Siman 119

One who is suspected regarding a forbidden matter has no credibility in that matter. And it contains 55 seifim: The sages taught in a Baraita [Perek Ein Omadin 39b]: One may not purchase Y.M.CH. from CH.G. in Syria—neither wine, nor muries, nor milk, nor salcondrit salt, nor hiltit, nor cheese—except from an expert. And regarding all of them, if he stayed as a guest with a homeowner, it is permitted, etc. If the homeowner sent it to his house, it is permitted. What is the reason? A homeowner would not leave that which is permitted and eat that which is forbidden, and when he sends to him, he sends from that which he himself eats. Rashi, of blessed memory, explained that the shopkeepers in Syria are suspected because they are not careful regarding "do not place a stumbling block before the blind," and they sell to Jews items they purchased from Cutheans; however, they themselves do not eat forbidden things. Therefore, if he stayed as a guest with him, it is permitted to eat with him, and similarly when he sent it to him as a gift. Thus far the words of Rashi, of blessed memory. And the Ran, of blessed memory, wrote similarly; see there. It is clear from this that this law applies only in Syria, because it was known that the shopkeepers were suspected regarding "before the blind," but in the rest of the world, all Jews stand in a presumption of fitness, and as long as one is not suspected, it is permitted to buy anything from him even if he is an am ha'aretz. This is the opinion of the Ra'avad in the glosses at the end of chapter 11 of Ma'akhalot Assurot, who wrote: This is his wording: For amei ha'aretz are not suspected of switching nor of selling a forbidden thing unless he has been suspected. Thus far his words. And this is the opinion of the Tur and Shulchan Arukh according to the explanation of the commentators, as will be explained with the help of Heaven.

And so it is implied from what we learned in Shabbat [32a]: It was taught, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: The laws of consecrated items, terumot, and ma’asrot—these are the essentials of the Torah, and they were handed over to the am ha’aretz. Rashi explained that they did not hand it over to the beit din to appoint guards for the matter, and the Torah trusted every person regarding them, etc. And even though the rabbis instituted the decree of demai, nevertheless, the Torah trusted him. Thus far his words. And this that they decreed regarding demai is because they sent throughout all the borders of Israel and saw that they were lenient regarding the separation of ma’asrot, as is found at the end of Sotah. But regarding all prohibitions, even those of rabbinic origin, they did not decree. And this is the foundation that "one witness is believed in matters of prohibitions," for the Torah trusted each and every individual and did not require the standing of witnesses except for monetary matters, or death, or forbidden relations [Rashi, Chullin 10b]. And this that they did not trust an am ha’aretz regarding matters of purity is not due to a lack of his trustworthiness or that he is suspected of causing others to stumble, but rather because they are not expert in the minutiae of impurity and purity, as the Rambam wrote in the tenth chapter of Metamei Mishkav u-Moshav; see there. Furthermore, regarding impurity and purity, the sages established many higher standards, for even the garments of those who eat terumah are considered a midras-impurity for kodesh, and the garments of those who eat kodesh are considered a midras-impurity for the chatat-water, as we learned in the third chapter of Chagigah. And similarly, that which they said in Menachot [42b] that tekhelet is only purchased from an expert and not from every person is not because of suspicion, but because of a lack of knowledge, since there is kala ilan which resembles tekhelet and not every person is expert enough to recognize them, or because not everyone knows that kala ilan is forbidden, as Rashi explained there [and from Rashi at the end of the chapter "HaTechelet" 39, it is implied as I wrote before; see there in the entry beginning "Me-Inshi" and examine it closely]. Or it is for the reason the Rambam wrote in the second chapter of Tzitzit, because of the requirement of lishmah; see there, just like tefillin which are only purchased from an expert for this reason. But in all matters where the forbidden and the permitted are revealed to all, there is no difference between a talmid chacham and an am ha’aretz [and similarly fish innards, which are only purchased from an expert, is also for the reason that an error is easily made, as I wrote above in siman 83, section 44 from the Yerushalmi; see there].

But the Rambam, of blessed memory, has another approach to all of this. This is his wording at the end of chapter 11 of Ma'akhalot Assurot: When the entire Land of Israel belonged to Israel, they would purchase wine from any person of Israel and were not concerned about it. In the Diaspora, they would only purchase from a person established in fitness. In this time, one does not purchase wine from anywhere except from a person established in fitness, and likewise meat, cheese, and a piece of fish that has no sign. One who stays as a guest with a homeowner in any place and at any time, and he brought him wine, meat, cheese, or a piece of fish, this is permitted, and he does not need to ask about it, even though he does not know him, provided only that he knows he is a Jew. If he was established as one who is not fit and is not meticulous in these matters, it is forbidden to stay as a guest with him; if he transgressed and stayed as a guest with him, he may not eat meat or drink wine based on his word until a fit person testifies to him regarding them. Thus far his words. The Rambam holds that that which we say regarding Syria applies all the more so to the Diaspora; for even though in several laws Syria is equal to the Land of Israel, nevertheless, regarding this matter it is equal to the Diaspora because it does not have the supervision of a beit din as much as in the Land of Israel. Consequently, even in the Land of Israel in this time, its law is like the Diaspora in this matter. Indeed, the explanation of Rashi is not so understandable, for Syria is a province containing many cities, and how is it relevant to say that all the shopkeepers in the province are suspected? In any case, if they are all suspected, how is it possible to say that in other lands they are not suspected? One must settle this with difficulty, that in the province of Syria the corruption spread and not in other provinces. But according to the Rambam, it is settled simply. This is also explicitly implied by the Yerushalmi that we cited in siman 1, section 8, and from the Tosefta, see there. Therefore, the Rambam included meat, even though in the Shas meat is not mentioned; nevertheless, in the Yerushalmi it is mentioned. Regarding our Shas, one can say that meat is an a fortiori argument, and therefore it did not mention it, as I wrote there in section 6, see there.

The reasoning of the Rambam appears to be that even though the Torah trusted every individual of Israel regarding prohibitions, nevertheless, a permanent storekeeper who sells constantly at all times and at every hour is different, for he may permit the forbidden to himself. Proof for this is from that which we maintain: that the beit din is obligated to appoint overseers over the storekeepers so that they do not make false measures, as is found in Bava Batra at the end of the fifth chapter [89a], and he derives it from a verse, and as the Rambam wrote at the end of the eighth chapter of Laws of Theft. Even though no man of Israel is suspected of theft or of the prohibitions regarding false measures, nevertheless, the storekeepers, because they sell constantly, their inclination for money overpowers them; and all the more so regarding the prohibition of "before the blind," for they are certainly suspected in this. Therefore, for such reliability, one specifically needs someone who is established in uprightness. I do not know why he omitted that if he sent it to his house it is permitted; perhaps because he holds that it is all one, as is implied in the Gemara there, that being hosted by him is like sending it to his house [for it says there that this supports Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, etc., see there and examine carefully]. And that which he changed from the language of the Shas and the Yerushalmi, which said "from an expert," while he wrote "established in uprightness," is because in the Shas it considers muries and Salcondri salt, and in the Yerushalmi it considers tekhelet, for for these things one needs expertise to recognize the forgery; whereas for wine, meat, cheese, and fish, one does not need expertise but only reliability alone, and therefore an upright person alone is sufficient. The law of muries he wrote in the seventeenth chapter, and Salcondri salt is not found in our days and he did not write it, and tekhelet he wrote in the Laws of Tzitzit and wrote there "expert," see there.

This is the wording of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, section 1: One who is suspected of eating forbidden things, whether he is suspected regarding a Torah prohibition or whether he is suspected regarding a rabbinic prohibition, one may not rely upon him regarding them; and if one stayed with him as a guest, he shall not eat from his food of the things for which he is suspected. Thus far their words. And the Tur concluded: In what case does this apply? Regarding one who is suspected; but regarding an ordinary person, every man is in the presumption of fitness and one may eat with him. Thus far the words of the Tur. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch further wrote in section 2: If he is not suspected of eating forbidden things, but he is suspected of selling them, one may stay with him as a guest and eat with him; and likewise, if he sends to his house it is permitted, for there is a presumption that from what he eats, he sends to him. Thus far the words of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch.

The commentators explained that they hold according to the opinion of Rashi and the Ra'avad, and this is the explanation: that when he is suspect, one may not rely upon him regarding them when he sells and says that it is kosher. And likewise, if one stayed as a guest with him, he should not eat from his food from a matter for which he is suspect. And that which the Tur wrote, that in an ordinary case every person is in the presumption of kashrut and one may eat with him, he is saying two things: he is in the presumption of kashrut regarding sale, that it is permitted to purchase from him, and also one may eat with him [Derisha and Perisha, and Taz, and Shach, and Pri Chadash]. And so it is clear from the words of our teacher, the Rema, who wrote: And some say even from one who is not suspect, only that they do not know him to be established in kashrut, it is forbidden to purchase from him wine or other things where there is concern for a prohibition; however, if one stayed as a guest with him, he may eat with him. Thus far his words. And this is the opinion of the Rambam, and it is clear from this that the first opinion is the opinion of Rashi and the Ra'avad, that it is permitted to purchase from ordinary people.

In my humble opinion, it is very difficult, for if so, how could they have left the matters undefined in a case where the primary dispute is regarding this? Furthermore, the matters are puzzling, both in the first clause regarding one who is suspected, for since they wrote that when one is hosted by him he should not eat of his own, all the more so one should not purchase from him; and similarly in the latter clause regarding one who is not suspected, since he wrote according to the opinion of the commentators that he may sell, all the more so one may eat with him, for this is permitted even according to the opinion of the Rambam. Rather, it is certain that they were not dealing at all with the permission or prohibition of the sale. Also, the Rosh there did not mention this dispute at all, see there. This is also implied by the words of the Levush, see there. And our teacher, the Rema, who mentioned the opinion of the Rambam in the name of "there are those who say," did so because Rashi and the Ra'avad do not hold accordingly, and such is his way in every place; and also because the previous opinion can be interpreted opposite to this according to the explanation of the commentators, for so it appears ostensibly, since they did not write the words of the Rambam explicitly, hear from this that they incline toward the opinion of Rashi and the Ra'avad.

However, regarding the purchasing of meat, the Tur and the Beit Yosef wrote at the end of siman 65 in the name of the Rambam that one should not purchase meat from any butcher who slaughters for himself and sells for himself unless he was established in kashrut, see there. And such is the wording of the Rambam in chapter 8 of Ma'akhalot Assurot, law 7, and at the end of chapter 10 of Shehitah, see there. But when he does not slaughter for himself, everyone is trusted, as our teacher, the Rema, wrote in his book Darkhei Moshe, siman 1, letter 12. And according to this, it is necessary to say that also in the opinion of the Rambam he held thus; for even though here at the end of chapter 11 he wrote plainly that one should not purchase meat except from one who was established in kashrut, and it implies ostensibly that even if he does not slaughter for himself, he relied upon what he wrote previously in chapter 8. For one cannot say that our teacher, the Rema, wrote this only according to the opinion of the Tur, for behold, here he ruled like the Rambam, and if he held that according to the Rambam in every case one should not purchase except from one who was established in kashrut, he should have ruled so there. And above in siman 1, section 9, we were in doubt regarding the opinion of the Rambam on this matter, and there is one of the great authorities who wrote simply that according to the Rambam in every case one should not purchase except from one who was established in kashrut [Tav Yehoshua, siman 18, subsection 10]. And there in section 11 we wrote a correct reason to distinguish between meat and other things, that regarding meat we are only concerned when he slaughters for himself and sells for himself, see there.

And since according to the opinion of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch there is no prohibition regarding meat to purchase from any person unless he slaughters and sells by himself, as is written explicitly at the end of siman 65, and such is the opinion of all the commentators of the Shulchan Aruch, and according to our teacher, the Rema, even the Rambam holds so, since he did not add a gloss at the end of siman 65 on the words of the author, thus we establish; and as is written in siman 1, section 11, see there. However, regarding other matters, certainly one must be concerned for the opinion of the Rambam since our teacher, the Rema, rules accordingly. And such is the simple custom in all the dispersions of Israel: when someone whom they do not know to be established in kashrut brings wine, or cheese and butter, or Passover flour, or dried intestines and smoked meat and the like, he brings with him a letter of kashrut from a rabbi who sits upon the seat of instruction. And especially in this time, when licentiousness and heresy have increased, it is forbidden to purchase from a person whom they do not know without a letter of kashrut. Therefore, even though regarding meat we wrote that it is not necessary, nevertheless in this time it is obvious that it is forbidden, for in our times the reason we wrote in siman 1, section 11 is not applicable because, due to our many sins, the generation is licentious. Therefore, anyone whom the fear of Hashem touches his heart shall not eat fat, intestines, or smoked meat without a letter of kashrut, and one must not deviate. And as has been written regarding wine, milk, and cheese, that according to the essential law it is so according to the opinion of the Rambam and our teacher, the Rema.

And I have a great question regarding the opinion of the Rambam: for behold, we have learned in Bekhorot [29b]: One who is suspected regarding bekhorot, we do not purchase from him deer meat or hides, etc. One who is suspected regarding shevi'it, we do not purchase from him flax, etc. One who is suspected of selling terumah as chullin, we do not purchase from him even water and salt, etc. And it is explicitly clear that from one who is not suspected, it is permitted to purchase, and we do not require that he be known as established in kashrut. For if you were to think that we specifically require one established in kashrut, why specify one who is suspected? Even one who is not suspected would also be forbidden. However, regarding this it could be said that that which we learned "suspected" refers to the matter of the penalty, for with one who is suspected we penalize him even regarding the sale of deer meat, hides, water, and salt; but regarding a matter where there is reason for concern, one should not buy even from one who is not suspected until it is known to you that he is established in kashrut. However, further on there we learned: One who is suspected regarding shevi'it is not suspected regarding ma'asrot, etc. And behold, such a man who is suspected regarding one matter is certainly far from being called established in kashrut, and nevertheless it is permitted to purchase from him a matter regarding which he is not suspected. But in this too it could be said that this mishnah does not deal with selling at all, but rather regarding eating at his home, according to the words of the Rambam. However, it does not imply so, for behold, this mishnah stands upon the previous mishnayot which deal with selling. [And I wonder at the Shach, subsection 1, who challenged the Rambam from the Yerushalmi, chapter 8 of Shevi'it, which says there: Rabbi Yosei said, they only said this when it is not known if he is suspected or not, etc. See there. And from there it is not such a difficulty, for behold, Rabbi Ami permitted there even to purchase from one who is suspected because they were lenient regarding scented oil, see there. But why did he not challenge from these explicit mishnayot? And it requires further study]:

The answer to this is that what we wrote—that when one is suspected of one matter it is far from calling him established in kashrut—is not so. For that which the Rambam wrote, "established in kashrut," the intention is not that he must be one who fears God greatly or a pious and righteous man; rather, as long as he conducts himself according to the religion of Israel, dons tallit and tefillin, prays three times every day, washes his hands for eating, and leads the members of his household in the kashrut of the holy Torah, this is called "established in kashrut." It is possible that in some specific detail he is suspected because of the lightness of the matter in his eyes, yet for all other matters he is established in kashrut. A proof for this matter is that we find in Bekhorot that the kohanim were suspected of inflicting a blemish upon a firstborn animal, and therefore they are not believed when they say, "this blemish occurred on its own." For if so, shall we say that all kohanim are not called "established in kashrut"? And so it is in all matters. Therefore, that which we learned in Bekhorot there, "one who is suspected of etc.," from which it is explained that from one who is not suspected we are permitted to purchase, we are dealing with people whom we know to be Jews established in kashrut, but in this specific detail alone he is suspected. However, from a person whom we do not know at all, we do not purchase from him, according to the words of the Rambam. According to this, also in all matters that require one "established in kashrut," the intention is not a righteous and pious man or one who fears God greatly, but that he conducts himself in the religion of Israel as I wrote. There is no practical legal difference between the Rambam and Rashi and the Ra'avad except regarding a person whom we do not know at all. But as long as we know him, there is no dispute between them; for if he conducts himself in the religion of Israel, even according to the Rambam it is permitted to purchase from him, and if he is lenient regarding commandments and prohibitions, it is obvious that he is suspected, and also according to Rashi and the Ra'avad it is forbidden to purchase from him without testimony. And so it is proven from the words of the Rambam himself, who wrote that one who stays as a guest with a homeowner is permitted to eat with him even though he does not know him, but only knows that he is a Jew, see there. This implies that to purchase from him, one must know that he also conducts himself on the side of Judaism, and no more.

And know that this entire matter does not pertain to the laws of shechitah, bedikah, and nikkur, for there, according to all opinions, one must know that he is an expert and must examine him, as is explained in siman 1. For here there is no wisdom or craft, only reliability; but there, one requires great wisdom and craft, and clear fear of Heaven. Therefore, the permission post facto there is not based on the principle of reliability regarding prohibitions, but rather because the majority of those who engage in shechitah and nikkur are experts, and consequently they have reliability post facto. However, ab initio it is forbidden to rely on this [and see Shach subsection 1 and Pri Chadash, and according to our words there is no connection between them, and delve into this].

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 2: One who commits a transgression out of desire is not called "suspect." Thus far his words. And these are puzzling matters, for certainly every "suspect" is only so out of desire, and therefore he is not suspect regarding other matters; for if he is suspect of acting provocatively, it is obvious that he is not trusted in anything, for he is a min, and even if he only acted once provocatively, his law is like a star-worshiper, as is written in Shulchan Aruch siman 2, section 5, see there. And already one of the great Acharonim wondered at his words and rejected his words [Taz, subsection 4], and also the Levush omitted this, see there. And the source of the law is from the Rashba, and he only wrote this regarding testifying about the matters of others, as the Levush wrote in section 7, see there, and it will be explained before us with the help of Heaven. But regarding his own, he has no trustworthiness at all, even to eat at his home, and certainly not to sell. And there is one who pressed himself to interpret his words as dealing with the matter of eating at his home when we know that there is permitted and forbidden food in his house; and since he only acts out of desire, he will not leave the permitted and eat the forbidden, and it is permitted in such a case to eat at his home [Pri Chadash, subsection 6]. And it is a great pressure, for how can we rely on this? Perhaps the permitted is not as good as the forbidden. And Heaven forbid to permit eating at the home of such a man if the eater does not know clearly that this food is certainly kosher. And also his wording does not imply so, for he wrote that he is "not called suspect," which implies that he is like a fit Israelite [see Shach, subsection 6, and his words are puzzling, and if his intention is as the Pri Chadash wrote, it is also pressed as I wrote, and delve into it].

And it appears to me that there is another intention in his words based on what they wrote above in siman 2, section 6: that regarding one who commits a transgression by chance one time out of desire, even though through this he becomes disqualified for testimony as is written in Choshen Mishpat siman 34, nevertheless he does not require checking of the knife and is not called a transgressor, as we explained there in section 14; see there. And this is what he says here as well, that he is not called "suspect" when committing a transgression out of desire by chance, and he is only called "suspect" when he is accustomed to transgressing this because this prohibition is light to him. But regarding that which his inclination overcame him by chance, he is not called "suspect." And even according to what was ruled stringently there regarding the matter of checking the knife, nevertheless he is not called "suspect," for regarding the checking of the knife which requires great effort they did not trust him, but nevertheless one should not call him "suspect," as it is written: "For there is no righteous man on earth who does good and does not sin." And the term "suspect" applies to a constant matter, not by happenstance. And so it appears to me is the primary law.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote in section 3 that even one who is suspected of eating forbidden things, nevertheless, it is permitted to give to this suspected person food of his own so that the suspected person may prepare it for him or cook it for him, and we are not concerned lest he exchange it, since he is not suspected of theft. And if he gives to one who is concerned for his benefit and who is suspected of eating forbidden things, it is forbidden, for perhaps what he gives him will be spoiled and he will exchange it for his own. How so? If one gave to his mother-in-law who is suspected of the prohibition, it is forbidden, for she is ashamed before her son-in-law and desires the benefit of her daughter, and therefore she exchanges bad for good for him. And so too one who gives to a hostess who is suspected, sometimes she is ashamed before the guest and exchanges bad for good for him. Thus far their words. And our teacher, the Rema, wrote that nevertheless it is permitted to deposit with him and that he should return the items to him as they were deposited with him. Thus far his words. Meaning, that since they are not suspected of theft, but rather we say that for the benefit of the giver they will exchange, this is only relevant when giving to prepare the food, for in this we are concerned lest he not prepare it properly and exchange it for his own. But in depositing with him to return it as it is, he will not be ashamed to return it as it is even if it spoils, since he did nothing to it. And one should not ask: how do we say that one suspected of eating is not suspected of exchanging because he is not suspected of theft, and one suspected of one matter is not suspected of other matters as will be explained, and yet previously it was explained that one suspected of eating is suspected of selling? And behold, when he sells a forbidden item and takes money for this, it is absolute theft, for if the buyer knew that this was forbidden he would not have purchased it at all. And the answer to this is that even though according to the core of the law it is so, nevertheless, to this suspected person it does not seem to him that in the sale of a forbidden item it is theft, for in this he finds a justification, but to actually steal he is not suspected [Shach, sub-section 8]. And this is like the sages, of blessed memory, said: "Do not covet" is understood by people to apply to taking without payment [beginning of Bava Metzia], even though the truth is not so [and see Tosafot there]. And know that that which was explained in siman 118, that regarding a suspected person one requires two seals, this is regarding one suspected of exchanging, as written there in section 8; but regarding one suspected of eating, nothing is required, for he is not suspected of exchanging. And more will be explained regarding this with the help of Heaven in section 18 and in section 19.

According to what has been explained, that his mother-in-law and the innkeeper intend for his benefit, if so, if we knew that this innkeeper is not concerned for the benefit of the guest, it is permitted. And so too regarding his mother-in-law, if we knew that she is not concerned for the welfare of her daughter and is not ashamed before her son-in-law. However, this is according to the explanation of Rashi in Chullin [6b]. But the Tosafot explained there that, on the contrary, the innkeeper exchanges the good of the guest for her own bad because she instructs herself a permission, as she takes the exchange for her exertion; see there. And according to this, when she does it for free, it is forbidden in every case, and conversely, if she takes payment for her exertion, it is permitted in every case, for there is no instruction of permission here. However, according to the explanation of Rashi, it is forbidden when she intends for his benefit, as has been written.

The Rambam, of blessed memory, in chapter 11 of Ma'aserot, law 12, has another approach in this matter based on the Yerushalmi. This is his wording: One who gives to a hostess to bake for him or to cook for him must tithe what he gives to her so that it will not be a stumbling block for others, and he must tithe what he takes from her because she is suspected of exchanging this person's for that person's. But one who gives to his mother-in-law or to his neighbor bread to bake or a cooked dish to cook need not be concerned, etc., because she is not suspected of exchanging, etc. One who brings wheat to an am ha'aretz miller, they remain in their status of being presumed permitted, for he is not suspected of exchanging, etc. And similarly, one who deposits with an am ha'aretz, they remain in their status of being presumed permitted, etc. Thus far his words. For he also holds that one who is suspected of eating is not suspected of exchanging. And also, that which is found in our Gemara that with one's mother-in-law it is forbidden because she desires the benefit of her daughter, he rejected from the halacha, for this is the reasoning of Rabbi Yehuda and the sages disagree with this, as is found in the Yerushalmi, chapter 3 of Demai, and the halacha follows the sages. And regarding a hostess, the sages hold that in every case she is suspected. And it has not been clarified to me what is the inferiority of a hostess. And it seems to me that the intention is this: that because of the abundance [of guests] and since women's temperaments are light, she does not precisely ensure not to exchange this person's for that person's, and this is called "suspected of exchanging," meaning, not to be precise. And this is similar to what was written in siman 118, section 31; see there.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 20: One who is suspected of eating things that the public is not accustomed to be lenient regarding, he is also suspected of exchanging. And some say that one may not deposit with him a matter forbidden by the Torah except with two seals. Thus far his words. The explanation of his words is that what was explained, that one suspected of eating is not suspected of exchanging, this is regarding things that the public is accustomed to be lenient regarding, such as demai and the like, for he thinks he is not committing a transgression. But regarding things that the public is not accustomed to be lenient regarding, even though one suspected of one matter is not suspected of other matters, nevertheless regarding this matter itself he is like a complete transgressor and has no credibility. And some say that such a suspect requires two seals for a matter forbidden by the Torah, and for a matter forbidden by rabbinic law, one seal is required. Our teacher, the Rema, already brought this opinion in siman 118, section 1. And the reason he brought this law here, even though this siman does not deal with the law of a seal, is because the proof for this law—that one suspected of eating things that the public is not accustomed to be lenient regarding is also suspected regarding exchanging—its source is from the proponents of this opinion who hold that what the Gemara says, that two seals are required, is regarding a suspect, as the Rashba wrote in Torat HaBayit HaAruch [Bayit 4, Shaar 2]. Therefore, he attached it to here. However, in truth, there is no proof from the proponents of this opinion according to what was written in siman 118, section 8, for they are dealing with one suspected of exchanging, as the great Acharonim wrote [Shach ibid. subsection 16 and Pri Chadash ibid. subsection 14].

But I wonder at this, for while it is true that this is the opinion of the Rashba there, nevertheless it is only a single opinion, as the Ra'ah there disagrees with him with reasoned arguments that one suspected of one matter is not suspected of another matter; if so, how is he suspected of switching and stealing? And the Rashba in Mishmeret HaBayit did not respond with sufficient words regarding this, as he wrote that regarding that matter he is like a transgressor and has no trustworthiness [see Shach subsection 38], and this is not sufficient, for he is still not suspected of theft. And a clear proof for this is that the Rashba himself in the short Torat HaBayit omitted this law, see there, because he saw that the words of the Ra'ah are good and correct. And so wrote the Maggid Mishneh in chapter 8 of Ma'akhalot Assurot, law 10, see there. And such is the opinion of the Rambam there, who wrote: One who buys meat and sends it by the hand of an am ha'aretz, he is trusted regarding it, and even though he is not established in fitness, we do not fear that he might switch it, thus far his words. And meat is certainly among things that the public is not accustomed to be lenient about. Furthermore, since the entire source of the Rashba is from the approach of those who hold that for one who is suspected we require a seal within a seal, and he lists cheese there, and cheese is something that the public is lenient about, as the Rashba himself wrote in Responsa siman 109, see there [see Shach siman 118 subsection 16]. Also, the opinion of the Tur is explicitly the opposite, for he wrote: whether he is suspected of a Torah prohibition, etc., and regarding this he said that he is not suspected of switching; and certainly Torah prohibitions are things that the public is not accustomed to be lenient about. And more than this is puzzling, for the Rashba himself wrote that a tailor who is suspected of sewing his own wool garments with linen, nevertheless it is permitted to give him hemp to sew and we do not suspect him that he will switch it even though he is suspected in this; and shaatnez is not something the public is accustomed to be lenient about [Lechem Mishneh there]. Furthermore, our teacher, the Beit Yosef himself in siman 118, section 8, brought this opinion in the name of "there is one who says," so how did he write this here as an agreed-upon law when many disagree with it and he himself retracted it in the short Torat HaBayit [see Be'er HaGolah letter 28 who wanted to present it as a preliminary thought, see there, but it does not seem so from the Shach there, and also the flow of the matter does not appear so; however, certainly for the halakha, the opinion of most poskim is not so, and delve into this].

A great principle must be known: that all the laws of one who is suspected mentioned in this siman and in other places in the poskim, as well as one who is suspected in the mishnayot of the fourth chapter of Bekhorot and those mentioned in the Gemara throughout the entire Shas, the intention is not specifically when testimony was received in beit din that this man committed this transgression, for in such a case he is also disqualified from testimony as is written in Choshen Mishpat siman 34. Rather, even a mere suspicion where a rumor has spread—whether a rumor that ceased or a rumor that did not cease—he is called suspected. And the proof for this is from what our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Arukh, wrote there in section 25. This is his wording: A person is not disqualified by a transgression based on his own word, but rather based on witnesses who testify against him, for a person cannot make himself out to be wicked, etc. And similarly, he is not disqualified based on a rumor or mere suspicion, such as one who is suspected of forbidden relations, etc., and a rumor spreads about him; he is fit for all testimony except for testimony regarding a woman. See Yoreh Deah siman 119. Thus far his words. Behold, it is explicit that it deals with such a case, and there is no difference between a rumor that ceased and a rumor that did not cease, as our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote there in his great work in the name of the Rosh and Rabbeinu Yerucham; see there. And so it is explicit in Sanhedrin: Rava bar Nathan said: One who is suspected of forbidden relations is fit for testimony. Rav Sheshet said: Master of the world! Forty lashes are on his shoulders and he is fit? etc. And Rashi explained that they lash for "the report is not good"; see there. Behold, it is explicit that it deals with a case of a rumor, and there are many more proofs, and one should not elaborate on this.

And according to this, it appears to me that if the rumor was spread by enemies, there is no substance to it and he is not called "suspected," as it is stated in Yevamot [25a] that regarding a rumor spread by enemies, we do not concern ourselves with the rumor. And so it appears to me that if he himself spread the rumor about himself, he is not believed, for a man cannot make himself out to be a rishah. Nevertheless, there is some reason to be concerned about this ab initio, as we maintain there in Choshen Mishpat that even regarding testimony, we do not appoint him ab initio; see there. However, this is certain: that all the laws in this siman regarding one who is "suspected" also apply if it was clarified by witnesses in beit din, for we maintain that a transgressor regarding one matter is not a transgressor regarding other matters. And so it implies explicitly from the words of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, section 7. And only regarding testifying about the matters of others will it be explained in section 39.

One who is suspected of selling a forbidden item in place of a permitted one, it is forbidden to buy that item from him forever until he repents and removes himself from suspicion. However, an item for which he is not suspected is permitted to be bought from him, for one who is suspected regarding one matter is not suspected regarding all matters. Nevertheless, regarding that matter for which he is suspected, he is penalized such that one may not buy from him even if this time it was certainly permitted [as appears to me from what will be explained, and examine this carefully]. Furthermore, even a completely permitted item that has no connection to a prohibition at all, if this permitted item was a cause through which he sold the forbidden item—like the incident brought in Bekhorot there, where a certain butcher would attract children to him by means of nuts that he distributed to them and sold them chelev in place of fat, and similarly he would attract the sons of the butchers with these nuts and they would steal chelev from their fathers and he sold them in place of fat—and Rava penalized that butcher who was suspected of this, that it is forbidden to buy even nuts from him. And so too in any similar case, when the beit din understands that through this permitted item he had assistance for the sale of the forbidden item, they penalize him so that he may not sell this permitted item either. But regarding another matter, we do not penalize him [see the Derishah who wrote that even if it is not known that through the nuts he sold the chelev we are concerned for this, and the Taz in subsection 7 disputed him, see there. And the truth is that the wording of the Tur implies like the Taz, but the wording of the Gemara implies like the Derishah, see there. And all the words of the Taz regarding the change in the wording of the Tur from the wording of the Gemara are not settled in the heart, unless the Tur had a different version of the text in the Gemara. And there is a further difficulty for the Taz who wrote that even in the nuts alone there is a concern of a prohibition; if so, it is forbidden by the law and not because of a penalty, and this requires further study, and examine this carefully].

The sages taught in the Mishnah in Bekhorot [30a]: One who is suspected regarding Shevi'it is not suspected regarding tithes; one who is suspected regarding tithes is not suspected regarding Shevi'it. One who is suspected regarding this and regarding that [meaning, or regarding that] is suspected regarding taharot. And there is one who is suspected regarding taharot but is not suspected regarding neither this nor that. And it is explained in the Gemara: because Shevi'it and tithes each have a stringency that the other does not have. For Shevi'it has no redemption, while Ma'aser Sheni has redemption; and Ma'aser Sheni is eaten only in Jerusalem, while Shevi'it is eaten everywhere. Therefore, even though both are a negative commandment, nevertheless, there are those for whom Shevi'it is more stringent than tithes, and there are those for whom the opposite is true. And one who is suspected regarding one of the two is suspected regarding taharot, for since he is suspected regarding a Torah law, all the more so is he suspected regarding a rabbinic law. Therefore, one who is suspected regarding rabbinic taharot is not suspected regarding tithes and Shevi'it which are from the Torah. But one who is suspected regarding Torah taharot is suspected also regarding tithes and Shevi'it [the Rambam in the Commentary on the Mishnah, and therefore it was taught "And there is etc." and examine this carefully].

We have learned from this that anything of the same nature—meaning, for example, in matters of eating—one who is suspected regarding one prohibition is also suspected regarding other prohibitions of this nature that are equal to it in severity, and certainly regarding those less than it. However, regarding a prohibition more severe than that which he is suspected of, he is not suspected. And so too, even regarding a prohibition equal to it, if it contains some stringency that the suspected prohibition lacks, he is not suspected regarding it; even though the suspected prohibition also contains some stringency over the other prohibition, nevertheless, perhaps this stringency is more severe to him. And it is stated in the Gemara there that in places where Shevi'it was severe to them, one suspected regarding Shevi'it was suspected regarding Ma'aser; see there.

According to this, the words of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch are perplexing regarding this matter. This is the wording of the Tur: One who is suspected regarding a stringent matter is also suspected regarding a matter lighter than it, even if the stringent matter is not more stringent in punishment but is merely more stringent in the eyes of people. Thus far his words. And he learned this from that which we say, that in places where shevi'it is stringent to them, one who is suspected regarding shevi'it is suspected regarding ma'aser. And it goes without saying if it is also more stringent in punishment, such as one who is suspected regarding shevi'it and ma'aser is suspected regarding taharot. But nevertheless, it is clear from his words that only for a matter lighter than it is he suspected, but if it is equal in punishment and in the eyes of people to the matter for which he is suspected, he is not suspected regarding it. Yet in the Gemara it is proven that were it not that there was a stringency in shevi'it over ma'aser and in ma'aser over shevi'it, the law would be that one who is suspected regarding this is suspected regarding that. And it must be said that the Tur holds that it is impossible at all for there to be two types of prohibitions equal in all details of their laws to one another. For example, terefah and nevelah, for both are subject to a negative commandment, yet there is a stringency in nevelah in that it imparts impurity, and in terefah there is a stringency that in the womb there can be a terefah, such as if a limb was missing from it and they slaughtered its mother and it was found to be a terefah, for behold the fetus is also a terefah; but nevelah you do not find in the womb, as is understood, unless the fetus died, and then the term "fetus" does not apply to it. And so too anything that by law is a nevelah, such as if the thigh and its cavity were removed and the like, it is also like a dead animal and the term "fetus" does not apply to it. And so too chelev and blood, for both are subject to karet, yet there is a stringency in chelev over blood, for a person's soul is repulsed by blood; and so too blood that one cooked, one does not transgress because of it, which is not the case with chelev. And there is a stringency in blood over chelev, for with chelev, if it became putrid and one ate it, he is exempt, as the Rambam wrote in chapter 14, but with blood this is not applicable, for even without this a person's soul is repulsed by it. And you have no two prohibitions in the world that are equal in all details. And according to this, the Mishnah is interpreted according to its plain meaning: One who is suspected regarding ma'aser is not suspected regarding shevi'it, and likewise the reverse, because regarding an equal prohibition he is not suspected. And only in the Gemara is the reason explained why this is so, because there is a stringency in this that is not in that; that is to say, you have no two prohibitions equal in the world in all details of their laws [see Shach, subsection 12, who concluded regarding the intent of the Tur "and more stringent in punishment," see there, for it seemingly implies more stringent in punishment than the matter for which he is suspected, and it is not so as is proven in the Gemara; and also the Shach himself began "rather even if the stringent matter is not more stringent than it in punishment," a scribal error, meaning they are equal in punishment, but the end of his wording is not precise, and his intent is that it is as stringent in punishment as the matter for which he is suspected, and delve into this].

This is the wording of the Shulchan Aruch in section 5: One who is suspected of a severe prohibition is suspected of one lighter than it in punishment, unless it is severe in the eyes of people, who are more careful with it than with the severe one. Thus far his words. For it is explicitly explained that even a prohibition light in punishment, if it is more severe in the eyes of people, he is not suspected of it. But from where do we have this? For in the Gemara it is only explained regarding equal punishments, such as Ma'aser Sheni and Shevi'it, for both are a negative commandment; but regarding one light in punishment, he is certainly suspected even if in the eyes of people it is more severe than the severe one. And one cannot say that he wrote this based on logic—that since it is more severe in the eyes of the public, he is not suspected of it even though in essence it is lighter than the matter for which he is suspected—for if so, that which we learned in the Mishnah, that one suspected of Shevi'it and of Ma'aser is suspected of Taharot because Taharot is rabbinic while Shevi'it and Ma'aser Sheni are from the Torah, if Taharot were more severe in the eyes of people, he would not be suspected of it. If so, that which the Gemara teaches us from Shevi'it to Ma'aser—that what is severe in the eyes of people is considered a stringency—instead of teaching us regarding equal prohibitions, the Talmud should have told us a greater novelty, even regarding a light prohibition, such as from Shevi'it and Ma'aser to Taharot. Rather, it is certain that from severe to light one is always suspected, even if the light one is more severe in the eyes of people. And it must be said that he holds that the Talmud did not come there to teach us the essence of this law, for this is a simple matter, but rather because in the Mishnah it equates Ma'aser Sheni to Shevi'it, and there are places where Shevi'it is very severe to them; for this the Talmud says that in those places, one suspected of Shevi'it is suspected of Ma'aser. But the same applies that this law is practiced also in severe and light, such as Shevi'it and Taharot and the like. However, it is still difficult: from where does our teacher, the Beit Yosef, have this to say so? [See Shach subsection 12, who debated his reasoning and did not cite the Sugya in Bekhorot at all, and it requires further study].

And also in the words of the Rambam there are perplexing matters regarding this subject. This is his wording in chapter 8 of Shemittah: One who is suspected regarding Shevi'it is not suspected regarding tithes, and one who is suspected regarding tithes is not suspected regarding Shevi'it, etc. One who is suspected regarding purities is not suspected regarding tithes nor regarding Shevi'it, etc. And one who is suspected regarding the words of the Scribes is not suspected regarding the words of the Torah. Thus far his words. And why did he not also write what we learned in the Mishnah to the contrary, that one who is suspected regarding tithes and regarding Shevi'it is suspected regarding purities, for one who is suspected regarding the words of the Torah is suspected regarding the words of the Scribes? And furthermore, why did he omit what is stated in the Gemara there, that in a place where they treat Shevi'it with stringency, one who is suspected regarding Shevi'it is suspected regarding tithes?

And it appears to me that the Rambam, of blessed memory, had an entirely different approach to this matter, and the opinion of the Ramban is also thus, as will be explained with the help of Heaven. For since we hold that one who is a transgressor regarding one matter is not a transgressor regarding the entire Torah, and this matter is well-known throughout the Shas, and we do not distinguish between a light matter and a stringent matter; and according to the opinions of the poskim that one suspected of a stringent matter is suspected of a light matter, if so, the Shas should have specified that one who is a transgressor regarding one matter is not a transgressor regarding the entire Torah for those matters more stringent than this matter, but not for those lighter than this matter. For example, one who is a transgressor regarding a prohibition of karet would be a transgressor regarding prohibitions of negative and positive commandments. In all such cases, it should not have remained silent but rather specified. And more than this is difficult for me regarding that which we hold, that a transgressor regarding idol worship and the desecration of Shabbat is a transgressor regarding the entire Torah, for the reason that anyone who acknowledges idols denies the entire Torah, and Shabbat is also like this, for one who desecrates Shabbat denies the works of the Holy One, Blessed be He, etc. [Rashi, Chullin 5a]. Why do we need all of this? Since one suspected of a stringent matter is suspected of a light matter, it is obvious that Shabbat and idol worship are among the most stringent, and automatically he would be suspected regarding the entire Torah. Rather, it is certainly so that one suspected of a stringent matter is not suspected even of a light matter, because it is possible that in this matter his inclination overcame him, but in that matter it did not overcome him. Therefore, from the perspective of the essential stringency of the sin of idol worship and Shabbat, he would not be suspected regarding everything; and for this, the Sages, of blessed memory, were required to say that because in these two he is like one who denies the entire Torah, he is automatically not included among Jews.

And that which we learned, "One who is suspected regarding ma'aser sheni and regarding shevi'it is suspected regarding teharot," is not because one suspected of a severe matter is suspected of a light matter, as it would seemingly appear from the flow of the language of the Gemara there, and that this law applies to the entire Torah, for it is not so. These laws apply only to ma'aser, shevi'it, and teharot, because in these matters the Sages, of blessed memory, rendered all amei ha'aretz as suspected; for anyone who is not a chaver is not trusted regarding ma'aser, and his produce is demai, as is well known in the Shas. Also, he is not trusted regarding teharot, for the garments of an am ha'aretz are a midras-uncleanliness for perushim, as is explained in Chagigah and in the entire Order of Teharot. Likewise, they have no trustworthiness regarding shevi'it, as it is taught in Sukkah [39a]: One may not hand over the money of shevi'it produce to an am ha'aretz for more than the food of three meals. Rashi explained there that amei ha'aretz are suspected regarding shevi'it; see there. And anyone who wishes to be believed must take upon himself the obligations of chaverut, as is well known in the Shas. Regarding this we learned: One suspected of this is not suspected of that, but one suspected of both is suspected regarding teharot—meaning, his law is like all amei ha'aretz. The Rambam did not need to write this here, for he already wrote these laws in chapter 13 of Hilkhot Avot HaTumot and in chapter 10 of Hilkhot Mishkav [u-Moshav]; see there, for an ordinary am ha'aretz is suspected regarding teharot and has no trustworthiness. This is exactly this law: that one suspected regarding ma'aser and regarding shevi'it—meaning, that he conducts himself like an am ha'aretz in these matters—is suspected regarding teharot. Therefore, he did not write these laws in other places.

And also the opinion of the Ramban, of blessed memory, is such, for he wrote in a responsum [brought in the Beit Yosef at the end of this siman], and this is his wording: What you said regarding one suspected of a light matter, if he is suspected of a severe matter, even regarding a matter lighter than it he is not suspected, for a transgressor regarding orlah is not a transgressor regarding shechitah, and they did not say a transgressor for one matter is a transgressor for the entire Torah except regarding idol worship and public desecration of Shabbat. Thus far his words. Behold, this is explicitly like our words. And it is true that our teacher, the Beit Yosef, raised a difficulty against him from that which we learned in a Mishnah: One who is suspected regarding ma'aser and regarding shevi'it is suspected regarding taharot. And he answered that specifically within one subject he is suspected from the severe to the light, such as in matters of eating, and not in two different subjects, such as from orlah to shechitah, see there. And all the great Acharonim held thus, and as we explained in section 24. But in truth, the reasoning is difficult; for whichever way you look at it, if from one subject to another he is not suspected even from the severe to the light because in this his inclination overcame him and in this it did not, if so, even in the same subject we should say so. Rather, certainly the Ramban holds like our words regarding the opinion of the Rambam and from the clear proofs that we brought in the previous section. And that which we learned in Bekhorot is only regarding these specific laws, and this is like they used to learn: one who is an am ha'aretz regarding ma'aser is not an am ha'aretz regarding shevi'it, and likewise the reverse, but regarding taharot he is an am ha'aretz, and this is not a matter for the entire Torah.

And more than this is difficult for me, for we maintain that specifically one who profanes the Shabbat in public [is an apostate], but in private he is not a transgressor regarding the entire Torah. And why? For Shabbat is the most stringent of the stringent, and one suspected of a stringent matter is suspected of a lenient matter. And it is true that according to the opinion of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch and all the poskim, it must be said that the matter is so: that certainly one suspected of a stringent matter is suspected of a lenient matter; however, if we saw that in the lenient matter he is very careful, then logic dictates that he is not suspected regarding the lenient matter. But regarding idolatry and profaning Shabbat in public, even if we see that in other matters he is careful, he is not trusted and has left the collective of Israel. Alternatively, it is possible to say another justification: that if it were due to the stringency of the transgression, he would only be suspected in these matters and not so in other matters, like the reasoning of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, which we brought; but because he is like one who denies the entire Torah, he has no trustworthiness even in other matters. In any case, according to the system of the Rambam and the Ramban, the matters are simple and there is no need to be pressed in this at all, and it is clear with the help of Heaven [see Taz subsection 8, and his intention is like the second justification that we wrote].

And there is one who says that a transgressor regarding idolatry and the desecration of Shabbat, who is suspected regarding the entire Torah, is truly so because these are the most severe transgressions, and one who is suspected regarding a severe matter is suspected regarding a light matter [Shach, subsection 13]. And I wonder, for if it is for this reason, then why when he desecrates Shabbat in private is he not a transgressor regarding the entire Torah? [And this requires further study regarding the Shach, why he needed this, for he himself brought the reasoning of the Beit Yosef in subsection 12; and look closely]. And there is one who says that "one suspected regarding a severe matter is suspected regarding a light matter" applies to a matter from which he derives pleasure, but a matter in which there is no physical pleasure, he is not suspected even regarding a light matter; yet regarding idolatry and the desecration of Shabbat, he is a transgressor even for transgressions in which there is no pleasure [ibid. in the name of the Derisha]. And all of these are forced reasonings, and the main point is like the words of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, to distinguish between one matter and two matters according to the approach of the poskim and the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch. However, according to what we explained for the approach of the Rambam and the Ramban, of blessed memory, even this is not necessary at all, and according to them, this law of "one suspected regarding a severe matter is suspected regarding a light matter" does not exist at all, as we explained with the help of Heaven.

One who was suspected of two matters and repented and left the status of suspicion for both of them, and afterward was suspected of one of them—even if it is the lighter of the two—we fear that perhaps he returned to his corruption in both of them and he is suspected of both. For this person who returned to sin in one of them is much worse than when he sinned in this matter before he repented. Therefore, even if this transgression to which he returned is lighter, whether in the essence of the transgression or in the eyes of people, he is suspected also of the second, more stringent one, even if it is not of the same type as the first [Shach, subsection 14]. Nevertheless, for another transgression he is not suspected regarding that which he was never suspected of, if it is not of the same type or more stringent than it.

One who is suspected regarding a matter is not trusted concerning it even with an oath, and even though he is not suspected regarding other matters—for which reason we ruled that he is not suspected of switching it—nevertheless, an oath is different, for he is suspected regarding it. For every individual of Israel was adjured from Mount Sinai regarding all types of transgressions, and since he is suspected, he has violated the oath. And you should know that if you do not say so, why does a transgressor who eats nevelot out of appetite require an inspection of the knife? Let him swear that he will not feed nevela! Rather, it is certain that one who is suspected regarding a transgression is also suspected regarding an oath concerning the matter of this transgression [Ramban, cited in the Beit Yosef]. Nevertheless, for other oaths he is not suspected, for in truth, this fact that we treat him as suspected regarding this oath is not like a literal suspect, for a person does not have in mind this oath that he swore at Mount Sinai; rather, we say that in any event, for this matter he is not trusted with an oath, for regarding this matter he is like one suspected also regarding the oath [as mentioned above].

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 7: One who is notorious for one of the transgressions in the Torah, excluding idol worship and desecrating Shabbat in public, or who does not believe in the words of our Sages, of blessed memory, is trusted regarding other prohibitions. Regarding the property of others, he is trusted even regarding that same matter to say it is permitted. Thus far his words. According to the approach of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, the intent is that he is trusted regarding other prohibitions that are not of the nature of this prohibition, even regarding light ones; and regarding prohibitions that are of this nature, he is trusted regarding those more stringent than this prohibition, but not regarding those lighter than this prohibition. Regarding idol worship and Shabbat, he is not trusted regarding anything. We have already explained regarding this what appears to us according to the opinion of the Rambam and the Ramban, of blessed memory.

And that which he wrote, that regarding the property of others he is believed even regarding that same matter to say it is permitted, this is the opinion of the Rambam at the end of chapter 11 of Laws of Evidence. This is his wording: Therefore, one who is suspected regarding a matter may judge it and testify regarding it for others; there is a presumption that a person does not sin so that others may benefit. How so? An am ha'aretz is believed to say the fruits of so-and-so are tithed, etc., and so too anything similar to this regarding other prohibitions, etc. Thus far his words. And the Ra'avad raised a difficulty against him from that which we learned in the fourth chapter of Demai: One who buys fruit from one who is not trusted regarding tithes and forgot to tithe them, and asks him on Shabbat, he may eat based on his word; once it is dark at the conclusion of Shabbat, he may not eat until he tithes. If he did not find him, and another who is not trusted said to him, "They are tithed," he may eat based on his word; once it is dark at the conclusion of Shabbat, he may not eat until he tithes. See there. Behold, it is explicit that even regarding the property of others he is not believed. And the Rambam himself wrote so in chapter 12 of Laws of Tithes. However, in that very place at the end of chapter 12, he ruled that a suspect is believed regarding the property of others for the reason that a person does not sin for someone else. See there. And his primary foundation is from that which we establish in Bekhorot [35b] according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, that the kohanim, even though they are suspected of inflicting a blemish upon a firstborn, nevertheless they are believed regarding the property of others. And the Ra'avad rejected this, for there it is merely a penalty and they are not truly suspects, but one who is a true suspect is not believed. See there. [He further raised a difficulty against him from the Mishnah there: One who enters a city, etc., who here is trusted, etc. And the Yerushalmi asks: Is one witness believed? And it answers: Because of life-sustenance. But without this, he is not believed. However, from this there is no difficulty at all, for here we are concerned about reciprocal favors, as is explained in Ketubot 24].

And many things were said regarding this. There is one who answered that there we must suspect that he said so in order that he may eat on Shabbat [Kessef Mishneh]. And there is one who answered that since he took them in order to tithe, therefore when Shabbat passes he is obligated to tithe [Bach]. And there is one who answered that this Mishnah was taught according to everyone, even according to Rabbi who disagrees with Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in Bechorot, and according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel we would establish it when there is a concern of reciprocity [Pri Chadash, subsection 17]. And there is one who answered that behold, where a prohibition is established, a single witness is not believed when it is not in his power, and if so, how is even a proper person believed to testify about the grain of another that it is repaired, for behold it is not in his power to separate terumah, as is found at the beginning of HaIsha Rabbah? Rather, it is because here the owners say that it is repaired, and for the owners it is in their power, but the sages did not believe an am ha'aretz; therefore, when one testifies, it is not called an established prohibition since for the owners it was in their power. Therefore, in the beginning of the fourth chapter of Demai, where we are dealing with a case where the owners are not here, as it was taught "they did not find him," if so, by the letter of the law he is not believed, and they only were lenient for Shabbat [Rabbenu Yom Tov Algazi, chapter 4 there]. And all the answers are forced, as is understood. And also this answer is forced, for either way: if by the letter of the law he is not believed, how did they permit it on Shabbat? Rather, certainly from the Torah, since he sold the grain as permitted, it is as if he said they are tithed, but the sages did not believe him. And the proof is that behold, when a chaver sells his grain without specification, one eats based on his sale. And if so, even when he is not here, since he already sold it, the established prohibition within it is removed, and it is like a prohibition that was not established.

And it is possible to say, if we are precise regarding the latter clause of the Mishnah: why do I need it? For since he himself is believed to say "they are tithed," all the more so another. Rather, certainly it was taught for the novelty of its latter clause, that on the conclusion of Shabbat it is forbidden for him to eat even when another said to him—meaning, even though another is believed to testify according to the words of the Rambam, for one who is suspected is believed regarding that which belongs to others, nevertheless here he is not believed. And there are two reasons for the matter: one, since it is an enactment of the sages to believe an am ha'aretz on the day of Shabbat, and the credibility is only for this day, the sages did not distinguish between him and another, because the essence of the permission is due to the honor of Shabbat or the awe of Shabbat, as is found in the Yerushalmi there, and the questioning of the owner or the other is merely a pretext, as is explained there; therefore the sages did not permit in every case except for the day of Shabbat alone. And furthermore, that here where the other says "they are tithed," he says it without specification, and it is possible that his intention is that he heard so from the owner; and according to this it is a great novelty, that even regarding another who heard from his mouth, he is believed for Shabbat. And this is the novelty: that on Shabbat they permitted in every case, and on the conclusion of Shabbat they did not permit in every case. But if the other should come on the conclusion of Shabbat and testify by way of testimony, we would certainly believe him; but here we do not approach it by way of testimony, but rather due to the honor of Shabbat. And with this the words of the Rambam there are precise, see there. And so we hold for the law according to the ruling of the Rambam, and the Shulchan Aruch and all the great poskim agreed with him. And know that this, that one who is suspected is believed regarding that which belongs to others, this is specifically when this matter does not have a presumption of prohibition; but with a presumption of prohibition, such as regarding shechitah, he is not believed, as our teacher, the Rema, wrote in siman 2, section 6, see there. And even though he wrote "one who is disqualified for testimony," see there, it can be said that the same applies to one who is suspected. However, some say that regarding one who is suspected, even in such a case he is believed [Shach ibid. subsection 20], and so appears to be the primary view [and what the Pitchei Teshuvah wrote there in subsection 8 in the name of the Tiferet Yisrael, who disagrees with the Shach from the Mishnah in Demai where it was taught "it became dark on the conclusion of Shabbat, he shall not eat etc.," it is no proof at all, for the Rambam himself rules there to the contrary as they indeed challenged him, and there is no presumption of prohibition there as I wrote in section 37, and examine this].

There is one who says that specifically one who is suspected is trusted to testify regarding the affairs of others, but one who is habituated to commit that same transgression is not trusted regarding the affairs of others as well [Shach, subsection 8, and in siman 127, subsection 20]. And that which was written here, "one who is famous for one of the transgressions in the Torah etc.," the intention is that it is famous that he committed the transgression one time [ibid.]. And the difficulty is clear, for it is obvious that the language "famous" explicitly implies that he is habituated to transgress every time and he is disqualified from testimony through this. And in my humble opinion, the primary law is that even one who is disqualified from testimony through the transgression is also fit to testify regarding the affairs of others, as I wrote in section 21. And that which our teacher, the Rema, wrote in siman 127 at the end of section 1, this is his wording: And all those disqualified from testimony are fit regarding matters of prohibitions, unless he is suspected of that specific matter. Thus far his words. We explained there in section 33 and in section 45, see there, that it is a different matter. [And also that which the Shach wrote in subsection 18, that the suspected person is disqualified regarding monetary matters in everything, see there; I am astonished, for the Rema explicitly wrote in Choshen Mishpat siman 34, section 25, that a suspected person is fit for testimony, see there. And it must be said that his intention regarding monetary matters is from one matter to another matter, and delve into this.]

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 7: One who is suspected of a matter that does not appear to people to be a transgression is not called "suspected"; however, for that matter itself he is not trusted. Thus far his words. And his words are puzzling, for if so, for what matter is he not called "suspected"? For regarding another matter or to testify concerning the affairs of others, even one who is "suspected" is trusted, as has been explained. And since for that matter itself even he is not trusted, what difference is there between him and one who is "suspected"? [Taz subsection 9 and Shach subsection 19]. However, in a responsum he clarified his intent, that there is a practical difference regarding the matter of an oath; for one who is "suspected" is not trusted regarding that matter even with an oath, as I have written, but this man is trusted with an oath, since in his opinion he is not transgressing at all; if so, when he swears, he is trusted. Furthermore, there is a practical difference regarding matters lighter than it in that same subject, for one who is "suspected" is not trusted, but he is trusted, since in this he has no intention to commit a transgression [ibid.].

He further wrote that one who conducts himself with a prohibition regarding a certain matter, because he maintains that the law is such or because of a stringency he took upon himself, is permitted to eat with others who conduct themselves with permissibility, for they certainly will not feed him something in which he conducts himself with a prohibition. Thus far his words. This is because they certainly would not transgress "before a blind person do not place a stumbling block," and therefore this law applies only when they know that he conducts himself with a prohibition in this matter. This is not similar to what was written in siman 112 regarding the bread of a Cuthite, that when one who is careful and one who is not careful eat in one meal, the one who is careful may also eat from this bread in that meal, for there the sages permitted it because of enmity, since bread is the main part of the meal and it is not a fixed prohibition because this prohibition did not spread among all of Israel, as is explained there. This is not the case with other matters. And it is not only necessary to say this regarding one who knows it is permitted and took a stringency upon himself, which is like a vow and is a complete prohibition, but even when he maintains that the law is such, which is like an error, nevertheless, since he maintains a prohibition in this because he maintains like a certain opinion that holds so, certainly those who feed him transgress "before a blind person," etc., and therefore we do not suspect them. And if they do not know that he conducts himself with a prohibition in this, he must inform them. [This law is from the Hagahot Mordechai at the end of the first chapter of Yevamot, and he brought proof from that which Beit Shammai did according to their words, see there; and there is further proof from Chullin 111a regarding fish that were served on a plate, where it says there "Heaven forbid that the seed of," etc., see there and examine carefully].

There are some of the great authorities who established rules regarding this law, namely: one who conducts himself with a prohibition regarding a certain matter because he believes that such is the law, and he eats in the house of one who permits it—if the prohibition is recognizable to the one who prohibits, the one who permits may feed him, for if he holds it is prohibited, let him not eat. But if the prohibition is not recognizable, it is forbidden for the one who permits to feed him, and even to cook for him in his vessels even if they are not ben yomo, for the permission of that which is not ben yomo is only ex post facto. And all the more so, it is forbidden for the one who prohibits to tell the one who permits to cook for him in his vessels. However, when the one who permits cooks for himself and for others, it is permitted, as it is like an ex post facto case. And one who prohibits a matter due to the custom of his ancestors and the people of his province who conducted themselves so, it is forbidden for the one who permits to feed him even if the prohibition is recognizable, and even if the one who prohibits could himself take and eat, nevertheless, it is forbidden to give it to him, for it is like "handing a cup of wine to a nazir." Conversely, the one who prohibits may even cook initially in the vessels of the one who permits when they are not ben yomo, or in ordinary vessels, for we maintain that ordinary vessels are not ben yomo; for regarding a matter that is due to custom, they did not accept upon themselves the prohibition of vessels when they are not ben yomo. However, if the one who permits is present here, he must ask him if the vessels are ben yomo or not, since it is possible to clarify. And if the custom for the one who prohibits is that only in his own place he does not eat, but in the places of those who permit he is not so careful as to not cook in their vessels, he may cook even in a ben yomo vessel if everyone conducts themselves so; but the food itself is forbidden for him to eat. And if it is clear to this one who prohibits that it is permitted, only that in his place he is compelled to conduct himself according to the people of his place, he may eat the food itself in the places of those who permit even if his intention is to return [Shach, subsection 20, and in the name of Maharal Habib; and this latter law requires great study, for since he must conduct himself like the people of his province, how is it permitted to eat if his intention is to return, unless the people of his place conduct themselves in error? But when they accepted the stringency upon themselves, an individual does not have the power to change from the custom, and the proof is from the people of Beishan in Pesachim 50b; and perhaps this was also the intention of the Shach in such a case; and see Pri Chadash, Orach Chaim, siman 496, who wrote at great length regarding these laws].

A convert in ancient times who returned to his former ways due to fear, and similarly an Israelite who sinned due to fear so that they would not kill him, is a complete Israelite, and his shechitah is permitted, and he does not render wine forbidden by his touch. However, if he has already become rooted in this, he is not like an Israelite [it appears to me]. Regarding an informer to oppressors, there is a dispute, for some disqualify his shechitah and he has no reliability regarding prohibitions, and some qualify him. This has already been explained above in siman 2, see there, and we explained there in section 16 that it requires further study as a matter of law, and it is impossible to elaborate on this; see Choshen Mishpat siman 388. Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote: A transgressor who in one city believes in idolatry before the gentiles, and in another city enters the house of an Israelite and says that he is a Jew, does not render wine forbidden, but for all prohibitions he is not reliable [Shach subsection 24]. And the forced converts in Spain who remained in their lands, if they conduct themselves with fitness among themselves and it is not in their power to escape to a place where they can worship Hashem, we rely on their shechitah and they do not render wine forbidden by their touch. Thus far his words. And now these laws are not applicable, as is understood.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote in section 19: One who says to someone who is suspected of eating the cheese of Cutheans, "Buy me kosher cheese from an expert," and he went and brought it to him and said to him, "It is kosher, I bought it from the expert," he is not believed. "I bought it from so-and-so the expert," he is believed. If he brought him a gift in the name of one of the experts, he is believed, for he is not suspected of exchanging it. In what case does this apply? When he is not suspected of theft, but if he is suspected of theft, all the more so is he suspected of exchanging. Thus far their words. Our teacher, the Rema, wrote regarding this: And all this does not apply to one suspected of a Torah prohibition. Thus far his words.

The explanation of the matters: it is not only when he said to him generally, "buy me cheese," that he is not believed when he says to him generally, "I bought from an expert," but even if he said to him, "buy for me from an expert," where I would have said that presumably he did not violate his words, nevertheless, since he does not say "from person X," he is not afraid and will lie. However, when he says "from person X," he is afraid lest he ask that person and find him to be a liar, and therefore he does not lie. In such a case, he is believed even if the sender did not tell him at all to buy from an expert. But when he said to him, "buy for me from expert X," and he came and said, "I did not find him and I bought from expert Y" [as we learned in chapter 4 of Demai, mishnah 5], he is not believed; for since he said to him "from person X," it was a specific requirement, as if he said to him, "I only believe that person." And since he deviated from his mission, we no longer rely on the reasoning that he is afraid. And even though it has been explained that one suspected of eating is not suspected of exchanging and is believed regarding the property of others, nevertheless, regarding a matter done by his hand, he is not believed if there is no reasoning of being afraid, because he does not consider this a prohibition, and we say perhaps he was too lazy to go and take from an expert and took from one who is suspected [it appears to me].

But when he brought him a gift in the name of one of the experts, he is trusted, for there is no concern that perhaps he exchanged it, as he is not suspected of exchanging. And there is also no concern that perhaps he gave him the gift from his own, for it is not the way of a person to give his own gift in the name of another [Tur]. Therefore, in such a case, even if he did not mention the name of the expert to him but rather said to him simply "an expert sent you this cheese," it is also permitted [Shach, subsection 36]. For what should we concern ourselves with? For if we say that he is lying in what he said "an expert," and in truth he is not an expert, then his intention is to cause him to stumble, and he is not suspected of this. And that which the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote "in the name of one of the experts," they spoke of the common way of things, for it is not the way of the world to bring a gift from someone without mentioning his name. And it is not similar to a purchase, where he might lie to say "I bought from an expert," even though he is not suspected of exchanging or causing one to stumble; for there we say that he was too lazy to go to the expert, or an expert was not available to him, and he bought from one who is suspected, and he fears a monetary loss if he gave the money from his own. And even if he sent him with money, he fears that he will demand it from him when he tells him that he bought from one who is suspected, and therefore we concern ourselves that he is lying until he says "I bought from so-and-so." This is not the case with a gift. Therefore, all of this is when he is not suspected of theft, but with one who is suspected of theft, all the more so is he suspected of exchanging, and it is forbidden to send through him to buy in any manner. And likewise, to bring a gift he is not trusted, for we concern ourselves that perhaps he exchanged it for something worse than it.

Regarding that which our teacher, the Rema, wrote, that all of this does not apply to one suspected of a Torah prohibition, many have challenged him, for the reason of "fear" is effective even regarding Torah matters. As was written above in siman 2 regarding a transgressor who eats nevelot out of appetite, that he is believed to say "a certain expert slaughtered for me" because of the reason of fear [Taz subsection 18 and Pri Chadash subsection 34]. However, it could be said that regarding shechitah we maintain that the majority of those found engaged in shechitah are experts, and since it is clear that he did not slaughter it himself but slaughtered it with another, it is permitted based on the principle of "the majority of those found etc." But regarding other Torah prohibitions, we do not rely on fear [Shach subsection 37]. Nevertheless, in siman 86 he himself wrote that even regarding a Cuthean, when he says of eggs that they are from a certain pure bird, he is believed, and all the more so regarding a suspected Israelite; and impure eggs are a Torah prohibition. Yet even in this case it could be said that since he himself is selling them, we rely upon him [ibid.], or it could be said that since the majority of eggs found in the world are from pure birds, we can rely on the reason of fear and it is like "the majority of those found engaged in shechitah," which is not the case with other matters. Furthermore, one should not bring proof that we rely on the reason of fear even for a Torah prohibition from an agunah woman, whom the sages believed when she says "my husband died" because of the stringency we placed upon her at the end, and she is afraid to lie, as is stated in Yevamot; for it could be said that there the fear pertains to her very person, which is not the case here, where the fear is only that he might be caught in a lie. Therefore, this law remains a legal doubt.

One who sold forbidden items and it was clarified that he sold them intentionally, it is not only that he has lost his trustworthiness in any matter pertaining to issur and v'heter even if he did so only once, but they even remove him, and in ancient times they would place him under a ban, and he has no remedy until he performs proper teshuvah, as will be explained and as is written in Choshen Mishpat siman 34. And whenever it appears that he acted intentionally, such as a butcher from whose hand a treifah emerged, he has no excuse to say "I was acting inadvertently," for if so, everyone would say "I am inadvertent." This applies to an ordinary person, but regarding a person who is established as God-fearing and meticulous in his actions, it is written in the Responsa of Mahariw [siman 97] that they do not remove him and they attribute it to an error. Nevertheless, he requires the acceptance of the protocols of chavrut [Shach and Pri Chadash]. So too, a butcher whose actions prove that he wanted to cause the public to stumble by feeding them treifot, such as if he cut the sirkhot or if there was a needle in some organ and he removed it, and anything similar to this, they remove him from his craft until he performs proper teshuvah. Nevertheless, he is exempt from paying the value of the animal to the owners if the animal is not his, because it was not clarified that through this the animal became treifah, for perhaps there were treifah sirkhot inherently and the needle passed through the entire organ and the like, and in monetary matters the burden of proof is on the claimant. And so too one can say the opposite, perhaps even now it is kosher. And in Choshen Mishpat siman 306 further laws were explained regarding this, see there. But a butcher from whose hand a treifah emerged because he is not expert, he has a remedy that he should study and become wise. Nevertheless, it seems proper to fine him slightly, since he knew that he was not yet expert, he should not have engaged in this; and everything is according to the sight of the eyes of the dayan.

The repentance of a butcher who sold treifot in place of kosher meat is that he should go to a place where they do not recognize him, and he should dress in black and wrap himself in black, and he should return a lost object of significant value, or he should slaughter for himself and discard a treifah of his own of significant value, for he has certainly performed repentance without deception since he is not sparing of his money. Thus the sages, of blessed memory, commanded in Sanhedrin [25a]. The great Acharonim wrote that now that the generation is breached and there is no power to establish the law of the Talmud, if it appears to the sages that it is impossible for him to move from his place because dependents rely upon him or the like, they give him a path of repentance in his place with afflictions so that it should be equivalent to the weight of that which is in the Talmud [Taz subsection 16 in the name of Yam Shel Shlomo]. And likewise, if this stumbling block occurred only once, one should be lenient in his repentance [ibid.]. And in Choshen Mishpat siman 34, section 22, we explained whether he must return the money; see there. And whenever the beit din sees that he has performed repentance according to his sins, he returns to his fitness, and everything is according to the sight of the eyes of the beit din. Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 18 that this requirement to go to a place where they do not recognize him and perform repentance applies when he acted intentionally or if he is presumed to be such that he is likely to act intentionally; but if we can say that it happened to him by error, it is sufficient for him with the acceptance of the words of chavrut and he should perform repentance according to the sight of the eyes of the judge. Thus far his words. And the acceptance of the words of chavrut is that he should accept in the presence of three scholars who are talmidei chachamim to conduct himself with some additional abstinence beyond what the masses of the people practice, such as that which only the God-fearing are careful with [see Taz subsection 17]. And see what I wrote at the end of siman 64.

The Rambam wrote in chapter 16 of Laws of Sales: One who sells meat to his fellow and it is found to be the meat of a firstborn, or produce and it is found to be tevel, or wine and it is found to be wine used for idolatry—what he ate, he has eaten, and he must return the money to him. And so too, regarding anyone who sells an item that is forbidden to be eaten, such is its law, whether its prohibition carries the penalty of karet or its prohibition is only a negative commandment. However, one who sells to his fellow an item whose prohibition of eating is from the words of the scribes—if the produce is still extant, he returns the produce and takes his money, but if he ate them, he has eaten, and the seller returns nothing to him. And regarding all items from which benefit is forbidden, whether from the words of the Torah or from their words, he returns the money, and the law of sale does not apply to them at all. Thus far his words. For a Torah prohibition, even when he has eaten it, it is not considered eating at all, and therefore even when he has eaten them, the seller is obligated to return the money. And even though through this he profited by not eating from permitted food, nevertheless, this is nothing more than a cause of benefit, and since a cause of damage is exempt, all the more so a cause of benefit, for he does not need to deduct for him because of this. Furthermore, the eating of a forbidden item is not considered a benefit at all, even though he profited thereby, which is not the case with a rabbinic prohibition. But items from which benefit is forbidden, even those of their words, are not subject to sale at all, and therefore in every case he returns the money. And even though there are items from which benefit is forbidden whose proceeds are caught by the prohibition, as we learned in Kiddushin [52:]: One who betrothes with orlah, with diverse seeds of a vineyard, etc., she is not betrothed; if he sold them and betrothed with their proceeds, she is betrothed, see there—it is not because it was subject to sale, but because the exchanges for items from which benefit is forbidden do not become caught in the prohibition, as is found in Nedarim [57:]. And in truth, the buyer can claim the money from him if he did not know that they were items from which benefit is forbidden, but if he knew, he has lost his money since he consented to this. And we have explained this with the help of Heaven in Even HaEzer siman 25, section 92 and 93, see there.

And know that this which we wrote, that a Torah prohibition is not considered eating at all and therefore according to the letter of the law one must return the money, so wrote the Rambam explicitly in chapter 10 of Terumot, law 10. This is his wording: One who feeds his workers and his guests terumah etc. and he pays them the value of their meal, for the value of chullin is greater than the value of the terumah they ate, for a person's soul recoils from a forbidden thing. Thus far his words. And so it is explained explicitly in the Yerushalmi Terumot [chapter 6, halacha 2]. This is its wording: Like the one who said that a person's soul recoils from tevel. Thus far its words. And the explanation of the matters appears to me to be as follows: for it was taught in a Baraita at the end of chapter 5 of Bechorot: Our Rabbis taught, one who sells meat to his fellow and it is found to be the meat of a bechor, or fruit and they are found to be tevel etc., what they ate, they ate, and he shall return the money to them. Rabbi Shimon ben Eleazar says: Items that the soul loathes, he shall return etc., and those that the soul does not loathe, he shall deduct etc. And these are the items that the soul loathes: nevelot and terefot, creeping things and swarming things; and items that the soul does not loathe: bechorot, tevel etc. Thus far its words. And the Yerushalmi explains that they disagree in this: for the first Tanna holds that a person's soul loathes every forbidden thing, and Rabbi Shimon ben Eleazar holds that the soul only loathes disgusting things. And this is what the Yerushalmi says here, "that he said" etc., meaning like the first Tanna and not like Rabbi Shimon ben Eleazar. And according to this, there is no difference whether the seller knew that it was a forbidden item or did not know, since according to the letter of the law it is so, and not because of a fine [and that which regarding terumah he deducts the value of terumah is because for a kohen it is actual property, and examine this closely].

But Rashi, of blessed memory, explained in Bekhorot there that it was by reason of a penalty, and so wrote the Bartenura there, and so wrote the Nimukei Yosef in the sixth chapter of Bava Batra. Based on this, the great Acharonim wrote that this is specifically when the seller knew it was a forbidden item, but when he did not know, it is possible to say he was unintentional. And even though regarding a butcher it was explained that he is not believed to say "I was unintentional," that is regarding the matter of the prohibition and not to extract money [Shach subsection 25 and Pri Chadash subsection 22]. It appears that they would explain that this is the point of dispute between the first Tanna and Rashba, for the first Tanna holds that it is a penalty. I am astonished that this is against the Yerushalmi that we cited, and how did the great ones not cite the words of the Rambam that we cited? This requires further study. [And more than this requires study in the words of the Sma, Choshen Mishpat siman 234 subsection 4, who wrote both reasons, see there; and according to the words of the Shach and the Pri Chadash, there is a practical halachic difference, and also the Taz wrote so in subsection 12, see there. It is clear to me that the Sma holds that even by reason of a penalty one must return the money in all cases, and it requires further study. See the Machaneh Ephraim siman 9 regarding the practical difference, and the Maharit Algazi, Bekhorot there. And what appears to me in my humble opinion I have written, and for the final ruling it appears to me that even when the seller did not know, the buyer can say "I stand by the position of the Rambam and the Yerushalmi," and delve into this].

And there is one who questioned why regarding a rabbinic prohibition, if he ate it, the seller does not return the money; granted that he does not need to return all the money, in any case he should return what he received in excess of the value of the terefah. Therefore, he explained that the sages did not decree a prohibition in order to extract money, for regarding money they established it according to Torah law [Shach, subsection 27]. And these are astonishing words, for it is obvious that even an item that the sages prohibited must necessarily be cheaper than kosher items. And in truth, there is no difficulty at all, for certainly it is so: that if the item he sold, the terefah, is cheaper than the kosher one, he must return the surplus. However, it is not a universal rule, for sometimes terefot and kosher items are at the same price, as we see even with meat in places where Jews are few, and so too with several things like bread, butter, cheese, and milk. And the poskim did not deal with this at all, and it is an obvious matter that if the kosher item is more expensive, he must return the remainder, and it is not necessary to inform us of this [and so wrote the Peri Chadash, subsection 24, see there]. And know that if the buyer did not eat it himself but rather sold it to a gentile, the seller shall deduct for him from the money what he received from the gentile.

And know that in the Mishnah there we learned: when the buyer cast it to the dogs, they shall pay the value of a terefah. And there is reason to doubt if the intention is when he gave it to his dog for the purpose of their eating, or even if he threw it to dogs in general he must pay the value of a terefah, for who asked him to do so? And he should have returned it to the seller, and he would have sold it to a non-Jew. And if we say so, it is difficult according to the one who holds that it is a fine upon the seller, and they fined him when he knew that it was a terefah; and according to this, we should not have commanded the buyer to pay the value of a terefah for throwing it to the dogs, and on the contrary, he acted well. And it requires further study.

Our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, wrote in section 14: One who sells meat and afterwards it became known that the animal was not inspected properly, his law is like one who sells things that are forbidden by the words of the Scribes. Thus far their words. And this does not deal with a case where the lung was lost before inspection, for in such a case it is kosher as I wrote at the beginning of siman 39; rather, it deals with a case where it is the way of this seller not to inspect properly, for in such a case we certainly forbid the meat, and his law is like one who sells a rabbinic prohibition, where if the meat still exists, he returns the meat to him and he returns the money to him, and if he ate it, he does not return the money to him. They further wrote: And if he sold him a part of an animal whose presumption of kashrut was impaired because an impairment arose in it, and they are unable to inspect if it is kosher and they must forbid it due to doubt, even so, it is as if it were definitely treifa and he must return the money. Thus far their words. For in such a case where there is an impairment, it requires inspection by the Torah, and therefore it is like a thing forbidden by the Torah, where even if he ate it, he must return the money [Bach, and Taz subsection 15, and Peri Chadash subsection 27]. And some say that here too it is like a thing whose prohibition is by the words of the Scribes, and if he ate the meat, he does not need to return the money [Shach subsection 29]. And it appears the primary view is like the first opinion; however, even according to this opinion, this is specifically regarding a complete impairment that requires inspection by the Torah, but a thing that is forbidden only due to the stringencies of the poskim or due to custom, or that they declared it treifa due to a doubt, such as a doubt if it occurred during life or a doubt if it occurred after slaughter, or a needle found in the lung which is impossible to inspect by inflation if it is cut, and all similar cases where by the Torah it is permitted but by rabbinic law it is forbidden, it is like one who sells a thing whose prohibition is by the words of the Scribes [Peri Chadash ibid.]. And according to this, it can be said that the two opinions do not disagree, and the "some say" also deals with such a case. And in Choshen Mishpat siman 224 it was explained what the law is regarding one who sells an animal to his fellow and it is found to be treifa, whether he must return the money; see what is written there [see Peri Chadash subsection 28 who wrote at great length regarding the laws of butchers from whose hand a treifa went out and divided it into various parts, and we have already written that this matter depends on the assessment of the beit din and according to the matter, whether his intention was to cause a stumbling block or from a lack of supervision or if he was completely unintentional, and according to their assessment they shall rule concerning him regarding his fine and his repentance].