Siman 120

In Parashat Matot, regarding the vessels of Midian, it is written: "And Elazar the Kohen said etc. Only the gold and the silver etc. everything that comes into the fire, you shall pass through the fire and it shall be pure; only it shall be purified with the water of sprinkling, and all that does not come into the fire you shall pass through the water." This means everything whose use is not by way of fire, such as cups and flasks whose use is with cold substances and have not absorbed forbidden matter, "you shall pass through the water"—he immerses it and that is sufficient; and specifically metal vessels [Rashi]. And likewise, the vessels that require hagalah or libun among the vessels of Midian require tevilah after the hagalah and the libun. And thus our sages, of blessed memory, expounded at the end of Avodah Zarah, that all vessels taken from the idolaters require tevilah in a mikveh of forty seah, whether they are new vessels or old ones that require hagalah or libun. This is derived from that which is written, "everything that comes into the fire, you shall pass through the fire and it shall be pure," and this "and it shall be pure" is superfluous and comes for an exposition, that the verse added for you another purity, and that is to immerse in a mikveh of forty seah. From that which is written, "only it shall be purified with the water of sprinkling (niddah)," they expounded: water in which a niddah immerses, and that is forty seah. And according to this, for new vessels we learned from "you shall pass through the water," and for old ones from "and it shall be pure." And this is according to the explanation of Rashi. But the Ramban, of blessed memory, explained "you shall pass through the water" as referring to rinsing, meaning that even vessels used with cold substances require rinsing. And likewise the Semag, Lavin [148], explained "you shall pass through the water" as referring to hagalah, see there. And according to them, one must say that from "and it shall be pure" we derive even for new vessels [and it appears so in the Gemara there, which says: Rav Nachman said, even new vessels are implied, for behold, old ones that were subjected to libun are like new ones, etc. And according to Rashi, one must say that this reasoning reveals the meaning of the verse "you shall pass through the water," that it refers to tevilah; and examine this carefully].

This is the wording of the Rambam in chapter 17 of Ma'akhalot Assurot, law 5: This immersion that one immerses meal vessels taken from etc. is not for the matter of impurity and purity, but rather from the words of the scribes, and there is an allusion to it: "Everything that passes through fire, you shall pass through fire and it shall be pure." And from the oral tradition they learned that it only speaks of their purification from the absorption of gentiles' food, not from impurity, for you have no impurity that is removed by fire; rather, all those who are impure are removed from their impurity through immersion, and the impurity of the dead through sprinkling and immersion, and there is no fire there at all. Rather, regarding the matter of the purging of gentiles' food, since it is written "and it shall be pure," the sages said: add to it another purity after its passing through fire to permit it from the absorption of gentiles' food. Thus far his words. And many have labored over his intent and the length of his words [see Lechem Mishneh].

And in my humble opinion, it appears that for the Rambam there was a difficulty: what did the Shas infer from "and he shall be pure" [v'taher], that it is superfluous? For in the entire Torah, after all the laws of purification, the word "and he shall be pure" is written, such as "and the priest shall provide atonement for her and she shall be pure," "and the priest shall provide atonement for him and he shall be pure," "and he shall wash his flesh in living waters and he shall be pure," "and the sun shall set and he shall be pure," and similar to these. And for this he answers that certainly if the matter were speaking of ritual impurity and purity, "and he shall be pure" is written well, as in all places. But here they learned from the oral tradition—meaning that it came through received tradition—that it speaks only of purging [gi'ulim]. And there is a necessity for this, for we have not found regarding any impurity that the impurity is removed by means of fire, neither regarding all those who are impure nor regarding the impurity of a corpse. Therefore, of necessity, the fire is to extract the non-kosher purging. And since this is so, the terms of impurity and purity are not relevant to this, but rather non-kosher and kosher. And if so, what kind of language is "and he shall be pure"? Rather, it certainly refers to immersion in a mikveh, for regarding this the term purity is relevant, as it is stated in the Yerushalmi there, that he brings him out from the impurity of the Egyptians to the holiness of Israel; and holiness and purity are one, as it is stated at the end of Sotah, see there.

All of our teachers agreed that this immersion is from the Torah, though some wrote that the Rambam is of the opinion that it is Rabbinic [Rashba in Torat HaBayit], as the superficial flow of his wording seemingly implies this, for he calls it "the words of the scribes." However, according to what we have explained, it is well-settled; since in the plain meaning of the verse there is no redundancy, but rather the Sages received this through tradition by necessity—that the subject here is not ritual impurity and purity—and according to this, the phrase "and he shall be pure" is redundant. Therefore, he calls it "the words of the scribes," just as he calls betrothal by money "the words of the scribes" even though it is from the Torah, as he himself wrote in the second root of the Book of Commandments; for such is his way regarding all such laws. And thus we rule, that this immersion is from the Torah.

The Tur wrote: It is forbidden to use them until one immerses them in a proper immersion without a chatzitzah in a place of forty seah. And he wrote in the Sefer HaMitzvot: But not in a spring, for even though a spring purifies a tamei vessel in any amount, regarding vessels purchased from Egyptians, forty seah are required. And it is not clear, for we should not be more stringent regarding this immersion than regarding the immersion of a tamei woman, as we only know of this [immersion] from her. Thus far his words. The explanation of his words is as follows: Behold, the immersion of vessels from tumah according to the Torah is sufficient whether in a mikveh or in a spring with a revi'it if the entire vessel is submerged in these waters, such as needles and pipes [Pesachim 17b]. However, the sages nullified the revi'it of a mikveh [Nazir 38b] and forty seah are required, but the revi'it of a spring was not nullified. And even for the immersion of a niddah, it is the opinion of the Rambam in chapter 4 of Mikvaot, and the Ra'avad, and other Rishonim, that in a spring forty seah are not required, and if the body is small and the entire body is covered in less than forty seah, it is permitted. And this is what we learned in chapter 5 of Mikvaot, that a spring purifies in any amount. And in Torat Kohanim, Parshat Shemini, they expounded: If a spring purifies in any amount, perhaps a mikveh also purifies in any amount? The verse teaches: "But a spring etc." see there. However, Rabbeinu Tam, and the Rash, and the Rosh in the laws of Mikvaot wrote that only regarding vessels does a spring purify in any amount, but not regarding a person, and the exposition of the Torat Kohanim is a mere asmachta, meaning regarding the matter of vessels. And so wrote the Rashba in Torat HaBayit [Bayit 7, Sha'ar 7]. This is his wording: And that which was taught etc. "If a spring in any amount etc." according to the words of Rabbeinu Tam, of blessed memory, we will need to establish it specifically regarding vessels, and it is a mere asmachta after they nullified the revi'it of a mikveh. Thus far his words.

And this is the intent of the Tur, for the Sefer HaMitzvot wrote that the immersion of vessels even in a spring requires forty seah, and even though a spring purifies an impure vessel in any amount, nevertheless, for the immersion of vessels one requires forty seah. And his reasoning is that since we derive from the verse "only in the waters of sprinkling" that the Torah equated the immersion of vessels to a niddah and not to impure vessels. And regarding this, the Tur challenges him that in any event one should not be more stringent in this than in the immersion of an impure woman, meaning the immersion of a niddah, and in a spring even for a niddah one does not require forty seah according to the Rambam and the Ra'avad, as has been written. And our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in his great work, wondered about him: did not the Tur himself rule at the beginning of siman 201 like the Rosh, that for a niddah even in a spring one requires forty seah? And if so, what is his challenge against him? And furthermore, behold the author of the Sefer HaMitzvot says explicitly that a spring purifies an impure vessel in any amount, and it is explicitly clarified that he holds that a person requires forty seah.

And many things were said regarding this. Some answered that the intention of the Tur is that one should not be more stringent in this than regarding the immersion for the impurity of vessels [Derisha and Taz, subsection 2]; that is to say, granted that regarding a mikveh we derive it from a niddah as it is written "only with the water of niddah" etc., but from where do we know to be as stringent with a spring as with a niddah [Taz]? And furthermore, that the verse "only with the water of niddah" is a mere asmachta, and in any case, one should not be more stringent with them than with the immersion for impurity in vessels [Derisha]. And the difficulty is evident. And there is one who answered that the Tur holds that the entire principle of forty seah in a mikveh for a niddah is a mere asmachta, for from the Torah we only require that the body be covered by it, and if so, for vessels that are covered by a small amount of water, less is sufficient [Bach]. And he brought proof from what the Rosh wrote, that the exposition of the Torat Kohanim is a mere asmachta. And the Semag wrote similarly in the name of Ri, that this teaching of the Torat Kohanim which distinguishes a mikveh from a spring is a mere asmachta, see there. And these are astonishing words, for that which they wrote that it is a mere asmachta, this is regarding vessels, because from the Torah even in a mikveh a revi'it is sufficient, but the Sages nullified it; and in Parshat Shemini it deals there with the impurity of vessels as is explained in the verse and as we brought from the words of the Rashba, of blessed memory. But regarding a niddah in a mikveh, from the Torah one requires forty seah, and Heaven forbid to say the opposite. For behold, three lugin that fell into a mikveh of less than forty seah is a Halacha LeMoshe MiSinai that it disqualifies it, as is well known in the Shas; and if you were to think that from the Torah there is no measure for a mikveh, how would Halacha LeMoshe MiSinai apply to this? And all our teachers, the Rishonim and Acharonim, wrote that forty seah for a mikveh is from the Torah, and so it is proven in the Shas in many places. And the Ran, of blessed memory, in Shevuot chapter 2 explained this matter, and this is his wording: A spring purifies in any amount—not literally in any amount etc., it is necessary that his whole body can enter into them etc., for in a spring there is no extra verse, which is not the case with a mikveh, for even a short person whose whole body can enter into twenty seah, the immersion is not effective for him until he immerses in forty seah, as it is written "and he shall wash all his flesh in water"—water that his whole body can enter into, and that is forty seah. Thus far his words.

And all our teachers are equal in this matter, that forty seah for a mikveh is from the Torah, as it is written: "all his flesh." And this is what is common in the Shas, that the sages measured the water of a mikveh to be forty seah. Certainly it is so, for the sages measured that an average person requires forty seah to cover his entire body, and this is what the Torah meant by "all his flesh," and the sages measured that this was the intent of the Torah. But in a spring, where there is no superfluity of "all his flesh," forty seah is not required from the Torah. And this is what the Tur says, that while it is true that we hold that even in a spring forty seah is required for a niddah, this is certainly rabbinic; but from the Torah, forty seah is not required in a spring, for there is no superfluity in a spring as there is in a mikveh. And according to the Rambam and the Ra'avad, even rabbinically forty seah is not required in a spring. And according to this, the Tur rightly questions the Sefer HaMitzvot, for while it is true that we derive the immersion of vessels from niddah, nevertheless, from the Torah even for a niddah forty seah is not required in a spring, and only the rabbis were stringent; and from where do we have the authority to be stringent regarding the immersion of vessels?

It is clear to me that the Tur disagrees with the Sefer HaMitzvot in the interpretation of the words of the Tosafot there, who wrote, and this is their wording: Water in which a niddah immerses, even though a revit is sufficient to immerse needles and hooks according to Torah law, that refers to immersion for impurity; however, the immersion of a vessel is a new law and requires forty seah. Thus far their words. For the author of the Sefer HaMitzvot holds that since it is a new law, if so, even in a spring one requires forty seah. But the Tur holds that only regarding a mikveh did they compare them to a niddah—meaning, and not to vessels—and we require forty seah; but in a spring, where even for a niddah one does not require forty seah, what reason is there to be more stringent regarding the immersion of vessels than regarding a niddah? [And regarding that which the Bach labored over in the Gemara there, whether it wrote "and he shall be clean" I would have thought any amount etc., the Rashba explained it in Torat HaBayit there in the name of the Ramban, that the intention is that I would have said even if the entire body of the vessel does not enter etc., see there; meaning, that I would have permitted immersion in halves, and with this everything is settled. And know that the words of the Rema in Darkei Moshe, note 1, have no explanation, and it is evident that he had a different version of the text in the Tur in the name of the Sefer HaMitzvot, see there and examine carefully].

Regarding the law, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, ruled in section 1 that even in a spring one requires forty seah, see there. He follows his reasoning in his great work where he wondered at the words of the Tur. However, according to what the great authorities settled the words of the Tur, and especially according to what we explained regarding his intention—that what they ruled in Niddah, that even in a spring one requires forty seah, is only rabbinic—it is obvious that regarding the immersion of vessels, one does not require forty seah in a spring. And one cannot say that our teacher, the Beit Yosef, holds that in Niddah it is required from the Torah to have forty seah even in a spring, for from where would we know this? For in a spring there is no superfluous word as there is in a mikveh, as the Ran wrote. And one cannot say that we learn spring from mikveh, for in many laws they are divided from one another regarding flowing water and the like, so how could we learn spring from mikveh? Aside from this, the Rambam, the Ra'avad, the Mordechai in the second chapter of Shevuot in the name of our teacher Simcha, and the Ri Or Zarua hold that even in Niddah one does not require forty seah in a spring. And even the Rashba and the Ran, who were stringent to require forty seah in a spring for Niddah, wrote explicitly that it is because it is proper to be stringent in a prohibition of karet. Only Rabbeinu Tam, the Rash, and the Rosh hold that by law one requires forty seah in a spring. If so, why should we create a distant dispute to say that they hold it is so from the Torah? And one should not ask that if so, why must they say that the derivation of the Torat Kohanim is a mere asmachta, and regarding vessels let us say it is a complete derivation regarding a person—for this is no question at all. First, this verse is written regarding the impurity of vessels. Furthermore, here he learns that in a mikveh one requires forty seah from the verse "nevertheless a spring," while in the entire Shas we learn it from "all his flesh." Furthermore, the Torat Kohanim teaches us practical law like the Mishnah in Mikvaot which taught that a spring purifies with any amount; and if we say it refers to a person, behold rabbinically one requires forty seah according to their approach. Therefore they were forced to explain that it refers to vessels. Therefore, it appears to me regarding the law that in a time of pressing need, one may immerse vessels in a spring even if it does not have forty seah [see the Gra, subsection 4, who wrote that from the Torah one requires forty seah in a spring, and it requires further study; and more difficult than this is that he himself in siman 201, subsection 6, rejected the proof of the Ri and the Rosh and upheld the words of the Rambam, see there and examine carefully].

We learned at the beginning of the sixth chapter of Mikvaot: Everything connected to a mikveh is like the mikveh; the holes of a cave and the cracks of a cave, one may immerse in them as they are. And so wrote the Tur and Shulchan Aruch in siman 201, section 58, and this is his wording: The holes of a cave and the cracks of a cave, one may immerse in them even though the water within them is not connected to the water of the mikveh except by any amount. Thus far his words. And since we learn the immersion of vessels from a verse, that it is like the immersion of a niddah, it follows that the law for them is also thus. Therefore, when there is a small amount of water in a separate pit adjacent to a mikveh, and they are connected to the water of the mikveh and the vessel is covered by them, one may immerse there. And so wrote one of the great Acharonim [Ma'asei Yom Tov in the laws of Mikvaot, section 8, letter 17, see there].

It is an agreed-upon matter that the immersion of vessels does not require intent, and if the vessel fell into a mikveh or into a spring, even without human intent, the immersion is valid. For intent is required only for tithes, for terumah, and for holy things, but for mundane things intent is not required, as is found in Chagigah [18b]. Furthermore, behold the Torah compared it to the immersion of a niddah, and for a niddah intent is not required, as is found in Chullin [31a]. And one also cannot say that we should require human force as in the washing of hands, for behold we learned in Mikvaot chapter 5: A wave that was detached and contains forty se'ah and fell upon a person or upon vessels, they are pure. It follows that human force is not required.

Since the immersion of vessels does not require intent, therefore even if a minor boy or a minor girl immersed them, it is a valid immersion. So too, a gentile who immersed the vessel of an Israelite, as our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, wrote in section 14 and section 15. This is their wording: We do not believe a minor regarding the immersion of vessels, but if they immersed them before an adult, it is a valid immersion. If one immersed a vessel by means of a gentile, the immersion is effective for them, but he is not believed regarding the immersion. Thus far their words. And the reason they do not have credibility is simple: even though this is within their power and does not involve such great effort, nevertheless, since the immersion of vessels is from the Torah, it is not possible to believe them [Terumat HaDeshen siman 257]. According to this, it would seem that regarding glass vessels they are believed, as this is rabbinic, as will be explained. However, there is one who hesitated regarding this for the reason that regarding something with a presumption of being forbidden, even in rabbinic matters they are not believed, as is written in siman 127. However, in my humble opinion, it appears that this is not called a prohibition but rather a mitzvah, and therefore the food used in it is not forbidden, as will be explained [according to Pitchei Teshuva subsection 14 in the name of the Pri Megadim].

Regarding that which we wrote, that intention is not required for this immersion, there are those who disagree on this [Bach], and their reasoning is that at the end of siman 198 some say that a niddah requires intention, see there, and so too regarding vessels. According to this, it is also not effective via a gentile [ibid.], and a minor is capable of intention when they teach him to intend to purify, but a gentile acts according to his own mind. And some say that even if a niddah requires intention, who is to say to us that this immersion, which is not from impurity to purity and carries no prohibition when used without immersion, who is to say to us that it requires intention [Shach, subsection 28]. This reasoning was written by the Rashba and the Terumat HaDeshen there [see Beit Yosef at the end of this siman]. Aside from this, it appears to me that regarding a niddah we establish the law in the Shulchan Aruch later at the end of siman 198 like the Rambam, that she does not require intention, and only our teacher, the Rema, was concerned there for the opinion of the stringent, and he himself wrote there only that one should be stringent ab initio, see there. And since regarding the core of the law we establish it so, therefore regarding vessels one should not be stringent even ab initio; and there he was stringent ab initio because it involves a prohibition of karet. There is clear proof for this, for the Rashba is among those who disagree with the Rambam regarding a niddah there, yet he himself permits immersion via a gentile, as he wrote in Responsa, siman 511, see there [see Rashi, Yevamot 119, s.v. "mah li," and study it well].

In this immersion, chatzitzah disqualifies as in all immersions. The general rule of chatzitzah is that regarding a matter about which one is fastidious, even a minority of it constitutes a chatzitzah; and regarding that which one is not fastidious, it does not constitute a chatzitzah unless the majority of the vessel is covered by it, as I have written below in siman 202. The blackness attached to a cauldron from the outside is like the wall of the vessel, as is its way, and it does not constitute a chatzitzah, as I have written there. And that which we learned in the fourth chapter of Mikvaot, "one may not immerse a kettle in hot water unless he rubs it," the Rambam explained there that it is a vessel in which one heats hot water, and sometimes when there is water in it, one extinguishes coals in it; and it says that he must rub the coals within it and move them from place to place so that they do not stick to one another and constitute a chatzitzah. Thus far his words. However, the blackness is not a chatzitzah [Rosh]. And in the ninth chapter of Mikvaot we learned: And these constitute a chatzitzah in glass vessels: pitch and myrrh, see there; and so too anything similar to this. And every type of rust, whether on a knife or on other vessels, is a chatzitzah. Therefore, one must remove the rust before immersion. And if he did not remove it, if he is fastidious about it, it constitutes a chatzitzah. And if he rubbed it and also placed glowing coals on the place of the rust, and nevertheless a small amount of rust still remained that he could not remove through this, it is a minority about which he is not fastidious and it does not constitute a chatzitzah. And the general rule of chatzitzah is that if one immersed with a thing that constitutes a chatzitzah, the immersion is not effective and it requires another immersion.

We learned in the tenth chapter of Mikvaot: All handles of vessels that one inserted not in their usual manner, or that one inserted in their usual manner but did not finish—meaning, he did not complete their insertion—or that he finished and they broke, behold these are interpositions. From this it is clarified that one must immerse the handles of the vessel, as our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 12. And even though there is no proof from there, for there it is regarding impurity and purity, and automatically when the vessel becomes impure the handle also becomes impure, which is not the case regarding this immersion which is because of the usage within, nevertheless the handle of a vessel is like the vessel. And he wrote later in siman 202: Handles of vessels that are not intended to be permanent, such as when one inserted them not in their usual manner, or did not insert the whole thing, or inserted the whole thing and it broke, it interposes. And all handles of vessels that broke, if they serve a function similar to their original work, they do not interpose, and if not, they interpose. Thus far his words. At any rate, we have learned that the handle itself does not interpose. And it appears that even if the handle is of wood, which does not require immersion, and the vessel is of metal, which requires immersion, and inside the handle is fixed part of the vessel itself, like the handles of knives and their like, they do not interpose; for just as this is not an interposition regarding impurity and purity, so too regarding this immersion.

It is forbidden to use a vessel prior to tevilah, and if one transgressed and used a vessel without tevilah, that which was used in it is not forbidden, and he shall yet immerse it. The reason that which was used in it is not forbidden is because even with a vessel containing an absorbed forbidden substance of its day, when one used it for permitted food while cold, the food is not forbidden; and here, even hot is considered like cold, for there is no absorption of a forbidden substance here, but rather it is merely a mitzvah that the Torah commanded us. And even though the language of the Shas there implies that it is similar to hagalah and libun, see there, nevertheless all our teachers agreed that the food is not forbidden by usage prior to tevilah. And so too regarding forbidden vessels purchased from a gentile which require hagalah or libun and tevilah, and it is implied from the language of the Shas there that the tevilah specifically must be after the koshering, all our teachers agreed that certainly ab initio one must do so, but ex post facto, even if he immersed prior to hagalah and libun, it is permitted [Tosafot ibid. s.v. Magilan and the Rosh]. And so it is explicitly stated in the Yerushalmi, that the food is not forbidden by usage prior to tevilah.

It appears to me that those folding knives, meaning that the iron is made with a hinge that is placed into the slit in the handle and at the time of eating they open it, that its immersion is not effective while the iron is placed inside the handle, for the water will not enter it entirely and it constitutes a chatzitzah; and one must open it at the time of immersion. And all the more so those spoons and forks and knives that are all made as one, meaning that they are connected together—the spoon, the fork, and the knife—folded and connected together like links, and at the time of eating one separates them, that they must be separated at the time of immersion and each one immersed by itself. And when one immersed them while they were connected together, it constitutes a chatzitzah and the immersion was not effective for them, and they require another immersion. And the proof for this is from what we learned in the tenth chapter of Mikvaot regarding matters that have knots, that any knot that one unties periodically must be untied at the time of immersion, and if not, it constitutes a chatzitzah. For thus we learned there [mishnah 4]: These are the things that require water to enter them: the knot of the undershirt at the shoulder, etc., and the laces of a sandal, etc., see there. And all the more so in this that we have written, that at the time of use they are separated, that one must separate them at the time of immersion, and so too anything similar to this.

These glass bottles that hold drink, which are called "bottles" or "flasks," whose mouths are narrow, one must tilt them on their side during their immersion so that the water enters them, and afterwards he should submerge it entirely within the mikveh. But if he brings it into the water with its mouth downward, the water will never reach its bottom, and this matter was explained in the Mishnah there and below in siman 202, see there. And it appears to me that if he fills it with drawn water and brings it into the mikveh until the water of the mikveh kisses the water in the bottle, it is a valid immersion, for in such a case it is a "kissing" regarding impurity. And it is permitted to immerse a vessel within a vessel if the mouth of the outer one is like the tube of a wineskin, which is like the two fingers of the hand adjacent to the thumb rotating within the width of the hole with ease. And he must be careful that the inner vessel is loose within the outer vessel; therefore, he should not thrust knives into a bucket and immerse them, for the immersion will not be effective for their tips. And so too, if the inner vessel is heavy and rests within the outer one, the immersion will not be effective for it in the place where it rests, as is explained below in siman 202, see there. [See Shach there, subsection 4, and it appears to me that this law does not apply to the immersion of vessels, and in any case the mouth of the outer one must be like the tube of a wineskin, and see there subsection 6, and delve into this.]

And due to the reason of chatzitzah, one must be careful that the vessel is held loosely in his hand at the time of immersion, for if he grips it tightly in his hand, it is a chatzitzah. And if he moistened his hand with water first, there is no concern. Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 2 that this specifically applies if he moistened his hands with mikveh water, but not with detached water. Thus far his words. And they rejected his words, for since the reason that moistening his hand is effective is because the liquid on his hand connects to the mikveh water and there is no chatzitzah here, if so, even with detached water, since his hand is now inside the mikveh, the water on his hand has connected to the mikveh water, for this is the "hashakah" mentioned in the Talmud regarding the connection of water to water, and "moist enough to moisten" constitutes a connection [Taz subsection 4 and Pri Chadash subsection 9]. And specifically when there is something intervening between this water and the water in the mikveh it is not effective, but when there is no intervention between them, it is certainly a connection [ibid.]. And there is one who answered that since this water comes to remove it from the status of chatzitzah, it specifically requires mikveh water [Shach subsection 7]. And it is not understood at all, for still, the water is connected to one another. And it is possible to say that since his hand is tight against the vessel, and we only say that the water on his hand is like mikveh water, if so, when the water is detached, there is perforce an intervention between them and the mikveh water by means of the adhesion of the hand, and certainly so it is. And it is true that they wrote that even though one does not require loose hands, nevertheless, it should also not be tight, but rather a light grip [Taz ibid.]. But who can be careful in this? Therefore, the primary ruling is like the words of our teacher, the Rema, and one should not deviate [see the new Yoreh Deah in the name of the Kereti u-Peleti, and it is not understood at all, see there and examine carefully].

And know that regarding what has been explained, that when the vessel is loose in his hand the immersion is effective in any case even without having rinsed his hands in water, they raised an objection to this from what the Rambam wrote in chapter 2 of Mikvaot, and this is his wording: One who holds a person or vessels and immerses them, they remain in their impurity, and even though he loosened his hands, it is a decree lest he not loosen them [Shach subsection 6 and Pri Chadash subsection 8]. And there is one who answered that regarding the immersion of vessels, which is rabbinic, they were not concerned for this decree [Pri Chadash]. But it is not so, for we have already written that everyone holds that it is from the Torah. And there is one who answered that there they were concerned because of a prohibition of karet or a negative commandment, whereas regarding immersion of vessels where the food is not prohibited, they were not concerned [Pitchei Teshuvah in the name of Tiferet LeMoshe]. And all these matters are astonishing, for behold, regarding a niddah as well, they ruled in the Shulchan Aruch later in siman 198, section 28, accordingly, and this is his wording there: Her hand should not hold her etc. unless she loosened her hand etc. see there. However, the truth is that the Tur there brought that the Rambam holds thus and the Rashba disagrees with him, and the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch agreed with the words of the Rashba because his words are logical in the explanation of the Mishnah at the end of chapter 8 of Mikvaot. Therefore, they ruled thus as the law, both here and there regarding a niddah. And certainly, if we were to be concerned for the opinion of the Rambam, one must moisten his hands with water when holding the vessel even with looseness, but as the law, they agreed with the Rashba [for in the Mishnah there: One who holds a person or vessels and immerses them, they are impure; and if he rinsed etc. they are pure; Rabbi Shimon says: he should loosen etc. And the Rambam explained that the first Tanna holds that looseness is not effective and the halacha is like the first Tanna. And the Rashba explains that Rabbi Shimon is for stringency and disagrees that rinsing is not effective without looseness, and therefore the first Tanna who holds that rinsing is effective, all the more so that looseness is effective; and see there in Tosafot Yom Tov].

At the time of the immersion, one should recite the blessing with the Name and Sovereignty: "Who has sanctified us... regarding the immersion of vessels." And even for glass vessels, whose immersion is of rabbinic origin as will be explained, nevertheless one must recite a blessing over them, for we are commanded regarding rabbinic commandments as well, as it is written in the Torah: "You shall not deviate from the matter that they tell you, right or left." And some have written to recite the blessing "regarding the immersion of metal vessels," but this is not the primary view. Firstly, because we are also commanded regarding glass vessels as has been written. Furthermore, in all blessings over commandments, we do not mention the details of the laws in the blessing, as has been written in siman 28, section 9; see there. And one should not say that if so, why must we mention "vessels" at all—let us say only "regarding the immersion"—for this is because an unspecified "immersion" refers to the immersion of a woman. The proof is that, indeed, a woman recites the blessing simply "regarding the immersion," as has been written in siman 200; see there. Therefore, one must clarify that this is "the immersion of vessels," but the details of the laws should not be mentioned in the blessing [see Taz subsection 5, and Shach subsection 8, and Pri Chadash; and according to what I have written, all is well, and delve into it]. Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 3: He should recite the blessing "regarding the immersion of a vessel," and if they are two or more, he recites the blessing "regarding the immersion of vessels." Thus far his words. And in truth, there is no strictness in this, as the great Acharonim have written, and the common custom among us is to recite the blessing "regarding the immersion of vessels" even over a single vessel.

Not all vessels require tevilah, but rather metal vessels, as it is written: "Only the gold and the silver," etc. Therefore, every vessel of whatever type of metal it may be requires tevilah. However, not every metal vessel requires tevilah, but rather vessels that are used for eating and drinking, such as bowls, pots, and pans; and all types of drinking vessels that are made of metal require tevilah. And thus our Sages, of blessed memory, said there: Dining vessels are mentioned in the passage, as it is written: "Everything that comes into the fire," and it is not the way to use fire except for the needs of a meal with metal [Rashi]. That is to say, this passage speaks of the purging of the vessels of Midian, and all purgings of treifot pertain only to eating and drinking, as is understood, only that it is possible to use all types of vessels; but with fire, to cook and to bake, most uses with fire are only of metal, such as spits, grills, and pans. And even though one also cooks in earthenware pots, the verse certainly does not deal with these, for they have no purification through purging, and perforce it deals only with metal.

Glass vessels are like metal vessels regarding the matter of tevilah, and so they said in the Gemara ibid.: Rav Ashi said, these glass vessels, since when they are broken they have a remedy, they are considered like metal vessels. For a glass vessel that was broken is fit to be repaired through melting and to be made into a vessel, they treated them like metal vessels. And this tevilah is midirabbanan for glass vessels [Pri Chadash, subsection 3]. And certainly it is so, for regarding the matter of tumah their law is like earthenware vessels, as they said in Shabbat [15b], that they decreed tumah upon glass vessels because since their initial creation is from sand, the rabbis equated them to earthenware vessels. And also tevilah does not avail them, like earthenware vessels, as the Rambam wrote in the first chapter of Kelim, see there. It follows that for tumah their law is exactly like earthenware vessels, and only for tevilah did they treat them like metal vessels for the reason that when they are broken they have a remedy. And there is a question on this: for regarding the matter of tumah they said there in Shabbat that therefore a glass vessel becomes tamei from its exterior like metal vessels and not like earthenware vessels for this reason, that when they are broken they have a remedy, and the Shas rejects this and Rav Ashi concludes there that actually it is like earthenware vessels in all matters, and that which they become tamei from their exterior is because their interior is visible like their exterior, see there. And how did Rav Ashi himself say here that regarding the matter of tevilah they are like metal vessels for this reason [and see there in Tosafot]?

And it appears to me, as we examine the essence of the reason that the sages established them as metal vessels for this reason, what logic is there in this? Is its essence not sand? And what did the sages see in this to decree immersion upon them for this very reason, that regarding the matter of impurity they rejected it? However, the matter is as follows: behold, all types of metals have their foundation in the earth, but in those places where they dig for the metals, the particles of earth adhere to one another with a strong bond and change into several qualities and elements, as is known to the natural scientists, but their primary foundation is earth. Therefore, all types of metals require refining and purifying in fire until they divest one form and invest another form, each type of metal according to its elements. Not so earthenware vessels; they do not invest any other form when they become vessels, and just as their foundation is from the earth, so too their form is earth, and they do not require purifying and refining in fire. Now, this type, glass, it is true that its foundation is from earth, but behold, it has invested a completely different form and requires purifying and refining in fire like all types of metals. And for this reason, when they are broken, they have a remedy, for just as their beginning is from the fire, so too their end, when they are broken, their remedy is by means of the fire. Consequently, they have all the types of properties of metal; and as for its foundation being from sand, behold, metals also have their foundation from earth. Therefore, the sages said that regarding the type of glass, we shall follow the stringency in all the general rules of their laws. Therefore, regarding impurity, since there is also impurity in earthenware vessels, the sages of blessed memory did not need to make them like metals in any detail; since its primary foundation is from earth, and in earthenware there is also impurity, they made them like earthenware vessels in all the laws of impurity, and they rejected this reason that "when they are broken, etc." to make them like metals, for it is impossible to apply two stringencies to them, as how can we do two opposites, to make them like earthenware vessels and like metal vessels? Therefore, they followed the primary foundation. This is not the case regarding immersion, for in earthenware vessels there is no immersion at all; of necessity, the sages of blessed memory had to make them like metal vessels because they possess the property of all types of metals, which is the change of form and refining in fire. And that which they said, "since when they are broken they have a remedy," this is like an explanation for all that we have written: that because they have a change of form and refining in fire, therefore when they are broken they have a remedy.

It is further stated in the Gemara there: Konia requires tevilah. This is a vessel of "plumieri," which is initially of earthenware and they coat it with a coating of lead, and its use is for cold [food], and it was purchased from a gentile [Rashi]. And this is specifically when it is coated with lead on the inside, but if they are coated only on the outside, it does not require tevilah [Tosafot]. This is the wording of the Tur: And so too earthenware vessels coated with lead; and these words apply to those coated on the inside, for now they are similar to vessels of the meal since the coating is on the inside in the place of use, but if they are not coated except on the outside, it does not require tevilah. And for this reason as well, a vessel of wood that has hoops of iron that sustain it does not require tevilah, even according to the one who follows the sustainer. Thus far his words. And so wrote the Tosafot and the Rosh; see there.

The explanation of the matter is as we learned in the twenty-second chapter of Kelim, that we follow the plating of a vessel even for leniency regarding the laws of tumah, see there, and certainly for stringency, as is found at the end of Chagigah, see there. Therefore, an earthenware vessel or a wooden vessel plated with iron or other metals requires tevilah. However, plating is only relevant in the place of the vessel's use, as in Kelim and in Chagigah, which deal with a table that they plated on top, see there. Likewise here, when the plating is inside the vessel in the place where it is used, it requires tevilah, but from the outside it does not require tevilah. However, for another reason one should require it to have tevilah even from the outside, for behold, in Shabbat [60a] Rav Nachman and the Sages disagree whether we follow the support of the vessel regarding tumah; for the Sages hold that we follow the support, and Rabbi Nehemiah holds that we follow the primary part of the vessel. And even though it would seem the halacha follows the Sages, nevertheless there are poskim who rule like Rabbi Nehemiah because the Gemara there establishes the Mishnah in Shabbat according to Rabbi Nehemiah, see there [Rosh]. But the Mishnah in Kelim [chapter 13, mishnah 6] follows the Sages. However, even according to the Sages that we follow the support, it would not require tevilah, for it is not similar to the vessels of Midian, where they used the metal part itself [ibid.]. And the Rambam in the fourth chapter of Kelim, law 6, also ruled like the Sages that we follow the support, see there.

And know that there are some among the poskim who hold that even in cases where they are plated on the inside and not on the outside, they do not require tevilah, for the plating on the inside is only for mere beauty and not for the sake of use, since they did not plate it on the outside [Beit Yosef in the name of the Semak and the Issur V'Heter]. Our teacher, the Rema, was concerned for this opinion, as he wrote in section 1: There are those who say that vessels plated with lead, even on the inside, one should perform tevilah without a berakhah, and such is the custom. Thus far his words. And there are those who say the opposite, that even if it is only plated on the outside it requires tevilah, because the sages did not distinguish between being plated on the inside and being plated on the outside [Mordechai in the name of the Ra'avyah]. And also since the Rambam ruled that we follow the support, as I have written, and they wrote that one should perform tevilah on them without a berakhah [Beit Yosef in the name of the Haraph]. However, our teacher, the Rema, was not concerned for this opinion and did not bring it. And also our teacher, the Beit Yosef, who wrote in section 6: A wooden vessel that has iron hoops on the outside that support it does not require tevilah, thus far his words, was not concerned for this opinion. But the Acharonim were concerned for this opinion and wrote that one should perform tevilah on them with another vessel that requires tevilah and recite the berakhah [see Shach subsection 4 and subsection 5]. And according to their words, our barrels, if the iron hoops called "reifen" [require tevilah], it would need tevilah, but we have never seen the practice of this stringency. However, regarding large barrels, there are those who are lenient even if it is entirely of metal, as they are not vessels of the meal, as will be explained with the help of Heaven in section 39; see there.

And behold, in these days of ours in all countries, the primary use of meal vessels—large and small bowls—is of clay, whitened, beautiful, and clear, which are called "paliwa" or "porcelain" or "faience," and they contain no metal and are only whitened in fire. The world is accustomed to immerse them, yet the reason why they require immersion is not understood. For they do not possess the reason that the sages, of blessed memory, stated regarding glass—that since when they break they have a remedy, they are equated with metal vessels—whereas these, when they break, have no remedy, like all clay vessels. Two giants of the generation have already been aroused by this, the Knesset HaGedolah and the Chakham Tzevi [as written by the Pitchei Teshuvah and the Geresh"a in the new Yoreh Deah]. Therefore, Heaven forbid one should recite a blessing over their immersion, for it would be a blessing in vain, as they do not require immersion. It appears to me that perhaps in former days these vessels were coated with a thin glass called "glaziert," and these certainly require immersion, for a covering of glass is like a plating of metal. I have seen such vessels, and from this the custom spread that porcelain vessels require immersion, and they did not distinguish between "glaziert" and those that are not "glaziert." However, even the "glaziert" ones, it is good to immerse them without a blessing.

Meal vessels that require tevilah are not specifically vessels that one eats and drinks from, but even vessels in which one cooks, bakes, fries, and prepares food and drink—all of them require tevilah when they are of metal or glass. Therefore, all types of pots, all types of pans, all types of knives, and also the hack-messer, and also the thick knife with which one breaks bones and with which one breaks sugar-loaf, which is "zucker," and the vessel with which one grates horseradish, which they call "chrain" and call a "reib-eisen" or "tarka," and everything used for eating and drinking requires tevilah. Therefore, a muliar, which they call a "samovar" or "tea machine," requires tevilah, and likewise that which one uses to strain hot water, if it is of metal, requires tevilah. And likewise now that machines have come out in which one cooks on the table, which they call a "mashinka," and one roasts in them and drinks hot liquids from them, all of them require tevilah with a berakhah. And likewise a metal mortar in which one crushes salt or peppers or other spices requires tevilah, and likewise hand-mills of metal in which one grinds—all of these require tevilah with a berakhah. And if they also contain wood, it will be explained before us in section 38; see there.

Our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, wrote in section 4 and section 5: Tripods upon which one sets a pot do not require tevilah, but grills require tevilah because one places the food itself upon them. A slaughtering knife or a knife with which one skins, there is one who says they do not require tevilah and there are those who disagree, and it is good to immerse it without a berakhah. The irons with which one prepares the matzot do not require tevilah, and likewise a cover that one places over bread to bake it, but a pot cover requires tevilah. Thus far their words.

The explanation of the matters is that meal vessels are only those that touch the food itself and not the vessel in which the food is contained. Therefore, the trepides upon which the pot is placed do not require tevilah, and in our language we call it a dreifuss. However, the broilers upon which one roasts the food itself require tevilah. From this we have learned that all bases of vessels, such as the base upon which the mulyar is placed and all similar to this, do not require tevilah. So too the base of the masinka, and so too covers that are over the foods, such as a cover over the bread, for it does not touch the food itself. However, covers of pots in which they cook require tevilah, because the cooking seeps upward and the cooked food touches the cover as well. So too a frying cover, it appears to me that it is like a cooking cover and requires tevilah, for frying also seeps upward. [The mulyar does not require tevilah except for the body of the mulyar in which the water is contained, but the chimney that they call kamin, and so too the konforka upon which they place the teapot, and so too the cover of the coals do not require tevilah, and so too the base as I have written; and examine this carefully]:

However, regarding what they wrote concerning a slaughtering knife and a knife used for skinning hides, that there is one who says they do not require tevilah, and there are those who disagree, and it is good to immerse it without a berakhah—one must investigate the reason for the first opinion. Does the knife not touch the food itself? The commentators on the Shulchan Aruch wrote that the reason is that it is only called a "meal vessel" when the food is immediately fit for eating, but when the food still requires further preparation, it is not called a meal vessel [Shach subsection 10 and Taz subsection 7], and here, after the slaughtering and the skinning, it still requires cooking, so it is not a meal vessel; see there. And it is true that this reason was written by the Issur Ve-Hetter in Klal 58, Siman 85 regarding a skinning knife, and this is his wording there: And so too anything that is not used for food fit for eating as it is now, such as the knife with which one skins the animals and needles with which one sews the stuffing, do not require tevilah. Thus far his words. But it is difficult, for he himself wrote prior to this, and this is his wording: The Raviah wrote that a slaughtering knife does not require tevilah because it is not a meal vessel, for even cold food would be forbidden to cut with it if not for rinsing, and also the meat still requires boiling or roasting. Thus far his words. And so wrote the Mordekhai; see there [and the Shach there did not transcribe as is written there and in the Taz]. Behold, the primary reason is because it is forbidden to cut with it even cold food, and the reason that it lacks cooking is merely a secondary support, for one should not say that he is stating two separate reasons, as if so, he should have said "and furthermore, that the meat still requires cooking." And furthermore it is difficult, for our teacher, the Rema, ruled in section 7 that a pepper mill requires tevilah, and his source is also from the Mordekhai, and yet you have no greater lack of preparation than peppers, which are neither a food nor a spice except when one puts them into a cooked dish or a roast, and why does it require tevilah? Rather, it is certain that this reason is not the primary one.

And it is further difficult, for they wrote regarding the irons with which they prepare the matzot that they do not require tevilah for the reason that they are not fit for any other use besides this [Shach, subsection 11]. And why do they require this reason? Are they not still in need of baking? And indeed, there is one who wrote this reason [Taz, ibid.]. And the essence of this reason is not understood, for what of it if it is not fit for another use? Is it only called a kelli seudah when the vessel is fit for many uses? And already some of the great Acharonim have challenged this reason [Pri Chadash, subsection 13]. And likewise, the essence of the reason that it lacks cooking is perplexing, for it is a known matter that in the houses of the wealthy there are kelli seudah, various types of vessels, and there are those upon which they arrange the food before the cooking, roasting, and baking, and from them they place into the cooking vessels, etc. Shall we say that they are not called kelli seudah? Behold, they serve the seudah.

Therefore, it appears to me in the intent of our teachers that certainly regarding a complete usage where the vessel serves the meal, there is no difference whether it still lacks cooking or does not lack it, and whether it is fit for another usage or is not fit, for in all of them it requires tevilah by Torah law and with a blessing. However, vessels that are not of the primary needs of the meal—meaning, they do not raise or lower regarding the business of cooking and baking, but rather from another side we required this labor, either because of the law, like a shechitah knife, for it is impossible to eat meat without shechitah, or because of common decency, like a skinning knife, for it is not common decency to eat before skinning and carving [Beitzah 25a], and similarly the irons with which they fix the matzot, called "stumpel eisen," for this too is not for the primary need of the meal but rather so that it does not rise by bloating. And in the book Issur VeHeter there, he counts further, such as metal vessels with which they fix the kreplach, and the iron with which they prick the matzot, and the iron vessel with which they scrape the dough from the kneading trough, for all of these are not primary to the meal and they are not needed at all, and even without them it would be baked and cooked properly; therefore, they do not require tevilah since it is not yet fit for eating and drinking. Meaning, that at the time of completion, when the food is fit for eating and the drink for drinking, every vessel used with it requires tevilah, even if the usage is not of the primaries of the meal but merely for an extra preference, as the Issur VeHeter wrote there, and this is his wording: However, in places where they are accustomed to remove the burnt part from the bread when they take them out of the oven with those irons with which they fix the arrangement, it requires tevilah and a blessing. Thus far his words. And the reason is because it is fit for eating, and therefore even though this is not of the primary usages of the meal, nevertheless it requires tevilah. And that which they wrote regarding a shechitah knife, "because they do not use it for another usage," this is the explanation: that if they were to use it for another usage, it would be obligated in tevilah because of the other usage; but since they do not use it for another usage, and this usage is not of the primary needs of the meal but rather because of the law, therefore it does not require tevilah. And therefore they also wrote regarding the needle with which they sew the stuffing that it does not require tevilah, for this is not of the primary meal, because it is also possible by tying the thread, as is understood. And therefore, since the food is not ready for eating until he cooks it, it does not require tevilah for such an inferior usage. And therefore our teacher, the Rema, regarding a shechitah knife and a skinning knife, was concerned for the "there are those who disagree" and to immerse without a blessing because in any case this is a complete usage for it is not sufficient without it; but regarding the irons, he was not concerned at all because this is not in the category of usage at all. And the words of the Acharonim in this matter were not clarified to me at all in my humble opinion. [And according to this, the words of the Issur VeHeter are understood, and the skinning knife stands on the reason of the shechitah knife, that they do not use it for another usage and it is not yet fit for eating; see there well. And he did not need to write the first reason explicitly for it is understood to all because of the repulsiveness. And according to this, also the knife in the slaughterhouse does not require tevilah; and delve into this.]

Scissors with which one cuts vegetables, some say they require tevilah [Bach and Pri Chadash, subsection 13], and some say they do not require tevilah [Taz, subsection 7, and Shach, subsection 11]. For even though in Choshen Mishpat siman 97 they are called a vessel of the meal regarding the prohibition of seizing them as a pledge, nevertheless regarding tevilah, since they are not for another use, they are not called a vessel of the meal for tevilah [ibid.]. And according to what we explained in the previous section, both opinions are the halakhah: for if the vegetable is eaten raw, the primary view is like the first opinion, and if it requires cooking, the primary view is like the latter opinion. And so it appears to me to be the primary ruling.

We have already written in section 28 that even according to the one who holds that we follow the stabilizer regarding tumah, nevertheless, regarding tevilah, since the stabilizer is on the outside—such as a wooden barrel that has iron hoops called "reifen" and they stabilize the vessel—it does not require tevilah, for the usage is on the inside in the place of the wood. Nevertheless, there is one who was concerned and requires immersing without a berakhah [see Shach, subsection 12]. Iron funnels called "leika" or "liver" require tevilah. A funnel fixed inside the vessel called a "krant," and similarly the faucets of vessels called a "spont," require tevilah when they are of iron or other metals. This is specifically when the main part of the vessel is also of metal; but if the main part of the vessel is of wood, and only a small amount of iron or other metals is fixed in it for a funnel or for a faucet, they are nullified relative to the main part of the vessel and do not require tevilah, for they are not the primary usage of the vessel, as the vessel is fit for use even without them, and the usage is not in them but in the vessel. Therefore, a vessel repaired with iron pegs on the inside, and without the pegs it would be impossible to use it, requires tevilah. This is not similar to iron hoops, for the hoops are on the outside and the pegs are on the inside in the place of the liquid. Therefore, when the pegs are on the outside, it does not require tevilah even according to the one who follows the stabilizer, as I wrote regarding the hoops. And whoever is stringent there to immerse without a berakhah is stringent here as well, for they have one law.

A silver cup with a wooden stand requires tevilah without a berakhah [Beit Yosef], for perhaps we follow the stand. Nevertheless, it requires tevilah, for just as we wrote regarding iron hoops that they do not require tevilah even if we follow the stand because the hoops are on the outside, so too conversely, when the stand is of wood and it is on the outside, since the usage is on the inside in the place of the metal, it requires tevilah. However, a wooden funnel that has an iron tube, even though one uses it by way of the iron, it does not require tevilah, for since it is not a stand, it is nullified to the funnel, as the minority is nullified to the majority, as was written in the previous section. But a silver cup attached to a wooden vessel, where the cup is an entity unto itself but is merely attached to the wooden vessel, therefore requires tevilah with a berakhah. And if the wood surrounds the silver or the silver surrounds the wood, we have already learned from the laws we explained. Similarly, a pepper mill that has fixed iron inside the wood with which they grind requires tevilah and with a berakhah, for the metal is the primary part of the vessel. Similarly, a mill in which one grinds coffee, and the bottom of the vessel into which the peppers and the coffee fall, which is of wood, does not require tevilah. And there is one who says that it does not require a berakhah since it still lacks cooking [according to the Pri Megadim, Orach Chaim siman 451 in the Mishbetzot Zahav subsection 10 and in the Pitchei Teshuvah subsection 8]. And all this is based on the foundation written by the Acharonim that we brought in section 33, but according to what was written in section 35, this is not the primary factor in complete usage; see there.

And know that we have never seen people immerse the iron or copper cauldrons that are fixed in the ovens, in which they heat a great deal of hot water. And one cannot say this is because they are attached to the oven and the oven is attached to the ground and their law is like the ground and not like a vessel, for we hold that "detached and subsequently attached" is like detached regarding the susceptibility of seeds to ritual impurity and regarding idol worship, and also regarding shechitah, the opinion of the Rif and the Rambam is that it is like detached, as I wrote in siman 6, section 4, see there. Nevertheless, it can be said that they are nonetheless not included in the category of "dining vessels," for it is only called a dining vessel when they move it from place to place. Furthermore, it is possible to say that any vessel that is excessively large and is made so that from it they pour into small vessels is also not called a dining vessel, and it is a storage vessel and not a dining vessel. Therefore, we have never seen people immerse large metal barrels in which water or other liquids are stored, for since it is excessively large, it is not called a dining vessel; for a dining vessel is that which they use by the oven, in the kitchen, and at the dining table, and not the large vessels for which there is a designated place of their own [see there in the name of the Shevut Yaakov]. And it appears to me there is a proof for this from that which we hold regarding the laws of ritual impurity, that a wooden vessel that holds forty se'ah does not contract ritual impurity. And in the Gemara the reason is well-known, because we require it to be similar to a "sack," which must be movable full and empty. However, in the Torat Kohanim, Parshat Shemini, it is stated: "Wooden vessel"—I might think a chest, a box, or a locker, etc., and they hold forty se'ah, etc., it is like a wooden vessel and not "every wooden vessel"; or I might think that I exclude a wagon's round tub, etc., the verse states "every wooden vessel" to include. And what did you see [to include these and exclude those], etc., it is like a "sack," just as a sack is unique in that it is moved when full, etc. Thus far its words. And it is like the exposition of the Gemara. It follows that the primary exclusion is from "wooden vessel" and not "every wooden vessel," for anything that is excessively large does not enter the definition of a vessel at all. And all the more so regarding dining, that it is not called a dining vessel when it is large and does not serve for the primary meal [so it appears to me].

It appears clear to me that just as regarding hagalah we maintain that we follow the majority of the vessel's usage, so too regarding the law of tevilat kelim: if the vessel is not for the purpose of a meal, such as a knife purchased to cut parchment, to make a quill, to cut fingernails, and the like, even though he occasionally cuts some food with it, nevertheless it does not require tevilah. This is an a fortiori argument: if regarding hagalah, which involves absorption within it, we do not concern ourselves with occasional use, all the more so it is not called a "meal vessel" because of occasional use. And so wrote one of the great Acharonim [Pri Chadash, subsection 19]. However, in the Issur V'Heter there, siman 85, he wrote, and this is his wording: A small scribe's knife used for cutting parchment is forbidden to be used for eating occasionally if he did not perform tevilah on it. Thus far his words. And these words are astonishing. It appears to me that his intention is when one purchases it initially for such a purpose—that the primary use will be for cutting parchment but occasionally he will cut bread with it—for in such a case it certainly requires tevilah. But if he purchases it only for parchment alone, even though occasionally in a temporary manner he also cuts bread or other food with it, it does not require tevilah unless he does this regularly. And so it seems one should instruct.

But from the words of our teacher, the Rema, it does not appear so, for he wrote in section 8 regarding what the author wrote concerning the law of a borrowed vessel—that when the first person did not take it for the needs of a meal but to cut parchment and the like, he is not required to immerse it—he wrote, and this is his wording: But the first person is forbidden to use it for the needs of a meal even in a temporary manner without immersion, even though he took it for the needs of parchment. Thus far his words. Nevertheless, it appears to me in my humble opinion that his intention with "temporary manner" is not a chance occurrence, but rather like "temporary eating," meaning that it is not a fixed meal; and here too his intention is not for fixed usage but for temporary usage, yet he does so frequently, such as when he does not cut much bread with it but only a little bread, and all such similar cases. But a chance occurrence is not called "usage" regarding the matter of immersion, and this requires deliberation and further study.

One who borrows or rents metal meal vessels from a non-Jew does not require tevilah. And even though "rental for a day is a sale," and similarly for a borrower, throughout the days of his borrowing it is like his own, nevertheless it is not similar to the vessels of Midian, for those vessels belonged to Israel entirely and their name was called upon the vessels. But for a borrowed or rented vessel, the name of the lender or the lessor is called upon it, and not the name of the borrower or the renter. Furthermore, rental is not like a sale regarding every matter, as we say in the first chapter there [15a], that rental does not effect acquisition. And that which is said, "rental for a day is a sale," this is only regarding the matter of ona'ah [Tosafot ibid.]. And all the more so borrowing is not an acquisition. [And in the Gemara it implies like the first reason, as it says there: They only taught this regarding purchases and like the event that occurred, but not regarding borrowed items; see there. It implies that we require it to be similar to the event that occurred in Midian. And it is obvious that this is dealing with a case where it is permitted to use it, such as if he performed hag'alah, or for cold use, or if the non-Jew had not yet used it for hot food, and the like.]

But an Israelite who purchased a vessel from a Cuthean and has not yet used it or immersed it, and he lent it to his fellow, the borrower is forbidden to use it without immersion, for it already became obligated while in the hand of the lender. Therefore, if it did not become obligated while in the hand of the lender, such as if he purchased it not for the needs of a meal but for cutting parchment or for another use that is not of the needs of a meal, the borrower may use it without immersion even for the needs of a meal; for from his perspective there is no obligation since it is a loan in his hand, and from the perspective of the first person there is no obligation here because he did not purchase it for the needs of a meal, and consequently it is like one who borrows from a Cuthean. However, the first person is forbidden to use it even in a non-fixed manner, as I wrote in section 40. And so too, if the second person purchased it from the first, he is obligated in immersion, and we do not say that since the first was not obligated in its immersion, the second is like one who purchases a vessel made by an Israelite which has no obligation of immersion. For it is not comparable; there, the vessel has no obligation of immersion at all, but here, it is subject to the obligation of immersion, except that in the hand of the first it did not become obligated while in the hand of the second it became obligated. And so too the reverse: when the first purchased it for the needs of a meal and sold it to the second not for the needs of a meal, or if the first himself decided not to use it for the needs of a meal, it does not require immersion [see Shach, subsection 17]. And there is one who says that when the first took it not for a meal, if the second borrowed it from him for a meal, he is obligated to immerse it without a blessing [ibid., subsection 16]. But the primary view is like the first opinion [Pri Chadash, subsection 22], and particularly according to what we explained in section 9, that even the first is not obligated for occasional use, see there [ibid.].

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in his great work that a shopkeeper who purchases vessels from a gentile and lends them to another, the other person does not need to immerse them, since the first person is not obligated in their immersion because he did not purchase them for use but rather for merchandise, and it is like the first person purchased it not for the needs of a meal but for another use, as we have explained. His opinion was that even when one purchases from the shopkeeper, he is exempt from immersion, since it did not become obligated while in the hand of the shopkeeper, and it is like one who purchases a vessel from an Israelite. However, his great teacher, Mahari Beirav, did not rule accordingly, see there. Nevertheless, regarding a loan, it is certainly exempt. And even though a shopkeeper is not similar to one who purchases not for the needs of a meal—which is completely exempt in the hand of the first person—whereas the shopkeeper is destined to sell them to Israelites for the needs of a meal, nevertheless, ultimately the shopkeeper is not obligated in their immersion, for he did not purchase them to use them for a meal, and it is not similar to the vessels of Midian. Furthermore, it is possible that gentiles will purchase them from him. And there is one who was concerned to obligate them in immersion because the first person is also obligated in immersion for temporary use even if he did not purchase them for the needs of a meal [Taz, subsection 10]. And this is all according to the one who holds thus, that in such a case one is obligated to immerse them; but we have already written in section 40 and in the previous section that there is no basis for this opinion, see there.

And such is the widespread custom in all the dispersions of Israel, that for large meals they take glassware and iron vessels such as spoons, forks, and knives for a small fee by way of borrowing and afterwards return them to the shopkeepers, and we have never heard that they should immerse them. There are those who hesitate regarding this, but in truth there is no hesitation here at all, for such is the primary law. And there is one who wishes to say that if he stipulated with the shopkeeper that for the broken ones he shall pay the shopkeeper according to the price at which he sells them, he is obligated to immerse them, for this is like a sale [Pitchei Teshuvah subsection 9 in the name of Chiddushei Beit Yitzchak]. And there is no basis for these words, for behold, until the moment of breaking they are borrowed by him, and after the breaking, even if we consider that at that moment they are as if purchased by him, behold they are broken. Furthermore, this is an error in the essence of the matter, for even afterwards they are only as if borrowed, except that the borrower is obligated in their rental and stipulated with him that he would pay him according to the price. And such is the primary law. [And as for what the Taz wondered there, why they did not mention this in the Shulchan Aruch, the reason is simple, because it is a simple logic that this is exactly comparable to what was explained in the Shulchan Aruch when the first one purchased for parchment, for this and that are one and the same. And that which the author wrote the phrasing "and there is one who says," for such is his way in the Shulchan Aruch, that even regarding an agreed-upon law, when one of the poskim wrote it, he writes this phrasing, as is known of his holy way].

A Kuti who pledged a vessel to an Israelite, whether it is permitted to use it without tevilah, there is a doubt in the Gemara ibid. This is the wording of the Gemara: They raised a dilemma: What is the law regarding a pledge? Mar bar Rav Ashi said: A Kuti pledged a silver cup to my father, and he immersed it and drank from it; but I do not know if it was because he held that a pledge is like a sale, or because he saw that the Kuti's intention was to abandon it, meaning, not to redeem it further. And it implies explicitly that in a case where his intention is to abandon it, it certainly requires tevilah, and where his intention is not to abandon it, it is a doubt. This is the wording of the Tur: If the Kuti pledged a vessel to him, if it appears to be the Kuti's intention that he wants to abandon it in his hand, he must immerse it; and if he does not know if his intention is to abandon it, it is a dilemma whether it requires tevilah and it was not resolved. And some say to be lenient, that it does not require tevilah, and it is good to immerse it without a berakhah or he should purchase another vessel and immerse it with it. Thus far his words. And it is explained explicitly that if he knows that his intention is not to abandon it, it certainly does not require tevilah, and the reasoning is so, for it is no greater than a borrowed vessel. And the Gemara which said "if because he held that a pledge is like a sale," this is also in a case where it is not known if his intention is to abandon it or not [Shach subsection 19].

And some say that even if it is known that his intent is not to retain it, he is obligated to immerse it due to the doubt, for regarding an ordinary mashkanta his intent is not to retain it, and even so, the Gemara was in doubt about it [Taz subsection 11, and Bach, and Pri Chadash subsection 25]. And seemingly, this is implied by the wording of the Shulchan Aruch in section 9, who wrote: If a Kuti pawned a vessel to an Israelite, if it appears to be his intent that he wants to retain it in his hand, it requires tevilah; and if not, he should immerse it without a berakhah, etc. Thus far his words. But in my humble opinion, the first opinion appears primary, for what reasoning is there in this, and how is it any greater than a loan? And that which is written in the Shulchan Aruch "and if not" also refers to when it is not known. And proof for this is from the words of the author of the Issur VeHeter, Klal 58, Siman 91, who wrote, and this is his wording: And regarding a vessel pawned from a Kuti and it is not known if their intent is to retain them with him, it results in a teiku, for the Gemara was in doubt, etc., and a teiku in a Torah matter is resolved stringently, etc. Thus far his words. Behold, he wrote explicitly that only when it is not known is it a legal doubt. And also our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in his great work, who wrote nothing on the words of the Tur, we learn from this that he holds like him [and that which the Bach wrote regarding the intent of the Tur, that one may not use a vessel of a mashkanta, everyone has already refuted him; and also that which the Taz wrote, that the Tur comes to teach us a greater novelty, the forced nature of the explanation is evident, and especially since the Issur VeHeter wrote this explicitly].

And the words of the Rambam in chapter 17 are very puzzling, for he wrote: But one who borrows a vessel from a Kuti, or if a Kuti gave him a metal vessel as a collateral, etc., and it does not require tevilah. Thus far his words. And he did not write at all that if his intention is to keep it, it requires tevilah. And also, why did he rule leniently? Is it not a doubt regarding a Torah law? Therefore, there is one who wrote that he holds that tevilat kelim is rabbinic. However, we have already written at the beginning of this siman that he also holds that it is from the Torah. And also the wording of the Rif is unusual in this, for he wrote: And a collateral is a matter that was not resolved. Thus far his words, and no more. And our teacher, the Beit Yosef, already exerted himself in his book Kesef Mishneh regarding the words of the Rambam and did not produce a clear matter, and therefore his opinion was not brought at all in the Shulchan Aruch.

In my humble opinion, it seems clear that the reasoning of the Rambam is from that which is stated in Pesachim in the second chapter [31b], that the sages hold that an Israelite does not acquire a mashkon from a gentile, and Rabbi Meir holds that he does acquire it, see there. If so, Rav Ashi, who holds that a mashkanta is like a sale, holds like Rabbi Meir, and we rule like the sages, as the Rosh wrote there and the Tur in Orach Chaim siman 441. And even though the Rambam in the fourth chapter of Hilkhot Chametz did not bring this law at all, and the Maggid Mishneh wrote there that he holds like Rabbi Meir, see there, it is not at all certain; on the contrary, the opposite appears likely, and this is not the place for the explanation of this. Therefore, the Rambam ruled that a mashkanta does not require tevilah, as it is not similar to a sale since he does not acquire it. And in truth, I have a great difficulty with the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, how they ruled here that a mashkanta requires tevilah, when they themselves ruled there in Orach Chaim regarding chametz that the mashkon is not acquired by the Israelite and he does not transgress regarding the chametz the prohibition of "it shall not be seen," see there. And one of the great Acharonim wrote there that regarding tevilah they were stringent because it appears like his own [Magen Avraham, subsection 6], but it is not understood at all, for if so, why were they not also stringent regarding the prohibition of "it shall not be seen"? But according to the Rambam, it is simply settled. And the Rif leaves the matter undefined, perhaps because he is in doubt whether the halacha follows the sages or Rabbi Meir, because the Mishnah there follows Rabbi Shimon, see there. Therefore, it is like a double doubt, for Mar bar Rav Ashi was in doubt regarding the reasoning of Rav Ashi, and if you say his reasoning is because he holds like Rabbi Meir, perhaps the halacha follows the sages. Nevertheless, he did not wish to write explicitly that it does not require tevilah, and he leaves it undefined.

And also this, that they did not write that when his intention is to sink it into the hand of the Israelite that it certainly requires tevilah, is also well-settled. For in truth it is very difficult: what of it that his intention is to sink it? For in any event, he has not yet sunk it into his hand. And behold, regarding chametz there, it is not effective even with his intention to sink it [Magen Avraham ibid.] for this reason, since he has not yet sunk it; and does thought avail for an acquisition? Therefore, it appears to me that the Rif and the Rambam explained that which we say in the Gemara, "if because it is fit for a Cuthite for his intention is to sink it," the intention is not after the loan, for in such a case it is nothing, just as with chametz. Rather, the intention is that it was fit for a Cuthite at the time of the loan, for his intention was to sink it; that is to say, that he did not give it to him as a mashkon but as a sale, such as where he was precise to receive from him its full value and the like, such that Rav Ashi understood that his giving it to him as a mashkon was only because of shame, but his intention was for a sale. Therefore, there is no novelty in this at all, for this is an actual sale and it was not necessary to inform us of this. However, for the halachah we follow the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch that a mashkanta requires tevilah, and without a berakhah. And it appears to me that even if his intention is to sink it, he should not recite a berakhah because of the opinion of the Rif and the Rambam that we explained. Even though the opinion of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch is not so, nevertheless, since berakhot are not indispensable, we certainly must be concerned for the opinion of the Rif and the Rambam. And the halachah requires further study [see Pri Chadash subsection 26 who raised a difficulty from Orach Chaim end of siman 66 regarding one who out of doubt recited Shema, that he must recite the berakhah since Shema is from the Torah, and here too, why should he not recite the berakhah? And he answered that here the doubt is regarding the essence of the obligation, see there. And this is not necessary, for regarding a berakhah we certainly must be concerned for the opinion of the Rif and the Rambam; and delve into this].

There is one who says that regarding glass vessels, since the immersion is of rabbinic origin, they do not require immersion in the case of a mortgage, as it is a doubt regarding a rabbinic law and we rule leniently. However, for metal vessels, one should immerse them without a blessing, or purchase another vessel and immerse it with it and recite the blessing over the immersion of vessels. And if ultimately the vessel remains permanently in his possession, he should return and immerse it without a blessing, for the previous immersion was due to doubt and perhaps it did not require immersion, and the first immersion is as if it were nothing. Therefore, if it was in his mind to keep it permanently such that we required a certain immersion, there is no need afterwards at the completion of the acquisition to immerse it a second time. And even though according to the opinion of the Rif and the Rambam, according to what we have explained, it did not require immersion previously even in such a case, nevertheless one can rely in this matter on the opinion of the majority of the poskim. And that which the Shach wrote in subsection 20, that if he added money to the gentile he requires a second immersion with a blessing, see there, it is not compelling, as the Pri Chadash wrote there; and examine this carefully.

An Israelite who pawned a vessel in the hand of a Cuthean and then returned and redeemed it from him does not require tevilah. And even if his intention was to leave it permanently with him, it does not require tevilah, for a Cuthean does not acquire a pawned object from an Israelite according to all opinions. And there is one who says that if from the beginning he pawned it in his hand with the intent not to redeem it, and he reconsidered and redeemed it, it requires tevilah [Shach, subsection 25]. But this is not the primary view, for in any case: if his intention to leave it permanently is called a sale, then even if from the beginning he pawned it with the intent not to leave it permanently and afterwards reconsidered to leave it permanently, it should require tevilah, just as in the case of a Cuthean who pawned to an Israelite, as has been explained. And if this is not called a sale, then even if at the time of the pawning his intention was to leave it permanently, this is nothing. Rather, certainly a Cuthean does not acquire from an Israelite in any manner except through an actual sale [Pri Chadash, subsection 34]. However, in an actual sale where the Israelite sold to the Cuthean and returned and took it from him, it certainly requires tevilah, for his name was called upon it and he acquired it. And I saw one who says that for this reason, at the time of the sale of chametz when they sell the pots to the Cuthean and after Pesach take them back from him as is the custom, they require tevilah. But to me it does not appear so, because everyone knows that they do this because of the stringency of the prohibition of chametz and as a mere stringency, for according to the law one does not violate "it shall not be seen" regarding vessels. And everyone knows that after Pesach they will be returned to the Israelite, and the name of the Cuthean was not called upon it, and therefore it does not require tevilah, and it seems that such is the simple custom.

An Israelite and a Cuthean who purchased a vessel in partnership do not require tevilah. And even though in all matters the partnership of a Cuthean exempts, such as regarding the firstborn, terumah, the first of the shearing, and the like, a verse is required for this as is explained at the beginning of the chapter "Reshit HaGez," see there; nevertheless, here a verse is not required. Firstly, because it is not similar to the vessels of Midian. Furthermore, the reason for tevilah is as it is stated in the Yerushalmi: because it has entered into the sanctity of Israel, and here it has not entered completely. Therefore, if the Israelite subsequently purchased the portion of the Cuthean, it is obligated in tevilah. An Israelite from whom his vessels were stolen or robbed and they were returned to him, they do not require tevilah even if he despaired of them; for since the thief or the robber is not permitted to hold them publicly, their name is not yet called upon them. But a minister or a ruler who took the vessels of an Israelite with the intent not to return them, and afterwards they were returned to him, they require tevilah, for they were already submerged in his hand and his name was called upon them.

Our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, wrote in section 10: An Israelite who gave silver to a gentile artisan to make a vessel for him from it, it does not require tevilah; and there are those who disagree, and it should be immersed without a berakhah. And if some of the silver from which the vessel was made belonged to the gentile, it requires tevilah. And similarly, an Israelite artisan who made a vessel for a gentile and purchased it from him, he should immerse it also without a berakhah if the gentile gave all the metal; but if he made it for himself, only that he purchased the metal from the gentile or that he gave some metal of his own, it does not require tevilah. Thus far their words.

The explanation of their words is as follows: In Choshen Mishpat siman 306, there is a dispute whether a craftsman acquires the improvement of a vessel or not. That is to say, if Reuven gave silver or another type of metal to Shimon to make a vessel for him from it, some say that Shimon the craftsman acquires the vessel such that it is like his own; even though the metal belongs to Reuven, the improvement that he improved through his labor becomes like his own. And some say that a craftsman does not acquire the improvement of a vessel, and it remains Reuven's. This law is a legal doubt. Accordingly, it would seem that an Israelite who gave silver or other metals to a gentile craftsman to make a vessel for him depends on this dispute: for if a craftsman acquires the improvement of a vessel, it requires tevilah because it is like the gentile's, and if not, it does not require tevilah because it is like the Israelite's. This is the opinion of those who disagree, and that one should immerse it without a berakhah because this is a legal doubt, as I have written. However, the first opinion holds that even according to the one who says a craftsman acquires the improvement of a vessel, it does not require tevilah. The reason is that it is not similar to the vessels of Midian, for there the metal itself also belonged to the gentiles; furthermore, the name of the gentile is not called upon this vessel. Therefore, if the gentile also gave some of the metal from his own, it certainly requires tevilah and with a berakhah [Shach, subsection 22], and some say without a berakhah [Taz, subsection 12]. It is obvious that one should not immerse it until after he pays the gentile for the metal he gave from his own, for otherwise, it is a vessel of partnership [Pri Chadash].

And so too the opposite: an Israelite craftsman who made a vessel for a gentile, and the gentile provided all the metal, and the Israelite craftsman or another returned and purchased the vessel from the gentile, it also requires tevilah without a berakhah because of this doubt. For perhaps a craftsman acquires through the improvement of the vessel, and it is considered the vessel of an Israelite and does not require tevilah; or perhaps a craftsman does not acquire through the improvement of the vessel, and it is considered the gentile's and requires tevilah. Therefore, if the Israelite craftsman provided some of the metal from his own, it does not require tevilah, because besides the improvement of the vessel, the essence of the metal is his. And all the more so if the Israelite craftsman made the vessel for himself, only that he purchased the metal from the gentile, that it does not require tevilah, as it is entirely the Israelite's and he owes the gentile money for the metal, but the gentile has no connection to the vessel [I have written according to the latter explanation of the Shach, subsection 24, for such is the primary view]. However, there are those who disagree regarding one who provided some of the metal from his own, that it requires tevilah without a berakhah, for perhaps a craftsman does not acquire through the improvement of the vessel and they are like partners in the vessel, and when the Israelite returns and purchases his portion from him, it requires tevilah [Pri Chadash, subsection 33]. And the reasoning of the Shulchan Arukh seems to me primary, for when do we say a craftsman does not acquire through the improvement of the vessel? At a time when all the metal does not belong to the craftsman; but when some of the metal belongs to the craftsman, certainly his name is called upon it, and we do not judge it as a vessel of both of them regarding the matter of tevilah [the Taz, subsection 13, also wrote like the Pri Chadash, but in my humble opinion the primary view is like the Shach].

And know that regarding what is written in the Shulchan Aruch, that where an Israelite gave metal to a Cuthite artisan there are those who disagree and require immersion as mentioned, this is the opinion of the Ritzba in the Tur who wrote in this wording: Even if he gives him a broken vessel to repair it, if it did not hold a revi'it beforehand and he repaired it so that it holds a revi'it, it requires immersion etc. Thus far his words. And the authors of the Shulchan Aruch explained that this is what he meant: It is not only necessary when the Israelite gave him scrap metal and he made the entire vessel that it requires immersion, but even a vessel of an Israelite that was broken and does not hold a revi'it from the break and below, and the Israelite gave metal to repair the vessel, it also requires immersion. And there are those who disagree on this and hold that when the Israelite gave his own metal, everyone holds like the first opinion that it does not require immersion, and the Ritzba was not dealing with this at all, and his intention was that the Cuthite artisan gave the metal of his own to repair the vessel, for then it requires immersion. And this is what he meant: It is not only necessary when one buys a prepared vessel from a Cuthite that it requires immersion, but even an Israelite's vessel that was broken and the Cuthite repaired it with his own material, it is like a Cuthite's vessel. But regarding the matter of "an artisan acquires through the improvement of the vessel," he was not dealing at all [Bach]. And the great Acharonim agreed with the ruling of the Shulchan Aruch; however, this is certainly true regarding a broken vessel that is not fit for use and a Cuthite artisan repaired it with his own material, that it requires immersion with a berakhah.

There is one who wrote that an Israelite who maintains a "huta" that makes glass vessels and the workers are gentiles, or conversely, where the maintainer is a gentile and the workers are Israelites, one may rely on the lenient opinions and use them without tevilah, since glass vessels are rabbinic [Chachmat Adam]. But this is not at all clear to me, for in this case the principle of "an artisan acquires a stake through the improvement of the vessel" or "does not acquire a stake through the improvement of the vessel" is not relevant; for that only applies to one who gives silver to an artisan in his home to make him this specific vessel. However, in a general business such as a "fabrik" that makes vessels by the hundreds and thousands, everything follows the owner of the business, and the vessels are called by his name, and the workers are nothing to him but like day-laborers. Therefore, if the maintainer is an Israelite, they are exempt from tevilah, even metal vessels, even if the workers are gentiles. And conversely, if the maintainer is a gentile and the workers are Israelites, even with glass vessels they are obligated in tevilah and in a berakhah. Therefore, when one buys metal vessels or glass vessels, he needs to know who is the owner of the business.

An Israelite who purchased metal vessels from a gentile in order to break them and melt them down and to make a new vessel does not require tevilah, for this is exactly like one who purchases metal from a gentile [Pri Chadash, subsection 33]. And even if he purchased it in order to use it as it is and afterward changed his mind to melt it down, it also does not require tevilah. It is not relevant to say that since it was already obligated in tevilah it is impossible to remove the obligation, for what of it? Ultimately, a new entity has come here [ibid.]. And it is not relevant to decree because of "old impurity," as they decreed regarding the matter of impurity on Shabbat [Taz, 16], for they only decreed regarding impurity for the reasons explained there, and not regarding the tevilah of vessels, where all the reasons they decreed because of this are not relevant; see there.

On Shabbat and Yom Tov it is forbidden to immerse vessels because it is like repairing a vessel, and even during the period of doubt whether it is dark or not dark, it is forbidden to immerse vessels. There is one who says that regarding glass vessels, since the immersion is of rabbinic origin, it is permitted to immerse them during the twilight of the eve of Shabbat and the eve of Yom Tov, but during the twilight of Shabbat and Yom Tov it is forbidden because the use is for a weekday [Sha'agat Aryeh siman 57]. Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 16: If one forgot and did not immerse a vessel on the eve of Shabbat or the eve of Yom Tov, he should give it to a non-Jew as a gift and afterwards borrow it from him, and it is permitted to use it. Thus far his words. For the sake of Shabbat and Yom Tov they permitted giving a gift, and so he should do even on a weekday in a place where he does not have a mikveh, and the permission is only until after the Shabbat, or on a weekday until he finds a mikveh, and afterwards he shall immerse it without a blessing. And so there is another permission: if it is a vessel suitable for drawing water, he may draw water with it even on Shabbat and Yom Tov and the immersion will be effective for it, and blessings are not indispensable. See Orach Chaim siman 323.

And know that I am very much astonished by our teacher, the Beit Yosef, who here rules explicitly that it is forbidden to immerse new vessels on Shabbat and Yom Tov, yet in Orach Chaim siman 323, section 7, he wrote, and this is his wording: It is permitted to immerse a new vessel that requires immersion, and some forbid, etc. Thus far his words. Behold, he adopted the opinion of those who permit as the primary view, and he follows his reasoning in his great work there, that according to the Rif and the Rambam in chapter 23 of Shabbat and chapter 4 of Yom Tov, there is no prohibition of immersion except for a vessel of impurity and not for new vessels; see there. And it appears to me that here he retracted, because all his words there are founded upon what they understood of the Rambam's opinion, that the immersion of vessels is rabbinic, and we have already explained that the Rambam also holds that it is from the Torah. Furthermore, even if it were rabbinic, it is forbidden, as the Maggid Mishneh wrote there in the name of the Rashba, of blessed memory, that since previously it was not fit for use at all, even though it is rabbinic, for this reason it is considered a complete fixing. It is not similar to a vessel that became impure through a "derivative of impurity" which the sages permitted in the second chapter of Beitzah, for there it is fit to be used for non-sacred items, which is not the case here. And all the Rishonim wrote explicitly to forbid, and therefore he ruled here anonymously according to the forbidding opinion. And one should not ask why we permitted immersing glass vessels during twilight on the grounds that it is rabbinic, for there is another reason therein, that regarding anything which is due to a shevut, they did not decree against it during twilight, but not on Shabbat and Yom Tov themselves. And it has already been explained that if they used the vessel before immersion, the cooked food is not forbidden, even with heat.