Siman 113

Shelakot that an idolater cooked, even if it is kosher food, the sages nevertheless forbade them. This is more stringent than bread, which was explained in the previous siman where they were lenient regarding several details and where the decree of bread did not spread throughout all of Israel. However, the prohibition of shelakot spread throughout all of Israel, and there is no "life-sustaining" element in this as there is with bread. It is an ancient decree, for before they decreed upon bread, they decreed upon shelakot, and they supported it from a verse as is explained in the chapter "Ein Ma'amidin," which derives it from "Food you shall sell me for money," etc. See there [37b]. Initially, they decreed upon it because of the concern of intermarriage, but they did not decree upon bread because intermarriage is not so relevant to it, until Shammai and Hillel came and decreed among the eighteen matters also upon bread [Tosafot ibid.]. And when they permitted the bread, they did not permit the shelakot, for they are two separate matters [ibid.]. Only bread that is not from the five species of grain, which is not considered within the category of bread, is included in the decree of shelakot, as I wrote in the previous siman, section 14; see there. [And the Ran wrote that they first decreed upon bread because it is a common matter, and afterwards they decreed upon shelakot; see there].

Most of the poskim wrote that the reason for the prohibition of shelakot is due to intermarriage. However, there are some of our teachers who wrote the reason is so that he will not feed him a forbidden matter [Hagahot Ashri there in the name of the Rashbam]. Rashi, of blessed memory, in the Mishnah there [35b] wrote it is due to intermarriage, but in the Gemara there [38a] he wrote so that he will not feed him a forbidden matter; see there. It is possible that his reasoning is why they were lenient regarding bread but not regarding shelakot, because in shelakot there are two reasons, whereas in bread the second concern of eating a forbidden matter is not applicable, for in bread what is in it is clearly visible, but this is not so with shelakot. Therefore, they were more stringent with shelakot than with bread [and with this, that which the Tosafot and the Ran labored over—why the Tanna divided them into two, and they were forced to say that they were two separate decrees—is settled simply according to what I have written regarding the intent of Rashi].

Our teachers, the authors of the Tosafot, wrote [ibid.], and this is their wording: The Ra’avad says that certainly the sages forbade cooked foods when the star-worshiper cooks them in his own house, but when he cooks in the house of an Israelite, there is no concern for either intermarriage or lest he feed him impure things. But the Ri did not agree with him, for certainly since he is cooking, the sages made no distinction at all between the domain of an Israelite and his own domain, because there is always a concern that he will not be careful even in the house of an Israelite just as in his own house. Thus far their words. And the Ra’ah in the book Bedek HaBayit [4:58b] wrote: I heard in the name of the Ri bar Manoach that the law of bishulakum does not apply to his acquired manservant or maidservant, since they act by way of compulsion, the "closeness of mind" does not apply; and my teacher, the Ramban, of blessed memory, views his words favorably, that even though it is not proper to do so, after the fact it is permitted. Thus far his words. And the Rashba wrote regarding this in Mishmeret HaBayit, and this is his wording: And there is no difference regarding a manservant or maidservant, etc., for they did not make distinctions in their decrees. Thus far his words. And it is possible that even those who permit only permitted those acquired by us and not those hired for a year or more [Bach]. And in Issur VeHeter, rule 43, he wrote that after the fact it is customary to rely on the words of the Ra’avad who permits in the house of an Israelite, see there. And in the glosses of Sha’arei Dura, siman 75, he wrote in the name of the Terumat HaDeshen that it is customary to permit leaving maidservants to cook and roast, and it is possible they relied on the fact that it is impossible that one of the members of the household will not rake the coals for the purpose of the cooking or roasting. Thus far his words.

And behold, the Tur also wrote, and this is his wording: And the R' Avraham used to permit them if they cooked in the house of an Israelite, etc., but Rabbeinu Tam disagrees with him, and so we practice. Thus far his words. And he agreed to the prohibition. And also our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 4 wrote: There is one who permits regarding our maidservants, and there is one who prohibits even post facto. Thus far his words. And his opinion is toward prohibition, as he wrote in his great book; see there. However, our teacher, the Rema, wrote, and this is his wording: And post facto, one may rely on the words of those who permit, and even initially we practice to be lenient in an Israelite home where the maidservants and servants cook in the Israelite home, for it is impossible that one of the members of the household will not rake the coals a little. Thus far his words. And it appears explicitly that he was lenient because of all the reasons together, namely, in an Israelite home, and the maidservants are hired, and it is impossible that one of the members of the household will not rake a little during the cooking of the cooked food or the roast, and in a manner that is effective in hastening the cooking. And our teacher, the Rema, holds that although the Ri and Rabbeinu Tam disagree with the reasoning of the Ra'avad that in the house of an Israelite it is permitted, and also the permission regarding those acquired by us is not to be relied upon because they are not acquired by us but rather hired, nevertheless, with both of them together and in combination with the third permission, one may permit it initially [and see Shach subsection 6 and Taz subsection 3]. And certainly in large places where they do not allow an Israelite maidservant to stay, they certainly may rely on these permissions. But in a place where it is possible, one should not rely on all the permissions that have been explained, and so is the widespread custom and one should not change it.

Regarding what things the prohibition of bishul akum applies to, the sages gave two rules: everything that is eaten as it is raw, such as fruits and the like, is not subject to the prohibition of their cooking [ibid. 38b]; and similarly, everything that does not ascend to the table of kings is not subject to the prohibition of their cooking [ibid.]. And we establish the law according to these formulations: that if it is eaten as it is raw, even if it ascends to the table of kings, or if it does not ascend to the table of kings, even if it is not eaten as it is raw, there is no prohibition in them. And thus all our teachers, the Rishonim and Achronim, agreed that this prohibition only applies to a thing that is not eaten raw and ascends to the table of kings. And thus they ruled in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch, section 1.

In the Gemara [38a] it is stated: Anything that does not go up on the table of kings to eat with bread is not subject to the prohibition of bishul, etc. And so the Rambam wrote in chapter 17, law 15, and explained the reason: because the primary decree is due to intermarriage, so that one will not invite him to a meal, and a thing that does not go up on the table of kings to eat with bread, a person does not invite his fellow for it. Thus far his words. And from this wording it is implied that a thing that is not for eating with bread, even if it is a thing of importance like important types of desserts, since it is not for eating with bread, we have no concern with it, even if they are not eaten as they are raw. And so wrote one of the great Acharonim, that this is the opinion of the Rambam, and such is the primary ruling [Pri Chadash, subsection 3].

But the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, section 1, wrote: A thing that is not eaten as it is raw, and also comes upon the table of kings to relish the bread with it or as a dessert, etc., is forbidden due to bishul kokhavim. Thus far their words. And it appears that their opinion is this: that which the Sages, of blessed memory, said, "to relish the bread with it," is not literal, and they spoke of the common manner of the matter, for a thing that is not important is not brought upon the table of kings to relish the bread with it; but the essence depends on a thing of importance that comes upon the table of kings, even though it is eaten by itself and not with the bread. And the Rambam himself also mentioned there in law 18 the term "dessert" regarding beans and lentils; see there. However, it can be said that his intention was a dessert that is eaten with the bread, for so he wrote explicitly in chapter 4 of Berakhot, law 6. This is his wording: If one recited the blessing over the bread, he exempted the dessert that they eat the bread with, etc. Thus far his words. Nevertheless, regarding the halacha, since the Tur and Shulchan Aruch ruled for prohibition, so we maintain. [And from the Yerushalmi, chapter 1 of Avodah Zarah, halacha 8, it implies like the Rambam, as it is stated there: Any food that is eaten as it is raw is not subject to bishul kokhavim; with the bread, it is subject to bishul kokhavim. Thus far its words. That is to say, that which they eat to relish the bread is a cooked thing, for it is the way of relishing bread to be with a cooked thing. And the Yerushalmi did not mention at all this matter of "coming upon the table of kings"; see there. However, the essence appears to be that it depends on relishing the bread, and it requires further study].

In the Gemara [37b], it sought to learn the law of shalot from the verse, "Food you shall sell me for money, and water you shall give me for money"; just as water is not changed from its natural state by fire—meaning that even when water is cooked, its form is not changed from before the cooking—so too anything that is not changed from its natural state by cooking is not subject to the prohibition of shalot. For this reason, it was taught that wheat made into parched grain is not subject to the prohibition of bishulei kochavim because it has not been changed from its natural state by fire. Afterwards, the Shas concludes that this prohibition is rabbinic and the verse is a mere asmachta; see there. The Ran, of blessed memory, wrote that even according to the conclusion, this law was not rejected: that anything that is not changed from its natural state by fire is not subject to the prohibition of bishulei kochavim. This is also the explicit implication of the opinion of Rashi there [38a, s.v. ve-kaliyot], and such is the opinion of one of the great acharonim [Shach, subsection 1].

But the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch did not mention this matter at all, and also the Rambam did not mention this. On the contrary, from the fact that he wrote in chapter 17 regarding the reason for the permissibility of parched grain that it is because a person does not invite his fellow for parched grain, see there, and he did not write the reason mentioned in the Gemara, it implies that he holds that in the final conclusion this reason was rejected. And also in the Gemara itself this is proven, for they disagree there regarding a roasted egg whether it is subject to bishul akum, and we rule for prohibition; and yet an egg is not changed from its original state by the fire [Pri Chadash, subsection 1], unless we say that since it is changed on the inside it is called changed by the fire. And also the opinion of our teacher, the Rema, explicitly proves this, from the fact that he wrote in section 1 regarding the reason for the permissibility of legumes and peas that it is because they do not go up on a table of kings, and he did not write the reason that they were not changed from their original state by the fire; it implies that he does not hold by this reason, and thus we rule. And furthermore, the Rashba explains that this which they said, "that it was not changed from its original state by the fire," means that previously it was not fit for eating and through the fire it became fit for eating, and if so, it is one and the same thing as a matter that is not eaten as it is raw [so he wrote in Torat HaBayit, Bayit 3, Shaar 7]. And in the Yerushalmi it is implied that its explanation is that it was not changed from its original state by the fire, meaning that through soaking the matter would return to how it was before cooking, see there [but our Talmud does not hold so, for the Yerushalmi says that parched grain is called changed, see there halacha 8, and in the Gemara it is explicitly stated the opposite; and examine this carefully].

There is one who wrote that truffles and mushrooms are served on the table of kings as appetizers and are subject to the prohibition of shelakot [Shach, subsection 2, in the name of Issur V'Heter]. However, according to the explanation of the Aruch on the Gemara there [38a], where it is stated that small fish, ardi, and porridge are not served on the table of kings, for ardi are truffles and mushrooms [Aruch, entry ardi], and so it is proven from the commentary of Rashi in Berakhot [47a] and Ketubot [61a], and therefore they are not subject to the prohibition of bishul akum. One of the great Acharonim [Pri Chadash, subsection 3] ruled accordingly. But the gizzard and intestines, even though it is stated in the Gemara in Nedarim [54a] that those who eat them are not considered "men" and they are not included in the category of "pieces fit to be served to guests" as written in siman 101, nevertheless regarding shelakot they are forbidden, for the sages did not distinguish between one type of meat and another. For if not so, we would permit lean meat which has no importance; rather, it is certain that every type of meat is forbidden [Shach and Pri Chadash ibid.].

There are some among the great Acharonim who wished to say that a distinguished person is forbidden to eat or drink from the cooked foods of gentiles even regarding a thing that is eaten as it is raw [Bach and Shach siman 152, subsection 2], and many rejected their words [Pri Chadash subsection 3 and Taz siman 152 and Magen Avraham siman 257 subsection 15 and Keneset HaGedolah end of Perek Bameh Madlikin]. And the truth is indeed so, for even though we find many times in the Shas that a distinguished person must be stringent upon himself, nevertheless, regarding this law which we find in the Gemara [Shabbat 51a] that Rabban Gamliel performed an action himself to permit it and Rav Yosef supported him; and therefore, even though Rabbi Ami was particular about this, nevertheless the halacha is like the many, and so it is implied from the wording of the Shas there. And likewise in Moed Katan [12b], Rabbi Yehuda Nesi'ah performed an action himself and drank from water that a gentile heated; hear from this that they were not concerned for this. And therefore, even though in Yevamot [46a] we find that Rabbi Yehuda sent to a certain place to forbid it to them because they were not people of Torah, see there, nevertheless we do not hold ourselves to be those who are not people of Torah, and likewise regarding all the matters that were explained there, see there well. And so wrote the Tosafot in the first chapter of Beitzah [6a] s.v. "ve-ha-idna" and the Rosh there siman 5, see there.

It is a simple matter that regarding a thing that is not eaten as it is raw, we follow the majority of people; for if the majority do not eat this food as it is raw, even though an individual eats it, nevertheless it is also forbidden for that individual to eat it cooked. And if the majority eat this when it is raw, even though an individual cannot eat it except cooked, nevertheless it is permitted for him, for his opinion is nullified relative to all people. And so ruled one of the great Acharonim [Pri Chadash, subsection 3]. But if one province eats it while it is raw and another province does not eat it except cooked, they are not nullified to one another [see Tosafot Shabbat 92b, s.v. "ve-im tima" and Eruvin 28b, s.v. "u-ve-Vavel," and examine this closely].

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 1 that it is permitted to eat roasted peas of a gentiles and likewise the legumes called "arbesin" roasted, for they do not ascend to the table of kings, and thus they have been accustomed to permit them, unless in a place where they are accustomed to grease the pan with fat, in which case they are accustomed to forbid them; but otherwise it is permitted, and one need not be concerned for the vessels of gentiles, for their status is generally that they are not "ben yomo." And any fruit that is eaten as it is raw, even if gentiles cooked it and it was mashed and became a cooked dish in their hands, it is permitted; and therefore one may eat the "povidla" that gentiles make. Thus far his words. And according to this, the "confecturen" that they make in the "zuckerness" and what they bring from distant places, it is permitted to eat them, unless the fruit is presumed to have worms, like "malines," for then it is forbidden to eat them without inspection. But all types of fruits that they fry in sugar or in honey, it is permitted to eat them. But when the fruit is not fit to be eaten raw, such as types of roses and lilies that they fry in sugar and they are not eaten raw, they are forbidden for consumption. And it is possible that they are not considered fruit at all and they are merely like grasses, and one must deliberate on this.

It is stated in the Gemara [Berakhot 36b]: This hamlita that comes from the house of the Hindu is permitted regarding bishul akum, and this is moist zangbila which is called ingber. When it is moist, it is fit for eating while raw, and therefore it is not subject to bishul akum. However, when it is dry, it is not fit for eating while raw, and it is subject to bishul akum, unless other things were mixed into it that are eaten as they are raw and they are the primary part. For thus wrote the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch in section 2: If one mixed an item that is eaten as it is raw with an item that is not eaten as it is raw and an akum cooked them, if the primary part is from the item that is subject to bishul akum, it is forbidden; and if not, it is permitted. Thus far their words. From this wording it is implied that if both are equal in importance, it is permitted, for since it is a light prohibition, it is permitted even in a half-and-half mixture. [And there is one who permits zangbil whether moist or dry, for it is not subject to bishul akum (Magen Avraham siman 203, subsection 4, see there), and this requires further study, and delve into it].

And know that from the wording of our teacher, the Rema, who wrote regarding toasted peas and legumes that the reason for the permission is because they do not ascend to the table of kings, and he did not write the reason because they are eaten while they are raw, we have learned from this that regarding any matter where, even though at the time it ripens it is eaten while it is raw—such as peas and legumes that at the end of the summer, when they ripen properly, are eaten while they are raw as is known—nevertheless, since after they have dried they are not fit to be eaten raw except through pressing need, it is not called "eaten as it is raw." And according to this, also ribes and cherries and brusca are subject to bishul akum [and so wrote the Chachmat Adam, klal 66], and so too anything similar to this.

And behold, according to what he wrote, that peas and legumes do not ascend upon a table of kings, if so, even cooked they are permitted. Or, perhaps his intention was that only when they are roasted do they not ascend upon a table of kings, but not when they are cooked; and therefore he was precise to write "roasted" [and so it appears from the Pri Chadash, subsection 5]. And so it is explicitly explained in the Rambam, chapter 17, law 18, and this is his wording: Beans, peas, lentils, and the like, which the gentiles boil and sell, are forbidden due to bishul akum in a place where they ascend upon a table of kings as a relish, etc. Thus far his words. Therefore, if we know that they do not ascend upon a table of kings, it is permitted to eat them. [And nevertheless, there is no correct reasoning to distinguish between roasted and cooked; and so it is explicitly implied from the words of the Maharai brought in the Beit Yosef, and this is his wording: The Maharai was asked regarding beans, etc., and there is some proof from the Smag, Negative Commandment 19, who wrote that nowadays lupines that gentiles boil are permitted, and there is no correct distinction to divide between beans and lupines. Thus far his words.] Behold, he permits boiled beans, and therefore there is someone to rely upon.

The Rambam wrote there, law 21: Roasted flour of lentils that one kneaded, whether with water or with vinegar, this is forbidden; but roasted flour of wheat and barley that one kneads with water, this is permitted. Thus far his words. And the reason for the matter is because it is not the way of wheat and barley to be kneaded with vinegar, and therefore they did not decree water on account of vinegar; but regarding lentils, because they are very sweet, they knead them with vinegar. And I wonder at the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch who omitted this law, for it is an explicit Gemara [38b], and also the Rif and the Rosh brought this, see there. And it appears to me that because in the Gemara there are two versions, and according to the first version even that of lentils is permitted with water, and since it is a rabbinic prohibition we follow the lenient view; and that which is with vinegar is forbidden they did not need to inform us, for it is a simple matter that this is wine of gentiles, and this is explained below in siman 123 that the vinegar of a gentile is forbidden [and the Rif and the Rambam follow the system of the Geonim to rule according to the "there are those who say," and see there in the Rosh and the Pnei Yehoshua, and delve into this].

Potatoes, which are called "kartoflyes" or "bulbes," it appears to me that this is considered "does not ascend to the table of kings." If a gentile cooked them in water alone or baked them, it is permitted for an Israelite to eat them, for it is known that it is a simple food and only the poor of the people eat it in abundance due to their poverty and hardship. Even though the wealthy also eat them occasionally, this is because of their great abundance and not because it is an important food. On the table of kings it certainly would not ascend, neither to accompany bread nor as a dessert. Only during the time of their cooking, when they are still soft, is it the way of ministers to buy them to place them in an "aye" dish with spices, but during the rest of the year they would not eat them as a food. However, I found one great authority who wrote that potatoes do ascend; see there [Chachmat Adam ibid.]. Perhaps in former times when this was not available it was an important food, for it has been about a hundred years since this species was brought from the countries across the great sea. But now in our country, where they plant it in abundance and it is the food of the majority of the masses and is a very simple food, and the soft and delicate man would say to it "keep away," it appears to me that it is not relevant to say of this "ascends to the table of kings." And one should deliberate on this.

An egg, even though it is fit to be swallowed raw, is forbidden due to bishul akum [Gemara]. Similarly, dates that are somewhat bitter, which are only eaten under duress, if a gentile cooked them they are forbidden. Nevertheless, pears and hard apples, even though the majority of their consumption is through roasting and cooking, if a gentile roasted or cooked them they are permitted, because they are nevertheless also eaten raw, and furthermore, the primary majority of their consumption is raw [ibid. subsection 19 in the name of the Issur V'Heter]. And it is stated in the Gemara that garlic and leeks are eaten raw [Berakhot 38b], and similarly capers and small leeks [Avodah Zarah 38b]. And regarding turnip, even though there are those who eat it raw, their opinion is nullified, and it is subject to bishul akum [Pri Chadash subsection 24], as I wrote in section 15, see there. Rice is served on a table of kings, but millet, which is called "hirz," there is one who says that it is not served on a table of kings and is permitted [Chachmat Adam there]. Whole walnuts that gentiles cook in their vessels are permitted because they are not served on a table of kings, but large walnuts that are preserved in their bitter shells are forbidden, for they are not eaten raw and are served on a table of kings [Mordechai, Perek Ein Ma'amidin]. And I do not know what this is, for in our countries this species is not found. And whole walnuts are called "stachel-nuss" [Shach subsection 3]. And when flour is boiled on a pan with some liquid, if the flour is the primary element such that one recites over it "borei minei mezonot," it is forbidden due to bishul akum; but if the flour is merely for binding, in a manner that one recites over it "shehakol," it is not subject to bishul akum. Therefore, all types of "zuckerkes" are permitted to be eaten, even those that have a little flour, for it is only for binding, and similarly all types of "koniditerski" are permitted for eating.

Fat of meat or of poultry, if they have not yet been fried, are subject to the prohibition of bishul akum. However, when they have already been fried and hardened, and the gentile melted them, there is no prohibition of bishul akum in this, for there is no cooking after cooking. So too with fish fat [Shach, subsection 5]. And all types of oils, whether olive oil or sesame oil or oil from flaxseed or hemp oil which they call "olay," or of roses which they call "rosen oil," or sunflower oil, all of them are eaten raw and are not subject to the prohibition of bishul akum.

A panada or pastida that a non-Jew baked is forbidden; even in a place where they follow the practice of permitting the bread of a non-Jew, it is forbidden because of the fat absorbed within it, which is forbidden in its own right due to the laws of bishul akum. And even though the flour is the primary ingredient, why should the fat not be nullified by the flour? Because the fat is visible and discernible to the eye within the dough, and it is not similar to the eggs in siman 112, section 20, see there. Therefore, if there is no prohibition here on account of the fat, such as if it were a loaf that was melted and fried, and there is no bishul after bishul, it is permitted. Such is the law regarding vegetables and fruits that are eaten raw which he cooked with meat; they are forbidden because the fat of the meat is absorbed in them and is visible and discernible to the eye and is not nullified [and this is dealing with kosher fat and meat]. The Rashba, the Tur, and the Shulchan Aruch in section 3 wrote this law.

And know that I have a great question regarding this law. For behold, all of our teachers wrote that the reason beer is not subject to the prohibition of bishulei akkum is because just as the grain is nullified to the water regarding the blessing, as we recite "she-hakol" over it, so too it is nullified regarding the prohibition of bishulei akkum [Tosafot, Perek Af Al Pi 31b and the Rosh there]. And behold, there is nothing more recognizable than this, and everyone sees that there are barley and wheat, and if so, how is the fat in the panada superior to the barley within the beer? Furthermore, since regarding beer they wrote the reason is based on the blessing, behold, in a panada as well the fat is nullified to the dough regarding the blessing, and we recite "borei minei mezonot" over it. And so too, we drink tea in their homes because the tea herb is nullified to the water, and likewise it is permitted to drink coffee and chocolate without milk because it is nullified to the water, and there is no greater recognizability than this [so wrote the Pri Chadash regarding the permissibility of coffee and chocolate in siman 112, subsection 12 and subsection 17, and so he ruled in Teshuvot Be'er Eshek siman 105, that even from the custom of the holy it is permitted, see there; and so wrote the Birkei Yosef at the beginning of siman 114, and there is no one who concerns himself with what the Panim Me'irot wrote in part 2, siman 62, brought by the Pitchei Teshuvah there; and examine this carefully].

The answer to this is that eating is not comparable to drinking, for the reasons that were explained—the reason of nullification and the reason of the blessing—only avail when the thing is changed from its essence, such as with beer, tea, and coffee, which change from eating to drinking. This is not the case with panada, which is a food item, and its importance is due to the fat, as it is known that baked dough without fat has no importance, and it is the fat that gives it importance. The primary name "panada" or "pastida" is due to the fat, for without fat it is called bread. Therefore, when it is recognizable and visible to the eye, it is not nullified, and it is like one who mixed an item that is eaten as it is raw with an item that is not eaten, where we follow the primary component, as I wrote in section 14. Here too, the primary importance is the fat. Regarding sugar, the prohibition of bishul akum does not apply at all for several reasons, and particularly since it is not in its original form, neither in appearance nor in its taste, and it is not in the category of eating or drinking at all.

When the sages decreed against their cooking, they did not decree against their pickling, nor against their salting, nor against the smoked, as the Rambam wrote in chapter 17, law 17. This is his wording: Fish that an akum salted and fruits that he smoked until he prepared them for eating, these are permitted; salted is not like hot in this decree, and the smoked is not like the cooked. Thus far his words. And he did not mention pickling because this is not explicit in the Shas, for salted is explicit in the Gemara [38a] and smoked is in the Yerushalmi Nedarim [beginning of chapter 6], but pickling is not explicit. Nevertheless, they have one law, for they only decreed against cooking. And nevertheless, it seems to me that frying is included in cooking regarding this matter, because also regarding Shabbat, frying is exactly like cooking. And I found support for this from the Yerushalmi there, see there [and with this, the wording of the Rema in section 13 is precise, and examine it closely].

Therefore, it is permitted to eat their salted fish, and even if they cooked them afterward it is permitted, since prior to the cooking it was fit for eating by means of the salting, it is like a thing that is eaten as it is raw. This is the wording of our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, in section 12: Small fish that an Israelite or a gentile salted are as if they were partially cooked, and if a gentile roasted them afterward they are permitted. However, large salted fish are not eaten except with difficulty; therefore, if a gentile roasted them they are forbidden, and some permit. And so too, anything that is eaten raw with difficulty, and in the language of the gentiles, their law is like large fish. Salted meat is not eaten at all as it is raw, and it is forbidden if it was cooked by a gentile. Thus far his words.

The explanation of their words is that even though small fish are permitted regardless because they are not served on a table of kings, as is stated in the Gemara and as I wrote in section 10, this refers to species of large fish when they are still small and have no importance, such as what are called in our language "plotkes." However, species of small fish whose essence is this size and they do not grow larger, such as "herring," "marqudes," "sardinkes," "flianderkes," "samaykes," and the like, are very important and are served on a table of kings, and therefore the permission is due to their prior salting. And that which they wrote, that large salted fish are not eaten except with difficulty, is not a general rule, for behold in our times there are large salted fish that are eaten well, such as "shanga," "byela ribitsa," and "laks." However, their intention was to ordinary large fish such as "hecht," "lachs," and "schleien" and the like, for these certainly are not eaten in their salted state except with difficulty, and therefore some forbid and some permit. And the main point is according to the opinion of those who forbid, for eating with difficulty is not called eating [Pri Chadash, subsection 21], unless they were salted for a vast amount of time in a manner that they are eaten with good taste, for then it is permitted. Therefore, salted meat and anything that is eaten raw with difficulty are forbidden when a non-Jew cooked them.

It has already been explained that smoked food is permitted, and therefore smoked fish called "kaptshkes" are permitted for eating, and one need not concern himself that perhaps he smoked them under a pot of treif meat and the steam rose to the fish, for we do not establish a flaw. Furthermore, they are meticulous regarding cleanliness, and therefore even a gentile homeowner who smoked fish, they are permitted [Shach, siman 74], and all the more so in the factories that produce smoked fish in great quantities, such as "flanderkes," for there is no concern at all in this. However, if a gentile roasted them before the smoking, it is simple that they were forbidden through roasting, for this is like cooking. And so it appears clear regarding fruits such as apples and pears that gentiles dry in an oven, that they are permitted for eating, since they are eaten as they are raw, and there is no concern that perhaps they dried them in an oven that contains forbidden fat. And even if they dried them in a large pan called "blekhn," we do not concern ourselves that perhaps there was fat in them, for they are meticulous regarding cleanliness as is stated in the Gemara. Furthermore, for the most part, they place straw and upon it they place the fruits to dry them, and such is the simple custom and one should not doubt this at all.

A non-Jew who cooked but did not intend to cook, it is permitted. How so? For example, if he ignited a fire in a marsh in order to clear the hay and pure locusts were cooked therein, these are permitted even in a place where they would rise to the table of kings. And similarly, if he singed a head to remove the hair, it is permitted to eat the tips of the ears that were roasted at the time of the singeing. And similarly, if he heated the oven to dry a damp peg therein or the like, and the Israelite had previously hidden some food item to be roasted there, it is permitted to eat because he did not intend to cook, but rather to dry the peg. And even though regarding the matter of Shabbat this is also called cooking, as is found in Shabbat [74b], nevertheless regarding the matter of cooked foods this is not considered cooking at all [Tosafot, Perek Af Al Pi 38]. And some say that specifically when the non-Jew did not know of the Israelite's hiding [of the food], but if he knew it is forbidden, perhaps he intended to cook; and this is the opinion of the Tur, see there. However, most of the poskim do not hold accordingly [Beit Yosef]. And without a situation of great loss, it is proper to be concerned for this opinion [Pri Chadash, subsection 11].

And all this is when the akkum did not intend for the sake of cooking at all, as has been written. However, if he intended for the sake of cooking in general, even though he did not intend for this cooking of the Yisrael—for example, he stoked the oven to cook in it and the Yisrael had previously hidden meat there and it was roasted—even though the akkum did not intend for this, as he did not know of it at all, nevertheless it is forbidden since the stoking was for the sake of cooking. And it appears to me that this is when the Yisrael did not intend to place the meat so that it would roast, but rather hid it there without intent for cooking. But when the Yisrael placed the meat with the intent for cooking, it is obvious that it is permitted, as will be explained, for in this there is no concern of bishul akkum when the Yisrael placed the food into the oven. And one cannot say that this is specifically after the stoking of the oven and not before, for what difference does it make? And so it appears to me from the wording of the Gemara [38a] that the Yisrael did not intend for cooking, see there. Furthermore, it appears to me that when the Yisrael did not intend for cooking and the akkum intended for cooking, it is forbidden even if the akkum did not cook at all with this stoking, for example, if he changed his mind about cooking; nevertheless, since the stoking was with the intent for cooking, it is forbidden.

The prohibition of bishul akum is only when the Yisrael had no part in the cooking, but when he had some part, it is permitted. How so? For example, if the akum placed the meat on the fire, or placed the meat in the pot and placed the pot on the fire, or put it in the oven, and the Yisrael came and flipped the meat or stirred the pot in order to hasten the cooking or to improve it, it is permitted. And so too the opposite: when the Yisrael placed the meat or the pot and the akum flipped it or stirred the pot, it is permitted. This is the rule: anything that a Yisrael cooked even a little of the cooking, whether at the beginning or at the end, it is permitted. And even if without the assistance of the akum it would not have cooked, nevertheless, since the Yisrael had a small part in the cooking, it is permitted. And thus our sages, of blessed memory, said [38b]: whether the akum placed it and the Yisrael flipped it, or whether the Yisrael placed it and the akum flipped it, it is permitted; and it is not prohibited until its beginning and its end etc.

And know that that which we wrote, that even if without the assistance of the Akum it would not have been cooked it is permitted, we wrote this according to the words of our teacher, the Rema, in section 6 who wrote so. And all the commentators of the Shulchan Aruch challenged him, for this is against the Shas [Shach subsection 8, and Taz subsection 6, and Pri Chadash], as it is explicit there that if the primary cooking is by means of the Akum it is forbidden. And they were very pressed regarding his words, see there. And there are those who rejected his words entirely. And in my humble opinion, his words are clear as the sun, and we will explain them with the help of Heaven:

It is stated in the Gemara [38a]: Shmuel said, if an Israelite placed meat upon coals and a gentile came and flipped it, it is permitted. And it concludes that this refers to a case where without the flipping it would have been cooked in two hours, and when he flipped it, it will be cooked in one hour; but if without the flipping it would not have been cooked at all, it is forbidden. And it comes to teach us that even though the gentile hastens the cooking, we have no concern with it, for hastening the cooking is of no consequence. And afterwards it says: They raised an inquiry: if a gentile placed it and an Israelite flipped it, what is the law? Rav Nahman bar Yitzchak said, it is an a fortiori argument: if when its completion is by the hand of a gentile it is permitted, when its completion is by the hand of an Israelite, is it not all the more so? It was also stated etc. Rabbi Yochanan said: whether a gentile placed it and an Israelite flipped it, or an Israelite placed it and a gentile flipped it, it is permitted; and it is not forbidden unless its beginning and its completion are by the hands of a gentile. Ravina said: The halacha is that this bread, where a gentile stoked the oven and an Israelite baked, or alternatively an Israelite stoked and a gentile baked, or alternatively a gentile stoked and a gentile baked and an Israelite came and raked the coals slightly, it is perfectly fine. Thus far the words of the Gemara. And the She'iltot at the end of Parshat Devarim reads: "Therefore, this bread etc." See there.

The Rashba, the Ran, and the Rivash [514] explained that this permission regarding the stoking of the oven applies only to bread and not to cooked food. They were compelled to this because regarding cooked foods it says explicitly beforehand that if it would not have been cooked at all without the turning of the gentile, it is forbidden; if so, how is it possible to permit it through the stoking of the Israelite alone, for without the action of the gentile—namely, the baking—it would not have been cooked at all? Rather, it is certain that they were lenient only regarding bread and not regarding cooked foods. However, I find it difficult: if so, why did the Shas establish this statement here? It should have established it much earlier on page [35b], for there we deal with the laws of bread. And even more difficult than this is the version of the She'iltot, which reads "Therefore," which implies explicitly that we learned this from the previous law, yet it is quite the opposite.

They further raised a difficulty regarding that which Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak said: It is a kal vachomer: if its completion by the hand of a gentile is permitted, its completion by the hand of an Israelite, is it not all the more so? What kal vachomer is this? On the contrary, he says previously that "hastening the cooking is of no consequence," and therefore when the gentile hastened the cooking it is permitted; if so, it follows automatically to the contrary, that when the Israelite hastened the cooking it is forbidden, as it is of no consequence. And they answered that certainly hastening the cooking is of consequence, and that which he forbids previously because "it is of no consequence," meaning that regarding the leniency of bishul akkum it is of no consequence so as not to forbid for this reason [Ran]. And I wonder, for if it is because of this, why must he say "it is of no consequence"? For even if it is of consequence it is permitted, since the Israelite also had a part in the cooking by placing the meat upon the coals. It would be understandable if we required that the entire cooking be by the Israelite, then he would certainly be forced to say that hastening the cooking is of no consequence; but in truth, even when a gentile placed it and an Israelite turned it, the entire cooking is not by the Israelite, but rather the hastening of the cooking. And if so, why was he forced regarding this previously, when an Israelite placed it and a gentile turned it, to say that it is of no consequence at all? And it requires great study.

And behold, from the words of the Tosafot, the Rosh, and the Mordechai, it is explicitly clarified that this law of Ravina applies both to bread and to cooked food, and all the more so according to the version of the She'iltot, which reads "therefore," as I have written; for in truth, the decree of bread and cooked food are equal according to the conclusion, as cooked food is also due to the concern of intermarriage, and it is only that there are places where the decree of bread did not spread, but in the essence of the decree they are equal. Therefore, it appears to me correct to explain the sugya according to their words in a different manner, and through this the words of our teacher, the Rema, will be clarified [my brother-in-law, the Gaon, in his commentary on the She'iltot, was greatly pressed to distinguish even according to his words between bread and cooked food, see there, and the difficulty is evident]:

And behold, this matter is explicitly stated in the Gemara there, that if an Israelite placed meat upon coals, and before it was cooked to the extent of the food of Ben Drusai he took the meat and placed it in a basket, and a non-Jew came and took it from the basket and roasted it, it is forbidden as bishul akum. And even though the Israelite had a part in the beginning of the cooking, because when he took it and placed it in the basket, the prior action was nullified. And behold, this matter is also understood when one places meat upon the coals and takes the meat to flip it; does he not lift it from the coals entirely? And it is as if it were placed in a basket. And this is explicitly stated in the She'iltot there, and this is his wording: However, it is necessary [to ask], these Israelites who placed meat upon coals, and a Cuthean came and flipped it, what is the law? In a case where if he had not flipped it, it would not have cooked, we do not have a question, for it is certainly forbidden, as it is like one who took it from a basket and placed it upon coals, etc. Thus far his words. See there, for he brought the entire sugya.

And according to this, I say that these, our teachers, hold that the decree was only if the Israelite had no part at all in the cooking, and we do not concern ourselves at all if it would not have been cooked by the action of the Israelite, or if it would have been cooked if he performed only a thing necessary for the cooking. And behold, if the Israelite stoked the oven, there is no law and no judge, for it is permitted, as this matter is the primary element of the cooking. Therefore, even if the Cuthean performed all the cooking, it is permitted, for the beginning of the cooking is the stoking of the oven, and the Israelite performed an act of cooking at its commencement. But if from the stoking of the oven there is no permission here—for example, if the Cuthean stoked it or the coals were there from before—it is necessary that the Israelite take a part in the essence of the cooking, at the beginning or at the end. However, if he took part at the beginning of the cooking and they raised the meat from the coals, or they took the pot from the oven, the previous act was nullified. And with this, the entire sugya will be explained like a string of pearls, with the help of Heaven.

And thus it is explained: Shmuel said, if an Israelite placed meat upon coals and a gentiles came and flipped it, it is permitted. And it asks: What are the circumstances? If we say that if he had not flipped it, it would have cooked, it is obvious [meaning, even though by his flipping he nullified the first act, nevertheless what do we care? For the Israelite did not command him and he did it on his own, and since through the act of the Israelite it would have cooked completely, we do not care]. Rather, is it not that if he had not flipped it, it would not have cooked? Why is it permitted? It is bishuli akkum [meaning, behold through his flipping the act of the Israelite was nullified, and granted that he did not command him, nevertheless since through the act of the Israelite it would not have cooked completely and the beginning of the act was nullified, it is literally bishuli akkum]. And it answers: No, it is necessary [to state this] where if he had not flipped it, it would have cooked in two hours, etc. Lest you say that hastening the cooking is a significant matter, it comes to teach us [meaning, that in a place where the first act was nullified, I would have said that hastening the cooking is a significant matter and it is like the entire cooking, and the first act is nullified, and its law would be as if he had not flipped it it would not have cooked and it would be forbidden; it comes to teach us that it is not a significant matter also regarding the nullification of the first act, and it is as if if he had not flipped it, it would have cooked, and it is permitted]. And it asks from the words of Rabbi Yochanan, that anything that is like ma'achal ben derosai is not subject to bishuli, etc. But if it is not like ma'achal ben derosai, it is subject to it, etc. Meaning, and here where he flipped it before the meat reached ma'achal ben derosai, why should it not be forbidden? And it answers: There, for example, where he placed it in a basket, etc. Meaning, even though we compare flipping to taking it away entirely, nevertheless it is not literally similar in this matter. And it brings a Baraita: It was also taught thus, an Israelite places meat upon coals and a gentile comes and flips it until the Israelite comes from the synagogue or the beit midrash and he is not concerned. Meaning, he is not concerned lest he took it from the fire and placed it in a basket. And regarding the permissibility of the stoking, it does not deal here at all, such as where the Israelite did not stoke or the coals were from before, but if the stoking was by the Israelite, it is obvious that it is effective, as will be explained with the help of Heaven.

And afterwards the Gemara says: A question was raised to them: if a non-Jew placed it and an Israelite flipped it, what is the law? Rava bar Nathan said: It is a kal vachomer; if its completion was by the hand of a non-Jew it is permitted, if its completion was by the hand of an Israelite, is it not all the more so? Meaning, if its completion was by the hand of a non-Jew, who nullified the previous act of the Israelite through his flipping, and nevertheless we ruled that it is permitted, all the more so if its completion was by the hand of an Israelite, who nullified the previous act of the non-Jew, is it not all the more so that it is permitted? And regarding this it brings: It was also stated, Rav Isaac said: Whether a non-Jew placed it and an Israelite flipped it, or an Israelite placed it, etc., and it is not forbidden unless its beginning and its completion are by the hands of a non-Jew. Meaning, since the Israelite took some part in the matter of the cooking, they did not decree. And regarding this Ravina says: Therefore, this bread where a non-Jew stoked the oven and an Israelite baked, or alternatively an Israelite stoked and a non-Jew baked, or alternatively a non-Jew stoked and a non-Jew baked and an Israelite came and raked the coals—it is perfectly fine. Meaning, since we say that if the Israelite only took some part, we do not descend to scrutinize whether his act is completely effective or only slightly effective. Therefore, it is not necessary to state regarding the stoking of an Israelite, for this is a major part, that it is certainly permitted, and all the more so regarding the stoking of a non-Jew and the baking of an Israelite; but even the stoking of a non-Jew and the baking of a non-Jew, where the Israelite only raked the coals, it is permitted, for it cannot be avoided that through the raking of the coals it would not assist the cooking somewhat.

And that which he states this law regarding bread is to teach us a novelty: not only regarding a cooked dish or a roast, where it is within the power of the Israelite to turn the roast or to stir the pot, which is a significant action, as with every roast or cooked dish one performs an action even in the middle of the cooking; but even bread, where if they only placed it in the oven one performs no action at all, as is known, nevertheless, even the raking of the coals is effective. But as for the law, there is no difference between bread and a cooked dish. And according to this, the words of our teacher, the Rema, fit perfectly, as will be explained with the help of Heaven:

For behold, it is truly difficult according to the explanation of our teachers, the Rashba, the Ran, and the Rivash, that we require it to be cooked over time by the Israelite alone, and if not so, it is forbidden, as is implied by the plain meaning of the language of the Gemara which says: "Rather, is it not that if he had not flipped it, it would not have cooked, why is it permitted etc." If so, that which R. Yochanan said, "Whether a gentile placed it and an Israelite flipped it, or an Israelite placed it and a gentile flipped it, it is permitted etc.," his intention must also be that even if the gentile had not flipped it, it would have cooked. If so, how could R. Yochanan state this without qualification? And more difficult than this is the difficulty against the Rambam there, who also wrote in this language; how did he not clarify the matter, that the permission is only if it would have cooked by the Israelite alone? Rather, it is certainly so that there is no concern in this, like the words of our teacher, the Rema [and even though regarding the permission of stoking the fire it is implied from the Rambam there that they only permitted it regarding bread, see there, nevertheless in this he certainly holds like the Rema, and also regarding stoking the fire it can be said that he employed the language of the Gemara as is his way, and the same applies to cooking, and examine this carefully].

Therefore, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, who follows the approach of the Rashba, the Ran, and the Rivash, for he wrote in section 7, and this is his wording: The stoking of the oven is only effective regarding bread, but regarding other cooked items, neither the stoking of the oven nor the lighting of the fire is of consequence, rather it is specifically the placement. Therefore, one who wishes to cook a pan in the oven of a gentile, a Israelite must place the pan into the oven in the place fit for it to be cooked. Thus far his words. And the reason they were lenient regarding bread is because it is a necessity of life, and furthermore, the stoking of the oven for bread is a labor specific to it, meaning that one must heat the oven until it is entirely burning, and one must remove the coals and sweep the oven, and it is a significant labor; this is not the case regarding the cooking of a cooked dish, where they heat the oven and cook and the action is not so recognizable. Thus far his words. [The Ran, and as the Taz wrote in subsection 7].

Therefore, he wrote in section 6, and this is his wording: Anything that an Israelite cooked even a little of its cooking, whether at the beginning or at the end, is permitted. Therefore, if a gentile placed meat or a pot upon the fire, and an Israelite turned the meat or stirred the pot, or if an Israelite placed it and a gentile finished it, this is permitted. Thus far his words. And his intention is when it would have cooked even without the gentile over the course of time, as he wrote in his great work, and he transcribed the wording of the Rambam, for according to their interpretation it is only in this manner, and he does not hold of the permission of stoking the fire, as has been written. However, our teacher, the Rema, follows the approach of the other poskim, that it is also permitted through the stoking of the oven, as will be explained. And therefore he wrote in section 6: Even if it would not have cooked without the assistance of the gentile. Thus far his words. This is because according to him, the approach of the Shas is to be interpreted as we have explained. And the reason he did not write this in the phrasing of "there are those who say" is because even in the wording of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, the opposite is not explicitly stated; on the contrary, from the plain sense of his wording, which is the wording of the Rambam, it implies this as well, as has been written in section 41. Furthermore, the standard reality was that the stoking of the oven was done by the Israelite, and if so, it follows that according to his approach, no other permission is required.

This is the wording of our teacher, the Rema, in section 7: And there are those who disagree and hold that lighting the fire or raking the coals is effective regarding bishul just as it is regarding bread, and such is the custom; and even raking without intent is effective and avails. And some say that even if an Israelite did not rake and did not throw a splinter there, but only that the gentile woman lit the fire from the fire of an Israelite, it is permitted. Thus far his words. And behold, that which he wrote that lighting or raking is effective, this is from the essential law of the Gemara as we have explained. However, that which is implied by his words that even throwing a splinter is effective, this is not from the law of the Gemara, but rather from the customs that exist between the people of Babylonia and the people of the Land of Israel, as the Tosafot and the Rosh wrote there. Therefore, these "some say" hold that even without throwing a splinter, but only by lighting from the fire of an Israelite, it is permitted; for these "some say" hold that since its law is equal to bread, and since regarding bread they were very lenient as written in siman 112, so too here. But in truth, these are great leniencies, and it is not proper to rely on this except in a time of great need and in the house of an Israelite. And similarly, that which he wrote that raking without intent is effective, many also disagree with this [see Shach, subsection 10].

Our Sages, of blessed memory, said there: Anything that has reached the stage of the food of Ben Drusai is not subject to the prohibition of bishul akum. And this is the explanation: If the Israelite already cooked it to the extent of the food of Ben Drusai, even if he removed it entirely from the fire and a gentile came and returned it and finished its cooking, it is permitted, for anything cooked like the food of Ben Drusai is called having its cooking completed. But if he removed it before it was like the food of Ben Drusai and a gentile came and returned it, it is forbidden. And even according to the opinion of our teacher, the Rema, it is forbidden if the stoking of the oven was not performed by an Israelite, and it is not similar to the opposite case in section 38.

And therefore, some say also the opposite and to be stringent, that if a non-Jew cooked it like the food of Ben Derusai and an Israelite finished it, it is forbidden unless it is on the eve of Shabbat or the eve of a Festival, or if there is a great loss in the matter, or for the honor of guests. But there are some of our teachers who permit it in every case, for they said that like the food of Ben Derusai is considered cooking to be lenient and not to be stringent. And this is the opinion of the Rosh and the Tur and most poskim, and so it is implied from the words of the Rambam. And so ruled our teacher, the Rema, in section 9, and he wrote that such is the custom and one should not doubt this at all; and one who wishes to be stringent should be stringent for himself and not for others.

However, if an Israelite placed the meat or the pot upon dying coals that were not fit to cook it even to the extent of ma'achal ben drosai, and a non-Jew came and added coals and finished the cooking, it is certainly forbidden, for the status of cooking is not applied to this at all. Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, ruled thus in section 10, and since our teacher, the Rema, did not provide any gloss upon it, we learn from this that he also agrees to this. For although he is very lenient, as has been explained, nevertheless, since the beginning of the Israelite's labor was such that it was not possible to reach even ma'achal ben drosai, the status of cooking is not applied to this at all. And even though from the perspective of logical reasoning it does not appear so—for how is this worse than the stoking of coals? And the author of this opinion is the Rashba, of blessed memory, who holds that only regarding bread is this leniency permitted and not regarding cooked items, as we have explained. But for us, it would have been possible to be lenient, and as for the fact that our teacher, the Rema, did not provide a gloss, it can be said that he relied on what was stated above, and such is his way in many places. Nevertheless, in practice, the matter requires further study and one should deliberate upon this.

Any doubt regarding bishulei akkum, we follow the lenient view because it is a rabbinic prohibition and they also did not treat it with great severity, as has been explained. Therefore, if an Israelite placed the food on the fire and left an akkum to guard it, and he turned it and finished its cooking, and it is not known if he removed the pot before it reached ma'achal ben derosai, it is permitted, for a doubt regarding rabbinic matters is resolved leniently. However, whenever we know with certainty that he removed it, it is forbidden. And there is one who says that the removal by the akkum not at the command of the Israelite, but rather he removed it on his own, we have no concern with it [see Bach]. And know that ma'achal ben derosai, some say it is half-cooked and some say it is a third-cooked, and the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch adopted this latter opinion.

And know that the Mordechai raised a difficulty regarding the previous law, for how may we leave the gentile alone? Let us be concerned lest he exchange it for treifa meat. And he wrote in the name of the Raviah that it deals with a case where the Israelite left a seal, and in the name of the Yerushalmi he explained that it deals with a case where a child is sitting and watching. However, in the name of the Semag he wrote that it is permitted for an Israelite to go to the market and leave his pot in his house, and even though there is milk or another prohibition, for we are not concerned lest the Cuthean cast a prohibition into the pot in order to cause the Israelite to stumble; for anywhere that the Cuthean does not profit from the matter, we are not concerned for this. Thus far his words. And such is the opinion of our teachers, the authors of the Tosafot [in the first chapter, page 12, beginning with "Veshadi," see there]. But from the language of Rashi there, it implies like the first opinion, for he wrote there, and this is his wording: For there the gentile has no benefit in casting nevela into the pot, for he is afraid that if the Israelite sees him, he will summon him to a beit din, etc. Thus far his words. And it implies that without this reason it is prohibited. And the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch later in siman 118 ruled to be lenient according to the opinion of the Semag and the Tosafot, see there.

The Tur wrote, and this is his wording: The Rashba wrote that vessels in which Cutheans cooked things that are subject to the prohibition of bishul Cutheans are forbidden; therefore, one must be careful with maidservants in a Jewish home who cook for themselves, etc. But this was not clear to my father, the Rosh, of blessed memory, and he wrote that there is no need to be concerned for this at all, for they did not apply the stringency of their cooking to forbid its discharge. Thus far his words. And the reasoning of the Rosh is as the Ra'ah wrote in the book Bedek HaBayit, that since the reason for the prohibition is because of intermarriage, the prohibition of intermarriage does not apply to discharges. However, the Rashba wrote there that whatever the sages ordained, they ordained similar to a Torah law, and since they forbade the food, the discharge is automatically forbidden. And this is what our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 16, and this is his wording: Vessels in which a gentile cooked in our presence things that are subject to the prohibition of bishul gentiles require kashering, and some say they do not require it. And even according to those who require kashering, if it is an earthenware vessel, one performs hagalah three times and that is sufficient, because this prohibition has no root in the Torah. Thus far his words. And this is how we rule, to require kashering, and in this we are lenient, that even for earthenware vessels hagalah three times is effective. And this matter is explained in the Yerushalmi Terumot and will be explained, with the help of Heaven, in siman 121.

The Rashba and the Ra'ah further disagreed there regarding a non-Jew who cooks for a sick person on Shabbat, as to whether this food is forbidden to a healthy person on Saturday night, and even to the sick person himself it is forbidden on Saturday night due to bishul akum, for it was only permitted to him on Shabbat because it was impossible otherwise, and consequently the vessel also requires hagalah; and this is the opinion of the Rashba, of blessed memory. However, the Ra'ah, of blessed memory, disagrees on this and holds that since the primary prohibition is due to intermarriage, it only applies on a weekday when we are also able [to cook], but on Shabbat when it is forbidden for us to cook and we are forced to have it cooked by them, the concern of intermarriage does not apply here. And not only is the pot not forbidden, but even the cooked food itself is permitted even to a healthy person on Saturday night. And the Ran, of blessed memory, in a responsum agreed to this [see the Beit Yosef].

And one must wonder somewhat at our teacher, the Rema, who at the end of this siman wrote: An akkum who cooked for a sick person on Shabbat, it is permitted on Saturday night even for a healthy person, and it does not involve the prohibition of bishul akkum, for in any such case there is a distinction. Thus far his words. And why did he not bring the opinion of the Rashba at all? For even if he did not see his book Mishmeret HaBayit, where he explained this in detail, nevertheless, in his book Torat HaBayit he also wrote that one should not distinguish between this prohibition and other prohibitions. And it appears that the opinion of our teacher, the Rema, is that since in truth many leniencies were applied to this prohibition as has been written, therefore on Shabbat the Ra'ah and the Ran are sufficient to rely upon, and the Rashba is a lone opinion against them. And there are some of the great authorities who agreed with his words [Shach in Nekudat HaKesef and Magen Avraham siman 318, subsection 7], and there are those who disagreed with him and ruled like the Rashba to be stringent [Taz subsection 15 and Pri Chadash subsection 26]. And certainly ab initio one should be stringent, but ex post facto, if they cooked in the vessel even when it was ben yomo, one should not prohibit the cooked food [see Ba'er Heitev subsection 10, who questioned the Rema: how is it permitted for a healthy person on Saturday night? We should decree lest he increase for his sake, see there. And he repeated regarding this that even with an Israelite who cooked for a dangerously ill person on Shabbat, where it is prohibited lest he increase for his sake, this is only until Saturday night, and on Saturday night it is permitted as our teacher, the Rema, and the Levush wrote in Orach Chaim siman 318. Furthermore, if they decreed this regarding a severe Torah prohibition, from where do we know to decree regarding a light rabbinic prohibition].

If a kosher cooked dish was mixed with a dish cooked by a Cuthean, if there is a majority of the kosher dish, it is permitted to eat it [Shach, subsection 21]. For even though in all rabbinic prohibitions we require sixty in a liquid-in-liquid mixture just as with a Torah prohibition, as I wrote in siman 98, nevertheless, this prohibition is lenient and is nullified by a majority.