Siman 118

It is stated in the Gemara [Avodah Zarah 39a]: Rav said, CHAVIT is forbidden with one seal; CHAMPAG is permitted with one seal. CHAVIT is a piece of fish that has no sign, meat, wine, and tekhelet. And CHAMPAG is asafoetida, muries, bread, and cheese. And the explanation of the matters is that when one sends via a gentile, or deposits in his hand, fish or meat or wine or tekhelet, two seals are required. But CHAMPAG is permitted with one seal. And the difference between these and those Rashi explained is because CHAVIT, their value is high, and he will take the trouble and forge one seal. And even though wine is not expensive, nevertheless, because of the desire for libation, he will take the trouble and forge the seal in order to perform a libation. And these three, he takes the trouble and forges in order to exchange them for something of lesser quality than this. But CHAMPAG, whose value is not high, he does not take the trouble and forge even with one seal.

It turns out according to this that everything depends on the cost and importance in that place, except for wine. However, from the words of the Rambam in chapter 13, it is explained that anything for which there is a Torah prohibition in its substitution, such as fish, meat, and tekhelet, requires two seals. And anything for which there is only a rabbinic prohibition in its substitution, such as bread, oil, salt, and vegetables, one seal is sufficient. And wine, even though it is rabbinic, they were stringent with it like a Torah prohibition because of the concern of libation. And so wrote the Tur in the name of the Rashba, that for a Torah prohibition one requires two seals, and for a rabbinic prohibition one seal is sufficient. And milk is also rabbinic, because to substitute it entirely for impure milk is impossible, as one can recognize that impure is green and pure is white. The concern is only regarding a mixture, and according to the Torah, a substance in its own kind is nullified by a majority, and regarding a majority of impure there is no concern because it would be recognized as has been written. It turns out that the prohibition is only rabbinic, and one seal is sufficient [see Drisha and Shach subsection 8].

And there are those among the Rishonim who wrote a reason based on the Yerushalmi, because hilit, baitza, yain, and tzir, their prohibition is intrinsic, whereas vinegar, muries, palyas, and garum, their prohibition is through mixture; and bread, even though its prohibition is intrinsic, since it is only rabbinic, one seal is sufficient [the Ran and the Ra'ah in Bedek HaBayit]. And according to this, two conditions are required for two seals: that it be a Torah prohibition and that it not be through mixture; and if one of these two conditions is lacking, one seal is sufficient. And the poskekim [the Beit Yosef and the Shach, subsection 5] understood that this is a different reason from the previous reason. And in my humble opinion, it appears that the primary reason of the Yerushalmi is also that for a Torah prohibition one requires two seals and for a rabbinic prohibition one seal is sufficient, as it is for the Rambam and the Rashba. And the Yerushalmi stated merely a sign, for there is no prohibition through mixture that would be a Torah prohibition unless the prohibited substance is the majority, for the permitted substance is nullified by the prohibited substance, and since the prohibited substance is the majority, this is not a prohibition through mixture. And this is what the Yerushalmi is saying: anything whose prohibition is through mixture, one seal is sufficient, for the prohibition is rabbinic; and anything whose prohibition is due to itself, there are those that are a Torah prohibition, such as a piece of fish or meat, or tekhelet, for if he exchanges it for treifa, it is a Torah prohibition; and wine, when he pours it as a libation, it is also a Torah prohibition [and also the intent of Tosafot there 39a, starting with the words "Amar," who wrote this reasoning in the name of the Ra'ah, their intent is also thus. And I wonder at the Beit Yosef and the later authorities who made this into a reason unto itself, and perhaps in the Shulchan Aruch he retracted and did not bring this reason because it is all one. And with this, all the difficulties of the Shach, subsection 5, against the Rema in Torat Chattat are answered, see there carefully; and I have not descended to the depth of the Shach's mind in this. And the reason of Rashi was not brought at all in the Shulchan Aruch because most of the poskekim did not hold thus; and delve into this].

According to the opinion of the Rambam and the Rashba, there is no distinction between one who sends via a star-worshiper and one who deposits in his hand; and in a matter that requires two seals, even when depositing in his hand, one requires two seals. However, according to the opinion of our teachers, the authors of the Tosafot [31a, s.v. d'amar], two seals are only required when sending via him, for since the Israelite will not see the seal, two seals are required. But when depositing in his hand and afterward he will come and take it, in all matters one seal is sufficient, for the Israelite will see afterward if the seal was not damaged. And according to this, even when sending via him to another Israelite, if he informed the Israelite in writing of the form of the seal so that they will recognize it when they receive it from the hand of the star-worshiper, one seal is also sufficient in all matters. The Rosh, of blessed memory, also agreed with this opinion, as the Tur wrote in his name, except that he wrote that besides the need to inform the Israelite of his signature, he must inform the star-worshiper that he informed the Israelite of the nature of his signature, see there. And so wrote the Rosh, and this is their wording: And even one who sends, if he informed his fellow of the form of the seal and also said to the star-worshiper that he informed his fellow, one seal is sufficient. Thus far their words. And such is the wording of the Shulchan Aruch, section 1, see there; and the matters require clarification:

For seemingly from this wording it is implied that when one sends to his fellow, two things are required: to inform his fellow so that he will recognize the signature, and also to inform the idolater that he informed his fellow. And if you should say, why must he inform the idolater? Is it not sufficient to inform his fellow, and if he recognizes the signature it is good, and if not, in any case it is of no avail? It can be said that certainly this is so, but it is for the benefit of the matter, so that the idolater will not touch it to ruin the seal and do as his heart desires. And if you should say that if so, when he informs the idolater, he will surely not touch it because he is afraid, and why is it necessary to inform his fellow? For it can be said that because sometimes the seal is ruined on its own, for it is possible for this to happen, as is explained below in siman 130. And according to this, one cannot rely on the reason of fear alone, for he would be able to say that the seal was ruined on its own. Therefore, the primary basis for the permission is due to the recognition of the seal, as in the case of one who deposits. However, for this it is better to also tell him that he informed his fellow, for then in most instances he will surely recognize the seal. And if even in a remote occurrence the signature is ruined, if he understands according to his own eyes that it is possible it was ruined on its own, we would base the permission on the reason of fear, as I wrote there. But to build the primary basis for the permission on the reason of fear is not correct, for since he would be able to say that it was ruined on its own, he would not be so afraid. And with this, their wording is precise, as they wrote "if he informed his fellow etc. and also said etc.," for it is explained explicitly that the primary basis for the permission is in informing his fellow so that he will recognize the seal, and in addition to this, he also needs to tell him.

But the great Achronim [Shach subsection 15 and Pri Chadash] did not explain it so, and they wrote that in the statement to the Akum where he informs his fellow it is sufficient, and there is no need to inform his fellow at all because of the reason that the Akum is afraid. And they explained their words that this is what it means: that even when he informs his fellow it is not enough until he says etc., and with this alone it is sufficient, see there. And how much of a forced interpretation is this, for if so, they should have written only this permission alone. Therefore the Achronim wrote that ab initio one certainly must also inform his fellow of the form of the seal. And it is a great forced interpretation, for it is explicitly implied from Tosafot and the Rosh that regarding one who deposits, the primary permission is through the recognition of the seal, and consequently the Akum is afraid, see there; and consequently, also regarding one who sends to his fellow, the primary permission is for this reason, and it requires further study. [And I found in the Ritva there explicitly as I wrote, and this is his wording: And if he sends etc. he must inform him etc. and it is also good that he say so to the Akum, even though this is not a requirement. Thus far his words.]

And regarding what they brought as proof from what the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote in section 2, and this is his wording: Since they sealed it properly with two seals for a matter that requires two, and one for matters where one is sufficient, there is no need to return to it to see it, thus far his words; I am astonished, for behold, the source of this law is from the Rashba [see Beit Yosef], and the Rashba does not distinguish at all between one who leaves it and one who sends it, and he does not hold of this distinction, as I wrote at the beginning of section 4. However, according to the opinion of the Tosafot and the Rosh, the primary basis for the permission is because of this, as I wrote. And you should know that it is so, for behold, they wrote "two seals for a matter that requires two," and according to the Tosafot and the Rosh, you have no matter that requires two seals, for it is not necessary to say regarding one who leaves it, but even regarding one who sends it, one seal is sufficient when he informs him, as has been explained. Rather, it is certainly that this is only according to the opinion of the Rambam and the Rashba, that the permission is because with two seals he will not take the trouble to forge, and regarding a rabbinic matter we say that even with one seal he will not take the trouble to forge; if so, it follows automatically that there is no need to see the seal. And so it is also according to the Tosafot and the Rosh when he sealed with two seals, for then the reason for the permission is because he will not take the trouble to forge, and similarly regarding a rabbinic matter with one seal. But with one seal regarding a Torah matter, where the permission is due to the recognition of the seal, how is it possible to permit without this? And the primary reason of the Acharonim is because we rely on the reason of "fear" in all these laws, and in my humble opinion, here this reason alone is not sufficient, because he is able to say that it became spoiled on its own, and therefore the law requires further study. And we have already explained that the Ritva holds like our words, and such is the primary view.

And there are some of our teachers who said that regarding a suspect Israelite, two seals are required for a matter of Torah law, whereas for a gentile, one seal is always sufficient [Rabbeinu Tam in Tosafot ibid.]. And in this regard, a suspect Israelite is worse because he considers himself an Israelite and is not afraid at all; therefore, two seals are required, for in such a case he will not trouble himself to forge. And it must be said according to this opinion that for a gentile, the permission is with one seal because he is afraid, and even though he did not tell him that he informed his fellow of the nature of the seal, nevertheless he is somewhat afraid. And he is called "suspect" when he is suspected of exchanging, but if he is only suspected of eating forbidden things, nothing is required, for one who is suspected of eating is not suspected of exchanging, as will be explained in siman 119 [Shach subsection 16]. However, it is not a general rule, and it will be explained there with the help of Heaven. And all the Rishonim did not accept this opinion as primary and agreed with the opinion of the Tosafot in section 4 to distinguish between one who deposits and one who sends, as is written there. Nevertheless, our teacher, the Rema, cited this opinion in section 1 and wrote that after the fact one may rely on this opinion, thus far his words; that is to say, but not initially, because most poskim did not agree with this opinion.

This is the wording of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 1: Wine, meat, and a piece of fish that has no sign, which one deposited or sent by means of a non-Jew, requires two seals. However, cooked wine and beer, or wine in which other things were mixed, such as honey, and likewise vinegar, milk, muries, bread, and cheese, and anything whose prohibition is by words of the scribes, which one deposited by means of a non-Jew, is permitted with one seal. And there are those who say that even regarding things that require two seals, they only spoke of one who sends by means of a non-Jew who is not destined to see the seal, but one who deposits, who is destined to see his seal, one seal is sufficient because he is afraid. And even one who sends, if he informed his fellow of the form of the seal and also told the non-Jew that he informed his fellow, one seal is sufficient. Thus far his words. And we have already explained that the first opinion is the opinion of the Rambam and the Rashba, and also the opinion of the Yerushalmi agrees with this, and it is not a separate reason as I wrote in section 3. And he took this reason as the primary one, and afterwards he wrote the opinion of the Tosafot and the Rosh, that when one is destined to see the seal, even regarding a Torah prohibition, one seal is sufficient. And it appears to me that the two opinions do not disagree at all, and the first opinion also admits in such a case that only one seal is necessary, and the latter opinion admits to the first opinion that when one is not destined to see his seal, a Torah prohibition requires two seals and a rabbinic prohibition one seal. And that which our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote "and there are those who say" is not because of a dispute, but rather such is his way regarding a matter that is not mentioned in the Gemara or the Rambam, but rather the poskim innovated this, he wrote it in the language of "and there are those who say."

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote regarding this: And some say that we do not require two seals except with a suspect Israelite, but with a gentile everything is permitted by means of one seal, and post facto one may rely on this. Thus far his words. And behold, this opinion certainly disagrees with the previous opinions, and many did not agree with it, as is explained in the Rosh and Mordechai; therefore, he wrote that only post facto may one rely on this, but on the two previous opinions one may rely ab initio. And we have already explained our opinion in section 5, that what our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote regarding sending, the primary basis for the permission is in informing his fellow of the form of the seal, and the statement to the gentile is merely for additional preference, and that the Ritva wrote so, and that with the statement alone there is no permission. However, the opinion of the great Acharonim is not so, for they hold that with the statement to the gentile alone it is permitted due to the reason of fear, as I wrote in section 6; see there.

And in section 2, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote that since he sealed it properly with two seals for things that require two, and one for things where one is sufficient, he does not need to return to it to see it. But if he returned to his seal and did not recognize it, it is forbidden even if he made two seals. Thus far his words. And specifically if they see that it was intentionally damaged by a person; but in a place where they can attribute it to having been spoiled on its own, or by an animal, or by a child without intention, it is permitted ex post facto, as will be explained in siman 130. And so too if an Israelite is going out and coming in, we are not concerned even if it was spoiled intentionally, for he is afraid to exchange it, as is written there regarding wine, that he is afraid to touch it, and all the more so he is afraid to exchange it. And we have already explained in section 7 that in our opinion this is only according to the law of the first opinion—meaning, when the permission is not because he will later see the seal, but because of the primary law that we forbid, for whenever there are two seals, he will not take the trouble to forge. Therefore, he does not need to return to it to see it. But according to the law of the "there are those who say," where the primary permission with one seal is because he will see the seal, certainly he is obligated to return to see the seal. And according to the great Acharonim, even there he does not need to [for they grasped that the wording of the Beit Yosef implies that it refers to both opinions, and I say that certainly it is so, for the "there are those who say" do not disagree at all, as I wrote in section 9; and delve into this].

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote regarding this law that if he did not recognize the seals it is forbidden, and this is his wording: However, this is specifically if it is a matter where there is concern that he swapped it and benefited from the swap, or it is wine and there is concern that he rendered it forbidden through touch; but if he sees the item that he sent or deposited and it is as good as what he sent, and the idolater did not benefit if he swapped it, we are not concerned even if the seal is damaged. Thus far his words. Meaning, even if it appears that it was done intentionally by a person. And the reason is simple, for it has already been explained that the idolater is not suspected of causing the Jew to stumble; for if he were suspected of causing him to stumble, then there would be no permission in the fact that it is as good as what he sent, for perhaps he swapped it for treifah that is as good as it. But since he is not suspected of causing him to stumble unless he has benefit in this, such as swapping it for something of lesser quality than this, and since it is not of lesser quality, there is no reason to forbid. And we attribute the fact that he damaged the seal intentionally to his desire to see what is located there or to take a bit from it, but regarding the concern of swapping, there is no place for it. And it is a simple matter that if they recognize by a siman muvhak that this is what was sent, it is permitted in any case. And if some of them are recognized and some pieces are not recognizable, and it is possible that those not recognizable were swapped for those of lesser quality than what was sent, those that are not possible to recognize are forbidden, and the pieces that they recognize are permitted. And know that even ab initio it is permitted to send via an idolater when he sealed them according to the law.

And behold, it has already been explained that regarding a Torah prohibition, two seals are required, and regarding a rabbinic prohibition, one seal is sufficient. And wine, even though it is rabbinic, they were stringent regarding it like that of the Torah because we are concerned for the fondness of libation, as has been written. Therefore, several of the great authorities agreed that in this time this does not apply, and one seal is sufficient for wine like all rabbinic prohibitions, and so one should rule. And consequently, there is also no need to search for the recognition of the seal, and also no need to inform him, since by the law one seal is sufficient [Taz subsection 4, and there is a printing error in it, and that which he wrote that "everyone admits to this," it should say "everyone admits regarding wine," and he answers the difficulty of the Nekudot HaKesef, and so wrote the Minchat Yaakov Klal 32, and in Shevut Yaakov Part 1 Siman 63, and in the glosses of Rav Baruch Fraenkel]:

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 3: One letter is considered as one seal; two are like two seals. Printed stamps, even though they contain several letters, are considered only as one seal since they are set at one time. And there are those who say that in a place where there are wicked people who know how to write, the writing is not a sign except for one who recognizes the handwriting. Thus far his words. The explanation of these matters is: when the sent item is placed in a vessel or a sack and the like, in a manner that the idolater has no place to take the sent item and exchange it except from one place, such as from the place of the cover or the place of the knot, and he writes there one letter such that half of the letter is on the cover or the place of the knot and half is on the vessel or the sack—consequently, when he opens it and takes from there, the letter will be spoiled, and it will not be possible for him to repair it afterwards as it was at first so that the letter is whole—this is one seal. In such a case, if he makes two such letters, it is two seals. But when the two letters are in a print, such as in a signature-stamp, and he places the signature half on the cover or the knot and half on the vessel or the sack, it is only one seal even if there are many letters in the seal, since it is all made at one time. Therefore, he must place the seal in two places. And that which he wrote, that in a place where they know how to write, the writing is not a sign, for perhaps he wrote the letters himself; even if the sender writes letters, he will open, take, exchange, cover or tie, and make other letters. This applies only to letters, but regarding a signature-stamp this is not relevant, obviously. And even with letters, it is only when the receiving Israelite does not recognize the form of the sender's handwriting, but if he recognizes it, we have no concern, for it is impossible to forge.

And know that there is one who wrote that even if a seal was placed in several locations, it is considered only as one seal [Noda BiYehudah, Second Edition, section 71]. And these are puzzling matters, for what difference is there to me between two letters or two signatures? And if there is a concern that they possess such a signature, or that they steal the signature of the sender and seal it themselves—as the Rashba wrote in a responsum [siman 109] regarding cheese molds, that they steal the molds from the headboards of the Jews and place the molds themselves—if so, it is not considered even as one seal. But if there is no such concern, it is certainly considered as two seals [Rav Baruch Fraenkel].

He further wrote in section 4: A key and a seal constitute two seals, but regarding matters where one seal suffices, if there was nothing but a key, it is not considered a seal. Thus far his words. And his reasoning is that even though the key is in the hand of the Israelite, nevertheless, it is possible that he will take the trouble to obtain such a key and open the lock, take and exchange and close, and it will not be noticeable at all; therefore, it is not even like one seal. And nevertheless, with a seal it is considered like two seals, for in combination with the trouble of making a seal, obtaining such a key is also considered a great trouble. And behold, it is true that there are some of the early authorities who hold that a key is like one seal, and to this the great later authorities agreed; nevertheless, there are those who agreed with the words of our teacher, the Beit Yosef. And after the fact, one may rely on those who permit, and likewise if it is a time of pressing need where it is impossible to make any seal, a key suffices. [And the Taz, subsection 3, and the Bach and the Pri Chadash agreed to permit, and the Shach, subsection 22, agreed with the Beit Yosef]:

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote: if one sends any item in a sack and seals the sack, it is not even considered as one seal unless he turned the seams inward. Thus far his words. And it is obvious that when the seams are outward, what benefit is the seal? For he can open the place of the seams and take and exchange and sew as before. But when the seams are inward, he cannot do so, for if he does so, the seams will be outward and he will be caught as a thief. And so is the simple custom to send with the seams inward, and even with ordinary use of sacks, such as for flour and other things, such is the way of their use, with the seams inward and not outward. And he further wrote: and if he sealed the item that he sent and also the sack, it is considered as two seals. Thus far his words. This is to say that we do not require the two seals in one place close to one another, but even in two places; for example, if he sent meat and wrapped it in paper and tied the paper and placed a seal upon it, and placed the paper in a sack and tied the sack and placed a seal upon the sack, it is considered two seals. And so too anything similar to this. And the reason is simple, because with two, he will not trouble himself to forge.

And they wrote further signs later in siman 130, and this is his wording there in section 4: If one closed the barrel with a vessel that is not fastened in the manner that everyone closes it, and smeared it with clay, this is one seal. If the vessel was fastened and he smeared over it from above, this is a seal within a seal. Thus far his words. And from this we have learned that a fastened vessel is considered like a seal, and smearing from above is considered a seal within a seal. And if so, our bottles which are closed tightly with wood that is called a "propka," and it is impossible to open them without an iron that picks, a "kreitzer," it is one seal. And if he labored according to the custom with red earth that is called "treif," it is a seal within a seal, even without signs of letters. And according to what we wrote in section 13, that in this time even for wine one seal is sufficient, if so, it is possible to send via a gentile with one of them, either with a tight closing or with a loose closing and smearing with clay or with "treif" according to the custom. And so too he may send milk, and all the more so butter, with one of them, and so too in a similar case with cheese in this manner, for in these one seal is sufficient, as has been explained.

They further wrote there that if one tied the mouth of the flask, this is one seal, and if one turned the mouth of the flask inward and tied over it, this is a seal within a seal. Thus far their words. And behold, Rashi, of blessed memory, explained in the Gemara [31a] that it is necessary for the flask to be in a leather pouch, for in such a case the tying of the mouth of the flask is considered a seal because one would not trouble himself to remove it from the pouch; however, a mere tying is not a seal. And so it is clarified from the wording of the Tur there. But they followed the approach of the Rambam, who wrote according to their wording, and he maintains that a mere tying done with strength is considered a seal, because one would not trouble himself to untie the strong tying and afterwards tie it as it was before, because it is a great exertion. And behold, according to this, when one sends meat in a sack or in a cloth and ties the mouth of the sack with strength, it is permitted even with one seal, for the tying itself is a seal. And for things that require only one seal, such as milk and cheese, a mere tying is sufficient, and it is a great leniency. And perhaps even the Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch only spoke regarding the tying of a leather flask, which is a very strong knot, and there were those who would tie it until it was difficult to untie, as is proven in Kelim [Chapter 26, Mishnah 4]. But in other things, the tying is not a sign unless it is an unusual knot. However, the tying of a load on wagons is also a strong and very tight tying and is considered one seal [see the Shach there, subsection 8, who wrote in the name of the Maharshal that since every day they untie the wagon to take the food, it is not a seal, see there; and this was in their days, but in our days the food is not placed within the knots and the knots remain until the arrival of the merchandise to its destination, and it is properly considered one seal. And it also appears to me that turning the mouth of the flask inward is only effective with leather flasks which are difficult to turn, but in other things turning it inward is not effective].

They further wrote there: And likewise any change that one makes from things that are not the way of all people, they are as one seal, and the plastering or the tying is a second seal, and two unusual knots are as two seals. Thus far their words. And also the tying that they wrote previously, their intention was an unusual knot, for if it is not unusual, it is not a sign, and it is not similar to the binding of a skin-bottle in the previous section, as I wrote there. And know that since it has been clarified that a strong tying is as a seal, all the more so when the item is placed in a wooden or metal vessel and the cover is attached with many nails, that it is as one seal, for we are witnesses that there is excessive exertion in this. And I saw one who was in doubt regarding this, but the matter is clear as I have written [according to the Pitchei Teshuva, subsection 3].

Our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, wrote in section 5: If one sent a thigh by means of a kouti without a seal, if it is cut in the manner that an Israelite cuts it after the removal of the gid, it is kosher. And so too any piece in which the nikur of the Israelite is recognizable, such as in the removal of the vein of the hand and the vein near the chest and the like, and the other pieces that are with them, if there is reason to fear for them that they were exchanged. And specifically regarding meat or other Torah prohibitions, but if one sent a rabbinic prohibition, such as cheeses where there is reason to fear perhaps the kouti exchanged them, if he recognizes some of them that they were not exchanged, all of them are permitted if those that were not exchanged are the best ones that he sent; for certainly if he had exchanged them, he would have taken the best among them. Thus far their words. And it is explicitly explained that regarding a Torah prohibition, we do not rely even in such a case where there is like clear evidence that he did not exchange; nevertheless, it is forbidden, for we fear perhaps he did not have enough time to take the best among them due to fear. But regarding a rabbinic prohibition, we rely on this. And not only that, but even when the seal is damaged and broken, we rely on such a case regarding a rabbinic prohibition. And know that the sending of a thigh or other meat by means of the siman of the removal of the gidim is only after the fact, and ab initio it is forbidden to rely on this; so the Acharonim agreed. And so too regarding chickens, when the veins of the neck were removed in the manner that the daughters of Israel do, it is a siman after the fact and not ab initio. And all of this is only regarding one who sends, but regarding a thigh and meat found in the hand of a kouti with the siman of removal, we do not rely on this at all, for perhaps the Israelite gave it to him after he removed it, and if so, some treifot in the animal became known to him [Taz and Pri Chadash].

A sign of shechitah is no sign at all, for the gentile can forge and exchange it for another and slaughter it himself, and it would not be recognizable. Therefore, if one sent with him a slaughtered animal or bird without a seal within a seal, it is forbidden, unless the shochet sent a letter with him and there is some sign on the bird that he made, such as the cutting of the tongue or the like, in a manner that there can be no concern of forgery. But in another manner it is not effective, even in a case of a majority of Yisrael and a majority of Yisrael butchers, for this is only effective regarding meat that is found, as in siman 1, or in a case where it was hidden from the eye according to the one who holds it is permitted, as I wrote in siman 63. But it is not so when sending via a gentile, where it can be said that he exchanged good for bad and slaughtered them himself. And this is not at all related to what was explained there [Shach, subsection 1 and subsection 25], unlike those who distinguish here as well between a majority of Yisrael and a majority of Yisrael butchers versus a majority of gentiles and a majority of gentile butchers; rather, in every case it is forbidden without a distinct sign or a seal within a seal [see Shach, subsection 26, regarding the incident of Mordechai with a slaughtered hen, etc., and we have already explained it in siman 63].

There is one who says that one who conceals meat for Shabbat and other foods in the ovens of idolaters is permitted even with one chotam, even according to the opinion of the Rambam and the Rashba who do not distinguish between one who sends and one who deposits and hold that in all of them two chotamot are required for a Torah prohibition, because the owner of the oven takes payment for this and is like a craftsman who will not damage his reputation and does not trouble himself to forge the chotam to exchange good for bad [Pri Chadash, subsection 18]. In my humble opinion, it seems that if we come to compare him to a craftsman, it should be permitted even without a chotam for this reason; rather, it is certain that they are not related to one another, for that which we say a craftsman does not damage his craft, this applies to his own merchandise, that he will not ruin it and will not mix any forgery into it. But in the case of one who rents out his oven and the Israelite places his foods in it, this is not a matter of damaging his craft. Nevertheless, the law is a true law, for the primary view is according to the opinion of the Tosafot and the Rosh who distinguish between one who sends and one who deposits, and we have already written in section 9 that even the Rambam and the Rashba admit to this, and therefore one chotam is sufficient, and they must recognize the chotam [see there in the Pri Chadash who wrote that all those with him disagreed with him and he did not explain why, and it is clear that the reason is as I have written, and examine it closely].

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 7: If one sent by means of a Kuti without a seal, if that place is a public thoroughfare, it is permitted, for he is afraid lest one of the passersby see him and seize him like a thief; however, ab initio one should not send by his means without a seal. Thus far his words. And they wrote that even if the passersby are non-Jews, he is afraid lest they tell the Israelite, as is written below in siman 129 [Taz, subsection 10]. And so too, even if he sent not by means of his manservant or maidservant, it is permitted in a public thoroughfare ex post facto [Shach, subsection 27]. And there is one who says that specifically by means of his manservant or maidservant, but not by their means it is forbidden [Issur V'Heter], but it is not so, for there is no distinction in this [Shach, ibid.].

And in my humble opinion it appears that it is not comparable to siman 129, for there everyone knows that the Israelite guards himself from contact with wine, and there we are dealing with a case where he is a laborer or a hired worker for him, see there, and certainly he is afraid that they will tell the owners. But when one carries a food item of an Israelite, from where would the star-worshippers walking in the street know that this one is carrying the food of an Israelite and that there is a concern in this? They would not consider this at all, and also this messenger is not afraid of them at all. It is sufficient for us to be lenient when the thoroughfare is a majority of Israelites, for this messenger is afraid because he imagines that they are looking at him and they are expert in the foods of Israelites; but when the thoroughfare for the masses is not Israelites, it appears that one should not be so lenient. And if we come to be lenient even in this manner, it is sufficient at least regarding his manservant or maidservant, upon whom the fear of their master lies, and for any slight concern they will not act; but not with a Cuthean who is not his own [and perhaps in such a case the Issur V'Heter says this, and also the Shach and the Taz would agree to this, and delve into it].

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in his book Torat Chattat that it is customary to send via Cutheans in a place where the public passes and it is a Jewish neighborhood and Cutheans are not commonly found there. Thus far his words. Meaning, even though it was explained that it is only permitted ex post facto in a place where the public passes, nevertheless, in a Jewish neighborhood it is customary to permit it even ab initio. And there is doubt whether this is specifically via his manservant or maidservant or via anyone, and it appears so since he wrote without specification. From this it is somewhat implied that ex post facto it is permitted even without a Jewish neighborhood and without his manservant or maidservant, and not like what I wrote in the previous section. However, one could say that this which is permitted ex post facto even without a Jewish neighborhood is only via his manservant or maidservant, as I wrote, and it requires further study for the law [see Taz subsection 11, and there is no understanding of his difficulty; however, it was printed by error on this section and refers to section 9, see there].

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 8: One who purchases meat and sends it by the hand of one of the amei ha'aretz, he is trusted regarding it even though he is not established as having kashrut, and we do not fear that perhaps he will exchange it; and even the slaves of Israel and their maidservants are trusted in this matter. And there is one who says that if he is suspected of eating things that the general public is not accustomed to be lenient with, he is also suspected of exchanging. Thus far his words. And the first opinion is the view of the Rambam in chapter 8, and he holds that one who is suspected of eating is not suspected of exchanging, just as we find this regarding demai [Chullin 6]. And the "one who says" is the view of the Rashba, and he holds that only regarding demai do we say this, because most amei ha'aretz are lenient in this; but if he is suspected of eating a thing that the public is not lenient in, he is also suspected of exchanging, for even though regarding eating alone he is only bad toward Heaven and in exchanging he is bad toward Heaven and toward people, nevertheless, regarding that matter for which he is suspected, it is impossible to trust him. And more will be explained regarding this with the help of Heaven in siman 119. And know that this which the Rambam wrote, that even their slaves and maidservants are trusted, this was in ancient times when they were the acquisition of their money and were circumcised and immersed for the sake of servitude, as the Maggid Mishneh wrote; but in this time, this is not applicable.

The Rashba, of blessed memory, wrote at the beginning of his book Torat HaBayit: That although a katan is not fit for shechitah without one standing over him, nevertheless, to send by his hand to buy wine and meat and other things, when he is a sharp katan and understands how to buy, it is permitted to buy by his hand and to send by his hand to a shochet to perform shechitah, and one may give money by his hand to pay the shochet or the butcher. And we do not fear that perhaps he took the money for himself and performed shechitah himself, or perhaps he bought treif cheaply and kept some of the money for himself, and so too anything similar to this. And there is no need for guarding, for this is not based on the reasoning of testimony, but rather on the reasoning of a chazakah that they are not prone to deviate from that which they were commanded, and it is not their way to ruin things by buying from the forbidden and leaving the permitted. And such is the custom of the world. Thus far his words.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote in section 6: One who leaves a star-worshiper in his house, and in it are items that if they were switched would involve even a Torah prohibition—if he is coming and going, or even if he stayed away a long time but did not inform him that he intended to stay away, it is permitted, and we do not fear that perhaps he switched them, even if he benefits from the switch, provided that the Cuthite did not close the house upon himself; for he is afraid at every moment, saying "now he will come and see me." But if he informed him that he intended to stay away, it is forbidden. And if he does not benefit from the switch, it is permitted in any case, for we do not fear that perhaps he switched them to cause him to stumble since he has no benefit in the matter. Thus far their words. And that which he wrote, "provided that he did not close the house upon himself," his intention is that if we knew that he closed the house upon himself, it is forbidden; but ordinarily we do not fear that perhaps he closed the door upon himself, and so he wrote in siman 129, see there. And it is a simple matter that if the Israelite closed the door from the outside, it is also permitted; for even though the Cuthite sees that the Israelite intends to stay away for a long time, nevertheless he has no place to go out and switch. However, if it is within his power to go out through a window or the like, it is forbidden. And that which they wrote, "one who leaves," which implies after the fact, they adopted the language of the Shas; but even initially it is permitted to leave him if one is coming and going [Shach, sub-section 32]. And furthermore, they adopted the language of after the fact because of the end of the ruling, that if he stayed away a long time and did not inform him that he intended to stay away, it is permitted, and this is only after the fact, but initially it is forbidden to do so [ibid.]. And know that even if a young boy or a young girl is coming and going, it is permitted, for he is afraid [ibid., sub-section 33].

And behold, the consensus of all our teachers, the Rishonim and Acharonim, is that we do not suspect a star-worshiper of causing an Israelite to stumble for no reason when he derives no benefit from it, as has been written several times. And one should not ask that if so, regarding an agunah, where they only believed a Cuthean when speaking in innocence, but without this he is not believed—and why should he not be believed, for behold, he derives no benefit from it? For it can be said that there it is a different matter, because we require testimony, and without speaking in innocence there is no testimony here, and the sages did not believe him, and it is as if he is not [Beit Shmuel on Even HaEzer siman 17, subsection 38].

And one of the great Acharonim wishes to say that even without benefit, he is suspected of switching, and he brought a proof from that which we learned in the third chapter of Demai [Mishnah 4]: One who brings wheat to a gentile miller, it is demai, for we fear that he switched them, even though he has no benefit. And I am wondered, for the Rambam wrote there explicitly, and this is his wording: Because the miller gathers baskets of wheat to him, and it is possible that he will switch them, etc. Thus far his words. Meaning, that he will switch them unintentionally. And it is true that the Rosh wrote there in this wording: Since he is supported by his craft and is afraid to act falsely, etc. Thus far his words. From this it implies that he would switch intentionally. However, even this is well-settled according to what the Rosh wrote further there, and this is his wording: Since everyone brings wheat there to grind, and even if he does not have poor quality of his own, he switches the poor quality of another for the good quality of this one, and afterwards when poor quality happens to come to him, he will give it to the owner of the poor quality. Thus far his words. Behold, he explains that he will switch poor for good and benefit will reach him from this, but without this, we do not fear. And so must be said regarding the intention of the Bartenura there, who wrote that he is suspected of switching, see there, meaning poor for good [and so must be said regarding the Rambam in his great work, chapter 11 of Ma'aser, halakhah 13, see there and examine closely].

He further brought a proof from that which we say in the Gemara [at the end of the chapter "All Forbidden Meats"] that bread is permitted with one seal, for what should we fear? If because of exchanging cold for hot—it is recognizable; wheat for barley—it is also recognizable; if they are similar—since there is one seal, he will not trouble himself to forge. And Rashi explained: He will not trouble himself to forge in a matter where he has no profit, see there. Behold, it is explicit that even in a matter where he has no profit, specifically with a seal he will not trouble himself to forge, but without this, we are concerned even without benefit. And there is one who rejected this, saying that Rashi's intention is that he does not have so much profit, such as cold for hot or wheat for barley, but there is some profit, such as if this bread is cleaner [Pri Chadash, subsection 36]. And I say that certainly the wording of Rashi, of blessed memory, indicates that even in a matter where he has no profit at all, we are concerned. However, Rashi follows his own reasoning in the first chapter there [12a], where he explained in the heading starting "Rava said," and this is his wording: For there he has no benefit to throw nevelah into the pot, for he is afraid that if the Israelite sees him, he will summon him to a beit din. Thus far his words. Behold, he wrote explicitly that even in what he has no benefit, if not for fear, we suspect him. And it is true that the Tosafot wrote there: He throws his lean meat and takes fat meat in order to profit, but for nothing, merely to cause stumbling, we are not concerned. Thus far their words. But Rashi does not hold so, and it is a minority opinion; but the Tosafot would explain also regarding bread that with a seal he will not trouble himself to forge bad for good, but without this we are not concerned at all. And since this is the opinion of the majority of the poskim, so we rule. [And the Ran inclined Rashi's intention also toward all the poskim, that even Abaye only feared lest he err, and Rava says that he will be precise because of fear and will not err, see there; and although the wording of Rashi is difficult according to his explanation, nevertheless we see that to the Ran this law was clear, and therefore he inclined Rashi's commentary also to this].

It is stated in the Gemara ibid.: Have you never gone to Tyre and seen an Israelite and a Kuti who placed two pots upon one stove, and the sages were not concerned for them lest the Israelite turn his face away and the Kuti throw nevelah into the pot? Thus far its words. That is to say, he throws his lean meat into the pot of the Israelite and takes the fat meat of the Israelite into his own pot [Tosafot]. And there is a doubt regarding the intent of the Shas, whether it says they were not concerned lest he turn his face because we do not presume a prohibition, but if he certainly turned his face it is forbidden; or perhaps this is the explanation: they were not concerned with the turning of the face, for even if he turned his face it is of no consequence to us, as we are not concerned for a brief moment. And I found in the Mordekhai [chapter ?] and in the Hagahot Ashri [chapter 1] that there is a dispute regarding this. This is his wording: It implies that if the Israelite turns his face we are concerned; from here Rabbeinu Peter ruled in the name of Rabbeinu Tam that if there were two pots etc. and the Israelite turned his face we are concerned lest he throw nevelah etc. And Rabbeinu Baruch permits etc. and specifically to exchange bad for good etc. Thus far his words. And in the Mordekhai it implies that even bad for bad or good for good we are concerned. This is his wording: And Rabbeinu Shmuel wrote, I found it written that some forbid and explain that the sages were not concerned for them lest the Israelite turn his face, implying that if he turns his face it is forbidden; and the proof is from the chapter "Keitzad Tzolin," one may not roast two Paschal offerings as one because of the mixing of the bodies. Thus far his words. And since he compares it to that of the Paschal offerings, hear from it that we are concerned lest he do so by mistake and not with intent; and since it is by mistake, then even without benefit it is forbidden [and this is like the reasoning of the Ran that we brought in the previous section].

But the Tosafot, the Rosh, the Tur, and the Shulchan Aruch simply maintained the permissive ruling and did not cite another opinion regarding this. This is the wording of the Tur and Shulchan Aruch in section 11: If an Israelite and a gentile placed two pots one next to the other, this one containing slaughtered meat and that one containing meat of a nevela, it is permitted, and one need not fear that when the Israelite turned his face away, he [the gentile] swapped the slaughtered meat for the nevela; even if the Israelite's meat is superior, and even if their openings are uncovered, it is permitted, and one need not fear that sparks will splatter from one to the other. Thus far their words. And the Tur concluded, and this is his wording: And my father, our teacher the Rosh, of blessed memory, wrote that upon this we rely to leave the pots with the maidservants when going to the synagogue; but it is proper for one who fears Heaven to be stringent, for several times a mishap occurred in the matter, and furthermore, in order to improve her portion, she puts milk into the pot. Thus far his words. And our teacher, the Rema, wrote that the same law applies to two roasted items one next to the other, but ab initio one should be careful even with two pots. Thus far his words. And there are those who explained that the reason one should be careful ab initio is because of splatters, and according to this, with covered pots it would be permitted even ab initio [Shach, subsection 36]. And there is one who explained that the prohibition ab initio is so that they do not get swapped with one another, like that case of the two Paschal offerings [Siftei Da'at, subsection 12], and according to this, with two pots, one of meat and one of milk, where there is no fear of swapping, it would be permitted even ab initio [ibid.]. And in my humble opinion, it appears that in any case it is prohibited ab initio, for behold, the Tur wrote that several times a mishap occurred in the matter, and how could we permit it ab initio? And even though he wrote this regarding maidservants and going to the synagogue, nevertheless, the matter is simple that something that can be done in a single moment when they are adjacent to one another, one must fear even for a single moment. On the contrary, it is an a fortiori argument: if with maidservants, who are very much afraid of the master of the house, mishaps occurred, all the more so with another. And behold, we see that this is not similar to all other matters even according to the opinion of those who permit, for here they only permitted by "turning the face," whereas in all other matters we permit by "exiting and entering," and as the Tosafot wrote there, that here it is impossible to permit by "exiting and entering" because they can offer an excuse; see there. If so, also by "turning the face" it is certainly prohibited ab initio [and therefore the annotator noted on the Rema "Tur," and the Taz wondered about this, see there; and according to what I wrote, it is well-settled]. And so too from that case of Pesachim there is clear proof that in any event it is prohibited ab initio, and even those who permit only permitted ex post facto and not ab initio, and they hold that from Pesachim there is no proof except regarding ab initio. And so it is implied from the language of the Gemara which said, "and the sages did not fear for them," meaning to prohibit ex post facto, but ab initio it is certainly prohibited to look away when two pots are one next to the other, one kosher and one treifa. And behold, those who prohibit, prohibit even ex post facto, and it is not similar to all other prohibitions in the world which are permitted even with "entering and exiting," because here it is easy to cause a stumbling block; all the more so that we should not, in any event, permit ab initio even with two covered pots, and so one should instruct.

This is the wording of our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, in section 12: One should be stringent not to leave the pots with the maidservants when there is no Israelite in the house and he is not coming in and out. And if a mishap occurred where she placed a forbidden item in the pot, one should not feed her that food, so that she does not become accustomed to doing so. Thus far their words. And it is clear from this that even ab initio one should only be stringent when he is not coming in and out, but when he is coming in and out, even ab initio one should not be stringent. And even though in the previous section we explained that ab initio even with turning one's face away it is forbidden, that is specifically not with maidservants who are not so afraid, and with two pots where she can easily cause a mishap; but with maidservants and with one pot, it is like all other prohibitions in the world where when one is coming in and out it is permitted even ab initio, for she requires a small amount of time to bring a forbidden item and place it in the pot, which is not the case with two pots. Therefore, it is possible that even with maidservants, when she is cooking a pot of forbidden food for herself, it is also forbidden ab initio even with turning one's face away. And know that regarding this which they permitted ab initio when coming in and out, one should not raise a difficulty that from the Tur it implies that even in such a case it is proper to be careful, for it can be said that he holds that the Tur was only particular regarding going to the synagogue, where she knows that he must necessarily tarry for some small amount of time, but when coming in and out, where at any moment he is able to come, they are very afraid [Shach, sub-section 37]. And that which they wrote not to feed it to her is not specifically to her, but the same applies to others, so that she sees that her actions are for naught [ibid.]. [See Pitchei Teshuvah, sub-section 6, in the name of the Chavat Da'at who distinguishes between for her benefit and to provoke, see there; and it is not certain, and in any case one should not give it to others either, and that which he said "to provoke" is not specific, as the Shach wrote in sub-section 38, and delve into this].

The poskim wrote that a Cuthean who said to an Israelite, "Do not eat from this pot because I threw a forbidden substance into it," is not believed [Beit Yosef and Shach there]. Certainly, according to the letter of the law, this is so. However, it is not a universal rule, for if the Israelite understands from his words that it could be so—for instance, if his statement was not made by way of jest or vengeance, but rather by way of confession and the like—certainly one must be concerned and not eat. For the general principle regarding the matter of credibility is that even though according to the law he is not believed, nevertheless, if one understands according to the estimation that he is not lying, one must believe him, as I wrote in siman 129, see there. And above in siman 36, section 22, and at the end of siman 48, we explained this, see there; and see in Even HaEzer siman 115.

If one left meat or other food in the hand of a star-worshiper and afterwards recognizes it by a clear visual identification that this is the meat or the food that he left, it is permitted even without a seal, for a clear visual identification is superior to signs. And so the early authorities wrote, that once the Jews were seized by oppressors and they took all that they had, and they reached a settlement with them and they returned everything, and they found their pots with goose fat and recognized them by a clear visual identification, and they permitted them [Taz, subsection 12, in the name of the Agudah]. It is further written in the Mordechai that when an Israelite gives a non-Jew a cooked dish in a vessel to bring to his house, he should warn him not to rinse the vessel and to leave the remnants of the food in order to know that he did not use the vessel. And it appears to me that the intention is that he should leave the remnants of this food, for we do not suspect to such an extent that perhaps he also made such a food and these are those remnants, for we do not suspect to such an extent [and the difficulty of the Taz there is settled]. And likewise, there is no need to fear that he would first remove the remnants and use it and afterwards place those remnants back, for he certainly would not trouble himself so much, and we do not have to fear such remote suspicions. And more of these laws regarding vessels that remained with a non-Jew will be explained in siman 122 with the help of Heaven.

Our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, wrote in section 9: Meat found in the hand of a Kutite and written upon it is a seal or "kasher," even though he does not know who wrote it, it is kasher, for it is known that it belongs to an Israelite, provided that there are no Kutites present there who know how to write. And similarly, it is permitted to buy cheeses that are sealed in the manner that Israelites seal them, and specifically in a place where there is no concern that perhaps the molds remained in their hands and they set them in their cheeses. And some forbid in all of this since we do not know who wrote it or sealed it, but post facto one should not be stringent. Thus far their words. And in section 13 they wrote: An Israelite who made cheeses in the house of Kutites and sealed them with a seal of a wooden mold and forgot the mold in their house, we do not fear that perhaps they forged and sealed others with that mold, and similarly there is no fear that perhaps they smeared the cheeses with lard. And some say that it should not be permitted if he forgot the mold in their house unless he left it placed upon the cheeses that the Israelite made; but if he did not leave it so, and there is a fear that perhaps he made small cheeses and exchanged them for large ones or for better ones, it is forbidden. And in a place of loss, one may permit in any case. Thus far their words.

The explanation of the matters is that we rely on the writing when it is the writing of an Israelite, even if we do not know who wrote it, since an Israelite certainly wrote it. And it is to be questioned whether we specifically require that the writing be on the food itself, or even when the food is in a vessel or wrapped in a sack or a cloth and "kosher" is written upon them, it is also permitted. And from the end of chapter 4 of Maaser Sheni it implies so, as we learned there: One who finds a vessel and written upon it is "Korban," Rabbi Yehuda says if it was of earthenware, it is chullin and what is inside it is Korban, etc. One who finds a vessel and written upon it is "Kof," it is Korban; "Mem," it is Maaser; "Dalet," it is Demai, etc. See there. Behold, we take a sign from the writing on the vessel regarding the item that is inside the vessel, and we do not fear that perhaps he already cleared it from the vessel and placed another inside it, for if so, he would have erased the writing [Yevamot 115b]. And here too it is similar. Nevertheless, it is impossible here to be lenient in such a case; first, because there it is for a stringency and here we are going toward a leniency; and furthermore, perhaps the Cuthean took what was inside it and placed another inferior to it, and so is the primary law, and we do not rely on the writing unless it is written on the food itself. And in a place where Cutheans are able to write, this is no sign at all, for perhaps he himself made it and placed a forbidden item in order to profit the money and the like, for he is not suspected of causing others to stumble as I have written. And automatically, all the more so regarding cheeses, which is only a rabbinic prohibition, that we rely on the seal if there is no concern that the seal remained in their possession. And there are those who forbid in all this ab initio to rely on a sign of writing when we do not know who wrote it, for from where do we have authority to rely to be lenient with mere writing? And from Maaser Sheni there is no proof, for there it is for a stringency. Nevertheless, one should not be stringent ex post facto, for the primary view is like the first opinion. And there is one who raised a difficulty: let us fear perhaps an Israelite wrote it as a sign of kashrut, but afterward it became known to him that it is treif [Taz, subsection 11]. However, it is no difficulty at all, for if so, he would have erased the writing [Nekudot HaKesef], and certainly so it is, for so it is in the Gemara in Yevamot there as I have written. And regarding the use of vessels when "kosher" is written on them, it is permitted even ab initio to use them, for ordinary vessels are not ben yomo [Torat Chattat, klal 32]. And the matter is simple that this is specifically when it is written on the inside of the vessel and not on the outside, so that if one uses them, the writing will be erased.

And that which they wrote in section 13 regarding cheeses, that when one forgot the mold in the house of the kouti we do not fear that perhaps he forged and sealed others, disagrees with what is written in section 9, that in such a case we do fear. And this is what they wrote, "And there are those who say that one should not permit if he forgot the mold etc.," and this is according to the opinion in section 9. However, from the plain sense of the words it does not imply so, and therefore it appears to me that they are two different matters. For there it deals with when the cheeses are now in the possession of the kouti and he is the seller, and therefore we certainly should fear that he acted and forged also on other cheeses. This is not the case in section 13, which deals with where the Israelite is the one selling them and the Israelite will see all the cheeses afterward; therefore we do not fear, because he is afraid that perhaps the Israelite will recognize the forgery, meaning that the seal is not on the place on the cheese where he is accustomed to make it, and also perhaps he will recognize that the later ones are more moist, and therefore we do not fear forgery [see Shach subsection 40]. And we also do not fear that perhaps he will smooth the surface of the cheeses with lard, because he is not suspected of causing one to stumble in a matter from which he has no profit [ibid. subsection 41]. And the "there are those who say" feared forgery even in such a case, unless the Israelite forgot the mold and left it placed upon the cheeses themselves, for then he is afraid to take it, lest he not succeed in returning it to that same place, and he reasons that the Israelite placed it upon the cheeses in this place intentionally. But if he did not leave it upon the cheeses but rather in another place, we fear forgery, for in this he will reason that the Israelite did not place it intentionally on this spot. However, in a case of loss, one may permit in any manner and rely on the first opinion, which is the primary one in halacha. And that which they wrote in section 9, that post facto one should not be stringent, there are those who say their intention is post facto if he already bought from the kouti in a place where there is no concern that perhaps the molds remained in his possession, but in a place where there is concern, even post facto it is forbidden. And there are those who say that even in such a case it is permitted post facto, and one may rely on this in a time of need [see Shach subsection 31]. And know that regarding signs of a seal on cheeses, there is no difference between one who deposits and one who sends, for it is not necessary that the Israelite see the seal [Pri Chadash subsection 31].