Siman 266

Even though one who cuts or plucks one of the signs of impurity of the four appearances of nega'im transgresses a negative commandment, as we learned in the seventh chapter of Nega'im and in Makkot (Makkot 13a), nevertheless, when there is a nega on the foreskin – it is permitted to circumcise, even though by doing so he cuts it. This is the wording of the Rambam in the tenth chapter of Tum'at Tzara'at, law 5: One who had a baheret on his foreskin – he shall circumcise, and even though it is a milah not in its proper time, for a "positive commandment" supersedes a "negative commandment" in every instance. Thus far his words. That is to say: for a milah in its proper time, he does not need the reasoning that "a positive commandment supersedes a negative commandment." For this we derive from a kal vachomer from Shabbat which is more stringent – milah supersedes it, tzara'at which is more lenient, is it not all the more so (Shabbat 132b)? However, for milah not in its proper time, where the milah does not supersede Shabbat, this reasoning is required. And such is his intention in the first chapter of Milah, law 9, see there. And even though we say there that in the cutting of a baheret there is a "positive commandment" and a "negative commandment," nevertheless, there are those in the Gemara who said that it contains only a "negative commandment" (see Tosafot ibid. s.v. Hai). And the opinions are divided (see Mishneh LaMelech ibid.). Furthermore: aside from this, there are other derivations there that it supersedes, see there.

And know that it seemingly appears in the Gemara there (Shabbat 133a) that one only violates the prohibition of cutting the baheret when he intends to cut it. But when he does not intend—it is a case of a matter that is unintentional, and it is permitted. And we say there that the father intends to cut the baheret, and another does not intend. And we say there that if there is another and not the father, see there. And if so, why did the poskim not bring this law? However, in truth, it is well-settled, for we say this there according to Abaye who held this way. But Rava said there that in a case of pesik reisha, it does not help that he does not intend, and even another violates a negative commandment. And Abaye himself retracted, see there. And therefore they did not write this, because there is no practical difference between a father and another.

And when is it permitted to circumcise in the presence of a baheret? At the time of the circumcision, for the positive commandment of circumcision comes and overrides the negative commandment of cutting a baheret. However, if after he was circumcised a baheret grew on his circumcision, until he does not appear circumcised—it is forbidden to cut it, for since according to the Torah he does not need to circumcise a second time except by rabbinic law, it is forbidden to transgress a negative commandment. And the law of cutting a baheret applies even in this time, as the Rambam wrote in the eleventh chapter of the Laws of the Impurity of Tzara'at, law 6, that the purification of a metzora applies in the Land and outside of the Land, in the presence of the Temple and not in the presence of the Temple, see there.

The fact that milah overrides Shabbat and Yom Tov is only regarding milah in its proper time. However, when it is not in its proper time – it overrides neither Shabbat nor Yom Tov, and one should leave it for the next day. For that which milah overrides Shabbat, we learned from the verse "And on the eighth day he shall be circumcised" – even on Shabbat. And it is only on the eighth day, but when he was not circumcised on the eighth because of illness or another reason – it does not override Shabbat. And it also does not override Yom Tov, for we expound from what is written regarding Yom Tov that food preparation is permitted on Yom Tov: "it alone shall be done for them." And this "alone" is superfluous, and we expound from this: but not milah that is not in its proper time (ibid.). And one should not ask: behold, in any event there is a positive commandment to circumcise, and let the positive commandment come and override the negative commandment? For in truth, on Yom Tov there is a positive commandment and a negative commandment, as "a day of rest" is a positive commandment, and "no manner of work shall be done in them" is a negative commandment. And a positive commandment does not override a negative commandment and a positive commandment (ibid.). And if it is difficult, that if so, why is the exclusion of "alone" necessary? For it can be said that if not for the verse, I would have said that it overrides based on a kal vachomer from tzara'at, which overrides the service and milah overrides it, as we explained that milah overrides tzara'at even when not in its proper time; a kal vachomer for Yom Tov which is overridden for the service – is it not logical that milah should override it? Therefore, the verse "alone" is necessary. (ibid. see there. And be precise and you will find it easy.)

And even circumcision in its proper time—only the essence of the circumcision overrides Shabbat and Yom Tov. And so too the periah and the metzitzah, for even though metzitzah is not of the essence of the circumcision, yet since there is danger without metzitzah—it overrides. And so too if he left over tzitzin that invalidate the circumcision, even if he withdrew—he returns and circumcises. And this is if there remained from the skin of the orlah the skin that covers the majority of the height of the atarah even in one place, or the circumference of the atarah even without the majority of its height, as I wrote in siman 264. But if there remained tzitzin that do not invalidate the circumcision—certainly when he has not withdrawn, he cuts everything. But when he has withdrawn—he does not return for them. And it appears to me that it is necessary to repair it after Shabbat and after Yom Tov. And in Orach Chaim siman 331 we explained further on this.

And likewise, one may place a plaster and cumin upon it to heal it, for this is a necessity and there is no Torah prohibition in this. Furthermore, there is danger to the infant in this, and even a Torah prohibition is permitted. However, all this applies to a matter that cannot be done from the eve of Shabbat, such as the circumcision itself. But a matter that can be done from the eve of Shabbat does not override the Shabbat. Therefore, the medicine that must be prepared, wherein there is a Torah prohibition such as the grinding of ingredients which involves the prohibition of grinding, behold, he could have ground them from the eve of Shabbat. And likewise, all preparatory acts of circumcision do not override the Shabbat, such as making a knife for circumcising, or sharpening it, or bringing it through a public domain—it does not override the Shabbat because he could have done it from the eve of Shabbat. And if he did not prepare from the eve of Shabbat, they postpone the circumcision to the following day.

And not only does it not override a Torah prohibition in a matter that could have been done from the eve of Shabbat, but it does not even override a rabbinic prohibition. In this, the sages upheld their words even in a place of a mitzvah that involves karet, so that the Children of Israel would be careful regarding the desecration of Shabbats. Therefore, if the knife was in one of the houses of the courtyard, and all the houses of the courtyard did not make an eruv such that it is now forbidden to carry from house to house, and the infant was in one house of the courtyard and the knife in the second house—one may not bring the knife to the house where the infant is. And also the infant one may not bring to the house where the knife is, for even though a living being carries itself, nevertheless, they must return him to his mother after the milah. And then, because of the milah, he is like one bound, and he does not carry himself (Tosafot at the beginning of the chapter "Rabbi Eliezer de-Milah" (Shabbat 130a)). However, in this there is a remedy: that all the residents of the courtyard shall nullify their domain in the courtyard and in the houses to the owner of the house where the infant is, and then it will be permitted to take the knife from that house where it is placed. And so Rashi performed an act regarding a certain wedding canopy, where they forgot and did not make an eruv, and they needed to carry from house to house, and he permitted it for them by means of nullification of domain (Tosafot Eruvin 64a s.v. "Im Ken"). And even those who disagree with him—they admit if they left over one room that they did not nullify (ibid.). And this matter was explained in Orach Chaim siman 381, see there.

However, if the infant was in one courtyard and the knife in another courtyard, and in a manner where nullification of domain would not be effective there, such as where another courtyard intervenes between them and the like, and even though it is possible to bring it without a Torah prohibition to transfer it through a public domain but rather to bring it through roofs, courtyards, and alleys that were not joined by an eruv together, which is only a rabbinic prohibition—it is forbidden. And even though we hold in Orach Chaim siman 372 that roofs, courtyards, and enclosures are all one domain even when they did not join by an eruv, and it is permitted to carry from one to the other—this applies to vessels that rested in them at the onset of Shabbat and not to vessels that rested in the houses, as is explained there. Therefore, when the knife was in a house, it is forbidden to take it out through these. And according to this, if the knife truly did not rest in a house, but rather was lying in a courtyard or on a roof, it is permitted to bring it from courtyard to courtyard. For one does not need an eruv for this, as such is the law even for a voluntary matter as I have written there. And we do not decree that if we carry vessels that rested in a courtyard from one to another, one will come to carry also vessels that rested in a house, for we are not concerned about this. And it is not only if each courtyard did not join an eruv for itself, for then vessels of the houses are not commonly found in the courtyard, since it is forbidden to take out from a house to a courtyard without an eruv. Rather, even if each courtyard joined an eruv for itself, such that now vessels of the houses are commonly found in the courtyard, nevertheless we do not decree, for thus we hold in Orach Chaim there, see there. (And according to this, it must be said that the infant was also in a courtyard. And this is the opinion of the Tosafot and the Rif at the beginning of the chapter "Rabbi Eliezer de-Milah." But the opinion of Rashi there (Shabbat 130b) s.v. "ve-aytuha me-hai reisha," was that the infant was in one house and the scalpel in another house, see there. And it is not understood at all, for regarding vessels that rested in a house even Rabbi Shimon admits. But the Maharsha there has already elaborated that Rashi holds like the approach of the authorities brought by the Rif, that according to Rabbi Shimon it is permitted even with vessels that rested in a house. And they did not establish their words, since for him there is a permission regarding vessels that rested in a courtyard: the matter is not recognizable at all and it is permitted, see there. However, the Tur and Shulchan Aruch follow the approach of the Tosafot and the Rif. And the difficulty is evident in saying that the infant was in a courtyard. And perhaps they also hold that when this courtyard that the infant was in joined an eruv—it is permitted to bring the knife even to the house when it rested in a courtyard, for in this they did not decree. And so it appears to me from a precision in the wording of the Tosafot there in s.v. "le-kelim" where they wrote: And so was that scalpel. Thus far his words, and they did not mention the infant. And with this the complaint of the Maharsha is removed. Examine and you will find it simple.)

And that which is forbidden to bring the knife even in rabbinic domains, this is by means of an Israelite. But by means of a gentile it is permitted in a rabbinic prohibition, for this is a shevut d'shevut, and they did not decree in a place of a mitzvah. This is the wording of the Rambam at the end of the second chapter of Milah: If they forgot and did not bring a knife from the eve of Shabbat – one tells a gentile to bring a knife on Shabbat, provided that he does not bring it through a public domain. The general rule of the matter: anything whose performance on Shabbat is forbidden to us due to shevut – it is permitted for us to tell a gentile to do it in order to perform a mitzvah in its proper time. And a matter whose performance on Shabbat is forbidden to us due to melakhah – it is forbidden for us to tell a gentile to do it on Shabbat. Thus far his words. And so wrote the Tur and the Shulchan Arukh in section 5. And according to this approach, just as they forbade a rabbinic melakhah by means of the Israelite himself for the sake of milah, as has been explained that it is forbidden to move the knife even in rabbinic domains, likewise they forbade a Torah melakhah by means of a gentile, for this too is a shevut. And even though for the sake of the mitzvah of settling the Land of Israel they permitted telling a gentile even regarding a Torah prohibition, however, for the sake of another mitzvah they did not permit it, and even for milah they did not permit it. But the Bahag holds that even regarding milah they permitted telling a gentile even regarding a Torah prohibition. And it is not similar to a rabbinic prohibition by means of the Israelite himself which is more severe, for that is called a shevut that involves an action, and telling a gentile is called a shevut that does not involve an action. But all of our teachers do not hold accordingly. (And according to our version in Eruvin 68a: "And is there no difference to you between a shevut that involves an action etc., for the master did not say to the gentile 'go heat it up' explicitly" – it is explained not like the Bahag. But the Bahag did not have this version, as the Rif and the Rosh wrote at the beginning of the chapter "Rabbi Eliezer de-Milah." See there that they wrote so, that according to this approach we do not have this version, and they rejected it, see there. And examine and you will find it easy.)

And I am astonished at our teacher, the Rema, who in Orach Chaim, siman 276, section 2, wrote that there are those who say it is permitted to tell a non-Jew to light a candle for him for the Shabbat meal, because he holds that it is permitted to speak to a non-Jew even regarding a complete labor in a place of a mitzvah, etc., and one should be stringent in a place where there is no great need, etc. Thus far his words. And this is the opinion of the Ittur brought by the Ran at the end of the chapter "Rabbi Eliezer De-Mila," for he holds like the Bahag that regarding milah it is permitted to tell a non-Jew to perform even a Torah labor. And the Ittur derived from this for other mitzvot as well. And it is a wondrous thing that for the Shabbat meal he brought this opinion, yet regarding milah itself, than which there is nothing greater, he did not bring it. And behold, from his wording it is clear that in a case of great need one may rely on this, and what great need is greater than milah? And one cannot say that he relied here on what he wrote in Orach Chaim, for if so, he should have noted to see there, as is his way in every place. And it must be said that he holds that only in a place of a passing mitzvah may one rely on this and not regarding milah, for if he does not circumcise today, he will circumcise tomorrow. And even though milah in its proper time is a great mitzvah, nevertheless, in any event it is not passing, and he will fulfill it on the following day. And nevertheless, it requires further study. (And afterwards I saw that in Orach Chaim, siman 331, he noted to there, and according to this it sits well. Examine and you will find it simple.)

And so, one may not grind spices on Shabbat before the milah, nor heat hot water for it, and one may not make a plaster for it, nor mix wine and oil for it as was their custom, for in all of these there is a Torah-prohibited labor. And even regarding a rabbinically-prohibited labor such as mixing wine and oil—which means that they beat them and mix them very well (Shabbat 134a), for it seems to me that there is no Torah prohibition in this—nevertheless, since it was possible to do it on Erev Shabbat, it is forbidden on Shabbat. Therefore, if he did not grind the spices on Erev Shabbat, he chews with his teeth by way of a shinui, for there is no category of labor in this at all. And if he did not mix wine and oil on Erev Shabbat, he places this by itself and that by itself. And one may not make a garment for the milah, as their way was to make a kind of tight pocket, and they would clothe the milah up to the corona and tie it there so that the skin would not return to cover the organ (Rashi 133a (Shabbat 133a)). But he may wrap a rag around it. And if he also did not prepare this there on Erev Shabbat, he wraps it around his finger and brings it from another courtyard by way of a garment (and among us we do not practice this at all). And it is permitted to bring it even from a courtyard that is not joined by an eruv, since he brings it by way of a garment and not by way of a public domain, for it is not a true garment.

And all this is before the circumcision. But if they circumcised him on Shabbat and the medications were scattered, or they forgot that there are no medications—they perform everything for him on Shabbat as on a weekday, because it is a danger to him, and he is like any person who is dangerously ill for whom one profanes the Shabbat. And if they prepared medications on the eve of Shabbat and they were scattered before the circumcision, there are some of our teachers who hold that they circumcise him, and they do not postpone the circumcision since he stood ready to be circumcised. And afterward, automatically, they profane the Shabbat for him. And this is the opinion of the Ramban (Shach, subsection 6). But the Me'or and the Rashba disagree on this, and they hold that they postpone the circumcision, and so the later authorities decided (Levush and Bach and Shach ibid.). And the law of washing the infant before the circumcision and after it was explained in Orach Chaim siman 331, see there. And among us, the custom is not to wash at all even on a weekday. And know that all the preparations for circumcision that do not postpone Shabbat—they also do not postpone Yom Tov, except for this: that they grind cumin for it on Yom Tov since it is fit for a pot. And similarly, they mix wine and oil for it, and anything similar to this that is fit for a cooked dish, and it is simple. And Yom Kippur, its law is like Shabbat.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 2 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 266:2) that it is permitted to handle the izmel after the milah to put it away in a courtyard with an eruv, even though it is no longer needed for that same Shabbat, for it was not set aside at twilight since it was needed for that same Shabbat. Thus far his words. And this is not understood at all: what does the matter of being set aside at twilight have to do with this? For we only say this regarding a thing that became fit on Shabbat, but since it was set aside at twilight, it is set aside for the entire day, and not regarding a thing that is inherently muktzah. And a knife for milah is certainly more muktzah than a butcher's knife (Shabbat 123b) because people are particular about it. And it was only permitted for the mitzvah, and once its mitzvah is performed, it is forbidden to handle it. And there are those who wrote that it is because there is no muktzah for half a Shabbat. And this is even more puzzling: what does this matter have to do with that? And they have already challenged this (Taz subsection 1). And in truth, it is found in the Maharil that he forbade handling the knife after the milah. And that which they wrote in the name of the Ramban, that since one handled it permissibly one may return it to any place one desires (see Beit Yosef and Taz ibid.), and they labored over his intent, it seems to me that this is what he is saying: that any muktzah, when one is holding it in one's hand, one is permitted to place it in any place one desires, and one is not obligated to cast it from one's hands immediately, as I wrote in Orach Chaim siman 308. And this is what the Ramban says, that since one is holding it in one's hand at the time of the milah, one is permitted to place it in any place one desires. But once one has placed it down, it is certainly forbidden to handle it.

It appears to me regarding the intention of our teacher, the Rema, that were it not set aside for the twilight period, we would say "it is set aside for the entire day," and it would not be permitted to handle it except at the actual time of the circumcision. But since "set aside for the twilight period" is not applicable, but rather it is inherently muktzeh, and muktzeh is a rabbinic prohibition, we say that its handling was permitted to him at the time of the circumcision, and also after the circumcision until he stows it away properly. And there is a great reason for the matter: for since the sages permitted this muktzeh for the sake of the circumcision, therefore regarding everything that pertains to the circumcision and its preparation, whether before it or after it, the muktzeh status is removed for this time, and this is also the meaning of "there is no muktzeh for half a Shabbat." (And the proofs of the Taz from a vessel are not a comparison, as the Nekudot HaKesef wrote. And the proof from a shofar can also be rejected, for a shofar will not be damaged, which is not the case with a circumcision knife. For if they leave it there—they will use it for other things and it will be damaged. And the Gra in subsection 3 challenged this from the Tosefta of Sukkah, that when one places the lulav on the ground it is forbidden to handle it—this is also because there is no concern for damage as there is with a knife. And that which the Gra wrote, that the reason it is permitted to place it wherever he wishes once he holds it in his hand is because it is a "vessel whose work is for a forbidden purpose" where the handling began in a permitted manner, and not regarding absolute muktzeh—he follows his reasoning in Orach Chaim at the end of siman 266. And the Magen Avraham there in subsection 19 did not write so. Furthermore: even according to the words of the Gra, here it certainly began in a permitted manner and for a mitzvah, so why should it be worse than there? And according to what I wrote regarding the reasoning of the Rema, all of this is not necessary. Examine it and you will find it simple.)

There is one who forbids wiping the blood from the scalpel on Shabbat (the Levush). However, this is not the custom. Furthermore, from the essential law it seems to me that it is permitted, for since it is permitted to handle it for the purpose of the milah—certainly anything that pertains to the matter of the milah is not subject to muktzah, just as I wrote in the previous section according to the opinion of our teacher, the Rema. Especially since it is known that the knife of milah, if they do not keep it clean, will harm the infants. And until they clean it, muktzah does not apply to it, as it is called the needs of milah. It is only the orlah, once he has cast it away, that is forbidden to handle. And there is one who permits, when he has not yet cast it into the dust, to handle it again to place it in the dust. But this is not clear to me at all. The third law of milah was explained in Orach Chaim siman 331, see there.

A person who has never performed a circumcision—he shall not circumcise for the first time on Shabbat, lest he ruin it, and it will be found that he desecrated Shabbat and did not fulfill the mitzvah. But once he has circumcised a first time—he may circumcise a second time on Shabbat. And a chazakah is not required here, for this is only a concern lest his hands not be skilled. And since he skilled his hands the first time—it is sufficient (Taz, subsection 6). And there is one who is stringent to require no less than two times that he circumcises on a weekday, and then it is permitted to circumcise on Shabbat (Bach). And in all this there is no distinction between his father and another, for there is one who distinguishes in this as the Tur wrote, see there. And we do not hold accordingly (see Bach and Shach, subsection 7). And also one who has not performed periah—he shall not perform periah for the first time on Shabbat.

One who is born during bein hashemashot, which is a doubt whether it is day or doubt whether it is night—one counts from the night, and he is circumcised on the ninth day which is a doubtful eighth. Therefore, when he is born on Erev Shabbat during bein hashemashot—one counts from the day of Shabbat, and he is not circumcised on the following Shabbat, for perhaps it was day and his time was on Erev Shabbat, and it would be a milah not in its time which does not supersede Shabbat. He is circumcised on Sunday, a doubtful ninth or doubtful tenth. And if Sunday and Monday were Yom Tov—he is circumcised on Tuesday, for even Yom Tov a milah not in its time does not supersede, and even the second Yom Tov of the diaspora. And this is what the sages taught in the Mishnah (Shabbat 137a): A child is circumcised on the eighth, on the ninth, and on the tenth, and on the eleventh, and on the twelfth, see there. And this is in the manner that we have explained.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 9 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 266:9): Regarding the duration of bein hashemashot, the Tanna'im and Amora'im disagreed at the end of the chapter "Bameh Madlikin." The author of the Ittur wrote that we are in doubt as to whom the halacha follows. Therefore, if a child was born after the sun has set—it is a doubt until the conclusion of the bein hashemashot of Rabbi Yose, and he is circumcised on the tenth day (when he was born on Friday during bein hashemashot). And if he was born on Saturday night after the sun has set—we act stringently according to the view of Rava. Thus far his words. The matter of bein hashemashot is long and deep, and its place is in Orach Chaim siman 261. However, in the winter or during rainy days, when the sky is covered with clouds and the sun does not shine—one must understand according to the appearance of the day, or by a reliable timepiece. However, if there is even a slight doubt—we calculate from the following day. And everything is according to the perception of the experts.

A minor who was born circumcised, and one who has two orlas, two penises, or two skins one on top of the other, and an androgynos, and one born via cesarean section, and a slave born in the house whose mother did not immerse until she gave birth, even though they are circumcised on the eighth day—they do not override the Shabbat. And all this our sages, of blessed memory, learned from verses (Shabbat 135a). And a tumtum who was torn open and found to be a male—one circumcises him on Shabbat. And some forbid it. And this matter depends on the sugya in Bava Batra (Bava Batra 126b). And the Rambam did not mention the law of a tumtum at all, because he holds that it is a simple matter that it overrides Shabbat. Nevertheless, he should have mentioned it, and it requires further study. And a Jewish transgressor to whom a son was born from a female transgressor—one circumcises him on Shabbat. But one born from a gentile woman—one does not circumcise on Shabbat. And a gentile who had relations with a Jewish woman and fathered a son—his law is like a Jew. And the Karaites, if they allow him to be circumcised with periah—one circumcises on Shabbat. And if not—one does not circumcise him even on a weekday. And a mamzer, one circumcises him on Shabbat. (See Shach subsection 16, and Taz subsection 10, what they wrote regarding transgressors. And see Shach subsection 17 what he wrote in the name of Rav B.Z. regarding the Karaites. And also from his words it is implied that if they allow the performing of periah—one circumcises on Shabbat. And this seems simple, that even on a weekday we do not attend to them without periah. And see Mishneh LaMelekh in the first chapter regarding transgressors. And it is impossible for us to explain now, as is understood. And also the words of the Shach and the Taz are impossible to explain, therefore it is necessary to be brief. And be precise and you will find it easy.)

The Rambam wrote in the first chapter, law 13: One who is born in the eighth month, if he was complete in his hair and in his nails – behold, this is a complete newborn. And he is a seven-month child, but he was delayed. And it is permitted to move him on Shabbat, and he is not like a stone. And we circumcise him on Shabbat. But if he was born and his hair is defective, and his nails are not complete as in their creation – behold, this is a certain eighth-month child, who was not fit to be born until the ninth, and he came out before he was finished. Therefore, he is considered like a stone, and it is forbidden to move him on Shabbat. And nevertheless, if he survived thirty days – behold, he is a viable newborn, and behold, he is like all others born regarding every matter. For anyone who survived thirty days among humans – he is not a nefel. And one who is born in the seventh month of her pregnancy, if he was born complete – behold, this is a viable newborn, and we circumcise him on Shabbat. One who is a doubt whether he is a seven-month child or an eight-month child, we circumcise him on Shabbat in any event: if he is a seven-month child and he is complete – it is by law that he should supersede Shabbat. And if he is an eight-month child – behold, the one who circumcises is like one who cuts meat, because this one is a nefel if he is an eight-month child. Thus far his words.

And behold, we have already elaborated on his words in Even HaEzer siman 156 from section 5 until section 13, for we find regarding the Rambam in many places in these laws that he did not make his words consistent. And we explained there that his source is from the Tosefta of Shabbat (chapter sixteen) where it is taught: Who is an eight-month-old? Anyone whose months were not completed. Rabbi says: Recognizable signs are in him—his hair and his nails which have not finished. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Anything that remained thirty days in a human—is not a nefel. Thus far his words. And he holds that Rabbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel do not disagree, and both of them hold that one is sufficient: either with the completion of his hair and nails, or with remaining thirty days even if his signs were not finished. And we say this is a seven-month-old who delayed. And the Rabbanan hold that without completed months—nothing avails. And he holds that the halacha is like Rabbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, because Shmuel ruled in Shabbat (Shabbat 136a) like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, and Mar bar Rav Ashi who ruled this matter of delaying, for all this is not like the Rabbanan. (And therefore he omitted the statement of Rabbi Abbahu in Yevamot 80b, which follows the Rabbanan, and is not the halacha, see there.) And this is by Torah law. But by rabbinic law there are stringencies in this, and therefore in other places he was stringent. But regarding milah, where it is a positive commandment to circumcise specifically on the eighth day—he established it upon Torah law. And according to this, all his words are explained. And regarding a certain eight-month-old, we certainly do not circumcise, for even though it is like cutting flesh, nevertheless why should we circumcise him since he is like a mere stone? And only in a case of doubt if he is a seven-month-old or a doubt if he is an eight-month-old, for because of the doubt we circumcise him whichever way it is, as I have written. And the Tur ruled like the Rambam, see there.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 11 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 266:11) also ruled accordingly, except that he wrote that one who is born in the seventh month—we circumcise him on Shabbat even if his hair and nails are not complete. Thus far his words. And he follows his reasoning in his great work, that regarding what the Rambam and the Tur wrote concerning a seven-month-old, that if he is born complete he is a viable birth, their intention is complete in his limbs, but he does not require his hair and nails. And there is one who challenged him, that certainly their intention refers to the completion of his hair and nails which they mentioned previously, and we do not find a requirement regarding limbs for the matter of circumcision, only regarding his hair and nails (Taz, subsection 7). Rather, in a seven-month-old one does not need to be exacting after this, for presumably it is so. And also one who is not expert in this may rely on this. And in an eight-month-old one must know well that his hair and nails are complete, but when we see that they are not complete—even a seven-month-old we do not circumcise (ibid.). And there are those who agreed with the words of our teacher, the Beit Yosef (Bach and Derisha), and so it appears primary. And their intention by "complete" is like the manner of the body of a child, for it appears from their words that a seven-month-old is equal to a nine-month-old. And in a nine-month-old we certainly do not pay attention to his hair and nails, and here too in a seven-month-old.

He further wrote that one who is a doubt whether he is a seven-month birth or an eight-month birth – we do not circumcise him on Shabbat unless his hair and nails are fully developed. Thus far his words. And the Tur understood that this was the intention of the Rambam and disagrees with him, for even if they are not fully developed we circumcise him regardless, see there. And in truth, even in the Rambam it is not proven so (see Bach). And this is what our teacher, the Rema, wrote: And there are those who say that we circumcise him, since he is a doubt whether he is a seven-month birth, but we do not desecrate the Shabbat for him regarding other matters. And so it appears to me to be the primary view. Thus far his words. And there are those who disagree with him, that without being fully developed – we do not circumcise him on Shabbat. (Taz ibid. and Bach, for so is explained the opinion of the Rosh and Nimukei Yosef, see there.)

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote at the end of this siman (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 266): One must be careful that two mohalim do not perform a single mila on Shabbat, such that this one performs the mila and this one performs the periah; rather, the one who performs the mila must himself perform the periah. Thus far his words. Our teacher, the Rema, wrote regarding this: And I have not found a source for his words. On the contrary, it seems to me that it is permitted, for mila overrides Shabbat just like the service in the Mikdash. For many kohanim perform the service and desecrate Shabbat, since once Shabbat is permitted to be overridden—it is like a weekday in every respect. And so I found in an old parchment Sefer HaTerumah, who wrote that it is permitted. However, I found in a collection that one should forbid it, and therefore it is good to be stringent ab initio even though according to the law what I wrote appears correct. Thus far his words. And in his responsa, siman 76, he elaborated with proofs for the permission, and so the great authorities agreed (Levush, and Bach, and Taz subsection 11, and Shach subsection 18). And so is the simple custom in the entire world. And also our teacher, the Beit Yosef, himself in his book Bedek HaBayit cited the permission, see there. And metzitzah certainly anyone can perform, for this is a matter of danger and the one who is zealous is praiseworthy.

And there are some of the great authorities who wrote that certainly there is no difference between one mohel and two mohels, but rather that even with one mohel he should perform the cutting and the peri'ah as one without an interruption between them, so that there will be one desecration and not two desecrations. For even though milah on Shabbat is permitted, nevertheless, whatever we can do to minimize the desecration is preferable. And consequently, this is only possible with one mohel and not with two. But if the mohel interrupted between the cutting and the peri'ah – then there is no longer a difference whether he completes the peri'ah or another person does (Sha'agat Aryeh, siman 59). And this matter is not understood at all: for how is it possible without an interruption? Behold, after the cutting he must set down the knife. And even if another person takes the knife from his hand, behold, of necessity after the cutting he removes his hands and seeks to grasp the skin of the peri'ah, and consequently there is an interruption. Furthermore: it is explicitly explained in the Gemara (Shabbat 133b) that there is no concern even ab initio, as it says there that a craftsman says, "I will perform half of the mitzvah – you perform half," see there. And there are those who rejected this proof, but it is not a rejection, and the plain meaning does not depart from its simple sense. Therefore, in our days we have not heard of anyone who is particular about this even ab initio. (And there are those who hung themselves on the words of the Gra, subsection 25, who wrote regarding the Rema that there is no proof from the Temple service, for the service is permitted on Shabbat, while milah is set aside like saving a life, as appears from the wording of the Rambam at the beginning of the second chapter of Shabbat (Rambam, Laws of Shabbat 2), see there. And they did not understand his words: the Gra wanted to say this, but his conclusion is not so. And he was brief as is his way, and his intention is that of necessity even saving a life and a sick person are permitted. And the Rambam was not dealing with the matter of this distinction, and he wrote the term "set aside," meaning that the Shabbat is set aside because of saving a life. And his intention was not "set aside" and not "permitted." And his proof is clear, for in Menachot 64a we say that Rabbi Ishmael and Rabbi Chanina the Deputy High Priest said one thing: that on Shabbat we minimize the service of the Omer; even though the service is permitted, nevertheless, what we can minimize in desecration is preferable. And therefore Rava asked there even regarding a sick person, even though it is permitted. And the Rabbis hold that we do not minimize on Shabbat. And in Shabbat 133b we say: Who is the Tanna who holds that if he separated he may not return? Rabbi Ishmael, see there. And if it should enter your mind that milah is set aside, behold even the Rabbis would agree. Rather, it is certain that milah is also permitted, and saving a life is also permitted, and with all this, to minimize the desecration more is preferable. And this is the intention of the Gra, see there. And see what I wrote in Orach Chaim, siman 328. Examine it and you will find it easy.)