Siman 185

The Torah trusted every Jewish woman regarding her niddah status and her purity, and thus our sages of blessed memory expounded in Ketubot [72a]: From where do we know that a niddah counts for herself? As it is said, "And she shall count for herself" — "for herself," meaning for herself, implying that she does not require witnesses in this. And this is according to the laws that were explained in siman 127 regarding the matter of reliability in prohibitions, that a matter which has neither a presumption of prohibition nor a presumption of permission, such as a piece of meat that is doubtfully chelev or doubtfully fat, one witness is reliable. And a matter that has a presumption of prohibition, one is reliable in that which is in one's hand; see there. And here too it is so, for even though she is impure, nevertheless it is not called a presumption of prohibition since it is the way of blood to cease, and after seven days of niddah she will become pure, and it is like a piece of meat that is doubtfully chelev or doubtfully fat. And even though without a mikveh she is always in her prohibition and it would be a presumption of prohibition, yet this is in her hand to immerse [and this is the intention of the Tosafot at the beginning of Gittin s.v. "one witness" and according to the explanation of the Maharsha there, and so it is explicit in the novellae of the Rashba there. And according to this, all the laws in siman 127 we learn from niddah. And even though at the beginning of the chapter "Ha'isha Rabbah" we say that the reason of "in one's hand" is specifically regarding one's own and not regarding others', see there, and how is she reliable regarding the husband? But the husband is like her own body, for one's wife is like one's body, and automatically also the reverse. And furthermore, since the purity depends on her, it is like her own; see there and examine carefully]:

And according to this, it would appear that if a woman committed an act of zenut even when she was unmarried, and she was certainly a niddah according to her years, and it is obvious that she did not immerse, and if so she is suspect regarding the prohibition of niddah, and we maintain that one who is suspect regarding a matter is no longer trusted in that matter, as is written in siman 119; and if so, when this unmarried woman marries a husband, how is she trusted regarding the purity of her niddah status? And if you say that in truth she is not trusted, behold, there are daily occurrences among all the women of Israel whose husbands trust them, and this law is not found in any place that such women require witnesses for their purity. And it must be said that the reason is that since they are able to become pure and the mikveh is before them, one does not leave aside that which is permitted and consume that which is prohibited. However, one must ask that perhaps her inclination will overcome her to immerse before the counting of seven clean days. And it can be said that since the counting of seven clean days is from a stringency that the daughters of Israel adopted and not from the essential law, we are not concerned about it. And that we should be concerned that her inclination will overcome her within the seven days of her niddah status—this we certainly are not concerned about, for the husband will certainly sense this, and she will also fear lest the husband find blood on his checking cloth, for all seven days she fears the seeing of blood. And one should not ask how we can rely on the fact that they are able to become pure, for if so, why did she not purify herself during her zenut when she was unmarried? For this is not a question, as she was ashamed to immerse, and it is not so now that she has married [see Chiddushei HaRim, subsection 1].

But if she caused her husband to stumble once regarding the prohibition of niddah, it seems clear to me that she is no longer trusted, and the husband is obligated to provide witnesses for her, or that he should know for himself that she went to the mikveh after the appropriate days according to the measure of her vest. And not specifically kosher witnesses, for this is impossible, but rather one woman who shall see at the time she purifies herself; for we have only to remove from her the trust until she returns in complete repentance without deception, and then she returns to her trust. And this matter depends on the observation of the husband [see there in the Chavat Da'at who also wrote that if she caused him to stumble, she is no longer trusted]. And know that in this generation, due to our many sins, the husband has much to supervise regarding the purity of his wife, according to the reports we have heard to our heart's sorrow, that heresy has increased among light-minded women. Therefore, whoever the fear of Hashem has touched his heart shall supervise this well.

In the previous siman it was explained that when the husband was on a journey and returned from the journey, if he left her in a state of taharah, if there was time in which she could have become taharah after the days of her tumah, he is permitted to come upon her without asking according to the opinion of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch. And this is when he left her with the presumption of taharah, but when he left her in a state of tumah, even if many days passed, he is forbidden to come upon her until she says to him, "I have immersed," for the tumah is a certainty and the taharah is a doubt, and a doubt does not remove a certainty. And it appears to me that it is not specifically when she says with her mouth, "I have immersed," but rather even if she does something that hints to him of her immersion, such as giving him an object from her hand to his hand—for when she is in a state of tumah it is forbidden to do so, as I wrote in siman 195—he is also permitted to come upon her. And I saw one who says that the verbal statement is indispensable, for even if she comes and lies next to him it does not avail [Chavat Da'at subsection 5]. And I do not know why; is the verbal statement indispensable? Is not the essence only to know if she became taharah? And when she hints to him, it is sufficient, for it seems to me that the daughters of Israel are ashamed to say with their mouths, "I have immersed." [See there, for he wrote that this is proven from Tosafot, and he did not explain from which place. And it appears his intention is from Tosafot, Yevamot 11b, "Tanya," who wrote that if he left her with the presumption of tumah, even if she is awake she is in a state of tumah until she says, "I am taharah." Thus far his words. And there is no proof from this, for certainly it is forbidden for him to approach her even when she is awake, for one may not rely on her silence regarding a certainty of tumah. But when she begins to do something as a sign of her taharah, her verbal statement is not indispensable. This is what appears to me to be correct.]

And a proof for this is that behold, there is one who raised a difficulty regarding the essence of this law: why do we need her to say it at all when she is awake, and why should we not rely on the fact that since he comes to her and she says nothing to him, she is presumably tahora? As our teacher, the Rema, wrote in siman 1, section 3, that one who is prone to fainting and slaughtered, and said, "it is clear to me that I did not faint," he is believed. And the commentators wrote there [the Shach, the Pri Chadash, and the Kereti U'Peleti] that even if he says nothing it is kosher, for if he had paused or pressed, he would have said that it is treifa, see there. If so, here too let us say the same, that if she were still temeia, she would have told him [Pri Toar, subsection 1]. But in truth, there is no comparison between them, for there he is explicitly performing an action to remove the animal from the presumption of prohibition by slaughtering it, but we are concerned that perhaps there was some flaw in his action; therefore, we rely on his silence. But here, behold, he left her in the presumption of being temeia, and how is it possible to remove her from this presumption without any speech or without any action on her part? And all matters of presumptions are so, that one needs some action to remove from a presumption of prohibition and not to rely on the absence of speech or the absence of action. However, in any case, that which we wrote that her specific speech is not required, there is certainly a proof from there, and it is even stronger than it, as is understood.

And regarding this law, that when she is in the status of being impure she is forbidden to him until she says "I have immersed," our teacher, the Rema, wrote that since days have passed in which it was possible for her to count and immerse, she is believed; even if he sees her garments soiled with blood, she is believed to say "I passed through the butchers' market" or "I was occupied with a bird" and the like. Thus far his words. And they wrote that this comes to teach us that specifically if he knows with certainty that the days have not yet passed, she is not believed; but if he does not know whether they have passed or have not passed, she is believed [Shach, subsection 8]. And there is no novelty even in this, for the Torah has believed her; rather, it comes to teach us that even if it is her constant way to wear white garments on the sixth day from her seeing, and now she says that she wore them on the fifth day from her seeing, nevertheless she is believed since it is possible for it to be so [Taz, subsection 1].

Furthermore, it seems simple to say that this itself is what it comes to teach us: even if he sees her garments soiled with blood—and it will be explained later that regarding one who wears garments designated for the days of her niddah, this constitutes a presumption of impurity, and if so, all the more so when they are explicitly soiled with blood she should not be believed—and for this it comes to teach us that nevertheless she is believed. And it must be said that this is also the intention of the Tur, who wrote: And nevertheless, when she says to him "I have immersed," she is believed, see there. And what novelty is there in this? Rather, his intention is even in such a case, for so it is explicitly in the Rosh, chapter HaMadir, see there. However, it must be said that the garments are not of those designated for the days of her niddah, for in such a case she would not be believed; rather, the garments are ordinary garments, but they are soiled with blood, and therefore she is believed to say "in the market of butchers," etc. [and see the Bach]:

It is stated in Ketubot [72a]: If she was established as a niddah among her neighbors, her husband is lashed on her account because of niddah. Rashi explained: She was established, meaning they saw her wearing her niddah garments, and she says to her husband, "I am pure," and she cohabited; her husband is lashed if they warned him. Thus far his words. For she is not liable for lashes since she says, "It is clear to me that I am pure," but her husband is liable even if she says to him "pure," since it is against the presumption, for we lash based on presumptions. And he is unable to know clearly except through her word, and she is not believed against the presumption. And this is only against him, but she, when she says, "I know clearly that I am pure," is exempt from lashes. (Our teacher, the Rema, in Responsa siman 2, raised a difficulty regarding this, see there; and according to what I have written it is not a difficulty at all, and examine this well.) [Based on Ketubot 22, s.v. Ha-ba]:

They further said there (22b): If she said to her husband, "I am teme'ah," and then retracted and said, "I am tehorah," she is not believed. But if it is within kedei dibbur, she is believed, for regarding all utterances a person may retract within kedei dibbur. And even after kedei dibbur, if she provided an amtala for her words as to why she previously said "I am teme'ah," the sages of blessed memory said there that she is believed. The amtalot are many, such as if she says because she did not have strength, or because he requested of her in the presence of his female relative, or if she says "it seemed so to me, but now I have examined and found that the blood came to me due to a wound or a bruise," and similar to these, she is believed. And it appears to me that all the amtalot only apply when he requested of her, and so it is implied in the Gemara there [in that of Shmuel, see there in Tosafot], for without a request, who compelled her to say "I am teme'ah" if the matter was not clear to her? However, from the words of the Tur it is not so implied, from that which he questioned why an amtala does not avail where she is established as a niddah, and the poskim wrote to distinguish in this as will be explained, and there it is dealing without a request. And so it is implied from several amtalot in the Shas, that even without a request an amtala avails. And so it is implied above in siman 1 regarding a shochet, see there in section 41.

And know that there are some among the great authorities who doubted whether this amatla is effective, where she says "I was mocking you," as is the case regarding monetary matters in Choshen Mishpat siman 81 [Ketzot HaChoshen ibid.]. And it appears to me that it is certainly not effective, for besides the fact that a claim of mockery does not appear applicable here at all, as is understood, have we not established there that a claim of mockery is only effective when the other party sues him and he says to him: "Just as you mocked me by suing, so too I admitted to you for nothing"? And here it is not relevant to say this when he sued her, for he is permitted to sue her; and if it was without a suit, we do not apply the claim of mockery. And even when she says "I said this by way of laughter and jesting in the manner of women," the statement is recognizable in this manner. Therefore, if the husband sensed that she said this in laughter and jesting, it is certainly nothing; but if she said it not in a way of laughter, she is certainly not believed to say "I was mocking you."

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote: Nevertheless, one who wishes to be stringent upon himself not to believe her, it is a measure of piety. Thus far his words. That is to say, we do not say that he is a "pious fool" since she provides a justification for her words, for it is not so; for we find in the Gemara that Shmuel did not want to accept the justification from his wife and required of her separation and immersion. Furthermore, it appears to me that it comes to teach us that even if the time of her onah arrived, which he is obligated to fulfill, and by the law, since she is believed with a justification, I would have said that he is obligated to fulfill the mitzvah of onah—it comes to teach us no, and on the contrary, it is a measure of piety.

He further wrote: But according to the law, she is believed even with silence afterward, provided that she comes and lies with her husband and he knows and recognizes that what she said initially, "I am impure," she did because of a quarrel he had with her or something similar to this. Thus far his words. And some say that nevertheless, the husband is obligated to ask her, "Behold, you said you are impure," and he must elicit the explanation from her mouth [Bach]. And some say that our teacher, the Rema, also holds this [Shach, subsection 4]. But it does not appear so [Minchat Yaakov], for if so, what is this that he said, that she is believed even with silence? For there is no silence here. However, it is possible to say that although from the perspective of the law he is not obligated, nevertheless, wherever it is possible to clarify, we clarify [and it appears to me that this is the intention of the Shach]. And it further appears to me that if the husband recognized beforehand, at the time she said "I am impure," that this was because of anger and irritation, although it is forbidden for him to come upon her without an explanation, nevertheless it is sufficient when she comes and lies with him. And this is the intention of our teacher, the Rema, who wrote "and he knows and recognizes etc.," meaning that also from the beginning he recognized this. But if from the beginning he did not understand that she said this because of anger, but rather now when she came to him he recognized this, he must elicit the explanation from her mouth [and according to this, it is possible to say that the Bach does not disagree with the Rema; and examine this carefully].

And specifically when she says "I am tamei" does an amatla help, but if she wore garments designated for her days of niddah and afterwards said "I am tehorah," even though she gave an amatla for her words, she is not believed. The Tur wondered about this, what is the difference between one and the other? However, the Rashba and the Ran wrote that there is a great distinction between them, for because of embarrassment or compulsion it is possible that she would say "I am tamei," but to perform an action because of this, to wear her niddah garments, she is not believed with an amatla. And there is one who answered that there, by means of the niddah garments, she was established as a niddah among her neighbors; if so, upon what did she rely regarding the amatla, for the neighbors will not know of the amatla? This is not the case when she says to her husband "I am tamei," where she relied on the fact that she would tell him the amatla afterwards [Maharal of Prague]. And from this there is one who says that if she said "I am tamei" also in front of others who heard this, an amatla does not help [Taz, subsection 2]. And there are those who disagree on this, for with a mere statement we are not concerned about it [Minchat Yaakov and Kereti U'Peleti].

And even though in siman 1, regarding a shochet who made a mark on the head of the lamb, it was explained that an amptala is effective even when an action was performed, it is different there because it was not within his power to act in any other way. But here, why did she have to perform an action? She should have said "I am tamei," and since she added an action, therefore an amptala is not effective [Shach sub-section 5, and Bach, and it is simple]. And we have learned from this that in any place where, according to the amptala, one was forced to perform an action, the amptala is effective even regarding an action [ibid.]. And there is one who indeed disagrees with the law mentioned there [Taz ibid.], and we have already explained this there in section 61; see there.

And seemingly, I do not know why our teachers exerted themselves, for the distinction is simple: granted that from the perspective of logic an explanation might have been effective even when she wore her niddah garments, but the Shas calls this a chazakah, as they said, "she was established (huchzekah) as a niddah among her neighbors." And how does an explanation apply to a chazakah? For a chazakah is certainly from the Torah, and we rely upon chazakot, such as a man and a woman or a male child and a female child who grew up together, as is found at the end of Kiddushin; would an explanation be effective there? [And the Chavot Daat wrote something similar in subsection 5]. However, when we examine the wording of the Tur, it is well-settled. This is his wording: And it is a wonder; is "she was established as a niddah among her neighbors" greater than when she explicitly says "I am impure," where she is subsequently believed to say "I am pure" by means of an explanation? Thus far his words. And many wondered about him, for certainly one must distinguish based on several of the logical points we have written. And it appears clear to me that the Tur also knew that one must distinguish, but this is what he is questioning: "is it greater etc.", meaning, behold the Torah trusted the woman so that the husband may rely upon her regarding her impurity and her purity, as it is written, "and she shall count for herself"—for herself. If so, immediately when she says "I am impure to you," the Torah decreed that the husband is obligated to believe her, and she is to him like a certain niddah, and nevertheless an explanation is effective. All the more so regarding a chazakah in relation to neighbors, to whom the matter does not concern them, and what difference does this chazakah make to them whether she is impure or she is pure? And if it is because of a chazakah which is like a certainty, behold her statement to her husband is more like a certainty, for so the Torah decreed regarding a niddah, and nevertheless an explanation is effective. And perforce one must say that by means of the explanation her speech is nullified and it is as if she did not speak; if so, regarding one who was established (huchzekah) we should also say so, that by means of the explanation the chazakah is nullified. [And if so, this is not at all related to the slaughterer in Siman 1, and there it is simple that an explanation is effective in every case where there is no chazakah and no trust except for the slaughtering, for only regarding slaughtering did the Torah trust an individual, as I wrote there].

The Rashba and the Ran, who distinguished in this matter, intended as follows: Certainly, the explanation nullifies her statement and her presumption, but in a case where we understand that even according to her explanation she should not have acted so—such as performing an act like wearing her nidda garments—we do not believe her explanation due to the logical reasoning, and the presumption remains in its status. And so in this matter, one must explain the second resolution that we wrote in section 13. However, in truth, according to what we have explained, the second resolution does not seem correct. And all the more so, this is not related to siman 1 regarding a shochet who made a mark on the head of the lamb; for there, an explanation certainly avails. Also, regarding the incident that our teacher, the Rema, wrote in a responsum [the Taz cited it in subsection 2] concerning a man and his wife who made an agreement between them because they feared the evil eye, that she would say "I am tamei" so that they would not know she is pregnant—there is no doubt at all that he is permitted to have relations with her. For there is neither a presumption nor a statement here, since the essence of her credibility and her presumption belongs to the husband, and he intentionally acted thus; if so, what should we be concerned about? [And the Rema also concludes with a permission, and the Taz there also wondered at his lengthiness in this for another reason; and according to what I have written, there is no similarity at all. And what the Taz wrote at the end of his words regarding the difficulty of the Rema—why they said only that he is lashed—and wrote that it is obvious that she is lashed, see there; these are wondrous words, as I wrote in section 8, and delve into this.]

It is a simple matter that a woman who said to her husband "I am tamei" and then retracted and said "I am tahor" is not believed without a plausible explanation, even when she has a migo—for example, when days have passed during which she could have become tahor and she could have said "Indeed I was tamei and I became tahor." Nevertheless, when she says "I was tahor," she is not believed on the grounds that she has made herself a forbidden object, and a migo is not effective for this [Chavat Da'at, subsection 3]. And in truth, even for this reasoning we have no need, for since the Torah believed her, if so, immediately upon her speaking to him the Torah believed her and it is like witnesses; therefore, just as we do not say migo in the place of witnesses, so too one should not say migo here.

There is one who says that after thirty days an amatla is not effective for her, since she has been established for such a long time [Beit Shmuel in Even HaEzer siman 19, subsection 2]. In my humble opinion, this is not so; for even though in all matters we say that when one is established for thirty days it constitutes a chazaka, nevertheless regarding a nidda it is a point in her favor, for she has a time when she will become pure and she has a migo. And even though we have explained that a migo is not effective for her, nevertheless, in any event, the length of time does not diminish her standing. Furthermore, we have already clarified that the fact that the Torah believed her is superior to a chazaka, and in any event is not inferior to it, and for all of this an amatla is effective. Furthermore, even if she were established as a nidda, an amatla would also be effective were it not for the fact that she performed an action, as I have written; if so, why is a chazaka of thirty days superior to the chazaka by which she was established among her neighbors?

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote: If she said, "Such-and-such a sage purified a ketem for me," and the sage says she is lying, the sage is believed and she is impure. Thus far his words. This is explicit in Ketubot there, but in the Gemara it says, "purified the blood for me," see there. In the Rif and the Rosh the version is "ketem." It appears to me that he intentionally changed it to write "ketem" to teach us that even regarding ketamim, which are rabbinic, she is also not believed, as I wrote above in siman 127, section 47, see there. Superficially, there is no novelty in this law, for regarding any witness based on another witness, when the second contradicts him, the first is not believed. Rather, there is a novelty here, so that you should not say that since the Torah believed her, she is considered like two witnesses who are believed even against the one in whose name they speak; it comes to teach us that nevertheless she is not believed [and so too regarding the baker in the Gemara there, for the Torah believed every individual of Israel regarding his terumot, as Rashi wrote at the beginning of Gittin, see there].

And specifically the sage himself is believed to contradict her, according to the law of a witness from the mouth of a witness where the second is believed, but another is not believed to contradict her and to say that the sage declared it tamei for her, for wherever the Torah believes one witness, he is like two, as I wrote in siman 127. And know that in Even HaEzer siman 115 there is a dispute whether the second is believed to contradict the first; however, this is regarding the extraction of money, but regarding the essence of the reliability of the prohibition, it is simple that the second is believed to contradict the first according to the law of a witness from the mouth of a witness [and as the Taz wrote in subsection 3].

The Rambam wrote in the fifth chapter of Shegagot, halacha 6: One who has relations with his wife not at the time of her veset and she saw blood during the act of relations, behold these are exempt from a khatat offering because this is like an unavoidable accident and not an inadvertent sin; for the one who sins inadvertently should have checked and scrutinized, and had he checked very well and scrutinized with questions, he would not have come to an inadvertent sin, etc., and he requires atonement. But this one, what was there for him to do? Behold she was pure, and he had relations not at the time of her veset; this is nothing but an unavoidable accident. Therefore, whether blood was found on her checking-cloth or whether it was found on his checking-cloth, they are exempt, etc. Thus far his words. And even though in Yevamot [91b] regarding one who married based on witnesses we do not say this reasoning of "what was there for her to do," see there—this is regarding the prohibition where she becomes forbidden to her husband, for we do not consider her as completely under an unavoidable accident. But nevertheless, even there, one cannot categorize her as an inadvertent sinner such that she would be liable for an offering. But it is difficult, for behold there, when she married based on witnesses, she is liable for an offering as the Mishnah states at the beginning of the chapter "Ha'isha Rabba," and so the Rambam ruled there, halacha 5, and this is his wording: A woman whose husband went to a country overseas and she heard that her husband died, or witnesses came that he died, and she married, etc., she is liable for an offering, etc. Thus far his words. And how is she liable? Behold, she is under an unavoidable accident, for what was there for her to do, as they said in the Gemara this reasoning regarding the prohibition; however, in any case, it is not an inadvertent sin that should obligate an offering.

And behold, this reasoning that he is under duress is found in Shevuot [18a], and the Rambam explained it as: what was he to have done? And if so, why regarding a woman is she liable for a sacrifice when she marries based on witnesses? And it must be said that we do not say regarding a sacrifice this reasoning of "what was he to have done" and "he is under duress" except in a matter that he is compelled to do, such as here, for behold he is obligated to fulfill her marital rights and he is compelled to come upon her; therefore we consider him as one under duress. This is not the case in Yevamot regarding one who marries based on witnesses, for she is not compelled to marry, and therefore we consider her as one acting in error like any other general case of error [and that which the one who marries her is also liable for a sacrifice, though he is commanded regarding procreation, it can be said that he is not like one under duress since he could have taken another].

And behold, the Rambam in chapter 4 of Laws of Forbidden Intercourse ruled that a woman who does not have a fixed vest needs an examination before intercourse by law, and one who has a fixed vest does not need an examination by law; nevertheless, the modest ones examine before intercourse. And behold, this is certain: if she does not have a fixed vest and did not examine before intercourse, she is liable for a sin offering. However, regarding one who has a fixed vest and did not examine, the Kesef Mishneh also wrote there that she is liable for a sacrifice, see there, for in such a case she is not called "under duress" because she did not act like the modest ones. And it seems to me that she is exempt. Therefore, when we examine his wording, where he wrote only regarding him, "for what was he to do," and why did he not also write regarding her as he wrote previously, "behold these are exempt etc."? Rather, certainly this is what he meant: both are exempt from a sacrifice, for he is always under duress, and she is sometimes considered under duress and sometimes an inadvertent sinner, and he relied upon what he explained in chapter 4 of Laws of Forbidden Intercourse [so it appears to me]:

He further wrote: But if he transgressed and cohabited with her near her vest, and he imagined that he would cohabit and separate before she would see blood, and she saw blood during the act of tashmish, they are liable for a korban, for this is a shegaga, etc. Thus far his words. And it appears to me that whether according to the one who holds that vestot are rabbinic or according to the one who holds that vestot are de-oraita, it is a shegaga, since the Shas in Shevuot there did not mention that it depends on this dispute. And behold, if vestot are rabbinic, the matter is simple as to why it is a shegaga; for it is not meizid, since from the Torah it is permitted, and it is not anus, for since it is forbidden mid-rabbinan, he should have considered that perhaps she would see blood during the act of tashmish, and it is a shegaga like all shegagot where he imagined he would finish before the seeing. And even according to the one who says vestot are de-oraita, and according to this it would seemingly be meizid, nevertheless regarding the prohibition of niddah it is considered a shogeg. For granted that regarding the prohibition of "near her vest" he is a meizid, however that is a prohibition of a positive commandment; but regarding the prohibition of karet he is a shogeg, for he imagined he would finish before. To what is this comparable? To an animal that became a tereifah, and a piece of chelev was lying there from it, and he thought it was fat and ate it; for he is certainly liable for a chatat. For granted that regarding the tereifah he is a meizid, that is for a negative commandment; but regarding the prohibition of karet he is a shogeg, and had he known it was chelev he would not have eaten it, and he "returns from his knowledge" regarding this prohibition and brings a korban for his shegaga. And here too it is so [as it appears to me]. And this matter is explicit in the Rambam, chapter 2 of Shegagot, and this is his wording: If one committed a transgression and it was known to him that it is a negative commandment, but he did not know that it carries karet, this is a shegaga and he brings a chatat. Thus far his words. [And see the beginning of chapter 7 of Shabbat].

He further wrote: Therefore, if blood is found on his ed, both are tamei and liable for a korban. If it is found on her ed, if she wiped herself immediately when the husband withdrew and did not delay, both are tamei and liable for a korban. If she delayed long enough to reach her hand under the pillow or under the bolster and take an ed to examine herself with, and afterwards she wiped herself, both are tamei in doubt and are exempt from a korban. If she delayed long enough to descend from the bed and wash her face, and afterwards she wiped herself and blood was found, he is tahor. Thus far his words. And all this is in Niddah [14b]. And we say there that he is also exempt from an asham talui according to the one who holds that for an asham talui one requires a piece from two pieces where the prohibition was established, but for one piece he is exempt. Therefore, the Rambam, of blessed memory, who holds this in the eighth chapter of Shegagot—that specifically for a piece from two pieces is one liable for an asham talui—consequently did not mention an asham talui here [Lechem Mishneh; and one must look into the Beit Yosef in siman 187 in his great work, who wrote that he only exempted him from a chatat, see there; and also the Bartenura wrote that he is liable for an asham talui, and this requires great study].

And there is a question regarding this, for it certainly refers to where she felt a sensation during the act of tashmish, for if she did not feel a sensation, it is impossible to obligate them in a korban even if it was found on his, since from the Torah she is not a niddah without a sensation, as was written in siman 183. And so it is clear from the wording of the Rambam, and also from the sugya of the Shas in Shevuot 18a, which brings the Mishnah in Niddah there regarding the law of one who was engaged in tashmish and she said to him, "I have become tamei," see there. And since it refers to a sensation, she certainly saw blood, for this is the essence of the sensation—the opening of the womb. If so, why are they not obligated in a korban even when she found blood after she descended from the bed, and all the more so after reaching a hand to the pillow, for she certainly saw at the time of the act? However, this question is in the Gemara in Niddah 14b, and the Shas answered that it certainly refers to where she felt a sensation, but when she did not wipe immediately, one may attribute the sensation to the organ, see there.

Nevertheless, I have a question regarding this: why do we not say that since she wiped herself afterward and found blood, the end proves the beginning—that there was a sensation of the source and not a sensation of the organ? For behold, we find that based on this reasoning we say it is a get in Gittin [66a], see there. And since regarding the prohibition of a married woman we state this reasoning, how much more so regarding a korban. And it would be possible to say that this is the explanation: it was found on hers and on his it was not found; if so, there is some proof that she did not see at the time of the act, for even if she wiped immediately, it is impossible to say so, and one must say that his cloth did not wipe the place of the blood. But when she did not wipe immediately, it remains in doubt, and we do not say the end proves the beginning from the fact that it was not found on his. However, according to this, a new law would be innovated for us: that if they did not examine his cloth and it was lost, they would be liable for a korban even afterward; if so, the Shas should have specified this. Therefore, it appears that this reasoning of "the end proves the beginning" is only said regarding the intentions of human beings, that his end proves regarding his beginning that such was his intent, and not regarding general matters. [My son, the Rabbi R. Dov, may he live]. [And that which we learned in the Mishnah, that if it was found after a time they are impure out of doubt, and this requires further study, for she should be certainly impure even if she saw afterward; one must say that it refers only to him. However, in the Rambam both are explicit, etc., and one must say that it refers to the taharot she touched beforehand].

The sages taught in the Mishnah in Shevuot [14b]: If one was having relations with a pure woman and she said to him, "I have become impure," and he separated immediately with a live organ, he is liable for a sacrifice because his exit is as pleasurable to him as his entry. Rather, he should remain upon her until the organ dies and then exit. And how does he act? He sinks his ten fingernails into the floor of the bed and remains without movement until the organ dies, and he separates with a dead organ. And he should be filled with fear and trembling over the transgression that came to his hand, and he should not support himself upon her, but rather support himself on his feet and hands so as not to derive pleasure from her. And in the Yerushalmi of Shevuot there, Rabbi Zera says that he should be filled with fear and trembling over the transgression, and through this, the organ will die immediately. However, it says there that not everyone is like Rabbi Zera to be on this level, see there. Therefore, one who is God-fearing, certainly immediately upon contemplating this well, the organ will certainly die and he will be able to separate immediately.

This is the wording of the Rambam there in Shegagot: One who transgressed and cohabited near the time of the vest and so on, and she felt that she became impure, behold, he shall not withdraw with a turgid organ and so on. And if he did not know that it is forbidden to withdraw immediately and he withdrew while he was turgid, he is liable for two chatat offerings: one for his entry, for behold he cohabited with a niddah, and one for his exit and so on. In what case is this said? When he knew that it is forbidden to cohabit at the time of the vest and imagined that his cohabitation would precede her seeing [blood], and he did not know that it is forbidden to withdraw with a turgid organ, such that there were two lapses of awareness for the two acts of cohabitation. But if he did not know that it is forbidden to cohabit at the time of the vest and did not know that it is forbidden to withdraw immediately, even though he withdrew immediately and he was turgid, he is only liable for one chatat offering, because his entry and his exit, which are like two acts of cohabitation, are within one transgression, and he did everything in one lapse of awareness. Thus far his words. And if it was not at the time of her vest, he is not liable for the entry at all, for behold he is an anus, and he is liable for the withdrawal when he withdrew with a turgid organ. And a talmid chacham who knew the law that it is forbidden to withdraw with a turgid organ and withdrew is not liable for a korban, for behold he is a mezid [Gemara ibid.]. And it appears that even if due to panic he did not contemplate and withdrew with a turgid organ, nevertheless a korban is not applicable, for it is not in the category of a shogeg [as mentioned above, for if not so, how could he withdraw unlawfully since he is a talmid chacham, and examine this carefully].

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote that if he separated from her with difficulty and inadvertently, such that he did not know that it is forbidden to separate from her, he should fast forty days, and they do not need to be consecutive, but rather two days every week, such as Monday and Thursday. On the night of the fast [before the fast, and there is one who is stringent also after the fast] he is forbidden from meat and wine. If he is unable to fast, he should redeem each day with money that he shall give to tzedakah according to the value of the money he possesses, for a wealthy man shall give somewhat more than a poor man [see Orach Chaim at the end of siman 334 that he should not give less than twelve peshitin per day, which are two kopeks in our currency]. One should be stringent in his repentance, and whoever increases in repentance, it is a merit for him. The woman does not require atonement. If she cohabited not during the time of her veset and found blood after the cohabitation, even if it is found on his ed, it is called an accident even if she did not examine herself beforehand, and neither he nor she requires atonement. Thus far his words.

The explanation of his words seems to me to be that it is dealing with a case that was not at the time of her veset, and he requires atonement because he separated from her with difficulty, for his exit is as pleasurable to him as his entry, and therefore she does not require atonement, for she has no pleasure in his separation. And there are some of the great authorities who hold that she also has pleasure, but there is no necessity to say so [and so wrote the P'ri Toar]. And even if it is like the great authorities, behold, he is separating from her, and what was there for her to do? And even if she slipped out from under him, nevertheless, it seems to me that she does not require atonement, for who says that in such a case she has pleasure? However, in such a case, he also does not require atonement, for he is under duress. And therefore he wrote that if after tashmish she found blood, where he separated in a permitted manner as he did not yet know, even if he separated with difficulty, neither he nor she requires atonement, since it was not at the time of her veset. And that which he wrote, "and if she performed tashmish not at the time of her veset," his intention is not that previously it dealt with the time of her veset, but rather because regarding the matter he states previously, when he separated with difficulty, there is no difference in this prohibition between the time of her veset and not at the time of her veset, therefore he specifies "not at the time of her veset." But in truth, previously it also dealt with not at the time of her veset. But at the time of her veset, it is obvious that both of them require atonement and great repentance for the entry alone, and all the more so if the separation was also with difficulty, that he requires two atonements, as has been explained from the Rambam that we wrote above [and there are some of the great authorities who exerted themselves over his words and spoke at length on this (see Chavat Da'at and Pitchei Teshuvah) and the matter is simple as I have written, and examine it closely].

There is one who wrote that if he forgot and had relations near the time of her vest and remembered during the act of cohabitation, and she has not yet seen blood, it is forbidden to withdraw with a turgid organ [Siftei Da'at, subsection 7]. However, this does not seem correct, for since the primary prohibition is lest she see blood during the act of relations, and she has not yet seen blood, he should hasten and withdraw [Pardes Rimmonim; and also that which the Chavat Da'at wrote, that specifically when she found blood, but if she only says that she felt a sensation, he does not need to withdraw with a flaccid organ, see there; and his words are puzzling, for that which we say to attribute it to the sensation of the organ is to be stringent but not to be lenient, and the Pardes Rimmonim also disputed him, and examine this closely].

If he had relations with her not at the time of her veset and she felt the sensation in the middle of the act and did not tell the husband until after the withdrawal, he certainly does not require atonement, for he is completely under duress. Regarding her, there is one who is uncertain if she requires atonement [according to Pitchei Teshuvah, subsection 70]. And according to what we have explained, that not at the time of her veset she never requires atonement, even when he withdrew with a turgid organ, it follows that in every case she does not require atonement. However, it is possible that if he continued the act from the time of the sensation onward, and in this she certainly has pleasure, and had she told him he would have ceased the act, it appears that she requires atonement.