Siman 267

It is a positive commandment upon the master to circumcise his slaves, whether a slave born in his house from his maidservant, or a slave purchased from a star-worshiper, as it is written: "He that is born in thy house, and he that is bought with thy money, must needs be circumcised." If the master transgressed and did not circumcise him, the beit din is obligated to circumcise him, as it is written: "Every male among you shall be circumcised." But regarding the slave himself, we do not find an obligation that he is obligated to circumcise himself; for just as a woman is not commanded to circumcise her son, so too the slave is not commanded regarding himself; for any commandment from which a woman is exempt, the slave is exempt (the Gaon Rabbi Akiva Eiger). For that which a slave is obligated in circumcision is because a woman is not relevant to this. But to circumcise her son, where she is relevant, and nevertheless the Torah exempted her—here too the slave is exempt, and only others are obligated in it. And see in section 9.

According to what we have explained, so did one of the great ones (the Gaon Rabbi Akiva Eiger) analyze. And in my humble opinion, it is not relevant at all to say that the obligation is cast upon the slave to circumcise himself, for as long as he has not circumcised—his status is not that of a slave who would be obligated in mitzvot like a woman. And if he does not want to circumcise himself—it is forbidden to keep him, and he sells him to idolaters as will be explained. And we do not circumcise him against his will but rather by his will, and if so, how is it relevant that he is obligated to circumcise? And just as there is no obligation upon an idolater, so too there is no obligation upon him. And that which the beit din is obligated, this is when he has consented to this and seeks for himself to circumcise, for he has accepted upon himself the yoke of mitzvot—they are obligated, and so too the master. But upon himself no obligation is relevant. (And this matter is explicit in Yevamot 48b, that according to the Sages, just as you do not circumcise the son of a man against his will—so you do not circumcise the slave of a man against his will. See there.)

And they are not circumcised except during the day. And even those who are not circumcised on the eighth day, such as an adult slave, and similarly there is a home-born slave who is not circumcised on the eighth day as will be explained, nevertheless they are not circumcised at night, just as any circumcision not in its proper time is only during the day, as I wrote in siman 262. And just as the circumcision of sons circumcised in their proper time overrides the Shabbat, so too slaves who are circumcised on the eighth day override the Shabbat. And those who are not circumcised on the eighth day do not override the Shabbat, just as with sons, for a circumcision not in its proper time does not override Shabbat. And there are cases among slaves where even those circumcised on the eighth day do not override the Shabbat, and that is a home-born slave or one bought with money whose mother did not immerse until she gave birth, for even though they are circumcised on the eighth day—they do not override the Shabbat. And the reason is because this one who is circumcised on the eighth day is due to a stringency or due to a doubt, as will be explained, and a doubt does not override Shabbat. And all the more so if it is merely a stringency (Taz, subsection 4).

Before us it will be explained that a slave requires milah and tevilah, and likewise a ger. And behold, the Rambam in the thirteenth chapter of Issurei Biah wrote that regarding tevilah for both of them, three are required, which is to say a beit din, for "mishpat" is written: "One mishpat shall be for you and for the ger, etc." And the Tur in this siman regarding a slave did not mention, neither regarding milah nor regarding tevilah, that three are required; but in siman 268 regarding a ger, he wrote that both for milah and for tevilah, three are required, see there (and see Bach and Shach). And it appears to me that the Tur holds that since "mishpat" is written regarding a ger and not regarding a slave, therefore for a ger three are required for both matters. But regarding a slave "mishpat" is not written, and therefore it is not required. And the Rambam holds that for milah it is not necessary for there to be three, for behold it is written: "One mishpat shall be for you and for the ger," and behold, regarding the milah of "you" three are not required, and how could he be more stringent than them? It is only regarding tevilah, where he accepts upon himself the yoke of mitzvot, that three are relevant, meaning that he accepts in the presence of a beit din. And consequently, the same law applies to a slave, for what is the difference? (See Bach and Shach, subsection 1, that one should be stringent like both of them. And it is simple.)

Two verses are written regarding the milah of slaves in Parashat Lech Lecha; in one, "eight" is not written, and in the second, "eight" is written. It is written: "He that is born in your house, and he that is bought with your money, must surely be circumcised," and it is not written "for eight days." And afterward it is written: "And he that is eight days old shall be circumcised etc., he that is born in the house, or bought with money." And we learned from this that there are those among them who are circumcised at eight, and there are those who are not circumcised at eight. And it stands to reason that this one who requires eight—this is when he is similar to an Israelite, in that he was born in the house of an Israelite, or that his mother immersed before she gave birth to him. And this one who does not require eight—this is when he was not born in the house of an Israelite, or his mother did not immerse before his birth, and she is not similar to an Israelite woman at the time of his birth, according to the opinions that will be explained with the help of Heaven. (And its source is from the sugya in Shabbat 135b in the dispute of Rabbi Chama and the Rabbanan, see there.)

This is the wording of the Rambam in the first chapter of Milah: Whether a slave born in the domain of an Israelite, or a slave purchased from the star-worshippers—the master is obligated to circumcise them. However, a "home-born" is circumcised on the eighth day, and a "money-purchase" is circumcised on the day he is purchased. Even if he purchased him on the day he was born—he is circumcised on his day. There is a "money-purchase" who is circumcised on the eighth day, and there is a "home-born" who is circumcised on the day he is born. How so? If he purchased a maidservant and purchased her fetus with her and she gave birth—behold, this one is circumcised on the eighth day. And even if he purchased the fetus by itself, and behold the fetus itself is a "money-purchase," since he acquired its mother before it was born—behold, this one is circumcised on the eighth day. If he purchased a maidservant for her fetus, or if he purchased a maidservant on condition of not immersing her for the sake of servitude, even though he was born in his domain—he is circumcised on the day he is born, for behold this newborn is as if he is a "money-purchase" alone, and as if he purchased him today, for his mother is not included among the maidservants of Israel such that the son would be "home-born." And if his mother immersed after she gave birth—behold, this one is circumcised on the eighth day. Thus far his words. And this does not refer to one who purchased a maidservant for her fetus, for in such a case immersion is not relevant, since he did not purchase her at all. Rather, it refers to one who purchased on condition of not immersing her. Regarding this he said that if she immersed afterward—he is circumcised on the eighth day. And despite all this, it does not supersede Shabbat, as he wrote later in Law 10, that when his mother did not immerse until she gave birth, even though he is circumcised on the eighth day—it does not supersede the Shabbat. Thus far his words. And he wrote all this based on the sugya of the Gemara there. And this is what we wrote at the end of section 3, that it does not supersede the Shabbat in such a case—due to stringency or doubt, because regarding this law of being circumcised on the eighth day, there is a dispute in the Gemara there. Therefore, regarding the matter of milah on the eighth day we are stringent, and also regarding the matter of Shabbat we are stringent (and so wrote the Kesef Mishneh, see there).

And if Reuven purchased the maidservant, and Shimon the fetus – he is circumcised on the first day even though she immersed before she gave birth. And even if she immersed before she conceived, such as the maidservant of an Israelite, since it is not similar to "for you," as the owner of the fetus has no portion in its mother (Bach and Shach, subsection 2). And all the more so if he purchased a maidservant and her offspring with her, that he is circumcised on the first day in any case, even if she immersed long ago, since he purchased the offspring after it was born. And it is a great principle: that just as the circumcision of sons overrides the Shabbat when circumcised on the eighth day, so too slaves who are circumcised on the eighth day. Except for one born in the house or a purchase of money whose mother did not immerse until she gave birth, for even though they are circumcised on the eighth day – they do not override the Shabbat as I have written. (And there are those who say that their circumcision does not override Shabbat at all. See Shach, subsection 6.)

There is a doubt to be considered: Behold, to bring a slave into the category of Jewish slaves requires his knowledge and will, and one may not bring him in against his will, as will be explained. And behold, when one purchased him while he was a minor along with his father or along with his mother, and they circumcised and immersed him for the sake of slavery, can he retract once he grows up, like a minor convert, as will be explained in siman 268, who can retract? Or perhaps he cannot retract. However, this is certainly the case when one purchased his mother and she was pregnant, and his mother immersed for the sake of slavery, for then he was born into his slavery, and it is obvious that he cannot retract once he grows up. And also regarding a convert in such a case—he is born a complete Israelite. And it appears that also in the case where one purchased a minor slave, and they circumcised and immersed him for the sake of slavery—he cannot retract once he grows up, and it is not similar to a convert. (And it appears to me there is a proof for this from Yevamot 48a, for the Rashba holds that a man's slave you circumcise against his will, and the Rabbis disagree with him, see there. And according to this, regarding a minor, when they circumcise and immerse him, certainly even according to the Rabbis he cannot retract, and we do not establish a distant dispute. Examine and you will find it easy.)

Furthermore, it appears clear to me that one who buys an adult or minor slave, and he consented to undergo milah and tevilah, but the master and the beit din transgressed and did not circumcise him—that he may retract as long as they have not circumcised him, just as it is with a gentile who consented to convert and retracted, and there is no obligation upon him to circumcise himself. And there is room to doubt in the case of one who buys a pregnant maidservant, and she immersed and gave birth, and they did not circumcise her son until he grew up, whether he too may retract since he has not yet entered at all into the category of the slaves of Israel? Or perhaps: since he was born in the domain of an Israelite—he cannot retract, just as if they had circumcised him, as I wrote in the previous section. And it appears that he may retract, for as long as they have not circumcised him—he is not like a slave. Therefore, when he grows up, they cannot circumcise him against his will, but only with his consent. (And perhaps the Gaon Rabbi Akiva Eiger maintains that in such a case he cannot retract, and one could illustrate his ruling in section 1 in such a case. And the Sha'ar HaMelekh also wrote like the Gaon. And the matters are astonishing as I wrote in section 2, and if we say so it would settle well. But in my humble opinion it is not so, and there is no logic in this, and their words require further study. Examine carefully and you will find it easy.)

One who buys a slave from a star-worshiper, or if he sells himself as a slave – we do not bring him into circumcision and immersion against his will. Rather, we say to him: "Is it your desire to enter into the category of Jewish slaves, and to be among the upright, or not?" And if he desires – we inform him of the principles of the faith, and some of the minor and major mitzvot and their punishment and reward, just as we inform a convert. And we do not prolong words with him as we do with a convert (Shach, subsection 8), for he is only obligated in the mitzvot that a woman is obligated in. And he requires circumcision and immersion. And it was not explained in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch whether the circumcision precedes or the immersion precedes. And it seems simple that the circumcision precedes, just as with a convert in siman 268. One who circumcises his slaves recites the blessing: "Who has sanctified us etc. to circumcise the slaves," for it is an obligation upon him and he blesses with the letter lamed. Therefore, if he circumcises the slave of others, he blesses: "on the circumcision of the slaves." And there is one who wrote that he also blesses with "on" (Tashbetz), and so it implies in Midrash Bereshit (parashah 17). And the blessing "to bring him in" is not said regarding slaves, but rather the blessing of "Who cuts the covenant." And thus he blesses: Who has sanctified us with His mitzvot, and commanded us to circumcise the slaves, and to draw from them the blood of the covenant. For if not for the blood of the covenant – the statutes of heaven and earth would not endure, as it is said: "If not for My covenant day and night, the statutes of heaven and earth I would not have set." Blessed are You, Hashem, Who cuts the covenant. And there are those who hesitate not to conclude with "Who cuts the covenant" (Bach), but they did not agree with his words (see Shach, subsection 23). And it is necessary to cover his nakedness at the time of the blessing, since he is an adult. But when he is a minor less than nine years and one day old, who is not fit for intercourse – he does not yet need to cover, as I wrote in siman 265.

And after he has healed from the circumcision, they immerse him before three in a kosher mikveh. And there shall be no chatzitzah on his body, like all immersions. And while he is in the water, they inform him of the matters that were explained in section 9. And he immerses himself under the water, and when he raises his head he recites the blessing: "Who has sanctified us with His commandments and commanded us concerning immersion." And the slave recites this blessing and not the master. And it is impossible to recite the blessing before the immersion according to the law of all blessings which are "immediately prior to their performance," for behold, beforehand he has not yet entered into holiness, and how could he recite beforehand "Who has sanctified us etc."? And this is what they said in Pesachim (Pesachim 7b) that regarding immersion there is no "immediately prior to their performance." And so too regarding the immersion of a ger. And when they immerse a maidservant – women immerse her and the beit din stands outside, as will be explained regarding a female convert in siman 268.

One who buys a minor slave or an imbecile—they immerse him and circumcise him based on the knowledge of the beit din. And if he can retract once he grows up, we have explained it in section 8. However, in the case of buying an adult slave—one does not circumcise him against his will, but specifically with his consent. And if he agreed to be circumcised, and then retracted and does not want to be circumcised—one rolls with him for all twelve months. That is to say: he delays him for twelve months, and rolls with him through words, perhaps he will agree to this. And after twelve months when he does not agree—it is forbidden to keep him, and he sells him to idolaters. And the prohibition to delay him is from the Torah (Shach, subsection 9). But this is specifically when he bought him to make him a Jewish slave. However, if he bought him explicitly not to circumcise him, and likewise in these countries where it is forbidden to convert by the law of the land—it is as if it were unspecified that he stipulated not to circumcise him, and it is permitted to keep him uncircumcised for as long as he wishes. And all the more so regarding one who hires a slave for a set time, for all this does not apply. And the Rambam wrote there that if he stipulated with him from the beginning—it is permitted, provided that he accepts upon himself the seven Noahide laws, and he would be like a ger toshav. And if he did not accept etc. and a ger toshav is only practiced during the time that the Jubilee is practiced, see there. And now all of this does not apply, and none of these laws apply in our time.

And know that this which we wrote, that if he stipulated with him beforehand not to circumcise him it is permitted to keep him, this is the method of the Rambam in the first chapter of Milah and our teacher, the Rema, in section 4, see there. However, regarding what the Rambam wrote, that he must accept upon himself the seven commandments—our teacher, the Rema, did not write this. For according to the Rambam, this does not apply in this time, only during the time of the Yovel, as I have written. And the Ra'avad disagrees with him, and so the opinion of the Tur is clarified, as he did not write this. However, the intent of the Ra'avad is obscure, and there are those who explained his intent to be that it is forbidden to keep him (Kesef Mishneh). And it is impossible to say so, for the Ra'avad explicitly wrote in the Hassagot in the fourteenth chapter of the Laws of Forbidden Intercourse, law 8, and this is his wording at the end of the passage: And now we keep one who stipulated not to circumcise and not to immerse, as much as he wishes at any time. Thus far his words.

And the method of Rashi in Yevamot (Yevamot 48b) is thus: that if he stipulated, it is permitted to keep him. But if he bought him without specification and he did not agree to be circumcised—it is forbidden to keep him even one day. Unless he bought him on Friday at twilight and did not have time to circumcise him—he keeps him uncircumcised that Shabbat, and afterward he either circumcises him with his consent, and if he does not want to, he sells him immediately. And if he agreed and then retracted—he rolls with him twelve months, perhaps he will return to his first mind and agree to be circumcised. And if not—he sells him to an idolater. And according to Rav Hai Gaon it is the opposite: that when he agreed to be circumcised and retracted—he sells him immediately. And when he did not agree—he rolls with him twelve months. And the Tur brought them, see there. But from the language of the Rambam and the Ra'avad and our teacher, the Rema, it is implied that there is no difference between whether he bought him without specification, or whether he did not agree or did agree, for he always rolls with him twelve months.

And if they circumcised and immersed him for the sake of slavery against his will and without his consent, according to Rashi, of blessed memory, there, his status is that of a slave in all matters. However, ab initio one does not do this, so that he does not cause them to stumble through prohibitions, since he does not accept upon himself the yoke of the mitzvot of his own will. And according to the Rif, of blessed memory, the law of a slave does not apply to him at all as long as he did not accept it of his own will, and his circumcision and immersion are nothing. And so it appears from the words of the Rambam in the thirteenth chapter of the Laws of Forbidden Intercourse, see there. And so ruled our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, in section 5. This is their wording: If he acted of his own will and conducted himself according to the mitzvot of a slave—he can liberate him afterwards against his will. Thus far his words. That is to say: even according to this opinion, that it is impossible to make him a slave against his will and he remains an idolater as before, nevertheless, if he became a slave of his own will—he can liberate him against his will. And he does not require his consent even though many mitzvot are added to him, for previously he was only obligated in the mitzvot that a woman is obligated in and now he will be like a complete Israelite. Nevertheless, he cannot say "I do not accept upon myself the yoke of these mitzvot," for after he has already entered into holiness—he is forced to accept the yoke of all the mitzvot if his master wishes to release him to freedom. And on the contrary, it is a merit for him. And when he liberates him, he requires immersion afterwards before three, in order to emerge from slavery to the holiness of the collective of Israel. And he does not need to accept the yoke of mitzvot now, and also one does not need to inform him of the principles of the faith, because they already informed him when he immersed for the sake of slavery. And even though holiness is added to him now—we have no concern with it.

A slave whose master circumcised and immersed him with his consent, and afterward he recanted and [the master] sold him to an idolater, and an Israelite returned and purchased him from him and he consented to return – he does not require another immersion, for he is like a transgressing Israelite, but rather he is liable for lashes and nothing more, for he has already been circumcised and immersed and entered under the wings of the Shekhinah with his consent. And some say that in any event, they return and immerse him merely as an extra measure, and not by the letter of the law. And so too with a transgressor, as I wrote in siman 268. And they have practiced from of old for penitents to shave their hair and immerse them in a mikveh (and see the Bach).

We say in Yevamot (Yevamot 45b): One who buys a slave from a gentile, and [the slave] preceded and immersed for the sake of a free man—he has acquired himself as a free man. What is the reason? A gentile does not acquire the body of his fellow, but rather he is enslaved to him for labor, as we learn there from a verse, see there. And he cannot transfer to an Israelite except for that which he possesses. It follows that the Israelite has only a monetary lien over the slave, and therefore when he immersed for the sake of a free man to enter into holiness—the consecration uproots the lien that the Israelite has over him. Therefore, the master must ensure that he immerses himself for the sake of slavery. And it is good that he should impose upon him some labor while he is in the water, so that his slavery will be apparent, in order that he should not precede and say "I am immersing for the sake of a free man." This is the wording of the Gemara there (Yevamot 46a): And he must press him in the water. Rashi explained that he must place upon him a yoke of labor in the water, so that it will appear as an immersion of slavery, so that even if he says "for the sake of a free man"—he has not acquired himself as a free man, and there shall be no substance to his words. Thus far his words. Because the action contradicts his words.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch section 9 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 267:9) brought the previous ruling, and did not distinguish between whether he immersed in the presence of his master or not in the presence of his master. However, the Rambam holds that in the presence of his master, even if he immersed without specification—it is for the sake of a freeman, unless he said "I am immersing for the sake of slavery." And not in the presence of his master, without specification, it is for slavery, unless he said "I am immersing for the sake of a freeman." For so he wrote explicitly in the thirteenth chapter of Hilchot Issurei Biah (Rambam Hilchot Issurei Biah 13) and at the end of the eighth chapter of Avadim (Rambam Hilchot Avadim 8), see there. And when they force him into the water—his speech is of no effect. Therefore he wrote there further: A convert whose male slaves and female slaves preceded him, and they immersed themselves before him—they acquired themselves as freemen. Thus far his words. And this is in the Gemara there, the incident of Beluria, where her slaves preceded her and immersed before her etc.—they acquired themselves as freemen. And the Rambam interpreted "before her" as "in her presence." But Rashi interpreted "before her" there—prior to her converting, see there. Because she is still a gentile, and she does not acquire his body, and his servitude is extinguished as I have written.

He further wrote there: "An Israelite who seized a small gentile, or found a gentile infant, and immersed him for the sake of a ger – behold, he is a ger. For the sake of a slave – behold, he is a slave. For the sake of a freeman – behold, he is a freeman." Thus far his words. And its source is not known. The Kesef Mishneh wrote that it is from that which is in the first chapter of Ketubot, that they immerse a minor based on the knowledge of the beit din. But it is impossible to say so, for this law he wrote in the thirteenth chapter of the Laws of Forbidden Intercourse (the Rambam, Laws of Forbidden Intercourse 13) and in the language of the Shas (and also the Lechem Mishneh rejected it, see there). Furthermore: how can he seize him against his will? And in Ketubot the explanation is when his mother brought him, as Rashi explained there (ibid.). And I am in doubt if the minor came by himself to request if they listen to him. And it appears more likely that they do not listen to him, since he lacks da'at. For behold, even with an adult who comes to request – they accept him with difficulty, and they say to him "What did you see etc.", as I wrote in siman 268. And it is obvious that they do not seize him against his will, and also the will of a minor is no will at all. And in truth, this law is not found in the Tur or the Shulchan Aruch. And besides this, it is not understood what is "for the sake of a freeman"? For he is not a slave but a gentile, and he immersed him for the sake of a ger? And he already wrote this, and it requires great study. (However, that which we wrote that they do not listen to a minor when he comes to request, I found in Tosafot Ketubot 11a s.v. HaGiyoret the opposite: that when a minor comes to request they listen to him, see there. And so wrote the Ran in the first chapter there.)

And it appears in my humble opinion that it is necessary to say according to the words of the Kesef Mishneh, whose source is from Ketubot there. And several laws were written by the Rambam both here and in the thirteenth chapter of the Laws of Forbidden Intercourse (the Rambam, Laws of Forbidden Intercourse 13), see there. However, here he wrote it in a different language to innovate something: and that is that it is clear that the Rambam interprets that which is in Ketubot, that they immerse him based on the knowledge of the beit din, not as one who comes with his mother according to the explanation of Rashi, or with his father according to the rejection of the Gemara there, but rather as one who comes alone to request, for he does not mention this at all ibid. And he holds like the Tosafot and the Ran whom we cited, that when he comes by himself to request—we bring him close. And even though his intent is nothing, nevertheless, since they said there that when they grow up they can recant, and the Rambam brought this law in the tenth chapter of Kings (the Rambam, Laws of Kings and their Wars 10) see there—if so, there is no loss in this. And if he reaches the years of adulthood and recants—let him recant. And that which the Gemara rejected as support, which brought that he came with his father, see there—the Rambam holds that this is a mere rejection, meaning that there is no proof from this, as is the way of the Gemara in several places. And the proof is that also the Rif in Yevamot 85b, who brought this matter of immersing him based on the knowledge of the beit din, did not mention this, see there.

And for this reason the Rambam came to innovate another law from this: for behold, it is certainly so that when the beit din immerses him – they do not take him by force, but rather when he consents of his own accord and requests, as I have written. And even though his intent is nothing, nevertheless, since when he grows up he can protest – we do not coerce him. And for this the Rambam says that even if it happened that someone overpowered the minor, or found him and immersed him against his will not in a beit din, for the beit din would not have allowed this to be done, but rather he immersed him before three laymen and as the Rambam wrote there – that after the fact even laymen suffice, see there. And despite all this, he is either a ger or a slave or a liberated slave, according to how they immersed him. And his reasoning is that since even the intent of a minor is also nothing. Rather, for this reason they permitted the beit din to immerse him, because he can retract when he grows up. And therefore even if it happened that laymen did this by force – also until he grows up he shall be according to how they immersed him. And what would we lose by this? And perhaps in his adulthood he will consent, for behold the primary reasoning in the Gemara is that since he is a minor who has not tasted the taste of prohibition – it is a merit for him, see there. If so, what difference does it make if they acted with his will or by his coercion? Is not even his will like coercion, as it is stated in the Shas: the seduction of a minor girl is coercion. Rather, because he can retract, they were not concerned for this. And if so, if it happened that they did so by coercion, granted that one should not do so, nevertheless if they did it – they did it, and when he grows up he shall act according to his own mind. And that which he wrote "for the sake of a freeman," his intention is that after they immersed him for the sake of slavery – they return and immerse him for the sake of a freeman (so it appears in my humble opinion). And know that in this entire matter where immersion is mentioned, the same law applies to circumcision.

And that which has been explained, that when one purchases a slave from a kutei and he immersed himself for the sake of a freeman, that he becomes a freeman—nevertheless, he is obligated to pay the purchaser the money that he gave for him to the kutei. For it is no worse than one who damages the lien of his fellow, who is liable to pay, as the Rambam wrote in the seventh chapter of Chovel (Rambam, Laws of Wounding and Damaging 7), and we have already explained this in Choshen Mishpat siman 386. And all the more so here, where he himself profits by this, that he becomes a freeman, that he is liable to pay. And so too if others did so, meaning a beit din that immersed the slave of this person for the sake of a freeman, or other people when they did so, and they knew that this was his slave—they are liable to pay. But if they did not immerse him themselves, but rather they gave advice to the slave to do so—they are exempt. And it appears to me that he can collect from the slave. And so too if others did so, and the purchaser collects from them—they can collect from the slave. For this is no worse than one who does a favor for his fellow and a loss reached him through this, that he must pay him according to the favor he did for him, as I wrote there in siman 264, see there. And I do not know why our teacher, the Rema, did not mention this in section 9 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 267, 9). And this is not similar to one who chases away a lion where he is exempt, for behold, they did for him a literal favor.

And specifically when he purchased him from a gentile, where he does not acquire his person—therefore he can immerse himself for the sake of a freeman for the reason we explained. But a gentile who sold himself to an Israelite as a slave—he acquires his person immediately, and he cannot immerse himself for the sake of a freeman. And we learned this from a verse in Yevamot ibid., see there. And regarding one who purchased from a gentile where he can immerse for the sake of a freeman—this is when the gentile purchased him from himself, for then he does not acquire his person. But if the gentile purchased him by the law of the kingdom, such as where the king triumphed in war and sold those captured in war, or sold them on account of taxes—the law of the kingdom is law, for the king acquires his person, and he sold him to a gentile, for then the gentile also acquires the person. And when he sold him to an Israelite—the Israelite also acquires the person, and it follows that he cannot precede him and say "I am immersing for the sake of a freeman." And wherever there is a law of the kingdom in this matter, whether thus or thus—the law of the kingdom is law. And therefore now we have no permission to take slaves, for such is the law of the kingdom now in our times.

A male slave and a female slave, when they are hired to an Israelite, are permitted to perform labor on Shabbat. However, when one immerses them for the sake of slavery, they are forbidden to perform labor on Shabbat, as it is written (Exodus 20:10): "You shall not do any labor, you... and your male slave and your female slave, etc." Therefore, one who possesses a male slave or a female slave, and they have not yet immersed for the sake of slavery—it is forbidden for another to immerse them without the permission of the owners, for perhaps he does not wish to immerse them for the sake of slavery so that they may be able to perform labor on Shabbat. And likewise, so that it will be within his power to sell them to a gentile, which he cannot do when they are immersed for slavery, as will be explained. And if he transgressed and immersed them, he must pay the owners for the damage he caused him, according to what the experts appraise. But if he only gave advice, he is exempt as above. And there is a doubt whether the male slave or the female slave are liable to pay in such a case, and it appears that they are exempt.

And know that the previous law is in Shulchan Aruch, section 11 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 267:11), see there. It was clarified from this that one has the ability to transfer ownership of a male or female slave to a person against his will, for if not so, how can they immerse them without the permission of the owners? And it is a wondrous thing. Granted that one can transfer ownership of a male or female slave to a person not in his presence, like all gifts that one may acquire for a person not in his presence. But this person who has a male or female slave who can perform labor on Shabbat, and to immerse them without his knowledge which results in harm to him as I have written – how is it possible without his knowledge? For one may only act to a person's disadvantage in his presence and with his knowledge. And perhaps since through this they bring him into holiness – we do not require his knowledge, for the holiness expropriates the lien of the Israelite. And even if he suffers a loss from this – in truth they shall pay him for it, as I have written. And a proof for this is from what I have written that he may immerse himself for the sake of a freeman, for the reason that hekdesh expropriates a lien, as I have written in section 17. And all the more so in a case such as this, for there he was already within holiness and here he was not yet within holiness.

Even though the laws of a Hebrew servant do not apply in this time, as a Hebrew servant only applies at a time when the Yovel applies—this refers to acquiring his person for all the laws of a Hebrew servant. However, in a case where a captor acquired the Israelite for his manual labor through the law of the kingdom, such as if he was captured in war or if the tax collectors sold him—he may then sell him to an Israelite for his manual labor. And he may give to his Israelite master his purchase price or his value and go free, and the hand of the master is at a disadvantage to take the lesser amount. Similarly, people who do not behave properly—it is permitted to subjugate them with force, and to enslave them with the permission of the kingdom. And similarly, a king who decreed that anyone who does not pay the tax set upon each and every person shall be enslaved to the one who paid the tax on his behalf—it is permitted to make use of him excessively, but not as a servant. And if he does not behave properly—it is permitted to make use of him as a servant (see Shach, subsection 29).

One who buys a Cuthean slave from an Israelite or from a Cuthean, and similarly a Cuthean who sold himself to an Israelite, or who sold his sons and daughters—he is like a Canaanite slave. However, in this there is a distinction: for that which one takes from a Cuthean—his body is not acquired, but rather only for his handiwork and not his body. Unless he acquired him through the law of the kingdom, for then even his body is acquired as I have written. And in all of them, as long as he has not immersed them for the sake of slavery and they have not been circumcised—their status is like a Cuthean in every respect. Therefore, there is a distinction regarding those whose bodies are not acquired, that if he immerses himself for the sake of a freeman he becomes a freeman, while regarding those whose bodies are acquired—this is of no avail, as I have written. And after he immerses him for the sake of slavery and after the circumcision—his status is like a slave. And he is obligated in the mitzvot that a woman is obligated in, and it is permitted to work him with rigor. For that which is written "he shall not rule over him with rigor"—this refers to a Hebrew slave and not to a Canaanite slave. Nevertheless, it is the attribute of piety and the ways of wisdom that a person should be merciful, and not make his yoke heavy upon his slaves, and not cause them pain. And he should feed them from every food, and give them to drink from every beverage. And he should not humiliate them, neither by hand nor with words. And he should not speak with them harshly, and he should not increase shouting and anger toward them. Rather, he should speak with them pleasantly, and hear their claims, and answer them softly. And this is the attribute of the seed of Abraham our forefather, the inheritors of the religion of truth.

And so too, a king who waged war and brought captives and sold them; and so too, if he permitted anyone who so desires to go and take from the nation with whom he is waging war, and sell the souls as slaves; and so too, if he commanded that anyone who does not pay the tax imposed upon him shall be sold—behold, his laws are law. And a slave taken through these laws—behold, he is like a Canaanite slave in every respect, and he acquires his body as well, as I have written, for the law of the kingdom is law. And a woman shall only acquire maidservants and not slaves, because of suspicion. And even if they are minors, for they would suspect her that she will raise them and commit harlotry with them, and even if she has a husband (Shach subsection 31). And so too, a Hebrew slave she may not acquire. But regarding a mere servant there is no suspicion, for they only decreed regarding a slave who is very subordinate to her and not regarding a mere servant, and especially a woman who has a husband. And such is the custom (Taz subsection 7). And some forbid even a servant (Bach and Shach ibid.), but the custom is not so. And one must wonder why they did not forbid a man from acquiring maidservants. And it must be said that it is because they are more licentious and their temperaments are light, and he is afraid lest they reveal it and he be shamed. Furthermore: a man's wife guards him. And it is possible that when he is unmarried it is indeed forbidden. And also he should not keep a maidservant, for the temperament of women is light.

In Gittin (Gittin 12a) there is a dispute whether a master can say to a slave: "Work with me and I will not sustain you, rather you shall go around to the doors or they will give to you from charity." For it is a mitzvah to sustain even the slaves. And specifically his own slaves, but the melog slaves of his wife that she brought in to him – he is obligated to sustain them. And some say that this which he can say "I will not sustain you" is when the years are normal. But in a year of famine when they do not have mercy on him – he cannot say so. But he can say to him: "Go, your handiwork shall be for your sustenance," even though they are not sufficient. And this is the opinion of the Tosafot and the Rosh, and the Rashba and the Tur. But the Rambam did not write this distinction, and they questioned him and the Rif, for it is indeed proven explicitly in the Gemara there.

However, the essence of this law is not understood at all. For how can he say such a thing: "Work for me and I will not provide for you"? And seemingly, you have no greater cruelty than this. Furthermore: it is obvious that they will not give them tzedakah for the sake of the master, that he should take his labor and not provide for him. However, from the words of the Rambam I observed that there is another intention in this, and this is the wording of the Rambam at the end of the Laws of Servants (Rambam Laws of Servants): A master may say to his servant: "Work for me and I will not provide for you etc." In what case are these things said? Regarding his own servants, for the beit din does not attend to adults to guard their property. And if he does not feed his servants they will flee etc., and a person is concerned for his own property etc. But servants that his wife brought in to him – he is obligated in their maintenance, for if he does not provide for them they will die, or flee, and behold he is not liable for their replacement. Thus far his words.

And according to this, the explanation of the matters is as follows: It is not that we permit him to say to them, "Work with me and I will not provide for you," but rather the opposite: that we do not compel him to provide, and he shall do as he wishes and will naturally provide for them, for if he does not provide for them, they will flee from him. And they would act according to the Torah since he is so cruel. And why must we warn him to guard his property? Let him guard it himself. And if he should act insanely and say this to them—in truth they will flee and he will lose them entirely, and what is that to us? Therefore, regarding nichsei melog, for which he is not liable for their guarantee should they flee—we do not permit him to say this to them, but rather we compel him to provide for them. For if not so—he will not care and they will flee, and what is that to him? Therefore, the sages obligated him to provide for them. And from this we learn that also regarding a guardian of minor orphans—the beit din also compels him to provide for them, for if not so they will flee, and it is upon us to guard the property of the orphans. And it turns out that this law that he can say to his slave, "Work with me and I will not provide for you," is not that we permit him, Heaven forbid, to do so, but rather it is to say: we do not intervene in this, for naturally every person guards his property and will not do so. And if he does do so—he will lose them entirely. And therefore the Rif and the Rambam were not concerned to bring that which was said regarding years of famine, for naturally it is so. And whichever way you look at it: if he says this to them—they will flee, and what does it matter to me if it is years of famine or normal years? And in the Gemara it only cited it according to the flow of the Shas, and also before we concluded that he can say to him, "Work with me and I will not provide for you," see there. But for the law, there is no practical difference in this (so it appears in my humble opinion).

One who severs the hand of his fellow's Kenaani slave—he gives the payment for damage, pain, medical costs, loss of work, and humiliation to his master. The damager cannot say, "I will give the loss of work payment to the slave so that he may sustain himself with it," for the master can say to his slave, "Work for me and I will not sustain you." That is to say: therefore he is obligated to give it to the master, and the master will naturally sustain him as we have explained. And the medical costs the master gives to the doctor and for the medicines. If they appraised him to be healed in eight days, and they applied strong drugs to him such that he was quickly healed in three days—the master takes the surplus even though the slave suffered from the strong drugs. And certainly so if the master himself injured him. And it appears to me that the slave can protest that they should not apply sharp drugs to him if it is possible to be healed without them, but if they did so—the remainder belongs to his master.

A slave has no acquisition without his master. For the hand of a slave is like the hand of his master, and whatever the slave acquires—his master acquires, whether he earned it through the work of his hands, whether he found a lost object, or whether they gave him a gift. Even his master himself who gave him a gift—it is nothing, since his hand is like the hand of his master—the matter never left the domain of the master, and all the more so others who gave to him. And even if they said to him "on condition that your master has no authority over them"—it is not effective, for as soon as he said "I am giving to you"—the master acquired it. And this is like one who says "I am giving you a gift on condition that you do not acquire it," and they are two opposites. And there is a question regarding this: Granted that it is so, nevertheless the gift should be completely nullified and return to the giver, for behold he only gave it to him on condition that his master has no authority, and since this is impossible the gift should be nullified? But it does not imply so from the language of the Shas in Kiddushin (Kiddushin 23b), which says: And when he says to him "on condition"—he says nothing to him, see there.

However, the truth is this: that certainly the gift is valid and belongs to his master. For this condition is not similar to a general condition, which might be fulfilled and might not be fulfilled. This condition is impossible to fulfill at all, and any condition that is impossible to fulfill is not a condition (Ran there). It is nothing more than an exaggeration of words, and is like one who says "on condition that you ascend to the firmament." And any condition that contradicts the act is not a condition (the Rosh there). And so it must be said in Even HaEzer siman 85 regarding a woman and her husband, see there. And according to this, it appears in my humble opinion that this is specifically when the giver knew this law, that a slave has no acquisition without his master, and a woman without her husband. But if he did not know this law, the gift is void and returns to the giver. For even though in all monetary laws we do not make this distinction, nevertheless in this case where he did not know the law, you have no greater gift in error than this. However, if so, the Shas and the poskim should have specified, and since they did not specify, we learn from this that in all cases the gift is valid.

And it seems to me that it is indeed so. For some of the great authorities have raised a difficulty (Sha'ar HaMelekh in the laws of slaves and the Avnei Miluim there in Even HaEzer): why should we not fulfill the condition? Granted that there is no acquisition for this without that, yet this is not a matter of prohibition but rather a monetary concern that the sages ordained so, or in the case of a slave it is from the Torah. And behold, we hold like Rabbi Yehuda regarding "on condition that you have no claim against me for food, clothing, and marital rights," that in a monetary matter—his condition is valid. However, the truth is that it is not comparable at all, as we explained in Even HaEzer there, section 27, for this is only relevant to conditions between the giver and the receiver. But regarding what pertains between the receiver and others, by what power can the giver nullify it? And we explained there that this is like what we explained in Choshen Mishpat siman 207 section 5 according to the poskim who hold that we require a double condition, and if not—the condition is void and the act is valid. And how is it possible to transgress the intent of the giver? We explained there that we hang it on the assumption that he did not say so as an absolute hindrance. And certainly if there is a strong assessment that he only gave with that intent, such as the assessment where he heard his son died and gave his property to another. For we are witnesses that had he known he did not die—he would not have given the gift, in Choshen Mishpat siman 246. And in such a case, we certainly follow the assessment. But in other matters, we say that he imposed the condition if it can be fulfilled, and if not—there is no hindrance in the matter. According to this, even if he did not know the law—the gift is valid. And it is not called an "assessment" except in a matter that we must estimate on our own, see there.

But if someone gave a gift to a slave and said to him, "on condition that you go out to freedom with it" – his words are upheld. And he gives it to his master, and he goes out to freedom with this, for even to the slave he only transferred ownership on this condition. And it is not relevant to say in this case "whatever he acquired etc.," for he has not yet acquired it. This is the wording of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch section 22, see there. And it is implied from their words that in another manner it is not effective. But the Rambam in chapter 3 of Zechiyah, law 14, wrote: How so? One who gives a gift to a woman etc. and likewise if he said to a slave "on condition that you eat with them and drink with them" or "on condition that you go out to freedom with them" or "on condition that you do with them whatever you want without the permission of your master" – the master has not acquired etc. Thus far his words. For the Rambam equates the law of the slave entirely with the woman, that when the giver designates the gift for a specific thing in particular – it is not acquired by him until that time. And likewise when he said "whatever you want, it is not acquired by them until the will," as I have written above in siman 222 regarding a woman. And the Tur there disagrees only regarding "on condition that you do with them whatever you want," but when he designated it for a specific thing – he does not disagree, see there. And he wrote likewise in Even HaEzer siman 85, see there. And here he did not mention this. And it appears that his opinion is: that in this, a slave is not similar to a woman, for regarding a woman, she has a "hand" to acquire the essence, and only the husband consumes the fruits, and if the husband gave her a gift – even the fruits he does not consume. This is not so regarding a slave. Therefore, it is only effective for a slave "on condition that you go out to freedom with them." And our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, it appears that their opinion also leans toward this. And in truth, our teachers, the authors of the Tosafot, disagreed on this reasoning in Kiddushin, for Rabbeinu Tam holds like the Rambam and Ri like the Tur, see there. (And according to this, the words of the Taz, subsection 10, are according to the Tur. And what he wrote that Rabbeinu Tam also holds so – it is not implied so. And many great ones challenged him from the Rambam. And it is not a challenge except upon what he wrote that this did not occur to the mind of any posek. But regarding the essence of his words, it works well according to the Tur. And the words of the Derisha and the Shach, subsection 39, are according to the Rambam. And from their words it is implied that everyone holds so, and in this the words of the Taz are certainly correct. And according to this, these and those are the words of the living God. Examine and you will find it easy.)

And since a slave has no acquisition without his master, therefore our teacher, the Rema, wrote, and this is his wording: And therefore he cannot receive a gift from his master. But he receives a gift from another for his master, and from his master for another. Thus far his words. And his words are puzzling: for how can he receive from his master for another? Behold, it has not left the domain of his master, for his hand is as his hand, and how can he acquire from his master on behalf of another? And for this they wrote that it is a scribal error, and so it must be said: "from another for his master, and from another for another." For so it is in the Yerushalmi, first chapter of Kiddushin (Halacha 3), and this is the wording of the Yerushalmi: It is obvious that the slave receives a gift from another for another, from another for his master, from his master for himself no, etc. Thus far his words (Bach and Shach, subsection 40). And in my humble opinion, on the contrary, there is proof to the opposite from the Yerushalmi, for the Yerushalmi concludes there explicitly that it is effective from his master for another. And that which we learned in Eruvin, that he cannot acquire an eruv through him – that is according to Rabbi Meir and not according to the sages, see there. Nevertheless, for the law their words are true, for it appears explicitly that the Yerushalmi holds like Rav Sheshet in Kiddushin (Kiddushin 23b). For the sages hold that with "on condition that your master has no authority" – it is effective. But we hold like Rabbi Eleazar, that in such a case even the rabbis admit it is not effective, only that they disagree regarding "on condition that you go out to freedom with it," see there. (And even Rabbeinu Tam who ruled like Rabbi Shimon – he ruled like Rabbi Meir, as the Tosafot wrote there.)

With which of the modes of acquisition is a slave acquired by his master, and with which of the modes of acquisition does he acquire himself from his master to go out to freedom? The Rambam wrote at the beginning of the fifth chapter of Laws of Slaves (Rambam Hilkhot Avadim 5), and this is his wording: A Canaanite slave is acquired through five things, and acquires himself through three. He is acquired through money, or through a document, or through chazakah, or through chalipin, or through meshikhah. And he acquires himself through money, or through a document, or through the loss of the extremities of limbs. And a minor slave is acquired through meshikhah like the meshikhah of an animal, etc. Thus far his words. And there is no difference whether he acquired him while he was still a gentile or whether he acquired him after he circumcised and immersed, or whether he acquired him from a gentile or from an Israelite, for as long as he has not immersed for the sake of freedom—he is a slave, and his acquisition is as I have written. And the details of the laws of these acquisitions we have explained in Choshen Mishpat siman 196, see there.

And I have a great question regarding this: When a slave sells himself to a master for money, what shall he do with them? For since he has become a slave, everything belongs to his master, and if so, what kind of acquisition is this? And it is possible to say indeed that the money he takes for his sale, the master does not acquire, and we do not say "the hand of a slave is like the hand of his master" except regarding what comes into his hand after his sale, and not what is through the act of selling himself. But if so, why did we learn in the Mishnah in Kiddushin (Kiddushin 22b): And he acquires himself with money, etc., provided that the money is from others, for he has nothing of his own since everything belongs to his master? And as is explained there throughout the entire sugya. But you find that he has the money, for he sold himself to the master. However, even without this it is difficult for me, for you find that he had money from before he was sold as a slave, and this money, it appears, does not belong to the master.

And know that I saw one of the great ones who proved from the words of the Tosafot at the beginning of the chapter "Almanah LeKohen Gadol," regarding what they said there that the slaves of a kohen who purchased slaves—they may eat terumah. And they wrote that this is found in one who renounces ownership of his slave, who may eat terumah, see there. That is to say: that in any other manner it is not found that a slave is able to acquire. And since they did not answer, for example, that he had money from before he was sold as a slave, and he purchased with this money—one may infer from this that even the money he has from before belongs to the master (Sha'ar HaMelekh chapter six of the laws of slaves). And his words are astonishing: for granted that he had money, but how can he acquire slaves? Behold, his body is acquired to his master, and how shall his body acquire another slave? However, the words of Rashi, of blessed memory, must also be understood, for Rashi explained regarding slaves who purchased slaves, for example, that they gave him a maneh on the condition that his master has no authority over it. Thus far his words. And it is difficult: for still, how can he acquire slaves? But the words of Rashi work out well with simplicity: for in truth they are the slaves of the master, as the hand of a slave is like the hand of his master, but Rashi depicts how it could be from the funds of the slave, but forever the acquisition is for his master; and in truth if he purchased with money that he had from before—it also belongs to his master. But to say that the prior money belongs to him—this is certainly astonishing. And that Rashi did not depict it in such a manner is because he did not need to do so, as is understood. And in truth they could have explained it so, but from the Mishnah one may precisely infer thus, for if not so, why must the money be from others? Let us say that he had money from before? And according to this it is difficult, for how is it relevant that he is acquired with money, and behold the money would belong to the master? And it requires great study. And it is clear that it is not so. But the Mishnah deals with the majority of cases, and especially regarding one born in the house, it is impossible that he would have money, as is understood.

And I found a proof for my words that slaves who acquired slaves belong to his master, for so wrote the Rashba in Yevamot there regarding the commentary of Rashi that we brought, and this is his wording: The version of our teacher Chananel is "and her slaves who acquired slaves." And Rashi's version is "and his slaves who acquired slaves," and he explained that it is where another gave to him on condition etc. and even according to the version of our teacher Chananel one must explain thus, for "her slaves who acquired slaves" also means her slaves etc. Thus far his words. And he brought from the Yerushalmi that if they do not belong to his master—they do not eat terumah. And the Gemara is dealing with those who belong to his master. And he explained there how you find a case where they do not belong to the master, such as where another gave him a maneh on condition that he [the master] shall have nothing in them but rather to buy slaves who shall serve him [the slave], see there. And so wrote the Ritva regarding the intent of Rashi, see there. (And this is against the Yerushalmi, and it requires further study.) And this is in the case of "on condition that you have nothing except what you put into your mouth." And we have heard from our teachers that it is impossible for a slave to acquire a slave literally, such that he should be his like a slave, but rather either he belongs to his master, or even he [the slave] shall have nothing, only that they shall serve him. And the Yerushalmi before us is corrupted. And according to the explanation of the Rashba it is as I wrote. (And that which is written in the Yerushalmi there: A slave who acquired slaves on condition that his master shall have no authority over them, and he died—whoever precedes in [seizing] them has merited. Thus far his words. The reason is simple: for the status of slavery was never removed from them, and they only needed to serve him, and when he died and the slave has no heirs—whoever precedes merits. And there is a wondrous thing there, for it says that an uncircumcised slave who acquired slaves, since he does not eat—he does not enable others to eat, see there. And it is a wonder: for there is no slave unless he has circumcised and immersed. And one must say that it is impossible for him to circumcise due to danger. And so one is forced to say there. And from this a new law emerges for us, that even though there is no slave without milah and tevilah, yet when he is under duress—he has the law of a slave even without milah. And examine and you will find it easy.)

The slave acquires himself, such that he goes out to freedom, through money, or through a document, or through the tips of limbs. Regarding chalifin, there is a dispute, as will be explained. How so with money? For example, if another person gave the money only on the condition that he go out to freedom with it, whether he gave it to the slave and said to him, "on the condition that you go out to freedom with them," if the master desired to receive the funds—the slave goes out to freedom. And if he did not desire—the funds shall be returned to the giver. And the slave did not acquire them, for he did not give them to him except on the condition that he go out to freedom. And so too, another may give funds to the master and say to him: "on the condition that your slave go out to freedom with them." And he does not require the knowledge of the slave, for presumably it is pleasing to him as it is a merit for him, and one may acquire a merit for a person not in his presence. And the opinion of the Rosh and the Tur is that even against the slave's will—he goes out to freedom. And even though regarding a document it will be explained that he does not go out against his will—it is not comparable to a document. And there are two reasons for this in the Gemara (Kiddushin 23a): that since with money he is acquired against his will—he also acquires himself against his will. That is to say: when one acquires a slave from another—the other can sell him against his will. Another reason: granted that with a document, when others receive the document on his behalf and stand in the place of the slave—they cannot be in his place when he does not desire this. For granted that it is a merit for him, nevertheless since he does not desire it—how can another acquire on his behalf against his will? But with money that his master receives—others are not acting to his detriment but rather the master, and the master is not the agent of the slave but rather acts for his own needs, and he is liberated automatically. Nevertheless, the opinion of the Rif and the Rambam is that even with money it is impossible against his will, for these reasonings in the Gemara are according to Rabbi Meir and not according to the Rabbis, see there (and in the Shulchan Aruch they did not mention this at all, and it requires further study). And there is no distinction between money and the equivalent of money. But a mashkon is not effective, as in all acquisitions.

The Tur wrote that our teacher Tam and the Rosh hold that even through chalifin he also goes out to freedom, if he has a vessel with which to perform chalifin, such as if others gave it to him on condition that he goes out to freedom with it. And the Ramah wrote that chalifin is only effective to abrogate his servitude, but not to abrogate the prohibition. And specifically with chalifin given as payment, but with ordinary chalifin given on condition to return—it is a matter of doubt for us whether it is considered like the value of money. And it is effective to abrogate the prohibition, for a gift on condition to return is considered a gift, etc. Thus far his words. And the opinion of the Rambam is that chalifin is not effective at all (see Beit Yosef). And our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, ruled according to the opinion of our teacher Tam and the Rosh, see there.

With a document, how so? He wrote to him on paper, or on a shard, or any detached object: "Behold you, so-and-so, are a free man," or "Behold you are for yourself," or "I have no business with you," and he delivers it into his hand, and he goes out to freedom with this. And one should not ask: Behold, the hand of a slave is like the hand of his master, and how does he leave his domain through his own receipt? For the answer to this is that his get and his hand come as one. That is to say: his manumission and the power of his hand—so that it should not be in the domain of his master—come as one at the moment of receiving his get of manumission. And similarly, the master can deliver the document to another person who shall acquire it on behalf of the slave, even without the knowledge of the slave, for presumably it is pleasing to him, as it is a merit for him that he goes out to freedom. Nevertheless, if he protests against receiving it, he does not go out to freedom with it. And it is not similar to money, for the reason we explained in section 42. And even though he can give the document into his hand against his will, and even through a messenger he can send it to him against his will. For so wrote Rashi and Tosafot in Gittin (Gittin 10a, s.v. bishlichut), and this is their wording: By agency against her will, for it exists in divorce and does not exist in betrothal etc., for this messenger is sent to her to divorce her against her will, and similarly for a slave to manumit him against his will. But in betrothal etc. Thus far his words. And one is likewise forced to say so, for behold, we learn the document of manumission of a slave from the verse "or freedom was not given to her." And we learn "to her"—"to her" from a woman, as it is written: "and he shall write for her a scroll of severance" (Gittin 39b). And a woman's get is by Torah law against her will. Nevertheless, that another should acquire on his behalf against his will is impossible, for how can he stand in his place to acquire for him when he does not desire this? And also regarding a woman, she is not divorced through another against her will (Tosafot ibid. 11b s.v. begitti). And if he wrote to his maidservant in a document: "Behold you are permitted to any man"—it is nothing, for this is not a language of manumission but rather a language of severance from matrimonial status. And it should not be interpreted that she is permitted to marry an Israelite, for before her manumission she was forbidden to him, because behold, she has likewise now become forbidden to slaves. For previously she was permitted, and what is this language of "to any man"? And it appears to me that if he wrote to her: "Behold you are permitted to marry an Israelite"—it is a manumission. And similarly regarding a slave when he wrote to him: "Behold you are permitted to marry a daughter of Israel." (And so it is implied from the wording of Rashi, Kiddushin 6b s.v. harei at muteret, see there. And be precise and you will find it simple.)

And specifically if he wrote these expressions to him in a document. But if he said these expressions to him orally—it is nothing. This is the wording of the Rambam in the fifth chapter, law 3: If he said to him not in writing, "Behold you are a free man," "Behold you are your own," even though witnesses testified against him in a beit din, and even though they performed a kinyan from his hand—he is still not emancipated, for a slave does not go out to freedom except through money, or a document, or the tips of limbs. Thus far his words. And the Ra'avad disagreed with him, [holding] that through a kinyan he goes out to freedom. And we have already written in section 43 that the Rambam holds that chalupin is not effective, see there. Therefore, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch did not write this wording, for they hold that chalupin effects acquisition, as I wrote there. (Great study is required regarding the Shach, subsection 55, who wrote that the reason that an oral [declaration] is not effective is because his body is acquired. And a master who forgives his deficiency—his deficiency is not forgiven. Thus far his words. And this was stated in Kiddushin 16a regarding a Hebrew slave, and this is not relevant to a Canaanite slave. And the reason is as the Rambam wrote. Examine [this] and you will find it simple.)

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 44: If he delivered the document to him before witnesses, or if witnesses were signed on it and he delivered it to him privately – he goes out to freedom with it. And some say that he must deliver it to him before witnesses. And if we see it signed, it is not necessary for the witnesses of delivery to come before us, for we hang the matter on the assumption that it was delivered according to the law. Thus far his words. The explanation of the matters: For the first opinion is the opinion of the Rambam in the fifth chapter, and he follows his reasoning in the first chapter of Divorce, for also regarding a woman's get it is so. And this is the approach of the Rif, of blessed memory, for even though we hold like Rabbi Elazar that the witnesses of delivery effect the severance, the meaning is that also witnesses of delivery effect the severance and likewise witnesses of signature, and we explained the reason in Even HaEzer siman 133, section 6, see there. And this is the enactment of Rabban Gamliel that witnesses should sign on the get. But the opinion of Rashi and Tosafot there is that without witnesses of delivery it is nothing, and the enactment of Rabban Gamliel is that we say since witnesses are signed on it – presumably they acted according to the law, and he delivered the get before witnesses of delivery. And this is the opinion of the "some say." And therefore they said that if we see it signed etc., and there in section 7 we explained that everyone has adopted this approach, see there. For the general principle of the matter is that in this, bills of divorce for women are equal to manumissions of slaves, as will be explained.

And know that there is reason to doubt regarding that which we learned in a Mishnah in Gittin (Gittin 86a): Three gittin are invalid, but if she married, the offspring is kosher. He wrote it in his own handwriting and there are no witnesses on it; there are witnesses on it but it has no date; it has a date but has only one witness on it, etc., see there. And what is the law regarding a deed of emancipation? And ostensibly it appears that since we derive a deed of emancipation from a get of a woman—they are equal. Or perhaps this, that one who wrote in his own handwriting is kosher in a get, we derive from that which is written "and he shall write for her," and this is not written except regarding a woman. And we do not compare them in all matters, only in six matters, as will be explained. However, regarding the matter of a date, it appears they are equal, for both this and that are a rabbinic enactment (Yevamot 31b). And regarding the matter of one witness, according to the one who said in Gittin there "we learned his handwriting"—it depends on the law of his handwriting. And according to the one who said "we learned the scribe's writing"—this is only relevant to gittin and a professional scribe. And he should not write it unless he heard it from the mouth of the husband (Rashi ibid.). But regarding a deed of emancipation there is no proof, as it is not so common. And it requires further study for the law.

Regarding the tips of limbs, how so? Concerning a tooth and an eye, it is written in the Torah: "And if a man smite the eye of his servant etc., he shall let him go free etc. And if a tooth etc. he shall let him go free etc." And our sages, of blessed memory, learned via a general rule, a specific instance, and a general rule (Kiddushin 24b): "If [a man] smite" – a general rule. "Tooth" and "eye" – a specific instance. "He shall let him go" – it returned and generalized etc., and you may only judge according to the nature of the specific instance. Just as the specific instance is explicit: a visible blemish and one that does not return, so too any visible blemish that does not return – a servant goes out to freedom because of them. And there are twenty-four tips of limbs in this regard which are visible blemishes and do not return, as will be explained with the help of Heaven.

And behold, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 27 wrote, and this is his wording: How is it with the tips of limbs? A slave who underwent milah and tevilah for the sake of slavery, if his master blinded his eye, etc. Thus far his words. And in the Tur this wording does not exist. However, this is from the words of the Rambam in chapter 5, law 5, and this is his wording: They do not go free for the tips of limbs except for slaves who underwent milah and tevilah, for they are subject to some of the mitzvot. But a slave who remains in his heathendom – he does not go free for the tips of limbs, etc. Thus far his words. And the commentators did not write his source: why is the law of going free for the tips of limbs different from money and a document? For they are all from the Torah, as is explained in the Shas. Furthermore: for every slave is such, that he underwent milah and tevilah for the sake of slavery, and if not so, it is forbidden to keep him. And if we say that it deals with one who stipulated with him not to undergo milah, as was explained in section 13, that the opinion of the Rambam is that where he stipulated it is permitted to keep him, it is still difficult: from where does the Rambam have the authority to divide between going free for the tips of limbs and between money and a document? And granted that it is possible to say that the acquisition of money, since it exists in all types of acquisitions, even though regarding a slave we learn it from "and she was not at all redeemed" for standard redemption is with money, nevertheless there is no necessity to say that the verse deals with a slave according to every law of a slave, meaning with milah and tevilah, and the same law applies even without this, such as where he stipulated, since it exists in all acquisitions. But a document, which we learn from "or her freedom was not given to her," and we learn "to her" – "to her" from a woman, this certainly deals with the law of a complete slave just like a complete woman. And now, why did he distinguish the law of going free for the tips of limbs from both of them? And it requires further study. (And the Bach wrote because it is against his will. And it is difficult: from where do we have the authority to say so? And also it is not implied so from the wording of the Rambam.)

And it appears in my humble opinion that the Rambam, of blessed memory, inferred this from the verse itself. For behold, one must investigate regarding a slave who has not undergone mila or tevilah, what is his status upon his release to freedom? If we say that it is not possible at all to release him to freedom, aside from the fact that there is no logic at all to say so, should the Shas not have explained this? And if we say that it is possible to release him to freedom, what will be his status upon his exit? For does not everyone who goes out to freedom become like a complete Israelite, yet he has not undergone mila or tevilah? And if we say that he remains a Cuthean—this is even more puzzling. Rather, the matter is clear that he releases him to freedom, and he requires mila and tevilah beforehand, and afterwards he releases him to freedom. And behold, regarding the extremities of limbs it is written, "he shall send him away free for his eye's sake," and it is stated in the Mechilta: "'He shall send him away free'—I might understand that he must write him a deed of emancipation. Therefore the Torah teaches: 'for his eye's sake.'" Thus far his words. That is to say: for his eye's sake alone, and he needs nothing more (see Gittin 42b). And this is what the Rambam infers, that it deals with one who has undergone mila and tevilah, for if it should enter your mind that it applies even without mila and tevilah, it would be impossible to say "for his eye's sake" alone, for he would also require mila and tevilah. And the measure of the Rambam's words is as follows: They do not go out for the extremities of limbs unless etc., for they are obligated in some of the mitzvot. That is to say: and when he goes out, he is obligated in all the mitzvot. But etc. he does not go out. That is to say: for how can he go out, for behold he will not become obligated in all the mitzvot, and this is impossible. And if you say to require him also to undergo mila and tevilah—behold it is written "for his eye's sake" alone, and he does not need anything else. Rather, certainly this law of the extremities of limbs applies only to one who has undergone mila and tevilah. And see in section 53. (See Rashi, Gittin 21b, s.v. "Lo." And according to this, it can be stated simply.)

And these are the twenty-four tips of limbs, aside from tooth and eye which are written explicitly in the Torah, those that we learned in the sixth chapter of Negaim that do not contract impurity due to live flesh, and they are: the tips of the fingers of the hands and the toes of the feet, and they are twenty; and the tips of the ears—two; and the tip of the nose and the tip of the male organ—behold, twenty-four. And regarding a maidservant who lacks one—the tips of the breasts complete the count, for so it is in Negaim. And all of these are visible blemishes, and they do not grow back when they are removed. And also the teeth are as if visible, for when a person speaks or eats his teeth are revealed; but if he cut his tongue, even though you have no blemish greater than this, nevertheless he does not go out to freedom because of it. For it is not a visible blemish, as the tongue is hidden in his mouth and is not visible to all.

And know that the Rambam ruled that even for a tooth or an eye, he requires a get shichrur, and so wrote the Tur and Shulchan Aruch, section 27 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 267, 27). And many have labored over this, for according to the sugya of the Shas there, it appears explicitly that at any rate, for a tooth or an eye, he does not require a get shichrur. And the opinion of Rabbeinu Tam in Tosafot there is that even for other major limbs, where they said he requires a get shichrur—it is not by the core of the law. Rather, because this is not explicit in the Torah—we are concerned lest he seize him and say to him, "You are my slave." However, regarding our teachers it is more difficult, for if so, how did they write that he acquires himself through money, or through a shetar, or through major limbs, since major limbs also require a shetar? If so, that is a shetar? And indeed, in the Yerushalmi there, it asks why we did not learn major limbs in the Mishnah, and answers: because there is a dispute in this matter whether he requires a shetar or not. And now, they who ruled that he requires a shetar—how did they write major limbs as a matter unto itself (and see Korban HaEdah there who asked this, see there)? But regarding this, it can be said that they are not similar: for the first shetar is by the will of the master, and the shetar of major limbs, we compel him to give. And perhaps this is the intent of our teacher, the Rema, who wrote: And we compel his master to write him a get shichrur. Thus far his words. That is to say: this shetar is not similar to that shetar. But nevertheless, the essence of the matter requires further study.

In my humble opinion, it appears that there is no proof from this at all that they ruled like the one who says he requires a deed of liberation. Rather, the matter is as the Ran wrote in Kiddushin there, that nowadays even according to the one who says he does not require a deed of liberation—he nevertheless requires one, for nowadays there are no ordained judges. And this matter requires being before a beit din of ordained judges, as it is of the law of fines. And it is proven in Meruba (Bava Kamma 74a) that through the standing before a beit din he goes out to freedom, and not from the time of the injury, but rather they compel him to liberate him. Therefore, in this time, it is impossible at all without a deed. (And even though the Rif there elaborated that from the fundamental law it is so, see there, nevertheless the poskim, even if they do not hold so, are nevertheless forced nowadays to rule so, as I have written. And even according to those who hold that from the fundamental law he requires a deed—this is not a contradiction to what I wrote in section 50, for this we learn from "he shall send him" as is explained in the Gemara. And in any case, more than this we do not require, and therefore by necessity he does not require circumcision and immersion. Examine it and you will find it simple.)

And that which they said, twenty-four tips of limbs—it is not literal, for the law is the same for any limb that is exposed and does not return—the slave goes free because of it. And on the contrary, that which they said "tips of limbs" was stated as a greater novelty, for even tips of limbs that do not contract impurity regarding nega'im—nevertheless, regarding a slave, it is an exposed blemish (Ran, Kiddushin ibid.). Furthermore: this phrasing is common because of nega'im, for regarding it, it was taught: and for all of them he goes free, as is explained in the Gemara. Therefore, if he castrated him in the testicles, and they were removed from the scrotum entirely—he goes free, for this is like being exposed and also does not return. But if he severed them and they are still hanging in the scrotum—he does not go free, for this is not an exposed blemish. And if he had an extra finger and he cut it off, if it stands in the row of the fingers—he goes free. For if it does not stand in the row of the fingers—it is not in the category of a limb. And so too if he plucked his beard and loosened a bone from the jaw—he goes free, for this is like an exposed blemish. And the Rambam, of blessed memory, explained it because he nullified the function of the teeth fixed in that bone; see there. And his intention is not because we require a blemish that nullifies him from his work, for it is not so, as is proven in the Gemara there, but rather he explained that ostensibly what blemish is it when he loosened the bone; to this he explained that he nullified the function of the teeth, and you have no greater blemish than this (Bach).

If he struck him on his hand and it withered, but it is destined to return to its health—he does not go out to freedom, for we require a blemish that does not return. Therefore, if it is not destined to return—he goes out to freedom. And so too, if he knocked out the tooth of a minor slave, since the tooth is likely to be replaced and another will grow in its stead—he does not go out to freedom for this reason. And it appears to me that the intention is not a minor before thirteen years, for it is known that even after that the teeth are likely to be replaced. Rather, as long as it is the way for it to be replaced, he is called a "minor" regarding this matter.

If the eye of the slave was somewhat dim, and he struck it and blinded it completely, if initially he was able to use it somewhat, even if it was use through difficulty, nevertheless, when he blinded it completely – he goes out to freedom. But if he was not able to use it at all – he does not go out to freedom, for behold, he did not cause him a loss. And nevertheless, if he gouged it out completely, even in such a case he goes out to freedom, for he made him lacking a limb. And the same law applies to one of the other tips of the limbs: even when it was idle, and he does not perform labor with it, if he severed it – he goes out to freedom through it, for behold, he caused him to lack a limb. And if he struck him on his eye and its light was diminished, or on his tooth and it was loosened, if he is still able to use it – he does not go out to freedom through it even though he weakened the limb. And likewise, specifically when he struck him on his eye and blinded it, or on his ear and deafened it, then he goes out to freedom through them. But if he struck a wall opposite his eye or opposite his ear, and he was startled until he cannot see or cannot hear – he does not go out to freedom, for this is merely indirect causation.

In all of these, he does not go out to freedom until the master acts with intent. Therefore, if he intended to throw a stone at an animal and it fell on the slave, and it severed his finger or knocked out his tooth – he does not go out to freedom. And likewise, if he extended his hand into the womb of his maidservant and blinded the eye of the fetus in her womb – he does not go out to freedom, for he did not know of a thing to intend for it. And this is when he did not intend for the limb at all. But if he intended for the limb, even if the intent was for a good purpose, such as if his master was a physician and the slave said to him, "Apply kohl to my eye," and he blinded it – he goes out to freedom, since he intended to perform an action upon the limb. And this is the opinion of the Rambam. But the opinion of the Tosafot in Kiddushin (Kiddushin 24b) is that even when he did not intend for the limb at all – he is liable. And he goes out to freedom unless he did not intend for the limb and also his intent was for the benefit of the slave, such as when he extended his hand into her womb for her medical treatment and blinded the eye of the fetus. But when he did not intend for his benefit, even if he did not intend for the limb, such as if a stone was resting in his lap and he stood up and it fell on the eye of the slave and blinded it – he goes out to freedom, as is explained at the end of the chapter "Keitzad HaRegel," see there. And likewise, if he intended to throw at an animal and threw at a person, and blinded his eye or knocked out his tooth – he goes out to freedom, since he also did not intend for a good purpose. And our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, in section 36, brought only the opinion of the Rambam. But the Tur brought both opinions, see there (and in the Shach, subsection 46).

One who is half slave and half a free person, or a slave of two partners, whether the body belongs to this one and the produce to that one, or whether both are partners in the body—they do not go free for the loss of the tips of limbs, as it is written: "And if a man smite the eye of his slave... and if the tooth of his slave..." And this word "his slave" is superfluous, for it should have written: "and if his tooth he knocks out." For this we expound "his slave"—one who is designated to him alone. But when he is not designated to him alone, he does not go free to liberty. Therefore, a woman who brought slaves to her husband, if they are nichsei tzon barzel for which the responsibility is his—they go free for a tooth or an eye if he knocked it out. But nichsei melog, where the body is hers and the produce is his—they do not go free for a tooth or an eye, neither for him nor for her, for the reason that has been explained. And specifically after she has married. But after erusin—they go free for her and not for him. (And we explained the exposition of "his slave"—the designated one—from "the tooth of his slave" which is superfluous, as I have written. For if not so, from where do we know it? And this exposition is in Bava Kamma 90a. And similarly "his money" there is entirely superfluous, see there. Examine and you will find it easy.)

The Tur wrote: If one knocked out the tooth of his slave and blinded his eye—he goes free on account of his tooth, and he gives him the value of his eye. And so too conversely. Thus far his words. That is to say: when he first blinded his eye, and afterwards knocked out his tooth—he goes free on account of his eye, and he gives him the value of his tooth. But our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 39: If one knocked out the tooth of his slave and blinded his eye—he goes free on account of his tooth, and he does not give the value of his eye. And if he seized it—they do not extract it from his hand. And if he wrote him a writ of manumission between the knocking out of his tooth and the blinding of his eye—he is liable to give him the value of his eye. Thus far his words. And the Rambam in the fifth chapter of Avadim, law 14, wrote like the wording of the Tur. And the Ra'avad criticized him, for in the fourth chapter of Chovel U'Mazik, law 11, he wrote that he is not liable to give him the value of his eye, only that if he seized it—they do not extract it from his hand, see there. And therefore our teacher, the Beit Yosef, explained in his great book that that which he wrote here, his intention was also when he seized it, or that he wrote him a document of manumission between this and that. And based on this he established his words in the Shulchan Aruch. And there is one who says that when it was at one time, one after the other, such that he did not have time to write a document of manumission after the knocking out of his tooth—he must pay. And if there was time to write and he did not write—they do not extract it unless he seized it. And there is one who rejected these words, and wrote that the main point is like our teacher, the Beit Yosef. (Taz, subsection 14, and so wrote the Lechem Mishneh in the laws of Chovel, see there. And the Shach, subsection 49, brought the words of the Bach, see there.)

And behold, both justifications are forced, as is clear to the one who examines them. Furthermore, the sugya regarding contradiction and plotting witnesses in Bava Kamma (Bava Kamma 74a) appears explicitly like the words of the Tur; see there. Therefore, it appears in my humble opinion that the Rambam also holds this way, as he wrote here in the Laws of Servants. And that which he wrote in the Laws of One Who Causes Injury is a different matter. For we have already written in section 53 that their ruling that a deed of manumission is required is not because they hold that such is the halacha; on the contrary, the halacha implies more strongly that for a tooth or an eye he does not require a deed of manumission. Rather, it is because in this time everyone agrees that a deed is required, since this is a fine and we do not have experts; see there. According to this, there is no contradiction here. For here he wrote according to the primary law, and in the Laws of One Who Causes Injury where he deals with the matter of payments—certainly nowadays it is impossible to obligate one to pay a fine unless he seized it. And this is like all fines, that if he seized it, we do not remove it from his hand. And I do not know why they labored over his words, for his words are clear in their reasoning. It turns out according to this that the words of the Tur are true according to the halacha, and the words of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in the Shulchan Aruch are true according to the law that applies in this time. And all of them are the words of the living God. And in the Rambam, there is no contradiction here.

The Tur wrote: The departure of a slave through the loss of major limbs is practiced in every place and at all times. However, it is a fine, and it requires a beit din of experts. Therefore, we do not judge it now, for we do not accept testimony to judge him. And if he confesses on his own—he is exempt, even though he is seized, for he is held in his own body. Even so, the Ra'avad wrote that it is not effective, and if he confesses he shall be exempt. But the Ramban wrote that his confession does not exempt him except in a beit din. And nowadays there is no beit din of experts, and it is like one who confesses outside of a beit din who is not exempt from a fine. Therefore, since he is seized—it is effective even though he confesses. And such is the conclusion of my master, my father the Rosh, of blessed memory. Thus far his words. And it appears to me that this certainly deals with a case where there are witnesses that he knocked out his tooth or blinded his eye, for if not so, confession is not relevant at all in this time? And whether without confession or with confession there is no obligation at all in this time, and without witnesses there is no obligation here at all, as we explained in Choshen Mishpat siman 1, section 10, see there. Rather, it deals with a case where there are witnesses, and regarding this the Ramban holds that now confession is not relevant at all such that we would say "one who confesses to a fine is exempt," since it is like being outside of a beit din. And therefore, since he is seized—it is effective. But the opinion of the Ra'avad is that the confession is effective, and not because confession outside of a beit din is effective. Rather, it appears to me that this is its explanation: that he follows his reasoning which the Tur wrote in his name in Choshen Mishpat siman 1, that one who confesses to a fine and afterwards witnesses came is exempt. And if he seized before the confession, and afterwards he confessed—we remove it from him, see there. And it was also explained there that if the injured party seized and the damager summoned him to beit din, we tell the injured party to bring witnesses etc., see there. And according to this, this is what the Ra'avad is saying: for we do not accept testimony to judge him. That is to say: that we, without the claim of the damager who is the master, will not accept testimony. And when do we accept testimony? When he demands to receive witnesses. Is there not a remedy that he should be exempt by confessing immediately, and afterwards even if they receive witnesses he is exempt and the seizure is not effective, as I wrote there. (And with this, that which the Beit Yosef questioned is settled well. And the Bach labored to settle the wording of the Tur, see there. And examine closely and you will find it easy.)

And our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, in section 40 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 267:40) wrote: The release of a slave through the loss of the tips of limbs, even though it is a fine—it applies in this time. For if witnesses came regarding the matter—he cannot use him. And there is one who wrote that we compel him until he writes him a get shichrur, and the same law applies if the master confessed on his own. Thus far their words. That is to say: if he confessed before the arrival of the witnesses, we do not say that it is like one who confesses to a fine and afterwards witnesses arrive, who is exempt. For it is not so, as nowadays it is like a confession outside of beit din and according to the opinion of the Ramban, of blessed memory. And even though it is also impossible to receive witnesses, yet since the slave is seized of himself, and says "receive my testimony from the witnesses," we must necessarily receive it as in all laws of fines in Choshen Mishpat siman 1. However, that which they wrote that "there is one who wrote" that we compel him to write him a get shichrur—I do not know who wrote so. And if his intention is for what was explained in siman 1 as I have written, but regarding a get shichrur it is not mentioned there. And there regarding other damages, as they see that he compensates him until close to his damage—we remove his hands from him, as the Rif wrote in the chapter "HaChovel." But what matter is this to shichrur? And if they wrote so from the perspective of logical reasoning, because here it is impossible in any other way as is understood, they should have written their own opinion in this. But that which they wrote that "there is one who wrote so"—I do not know who wrote so. And regarding the essence of the matter, there are those who disagree with this, and they hold that we do not compel him to write a get shichrur (Bach and Taz subsection 15). And so it is clarified from the wording of the Rambam in the fifth chapter, see there. And afterwards I found that the Ran wrote so in the first chapter of Kiddushin according to the system of the Ramban, see there. Nevertheless, there are those who disagree as I have written, and they hold that it is a legal doubt. And it requires further study. (The Gra, subsection 79, cited on this the Rif in the chapter "HaChovel," see there. But this is not mentioned in the Rif. However, his intention is: one must say that the foundation of the words of the Ran in Kiddushin are based on the words of the Rif in "HaChovel" as is understood, see there.)

And behold, in section 58 it was explained that nikhsei melog slaves do not go free for a tooth or an eye, neither for the man nor for the woman. And its source is from Bava Kamma (Bava Kamma 90a), for Rabbi Eleazar holds that we require "his slave" – one that is unique to him, as I have written. And we establish the law like Rabbi Eleazar (Beit Yosef) because Amemar ruled like him, as he said there: A man and a woman who sold nikhsei melog property – they have done nothing. According to whom? According to Rabbi Eleazar, see there. And according to this, it is a wonder: for in Even HaEzer siman 90 we rule not like Amemar. This is the wording of the Tur and Shulchan Aruch there, section 16 (Shulchan Aruch Even HaEzer 16): If both of them sold nikhsei melog property etc. – their sale is valid. Thus far his words (see Beit Shmuel subsection 55 who raised this difficulty, see there). And also the Rambam in chapter twenty-two of Ishut law 16 (Rambam Hilkhot Ishut 22) ruled that their sale is valid, yet regarding tooth and eye he ruled like Rabbi Eleazar.

However, in truth it is not a difficulty at all, for in Bava Batra (Bava Batra 90a) there are two versions regarding this statement of Amemar. For the first version is that this is only when one of them sold alone, but when both of them sold—the sale is valid. And according to the second version, which compares it to the law of "a day or two days," and "tooth and eye," where we require "his money" that is unique to him, even if both of them sold—it is nothing. And we hold according to the first version, as the Rosh wrote in "HaChovel" regarding that sugya, see there (siman 9). And so wrote several of the Rishonim (Shita Mekubetzet, see there), because the first version follows the enactment of Usha, for the sages strengthened the lien of the husband, as is explained in the sugyot there. And only regarding the matter of "tooth and eye" do we hold like Rabbi Elazar, that we require "his money" that is unique to him alone, but not regarding a sale. Therefore, they ruled in Even HaEzer that the sale is valid (and so the Beit Shmuel answered there).

And according to this, a new law emerges for us regarding slaves as well. For although it has been explained that melog slaves do not go free for the loss of a tooth or an eye, nevertheless, the husband and wife can manumit them through money or a document. For just as they are able to sell them—likewise they are able to manumit them. And only regarding the departure for the loss of major limbs are they different from other slaves, but regarding money and a document—it is obvious that they go free. And even though there is one who is uncertain about this, nevertheless, the matter is clear that it is so. (See Mishneh LaMelekh in the fifth chapter of Slaves, halakha 16 (the Rambam, Laws of Slaves 5). And it appears from his lengthy words that he agreed to this in practice. And he cited there that Maharam HaLevi was uncertain about this, and he disputed him, see there. And the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch did not mention this. And the wording of the Beit Yosef in his great work requires explanation and correction, see Mishneh LaMelekh there. And examine carefully and you will find it simple.)

And the law of their departure via a document has already been explained. And thus the sages said in Gittin (Gittin 9a): In six matters the manumissions of slaves are equal to the bills of divorce of women, and in the remaining matters they are like all other documents. And these are the six matters: regarding the courts of idolaters, and being valid with a Kutite witness, and that they require writing for the sake of the manumitted person himself, which is to say writing for his name or for her name as with the bills of divorce of women, and that they are not written on that which is attached to the ground, and that their witnesses only sign in the presence of one another, and regarding one who conveys and brings from place to place, the bills of divorce of women and the manumissions of slaves are equal regarding the saying of "in my presence it was written" and "in my presence it was signed."

Arkaot, how so? For we maintain in Hoshen Mishpat siman 68 that all documents produced in arkaot are valid, for the law of the kingdom is the law. However, bills of divorce for women and manumissions of slaves must be written according to the law of the Torah, "lishma" and in the holy tongue, and other laws. And this is impossible in arkaot. And any document that has one Kuti witness upon it is invalid, because they are presumed to be transgressors and are disqualified from testimony, except for bills of divorce for women and manumissions of slaves, because in them the witnesses sign only in each other's presence. And were it not that this Kuti was a haver and an observer of the Torah, an Israelite would not have signed with him. And all this was in ancient times. But in this time, the Kutim are like star-worshippers in all their matters. And only from this do we learn regarding the Sadducees, and they in this time are like Kutim before they decreed upon them to be like star-worshippers in all their matters. And the Karaites are disqualified from testimony (Shach subsection 59).

Lishmah, how so? Regarding a get for a woman it says: "and he shall write for her" – lishmah. And regarding a get of manumission it says: "or her freedom was not given to her" – lishmah. And I wonder: why did they not also consider them equal regarding the matter that two women are not divorced with one get, and two slaves are not manumitted with one deed, because it is written "for her" – and not for her and her fellow (Gittin 42a), as Rashi explained there (s.v. "beshtar"), and as will be explained further on? And from this it appears to my humble opinion to be clear that also two women are not betrothed with one deed just as with a get, for we derive all matters of a deed of kiddushin from "and she shall depart and she shall become" (Kiddushin 9a). And therefore the Gemara did not consider it in Gittin there, for it says there: a matter that is not applicable to kiddushin it teaches, a matter that is applicable to kiddushin it does not teach, see there. And the poskim who considered something attached to the ground even though it is applicable to kiddushin, as I wrote in Even HaEzer siman 32, and according to the conclusion of the Gemara in Gittin there it should not have considered it, nevertheless since it was mentioned there in the sugya – they considered it, for the poskim were not concerned with the fact that also in kiddushin the law is so. But this, that two slaves are not manumitted with one deed – they did not consider, because it was not mentioned in the Gemara there. And the Gemara did not consider it for the reason that it is applicable to kiddushin.

Attached, how so? Regarding a bill of divorce for a woman, it says: "and he shall write and give" – one that lacks nothing but giving – this excludes one who writes on that which is attached and afterwards severed it, for it lacks severing and giving. And regarding a deed of manumission, it also says: "given to her" – that it should lack nothing but giving. That is to say: since it is written "or her freedom was not given to her" – it implies that the freedom, which is the document, has not yet been given to her, and nothing is missing from the freedom except the giving (and with this, that which the Taz questioned in subsection 21 is resolved well). And the laws of attached have been explained in Even HaEzer siman 124. And likewise, the witnesses do not sign this one not in the presence of that one regarding manumission of slaves, just as with bills of divorce for women. For the same reason they stated regarding a bill of divorce for a woman, a decree lest he say to ten people "all of you write a get for my wife," where one writes and all of them sign. And if one of them did not sign – the get is invalid. Therefore, they ordained that all the witnesses be gathered at the time of the signing, as I wrote there in siman 130. And this decree itself applies also to a deed of manumission, as is understood.

How are they equal regarding one who brings and delivers? Regarding the statement "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," which the rabbis instituted for gittin because witnesses are not commonly found to authenticate it, and so that the husband shall not come and protest, as I have written there in siman 142; and so too regarding slaves there is this concern. Therefore, one who brings a get of manumission in Eretz Yisrael does not need to say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed." And outside of the Land, if witnesses are not commonly found to authenticate it, and the messenger said "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" – this is its authentication. And if the master comes afterward and protests – we do not pay him heed. And just as a woman who brings her own get does not need to authenticate it, since the get is produced from her hand, so too the slave when the deed of manumission is produced from his hand – he does not need to authenticate it. And just as with a woman, if he stipulated with her that she is not divorced until she comes to the place of a certain beit din, she must say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" – so too the slave. And there are reasons and laws regarding this, and all of them were explained there. And anyone who is fit to bring a get of a woman, as I have written there – is fit to bring a deed of manumission. (And see Shach subsection 64, that there are those who disagree and hold that when bringing themselves they must authenticate the get and the manumission. And even according to the Rambam that they do not need to – this is only regarding the prohibition. But for the seizing of property from purchasers they must authenticate, see there.)

An eved may be made an agent to receive a get of liberation on behalf of another eved. And even though regarding a get of a woman he cannot be made an agent, because he is not within the category of gittin and kiddushin (Gittin 23b), nevertheless, since he is at least within the category of liberation—therefore he may be made an agent even on behalf of another. However, this is specifically from the hand of the master of the second eved. But from the hand of his own master he cannot be made an agent when his master has another eved, because the hand of an eved is like the hand of his master, and when he delivers the get of liberation to him—it has not left his domain. And as for the fact that he may receive a deed of liberation for himself, this is because his get and his hand come as one, for it is his own liberation. But not for another (Rashi ibid.).

It has already been explained that a slave who brings his bill of manumission, when his master said to him, "Do not be manumitted with it, except that you come before such-and-such a beit din, and there you shall be manumitted" – he must say "In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," and then the master cannot challenge him. But if he gave him his property as well in this document, such as if it is written in it "Yourself and my property are acquired by you" or "All my property is acquired by you," for he is also included in the property, and he said "In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," even though he himself goes out to freedom based on this statement, nevertheless he does not acquire the property until it is validated by its signatories with a beit din validation on the document. For only regarding his person did they institute that "In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" should be effective, as with a woman. But for the property – it is not effective, and it requires validation like all documents. And it is not relevant in this case to say, how can he be believed regarding part of the document and regarding part he is not believed? For this is not due to a reason of credibility, but rather that regarding this the sages instituted that his statement should be effective, and regarding this they did not institute. Therefore, if he cannot validate the document – he goes out to freedom, but he does not acquire the property.

The Tur wrote: One who writes over all of his property to his slave—he has gone out to freedom, for he is included in the property and acquires himself as part of the property. If he reserved a portion of the property, whether land or movable goods, whether he specified the reservation or did not specify it, whether he had other property besides that which he reserved or whether he did not have other property besides that which he reserved—he has not gone out to freedom and has not acquired the property. But if he wrote to him: "Yourself and my property are acquired by you except for such-and-such a thing," even if he only has that thing—he goes out to freedom. And the Rambam wrote regarding this that he has not gone out to freedom. And my lord father, the Rosh, of blessed memory, wrote according to the first opinion. Thus far his words.

The reasoning of the Rambam is as he wrote at the beginning of the seventh chapter: A bill of manumission must have a matter that severs between him and his master, and the master must not retain any right in it. Therefore, one who writes to his slave: "Yourself and all my property are acquired by you except for such-and-such a place, or except for such-and-such a garment" – this is not a severance. And the bill is void, and since it is not a bill – the slave is not liberated, and he has acquired nothing of the property. And so too anything similar to this. Thus far his words. And he follows the approach of the Rif, who explained regarding that which we conclude in Gittin on the Mishnah in Pe'ah chapter three, where it is taught: If he reserved any land at all – he has not gone out to freedom. The reason is not because we concern ourselves that perhaps he reserved the slave, for according to this, if he wrote "Yourself and my property are acquired by you," where this concern is removed – he would go out to freedom. Rather, it is because it is not a "bill of severance," see there. And the Rif and the Rambam explained that this is like the matter of severance regarding a woman, a matter that severs between him and her, so that the husband shall have no hold in the get. And here too, the master shall not have any hold in the bill of manumission. And since he reserved any amount – behold, he has a hold in the document, and this is not a severance, and it is completely void. And even though in the Yerushalmi in Pe'ah there it is explicitly explained otherwise, as it says there: If he reserved movables, I say it is his body that he reserved, see there. And were it not for this concern he would have gone out to freedom – our teachers did not concern themselves with it, for also in our Talmud in Gittin there it sought to give another reason, and Rav Ashi concludes because it is not a "bill of severance," and we hold according to the conclusion of our Talmud. (And I wonder at the Shulchan Aruch section 57 which ruled like the Rambam, see there. And if so, why did he lengthen with the wording of the Tur: whether land etc., whether he specified etc., whether he had etc. – for this belongs to the approach of the Tur. But according to the approach of the Rambam, this is no novelty and is not the matter, and therefore the Rambam did not mention this. Rather, as long as he has some hold in the document – this is not a severance as in a get, which we learn from a woman. And it requires further study.)

But the system of the Tur and the Rosh is like Rashi and Tosafot there, that that which he said "severance of a get"—this is not exactly like a get of a woman. For regarding a slave it is not written "a scroll of severance," but rather it means that it is through this title that the essence of his freedom depends upon it. Such as when he included him within the general category of the properties, where he did not write to him "yourself and my properties are acquired by you" but rather "all my properties are acquired by you"—and he is within their general category. And since there is a reservation in this title, and it is not entirely fulfilled—his manumission has no place to take hold through this title that has a reservation in it, and this title does not sever the slave from the master. And this is according to the explanation of Tosafot there. But according to Rashi there, even for this we are not concerned, but rather we are concerned lest his intention was to reserve also regarding the slave. (See there in Tosafot, starting with the words "The law." And in the Rashi before us this is not proven, see there. And be precise and you will find it easy.) However, according to these our teachers, when his manumission is through a title in its own right, such as if he wrote to him "yourself and my properties are acquired by you"—he has gone out to freedom. And this is what the Tur wrote: "Whether land etc., whether he specified etc., whether he had etc.," meaning: that you should not say that the concern is lest his intention was to reserve him, but if we knew that he did not intend to reserve him—he would go out to freedom. And according to this, if he reserved movables and the slave is similar to land, and likewise when he specified what he reserved where this concern does not exist, and likewise when he had no other properties where this concern is also removed as is understood—and despite all this he has not gone out to freedom. For the reason is because there is a reservation in this title, and as I have written.

There is one who says that specifically when he wrote "all my properties are given to you" – he acquired himself and the properties, but when he did not write "all" but rather "my properties are given to you" – he has not gone out to freedom. For even though a slave is included in the properties, nevertheless when he gives to him himself – it is not implied that there should be in this a get of manumission and a gift, unless he wrote "all my properties" (Shach, subsection 66 in the name of the Ran, see there). And he infers it from the language "all his properties," see there. And I do not understand: for since it was taught there: if he reserved land of any amount he has not gone out a free man – such is the way of the Tanna. Just as with a shekhiv mera in Bava Batra (Bava Batra 146b) where it was taught: a shekhiv mera who wrote all his properties and reserved etc., and in the entire sugya there we say the language "all his properties." And what inference is this? And in all the poskim I did not find this law, and it requires further study. And also from what I wrote in section 78 it is not implied so, see there.

It is stated in Gittin (Gittin 9a): One who writes a deed of betrothal for his maidservant like any deed of betrothal, in which he wrote to her "Behold you are betrothed to me" and said to her "Go out with it and be betrothed to me with it" – there is no language of manumission in this phrasing. That is to say: we do not say that his intention was "you are fit to be betrothed to me," and she is neither betrothed nor manumitted. So it is explained there from the commentary of Rashi, and so wrote the Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch section 58 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 267, 58), see there. And it implies explicitly: because he said to her orally "Go out with it and be betrothed to me with it." But if he wrote in the deed "Go out with it and be betrothed to me with it" – it is effective, for in this it is not relevant to say that there is no language of manumission in this phrasing, obviously. And according to this, it is a wonder regarding the Tur who wrote: One who writes a deed of betrothal for his maidservant, and wrote in it "Go out with it and be betrothed to me with it" – there is no language of manumission in this. And she is neither manumitted nor betrothed. Thus far his words. And from the perspective of logic as well, there is no reason for this, and I am astonished at the commentators of the Tur who were not aroused by this. Unless we say that it is a printing error, and so it should say: and he said to her "Go out with it." And it requires further study. And our teacher, the Rema, wrote: But if he said to her "Be betrothed" alone – we say he certainly manumitted her first, and the betrothal took effect. Thus far his words. And so it is explained from Rashi there. And it is simple that in all this it must be said when she already immersed for the sake of manumission, for if not so, the taking effect of betrothal is not relevant (Bach). And so it is explicit in Tosafot Yevamot (Yevamot 47b, s.v. sham, see there).

We have already written that just as two women are not divorced with one get, so too two slaves do not go free with one document. Therefore, one who releases his two slaves with one document—they have not gone out to freedom. Consequently, one who writes all his property to his two slaves in one document—they have acquired neither themselves nor the property. This is the wording of the Tur: One who writes all his property to his two slaves—each one acquires half of the property. It turns out that each one acquired half of himself and half of his fellow. Therefore, they must release one another. And this is specifically where he wrote two documents, and wrote in each one "all my property is given to so-and-so my slave," or where he wrote "half my property is given to so-and-so my slave, and the other half to so-and-so my slave," and he delivered them to one person together so that he may acquire on their behalf, for now both of them acquired as one. But if he did not deliver the two documents together, if he wrote in each of them "all my property is given to so-and-so my slave"—the first acquired and the second acquired nothing, for he already delivered them to the first. And if he wrote in each document "half the property," even if he specified "the other half"—neither of them acquires. The first did not acquire because he left over, and since the first did not acquire— the second also did not acquire. And if he did not specify in one of the documents "the other half"—even if he delivered both of them together they did not acquire, for it can be said that he gave one half to both of them, and behold he left over his acquisition. But if he wrote to them "all his property" in one document in any case—they did not acquire. Thus far his words.

And behold, all of his words are explained. And only regarding that which he wrote, that when he specified in each deed that the half he gives to this one he does not give to that one, and he delivered them to one person together so that he should acquire on their behalf, that both of them acquired—there are some of our teachers who disagree on this, and they hold that even in such a case it is not effective. And the Ramban, of blessed memory, gave a reason: because one who gives half of his property to his fellow does not take half in every vessel and in every field, but rather they appraise the property and he takes the inferior half. Therefore, this one whose master wrote to him "half of the property"—the slave is not included in that half, and he has done nothing. And the Ran, of blessed memory, gave a reason: for behold, the slave is only emancipated by the deed in his hand, and we require that there be no reservation in it. And behold, in his deed only half a slave was released. And even though the deed of his fellow proves that there is no reservation, since the second half is explained there, and it turns out that he emancipated him entirely—nevertheless it is not effective, for behold, he is not emancipated by the deed of his fellow, and in the deed itself there is a reservation. And so it is explained from the words of the Rambam in the seventh chapter, who wrote that the slave is among the property, and behold he reserved half of him in it and this is not an emancipation, etc. Thus far his words. (See the Beit Yosef who brought all the opinions. And in the Shulchan Aruch section 59 he stated the matters without specification, and his intention is like the Rambam. And see the Taz subsection 27. And I do not understand what he wrote, that according to the Ran it is not effective if he wrote in each deed that he gives all his property to Ploni and Ploni his slaves, etc., see there. And why is it not effective? And it requires further study. And be precise and you will find it easy.)

One who releases half of his slave with a shtar—the slave does not acquire his half, and he remains a slave as he was. For we derive the shtar of a slave from "freedom was not given to her," and we learn "to her"—"to her" from a woman: just as a woman is not divorced by halves, so too a slave. Therefore, if he released him with silver—he can release half of him, and he becomes half a freeman and half a slave, for with silver there is no exclusion from a verse, and he is like all commodities that are sold in halves. Therefore, with a gift, where there is no acquisition of silver, it is impossible in halves, that he should give the slave himself half of him as a gift, as is understood. And even with a shtar, which we said is not effective, this is when his second half remains with the master. But when he leaves the domain of the master entirely, even though only half of him went out to freedom—for example, if he sold or gave his second half to another—since he left his domain entirely, he is half a freeman and half a slave to the second. And the reason is simple, for even with a woman we only require that she leave the domain of the husband entirely, and only there it is not applicable that she should hand over half of herself to another, for a woman is not betrothed in halves. And this we did not learn regarding a slave from a woman; we only learned regarding a get of release, that at the time of his release he must leave the domain of his master entirely. But regarding entering the domain of another—he is not similar to a woman.

However, in this one must be precise: that he should not precede the half-emancipation to the half-sale, for if he precedes them—behold, he has not gone out to freedom, since at the time of the act of emancipation he did not leave his domain entirely. Rather, he should first precede the half-sale, or they should be as one, that in one moment he sells his half and emancipates his half. And it appears to me that in one moment he can even precede the emancipation to the sale, for anything "within the time of a speech" is like the speech itself. And there is room to doubt if one document is effective for the half-emancipation and the half-sale to the second party, just as a gift of all assets to the slave is effective within his document of emancipation, as has been explained. And one must deliberate on this. And according to what has been explained regarding a slave of two partners—one of them can emancipate his portion, since nothing remains in his domain, and he becomes half slave and half freeman.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 61: One who writes to his pregnant maidservant, "Behold, you are a free woman and your offspring is a slave" – his words are upheld. "You are a maidservant and your offspring is a free man" – he has said nothing. Thus far his words. The first ruling is explicit at the end of the third chapter of Kiddushin, and the second ruling is explicit in Gittin. And the reason: for we hold that "a fetus is not the thigh of its mother," and they are like two bodies. Therefore, in the first ruling, his words are upheld. And the second ruling, that he has said nothing, is because the mother does not have the power to receive the bill of manumission on behalf of the fetus from her master, as I wrote in section 71. This reason was written by the Ra'avad in the seventh chapter, law 5, see there. And also in Gittin ibid. it is explained thus, for according to the one who holds that "you are a maidservant and your offspring is a free man" his words are upheld, he explains the reason that "a fetus is the thigh of its mother," and it becomes as if he granted her one of her limbs. And he holds that one who frees half of his slave – he has acquired [freedom]. And in such a case it is called "his bill and his hand come as one." And this is explained explicitly in Temurah (and the difficulty raised by the Tosafot in Gittin ibid. s.v. "V'na'aseh" requires great study, see there). And from this it is explained that according to what we hold, that one who frees half of his slave has not acquired [freedom], and a fetus is not the thigh of its mother, it follows automatically that he has said nothing.

However, according to this, if another person receives a deed of manumission on behalf of the fetus—the fetus would go out to freedom, since it is not the thigh of its mother. However, the Ra'avad wrote another reason: that one who transfers ownership to a fetus does not effect a transfer because it has not yet come into the world, and according to this, even another person cannot acquire on its behalf. However, this reason is not implied in Temurah there at all. For when it challenges this law according to the one who holds a fetus is not the thigh of its mother, it challenges from the reason that it cannot receive a get of manumission from the hand of its own master, and it does not challenge at all from the fact that one cannot grant acquisition to a fetus, see there (and so wrote the Lechem Mishneh, see there). And in my humble opinion, it appears that certainly regarding another person, this reason is relevant. But regarding its mother, this reason is not relevant; even if a fetus is not the thigh of its mother—she acquires on its behalf, because her mind is close to her son, and it is considered as if it has come into the world, as we say this reasoning in Bava Batra (Bava Batra 142b) regarding another matter. And we shall say this reasoning here as well. Therefore, it was not mentioned in this context in the Gemara. And according to this, even for the previous reason, it is impossible to acquire on behalf of the fetus, neither the mother nor another person. The mother because he cannot acquire for the fetus through his maidservant, and another person because he cannot grant acquisition to a fetus (so it appears in my humble opinion).

And behold, the Rambam in chapter seven, law 5 (Rambam Hilkhot Avadim 7) and the Tur also wrote these two laws. However, regarding the second law they concluded that therefore in the case of "Behold you are a maidservant and your fetus is a freeman," he has said nothing, because this is like one who manumits half of her. Thus far his words. That is to say: that a fetus is the thigh of its mother, and one who manumits half of his slave has done nothing. And according to this, it is a great wonder: for if so, also in the first clause regarding "Behold you are a free woman and your fetus is a slave" – it should also not be effective. And the commentators wrote a reason for this, and the essence of their words is: that even though a fetus is the thigh of its mother, nevertheless the fetus is subordinate to her, and she is not subordinate to the fetus. Therefore, she hinders the fetus, but the fetus does not hinder her. (And this is the intention of the Shach, subsection 75, and the Perishah and the Lechem Mishneh there.)

And behold, in truth, from the perspective of the law of "a fetus is the thigh of its mother" itself, it is possible to say so. For in particular, the Rambam did not clarify this law in any place in his work. And from the place where it could be inferred that he holds it is not the thigh of its mother—such as regarding the offspring of a shelamim where she is an olah, which he ruled at the beginning of the fifteenth chapter of the Laws of Ma'aseh HaKorbanot is effective—there is no proof that he holds it is not the thigh of its mother, as there are other reasons in the Gemara for this; see there in Temurah. And also that which he ruled in the fourth chapter of the Laws of Pesulei HaMukdashin, that if one designated a pregnant chatat and she gave birth, if he wishes—he achieves atonement through her, and if he wishes through her offspring—likewise, there are other reasons in the Gemara. And also from what he ruled at the end of the second chapter of Issurei Mizbe'ach, that all those forbidden to the altar, their offspring are permitted—likewise there is no proof, as there is another reason at the end of the sixth chapter of Temurah; see there. And also from what he ruled there that the offspring of a tereifah may be offered—there is no proof, as there is another reason in Chullin (58a). And also to the contrary, there is no proof from what he ruled there in the third chapter that the offspring of an animal that was the object of bestiality is forbidden, and likewise the offspring of a goring animal is forbidden, for even if it is not the thigh of its mother—they are forbidden because the fetus itself received a part in this, as the Tosafot wrote in Bava Kamma (47a). And likewise from what he ruled in the ninth chapter of Nizkei Mamon that if a cow caused damage he collects from its offspring—this also works well for this reason, even if it is not the thigh of its mother. And in truth, our teachers the Tosafot in Bava Kamma and in Chullin there ruled that we hold a fetus is the thigh of its mother in every place except for tereifot, because the fetus has vitality of its own; see there, and not like the words of the Ra'avad. Therefore, one could say that the Rambam and the Tur also hold so. However, the primary reasoning is astonishing, to distinguish between her and the offspring (and the Lechem Mishneh himself wrote that it is astonishing; see there). Furthermore: in Temurah there, the Gemara wanted to compare the two laws to one another; see there, and it did not distinguish between them with this reasoning—learn from this that it is impossible to say so. (And also what the Taz wrote in subsection 30 to distinguish, that in the first clause we say his intention was for when she gives birth, which is not the case in the latter clause; see there—besides it being forced and pressured, furthermore from Temurah there this reasoning is refuted as I have written; see there. Examine it and you will find it simple.)

Therefore, it appears in my humble opinion that he holds that these two laws are not dependent at all on the law of "a fetus is the thigh of its mother." And he also holds that the law of "a fetus is the thigh of its mother" is not a general rule for all matters; rather, there are instances where we say "it is the thigh of its mother" and there are instances where we say "it is not the thigh of its mother." Therefore, we do not find this law in the Rambam in detail. And behold, regarding the second law of "behold you are a maidservant and your fetus is a freeman," it is stated explicitly in Gittin there that whoever holds that she acquired it for him requires two things: that "a fetus is the thigh of its mother," and that one who liberates half of his slave, he has acquired. But according to what we maintain, that one who liberates half of his slave has not acquired, even if we say it is the thigh of its mother—it is not effective due to the reason of half of his slave. And certainly if it is not the thigh of its mother—he has not acquired due to the reason that his slave cannot receive a bill of manumission on behalf of another slave. And this is why the Rambam and the Tur gave a reason for the second law, that this is like one who liberates half of her, meaning: it is not only that if it is not the thigh of its mother she certainly cannot acquire on its behalf. Rather, even if it is the thigh of its mother, in which case she could acquire on its behalf, as its bill and its hand come as one as we say in Temurah there, and as he wrote in section 82 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 267, 82)—it is also not effective, for this is like one who liberates half of her, and we maintain that one cannot liberate half of him.

And also the first law of "Behold you are a free woman and your offspring is a slave" works well, whether according to the one who says "the fetus is the thigh of its mother" or according to the one who says "it is not the thigh of its mother." For in Kiddushin there, which is the source of the law, it does not state any reason for this; see there. This proves that the matter does not depend on this dispute. And even though there in Temurah it sought to depend this dispute on whether if he reserved it, it is reserved—that is, whether it is "the thigh of its mother" or not—and it rejected this, saying that everyone holds that if he reserved it, it is reserved, which is "not the thigh of its mother," see there—this is only a rejection in the manner of the Shas in several places. And the same applies that it could have said that everyone holds that if he reserved it, it is not reserved, but rather because there it raises a difficulty from this against R. Yochanan, who holds there regarding consecrated items that if he reserved it, it is reserved—therefore it rejects it. For everyone holds like R. Yochanan, in the manner of the Shas to reject difficulties. And so it is in the entire sugya there; see there. But in truth, it appears in my humble opinion that even if we say "the fetus is the thigh of its mother," his words also stand, and the concept of one who manumits half of his slave does not apply to this. And it is not because the fetus is secondary to the mother, but rather because the fact that we do not manumit half a slave is derived from a woman: just as a woman is not divorced in halves, so too a slave, as I wrote in section 80. And if so, deduce from it and from its own terms: just as with a woman her fetus does not prevent the divorce, for her fetus is not relevant to divorce, so too with a slave the fetus does not prevent the divorce. However, when we judge regarding the fetus, of necessity the mother must prevent it, for she is the one who receives the get of manumission just like a woman who receives the get. But conversely, when we judge regarding the mother—the fetus does not prevent it, as with a woman. And therefore in the first clause they wrote no reason, and in the latter clause they wrote the reason, because in Gittin there the Shas explained it so. But their main intention is to say that these two laws do not depend on the dispute of "the thigh of its mother."

The Rambam wrote in the seventh chapter, law 6: A shifcha charufa, if he desired to manumit her remaining half so she becomes a complete married woman—he may manumit her, whether with money or with a document. For even money completes her manumission. Thus far his words. The explanation of his words: For a shifcha charufa is half maidservant and half free woman who is betrothed to a Hebrew slave. And he already explained this law in the fourth chapter of Ishut, law 16, see there. And there it deals with one who was betrothed to an ordinary Israelite. And he ruled that the kiddushin were completed, see there. And such is the law regarding one betrothed to a Hebrew slave, for so he wrote explicitly in the third chapter of the laws of Issurei Biah, law 13, and this is his wording: A shifcha charufa etc. and betrothed to a Hebrew slave etc., if she was entirely manumitted—they are liable for her etc., for she has become a complete married woman etc. Thus far his words. And here he did not come to inform us of the laws of Ishut, but rather that he can manumit her, whether with money or with a document. And the novelty in this is that money also completes her manumission. So that we should not say since it is written "for she was not freed," from which we derive that if she were freed they would die. And "freed" refers to a document, nevertheless money also completes it for her. And the reason: for money is superior to a document. And it is a kal vachomer: for if a document, which is not effective for her first half as I have written, nevertheless is effective for her second half, certainly money, which is effective for her first half, is effective for her second half. And the Tur and Shulchan Aruch did not write this law, because a Hebrew slave only applies during the time of the Yovel. (And they questioned him, and we explained his words in Even HaEzer, siman 44, see there.)

The sages taught in the Mishnah (Gittin 41a) that one who is half slave and half free person—by law, he works for his master one day and for himself one day, like a slave of two partners. However, since he is unable to marry a woman—neither a maidservant because of the side of freedom within him, nor a free woman because of the side of slavery within him—therefore the sages enacted that his master is obligated to liberate his half, and he writes him a deed of liberation. And the slave writes him a promissory note for half his value according to his appraisal. And it is not a wonder how it is possible to be half a free person, for is there not no liberation for halves? For one can say, for example, that he was a slave of two partners, and one of them liberated him. And this is regarding a slave, but a maidservant, since a woman is not commanded regarding procreation—they do not compel to liberate her entirely. Unless the licentious treat her with abandon, and it is impossible for her to take a husband, neither a slave nor a free person—they compel her master to liberate her. And one should not ask: for does one who liberates his slave not violate a positive commandment, and shall we not compel the master to perform a prohibition? For in truth, the prohibition is only when he intends for his own benefit. But when he intends for a mitzvah or for the sake of another matter—there is no such positive commandment at all (Ran ibid.). And the Tosafot answer that since the slave did not sin in this, they say to a person: "Commit a minor sin so that your fellow may merit a great mitzvah." And regarding a maidservant, even though she is a sinner through zanit, nevertheless, since the licentious pursue her, and it is a mitzvah of the public—therefore it is permitted, see there. And many of the poskim adopted the first answer.

And behold, the Rambam brought this law in the seventh chapter as according to the law of the Mishnah and no more, see there. And the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, section 62, wrote: One who is half slave etc. we compel his master to emancipate him, and he writes him a document for half his value. And as long as he has not written him a writ of emancipation—his handiwork belongs to himself. And if an ox killed him—he pays neither a fine nor a kofer. Thus far his words. That is to say: neither half the fine of thirty shekels according to the law of an ox that killed a slave, nor half a kofer, which is half the value of a free man. And the reason: for he does not have half a kofer like a free man, since the kofer goes to his heirs, and this one has no heirs. And he does not have half a fine for his master, for we are compelling his master to release him, and we do not read concerning him "thirty shekels of silver he shall give to his master"—and he is not a master. And it seems to me that regarding what they wrote "his handiwork belongs to himself"—this is because the profit belongs to him. But nevertheless, the master may take them because of his debt, since it is owed to him for half his value. And it is possible that as long as he has not written him a writ of emancipation—he is not yet liable to him.

And behold, this is the approach of our teachers, the authors of the Tosafot and the Rosh there. For since according to the final Mishnah one compels his master to release him to freedom—his status is like one who is withheld a get shichrur. However, the opinion of the Rambam is not so, for he wrote in the eleventh chapter of Nizkei Mammon that if an ox killed one who is half slave and half free—he gives half the fine to his master. And in the fourth chapter of Chovel he wrote that if an ox gored him on the day belonging to his master—it belongs to his master, see there. For he holds that it is not similar to one who lacks a get shichrur, for even though according to the final Mishnah one compels his master to write him a get shichrur, this is regarding the matter of prohibition. But regarding the matter of money, as long as the release has not been written for him—his status is like half slave and half free, as the plain meaning of the Gemara in Gittin implies, and so it implies in the Yerushalmi there. And we have already explained this in Choshen Mishpat siman 424, the end of section 10, see there. And many of the great authorities labored over his words in several places, and the matter is clear as I have written. (And with this, that which the Rambam wrote in the second chapter of the laws of Korban Pesach is settled, that he does not eat from that of his master etc., and see there in the Kesef Mishneh and in the Mishneh LaMelekh. And according to what I have written, it is settled simply.)

And behold, regarding a maidservant who remains half-maidservant and half-free woman—she remains as she is, and works for herself one day and for her master one day. And if a person injured her body, for example, if he struck her on her hand, and her hand swelled but is destined to return to its health, such that there is no permanent damage here but only "shevet" in that she is idle from work—if he struck her on the day she works for her master, the "shevet" belongs to her master for all the days she will be idle. And if he struck her on her own day, all the "shevet" belongs to her. And even though one of them will lose their day, this is only indirect causation, and the payment is according to the time of the injury. And this applies to an injury that is destined to return. But if he severed her hand, and likewise anything that is not destined to return where there is permanent damage—we do not follow the day, for this is only relevant to "shevet" and not to permanent damage. And she and the master divide the damage between them. And if he killed her—he gives half the fine to the master, and for the half of the ransom there is no one to give it to, for she has no heirs. And it seems to me that in a case where he pays for damage, such as where he severed her hand, and there is "shevet" there as well, we follow the day regarding the "shevet."

The Rambam wrote: One who is half-slave and half-free, whose master arose and transferred his half to his minor son so that the beit din would not compel him to manumit him—the beit din appoints a guardian for the minor. The guardian writes him a writ of manumission, and writes him a promissory note for half his value. And if the minor has need of the slave, or has an affection for him—they distance him from him with money, for the mind of a minor is close to money. Thus far his words. And it is from Gittin (Gittin 40a), see there. And the Ra'avad contested him, and this is his wording: Does a guardian write a writ of manumission? Rather, etc., a guardian in order to be exacting regarding his value, and the manumission is in the name of the minor. And he only requires manumission so that he does not become entangled with him and say to him, "You are my slave." Thus far his words. And his intention is clear, that it is not in the power of the guardian to manumit slaves, but rather the minor manumits him. And even though the act of a minor is nothing, and also he does not have the ability to transfer him to the minor after the sages compel him to manumit him, yet this is truly only so that the minor does not become entangled with him and say to him, "You are my slave." And similarly to this, the Tosafot wrote there, see there, and similarly to this, Rashi explained there. However, from Rashi it is clear that by law his manumission is a valid manumission, according to the law of toddlers whose purchase is a purchase and whose sale is a sale regarding movables, see there. And the Rambam holds according to the explanation of Rashbam there in Tosafot, that even though any guardian cannot release slaves to freedom, nevertheless, since he acted improperly—the sages permitted the guardian to release him to freedom. But the act of a minor is nothing. And according to this, the difficulty of the Ra'avad, of blessed memory, is not difficult.

And also the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch section 63 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 267:63) wrote like the Rambam, and it is a complete law. However, in this they changed from the words of the Rambam, for the Rambam wrote: "One who is half slave etc. whose master stood and transferred his half to his minor son," which implies explicitly that the transfer is effective even after he is half a free man. Whereas the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote: "A slave of two partners where one of them emancipated his portion – they compel the second that he also emancipate his portion. And if he knew of his fellow that he wants to emancipate his portion, and he transferred his portion to his minor son, and afterwards his fellow emancipated – the beit din cannot compel the minor to emancipate. But they appoint a guardian for him etc., and the guardian shall emancipate him with the money that the minor received, and the guardian shall write for him a deed of emancipation in his name etc." Thus far their words. Behold, they wrote that he transferred to his minor son before he became half a free man. And it appears that they follow their own reasoning, for they hold that after the enactment he is like one who is emancipated, and his transfer to the minor is not effective. Therefore they wrote that it was beforehand. And the Rambam, of blessed memory, according to what we explained in section 91, holds that even after the enactment he is half a slave, and therefore he explained that he transferred him after he became half a free man. And also in this there is a difference, for the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote that they give some money to the minor, and the Rambam wrote that it is specifically when he has an affection for him. But in this they did not write so specifically, for certainly in the Gemara it implies like the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, but the Rambam explained why must we do so? Because if he has an affection it is necessary to do so. And a minor presumably has an affection, therefore the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch left their words unspecified as in the Gemara. However, in this they hold like the Rambam that it is a complete law. (And according to this, what the Taz wrote in subsection 34, that the consent of the minor is required because of "evil talk," see there – this is according to the reasoning of the Tosafot and the Ra'avad, and not for the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch who follow the reasoning of the Rambam and the Rashbam. And similarly what the Shach wrote in subsection 81 in the name of the Bach, that the father must give to the son from his own money, see there – this is an entirely different opinion in the Mordechai, who also follows the reasoning of the Tosafot in the essence of the matter. But for the Rambam and the Rashbam and the Tur and Shulchan Aruch – there is no need for all this. And according to them it is a complete law and not a penalty. Examine carefully and you will find it simple.)

And all that has been explained, this is all when he intended to circumvent the enactment of the sages: either before he became half a freeman or afterward, according to the opinions that have been explained. But in any event, his intention was to circumvent the enactment of the sages, and therefore the sages found a remedy through an apotropos so that his evil thought would not be fulfilled. But if he died and left a minor son, and afterward the partner emancipated his portion—we do not appoint an apotropos for the minor to emancipate him, since there was no deception or stratagem in this, but rather we establish it upon the primary law that he serves himself one day and the minor one day until he grows up. And then we say to him that the law is that they shall release him to freedom, and he shall write him a document for half his value. And if he will not listen then—we compel him, but not while he is a minor. (And this is explained in the Gemara there, which said: As he has done, so shall be done to him. See there.)

It appears to me that regarding what the sages said in a case where they compel him to be emancipated, such as one who is half slave and half free man and the like, that they compel him to write a deed of emancipation—it is not specifically a deed of emancipation, for the same law applies if someone is found who wishes to give half the value of the slave in cash to his master, that they compel him to accept the money. And he goes out to freedom with this, for he acquires himself with money, as the Rambam wrote regarding a designated maidservant, whose words we cited in section 88. And as for the fact that in the Shas and in the poskim only a deed of emancipation was mentioned, it is because there is no cash present here, for that is why we learned that the slave writes him a deed for half his value. But if there were someone who would give cash on his behalf—he does not require a deed of emancipation.

One who renounces ownership of his slave—he has gone out to freedom, but he requires a get shichrur to remove his prohibition. For even though the obligation of the lien on the body is removed from the slave once he has renounced ownership of him—this is regarding the monetary obligation, like any property that a person renounces. However, regarding the prohibition, there is not one of the three ways here by which a slave acquires himself. Therefore, he requires a get shichrur to remove his prohibition. And it is simple that we compel him to write him a get shichrur. And it appears that here money is not effective as in the previous section, for he has already renounced his money, and he has no remedy except through a shetar shichrur. And one who renounces ownership of his slave and dies before he wrote him the shetar shichrur—the heir writes him the shetar shichrur, even though the heir inherits nothing since he already renounced ownership of him. And in truth, there is one in the Gemara who holds so, that the slave has no remedy (Gittin 40a) because a prohibition is not something that can be bequeathed to heirs. Nevertheless, we do not rule accordingly, for the heir stands in the place of his testator and can write him a shetar shichrur. And it appears that we also compel him to this. And the reason that he can bequeath this appears to me to be that just as he himself can write a get shichrur even though he has no monetary law over him, but rather because he is still called "his slave," so too here he bequeaths this status to his heir. Therefore, the heir is also called "master," and can write him a get shichrur.

A convert (in ancient times) who died and has no heirs, for we hold that whoever takes possession of his property has acquired it, and there were adult and minor slaves among them—the adults acquire themselves, and they are free men. And one should not ask: for this is similar to hefker, and regarding hefker a get shichrur is required, and in the case of death there is no one to write a document of release since he has no heirs? However, the truth is that this is not similar to hefker during one's lifetime, for a slave is derived from the comparison of "to her"—"to her" from a woman; therefore, during one's lifetime he has no remedy without a get, like a woman. But hefker after death, just as his wife is sent away without a get—his slave also does not require a get (Rashi ibid. 39a (Gittin 39a) s.v. "his slave"). Nevertheless, when he declared him hefker during his lifetime and afterwards died—the heir must write him a document of release, just as his benefactor would have been obligated to give him a document of release.

This refers to adult slaves who have the legal capacity to acquire themselves. However, minors who do not have the legal capacity to acquire themselves when there is no other mind transferring ownership to them, as I wrote in Choshen Mishpat siman 243, therefore, whoever first seizes them acquires them. And if no person acquired them until they grew up, they have no remedy, because upon the death of the ger, the prohibition did not depart from them due to their minority; therefore, now that they have become adults, even though the monetary ownership has departed from them since they have no owner, nevertheless, through what would their prohibition depart now? For now there is no death of the master to cause their prohibition to depart from them (Tur in the name of the Ramah). And there is one who says that when they grow up and have the legal capacity to acquire themselves, they now acquire also to remove their prohibition, and we view it as if their master died now (Beit Yosef). And the later authorities decided in accordance with the first opinion (Derisha and Bach), and our teacher, the Rema, ruled accordingly in section 65 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 267, 65). And in my humble opinion, there is a proof for the second opinion from that which we say in Yevamot (Yevamot 109b): The kiddushin of a minor girl are suspended, and when she grows up, they grow up with her; see there. Even though the kiddushin are no longer in the world, nevertheless we view it as if they were now created. If so, here too let us say the death of the master is suspended, and when they grow up, it grows up with them, as if he died now. Furthermore: regarding the primary law, Abba Shaul and the sages disagreed there. For the sages hold that even minors acquire themselves as free men. And Abba Shaul holds that regarding minors, whoever seizes them acquires them. And we establish the law like Abba Shaul. If so, how can we create such a distant dispute, that according to the sages they acquire themselves as free men even in their minority, and according to Abba Shaul it would not avail even in their adulthood? Therefore, this law requires further study.

A slave who was taken captive and fled from captivity, and comes before us after his master despaired of him—he cannot be enslaved by him any longer, and we compel him to write him a deed of manumission, because despair is like ownerless property, and it is a language of ownerless property (Rashi Gittin 39b s.v. "I have despaired"). And it has already been explained that one who makes his slave ownerless—he has gone out to freedom, and requires a deed of manumission. This law is explicit in Gittin (Gittin 38a): A slave who fled from prison etc., see there. And it is clearly implied from the wording of the Shas and the poskim that this is specifically when he was taken captive and fled and there was despair. But if he fled from the owners, and the owners despaired—it is not so. And a reason is required why, since despair is like ownerless property? And it can be said that there is one who holds in the Gemara there that even when he was taken captive and fled and there was despair—he should also be enslaved because of the enactment, so that everyone should not go and cast himself into troops and remove himself from the hand of his master. And we do not hold accordingly. However, one who flees from the owners—certainly all agree that despair is not effective, for if not so, every slave would do so.

Furthermore: we have already explained in Choshen Mishpat siman 262 section 7 that ye'ush is not like complete hefker. Our teachers, the authors of the Tosafot, wrote this reasoning in Bava Kamma (Bava Kamma 66a). Therefore, ye'ush is not effective regarding theft, and similarly regarding a lost object, ye'ush shelo mada'at is not effective. We explained there that the reason is because hefker only applies to an object in one's possession that one declares hefker of his own will. However, ye'ush applies to an object that is not in one's possession and is against one's will. Therefore, when he fled from prison, they treated ye'ush like complete hefker and the slave acquired himself, and it is like a lost object where ye'ush is effective. But when he fled from his home – ye'ush is not like hefker, for this is like theft where ye'ush is not effective. And hefker is not applicable in this case, since it is not in his possession, and hefker only applies to an object in one's possession. This matter we explained in Choshen Mishpat at the beginning of siman 273, see there.

A slave who was taken captive and did not escape from captivity, and others ransomed him: if his first master despaired of him—anyone who ransomed him for the sake of being a slave shall enslave him, and he belongs to him. And if he ransomed him for the sake of being a freeman—he is a freeman; for he shall not be enslaved to the first since it is after despair, nor to the second since he ransomed him for the sake of being a freeman. And if his first master did not despair of him—one who ransoms him for the sake of being a slave takes his ransom from his master, and he returns to his master. And if he ransomed him for the sake of being a freeman—he returns to his master for nothing. Thus the Rambam ruled in the eighth chapter (Rambam, Laws of Slaves 8). And his reasoning appears to be that anyone who ransoms for the sake of being a freeman—he has performed the mitzvah of ransoming captives. And this does not involve reimbursement as with all mitzvot. And although he returns to his master, nevertheless, the ransomer acted for the sake of a mitzvah. However, in the Tosefta it does not imply so (see Beit Yosef). And there are other opinions regarding this, see in the Tur. And know that in all these cases where it was explained that he goes out to freedom, he must accept upon himself the yoke of mitzvot before three, and he immerses for the sake of conversion like a complete Israelite (ibid.).

A slave whom his master made an apotiki for a creditor, even an explicit apotiki, such as where he said "you shall have no payment except from this one," and afterward he emancipated him—he has removed it from the lien, and behold, he is a freeman. For we hold that emancipation removes from a lien, just as his consecration must pay the creditor, for he has damaged his lien, and we hold: one who damages the lien of his fellow is liable to pay. And they compel the creditor to write him a get shichrur. And even though according to the essential law he does not require emancipation from him, for his body was not acquired by him, but rather he had a lien upon him and now his lien has been removed; nevertheless, for the sake of the betterment of the world, so that he should not find him in the marketplace and say to him "you are my slave"—they compel him to write him a get shichrur. And he collects his debt from the master, who is his borrower (Gittin 41a). And it appears to me that they compel him immediately to write him the emancipation, even before the borrower has paid him, for we should not delay the slave because of this in a matter for which he is not liable at all.

It is stated in Gittin (Gittin 40a): A slave whose master married him to a woman—he has gone out to freedom. For if he had not emancipated him, he would not have committed a transgression to marry a daughter of Israel to a slave. However, if the slave married a woman on his own, even if his master knew and did not protest against him, nevertheless he does not go out to freedom through this. And when he married him off—they compel him also to write a deed of emancipation, for perhaps he did not write a deed of emancipation for him beforehand. And the Tur wrote that since a slave whose master married him to a woman has gone out to freedom, because he would not have committed a transgression as I have written, if so, all the more so if he himself marries his maidservant who is a free woman, that we say: if he had not emancipated her—he would not have committed a transgression. And the Ramah wrote that she is betrothed out of doubt and they compel her master to write her a deed of emancipation. And if he desires to keep her after this, she requires another betrothal, for the first betrothal is a doubtful betrothal, and if he does not desire to keep her for the sake of marriage, she requires a get for the first betrothal, for on account of an assessment of intent we expropriate property. But regarding a prohibition, we do not follow an assessment of intent to permit her without a deed of emancipation, whether in the case where his master married him off or in the case of one who marries his maidservant.

And my master, my father the Rosh, of blessed memory, wrote: That which we require a deed of manumission when one marries off his slave is so that the master shall not say, "I did not release him and he is my slave." But certainly we follow the assessment of intent, for he certainly released him, and we remove him from his possession, and he is permitted to a free woman. Therefore, regarding one who betroths his maidservant, where there is no concern that perhaps he will say "I did not release her" – she does not even require a deed of manumission. Thus far the wording of the Tur. And the Rambam wrote at the beginning of the ninth chapter (Rambam Laws of Slaves 9): An Israelite who has relations with a Canaanite maidservant, even though she is his maidservant – this offspring is Canaanite in every respect. And he is sold and purchased, and one works with him forever like other slaves. Thus far his words. And according to this, he disagrees with the Tur, the Rosh, and the Ramah.

The Rambam follows his reasoning in the tenth chapter of Divorce, where he wrote that some of the Geonim ruled that one who has a son from his maidservant, we are concerned for him that perhaps he emancipated her and afterwards cohabited with her, and there is one who ruled that he certainly emancipated her. And all these matters are far in my eyes from the paths of ruling, for the sages did not say "a person does not make his cohabitation a cohabitation of licentiousness" except regarding his wife whom he divorced alone, etc. Thus far his words. And we have already mentioned his opinion and the opinion of those who disagree in Even HaEzer siman 156, see there. And so the commentators of the Tur understood that the Rambam disagrees with this law. And so wrote our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in the Shulchan Aruch section 69, and this is his wording: An Israelite who cohabited with a maidservant, even if she is his own maidservant – the offspring is a slave. And there are those who say that if he cohabited with his maidservant or betrothed her – the offspring is a free person for all matters. And there is one who says that even though for other matters his law is as a free person, he is not permitted to a free woman until he receives a get of emancipation. Thus far his words. And the first opinion is the opinion of the Rambam, and the second is the opinion of the Rosh, and the third is the opinion of the Ramah.

And in my humble opinion, these matters are astonishing: for if it is as they say, why did the Tur not mention the opinion of the Rambam at all, as he mentioned his opinion in Even HaEzer siman 156 regarding yibum, and in Choshen Mishpat siman 279 regarding inheritances? And also the Rosh brought the ruling of the Rambam and the Geonim in the second chapter of Yevamot. And this ruling he wrote in the fourth chapter of Gittin, and did not mention the opinion of the Rambam at all, see there. Rather, certainly this ruling does not pertain at all to the words of the Rambam, for the Rambam is dealing with one who had relations with his maidservant in an act of zenut and she bore him a son, where the Geonim hold that he certainly emancipated her based on the rationale that "a person does not make his act of intercourse an act of zenut," and the Rambam disagrees in this. But here we are dealing with one who married his maidservant by way of marriage in the manner that one marries a daughter of Israel and not merely in zenut, as the Tur was precise in his words when he said "if he marries his maidservant etc." And the Ramah wrote that she is betrothed out of doubt etc., for the initial kiddushin are a doubtful kiddushin etc. Thus far his words. And in this, it is possible that even the Rambam admits to this since he acted by way of kiddushin and marriage. And what connection is there to an act of zenut? Rather, the Ramah was concerned even in this, and in this the Rosh disagrees with him. But this is not related at all to the words of the Rambam, of blessed memory. (See Shach subsection 88, who wrote this regarding the first opinion, which is the opinion of the Rambam. And if so, he should have challenged the Beit Yosef and the Bach, who made this a dispute with the Rambam. And it requires further study.)

It appears to me that this is the opinion of our teacher, the Rema, in section 70 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 267:70), who wrote concerning what our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote, "A slave whose master married him to a free woman etc. goes out to freedom," he wrote regarding this: "And all the more so if he marries his own maidservant." Thus far his words. And it is difficult: for in the previous section there is a dispute regarding this. Rather, this is his intention: that in such a case even the Rambam admits, and it also works well according to the opinion of the Ramah, since they concluded with this that they compel his master to write him a get shichrur. Or perhaps he was not concerned for the opinion of the Ramah, for according to the Ramah they are only kiddushin of doubt, and if another betrothed her—she requires a get according to the law of kiddushin of doubt. And from his words it is explicitly implied that they are certain kiddushin, and that which they compel to write a get shichrur—this is for the other matters in this section, and as the Rosh wrote regarding the reason for the matter, and as I wrote in section 106. And he was not concerned to elaborate on this, according to his way to be brief. And so it appears to me to be the essence of his opinion, of blessed memory.

A slave whose master married him to a free woman, and all the more so if he marries his own maidservant by way of marriage, or if his master told him to read three verses of the Torah in the synagogue before the public, and similarly anything of this nature for which only a free man is obligated, and his master commanded him to do so before many people—he has gone out to freedom, and they compel his master to write him a get shichrur. And regarding one who marries his maidservant, some say she does not require a get shichrur, as has been explained. For in all these cases where it is required, it is only so that he may not seize him and say to him: "You are my slave." Therefore, it appears to me that the slave does not need to write him a document for his value, since it is not due to doubt but rather for the reason that has been explained. But according to the one who holds that by law he requires a get shichrur due to doubt, it appears to me that he must write him a document for his value. Since we are compelling him, how can we take money from him due to a doubt?

And specifically when he commanded him to read in public. But if he taught him Torah privately, even though it is forbidden to teach one's slave Torah as he is exempt from the study of Torah like a woman, nevertheless he does not go out to freedom, since he did not do this in public. And so too if he borrowed a loan from his slave, even though a loan is not applicable from a slave since everything is his, or if he appointed the slave an apitropos over his property and it is not the way to do so, or if he donned tefillin before his master and he did not protest against him, or if he read three verses in the synagogue on his own before his master and he did not protest against him, or if he married a free woman before him and he did not protest against him – he does not go out to freedom, since he did it on his own and why should he protest? And even if it is the way to protest, nevertheless we do not maintain because of this that he emancipated him. But when his master placed tefillin on him – he goes out to freedom. And so it appears to me if his master dressed him in tzitzit – he goes out to freedom.

The Rambam wrote in the eighth chapter, law 17, that if the slave made a vow, his master may compel him to violate it. For example, if he would become weakened by this, and his master was able to compel him to violate it, but did not compel him and instead said to him, "It is annulled for you" – he goes out to freedom. For since he did not compel him, he revealed his intent that his servitude has been removed. The Ra'avad disagrees with him, for on the contrary, from the fact that he said to him "It is annulled for you," it implies that he has authority over him. Nevertheless, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, section 72, agreed with the opinion of the Rambam, for it is an assessment that if he had not emancipated him, he would have compelled him. And their dispute depends on the version of the Mishnah in Nazir. And they compel him to write for him a get of emancipation. And it appears to me that certainly the language of "annulment" is nothing, as this is only for a husband and his wife or a father and his daughter. And the slave is obligated to fulfill his vow (and see Perishah).

They further wrote: One who releases his slave in any language, and uttered from his mouth words whose implication is that no servitude remains upon him at all, and he resolved in his heart to do this—he cannot retract, and they compel him to write for him a get shichrur. Thus far their words, and it is simple. And it appears that this is specifically when he spoke by way of admission before witnesses or if he says "you are witnesses," in the manner they said regarding admissions of money in Choshen Mishpat siman 81.

If he wrote in a document: "I have made so-and-so my slave a freeman," or "he is made a freeman," or "behold he is a freeman," and he delivered it into his hand—he has gone out to freedom. However, if he wrote "I will make him a freeman" and delivered it into his hand—he has not gone out to freedom, for this is a promise for the future. But if he wrote "let him be a freeman"—it is not a promise but rather a language of manumission in the present (Tur), and this is like one who says: "from now let him be a freeman." And all this is in writing. But if he said orally "I have made," or "he is made," or "behold he is," or "let him be"—he has not gone out to freedom, and he can retract it. For specifically when he said them by way of admission that he had already freed him does it avail orally, and not his speaking in the present as if he is now freeing him with this speech of his. And this is in the case of a healthy person, but in the case of a shekhiv mera, whose words are considered as written and delivered—it avails even orally. And when he said one of these expressions—he has gone out to freedom. And they compel the heirs to write for them a get shikh rur, and then he is permitted to a free woman. And so too with a healthy person by way of admission—they compel him to write a get shikh rur, and then he is permitted to a free woman. And a shekhiv mera, even if he recovered from his illness—he has gone out to freedom, and requires a get shikh rur. And he cannot retract it, because the reputation of a freeman has gone out concerning him.

It was taught in a baraita (Gittin 40b): One who says, "I have made so-and-so my slave a free man," and the slave says, "He did not make me free" – we are concerned that perhaps he granted the deed of manumission to him through another person, and said to him, "Acquire it on behalf of so-and-so," for it is a benefit to him, and one may acquire a benefit for a person in his absence. Therefore, there is no actual contradiction between them, but rather the slave did not know of this. And according to the opinion of the Tosafot and the Rosh, he is a completely free man, and is permitted to marry a free woman immediately. However, he certainly requires immersion for the sake of manumission before marriage, since he admitted that he did not immerse. And as for the fact that the manumission preceded the immersion – we are not concerned by it (Bach). And that which they used the language "we are concerned" – this is not a language of doubtful concern, for we find similar instances where "we are concerned" is like a certainty (Tosafot). But the Tur wrote in the name of the Ramah, and so wrote the Ran, that he is not certainly liberated, according to the plain meaning of the expression "we are concerned," and this means that he is certainly not a slave and he cannot enslave him further, for the admission of a litigant is equivalent to a hundred witnesses, but regarding the slave it is not relevant to say so because we say that he did not know of his manumission. Nevertheless, he cannot marry a free woman, since he does not know of his manumission. Therefore, we compel his master and he writes him a deed of manumission, and until he writes it for him – he is forbidden to a maidservant and to a free woman. And if so, it follows that we compel him to write him a deed of manumission, according to the law of one who is half-slave and half-free. And the Rambam leaves it unexplained like the language of the Talmud, and so too in the Shulchan Aruch, section 5 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 267:5). And regarding the practical law, one should be stringent and require a deed of manumission.

And if there is a clear contradiction between them, such as if the master says to the slave, "I wrote and gave you a deed of manumission," and the slave says, "He did not write for me and did not give to me," it is taught in a Baraita there that the admission of the slave is like a hundred witnesses, and he is a slave as before. And we say that the master erred and thought that he received it from his hand, but in truth he did not receive it (Rashi). And it must be said that regarding this which he said, "He did not write for me," even though this is a lie, he was not concerned with this. His primary intention was that he did not give it to him, meaning: that he did not want to receive it, and automatically it is as if he did not write for him, for this is nothing (it appears to me). Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 75 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 267:75): And if his master retracted and said, "I did not give it"—the slave cannot retract and say, "I received it." And if his master stands by his word—they compel him and he writes him a deed of manumission. Thus far his words. The explanation of his words: For certainly when both stand by their words—there is no litigation here at all. For his master will not claim from him to do work since he says he emancipated him, and the slave does not claim a deed of manumission and is permitted to a maidservant. There is only litigation regarding a retraction, for if his master retracted—he uses him as before. And the slave cannot retract since he admitted. However, if his master stands by his word and the slave retracted, then they compel that he write him a deed of manumission. (And that which he wrote "And if his master stands by his word" refers to the retraction of the slave. See Bach.)

The Rambam, the Tur, and the Shulchan Aruch in section 79 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 267:79) wrote: One who releases his slave transgresses a positive commandment of "you shall work them forever." However, it is permitted to release him for a matter of a mitzvah even if it is of rabbinic origin, such as if there were not ten in the beit knesset—he may release his slave and complete the minyan of ten with him. And so too anything similar to this. Likewise, a maidservant with whom the people behave in a licentious manner—they compel her master and he releases her, so that she may marry and the stumbling block will be removed. Thus far his words. And it implies explicitly that even if she is not half-maidservant and half-freewoman, but rather a complete maidservant whom they could marry off to a slave, nevertheless, this is not sufficient protection for her. And so the Tur wrote explicitly, and this is his wording: They may release her in order to marry her to an Israelite who will protect her. Even though it is possible to designate a slave for her—he does not protect her as much. Thus far his words. And in the Gemara there is a dispute regarding this, and they decided the halacha that even regarding a complete maidservant the law is so. (See Gittin 38b, that Abaye holds it is possible that he designates a slave for her and he protects her, and Ravina disagrees with him, saying that in such a case Rabbi Yehuda admits. And they ruled like Ravina, as he is of the later authorities. And see Shach subsection 100, where it appears that he holds that the Tur's intention is that regarding a complete maidservant it is permitted, but they only compel in the case of a half-maidservant etc., and he also explained Ravina's view thus. And behold, regarding Ravina it is certainly impossible to say so, for he stands in reference to Abaye who said "I would have compelled" etc., and so too in the Rambam and Shulchan Aruch it is explicitly so. And also the Tur, who wrote "and not only that but they compel her master etc."—it refers to the entire matter. And I do not know why we should press to say that the Tur disagrees with the Rambam, and also in the Gemara it is proven so. Examine it and you will find it easy.)

And know that these, our teachers, decided the prohibition completely, that it is forbidden to manumit except for a great mitzvah. And in truth, one of the great among our teachers wrote that this prohibition is only when he acts solely for the benefit of the slave, but when he acts for his own need, such as for a matter of a mitzvah—there is no positive commandment here at all (Ran, and the Beit Yosef brought him). And this matter is necessitated from the Gemara (Gittin 40a) which says: One who said at the time of his death, "So-and-so my maidservant, let them not enslave her"—we compel the heirs, and they write for her a get of manumit. And it is difficult: for it has already been explained in siman 240 that if one's father told him to transgress the words of the Torah—one does not listen to him. And how can we stand to compel the heirs to transgress the words of the Torah? Rather, it is certainly because their father said so, he presumably received a benefit from her. Therefore, he does this for the sake of the benefit he received, and there is no positive commandment here. And so too there is clear proof from the Mishnah in Kiddushin (Kiddushin 23b) that he can acquire a get of manumit through others, and yet there is no agent for a matter of transgression. And there is one of the greats who said that the one who acquires is the agent of the slave and not of the master (Noda BiYehuda, Even HaEzer, siman 77). And several of the greats have already wondered at his words (see Ketzot HaChoshen, siman 182), for from Tosafot in Bava Metzia (Bava Metzia 71b) it is explicitly proven that he must be the agent of the one who grants the merit. And according to our words it works out well: for in truth in Gittin there we do not find this prohibition except when we come to compel him to manumit him. But when he manumits of his own accord—he presumably does so for his own benefit, and there is no prohibition here at all.

And it seems to me that the Rambam and the Tur also intended this. For that which they said, that for the sake of a mitzvah it is also permitted, perforce their intention is that regarding a matter of a mitzvah there is no prohibition here. For it cannot be said that their intention is that the mitzvah overrides the prohibition—behold, the prohibition is not a "negative commandment" such that we would say "a positive commandment overrides a negative commandment." Rather, the prohibition is a positive commandment, and a positive commandment does not override a positive commandment. Furthermore: a rabbinic mitzvah does not override a Torah prohibition. Rather, the intention is that since there is a matter of a mitzvah—he acts for his own benefit, and there is no prohibition here at all. And consequently, the same law applies when he acts for his own benefit due to another matter. And it seems to me that for this reason the Tur was precise to say first that for the sake of a mitzvah it is permitted, and afterward he wrote: and not only that, but we even compel, see there. For this is what he is saying: that for the sake of a mitzvah it is permitted and there is no prohibition here, and afterward he says that if he himself does not want to, saying "it is not pleasing to me to perform a mitzvah"—we compel him. And you should know that it is so, for if not, behold our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in his great work brought this matter, and why did he not write this in the Shulchan Aruch? Rather, it is certain that from the law he brought, this is also proven. But nevertheless, the matter is clear as the halachah.

A shekhiv mera who wrote all of his property to his slave, and recovered, even though he may retract regarding the property when he recovers from his illness, nevertheless regarding the slave he cannot retract because the name "freeman" has already been applied to him. And one who said at the time of his death, "My maidservant so-and-so, the heirs shall not subject her to labor"—there is one in the Gemara there who wished to say that we compel the heirs to write her a get shichrur. But it concludes that this is not a language of "shichrur" but rather that they should not subject her to difficult labors. And similarly when he said, "They shall provide her satisfaction"—we compel the heirs not to force her into labor that she does not desire. And they cannot sell her to another, whether he said "they shall not subject her to labor" or whether he said to provide her satisfaction. For another would surely subject her to labor as he pleases, and it is obvious that she has no satisfaction from this; however, she remains a maidservant as she was and her children are slaves. And according to the explanation of Rashi, if she has no satisfaction without shichrur—we compel the heirs to release her. And if he said and commanded explicitly to release her—according to all opinions we compel them to release her. And this is not a violation of the positive commandment of "forever shall you work them etc.," as I wrote in section 117.

The sages taught in the Mishnah in Gittin (Gittin 11b): One who says, "Give this writ of manumission to my slave," and handed the writ to him—he cannot retract it, because it is a benefit for the slave to leave the hand of his master for freedom, and one may acquire a benefit for a person in his absence. And there is no issue here of "agency for a sinful act," as I wrote in section 117. Nevertheless, we taught there (Gittin 13a) in the Mishnah: One who says, "Give this writ of manumission to my slave," and died—they shall not give it after death, for there is no get after death. And this contradicts the previous Mishnah, for according to the previous Mishnah, he was already emancipated from the moment he handed the writ to another to acquire it for him. And for this, Rashi explained earlier (Gittin 9b), and this is his wording: Granted that he acquired it such that he cannot retract, however, the rabbis admit that as long as it has not reached the hand of the slave—he is not emancipated etc. Thus far his words. And all our teachers increased in questioning this, for it is like two opposites in one subject. Therefore, they explained that certainly he is emancipated immediately, but in the second Mishnah we do not read the version "Give this writ of manumission," which would mean he handed the writ during his life, but rather "Give a writ of manumission to my slave," meaning that he commanded them to write it. Therefore, there is no get after death. And Rashi himself also retracted there regarding this Mishnah, and wrote there that he did not hand them to the hand of an agent during his life. And our teachers the Tosafot, and the Meor, and the Ramban, and the Rashba, and the Rosh, and the Ran agreed to this, see there.

But the Rif there and the Rambam in the sixth chapter (Rambam Laws of Slaves 6) wrote explicitly like the first words of Rashi. This is the wording of the Rif: And specifically regarding retraction, for the master cannot retract even though it has not reached the hand of the slave, but the slave does not go out to freedom until it reaches his hand. Therefore, if the master died before it reached his hand – they shall not give, etc. Thus far his words. And many wondered at this, for from Kiddushin (Kiddushin 23b) it is explicitly explained that he can acquire the document through others and is completely emancipated. However, the Rambam was wise to distinguish between "give" and "acquire for him." This is his wording at the beginning of the sixth chapter (Rambam Laws of Slaves 6): One who writes a bill of manumission for his slave, and grants it to him through another, and says to him, "Acquire this bill for so-and-so my slave" – he goes out to freedom even though the bill has not reached his hand, for one may acquire a benefit for a person in his absence. But if he said, "Give this bill to my slave" – he cannot retract it, but the slave does not go out to freedom until the bill reaches his hand. Therefore, etc. Thus far his words. And according to this, in Kiddushin it is dealing with when he said "acquire" and not "give." And even though in Gittin there (Gittin 11b) we say: Anyone who says "give" is like one who says "acquire," see there – that is regarding retraction.

And one may bring a proof from the Yerushalmi there for this position, which says: Everywhere you say "give" is like "deliver," but here you say "give" is like "acquire"; thus is the baraita, etc., "acquire this deed of manumission for my slave." The wording of the baraita said "so," because one may acquire a benefit for a person in his absence, etc. Thus far his words. Behold, the Yerushalmi establishes the Mishnah as referring to one who says "acquire," but with "give" – he may retract. And granted that our Gemara holds that "give" is like "acquire," however, it is sufficient for us to say that this is only regarding retraction, and not that he is thereby emancipated. And we shall not create a distant dispute between the Bavli and the Yerushalmi. And the essence of the reasoning to distinguish between retraction and the emancipation itself, the Rif, of blessed memory, explained that this is like what we say there, "deliver a maneh to so-and-so to whom I am indebted" – he remains responsible. And if he comes to retract – he may not retract. And they challenged him that this is not a comparable case, for there, when he owes money – the law is that he is not discharged until the money reaches the hand of the creditor, for if we were to say he is discharged – behold, it is a disadvantage to the creditor. But here, it is a benefit for the slave (Ran and the Rosh ibid.). And furthermore: that the retraction and the freedom are one and the same thing, for "give" is like "acquire," and one may acquire a benefit for a person in his absence (ibid.).

It appears in my humble opinion regarding the intention of the Rif, when we examine the words of all our teachers, that he is completely emancipated when he says "give this writ of emancipation to my slave" because anyone who says "give" is considered as if he said "acquire on his behalf." Yet we only say "give" is like "acquire" regarding a debt and not regarding a gift, as I wrote in Choshen Mishpat siman 125, see there. And regarding a slave there is no debt here, only a gift. Indeed, because of this, the Tosafot wrote in Gittin there (Gittin 12a) that emancipation is like a loan, for were it not that he receives satisfaction from it, he would not have emancipated him, see there. And indeed, perforce one must say so, for if not, he would be transgressing a positive commandment, as I wrote in section 117. For this reason I say that the Rif and the Rambam also hold this. However, since the master explicitly said to him "give" and did not say to him "acquire on his behalf" – his explicit intention was that he should not be emancipated until they place it in his hand, and how can we say he is emancipated beforehand? However, this principle that "give" is like "acquire" means that he cannot retract his word. And it is not similar at all to a matter of money, for it is impossible for us to emancipate him against the will of the master. And that which the Rif compared to one who brings a maneh, his intention was that seemingly regarding the master there are two opposites: that he cannot retract, yet he is not yet emancipated. To this he says that we find the likes of it regarding a borrower, who cannot retract and take them from the messenger, and nevertheless remains liable for their responsibility. And this is also like two opposites, for he could say "whichever way you have it": if you obligate me in responsibility, give them into my hand and I will guard them. And despite all this, he cannot say so. And here too it is the same. Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 76 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 267, 76) only wrote the words of the Rambam. Our teacher, the Rema, brought the opinions of those who disagree, see there.

And know that from the language of the Shas and the poskim, it is implied that even when one says "acquire this deed of manumission for my slave" – he hands him the deed from hand to hand. And so wrote one of the poskim (Bach). However, there is one who disagrees regarding this, and says that it does not require handing from hand to hand, but rather like all acquisitions where he commands him to lift the deed and acquire on behalf of the slave, even if he lifts it from the ground or from some place, and we do not require handing from hand to hand (Taz subsection 44). And he brings proof from what some say in Choshen Mishpat siman 125 that "give" is not like "acquire" except when handing from hand to hand. And also from what the Tur wrote here in the name of our teacher Tam accordingly, see there. And I wonder: what is the relevance of monetary matters to a deed of manumission? For the manumission of a slave is derived from the get of a woman, and regarding a woman it is necessary either to give into her hand, or into the hand of her agent, or into her courtyard. And regarding a slave there is no courtyard, for whatever a slave acquires, his master acquires. Therefore, it is necessary to give into his hand specifically, or into the hand of an agent. And when he says even to the slave himself "take your manumission from such-and-such a place," it is like regarding a woman "take your get from upon the ground," which is not a get. And the proof from the Tur is to the contrary, for on the contrary, it is in this that our teacher Tam distinguishes to resolve the contradictory Mishnayot, that here it deals with where he handed it into his hand, and here where he did not hand it into his hand and therefore he can also retract. And from where did he infer that regarding "acquire" everyone agrees that it does not specifically require his hand, for on the contrary: our teacher Tam holds that where he handed it into his hand, "give" and "acquire" are all one, because it specifically requires handing into the hand, and automatically the same law applies to "acquire." Therefore, it appears in my humble opinion that the primary view is like the first opinion.

It has already been explained in section 23 that a kutei who acquires a Canaanite slave does not acquire him bodily, but only for his labor. According to this, by the letter of the law, when one sells his slave to a kutei and he flees from him, or if the kutei wishes to return him to him—he could be a slave. However, the sages penalized him for selling him to a kutei and removing him from the mitzvot. And thus the sages taught in Gittin (Gittin 43b): One who sells his slave to a kutei—he goes out as a free man when he flees from the buyer. And his master cannot enslave him further, and they compel him to write him a get shichrur to permit him to marry a free woman. And so too for one who sells to a ger toshav. And if he did not flee—they penalize the master to redeem him even up to ten times his value (Gittin 44a), and no more. And he shall write him a get shichrur. And if the seller died—they do not penalize his son after him, for the sages penalized him and not his son (ibid.). The Rambam ruled that this penalty is not adjudicated outside of the Land of Israel, like all penalties which are only collected in the Land of Israel and by a semikhah-ordained beit din. But the Rosh wrote that this is not related to other penalties that require experts, and this penalty is a fence for the Torah, and they collect it in every place. And this is as we explained in Choshen Mishpat siman 1 section 11, see there.

If he borrowed money upon him from a koti for a set time, such that if he does not repay him by a certain time the slave shall be his, if he handed him over to him immediately at the time of the loan – he goes out to freedom immediately even though the time has not arrived, for he has now removed him from mitzvot. And if he did not hand him over to him now, nevertheless, when the time arrives and he does not repay him – he goes out to freedom even if the buyer has not yet taken him, for he will certainly take him. (See Shach subsection 102. and it requires further study what he added in this, for the intention of the Rema is also thus.) But if the koti collected him on his own for his debt against his will, or if an extortionist rose against him seeking to kill him and he ransomed himself with the slave – he does not go out to freedom, for what was he to do and he is under duress? And if he sold him to an extortionist of the type who is accustomed to taking slaves and animals from wherever they are found, and they give their value to the owners – he goes out to freedom, for such an extortionist would have been appeased with something else. And if he sold him on condition that he return him to him after a time, or if he sold him excluding his labor, meaning that the labor shall be done for the seller, or if he stipulated with him that he allow him to perform mitzvot, or if he sold him to a Tzadoki or to a convert who reverted – this is a doubt in the Gemara. And the Tur wrote that it is a rabbinic doubt, and we follow the lenient view in it, and he does not go out to freedom. And the Rambam wrote in the eighth chapter (Rambam Hilkhot Avadim 8): Since it is a doubt, if the slave seized the equivalent of his value from his master, and he is able to go out to freedom with it from the hand of the buyer – we do not remove it from him. Thus far his words. And the Rambam follows his consistent reasoning in several places that seizing is effective in a case of doubt. And the Rosh disagrees with him, as I have written in Choshen Mishpat in several places. And besides this, the Ra'avad there objected that seizing is only effective for one who is lacking money (see Shach subsection 108, and the Gra subsection 153). And if he did not sell his person but only for his handiwork, some say that we do not penalize him (Ran).

Nevertheless, if the slave himself cast himself into troops or into the hand of a gentile and his master is unable to extract him, or if he was captured and there is no ability to redeem him, even if he is a slave who underwent milah and tevilah for the sake of slavery—it is permitted to take the payment from the troops or from the gentile, and he may write for them a bill of sale for him. For since he is not liable in the matter and did not cause this, and it is not within his power to take him, why should he lose his money for nothing? Therefore, it is better that he should rescue his money. And it is obvious that until he does so, he is obligated to exert effort and see if perhaps it will be possible for him to take him from their hands.

And so the sages penalized one who sells his slave from Eretz Yisrael to outside the Land or to Syria, or even to Akko which is half in the Land and half outside the Land, that he shall go out to freedom. And they compel his second master to write him a get shichrur and he loses the money. For we penalize the buyer, as "it is not the mouse that steals, but the hole that steals" (Gittin 45a), for if there were no buyer to purchase him—he would have had no one to sell to. And even though certainly the mouse also steals, nevertheless, where there is a prohibition—we penalize (ibid.), and the prohibition is in the house of the buyer. And even if the buyer says "it is not my desire to take him outside the Land, but rather I will enslave him in Eretz Yisrael"—we do not listen to him, since from the beginning he purchased him to take him outside the Land. And even though he cannot take him against his will, we fear perhaps he will entice him to follow him outside the Land, and therefore we penalize him (Tosafot 44a (Gittin 44a) s.v. lachutz la'aretz). And the Tur wrote in the name of the Ramah that even if the buyer has not yet paid the money to the seller, and the acquisition was through chazakah, nevertheless he is obligated to free him. And he pays the money to the seller, for it is a debt upon him and he is obligated to pay. And this law applies even nowadays, for even now there is a mitzvah in dwelling in Eretz Yisrael.

A slave who went out after his master to Syria or to outside the Land, and it was not that his master brought him but rather he went out after his master of his own accord, and he sold him there—the slave has lost his right and the sale is valid, for this is not like one who sells from the Land of Israel to outside the Land or to Syria. In what case are these words said? When his master went out with the intent not to return to the Land of Israel, for then the slave, of his own will, chose to be permanently outside the Land. But if it was his master's intention to return, and he went out after him and he sold him there—he goes out to freedom, and they compel the buyer to manumit him, for the slave did not lose his right since he went out with the intent to return. However, in this case we do not penalize the buyer such that he loses his money, since he purchased him outside the Land, and we penalize the seller (Shach, subsection 112). And a slave who says he wishes to ascend to the Land of Israel—they compel his master to ascend with him, or he must sell him to someone who will bring him up there. And if the master wants to go out from the Land of Israel to outside the Land—he cannot compel his slave to go with him outside the Land against his will. And this law applies at all times, even in this time when the Land of Israel is in the hands of gentiles.

A slave who fled from outside the Land to the Land—we do not return him to servitude. And this matter is a decree of the verse, as it is written: "You shall not deliver a slave to his master." And our sages, of blessed memory, received a tradition that this refers to a slave who fled from outside the Land to the Land of Israel (Gittin 45a). And we say to his master that he should write him a deed of manumission, and the slave shall write him a promissory note for his value until his hand can afford it and he gives it to him. And if the master did not want to manumit him—beit din annuls his servitude from upon him, and he may go his way. And some say that in the Land of Israel it is permitted for him to enslave him (Ran). And from the words of the Rambam it is implied that even this he cannot do (see Beit Yosef). And know that all the laws of a slave that were explained in this siman refer to one who circumcised and immersed for the sake of servitude (ibid.). And one who is delayed from a deed of manumission, meaning that he is manumitted but only has not received the deed yet, or from those whom it is necessary to compel the master to write him a deed of manumission and they have not yet compelled him—it appears from the words of Rashi that he is forbidden to a maidservant. And the Tosafot wrote that he is permitted (ibid. in the name of Rabbeinu Yerucham). And a slave is permitted to a gentile woman, and a gentile is permitted to a maidservant (Bach in the name of Rabbeinu Yerucham). And even one who lacks a deed of manumission, it is implied in the Tosafot at the end of Avodah Zarah that he is permitted, see there.

The text of a deed of emancipation: On such-and-such day of the week, etc., how I, so-and-so, and every name and nickname that I have, desired of my own free will without compulsion, and I have emancipated you, so-and-so, and every name and nickname that you have, who were my slave from before this time, and now I have acquired for you your person so that you shall be a freeman, and you shall be permitted to enter the congregation of Israel to marry their daughters, and you and your offspring shall study Torah, and they shall be brought into the synagogue of Israel. And no man shall protest against them from this day and forever. And the authority of any man is not over you or over anyone who is destined to come forth from you. And this shall be for you from me a letter of freedom and a deed of emancipation according to the law of Moses and Israel. And the master signs below and delivers it to him in the presence of witnesses. And it seems to me that the law is the same regarding the ability of witnesses to write this text in the third person, in the manner that they write a get for a woman, and the master delivers it to him or to his agent.

The Rambam wrote in the ninth chapter (Rambam, Laws of Slaves 9): Whether one purchases a Canaanite slave from an Israelite, or from a ger toshav, or from a Cuthite who is conquered under our hand, or from another of the rest of the nations who has the power to sell himself to an Israelite as a slave, he is a Canaanite slave in every respect. And so too one who sells his sons and daughters, as it is said, "from them shall you buy, and from their families that are with you, which they begot in your land," and all of these are as a Canaanite slave in every respect. Thus far his words. And it appears his intention is that in each of these cases, it is of no avail if the slave precedes him and immerses for the sake of freedom, as it is of avail when purchasing from an idolater, for the reason that an idolater does not acquire the body, which is not the case with these. (And the Ra'avad wrote: It is not clear, and what is "in every respect"? Thus far his words. And according to what I have written, it sits well. And it requires further study that the Kesef Mishneh and the Lechem Mishneh did not bring the objection, see there.)

He further wrote: One of the nations who cohabited with our Canaanite maidservant – the son is a Canaanite slave, as it is said (ibid.): "whom they begot in your land." But our slave who cohabited with one of the nations – the son is not a slave, as it is said: "whom they begot in your land," and a slave has no lineage. Thus far his words. And everyone challenged him, for this is a Baraita in Yevamot (Yevamot 78a) regarding the matter of "you shall not let any soul live," and it says there that the offspring follows the male. But according to the Rambam, it is the opposite, that he follows his mother, and they elaborated on this (see Kesef Mishneh and Lechem Mishneh). And in my humble opinion, it seems clear that this was also the intention of the Rambam, if we scrutinize what it is that he said, "the son is not a slave" – for is it forbidden to buy a slave from the rest of the nations? And the Ra'avad wondered about this, see there. Therefore, it seems to me that this is what he meant: "One of the nations etc. the son is a slave," meaning: that you are permitted to purchase him as a slave. For the verse deals with this, as it is written: "from them you shall buy etc.," because he follows the male and is not included in "you shall not let any soul live." "But our slave etc. the son is not a slave," meaning: that you are not permitted to purchase him as a slave, for he is included in "you shall not let any soul live." And the derivation from "whom they begot in your land" – and not from those born not in the land. And that which he said, that a slave has no lineage, meaning: to be attributed after his mother like a gentile, for a father to any Egyptian he does not have (Yevamot 98a) and only if he has one, and the slave does not even have this lineage. It turns out that his words are like the words of the Shas.

We have learned in the Torat Kohanim, Parshat Behar: "Forever you shall work them" – you have nothing with them but work alone. That is to say: that you are permitted to work him with any work you desire. Nevertheless, one is not permitted to strike him, to cause him pain, or to shame him. As we say in Niddah (Niddah 47a): I gave him to you for work and not for shame. And behold, if he killed him – he is executed for him, except for "a day or two" and onwards. However, if he struck him, wounded him, or shamed him – he is exempt from payments, as we have learned: One who wounds his own Canaanite slave – is exempt from all of them, in Bava Kamma, chapter "HaChovel" (the commentary of the Ra'avad). We have further learned there: "But over your brothers, the children of Israel, a man over his brother, you shall not rule over him with rigor" – over him you do not rule with rigor, but you may rule over a free man with rigor. That is to say: if he is your hired worker (ibid.), for he hired himself out on that basis.

The Rambam wrote at the end of the ninth chapter (Rambam, Laws of Servants 9): It is permitted to work a Canaanite servant with rigor. And even though this is the law, nevertheless, it is a measure of piety and the ways of wisdom that a person should be merciful and pursue justice, and not make his yoke heavy upon his servant nor distress him. And he should feed him and give him to drink from every food and drink. The early sages would give the servant from every food that they themselves would eat (Ketubot 61a). (And in the Yerushalmi, chapter "HaChovel," it is brought: Rabbi Yochanan would eat a piece of meat and give some to his servant. He would drink wine and give some to his servant. And he read regarding himself: "Did not He who made me in the womb make him?") And they would prioritize the food of the animals and the servants before their own meal. Behold it says: "As the eyes of servants unto the hand of their masters, etc." And so too, he should not degrade him, neither by hand nor with words, etc., he should speak with him gently and hear his claims. And so it is explicitly stated in Iyov: "If I despised the cause of my servant, etc." And cruelty and arrogance are found only among the idolaters, but the seed of Avraham our forefather are merciful toward all, etc., "and His mercies are over all His works." And everyone who is merciful—mercy is shown to him, as it is said: "And He shall give you mercy, and have compassion upon you, and multiply you." Thus far his words. (Thus far the laws of the Canaanite servant. And now we will explain, with the help of Heaven, the laws of the Hebrew servant, even though it is only practiced during the time of the Yovel.)

There are two types of eved ivri in the Torah: one in "Mishpatim," as it is written: "If you buy an eved ivri." This is an Israelite who stole and has nothing with which to pay. And it is written: "If he has nothing—then he shall be sold for his theft," for the beit din sells him and pays for the theft. And the second is in Parshat Behar: "And if your brother becomes impoverished and is sold to you, etc." And so we learned in the Mechilta at the beginning of "Mishpatim": "If you buy an eved ivri"—the verse speaks of one sold by the beit din, who serves him and serves the son. Or does it only speak of one who sells himself? When it says "And if your brother becomes impoverished and is sold to you"—behold, one who sells himself is mentioned. How then do I apply "If you buy an eved ivri"? To one sold by the beit din for his theft, etc., see there. And there is no man in Israel whom the beit din sells except for the thief alone. And regarding him it says in Mishneh Torah: "If your brother, a Hebrew man, is sold to you, etc."

But one who sells himself, the Torah permitted him to sell himself because of his poverty. And so we learned in Torat Kohanim, Parshat Behar (Parsha 7): From where do we know that a person is not permitted to sell himself and place [the money] in his money belt, or to buy for himself an animal, or to buy for himself vessels, or to buy for himself a house, unless he has become impoverished? The verse says: "And if he becomes impoverished and is sold etc." And from where do we know that when he is sold, he is sold only to you? The verse says: "and is sold to you." And from where do we know that when beit din sells him, he shall be sold only to you? The verse says: "If your Hebrew brother is sold to you" – "your brother," that you must treat him with brotherhood. Might it be that he too may treat himself with brotherhood? The verse says: "slave." Might it be that you too may treat him as a slave? The verse says: "he is your brother." How so? You treat him with brotherhood, and he treats himself with servitude. "You shall not work him with slave labor" – that he should not carry a lentia behind you. And this is a sack and a pouch in the Greek language (Aruch). And he should not carry vessels before you in the bathhouse etc. "He shall be with you" – with you in food, with you in drink, with you in clothing. That you should not be eating fine bread while he eats coarse bread etc., you sleep on soft padding and he sleeps on straw. And in Kiddushin (Kiddushin 20a) they concluded regarding this: From here they said: Anyone who acquires a Hebrew slave – is like one who acquires a master for himself. And this is as it is found in the Yerushalmi, that if he has only one pillow – he gives it to his slave (Tosafot ibid., see there).

And even though we have said that he is not permitted to sell himself until nothing remains for him, nevertheless it appears to me that if he transgressed and sold himself – he is sold. And the proof for this is: for behold, even regarding that which has been explained that he should not sell himself except to you, nevertheless the Rambam wrote in the first chapter of Laws of Servants, law 3, that if he transgressed and sold himself even to an idolater, and even to the idol itself – behold, he is sold, as it is said: "or to the offshoot of a stranger's family." "To the offshoot" – this refers to one who is sold to the idol itself. If he comes and says to you: "Behold, I am selling myself to idols" – you are not bound to him until he is sold. But after he is sold, even though he acted improperly – it is a mitzvah to redeem him so that he is not absorbed among them, as it is said: "after he is sold – redemption shall be for him."

Whether one who sells himself, or one whom the beit din sold—he is not sold publicly on the auction stone, nor in an alleyway in the manner that slaves are sold, as it is said: "They shall not be sold with the sale of a slave"—he is only sold privately and in a respectful manner. And with any eved ivri, it is forbidden to work him with crushing labor. The Rambam wrote there: And what is crushing labor? This is work that has no limit, and work that he does not need, but rather his intent is only to make him work so that he should not be idle, etc., but rather he should say to him: "Hoe until such-and-such a time." And he should not say to him "Dig this place" when he does not need this, and he violates a negative commandment. And so too a star-worshiper to whom he was sold, if he rules over him with crushing labor—behold, Israelites are commanded to prevent him. And if they allowed him—they violate a negative commandment, as it is said: "He shall not rule over him with crushing labor before your eyes." And we are not required to enter there and see if he is working him with crushing labor, as it is said: "Before your eyes"—at a time when you see. Thus far his words. And a woman is not sold for her theft, nor does she sell herself. And she does not acquire an eved ivri, nor a Canaanite slave, because of suspicion. And a convert is not acquired as an eved ivri, as it is written: "And he shall return to his family"—and he has no family. And even though one does not perform degrading tasks with him as I have written, nevertheless, it is permitted for him to cut his hair, and to wash his garment, and to bake his dough. But they shall not make him a bath-attendant for the public, or a barber for the public, or a baker for the public, unless this was his craft from before. And he shall not teach him a new craft, but only what he was doing from before. And all this is regarding one sold as a slave. But regarding a hired worker—it is permitted in everything, as I have written. And an amah ivriyah and an eved ivri only apply at a time when the Yovel applies, for behold it is written: "Until the year of the Yovel, etc."

The sages taught in the Mishnah in Kiddushin (Kiddushin 14b): A Hebrew slave is acquired through money and through a document, and he acquires himself through years, through the Yovel, and through the deduction of money. And we derive all of them from verses in the Gemara, whether regarding one who sells himself or one whom the beit din sold. And the equivalent of money is like money. And "through a document" means that he writes to him on paper or on a shard: "Behold, I am sold to you," "Behold, I am acquired by you," or the like, and he signs and delivers the document to the master. Now, regarding a Canaanite slave, it has been explained that he is acquired through chazakah and through chalifin, which is kinyan sudar. Now, chazakah certainly does not apply to a Hebrew slave, as we derive it regarding a Canaanite slave from the fact that they are compared to lands (Kiddushin 22b), and a Hebrew slave was not so compared. However, regarding kinyan sudar, there is room for doubt that perhaps a Hebrew slave is also acquired through it, for kinyan chalifin is practiced in all matters, as it is written: "to confirm all things, he drew off, etc." And as for it not being taught in the Mishnah—behold, even regarding a Canaanite slave it is not taught, for the reason that it applies to movables (ibid.), and here too it can be said so. And from the Rambam there is no proof, for he only writes the laws that are in the Gemara according to his way, and all the poskim did not write the laws of a Hebrew slave at all. Or it is possible that money and a document are derived from verses, but chalifin is not derived. And regarding a Canaanite slave we derive it from the fact that they are compared to lands, and so it is explicit in the Tosafot in Kiddushin (Kiddushin 8a, s.v. "u-mai").

Regarding one sold by a beit din, it is written, "Six years he shall serve, and in the seventh he shall go out to freedom for nothing." And we say at the end of the fourth chapter of Arachin (Arachin 18b) that these "six years" are from time to time, meaning: that same day and that same hour in the following year. And we do not follow the world's count, such that when Tishrei arrives it should be considered a year for him (Rashi), but rather we follow his own year. For example, if he was sold on Rosh Chodesh Iyar, we count six years from Iyar to Iyar. And thus our sages, of blessed memory, expounded: "Six years he shall serve, and in the seventh" – sometimes he also serves in the seventh, such as when he was sold in the middle of the year – he serves also in the seventh until the middle of the year. This is the wording of the Rambam at the beginning of the second chapter: One sold by a beit din – he serves six years from the day of his sale, and at the beginning of his seventh year he goes out as a free man, etc. Thus far his words. And this is his intention: that we follow his year and not the world's count. And he wrote further: that if the shemittah year occurred within the six – he serves during it. But if the Yovel year occurred, even if he was sold one year before the Yovel – he goes out to freedom, as it is said: "Until the year of the Yovel he shall serve with you, in this year of the Yovel you shall return, etc." And one who sells himself is permitted to sell himself even for more than six. If he sold himself for ten years or for twenty years, and Yovel occurred even after one year – he goes out in the Yovel, as it is said: "Until the year of the Yovel he shall serve with you." Thus far his words. It is found according to this that shemittah does not release a Hebrew slave, but Yovel releases him. And even though these verses of Yovel are written regarding one who sells himself, nevertheless in Torat Kohanim, Parshat Behar, they expounded that the verse "and he shall return to his family" deals with one sold by a beit din. And so it is in Kiddushin (Kiddushin 15a), see there. (See Kesef Mishneh that for shemittah we expound from "and in the seventh," and it requires further study. And see Mishneh LaMelech, and see in the Mechilta. And according to the Gemara in Arachin there is no need for this. And be precise and you will find it easy.)

There are those who inferred from the wording of Rashi in Kiddushin (Kiddushin 14b), who explained regarding that which we say there, "one who sells himself is sold for six" – and more than six if he stipulated to be sold for ten years. Thus far his words. And they inferred from this that when he sells himself without specification – it is for six years, for if it is for less than six, he only has the status of "hired worker" upon him and not "slave" (Mishneh LaMelech in the name of the Maharit). And it appears that according to this, even a beit din that sells shall not sell for less than six, for if not so, he does not have the status of "slave" upon him. However, the Ritva wrote that one who sells himself may sell himself whether for more than six or for less than six years. And from Jeremiah (34) it is explained according to the first opinion, as it is written: "I made a covenant etc. at the end of seven years you shall let go every man his brother a Hebrew, who has been sold unto you; and when he has served you six years etc." And there it deals with one who sells himself, for behold, previously it is written: "every man his manservant, and every man his maidservant, being a Hebrew man or a Hebrew woman, free," and a woman is not sold by a beit din. But it is possible to say that it deals with a father who sells his daughter, but the plain meaning of the verse does not imply so (see Tosafot Arakhin 33a, starting with "Rather"). And in the Yerushalmi there, there is a dispute regarding this, see there.

And behold, from the wording of the Rambam it is implied that they go free in the yovel when they were sold one year before the yovel. And I do not know if his intention is that for less than a year one does not go free in the yovel, or if he merely employed a common expression and the same law applies even if he was sold one day before the yovel—he goes free in the yovel. And so it appears primary. And a proof for this is from the wording of the Torat Kohanim. And the Shas there: the verse speaks only of one whom the beit din sold two or three years before the yovel, that the yovel releases him; shall we infer specifically two years? Rather, it merely employed a common expression, and so it is in the wording of the Rambam (it appears to me).

The Rambam wrote: Whether one sells himself or the beit din sold him, and he fled—he is obligated to complete six years. And if the yovel reaches him—he goes out to freedom. Thus far his words. And so it is explicitly stated in the Gemara ibid. (Kiddushin 16b). But the Semag ruled that one who flees does not go out in the yovel, and this is the approach of the Yerushalmi ibid. And they wondered about him: How could he reject our Shas in favor of the Yerushalmi (Kesef Mishneh)? And there is one who wanted to redirect the intent of the Shas to a different approach (Lechem Mishneh), but it is not clear at all. And in my humble opinion, it appears that Rashi also holds like the Semag, for he explained: And the yovel reached him afterward on the following day. Thus far his words. And his intent is specifically when he fled one day before the yovel, such that he is not called "one who flees." But when he fled some time before the yovel—the Yerushalmi correctly says he is surely not in his possession, see there. And logic dictates this, for what relevance is there to "going out" when he has already fled?

If he became ill, whether he was ill year after year or he was ill for intermittent periods, if the total is less than four years—they count toward the tally of six. But if he was ill for four years—he is obligated to complete all the days of the illness. And the reason is: for the years of a hired worker are three years, as it is written in Isaiah: "At the end of three years, like the years of a hired worker." Therefore, if he worked two years and a portion of the third—he has fulfilled the obligation of a hired worker, and he does not need to complete it. But when he was ill for four full years—he must complete it. And all this is when his illness is severe, such that he cannot do any work. But when he can do some light work, even needlework—he does not need to complete it even if he spent all six years in this manner. And there is one who says that according to Rashi and Tosafot in Kiddushin, if he was only ill for more than three—he is obligated to complete it (Shach, Choshen Mishpat, siman 333, subsection 25). And it is not certain that the Rambam disagrees on this, for it can be said that he employed the language of the Shas according to his custom (Mishneh LaMelekh). And in the Yerushalmi it is stated there that if he fled and afterward became ill—he completes it, for he can say to him: "Had you been with me, you would not have become ill." And similarly if he became ill and afterward fled, for he can say to him: "Had you been here, you would have been healed quickly." And the Rambam did not cite this.

One who sells himself to an idolater, if he is not redeemed—he does not go free except in the Yovel, as it is stated: "And if he be not redeemed by these means, then he shall go out in the year of Yovel, he and his children with him." And one who is sold to an idolater, if his own means do not suffice—it is a mitzvah upon the relatives to redeem him. And the closer relative takes precedence, as it is written: "Either his uncle or his uncle's son shall redeem him." And the beit din compels them to redeem him, so that he does not become assimilated among them. And if the relatives did not redeem him, or if their means do not suffice—it is a mitzvah upon every person to redeem him. And once they have redeemed him—he goes out to freedom. And it appears to me that they can collect from him afterwards when his means suffice. And this is not like one who drives away a lion from his fellow's property, since he sold himself willingly.

The Rambam wrote (ibid.) that he is permitted to borrow and redeem himself. That is to say: even though it is written "and his hand attains," nevertheless it is permitted to borrow. He may also redeem in halves, that is to say: if it is not within his power to redeem himself for all the years for which he was sold, he may redeem himself and deduct from his years, and even though in a field of possession it is not so. But one who is sold to an Israelite—the relatives do not redeem him, and he does not borrow and redeem, and he does not redeem in halves, see there. And they wondered about him, for in Kiddushin (Kiddushin 20b) there was an inquiry that was resolved, that even in the case of one sold to an idolater, he does not borrow and redeem, and he does not redeem in halves. The Semag also ruled accordingly. And they wrote that perhaps because Abaye said afterward: "If you find reason to say he is redeemed in halves"—therefore he ruled so, in the manner of the Geonim who rule according to an "if you find reason to say." And it must be said that therefore he also ruled so regarding borrowing and redeeming, and he holds that this is dependent on that. Also, so that he should not become defiled among them, he was lenient in this. Furthermore: borrowing and redeeming was not mentioned in the Gemara in this context at all, see there. However, later (Kiddushin 21a) this is mentioned, see there, and it requires further study. And it must be said that he holds since prior to this it is explained there that we expound everything to the benefit of the slave, see there—he holds that they would also hold so here. (And so it is implied from what he wrote in halacha 10, see there.)

How does he go out through the deduction of money? The Rambam wrote: Whether one who sells himself, whether to an Israelite or to an idolater, or one whom the beit din sold—he may deduct from his redemption price and go out. How so? Suppose they sold him for sixty dinars, and he served four years and his hand attained [the means]—he gives twenty dinars and goes out to freedom. And so too if he sold himself for forty dinars for ten years—he deducts four dinars for every year that passed, and gives the remainder in money or the equivalent of money and goes out. And so too one sold to an idolater—he calculates the money according to the years remaining until the Yovel year, as it is said: "And he shall calculate with his purchaser from the year he was sold to him until the Yovel year." How so? If he sold himself for one hundred, and ten years remained until the Yovel from the year of sale—he calculates ten dinars for every year that passed and deducts the money; and he returns the remainder in money, not grain and not vessels, as it is said: "The money of his sale"—he is redeemed with money and not with the equivalent of money. Thus far his words. And so it is in the Torat Kohanim and in the Yerushalmi there. And it is a great wonder: for it is explicitly explained in Kiddushin (Kiddushin 8a) that he is redeemed with the equivalent of money, see there (Lechem Mishneh). And in truth, the Semag ruled accordingly, see there. Furthermore: for the Yerushalmi there says that he is also not acquired with the equivalent of money, and the Rambam did not rule accordingly. Furthermore: for the Yerushalmi there says that this is specifically when he did not appraise them as money, but if he appraised them as money—the equivalent of money is like money, see there carefully. And the Rambam says explicitly that he is not redeemed with the equivalent of money.

And it seems to me regarding his intention that behold it is written: "The price of his sale shall be according to the number of years etc. if there be yet many years, according to them he shall return the price of his redemption from the money of his purchase." And from "he shall return" we derive that the equivalent of money is like money. And the Rambam holds that certainly it is so, that the equivalent of money is like money, and therefore he ruled that he is acquired with the equivalent of money. And that which he said, that he is not redeemed with the equivalent of money – this is when he was acquired with money, as he said: "he sold himself for a hundred." And the rule is that if he sold himself for the equivalent of money – he is redeemed with the equivalent of money. And regarding this it is said: "according to them he shall return the price of his redemption," meaning: according to the sale – so shall be the redemption. And afterwards it says "from the money of his purchase," and this refers back to the "money of his sale" mentioned previously, meaning: if he sold himself for money – he must be redeemed with money. And he inferred this from the wording of the Shas in Kiddushin there, which says "from the money of his purchase" – with money he is acquired etc. if you say that they do not acquire with them at all, "he shall return" – to include the equivalent of money etc. And it is difficult: for he began with acquisition and concluded with redemption, and see Rashi who labored over this. And furthermore: behold the verse deals with redemption, so why did he say "acquisition"? Rather, certainly this is the explanation: that certainly if he was acquired with money – he must be redeemed with money. And this is what he means: if you say that they do not acquire with them at all, meaning: it is well if you were to say with money he is redeemed, and that is when he was acquired with money. But when you said with money he is acquired, and he is not acquired with produce and vessels, which implies that they do not acquire with them at all, yet "he shall return" includes the equivalent of money? Rather, it refers to the matter of chalifin, see there. And from this itself the Rambam inferred that specifically when he was acquired with the equivalent of money – he is also redeemed with the equivalent of money. But when he was acquired with money – he is only redeemed with money.

Any Hebrew slave or maidservant who goes out through a deduction of money and became healthy and increased in value, or conversely, whose value decreased—one always calculates to their benefit. How so? If he was sold for one hundred and is now worth two hundred—one calculates according to one hundred. If he was sold for two hundred and is now worth only one hundred—one also calculates for him one hundred. And he always pays for the remaining years only according to the calculation of one hundred. And thus our sages, of blessed memory, expounded (Kiddushin 20a): If his value increased, "from the money of his purchase." That is to say: one must calculate the redemption according to the purchase; if his value decreased, "according to his remaining years," see there.

There is an inquiry there in the Gemara: Can he be redeemed in halves or can he not be redeemed in halves? And it resolves that he cannot be redeemed. And afterward Abaye said: If you should say he is redeemed in halves, if he bought him for one hundred and half of him was redeemed for fifty, and he improved such that he is worth two hundred—he only needs to give fifty according to what he bought him for, as has been explained. But if he bought him for two hundred, and he depreciated such that he is only worth one hundred, and he gave him half of his value, fifty, according to his current value as has been explained, and afterward he improved and stood at the previous two hundred—he gives him one hundred and goes free, and he does not need to give one hundred and fifty, for behold, half of him has already been redeemed. And if he bought him for two hundred and gave him half of his value which is one hundred, and now he depreciated such that he is only worth one hundred, nevertheless he is obligated to give him another fifty. And in this it is impossible to go toward the benefit of the slave and calculate according to his current value, and behold he already gave him one hundred, for it is not so since he is redeemed in halves—behold, half of him was already redeemed while he was worth two hundred. And his second half remains, and we assess according to his current value, and he gives fifty and goes free. But if we were to say that he is not redeemed in halves—behold, the hundred that he gave him are nothing, and behold they are like a deposit with him, and he goes free with these hundred alone. And the Rambam ruled that he is redeemed in halves as I wrote in section 147, therefore he ruled this law as well (in chapter two, halacha 10, see there).

We hold in Choshen Mishpat siman 241 that mechilah does not require a kinyan. According to this, we should have said that when a master says to his slave, "I hereby forgive you for the deficiency of money that you are obligated to give to me"—he goes out to freedom. But it is not so, as they said there (Kiddushin 16a): A Hebrew slave's body is acquired, and a master who forgave his deficiency—his deficiency is not forgiven. That is to say: since there is a kinyan of the body in him—the language of mechilah is not effective regarding him, for mechilah is only for a monetary obligation, and not for a kinyan of the body. And he requires a shtar of manumission.

A Hebrew servant serves the son when the father dies, as it is written: "Six years he shall serve," and it is not written "he shall serve you" – we learn from this that he also serves his son. However, what of that which is written: "And he shall serve you six years," which implies "you" specifically? This is when a son does not remain, but rather a daughter or a brother and those like them – he does not serve them. And we say: "And he shall serve you" – and not the heir (Kiddushin 17b). And a Hebrew maidservant and a pierced servant – he does not even serve the son, and certainly not another heir. For regarding a pierced servant it is written: "And his master shall pierce etc. and he shall serve him forever," and it is not written: "and he shall serve forever." We learn from this that this is the explanation: "and he shall serve him" – and not the son, for if it were to exclude other heirs – this could be learned from one who is not pierced. And a Hebrew maidservant is compared to a pierced servant, as it is written: "And also to your maidservant you shall do so," and the beginning of the verse deals with piercing, as it is written: "And you shall take the awl." And it is impossible to say according to its plain meaning that she is pierced, for we hold that she is not pierced, but rather it is to teach that she does not serve the son. And similarly, one who is sold to an idolater does not serve the son, as it is written: "And he shall reckon with his buyer," and we expound: but not with the heirs of his buyer. This is the wording of the Rambam at the end of the second chapter: It turns out that you say a Hebrew servant is acquired with money or with a document. And he acquires himself through five things: through years, or the Jubilee, or the deduction of money, or a document of his manumission, or the death of the master without a son. And with a Cuthean even if he left a son. And it is a mitzvah to say to him "Go" at the time of his departure. And even if he did not say it to him – behold, he goes out for free, and does not require a document. And even if he fell ill and his master spent many expenses on him – he owes him nothing, as it is said: "he shall go out to freedom for nothing." Thus far his words. And so we learned in the Mechilta: Why is "he shall go out to freedom" stated (meaning: for it should have said "and in the seventh he shall go out")? Since it says "And when you send him away" – I might hear that he must write him a bill of manumission. Therefore, the Torah says: "he shall go out to freedom." Or perhaps he should give him money and go out? Therefore, the Torah says: "for nothing," see there. Meaning: that when he goes out in his time or through the deduction of money – he does not require anything. And similarly when he goes out upon the death of the master. And only when he goes out not in his time through a document must he write him a bill of manumission. And he writes to him: "Behold you are a free man." (And in the Mishnah it does not count a document, for it is an a fortiori argument from a Canaanite servant. And see Tosafot there 16a s.v. Amar Rava. And be precise and you will find it easy.)

The Rambam wrote in the third chapter: Regarding every Hebrew slave—the master is obligated in the sustenance of the wife married to him. But not a betrothed woman or a woman awaiting levirate marriage. And this is provided she is permitted to him, but if she was from among those prohibited by a negative commandment, even if she is a secondary prohibition—he is not obligated in her sustenance. As it is said: "his wife with him"—a wife who is fit to remain with him. And likewise, he is obligated in the sustenance of his sons and daughters. Regarding one sold by a beit din it is said: "If he is the husband of a wife, then his wife shall go out with him." Now, would it enter your mind that because this man was acquired, his wife became enslaved? Rather, it comes only to teach that the master is obligated in her sustenance. And regarding one who sells himself it is said: "he shall depart from you, he and his children with him." And likewise regarding one sold to an idolater, whether a wife and children he had at the time of sale or a wife and children he had after his sale, provided that he marries her with the knowledge of his master. But if he married her without his knowledge—he is not obligated in her sustenance. Thus far his words. And the exposition of "his wife" is in the Mechilta, and the exposition of children and that he must marry her specifically with the knowledge of his master is in Torat Kohanim, Parshat Behar. And according to this, it appears that also in the case of one who sells himself to an idolater, the master is obligated in the sustenance of his children, for regarding him too it is written "he and his children." And why was this not explained in any place? And should you say that he will not obey us, the verse is speaking of when he listens to us, as it is stated in Kiddushin (Kiddushin 16a) and in Torat Kohanim. And it requires further study. (And there is in the commentary of Rashi in some Pentateuchs that he indeed wrote so, see there.)

It appears that he is only obligated in the sustenance of the sons until age six, in the same manner that the father is obligated in them, for why should his obligation be greater than that of the father himself? And so wrote the Ramban in the commentary on the Chumash and the Re'em there. And some say until twelve years (Mishneh LaMelekh). And it is simple that if the sons have a livelihood from another source, he is not obligated in their sustenance. But the Rambam wrote: Even though the master is obligated in the sustenance of his wife and his sons—he has nothing from their handiwork, rather the handiwork of the woman and her findings belong to her husband. And everything that the husband acquires through his wife—this one acquires, even though he is a Hebrew slave. Thus far his words. And this is in the Mechilta. And the Ramban and the Ritva explain that in such a case the master is not obligated to sustain them. But from the words of the Rambam it does not imply so (and so wrote the Mishneh LaMelekh).

It is written: "If his master gives him a wife and she bears him sons or daughters, the wife and her children shall belong to her master and he shall go out by himself." And it is impossible to say that the scripture is speaking of an Israelite woman, for if so, why would the wife and her children belong to her master? Rather, thus our sages, of blessed memory, taught us: that it is within the master's authority to hand over to him a Canaanite maidservant. And the offspring of a maidservant is like her, and therefore when he goes out they remain with the master. And this is only in a case where the beit din sold him. This is the wording of the Rambam there: One whom the beit din sold—his master has the right to give him a Canaanite maidservant. Whether it is the master or his son if he died—he may give him a maidservant, and he coerces him in this matter so that he may father slaves from her. And she is permitted to him all the days of his servitude, as it is said: "If his master etc." But one who sells himself is forbidden to a Canaanite maidservant like all other Israelites. Thus far his words. And so it appears simple that if his master does not hand over a Canaanite maidservant to him—that on his own he is forbidden to take one even if the beit din sold him. And there are those who have a doubt regarding this (see Mishneh LaMelekh in the name of the Maharit). And there is one who says that one who sells himself was only excluded from coercion, but by his own will—it is permitted. And these are bewildering words (ibid.).

A Hebrew slave is not permitted to a Canaanite handmaid unless he has an Israelite wife and children. But if he does not have a wife and children—his master may not give him a Canaanite handmaid. And this matter is from the Oral Tradition. And know that even if the one sold was a kohen—he is permitted to a Canaanite handmaid all the days of his servitude when his master gives her to him (Kiddushin 21b). And it is not specifically a pierced slave, for the same law applies to one who goes free in the sixth year. Rather, the text took the common case, because for one who goes free not at the time of the Jubilee, there is a strategy that he may serve further as is explicit in the Torah. But at the Jubilee, there is no further strategy to serve further (Tosafot ibid.).

Piercing, as it is written "and he shall pierce..." – is only applicable to one whom the beit din sold. However, one who sells himself is not pierced. And only when the beit din sold him, and six years passed and he does not wish to leave – they pierce him, and he serves until the Yovel or until the death of the master. And his son who inherits cannot pierce, as it is written: "and he shall serve him forever," and we expound: "and he shall serve him" – him, and not his son. And so too if the slave was a kohen – he is not pierced because he becomes blemished, and he would not be permitted for service in the Temple. For behold it is written: "and he shall return to his family" – to the status that he possessed. And we expound at the end of the second chapter of Makkot: To his family he returns, but he does not return to that which his ancestors held. That is to say: to any position of authority that his ancestors held. And the reason seems to be that since he is a lowly soul who sought to serve further – he is not worthy of being appointed over any matter.

How is the piercing performed? The Rambam wrote there: How do they pierce? They bring him to a beit din of three and he says his words before them. And he brings him at the end of six years to the door or to the mezuzah while they are standing in the building, whether it is the door and mezuzah of the master or of any person. And he punctures his right ear through the body of the ear with a metal awl until he reaches the door, as it is said: "And you shall put it through his ear and into the door." And "mezuzah" was only stated so that he should stand either next to the door or next to the mezuzah, and just as a mezuzah is while it is standing—so too a door must be while it is standing. But the piercing is in the door even if there is no mezuzah there. And it is the master who pierces by himself, as it is said: "And his master shall pierce"—not his son, nor his agent, nor an agent of the beit din. And they do not pierce two slaves as one, for they do not perform mitzvot in bundles. Thus far his words. And it is clear from his words that the standing can be either next to the door or next to the mezuzah. But the piercing must be only in the door (and so wrote the Mishneh LaMelech). And so it is explicitly in the Mechilta, that the piercing is only in the door and not in the mezuzah, and so Rashi explained in the Chumash. However, it is implied there that "mezuzah" only comes for the hekesh of "standing" and nothing more. And the Rambam explained it that the standing can be next to it, so as not to remove the verse from its plain meaning entirely. And it was taught in the Sifrei in Parshat Re'eh that they pierce by day and not by night. And he derives it from that which is written: "Therefore I command you this thing today." And it requires explanation, for behold, this is written regarding the severance gift. And it appears to me that this is its explanation: That certainly regarding the severance gift it is not relevant to say by day and not by night, but certainly it refers to the verse after it which deals with piercing, as it is written afterward: "And it shall be... and you shall take the awl, etc."

Our sages, of blessed memory, expounded in Kiddushin (Kiddushin 22a): "If the servant shall surely say" – until the servant says and repeats it, and that he says it while he is a servant. But if he said it after six years – he is not pierced, until he says and repeats it at the end of the six years at the beginning of the final perutah. How so? For example, if there remained of the day the value of a perutah from the money of his sale or slightly more. But if there remained less than the value of a perutah – this is like one who says it after six years. And not much before the end of the time, as it is written: "I will not go out free" – until he says it at the time of exit. And if the servant had a Canaanite handmaid and had children from her, and his master has no wife and children – he is not pierced, as it is written: "Because he loves you and your house." And it appears to me that children for his master is not exact, for only "your house" is written, and "his house" refers to his wife. Similarly, if his master has a wife and children, and the servant does not have a wife and children – he is not pierced, as it is written: "I love my master, my wife, and my children." And this refers to his Canaanite wife and her children, for upon his exit they have no connection with him as they remain with the master, as it is written: "The wife and her children etc." If he loves his master and his master does not love him – he is not pierced, as it is stated: "Because it is good for him with you." That is to say: that it is good for his master to be with the servant, and it is good for the servant to be with his master. Similarly, if his master loves him and he does not love his master – he is not pierced. And this is more explicit, as it is written: "Because he loves you." And from the previous verse one may also expound this, obviously. If he is ill and his master is not ill, or if his master is ill and he is not ill, or if both of them are ill – he is not pierced, as it is stated: "Because it is good for him with you," that they both be in a state of well-being.

The Rambam wrote: What is the difference between one who sells himself and one whom the beit din sold? One who sells himself is not bored through the ear, and one whom the beit din sold is bored through the ear. One who sells himself is forbidden to a Canaanite handmaid, and one whom the beit din sold, his master may provide him one, etc. One who sells himself may be sold to an idolater, and one whom the beit din sold is sold only to an Israelite, as it is said: "If your brother be sold to you" – the beit din sells him only to you. One who sells himself may be sold for six years or for more than six, and one whom the beit din sold is sold only for six. One who sells himself, they do not provide him with a severance gift; if the beit din sold him, they provide him with a severance gift. Thus far his words. He further wrote: From the oral tradition they learned that a woman is not bored through the ear. And so it appears from the context of the verse, for it says regarding the one bored through the ear: "I love my master, my wife, and my children." And what is the meaning of that which is said: "And also to your handmaid you shall do so"? For the severance gift, for just as it is a mitzvah to provide a severance gift to a Hebrew slave, so it is a mitzvah to provide a severance gift to a Hebrew handmaid. Thus far his words. And there is a further intention in this, that she does not serve the son like one bored through the ear, as I wrote in section 153.

What is ha'anakah? The Rambam wrote: Anyone who sends away his manservant or maidservant empty-handed violates a negative commandment, as it is said: "you shall not send him away empty." And behold, the verse transformed it into a positive commandment, as it is said: "you shall surely provide for him" — whether one who leaves at the end of six years, or leaves at the Yovel, or upon the death of the master. And so too the Hebrew maidservant who leaves through any of these or through signs — one provides for them. But those who leave through a deduction of money — one does not provide for them, as it is said: "And when you send him out free from you" — and this one he did not send out free, but rather the servant gave the remainder of the money that remained for him to work for, and afterwards he left. Thus far his words. And even though also upon the completion of six years or at the Yovel it is not the master who sends him but rather by the decree of the Torah, nevertheless, the servant also does not exert effort in this. And the master sends him according to the decree of the Torah. But regarding a deduction of money — behold, this is through the exertion of the servant, and therefore he does not receive ha'anakah.

It is written: "You shall surely grant him from your flock, from your threshing floor, and from your vat" – we require things similar to these items, which possess blessing inherently as they are fruitful and multiply, and it is possible for there to be blessing in them and likewise the opposite. However, money and garments and the like – he is not obligated to give from them. And how much does he give him? Not less than thirty sela, whether from one kind or from many kinds. Like the thirty of a slave regarding the fine, of which it is stated: "he shall give to his master." And whether the house was blessed because of him, meaning that from the time he came to the master the master became wealthy, or whether it was not blessed – we grant him. If so, why is it stated "as the Lord your God has blessed you"? This means that according to the blessing give to him: if you are very wealthy – give him much. And if not – do not give less than thirty sela. Thus ruled the Rambam there (and see Kesef Mishneh). And if he fled, and the Yovel reached him while he was fleeing – he goes out to freedom and has no granting, as it is stated: "And when you send him forth" – and behold he did not send him, but rather he fled on his own. And a creditor does not collect from the granting, as it is stated (ibid.): "you shall give to him" – and not to a creditor. And the granting of a Hebrew maidservant belongs to her father, and likewise her findings, for every right of a minor belongs to her father. And if her father died before it came into his hand – behold they belong to herself. And her brothers have nothing in them, and heirs do not inherit the right of the father in her, for a person does not bequeath a right that he has in his daughter to his son.

And know that from the words of the Rambam it is implied that the creditor does not collect from the ha'anaka even after it has come into the hand of the slave. And from Rashi (Kiddushin 16b), this is his wording: The master is not obligated to pay the creditor based on the rule of Rabbi Natan, see there. And so it is implied from the sugya of the Shas there (and see Mishneh LaMelekh). And it appears to me that this is also the intention of the Rambam. And that which he wrote, "the ha'anaka of a Hebrew slave belongs to himself, and a creditor does not collect from it" – his intention is that he may take it from the master. And the creditor does not collect from the master, and afterwards the creditor will claim it from the slave himself. And the practical legal difference is that we hold that we arrange for a creditor, and therefore perhaps they will need this for his arrangement. Furthermore: perhaps another creditor will seize it, or perhaps in the meantime he will use it for himself.

“And if a man sells his daughter as a maidservant” – he sells his daughter and not his son. A father sells his daughter and not the mother. A father sells his daughter and she does not sell herself. So it is stated in the Mechilta. And I wonder why the Rambam did not bring this in the fourth chapter (Rambam Hilkhot Avadim 4)? And the verse speaks of his minor daughter while she is still in his domain. And even though a na'arah is also in his domain until she becomes a bogeret, nevertheless, here there is an exegesis that she goes free with the signs of na'arut, as will be explained. And all the more so that he cannot sell her during her na'arut. Therefore, once she has brought two hairs after twelve years – he cannot sell her. And if she is an ayalonit – he can sell her as long as she has not become a bogeret, which is until twenty years (Rashi Kiddushin 4a s.v. ayalonit). And the tumtum and the androgynos are not sold, neither as a servant nor as a maidservant. And the father is not permitted to sell his daughter unless he has become impoverished and nothing remains for him. And even so, they compel the father to redeem her after he has sold her because of the family blemish. And if he has nothing with which to redeem her, or if he fled or died – she serves until she goes free. And the redemption of relatives applies only to one sold to an idolater.

An amah ivriyah is acquired with money, with the equivalent of money, and with a document. She is not acquired with a perutah because she must be acquired with a sum of money suitable for a deduction, so that she may deduct from her redemption price and go free. Thus wrote the Rambam in the fourth chapter (the Rambam, Laws of Servants 4). And they wondered about him: for if so, let us say the same regarding a servant as well, who also goes free through a deduction of money (Kessef Mishneh and Lechem Mishneh and Mishneh LaMelech)? However, in Kiddushin (Kiddushin 12a) it is explicitly stated so regarding an amah ivriyah, see there. And even though it is somewhat implied there that we require a dinar—this is not a necessity, for they said this according to Beit Shammai, see there. And it appears to me that while it is true that we derive the deduction of money for a servant from an amah as is stated in the Gemara (Kiddushin 14b)—this is regarding the essence of the acquisition whereby he acquires himself. But that there should be an obligation, we did not learn from her. And only regarding her did the verse reveal "then she shall be redeemed," that the obligation is for there to be "and she shall be redeemed" in her case. For they are not equal in all things, just as she goes free with signs of puberty and upon the death of the master, and he does not. And behold, in the Yerushalmi he derives the deduction of money from "if there be yet many years," see there. And what is the document that the father writes on paper or on a shard? "My daughter is sold to you," "my daughter is acquired by you," and he delivers it to the master. And the father writes the document.

A Hebrew maidservant works six years like a slave sold by a beit din, as it is written: "If your brother, a Hebrew man or a Hebrew woman, is sold to you, he shall serve you six years." And she goes out at the beginning of the seventh. And if the Yovel occurs within the six—she goes out like a slave. And if the master dies—she does not work for his son like one whose ear was pierced, as it is said: "And also to your maidservant you shall do so." And likewise, she deducts from her redemption price and goes out. And if he wrote her a deed of manumission—he has waived the remainder, and she goes out for free like a slave. And the Hebrew maidservant has an advantage in that she goes out with the signs of naarut, even if she brought signs on the day after he purchased her, as it is said: "And she shall go out for free"—from the oral tradition they learned that the verse increased for her another exit. And which is this? It is the signs. And then she returns to the authority of her father, and when she reaches bogeret she also leaves the authority of her father. And the aylonit who has no naarut shall go out upon her bogeret from the master and from the father.

A Hebrew maidservant does not go free for a tooth or an eye, as it is said: "she shall not go out as the slaves go out." And likewise, a Hebrew slave does not go free through this. Rather, he pays them the value of the tooth or eye like one who injures his fellow. It results that you learn she is acquired by two things: by money or by a document. And she acquires herself by six things: by years, and by the Jubilee, and by the deduction of money, and by the death of the master, and by a document of manumission, and by signs of puberty. And the master cannot sell a Hebrew maidservant nor a Hebrew slave to another, whether distant or near. And if he sold or gave—he has done nothing, as it is said: "To a foreign people he shall not have power to sell her etc.", and likewise a Hebrew slave. And the Rambam wrote there that the reason the verse needed to mention this regarding a Hebrew maidservant is because since the master has the authority to designate her, you should not err to think that he can also sell her; therefore it is written regarding a maidservant. And that which is written "To a foreign people he shall not have power to sell her" is as if it were written "to another man." And in the Mekhilta they expounded that it refers to the father, that it is forbidden for him to sell her to a non-Israelite, see there. And Rashi in the Chumash explained like the Rambam, see there. And there is one who wrote that the Rambam interprets the Mekhilta according to his words (Lechem Mishneh). And it is impossible to say so, for in the Mekhilta the intention is as I have written. And so wrote the Ramban in the Chumash, see there.

The Torah gave permission to designate her, which is to take her as a wife for himself or for his adult son. On the contrary, the mitzvah of designation precedes the mitzvah of redemption, as it is written: "If she be evil in the eyes of her master, who has not designated her, then he shall let her be redeemed." And then she is like all other betrothed women, and she does not go free except by a get or by the death of the husband. And how is the mitzvah of designation performed? He says to her in the presence of two: "Behold, you are sanctified to me," "Behold, you are betrothed to me," "Behold, you are to me for a wife." And it appears to me that even though regarding other kiddushin there is a query in the Gemara whether the language "Behold, you are designated to me" is effective, as is found at the beginning of Kiddushin (Kiddushin 6a), nevertheless regarding designation it certainly is effective, for the Torah called it by this language. And when does he say it to her? Specifically within the six years. And even at the end of the six, and even close to sunset of the final day. And he does not need to give her anything now, because the initial money of the sale was given for kiddushin. Therefore, even if there is now no time remaining for her to work the value of a perutah, and even though the money has already been consumed—it is kiddushin. As we maintain at the beginning of the third chapter of Kiddushin (Kiddushin 58b) regarding one who says to a woman, "Behold, you are sanctified to me after thirty days," when the thirty days arrive—she is sanctified, even though the money was consumed. And as I wrote in Even HaEzer siman 40, see there. (And from Rashi in the Chumash it is explained that the language of "designation" is effective, see there.)

And there is reason to doubt: regarding that which we said, that he does not need to give her anything now, whether this is specifically when the acquisition of the maidservant was with money, for then we say that those funds which the father received were given for kiddushin, and he does not need to give her anything now. But if the acquisition was with a document, it is impossible to say that the document was given for kiddushin, for regarding a document of kiddushin the husband writes "your daughter is betrothed to me," whereas regarding a document of a Hebrew maidservant the master writes, as has been explained. And if so, he must betroth her now with money or with a document. Or perhaps that which the Gemara said, "the initial money was given for kiddushin," the intention is not regarding the money of acquisition but rather regarding the money the father received for her labor. For he sold her due to his poverty, and presumably he received money for her, and this money was given for kiddushin. And from Rashi in Kiddushin (Kiddushin 45a, s.v. "be-kiddushin") it implies that it refers to the money of acquisition; see there. And it requires further study.

When he designates her—he treats her with the conduct of marriage. And he does not treat her with the conduct of servitude. And he does not designate two at once, as it is said: "he shall designate her" (Mekhilta). And the Rambam wrote, how does he designate her for his son? If his son was an adult and gave permission to his father to designate her for him, the father says to her in the presence of two: "Behold, you are betrothed to my son." Thus far his words. For the language of the verse implies this: "And if for his son he shall designate her," that the father designates her for his son. And it stands to reason that this is not specifically so, and the same law applies if his son says to her in the presence of two: "Behold, you are betrothed to me with the money that your father received from my father." And so Rashi explained in the Chumash, see there (Lechem Mishneh). And even though in all betrothals a man can betroth his minor daughter to a man without her consent, nevertheless regarding designation the Torah decreed that it must be specifically with her consent, for it says "he shall designate her"—with her knowledge. And it appears to me that the father's consent is not needed now, since he received the initial money for betrothal. And nevertheless it appears that if he protests and says that he does not desire the designation—he cannot designate her against his will, but rather he does not need to be asked now. And if the master dies, his son cannot designate her for himself, for she has already gone free with the death of the master. And from what will be explained in section 177, it appears explicitly that the father cannot protest.

"If he designates her for his son" – and not for his brother (Mekhilta), and certainly not for other relatives. "He shall deal with her according to the practice of daughters," and what have we learned regarding the "practice of daughters"? Rather, this comes to teach, and is found to be taught. Just as with this one, "her food, her clothing, and her conjugal rights he shall not diminish" – so too for a daughter of Israel, etc. (ibid.). And it appears that regarding that which the verse specified "according to the practice of daughters" in the designation for his son – the same law applies to the designation for himself, and it is an a fortiori argument. However, if it had written this obligation regarding his own designation, I would have said that in the designation for his son there is no such obligation. Therefore, it wrote it regarding the designation for his son, and it follows that it is certainly so regarding his own designation. And the designation is like erusin and not like nissuin. Therefore, he does not become tamei for her when she dies if he is a kohen, and he does not inherit from her, and he does not annul her vows, until she enters the chuppah. And what is this that is written: "And if he does not do these three things for her, etc."? The Rambam wrote: "And if he does not do these three things for her" – he did not designate her for himself, and he did not designate her for his son, and she was not redeemed through the deduction of money, then she shall go out for free upon the appearance of signs, as I have written, and so it is in the Mekhilta. And they did not interpret "and if these three things" as referring to her food, her clothing, and her conjugal rights, as the reason is explained in the Mekhilta, see there. And so Rashi interpreted in the Chumash, see there.

A Hebrew maidservant is only sold to one for whom she, or his son, is eligible for kiddushin, so that she will be fit for yi'ud. How so? A man may sell his daughter to his father, for even though the father cannot designate her, his son can designate her, as she is his brother’s daughter. However, he cannot sell his daughter to his son, for he cannot designate his sister, and his son likewise cannot designate his father’s sister. Nevertheless, a man may sell his daughter to those forbidden by a negative commandment, such as a widow to a Kohen Gadol, or a divorcee or a chalutzah to an ordinary Kohen, for even though they are under a negative commandment, kiddushin is effective with them. And this deals with a widow or divorcee from erusin, for if she were from nissuin, she would have already left the authority of the father, and he could not sell her. And one should not ask: Behold, even when she was betrothed he cannot sell her, for a man does not sell his daughter into servitude after marriage? For it can be said that this deals with a case where she was betrothed through yi'ud, and was widowed or divorced from the yi'ud before the nissuin, for in such a case he can sell her, as will be explained. And know that from what has been explained, that there is no sale except where there is yi'ud, we have learned that the father cannot sell his daughter to a tumtum or an androgynos, for yi'ud is not applicable to them. And regarding a woman, there is room for doubt, for there is yi'ud with her son, and it requires further study.

The Rambam wrote: One who betroths his daughter while she is a ketannah, and she was widowed or divorced—he cannot sell her, for a man does not sell his daughter into servitude after marriage. However, he may sell her into servitude after servitude; for example, if he sold her into servitude first, and the master designated her, and the master died or divorced her, and she returned to the authority of the father while she was a ketannah—behold, the father may sell her a second time even to a Kohen Gadol. And likewise, if she fell before a yavam from the designation and he performed chalitzah for her, even though it is an invalid chalitzah because she is a ketannah (and does not perform chalitzah), behold, she is disqualified from the priesthood. Nevertheless, he may sell her to a Kohen, since betrothal is effective for her as I have written. Thus far his words. And they wondered about him: for according to the sugya (Kiddushin 18b) it is explicitly explained that the one who holds that he may sell her into servitude after servitude, holds that he cannot sell her after the master has designated her; see there (Kessef Mishneh and Lechem Mishneh). And they further raised many difficulties against him (see Lechem Mishneh).

In my humble opinion, it appears that, on the contrary, his words are compelled by the sugya itself, when we examine closely that which he said: "But he may sell her for servitude after servitude, such as etc. and he designated her etc." And it is a wonder: can you not find servitude after servitude in its plain sense, as he himself wrote later? This is his wording: One who sells his daughter and she leaves after years, or at the Yovel, or through a deduction of money—he may return and sell her a second time as we have explained. Thus far his words. That is to say: that he sells for servitude after servitude. If so, why did he have to depict it earlier through the manner of designation? Rather, it is certainly this itself that he comes to teach us: that even though a man does not sell his daughter for servitude after marriage, this refers to general kiddushin and not to the kiddushin of designation, for this is called servitude after servitude. And this is explicit in the sugya there (Kiddushin 18a) regarding the Baraita where Rabbi Eliezer and the Rabbis disagree whether he is permitted to sell her to relatives or not. And the Baraita says: And they agree that he may sell her as a widow to a Kohen Gadol etc. and it asks: What are the circumstances of this widow etc.? Rather, her father betrothed her. But one does not sell for servitude after marriage. And it concludes there that her own erusin is different from her father's erusin. That is to say: that this fact that he cannot sell for servitude after marriage, this refers to her father's erusin where he betrothed her to a man. But her own erusin, meaning that through designation he can sell her. And this is what the Rambam ruled, that the kiddushin of designation is called afterward "servitude after servitude." And this is the primary novelty in his words, as I have written.

And even though the Gemara says that this is only according to the one who holds that the initial money was not given for kiddushin, and therefore it is called her kiddushin. But according to the one who holds it was given for kiddushin—it is called her father's kiddushin, as per the commentary of Rashi there, see there. However, later (Kiddushin 19a) it says that there is no yi'ud except with her consent. And this is also according to the one who says the initial money was not given for kiddushin. For according to the one who holds it was given for kiddushin—behold, they are her father's kiddushin and do not require her consent, like all kiddushin. And Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak disagrees there, that even if you say it was given for kiddushin, it is different here because the Merciful One said "he shall designate her," see there. And the Rambam explains that this is the explanation: that in everything you said where there is a distinction between kiddushin of yi'ud and her father's kiddushin, this is according to everyone. And it is not as you said, that this is only according to the one who says it was not given for kiddushin, but even according to the one who says it was given for kiddushin, there is a distinction between kiddushin of yi'ud and other kiddushin. And consequently, also regarding what we said previously, that the matter of selling for maidservant service after yi'ud is only according to the one who holds it was not given for kiddushin—it is not so. For even according to the one who says it was given for kiddushin—this is not similar to other kiddushin. And according to this, what we said previously, that according to the one who says they do not sell for maidservant service after marriage—this is according to Rabbi Akiva, who holds that also in kiddushin of yi'ud the law is so, it is not so according to the conclusion of that Baraita, for "and they agree that he may sell her as a widow to a Kohen Gadol" they argue against Rabbi Akiva, and they are the many. And since we ruled like Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak that there is no yi'ud except with her consent, perforce we maintain that even according to what is held as the halacha, that the initial money was given for kiddushin—it is also not similar to general kiddushin. And according to this, the ruling of the Rambam emerges properly and correctly according to the system of the Gemara, and it is clear with the help of Heaven.

He wrote further: One who sells his daughter, and afterward went and betrothed her to another, if the master wishes to designate her—he designates her. And if the master did not designate her, neither for himself nor for his son—when she leaves the master's authority her betrothal is finalized, and she becomes a married woman. Thus far his words. The explanation of the matters: Since we hold that the initial money was given for betrothal, it is like one who betroths a woman "from now and after thirty days," where if another came and betrothed her within the thirty days—she is not betrothed to the second unless the first retracted, for then the second betrothal takes effect after thirty days. And here too it is so (Gemara ibid.). And one who sells his daughter and stipulated with the master on the condition not to designate her, if he wishes to designate—he designates, for he stipulated against what is written in the Torah, and his condition is void (Kiddushin 19a).