redeem his son and to ascend for the festival—he redeems and afterwards ascends, because it is written "you shall redeem" and then "and they shall not appear," see there. And since the sages, of blessed memory, derived the juxtaposition for a certain matter, we are able to add more. However, from the plain meaning of the Baraita one cannot prove this law, for if agency is effective for the redemption of the firstborn, what relevance does the law of precedence have? For he is able to ascend for the festival and appoint an agent for the redemption. For there is no proof from this, as the explanation is that he does not have funds for both things, as the Rambam wrote in chapter 11 of Bikurim, law 4. This is his wording: If he had a son to redeem and the time arrived to ascend for the festival, and he does not have enough for this and for that, he redeems his son and afterwards etc. Thus far his words. Therefore, it appears in my humble opinion that the words of our teacher, the Rema, have a basis in the halacha and one should be concerned for his words (in the Tosefta of Bekhorot chapter 6 it says "to redeem himself and to ascend for the festival," see there, and certainly it is a scribal error, for behold in the derivation of the verse it is clear that it refers to his son).

And there are those among the great authorities who said that the intention of our teacher, the Rema, is not as many have understood—that he gives money to an agent and the agent redeems him through his agency, for there is no doubt that this is effective—but rather the intention is that the agent gives the money from his own and does not grant possession through another to the father of the son, for if so, it would be as his very own; rather, the agent redeems from his own money, and in this, our teacher, the Rema, forbids, and in this the law is with him, for the Torah insisted that the money must specifically be the father's (Chidushei HaGershuni in responsa Chamesh, siman 32, and Chatam Sofer siman 297). According to this, they do not disagree at all, but his wording does not imply so. Furthermore, according to this, it is not merely agency, but agency and the agent's money, and he should have explained it like that case in Nedarim (36b), one who contributes terumah from his own for that of his fellow. Furthermore, in any case, if agency is effective, why should it not be effective in such a case? For since he says to the kohen, "Behold, here are five sela'im for so-and-so," he perforce grants him possession through the kohen. And why should it not be effective? Is it then so that if the money of the firstborn's father were with a kohen as a deposit and the money was present, he could not redeem him with them? Rather, certainly its explanation is as all the commentators understood it. (And one should not raise a difficulty from Bekhorot 50a, where Rav Ashi sent thirteen zuz to Rav Acha for the pidyon haben, see there, for it is explicitly stated that one can redeem through an agent; for this can be rejected by saying that he granted possession to Rav Acha the kohen through another, or that he previously left a collateral with him, or that he said to him, "Behold, I am redeeming my son for five sela'im that I will send to you," and afterward he sent to him, for in such a case it is simple that it is effective according to everyone).

There is one who says that even though it is effective through a messenger, nevertheless, this is when the messenger acts after the thirtieth day, when he himself is able to redeem; but when he appoints a messenger beforehand it is not effective, for any matter that he himself cannot do, his messenger also cannot do (Dagan Merish). However, since we see that it is pleasing to him, he may redeem it when the time arrives based on the principle that one may acquire a benefit for a person in his absence (ibid.). In my humble opinion, this is not necessary, for he may certainly appoint a messenger even before the time. For even according to the one who holds this reasoning, that any matter that he himself cannot do he cannot appoint a messenger, as is found in Nazir (12), we only say this regarding a matter that lacks an action, such as one who appoints a messenger to betroth a woman for him who is currently a married woman, that he should betroth her when her husband divorces her, and the like, and as we explained in Choshen Mishpat siman 182, section 4. But regarding that which lacks time, we do not say so, for lacking time is not considered like lacking an action, as we say in Zevachim at the beginning of the second chapter, that a tevul yom is more lenient than one who lacks atonement in this specific detail, for one who lacks atonement lacks an action, while a tevul yom does not lack an action, for the sun sets on its own (see there in Rashi and Tosafot). For if it were not so, regarding every mission one performs in betrothal and divorce when the woman is at a distance, let us say that he himself cannot do it until the time of her arrival here or his arrival there, and it also lacks proximity to here. However, lacking proximity is not considered like lacking an action (ibid. 105b and Chullin 103); and similarly, lacking time is not considered like lacking an action.

And so there are those who wish to say that a kohen or a Levi cannot be an agent for pidyon haben because they are exempt from redemption, and anything that is not applicable to oneself is not applicable to perform as an agent, as we say in Gittin (23b) regarding a case where the agent is not subject to the obligation of that matter, see there. And according to this, he also cannot make a woman an agent to redeem his son, for she is exempt from the redemption of her son; yet there are daily occurrences where one makes his wife an agent to redeem the son when he is in a distant place. And there is one who says that a kohen is certainly valid for this agency since he is included in this mitzvah to have the firstborns of Israel redeemed through him (Chatam Sofer, siman 296), but Levites are disqualified for this agency, and consequently the same applies to women as I have written. But in my opinion it is not so, for all of Israel are included in the matter of the firstborn, meaning in the firstborn of a pure animal, in which everyone is obligated. Therefore, even though in the firstborn of a human, women, kohanim, and Levites are exempt, they are termed as being within the law of the firstborn. This is not similar to that of Gittin, where a slave is disqualified for the agency of gittin because he is not at all within the law of gittin and kiddushin. And a proof for this is that in the Shas it is doubted whether kohanim are our agents or the agents of the Merciful One; and how could it be possible for them to be our agents? For if so, how do they offer the bird-offerings of women after childbirth, who are not subject to this obligation? Rather, certainly since they are included in other sacrifices and in the bird-offerings of zavim, we have no concern with it, and here too it is the same. And one cannot say that they are included in the obligation of bird-offerings of women after childbirth for their wives, for the obligation is only upon the woman, except that the husband is obligated to give to her from his property. (And for the law, the Chatam Sofer also permits for another reason, because they are commanded to redeem the firstborns of Israel, see there. And his words require further study. And also what he wrote, that a kohen should not be an agent to give them to another kohen because he treats himself with contempt, just as a kohen who is a shliach tzibbur should not call another kohen, see there; this too is astonishing. For there it depends on him, whereas in pidyon haben it depends on the father to whom to give. Furthermore, if the second kohen is poor or a Torah scholar, there is certainly more of a mitzvah to give to him.)

And there is one who says that when one redeems through an agent, the blessing of shehecheyanu that the father is to recite is nullified, for the father is not redeeming and the agent is not relevant to shehecheyanu, but rather he blesses only "on the redemption of the son" (Tzelach, end of Pesachim), and he should not bless "on the redemption of the son" but rather "on the redemption of a firstborn." But this is not clear, for since he is his agent, why should he not also bless shehecheyanu to fulfill his obligation with this blessing, like one who recites kiddush for others on Yom Tov—even though he has already recited kiddush, nevertheless he recites kiddush for them and also blesses shehecheyanu, and this is a daily occurrence, and here too it is so (the Chatam Sofer, siman 298, also ruled accordingly, see there; and also in the gloss of the Perishah it is explained so in this siman, see there).

There is one who wrote that a person may redeem himself even from a minor kohen if he has reached the age of toddlers, and indeed one of the great authorities performed such an act (the Gara in the name of the Pri Chadash). And I wonder greatly at this ruling, for behold, the redemption of the firstborn is written in parashat Korach among all the gifts of the priesthood that are in the Temple and in the borders, and it is explicitly taught at the beginning of the seventh chapter of Menachot: A man shares, even if he is blemished, but a minor does not share, even if he is unblemished. And so the Rambam wrote in the tenth chapter of Maaseh HaKorbanot. And also regarding terumah it is taught in Yevamot (99b) that they do not distribute terumah to a minor in the threshing floors, and so the Rambam wrote at the end of the twelfth chapter of Terumot. And even though they may send it to them at home, this is because the terumah has already been separated in the threshing floor and the act of terumah is complete; but here, the redemption only occurs at the time of its giving to the kohen, which is like terumah in the threshing floor, where Rashi explained there that it is because it is a degradation of the terumah, see there. And here too, it is a degradation of the mitzvah, in any event, to redeem him from a minor, that through one who is not of sound mind the mitzvah should be completed and the father should recite two blessings; and especially when they perform the redemption in the presence of ten, it is a public matter, and this is like terumah in the threshing floor. Furthermore, one of the great authorities wrote to reject this ruling for another reason: since the Geonim instituted that the kohen should say, "Which do you prefer more, etc.," behold the kohen himself has power in this obligation, and a minor does not have the power to release the firstborn from his obligation (Chatam Sofer, siman 292). Furthermore, in the wilderness they gave the redemption money to Aaron and his sons, and they were adults, and from where do we know to say that for future generations it is not so? Therefore, one should not redeem with a minor kohen; but an adult kohen who is blemished, we have no concern regarding him, as has been written (but regarding the foreleg, the cheeks, and the abomasum, and the first of the fleece, which are written in Shoftim, and there it is written "and he shall give to the kohen," it is possible that even with a minor one fulfills the obligation).

It is a simple matter that if the father does not want to redeem his son, we compel him; and if it is impossible to compel him, others may redeem him. And this matter appears to be better than leaving it until he grows up and redeems himself. Therefore, when the father dies or is in a distant place, it appears that it is incumbent upon the beit din to endeavor to have him redeemed. But when the father is in a nearby place, another may not redeem him without the father's knowledge, for it is his mitzvah, and he certainly desires to perform the mitzvah himself. And there is one of the great authorities who wrote that when the father dies, others should not redeem him until he grows up and performs the mitzvah himself (Taz, subsection 11). And there is one of the great authorities who added further that others, even the beit din, do not have the power to redeem him in his minority until he grows up and redeems himself; for since the father died and the obligation is cast upon the son himself for when he grows up, if so, as long as he is a minor he is not commanded, and all the days of his minority are like within thirty days of his birth, where redemption is of no effect at all (Ma'adanei Yom Tov, chapter 8 of Bekhorot, letter 17).

And so it appears from the words of our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, section 15, who wrote: If the father transgressed and did not redeem his son, when he grows up he is obligated to redeem himself. And there is one who wrote that they write for him on a silver tablet that he is not redeemed and hang it around his neck so that he will know to redeem himself when he grows up. Thus far their words. And from the fact that they did not write that others should redeem him, one may infer that they hold that others are not to redeem them. However, in truth there is no proof from this, for they are stating the law, and regarding others there is no law that they are obligated to do so; but it is obvious that if they desire to redeem him, may a blessing come upon them. And so is the opinion of one of the great ones, that it is better that the beit din redeem him in his youth and acquire the money for the kohen on his behalf, because many times the tablet is lost and he will remain entirely without redemption (Nekudot HaKesef). And this is not like being within thirty days, for its time has already arrived, rather there is no one upon whom to cast the commandment except himself; and in truth the obligation takes effect upon him immediately, except that an obligation is not applicable to a minor. Therefore, if others exempt him from his obligation, it is certainly good and upright, but not that we should say it is like being within thirty days, and there is no reason at all to say that it is like being within thirty days (as appears in my humble opinion). And also, one should not say that this is not a merit but a liability because he wishes to perform the commandment himself when he grows up (and this is the reasoning of the Taz). And this too is not a logical premise at all, for on the contrary, it is certainly pleasing to him that the commandment be fulfilled according to its primary requirement from thirty days old. For when the Torah commanded that if his father did not redeem him, he is obligated to redeem himself when he grows up, it did not exempt this person from redemption upon reaching the time of his obligation, but rather there was no one upon whom to cast it, and the Torah did not cast it upon the beit din as it did with milah because there is a monetary loss here. Therefore, the Torah said that he is obligated when he grows up, but not that all this time there is no obligation at all upon this person. (And behold, the Chatam Sofer, siman 295, and the Chamudei Daniel, section 31, inclined toward the Taz and wrote that the beit din should redeem him now without a berakhah and hang a tablet on him so that when he grows up he will redeem himself again without a berakhah; but in all our days we have not heard of this. And the Gra, subsection 14, ruled simply like the Shach, and so appears primary in my humble opinion, and it seems that such is the custom).

The Rambam wrote in the eleventh chapter of Bikkurim: This mitzvah is practiced in every place and at all times. Thus far his words. And it is a wonder: what is he coming to teach us? It is obvious, for it is an obligation of the person, and in the Gemara this was not mentioned. And it can be said that he comes to teach us that even though this mitzvah is written in the portion of "And it shall be when He brings you etc. and every firstborn of man among your sons you shall redeem," I might have said that it depends specifically on Eretz Yisrael; he comes to teach us that it is not so. And similarly we say in Kiddushin (37a) regarding the matter of peter hamor, see there. And also regarding peter hamor the Rambam wrote thus in the twelfth chapter of Bikkurim. And also in the portion of Korach, pidyon haben is written among all the gifts of the priesthood, and I might have said that in a time when there are not all the gifts of the priesthood, there is no pidyon haben, and like the firstborn of a pure animal which according to his system is not practiced in Chutz La'aretz by Torah law—and it will be explained in siman 306—he comes to teach us that regarding the firstborn of man, one is obligated in every place and at all times.

How much is the redemption is explicit in the Torah: five shekalim. The Rambam wrote in the fourth chapter of Arachin that the shekel of the Torah is a sela in the language of the sages, and the sela is four dinarin, and the dinar is six ma'in, and in the language of the Torah, a gerah. Thus, the sela is twenty-four ma'in. And if it is difficult, for is it not written, "twenty gerah shall be the shekel"? However, in Bekhorot (50a) our sages, of blessed memory, said that they added a sixth to the weight. This is the wording of the Rambam at the beginning of Shekalim: The shekel mentioned in the Torah is 320 barleycorns, and the sages already added to it and made its weight like the weight of the coin called sela during the time of the Second Temple. And how much is the weight of the sela? 384 average barleycorns, etc. The gerah is sixteen barleycorns. Thus far his words. And this is what the Tur wrote here, that the redemption of a בכור according to the words of the Geonim is the weight of 1,920 barleycorns of silver. According to this calculation, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote at the beginning of this siman that five sela'im are 120 ma'im, which are thirty drachmas of refined silver. Rashi, of blessed memory, wrote there: two and a half ounces; so the Tur wrote in his name. Our teacher, the Rema, wrote that some say that five sela'im are approximately two Rhenish gold coins, which are two Polish gold coins. Thus far his words. And they are not like the gold coins of our time. And there is one who wrote three Reichsthaler, and not less than two Reichsthaler (Shach, subsection 1 in the name of Ma'adanei Melekh). And there are those who wrote five loth and a quint of the state of the Caesar (Taz, subsection 1).

And all these coins are not known to us, and according to the currency in our country, the Russian Empire, they are five silver rubles (Chachmat Adam). And there is one who wrote thirty zlotys (the Gra), and they are nearly close to one another, for according to the current calculation, five silver rubles are thirty-three and a third zlotys, as every silver ruble is six and two-thirds zlotys. And there is one who wrote that there must be eight loth of pure silver, which is called "fine silver" (the HaGrashaz). And one should not calculate in the sum of the five shekalim the value of the copper mixture that is in the coins, for it is not sufficient for the smelting of the silver from within it and its extraction (the Gra). And now we give six silver rubles of the silver currency of our country. And know that if there is not in them eight loth of pure silver, one must add coins until there is in them according to this measure.

And these five sela’im he gives to the kohen in silver or the equivalent of silver from anything he desires, and he may give part silver and part equivalent of silver, except for three things the Torah excluded, with which one may not redeem, and if he redeemed with them it is nothing and he must redeem it another time. And these are: lands, and deeds that he holds against others, and slaves. And in Bekhorot (51a) they derived this from verses. And there is a doubt whether that which was detached and subsequently attached is considered attached for this matter or not, and there is no doubt that a doubt regarding a Torah law is to be treated stringently and one does not redeem with this (see Sha’ar HaMelekh chapter 3 of Ishut). And know that the government deeds called "signatze" or "banknoten" that circulate as currency and are the primary coins in the country, one may redeem with them; nevertheless, in practice one should be stringent, and we have explained this in Hoshen Mishpat siman 66 section 9, see there.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote in section 4: If one wrote to a kohen that he owes him five sela'im for the pidyon of his son, he is obligated to give them to him, but his son is not redeemed. Thus far their words. The Rambam also wrote this there in law 3. They were very brief regarding this matter, for ostensibly the words are astonishing, as he only gave it to him for the pidyon of his son, and since he is not redeemed, there is no greater instance of a mistaken gift than this. However, the reason is that this is a rabbinic decree, for this matter was taught in a Mishnah (51a), and Ulla said in the Gemara that by Torah law his son is redeemed when he gives the money, and therefore he is obligated to give them to him, but by rabbinic law he is not redeemed, a decree lest they say one may perform pidyon with documents, and therefore he requires another pidyon. There is one who wrote that by Torah law he is redeemed by the fact that he obligates himself in a document to the kohen (Taz subsection 3), but it is not so, for in the Gemara they said he is redeemed when he gives, and so it is in the Rosh and in the Ramban in his laws, see there. (And according to what I wrote, even according to Rabbi Yochanan in Ketubot 101b, one must perforce explain like Ulla, and the difficulty of Tosafot there 102a, starting with "Amai," is answered, and it is possible that this is the intent of Tosafot in Bekhorot ibid., starting with "Amar," see there and examine carefully.)

And know that in the Mishnah it concludes with this: Therefore, if the kohen desired to give it to him as a gift, he is permitted; meaning, since he gives to him two times, the kohen may give him the second five sela’im as a gift. And ostensibly it implies that only in such a case did they permit the kohen to give it to him back as a gift, but not in every redemption where the kohen took only five sela’im. However, in the Gemara they said: We have learned this in a Baraita: If he took it and returned it to him, he has fulfilled his obligation, see there. And so we rule, and as will be explained before us with the help of Heaven. And it must be said that the Shas infers that if it came to teach us only this law alone, it would be a superfluous Mishnah. And what does it come to teach us? It is obvious! Since he took from him two times, it is obvious that he can return it to him as a gift. Rather, certainly this law refers to every redemption of a firstborn (and see the commentary of the Bartenura there in the Mishnayot, chapter 8, mishnah 8).

And know that the Tur wrote in the name of the Bahag that he is not redeemed until he says to him, "Take this for the redemption of my son," and he rejected his words. And in truth, it is not understood at all. And it appears to me that the Bahag did not possess the version in the statement of Ulla that "by Torah law he is redeemed when he gives," and it is evident in the Gemara that they emended it so in the Gemara, see there. And he explains that by Torah law he is redeemed immediately through the obligation of the document. And this is not "redemption with a document," for that refers to the document of others, but with his own document, the obligation is not in the document but rather in the lien of the person, and the redemption is completed by Torah law. Therefore, afterwards when he gives him the money, the kohen can take them for the document, and automatically, by rabbinic decree, he is obligated to give to him a second time. And for this the Mishnah said that there is no remedy for this except that he should give it back to him as a gift, as per the explanation of Rashi, see there. But if the kohen agrees to this, that he should say to him, "Take this for the redemption of my son," he has fulfilled his obligation even rabbinically, for it is not relevant to say "perhaps they will say one redeems with documents," since everyone sees that he redeems him with full silver. However, this is specifically with the will of the kohen and he waives the document for him, and this is also included in "if the kohen desired etc." But without his will, it is not in his power, for he is already redeemed and is obligated to pay him for the debt, and automatically the rabbinic decree is relevant. And the Bahag is dealing with the will of the kohen (so it appears in my humble opinion).

In Choshen Mishpat at the end of siman 204, it was explained that one who says he will give his fellow a small gift and does not give it, there is in this a status of "lacking in faithfulness." Therefore, if he said to a kohen that he would give to him to redeem his son and did not give to him, he is "lacking in faithfulness" and is obligated to give to him specifically, for this is like a small gift since he must give them. And even if he said it not in his presence, he must fulfill his word. However, if he retracted, it is a retraction, for these are mere words and he can retract. And it appears to me that even if he performed a kinyan sudar, he can retract, for money is not acquired through chalifin. Therefore, if he swore or gave a handshake, he cannot retract.

The Rambam and the Tur wrote: If he gave him a vessel that is not worth five sela'im in the market, and the kohen accepted it for five sela'im, his son is redeemed. Thus far their words. And they raised a difficulty against them, for in Kiddushin (8b) it is explicitly explained that this is specifically when there is some reason to say that to him it is worth five sela'im, such as a scarf for a Torah scholar or the like, see there. Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in his great work, answered that the Rambam's intention was also something like this—that in the market it is not worth that much, but there is someone for whom this object is worth five sela'im. Based on this, he wrote in the Shulchan Aruch, section 5: If he gave him a vessel, etc., provided that it is worth five sela'im to some person. Thus far his words. And the forced nature of this is evident, for if so, the essence of the law is missing from the words of the Rambam, and in the Tur it is impossible to interpret it this way, see there. There is one who says that when the father says, "Here is this object for five sela'im," it is effective when the kohen accepted it even if it is not worth that to any person; and the Gemara is dealing with a case where the father said nothing, but rather the kohen said, "To me it is worth five sela'im" (Bach). However, in the Bahag, a different version of the text is found in the Gemara: that in any case where the kohen accepted it for five sela'im it is permitted, even though it is not worth that to any person [see Shach, subsection 5, and the Taz at the end of subsection 5 struggled to interpret the sugya this way, see there; nevertheless, regarding the halacha, he also agreed to this, see there and examine it closely].

If he gave him a vessel for the redemption of his son without specification, even though they did not appraise the vessel first, if it is worth five sela’im in any case, his son is redeemed. We do not say that since they did not appraise it, the kohen’s mind was not resolved, for we maintain that an appraisal is not necessary (Kiddushin 7b). And if it is certainly not worth it, his son is not redeemed. Nevertheless, if the kohen wishes to keep the vessel and have him pay the remainder up to five sela’im, the father cannot protest against him and say, "I will take back the vessel and give you five sela’im or another vessel," for the kohen has already acquired the vessel, and that which is lacking of the five sela’im, he is obligated to complete. This is not called a "giving in error," for there is no error here in the essence of the giving, but rather he erred in its value. And behold, he did not sell the vessel but rather paid his debt, and it is like one who pays with coins and thought there were five sela’im here and it was found that some were missing, where that which he paid, he paid, and he must complete the rest; and so it is here as well.

If he gave the five sela'im even to ten kohanim, he has fulfilled the obligation. And it is not only necessary to state this when he gave all five sela'im to them together, but even if he gave them one after another, his son is redeemed. And certainly if he gave to one kohen little by little, he has fulfilled the obligation. And above in siman 61, we require that he give to each kohen at least the amount of a "proper gift," but here the poskim did not explain it so. And it appears to me that this is because there it is written, "And he shall give to the kohen the shoulder, etc.," we require the amount of a significant gift; but regarding pidyon haben, the language of "giving" is not written. And even though in Numbers it is written, "And Moshe gave the money of the redemptions to Aharon and to his sons," this language of giving is written regarding all of them and not regarding each one of them. Furthermore, for future generations, the language of giving is not written. Therefore, it appears to me that that which they said in the Gemara (51b) "ten kohanim" is not literal, and the same applies to a hundred or more, and so it is in every place in the Shas (see Gittin 44).

And know that in the Gemara they used this language regarding ex post facto, and this is the wording of the Gemara there: If he gave it to ten kohanim, he has fulfilled the obligation, etc. And such is the language of the poskim, and one should not prove from this that it is specifically ex post facto and not ab initio, as there is one who wished to say so (according to the Pitchei Teshuvah, subsection 10). For it is not so, as even regarding the priestly gifts in siman 61, where it is written "and he shall give to the kohen," which implies a singular expression, even so it is permitted ab initio to divide them among several kohanim, as is explained there. Certainly this is true regarding pidyon haben where this language is not written. And the fact that the Gemara did not use the language of ab initio was so that it should not imply that one is required to do so. However, it is certainly true that ab initio one must give all five sela'im together and not little by little, for as long as he has not given all of them, he has not fulfilled the mitzvah, and it is incumbent upon him to fulfill the mitzvah immediately. Furthermore, how could he recite the blessing when he has not yet fulfilled it? And even if he gave a mashkon it is not effective, for a mashkon is not an acquisition but merely security. And when he gives a mashkon, he must transfer to him the ownership of the object itself for the redemption and not as a mashkon. And one must be careful in this not to mention the language of mashkon. And if the object is worth more, he should transfer ownership to him in it to the value of five sela'im, and if the father later desires the object, he shall purchase it from the kohen.

It is stated in the Gemara ibid.: If he took it and returned it, he has fulfilled the obligation, and such was the custom of Rabbi Tarfon, who would take and return. Rabbi Chanina was accustomed to take and return; he saw a certain man who was going and coming before him (so that he would see him and return the five sela'im to him). He said to him: You did not resolve and give (a complete gift, but only so that I would return them to you). You have done a bad thing; therefore, your son is not redeemed. If I return them, your son is not redeemed (ibid.). It is clarified from this that even though the kohen has permission to return the five sela'im to the father, nevertheless, if the father relies in his mind that he will return them to him and does not give them absolutely with a whole heart, the pidyon is nothing, and the kohen must not return them to him in any manner. And according to another version of Rashi, even if he did not return them, he has not fulfilled the obligation. Therefore, one must rebuke the kohanim when it is evident at the time of giving that they take only for appearance, and the father gives only for appearance, as my eyes have seen many times and I rebuked them. And in truth, it is better that he should not return them at all, for because they have become accustomed to the return, they do not give with a whole heart absolutely.

This is the wording of the Rambam: If the kohen desired to return the redemption money to him, he may return it; but he should not give it while his intention is that he return it. And if he did so and he returned it to him, his son is not redeemed until he resolves in his heart to give it to him as an absolute gift, and if the kohen desired afterwards to return it, he may return it. And similarly, if he specified and gave it to him on condition that he return it, behold his son is redeemed. Thus far his words. For a gift on condition that it be returned is considered a gift, and it is superior to one who gave with the intention that he return it, where there is no gift here at all. But a gift on condition that it be returned is an absolute gift, except that he makes a condition with him that he return it to him, and it is like any other condition (the Gra, subsection 14, from the Rosh, chapter 4 of Sukkah). And furthermore, a gift on condition that it be returned is an absolute gift for that time, only that afterwards you shall return it to me; but without a condition, and even if he only intends in his heart that the kohen return it, there is no gift here at all even for that time (see Shach, subsection 8, in the name of the Responsa of the Rashba). And according to this, for both reasons, even thinking in his heart alone is inferior to a gift on condition that it be returned (and this is not like Tosafot, Bekhorot 51a, starting with "Hilkach," that if the kohen also intends to return it, it is not inferior to a gift on condition that it be returned, and Rabbeinu Tam who rebuked him was because his intention was for an absolute gift, see there and examine carefully).

And behold, the Rambam did not set a boundary for the kohen, neither regarding returning nor regarding a gift on condition that it be returned. Regarding returning, there is proof for his words from Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Hanina who were accustomed to return it. But regarding a gift on condition that it be returned, behold in Kiddushin (6b) it says explicitly that it is forbidden for a kohen to do so, as it appears like a kohen assisting in the granaries; see there. And it must be said that he holds that there it refers only to terumah and not to the redemption of a firstborn. And it appears to me that he was forced to this, for if not so, how were Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Hanina accustomed to return it? And why were they not concerned about a kohen assisting in the granaries? Rather, certainly regarding the redemption of a firstborn they were not concerned about this. And even though at the beginning of the fourth chapter of Bechorot they forbade a kohen to tend to a firstborn animal during the time that the owners must tend to it, this is because the time for its giving has not yet arrived, and in this it indeed appears like a kohen assisting in the granaries; but once he has already received it, he may do as he wishes.

But such is not the opinion of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, section 8. This is his wording: If the kohen desired to return it to him, he is permitted; but he [the father] may not give it on the condition that he [the kohen] return it to him. And if he did so and he returned it to him, his son is not redeemed until he resolves in his heart to give it to him as a complete gift. And if the kohen desired afterward to return it, he may return it. And the kohen should not be accustomed to return it to everyone, so as not to cause a loss to other kohanim, for because of this, everyone will only give their redemption of the firstborn to him. However, to the poor he is permitted to return it every time. And certainly for this reason he should not receive them on the condition to return. Nevertheless, if he transgressed and received them, and specified that he is giving it on the condition to return, the son is redeemed, for a gift on the condition to return is considered a gift. And specifically where he said "on the condition to return," but if he said "here are five sela'im to you and you shall return them to me," it is not a gift and his son is not redeemed. Thus far his words. And it must be said that they hold that Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Hanina would only return to the poor, and so it implies in the Gemara there, that they would praise Rabbi Tarfon for this, see there; and if it were to the wealthy, this is not a praise, but certainly it was to the poor and it is like tzedakah.

One must ask how they wrote previously, "But he should not give it on condition that he return it to him, and if he did so, his son is not redeemed," yet afterwards they wrote that he has fulfilled the obligation with a gift on condition that it be returned. However, in truth, their intention is that he gave it on condition that it be returned, but the kohen did not receive it upon this condition. This is what our teacher, the Rema, wrote, and this is his wording: "And the intent of the kohen from the beginning was not to receive it on condition that it be returned." Thus far his words. He wrote this so that their words would not contradict each other, as I have written. The commentators of the Shulchan Aruch (the Shach and the Taz in subsection 6) were pressed to explain that he did not say "on condition that it be returned," but rather he only thought so in his heart; see there. I wonder at this, for if so, what is it coming to teach us? Aside from the fact that the language does not imply this, furthermore, how is it relevant to say afterwards "and if he did so, he is not redeemed"—how is the kohen to know what he thought in his heart? But according to our words, it is well, for the father said this to him and the kohen remained silent and did not agree in his heart at the time he received it, and afterwards he decided to do so, and it is not effective. Nevertheless, regarding the halacha, there is no practical difference, for in either case it is not effective.

If one set aside five sela’im for redemption and they were lost, he is liable for their replacement until they reach the hand of the kohen. And thus the sages taught in the Mishnah (51a): One who sets aside the redemption of his son and it was lost is liable for its replacement, as it is said, "it shall be yours," and "you shall surely redeem"—when the redemption is "yours" [the kohen's], then he shall be redeemed. And the Merciful One said this verse to Aharon (Rashi). And it comes to teach us that even though regarding the redemption of a peter chamor we learned there (12b): One who sets aside the redemption of a peter chamor and it died, they are not liable for its replacement; and I would have said that since a firstborn human is equated to a firstborn of an impure animal, as we say there (10b), also regarding a firstborn human one should not be liable for replacement—it comes to teach us from the verse "it shall be yours" that he is liable for replacement. The Rambam omitted this law. And there is reason to doubt if he promised a certain kohen to give him the redemption and he set it aside and transferred ownership to him through another and it was lost, whether it is as if it reached the hand of the kohen and he is exempt, or perhaps since it is written "it shall be yours," we require specifically until it reaches his hand literally.

At the time that he gives the redemption money to the kohen, which is to say at the moment he holds it in his hand to give but has not yet given it, so that it is "immediately prior to their performance," he recites the blessing "...Who has sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us regarding the redemption of the son" (al pidyon haben). He does not recite the blessing "to redeem" (lifdot), as in the case of milah where one recites "to circumcise" (lamul) when the father circumcises, as I wrote in siman 265 according to the opinion of the Rambam, because it is possible for this mitzvah to be performed by the son himself when he grows up, and therefore he recites the blessing with "al." Afterward, he recites the blessing of Shehecheyanu, and then he gives the redemption money to the kohen. If he redeems himself after he has grown up, he recites the blessing "...Who has sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us to redeem the firstborn" (lifdot et habechor), and he recites it with the letter "lamed" and not with "al," because now the obligation is upon him and not upon another, and he recites Shehecheyanu. Behold, the poskim who disagree with the Rambam regarding milah and hold that even when the father circumcises he recites the blessing with "al," as I wrote in siman 265, disagree here as well and hold that even one who redeems himself recites the blessing "regarding the redemption of the firstborn" (al pidyon bechor). This is what our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 10: There are those who say that even one who redeems himself recites the blessing "regarding the redemption of the firstborn," and such is our custom. Thus far his words. The kohen recites the blessing over a cup of wine, "borei peri hagafen," and if there is no wine, he recites the blessing over other beverages (the Taz, subsection 10, wrote that with wine he should recite the blessing after "hamotzi," see there, but the custom is not so; rather, he recites the blessing immediately after the redemption and blesses the infant).

The Tur wrote that in the responsa of the Geonim it is stated: The enactment of the Geonim regarding the order of the custom of the pidyon and its blessing is thus: that the father brings his son before the kohen and informs him that he is a firstborn, the opening of the womb. And the kohen should ask him: "Which do you want more, your firstborn son or the five sela’im that you are obligated to use for his redemption?" And he should answer him: "I want my firstborn son more, and here are five sela’im for his redemption." And while he is giving them into his hand, he recites the blessing etc. over the pidyon haben and shehecheyanu. And afterwards, they pour a cup of wine for the kohen and bring myrtle, and he recites the blessing over the fruit of the vine and who creates fragrant trees etc. And the kohen blesses the son and returns him to his father and his mother etc. Thus far his words. And behold, the Tur cited in their name a long blessing for the kohen with the Name and Sovereignty, but the Rosh wrote that it is not within our power to enact new blessings, and they did not practice this blessing. Also regarding the myrtle, the custom is not so among us. However, the formula of "which do you want more" was cited by our teacher, the Rema, and it is printed in the prayer books, and such is the custom.

Many have wondered at this phrasing, for where do we find that the choice is in the hand of the father to give the son to the kohen? Our teacher, the Rema, explicitly wrote that if the father wants to leave the son to the kohen he does not fulfill his obligation, but rather he must redeem him. Thus far his words. However, the opposite is also puzzling: what is this terminology of "redemption"? For in all redemptions, such as hekdesh, ma'aser sheni, and peter chamor, the redemption is an exchange for the object itself; for if one did not redeem it, the object remains hekdesh, and the ma'aser sheni one brings to Jerusalem, and the donkey one breaks its neck. So too regarding a Hebrew maidservant, where it is written "and he shall redeem her," it is an exchange for her person so that she shall no longer be enslaved. But regarding a human firstborn, how is the terminology of redemption applicable?

Therefore, it appears in my humble opinion that the meaning of "why do you want more, bless your firstborn and give him to the kohen" is not so, but rather this is the explanation: behold, in Egypt the firstborn of man and the firstborn of animals were sanctified. Now, the firstborn of animals were sanctified for a sacrifice, but in what way were the firstborn of man sanctified? And what is the meaning of that which is written in Numbers, "I sanctified to Me every firstborn in Israel, from man to animal, they shall be Mine," etc.? Behold, in the wilderness their sanctity was for the service of the Mishkan, and the Levites were taken in their stead, as it is written there, "Take the Levites instead of every firstborn," etc. But if so, what is their sanctity for generations? And one cannot say that in truth they are not holy for generations, for if so, why do they require pidyon? Furthermore, behold, even the animals of the Levites were sanctified instead of their animals, as is explained there, and nevertheless, even for generations all the firstborn of the animals of Israel are holy; if so, the firstborn of man are also thus.

And the truth is so, that they are holy to Hashem like all sanctified things, such that it is forbidden for them to do any mundane matter, and their eating and all their actions are in holiness. And this is what is written at the end of Parshat Bo, "And you shall set apart (ve-ha'avarta) every first issue of the womb etc.," for the plain meaning of the verse "and you shall set apart every first issue of the womb" refers to the firstborn of man, as it concludes, "therefore I sacrifice etc. and every firstborn of my sons I redeem," for it counted both of them. And here too it is so, and so Rashi explained in the Chumash with a different phrasing, that "ve-ha'avarta" refers to the firstborn of man, see there. And in the Mechilta it is taught: "ve-ha'avarta" means nothing other than separation, see there. And in my opinion, this is the explanation: that they should be separated to Hashem. And it is known that this is a matter that is impossible to maintain; therefore, the Torah gave a remedy through redemption, for through this they exit from their holiness. And this is the statement of the kohen: "Which do you want more, either your firstborn son shall be entirely holy to Hashem as was the original intention at the Exodus from Egypt, or five sela'im for his redemption?" And the kohen informs him what the matter of redemption is, and to make him understand why the Torah required him to be redeemed. And this is like one saying: if we were to ask every father what is your desire, whether your son should be holy and unable to do any mundane matter, or to redeem him for five sela'im and he will be able to conduct himself in his world like all people—and certainly no father will be found who would not desire to redeem him.

The Tur wrote that one who has two heads must give ten sela'im to the kohen, see there. This is based on Menachot (37a) regarding an incident that occurred so, and the reason is because it is written in Numbers, "five shekels for each skull"; the Torah made it dependent on the skull, and when he has two, he requires twice five shekels. The Rambam omitted this law because we say there that he is a tereifah and will not live, and a tereifah is exempt, see there. The Tur holds that according to the sugya of the Shas there, it implies that in this case the Torah obligated him (for if not so, what does it answer with "it is different here because it made it dependent on the skull"? Ultimately, he is a tereifah. And one must say that this is the explanation: that in this case the Torah obligated him, for if not so, why did it make it dependent on the skull? See there and examine this carefully).

The bechor is not fit for pidyon until thirty days have passed over him, as it is written: "And their redemption, from a month old you shall redeem." This is a scriptural decree, and it is not intended to exclude the status of a nefel, for even if it is established for him that his months of gestation were complete, he is not subject to pidyon until this time (Tosafot Menachot 37a, s.v. Shomea). The pidyon is on the thirty-first day, as we derive "month" "month" from the wilderness; just as there it is written, "Number every firstborn male from a month old and upward," so too here, from a month and upward, which is the thirty-first day (Bechorot 49a).

And know that there are some of the great authorities who innovated a great matter regarding this, which is that it is known that the true month—meaning the renewal of the moon—is twenty-nine days, twelve hours, and seven hundred and ninety-three chalakim. For this reason, we make one month full and one month deficient in order to complete the calculation, as is known. If so, when the child is born at the beginning of the night, his month is completed on the thirtieth day after twelve hours and seven hundred and ninety-three chalakim of the day have passed, and after that he is called "from a month old and upward." And if one redeemed him then, he is redeemed. And also if it should happen sometimes that on the thirty-first day they are unable to redeem him, such as when it is Shabbat or Yom Tov, and he was born at the beginning of the night, one may redeem him on Erev Shabbat or Erev Yom Tov after the time that has been explained has passed from the day. And thus they ruled as practical halacha (Bach and Shach, subsection 12 and end of subsection 19) and they wrote that thus it was ruled in the Sefer Yereim, see there. And they wrote that the fact that in the Shas and the poskim they said the thirty-first day for redemption is because it is the habit in the Shas to call a month thirty days, see there.

And there is one of the great authorities who disagrees in this and is of the opinion that it is specifically the thirty-first day (Magen Avraham in Orach Chaim siman 339, subsection 8). And his proofs are from that which we say there: what is the reasoning of the rabbis? We learn it from the wilderness, as I have written. And it is difficult: why is a reason needed for this, since a month has not passed for him? Rather, this itself is what it asks: that after twelve hours and seven hundred and ninety-three chalakim he becomes a month old, and it answers that we learn from the wilderness that this is not effective. And this is no proof at all, for this is what it asks: that we should say "part of the day is like the whole of it," as in several matters we say so, and it answers that we learn from the wilderness that we require specifically "and upward." Furthermore, he brought a proof from Sanhedrin that in the language of the Torah a month is thirty days. And I wonder, for there they disagree whether an unspecified month is twenty-nine days or thirty days, and this is a different matter (see there, 11a); but forever it is a day until twelve hours and seven hundred and ninety-three chalakim.

Nevertheless, it appears in my humble opinion that the primary view is like this opinion, and I am very much astonished by the first opinion. This matter is explicitly stated in the Rambam at the beginning of chapter 8 of Kiddush HaChodesh, and this is his wording: The renewal of the moon is twenty-nine days, a half, and seven hundred and thirty-three parts, etc. From the oral tradition they learned that you calculate days and you do not calculate hours, as it is written, "until a month of days." Therefore, etc. so as not to calculate hours in a month but rather complete days. Thus far his words. Therefore, it is a decree of the Torah not to calculate the hours. And also regarding years it is so, for a year is twelve months, and the intercalation is performed to equalize the lunar months to the solar months, as is known. This too is a decree of the Torah, as the Rambam wrote there at the beginning of chapter 1, and this is his wording: And they make that year thirteen months, for it is impossible for the year to be twelve months and such-and-such days, as it is said, "for the months of the year"—you count months for the year and you do not count days. Thus far his words. Therefore, it appears clear to me that Heaven forbid one should redeem him after twelve [hours and] seven hundred and thirty-three [parts], but specifically on the thirty-first day. And if it falls on Shabbat or Yom Tov, he should redeem him afterward. (And the Rambam explained regarding this what they said in Megillah 5: From where do we know that we do not count days for years, etc. that we do not calculate hours for months, see there. And even though Rashi did not explain it so, nevertheless the law is true even according to Rashi's explanation, see there and examine it closely).

Furthermore, I wonder according to this opinion that the primary factor is 29 [days], 12 [hours], and 793 [halakim], if so, if he was born at the end of the day in a manner that at the beginning of the 31st day the 12 [hours] and 793 [halakim] have not yet concluded, shall we say that we must wait this amount of time into the 31st day? Regarding all such matters, the poskim should have explained them, as this is a very common occurrence and they could come to a mishap. And should you say that since our custom is to redeem during the day and not at night, if so, this duration has automatically passed as well—this cannot be said, for is it explained anywhere that one does not redeem at night? According to the law it is permitted even at night, and it was not mentioned by any posek even as a mere custom; rather, it is just the way of the world to redeem in the morning and make a feast, and many times they redeem even at night. Rather, it is certain that one should not pay any attention at all to the 12 [hours] and 793 [halakim].

When thirty days have passed, it is a mitzvah to redeem him immediately on the thirty-first day so as not to delay the mitzvah. One must consider whether he violates a positive commandment every day that he does not redeem him, as is the case with milah after the eighth day, or not. It appears from the fact that the Tur wrote the reason is so that he should not delay the mitzvah, and so wrote the Rosh at the end of Bechorot, that we learn from this that he does not violate it. There is further proof from the common custom that they redeem on the thirty-first day and do not redeem on the night belonging to the thirty-first day, for they do redeem even at night; rather, learn from this that there is no strict requirement. Furthermore, for we established that we do not redeem on Shabbat or Yom Tov because it is similar to buying and selling, and also giving a pledge is not effective since a pledge is not redemption, as I wrote in section 26, and if he grants him ownership of the body of the pledge, it would again be like buying and selling. This is a rabbinic concern, and if you were to think that he violates a positive commandment every day, we would not push aside a positive commandment for a rabbinic concern. However, if the infant is ill and has not yet been circumcised, nevertheless, one should redeem him on the thirty-first day and they do not wait until they circumcise him, for these are not dependent on one another. But if they circumcise him on the thirty-first day, certainly the milah takes precedence (Shach in the middle of subsection 12; and what he wrote there "and he gives to the kohen" etc. "within thirty" etc. has no explanation, and it appears there is an omission in his words, and it should be: "and he shall not give within thirty" etc. "and so regarding the blessing" etc. see there and examine carefully).

When the thirty-first day falls on a fast day, the matter is simple: we redeem him on the preceding night which belongs to the thirty-first day. And if it falls on Tisha B'Av, we redeem him after the fast at night. It is also possible to redeem on the day of the fast and make the meal at night; however, it is better to do everything at night so that the kohen may recite the blessing over the cup (Shach, subsection 12. And the words of the Magen Avraham in siman 568, subsection 10, who wrote: "And it requires further study if the thirty-first day falls on Shabbat and Sunday is a fast of the Ten Days of Repentance if they are permitted to eat, etc." Thus far his words. And it is a wonder: they should perform the redemption on Saturday night, and what doubt is there in this? And so they must do; and examine this well).

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 11: There are those who say that one should not perform a pidyon haben during chol hamoed, and there are those who permit it, and such is the primary ruling. Thus far his words. The reason of those who prohibit is because one does not mix one joy with another joy, like a wedding feast which is prohibited during chol hamoed, as written in Orach Chaim siman 546. And even though for a pidyon one does not recite the blessing "she-hasimcha bime'ono," nevertheless it is similar to an engagement feast where one also does not recite "she-hasimcha bime'ono," and yet it is prohibited to hold it during chol hamoed as written there. Those who permit it hold that "joy" is only relevant to matters of a groom and bride and not to a mere mitzvah, just as it is with a brit milah feast. And such is the custom, that we perform a pidyon haben during chol hamoed, and such is the primary ruling in law. This is the opinion of the Tosafot in Moed Katan (8b), and even when it is not in its proper time, it is permitted during chol hamoed; see there.

Since the obligation is only from a month old and above, therefore if the son died within thirty days, even on the thirtieth day itself, he is exempt from his redemption. And even if he preceded and gave the redemption to the kohen within thirty days and he died, he is obligated to return it to him, for it is a gift given in error; and if he did not return it, it is theft in the hand of the kohen. And so too if he became a tereifah before thirty, and even on the thirtieth day itself, the law is such; and even if he lived past thirty, he is as if dead, for a tereifah does not live. And even if it was a doubtful tereifah, he does not need to give until twelve months have passed over him, and for a certain tereifah, twelve months does not avail. And so too regarding a doubtful tereifah, if he already gave to the kohen, he does not need to return it to him, but for a certain tereifah, he must return it to him. And if he was not a tereifah and died after thirty, he is obligated to redeem him, as he was already obligated in his redemption, and he shall recite the blessing over the redemption because he was already obligated in its mitzvah; but he shall not recite Shehecheyanu, for even though one recites Shehecheyanu over the mitzvah, nevertheless one also needs a bit of joy for this, and since he died, the joy is nullified. And it is not similar to one whose father died and he inherited from him, where he recites Shehecheyanu, for there he recites the blessing over the money that he inherited from him. And it appears to me that here, even if he inherited from his son—for example, if he divorced his wife and she died and the son inherited from her, and upon his death the father inherits—he does not recite Shehecheyanu, for regarding the death of one's father, it is the way of the son to inherit the father and there is joy in this matter, as it is written: "Instead of your fathers shall be your sons," and not the reverse, for that is neither joy nor a blessing.

One who redeemed his son within thirty days, if he said to him "from now," his son is not redeemed, for he merely gave him a gift, as redemption is not applicable within thirty days, and he requires another redemption. And it appears to me that if it is known that he is an ignoramus and did not know that the redemption must specifically be after thirty days, it is a gift given in error and the kohen is obligated to return it to him, and he redeems now. However, if the kohen does not return it to him, nevertheless he must redeem now with his own money and litigate with the kohen. And if he said to him "after thirty days," his son is redeemed. And it appears to me that an unspecified statement is like saying "after thirty days," for presumably his intention was according to the law of the Torah, and when it reaches after thirty days, the redemption is fulfilled. And even if the money is no longer extant with the kohen after thirty days, similar to kiddushin in Even HaEzer siman 40. And some say that if the money is not extant, or if he returned it to the father within thirty days, even ex post facto his son is not redeemed, and it is not similar to kiddushin where it was in his power to betroth her now and therefore it is effective even after thirty days, which is not the case regarding pidyon haben. And this matter is a dispute in the Gemara (49a) and there are variant readings there, and therefore it is good to be stringent to return and redeem him without a berakhah (see Shach subsection 19 who disputed the Maharshal, who wanted to say that when the redemption falls on Shabbat he should redeem him on Friday and stipulate that he should not be redeemed until after thirty days, for it is not so; rather, he should redeem him after Shabbat. And what the Shach wrote, that when it is after 12 hours and 793 chalakim it is fine, we have already explained in section 42 that it is not so. And see Taz subsection 15 what he wrote: "And the same law applies if he spoke without specification etc. because he thought or erred etc. for according to the opinion of the Mahari even in this etc." Thus far his words. And it requires further study what the relevance of the Mahari is to this law; the Mahari deals with an unspecified statement and we say that his intention was for after thirty days, but when he erred or thought that one redeems within thirty days, it is obvious that it is nothing. See there and examine carefully).

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 13: One who is in doubt whether he is obligated in redemption is exempt, for the burden of proof rests on the claimant. Thus far his words. He left his words unspecified, and seemingly this is only in a case of doubt whether he is a firstborn; but if he is certainly a firstborn, only that the doubt is perhaps she is the daughter of a kohen or the daughter of a levi, then he is obligated in redemption, for the majority of Israel are not kohanim or levi'im. And even though we do not follow the majority in matters of money, nevertheless he is obligated to redeem him, for in matters of prohibition we follow the majority. And so too, this rule that we do not follow the majority in matters of money—according to what we explained in Choshen Mishpat in several places—is only when the possessor claims a certain claim that he is from the minority. And so too, when he is certainly a firstborn and the doubt is whether he was redeemed or not, although this is not similar to "I do not know if I repaid you" where he is liable, as written in Choshen Mishpat siman 75, for that is when the claimant makes a certain claim, nevertheless from the perspective of the prohibition he is not exempt, as is understood. And there is much to delve into this, and so too in every place where there is money and a prohibition, and logic inclines that he is obligated; and see in section 52.

If the father died within thirty days, he is under the presumption of not having redeemed, for it is not the way to redeem within the time, just as it is not the way to pay a debt within the time, until he brings complete proof that he redeemed; and this means that valid witnesses testify that he redeemed. And it appears to me that if he died on the thirtieth day itself, the law is also thus. And even though regarding a debt it is explained in Choshen Mishpat siman 78 that a person is likely to pay on the day the time is completed, that is when the litigant himself claims so, but for orphans we do not claim so, as is written there, because it is an uncommon matter. Furthermore, here the thirtieth day is literally within the time, and the way of all who redeem is to redeem only on the thirty-first day. And there is one who says that on the thirtieth day he is under the presumption of having redeemed, and there is one who is in doubt regarding this (see in the Gilyon HaMaharsha), and in my humble opinion it appears as I have written.

And if the father died after thirty days, he is in the status of being presumed redeemed until they say to him that he was not redeemed. This is the wording of the Mishnah in Bekhorot (49a), for in the first clause it was taught "until he brings proof that he was redeemed," and in this law it was taught "until they say to him that he was not redeemed." Rashi explained that a statement suffices without complete testimony, for this presumption is not a superior presumption, as the majority of people do not act to pay their debt immediately. Thus far his words. And according to this, even relatives and those disqualified from testimony are believed, for this is only a mere disclosure of the matter. And know that what Rashi wrote there, and likewise the poskim, that they shall say to him that his father commanded at the time of his death that they should redeem him, see there, is not meant specifically; for the law is the same if his father did not command anything because he was troubled by his illness and his death—as long as the members of the household say that he has not yet been redeemed, he is obligated to redeem himself when he grows up.

And know that below in siman 315 regarding a case of doubt concerning a firstborn of a pure animal, the Tur and Shulchan Aruch wrote that the Rambam and the Rosh disagree regarding "if a kohen seized it," for the Rambam ruled that we do not remove it from his hand, and the Rosh and the Rashba and the Tosafot hold that we do remove it; see there. But regarding a case of doubt concerning a firstborn of a human, and likewise regarding a case of doubt concerning the redemption of a firstborn of a donkey in siman 321, they did not mention at all what the law is if a kohen seized it. And it appears that in those cases even the Rambam admits that we remove it, for it is well and good to say in the case of a firstborn of a pure animal—where the essence of the firstborn belongs to the kohen—that seizing it is effective. But regarding a firstborn of a human and a firstborn of a donkey, where only the redemption money belongs to the kohen and not the essence of the firstborns, and the redemption money is the clear property of the owner, the kohen cannot seize it due to a doubt. This reasoning was mentioned in the Responsa of the Rashba (siman 310). And even though the Shas in Bava Metzia (6) challenges from one to the other, see there, it can be said that according to the conclusion it is not so (the Gra in siman 315, subsection 2, see there), for the reasoning is a powerful reasoning (and for the practical law the Urim VeTumim ruled thus in the laws of seizing, siman 2, and with this he resolves the contradiction in the Sefer Mitzvot Gadol, and so wrote Rabbi Akiva Eiger in the name of the Machaneh Ephraim; and delve into this).

If he himself was a firstborn whose father did not redeem him, and he had a firstborn son, he shall redeem himself first and afterwards he shall redeem his son, for the mitzvah of his own person is preferable, and furthermore, his obligation took effect first. And if he has only five sela'im, he shall redeem himself for the reason that has been explained. And it is not only necessary to say if he had the five sela'im before the son reached the thirty-first day, but even if they came into his possession on this day, the obligation of his own person also comes first. And if he did not have unencumbered properties but only encumbered ones, even though the debt is later than the time of the redemption, nevertheless the kohen does not collect from encumbered properties, for it is like an oral loan which does not collect from encumbered properties; and even though it is a loan written in the Torah, nevertheless it is not like a loan in a deed (and it is necessary to investigate how this is found, for encumbered properties are only lands and one does not redeem with lands, unless he transferred to him movables incidental to land, and it does not imply so in Tosafot Bekhorot 49a, starting with the words "Veredia," see there, and this requires further study; and I found in Tosafot Shevuot 4b, starting with the words "Bekhol," that they wrote to sell the land, see there, and this also requires further study, and look closely).

If the son grew up and his father did not redeem him, and now the son wishes to redeem himself and his father does not permit him and the father wishes to redeem him first because his right has not lapsed, so ruled the Rashba (Beit Yosef in the name of the Ha-Ittur). And if the father did not wish to redeem after the son grew up, we do not coerce the father after the son has grown up and has assets (ibid.), and we coerce the son to redeem himself. And if the son does not have assets and the father has, we coerce the father (it appears to me).

I have seen one who wrote that in this time, since we do not have genealogical records of the priesthood, it is proper for every kohen to be concerned that perhaps he is not a kohen and should return the money, and likewise he is obligated in redemption and should set it aside for himself. In my opinion, it is forbidden to listen to such words to diminish the status of the priesthood now, for it will lead to disparagement, and Heaven forbid to say so. For behold, even when Ezra ascended from Babylon, when all the kohanim had a written genealogy and for some of them it was not found, which weakened their priestly presumption, nevertheless Nehemiah said to them: Behold, you remain in your presumption; just as you ate terumah in the exile, so shall you eat now, as is brought in Ketubot (24b). And regarding this we learned there: "Great is presumption," see there. How much more so now, when kohanim have no written genealogy at all, and since none of them have a written genealogy, there is no deficiency here at all, as is explained there from the words of the Tosafot. How much more so are they in their presumption of sanctity, and far be it, far be it, to create regarding this any doubt or a double doubt, or to join this even for any combination whatsoever.

Kohanim and Levi'im are exempt from pidyon haben, for they redeemed the firstborn of Israel in the wilderness, as it is written: "Take the Levi'im instead of all the firstborn." Likewise, their peter chamor is exempt from redemption, as I wrote in siman 321, for they are equated to one another, as it is written: "But you shall surely redeem the firstborn of man, and the firstborn of impure animals you shall redeem." And one should not ask that if so, they should also be exempt from the law of the firstborn regarding their pure animals, since in the wilderness their animals redeemed the animals of Israel, as it is written: "and the animals of the Levi'im instead of their animals." However, this is not a question, for certainly if redemption were effective for the firstborn of a pure animal, it would certainly be so; but since it possesses sanctity of the body, one cannot distinguish between one animal and another, for in the wilderness we only find redemption for the ordinary animals of Israel, meaning for the lambs required for the redemption of peter chamor, or for the peter chamor themselves.

And so Rashi explained in the Chumash, and this is his wording: "And the cattle of the Levites in place of their cattle" — the cattle of the Levites did not redeem the firstborn of the pure cattle of Israel, but rather their firstborn donkeys, and one lamb, etc. Thus far his words. And so it is implied in Bekhorot (4a), which says: one lamb of a Levite redeemed several firstborn donkeys of Israel. And even though at the beginning of the sugya there it implies that even the firstborn of pure cattle were exempted in the wilderness by the cattle of the Levites, see there (and in Rashi and Tosafot s.v. "ve-od"), nevertheless, according to the conclusion it is not so. And even according to the beginning of the sugya, one cannot apply a kal vachomer to pure animals, since they themselves possess inherent sanctity. Furthermore, it asks there: for future generations, from where do we know it? The verse says, "And the Levites shall be Mine" — in their state they shall remain; it follows that we do not learn future generations from the immediate hour, and only from this midrash do we learn for future generations, and this is only regarding man and not regarding cattle. And firstborn donkey we learn because they were juxtaposed to one another, as I have written. (And it seems to me that this is the explanation of the verse in Parshat Korach: "You shall surely redeem," etc., "and the firstborn," etc., "you shall redeem," etc., "but the firstborn of an ox or the firstborn of a sheep," etc., "you shall not redeem, they are holy, their blood," etc. That is to say: I have juxtaposed for you the firstborn of an impure animal to the firstborn of man since they are subject to redemption, but the firstborn of an ox, etc., which are not subject to redemption and are holy in their bodies, therefore "their blood you shall sprinkle," even those of Kohanim and Levites; and examine this carefully.)

And even a daughter of a kohen or a daughter of a levi who is married to an Israelite, the son is not liable for pidyon, for the Merciful One made it dependent upon the opening of the womb (Gemara ibid.), and the essence of the firstborn status is not dependent on the father but on the mother alone, as has been written, that a firstborn to the mother and not to the father is liable for pidyon, and conversely he is not liable. And since this is so, it is simple that since kohanim and levi'im are exempt, all the more so that the daughter of a kohen and the daughter of a levi married to an Israelite exempt their sons from the status of firstborn. And so it is regarding the firstborn of a donkey, as has been written in siman 321. And if they became pregnant from a gentile, the daughter of a kohen who gave birth, the son is liable for pidyon, for behold, she was profaned by his intercourse from the sanctity of the priesthood and behold she is a chalalah and her legal status is like an Israelite woman; but the daughter of a levi, her son is exempt from pidyon, for she was not profaned by his intercourse and remained in her levitical status as before.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 18: And if she says that she conceived from an Israelite and the Israelite denies it and says that she conceived from a gentile, the son is exempt from the pidyon. Thus far his words. The explanation of the matter: An unmarried daughter of a kohen who gave birth to a male firstborn, and she says "I conceived from this certain Israelite," and he denies it and says that she conceived from a gentile, and he brings assessments and proofs for this; and even though since he denies it she is not believed against him and he is not his son at all, nevertheless, he is also not believed against her to say that she conceived from a gentile. And we say that she is believed to say that she conceived from an Israelite, and if not from this Israelite, then from another Israelite. Therefore, the son is exempt from pidyon, for we establish the money in its possession. Thus it is explained in Terumat HaDeshen, siman 267. However, a married woman who conceived, and the husband is a kohen and says that he is a mamzer, the father is believed even if she denies him, for the Torah believed him, as is written in Even HaEzer siman 4 (and the Shach in the end of subsection 23 wrote: and this requires further study, see there; and I do not know why, and examine this closely).

It is a simple matter that a Yisrael whose wife is the daughter of a kohen, and she became pregnant from a koti and gave birth to a firstborn, the father is not obligated to redeem him, for he is not his father; and also his mother is not obligated, as the redemption is not incumbent upon her, and he is obligated to redeem himself when he grows up. But if she became profaned through the intercourse with a koti and afterward became pregnant from her husband, the Yisrael, he is obligated in his redemption (Shach, subsection 22). And similarly, a kohen who has a wife who was profaned through the intercourse with a koti, and he dwells with her in a state of prohibition and she gave birth to a firstborn son, the son is obligated in redemption, for he is a challal and has left the category of kehunah, and his father, the kohen, is obligated to redeem him and takes the redemption for himself.

The Tur and the Shulchan Arukh wrote in section 19: A kohen to whom a challal son was born—if the father died within thirty days, the son is obligated to redeem himself, for the father had not yet acquired the redemption money. But if he died after thirty days, the father had already acquired the redemption money and his son inherited it from him; therefore, he should set aside the redemption money and keep it for himself. Thus far their words. It is clear from this that even though the father had not yet redeemed him, it is as if he redeemed him, since the redemption money belongs to him, and it is as if the father set aside five sela'im and redeemed him with them and kept them for himself, and the son inherits that right (the Rosh). This is only when he is the sole heir, but when there are other heirs, the redemption money is divided among them all (Perishah). And the matter is not understood, for in the end, he still has not redeemed him, so how can we say it is as if he redeemed him? And it must be said that since the essence of the redemption is the five sela'im, for the blessings are not indispensable, and it was incumbent upon his father the kohen to redeem him and take the money for himself, he acquired them without an actual, physical redemption. And it is as if he took the five sela'im from his property and gave them to his property; for is the father obligated in every redemption to give to the kohen immediately? Behold, he can say to the kohen, "take five sela'im from my property," and automatically here it is as if he took from his property and gave to his property.

A maidservant who was emancipated and an Egyptian woman who converted while they were pregnant and gave birth, even though their conception was not in holiness, since the birth was in holiness, one is obligated in redemption, as it is said, "the first to open the womb among Israel," and behold, the opening of the womb was among Israel. But if they gave birth previously and afterward, when they entered the religion of Israel, they gave birth, one is exempt from redemption; even though this is the first offspring since entering holiness, nevertheless, the womb has already been opened. And so too, if it is not known when she gave birth, whether before the conversion and emancipation or afterward, one is exempt, for the burden of proof rests on the claimant.

The Tur wrote: One who comes after a nefel whose head emerged alive—for example, a woman pregnant with twins, one a nefel and one whose months were complete, and the nefel emerged with its head alive and afterwards returned, and afterwards his second brother emerged and he is viable—he is not a בכור for redemption because of the nefel that emerged with its head first. And so too, a nine-month-old whose head emerged even dead, the one who comes after him is not a בכור. And so too, one who discharges something like a domestic animal, a wild beast, or a bird where half the features of their faces resemble a human form, or a sandal, or a placenta, or a formed gestational sac, or if the fetus emerged severed limb by limb—the one born after all these is not a בכור for redemption. But an eight-month-old whose head emerged dead, and one who discharges a gestational sac full of colors, full of variegated spots, or full of water or blood, and one who discharges something like fish, swarming things, or creeping things, and one who discharges on the fortieth day—the one born after all these is a בכור for redemption. A cesarean section and the one who comes after it through the womb, both are not a בכור for redemption. Thus far his words. This is because the first did not emerge through the womb, as we require "the opening of the womb," and the second because he is not a firstborn, for we require two conditions: firstborn and through the womb.

And like the words of the Tur, it is also written in the Shulchan Aruch, section 20. And they added to say that regarding the emergence of its head, we do not require the entire head, but rather from the time its forehead emerges, it exempts the one who follows it. It is a wonder regarding the Tur that he did not write this, as it is an explicit Gemara in Bekhorot (46b). It appears that he relied on what he wrote above at the end of siman 194, that from the time the majority of its forehead emerges, it is considered as born. Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, did not write "the majority of its forehead" because even there in his great work he did not agree to this; see there. And they challenged the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch regarding what they wrote, that an eight-month fetus that put out its head and died, the one after it is a בכור, for it is not so; for regarding an eight-month fetus there is no difference between living and dead (the Gra, subsection 39), as it was Shmuel who held this in Bekhorot (46b) and he was refuted. It is likewise explicit in Niddah (29a) that the head is like the majority of the limbs regarding a נפל; see there. And one cannot say that they hold this only when its head emerged while alive (and so it appears ostensibly from Rashi regarding that statement of Shmuel; see there), for in Niddah it refers to one that was cut into pieces, where it is impossible to be alive (and Rashi wrote so to emphasize the novelty of Shmuel's view; delve into this). However, the Rambam also, in chapter 11 of Bekhorim, wrote: an eight-month fetus that put out its head while it is alive; see there. This implies specifically alive and not dead, like the words of the Tur. This requires further study, for regarding matters of inheritance we require its head to be alive, but not regarding a בכור; and this requires great further study.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 23 that as long as the limbs are not formed, it does not exempt the one who follows it, and even in this time we rely on this. Thus far his words. These matters are clear: that when it is known that its limbs were not formed, it is a certain bechor and one recites the blessing over the redemption. And if it is not known, nevertheless, it is impossible to judge it as a doubtful bechor such that it would not require redemption at all, for the woman stands in the presumption that her womb has not been exempted, and also the nefel is in the presumption that its limbs have not yet formed; so it is explained in the Maharik, root 143. There are some of the great authorities who rejected his words based on that which is in Niddah (29a) that the majority of women give birth to a viable fetus (Chacham Tzevi and Shevut Yaakov). Their words are astonishing, for certainly when many months have passed for her, this is well said; but this one who miscarried in the early months, such that it is impossible for it to be a viable fetus at all, it is simple that she is not included in this majority (so wrote the Noda BiYehudah, Tinyana, siman 188).

And there is one who wondered about the Maharik, for behold, a majority is superior to a presumption, and since one does not follow the majority in matters of money, all the more so regarding a presumption (Pitchei Teshuvah in Nachalat Tzvi). But it is not so, for behold, with several presumptions one may extract money, such as the presumption that "a person does not pay within his term," and in this, a presumption is superior. And the reason is as we have explained in Choshen Mishpat in several places: that the fact that one does not follow the majority in matters of money is because the minority certainly exists in the world, and he can say "I am from the minority," which is not the case with a presumption. And one should not err in the wording of the Rambam in chapter 11 of Bikurim, law 14, who wrote: any non-viable birth whose mother is impure with the impurity of childbirth, the one who follows it is not a firstborn that opens the womb, etc., see there; for this is when she is certainly impure with the impurity of childbirth and is obligated in an offering, as he wrote in chapter 1 of Mechusarei Kapparah, see there. Therefore, such a child certainly requires redemption, and perhaps even with a blessing, and in any case, without a blessing he is certainly obligated in redemption.

One whose wife had not previously given birth and she gave birth to a male and a female, and it is not known which of them emerged first, there is nothing here for the kohen, for perhaps the female emerged first, and the burden of proof rests on the claimant. And if the midwife says that the male emerged first, she is believed, for she is believed even regarding inheritance, as I wrote in Choshen Mishpat siman 277. And it further appears to me that even though in Kiddushin (73b) it is explained that her credibility is only when she has not yet left the room, see there, nevertheless regarding a בכור she is believed in any case, and furthermore, even there the poskim omitted this, and we have already wondered about this in Choshen Mishpat there, section 13, see there.

If she gave birth to two males, even though it is not known which of them is the firstborn, he gives five sela’im to the kohen in any case—whether because of this one or because of that one. And if one of them died within thirty days, he is exempt, for he can say the firstborn died. But after thirty days, he has already become obligated in the redemption. Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 26: If the father died before he redeemed them, whether he died within thirty days or whether he died after thirty days and the sons are extant, they give five sela’im between the two of them, even if they already divided the property. Thus far his words. And this is the opinion of the Rambam. However, the Tur ruled that if he died within thirty days, even if they did not divide, they are exempt, for so it appears from the Shas (48a). And the reason is that granted after thirty days, when the father had already become obligated, his property certainly became liened; but within thirty days, when the obligation is only upon the sons, behold each one can deflect him according to the law of two individuals named Yosef ben Shimon, where one cannot produce a contract against them (see Beit Yosef). And they wrote that since it is a dispute of the great authorities, the burden of proof rests on the claimant (Bach and Shach, subsection 30).

His two wives who had not previously given birth and they gave birth to males, he gives ten sela’im to the kohen. And if one of them died within thirty days, if he gave within thirty days to one kohen, he must return to him the second five sela’im. And if he gave to two kohanim, if he was precise at the time of the act to say, "To you I am giving for my son so-and-so, and to you for so-and-so," it is simple that the kohen who took for the one who died must return it. But if he gave to them without specification, he cannot extract it from them, for each one will say, "Mine is for the living one." And it appears to me that this is when he gave without specification and said to them, "Here is for one and here is for the second," but if he gave them ten sela’im together for the two sons, they are obligated to return it to him, and this one returns half and this one returns half, for behold, he partnered them in the two sons.

Two of his wives were giving birth for the first time, and one gave birth to a male and one to a female, or a female and a male, and the offspring were mixed up, he gives five sela'im to the kohen from whichever way you look at it. And if one of the males died within thirty days, he gives nothing to the kohen, for the burden of proof is upon the claimant, as he can say the firstborn died. And if they gave birth to two females and a male, or two males and two females, and they were mixed up and it is not known which was born first, there is nothing for the kohen here, for I say a female was born first and afterwards the male. And in the case of two males and two females, even without them being mixed up. And examine this closely.

Two of his wives, one who had previously given birth and one who had not previously given birth, and they gave birth to two males and they were mixed up, he gives five sela'im to the kohen regardless of the circumstances. And if one of them died within thirty days, there is nothing here for the kohen. And if the father died, according to the opinion of the Rambam in section 68, the estate became obligated and they give five sela'im between the two of them. And according to the opinion of the Tur, if he died within thirty days, they are exempt. And if one gave birth to a male and one to a female, or a female and a male, and they were mixed up, there is nothing here for the kohen. And there is reason to doubt in every case where he is exempt due to doubt and the principle of "the burden of proof is on the claimant" applies, if he gave it to the kohen within thirty days, whether we remove it from his hand or not (see Pitchei Teshuva subsection 31 in the name of Tiferet LeMoshe that we do not remove it from his hand, and this requires further deliberation, and examine this well).

Two wives of two men who had not previously given birth and they gave birth to two males and they were intermingled, this one gives five sela'im and this one gives five sela'im. If they gave them and afterwards one of the sons died within thirty days, if they gave to two kohanim, they cannot extract from their hand, for each one will say: mine is for the living one. And if they gave to one kohen, even though the kohen can say to each one: yours is the living one, nevertheless, one of them writes an authorization for his fellow, and he shall go with the authorization and extract five sela'im from the kohen in any case. And the same law applies even without an authorization when both of them come and claim together, he is obligated to return (Shach, subsection 35). And if one gave birth to a male and one to a female and they were intermingled, or if they gave birth to two males and they were intermingled and one of them died, the fathers are exempt and the son is obligated to redeem himself when he grows up, for he is certainly a firstborn. And if they gave birth to two females and a male, or two males and two females, there is nothing here for the kohen. And according to the opinion of the Tur, even in the case of two males and one female, for each one will deflect him to his fellow (Atteret Zahav, subsection 24). And a woman giving birth for the first time who did not wait three months after her husband and married and gave birth to a male, it is a doubt if it is a nine-month son of the first or a seven-month son of the last, the fathers are exempt and the son is obligated to redeem himself when he grew up. And if one of them is a kohen or a Levi, he is also exempt. And two wives of two men, one had previously given birth and one had not previously given birth, and they gave birth to two males, this one whose wife had not previously given birth gives five sela'im to the kohen when the sons were intermingled. And if he died within thirty, he is exempt even according to the Rambam, since he was not yet obligated and they are from two men. And if they gave birth to a male and a female, or two males and a female, there is nothing here for the kohen. And the Rambam ruled in this that this one who had not previously given birth is obligated, and his words require further study (see Tur and Beit Yosef and Taz, subsection 28, and he had a different version in the Gemara, but even according to our version it is well, as the Gra wrote in subsection 48, see there and examine carefully).