Siman 112

The sages decreed four things to distance oneself from idolaters who did not believe in the Creator of the world: not to eat their bread, and not to eat of their cooking even if they cook a kosher item; they also forbade milk that they milked from a pure animal when an Israelite is not standing over them, and they also forbade their cheeses. These two, the milk and the cheeses, they forbade due to a concern of an actual prohibition, as will be explained in siman 115. However, their bread and their cooking they did not forbid due to a concern of a prohibition, but rather in order to distance oneself from them, as these matters lead to closeness of mind and they will come to intermarry with them. All these things they forbade only for eating but not for benefit, as we learned in the chapter "Ein Ma'amidin" [35b]:

And perhaps you will ask: Is there not a literal prohibition in their cooking due to their vessels, in which they constantly cook non-kosher foods? And similarly regarding bread, if they knead it with hot water, do they not heat it in their vessels? However, in this there is no prohibition at all, for the status of their vessels is that they are not "of the day," as all the poskim ruled that the status of the vessels of idolaters is that they are not "of the day." And even though a vessel that is not "of the day" is only permitted post facto and not initially, here too, since they have already baked and already cooked, it is considered post facto. And even according to the Rambam, of blessed memory, who does not hold of this law that the status of their vessels is that they are not "of the day," as appears from his words in chapter 17 of Ma'akhalot Assurot [and as the Kesef Mishneh wrote there in halakha 18, see there], nevertheless, the practical difference is that even if it were known that they were completely new, they would still be prohibited for eating. And particularly regarding the water that they heat for bread, they heat it in clean vessels, for they are meticulous about cleanliness [ibid. 30].

However, the decree regarding bread was not fully accepted even at the time they decreed it, as it is stated in the Yerushalmi [ibid.] that bread is among the "obscure laws," and they obscured this matter and permitted it. It is also proven in our Shas, which asks there regarding the statement "bread was not permitted by a beit din," implying that there is one who permits it, and it elaborates on this, see there. This is because this enactment did not spread throughout all of Israel [Tosafot], for in many places an Israelite baker is not available and this involves the sustenance of life [the Rosh ibid. section 27]. Therefore, they are unable to withstand this decree. They did not annul this decree entirely, but rather devised many leniencies for it, as will be explained with the help of Heaven.

This is the wording of the Rambam in chapter 17, law 12: Even though they forbade the bread of idolaters, there are places that are lenient in the matter and purchase the bread of a baker in a place where there is no Israelite baker and in the field, because it is a time of pressing need. However, regarding the bread of private individuals, there is no one who instructs to be lenient, for the primary decree was because of intermarriage, and if one eats the bread of a private individual, he will come to dine with them. Thus far his words. And there are those who explain his intention that two conditions are required: that there is no Israelite baker, and in the field, meaning on the road; but in the city, even if there is no Israelite baker, it is forbidden [Kesef Mishneh and Lechem Mishneh]. And the bread of a private individual is forbidden even in the field [Beit Yosef]. And it is not called the bread of a private individual unless he made it for the members of his household, but if he made it to sell, it is called a baker even though it is not his usual practice. And similarly, a baker who made it for himself is called a private individual [the Rema, section 2]. And a baker who invited guests to his home, his bread is like the bread of a private individual.

One must wonder about our teacher, the Beit Yosef, who wrote in section 2: There are places that are lenient in the matter and take bread from a gentile baker in a place where there is no Israelite baker because it is a time of pressing need, but regarding the bread of private homeowners, there is no one who instructs to be lenient, etc. Thus far his words. Since he transcribed the wording of the Rambam, why did he omit "in the field"? For from his wording it is explicitly clear that even in a city it is permitted. And such is indeed the opinion of the Tur and most of the poskim. And one cannot say that in this he truly ruled not like the Rambam; nevertheless, he should have brought his opinion at least, as is his way in every place. Therefore, it appears to me that even though in his books, Beit Yosef and Kesef Mishneh, he explained the opinion of the Rambam thus, as is seemingly implied by the flow of his wording, nevertheless here he retracted. For indeed, it is a wonderous reasoning: what shall the Israelite do in a city when there is no Israelite baker in it? And one cannot say that he should bake for himself, for it is well known that not every person possesses these preparations for the baking of bread.

And that which is explained in the Gemara there regarding a distinction between the field and the city, it can be said that this is in a place where there is a Jewish baker in the city; but when there is no Jewish baker, it is permitted even in the city [and like R. Helbo there, and also R"i does not disagree with him and it refers to what precedes it, and examine this]. And one may interpret the words of the Rambam that this is what he meant: and one may buy the bread of a baker in a place where there is no Jewish baker, and in the field, meaning that in the field it is permitted even when there is a Jewish baker in the city, for the sages did not burden him regarding bread, which is the primary sustenance of man [and the difficulty of the glossator in the Kesef Mishneh there is resolved].

This is the wording of the Tur: And according to the opinion of my father, the Rosh, of blessed memory, there is no distinction between the bread of a householder and that of a baker. However, some of the authors distinguished between that of a householder and that of a baker, for the concern of intermarriage only applies to that of a householder; therefore, they prohibited it in every case except in a place of danger. But regarding that of a baker, there is not such a great closeness of mind, for he is engaged in his craft. And so it distinguishes in the Yerushalmi, which permits buying from a baker in a place where a Jewish baker is not found. Thus far his words. And our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wondered at the Tur for saying that the Rosh does not distinguish, see there. And there is even more to wonder at the Tur for writing that the Yerushalmi permits buying from a baker, which implies that in our Gemara it is not mentioned, yet even in our Gemara they mentioned a baker explicitly, see there [for Rav Chananel said even according to the one who says a gentile baker, these words apply where there is no Jewish baker, etc., and so too Rav Yochanan, see there].

And in truth, the words of the Tur are correct, and also our teachers, the authors of the Tosafot, who wrote there, "and from here they relied now to eat the bread of etc.," did not mention at all a distinction between a palter and a homeowner. And so it is explicitly proven in Pesachim [31b] where the Gemara brought a baraita: A shop of a gentile etc., chametz found there after Pesach is permitted for eating etc. And so too there in the Mishnah, that chametz of a gentile that remained over Pesach is permitted for benefit, it is stated in the Gemara there [29a]: And by right it should have been taught that it is even permitted for eating, but etc. And so too in the Yerushalmi there, it says: Our Mishnah is in a place where they did not practice the custom of eating the bread of etc., and the Rosh brought it, see there, and they did not distinguish at all between a palter and a homeowner. And also at the time they decreed against the bread, they did not distinguish at all, as is proven from the Mishnah which said "bread" without qualification. And so too in the first chapter of Shabbat regarding the decree of the eighteen matters, they said there that they decreed against "their bread" [18b] and did not distinguish at all. And also here in the Gemara where Rabbi Yochanan said, "bread was not permitted by a beit din," implying that there is someone who permits it? Yes, for when Rav Dimi came etc., no distinction at all was mentioned between a palter and a homeowner. And only afterward it says: One time Rabbi went to a certain place and saw that bread was scarce for the students; Rabbi said, "Is there no palter here?" The people thought to say a gentile palter, but he only said a Jewish palter. Rabbi Chelbo said: Even according to the one who says a gentile palter, we only said this where there is no Jewish palter etc., see there. And the matter is clear that when Rabbi said "palter," his intention was not specifically a palter and not a homeowner, but rather such is the way of people: when one needs to buy bread, they say, "Perhaps there is a palter here to buy from," for a homeowner does not sell his bread. And there is a clear proof for this, for previously it said that the people erred in this, that Rabbi only spoke regarding a Jewish palter; and regarding a Jew, there is certainly no distinction, so why did he say "palter"? Rather, it is because such is the way of the world. And if so, also according to Rabbi Chelbo, who agreed with the one who said they did not err in this and Rabbi's intention was for a gentile palter, it is also not meant specifically [and we rule like Rabbi Chelbo that the people did not err, see the Ran].

And from all these there are clear proofs that our Talmud does not distinguish between a baker and a homeowner, and so too the Tosafot and the Rosh, and also the plain meaning of the Yerushalmi in Pesachim maintains this, except that here in the Yerushalmi there is one opinion that maintains this, and the Rif and the Rambam ruled according to this opinion. And the Rosh transcribed the words of the Rif according to his custom, and afterwards wrote: Since the Talmud said, "this implies that there is one who permits," it means it was known to them that there are places where they conduct themselves with permissibility, etc., and upon this the great ones relied who did not forbid it to the people of their province who conduct themselves with permissibility, for they said that they are from those places where its prohibition did not spread, etc. Thus far his words. Behold, it is explicit that when the Rosh came to analyze the view of our Talmud, he did not mention any distinction between a baker and a homeowner. And that which he wrote afterwards, "And in most places of our exile a Jewish baker is not found," thus far his words, his intention is also that we have no one from whom to buy, for we have no Jewish baker and it is not the way of a Jewish homeowner to sell, and therefore it is a matter of sustenance, and it is permitted to eat from their bread as well without distinction. And therefore, perhaps there are small places where there is no baker and the Jew eats from the bread of a star-worshipper homeowner, one should not rebuke them and they have upon what to rely [and so wrote there the Ma'adanei Yom Tov in Perek HaSokher Et HaPoel, letter 9, see there and examine carefully]. However, certainly we hold as the law like the Rif and the Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch, and the Tur himself in the Remazim ruled so, see there and see in section 11.

And know that the kneading and the shaping are of no consequence, for if the Israelite baked, even if the idolater kneaded the dough and shaped it, it is permitted, and vice versa it is forbidden. And there is no distinction whether the bread belongs to the Israelite or whether it belongs to the idolater, for the decree was upon its baking. And so the great later authorities agreed [Shach subsection 1 and Pri Chadash]. And so it is clarified from the words of our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, throughout this entire siman. And there are some of the great early authorities who divided this into two decrees: that when the bread belongs to an Israelite there is no prohibition in it due to intermarriage, but rather because of the cooking of idolaters, and therefore since in bread there is kneading and shaping, even if the Israelite did not do them, the bread is permitted. But with their bread, where it is relevant due to intermarriage, even if the Israelite baked it, if the idolater kneaded it and shaped it and he takes it from him, it is forbidden, unless the Israelite nullified his shaping and made it into another form, or that the Israelite kneaded it and he shaped it, or that he kneaded it and the Israelite shaped it [Ran and as the Beit Yosef wrote]. And also from the Tur it is implied so, as he wrote that their bread is forbidden even if an Israelite baked it, see there. But all the poskim do not hold so, and thus we rule. And I am wondered at this opinion, for behold, we explicitly learned in the Tosefta of Avodah Zarah [chapter 5]: Bread that a Cuthean baked not in the presence of an Israelite, behold it is forbidden; bread that an Israelite baked, even though the Cuthean kneaded it, and cheese that an Israelite curdled, even though the Cuthean worked it, behold it is permitted. Thus far its words. Behold it is explicit that the kneading is not a hindrance, and one cannot say that this is regarding our bread, for behold, it teaches it similar to cheeses, and it requires further study. And see what I wrote in section 25.

And even though regarding the bread of a householder the Rambam closed the path for us and most of the poskim agreed with him, nevertheless our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, wrote in section 8, and this is their wording: There is one who says that in a place where a palter is not found at all, it is permitted even that of householders, and one does not need to wait for kosher bread, and so we conduct ourselves. Thus far their words. And the reason for this opinion is not from the reason we wrote in section 9 according to the opinion of the Rosh, but rather as the Ra'ah wrote in his book: And regarding the matter of the bread of a householder, since there are different versions of it and it is a dispute between Rava Dimi and Rav Yosef, it stands to reason that we follow the lenient view etc. Therefore, any place where a palter is not found at all, it is permitted, even the bread of householders; and even to take the bread of a householder from the city in a place where there is an Israelite palter and to go into the field and eat it there is permitted, except that it is an unseemly thing for a Torah scholar etc. Thus far his words. And in this, the Rashba exceeded the measure in what he wrote there in Mishmeret HaBayit; however, in any event, he also agreed to this opinion that when there is no palter, it is permitted to eat that of a householder even without danger to life, and the Rashba, of blessed memory, did not permit it except in danger to life, see there.

It is permitted to take their leaven and leaven the dough with it, for even though leaven imparts flavor and "flavor is like the substance" is a Torah prohibition, nevertheless, the sages did not decree against "flavor is like the substance" regarding bread, even for those who are completely careful regarding their bread [Beit Yosef and Taz, subsection 10]. However, their bread crumbs are forbidden as long as they are intact, unless they were nullified in a majority [ibid.]. And their borscht, into which they put bread and bread crumbs, is permitted to drink, for this is not more stringent than leaven. And such is the widespread custom to drink their borscht. And even though it is their way to take all the crumbs from the table and put them into the borscht vessel, and perhaps there are crumbs of forbidden foods among them, nevertheless, they are certainly nullified in sixty, and there is no doubt in this. And one who wishes to be stringent should be stringent for himself and not for others.

The sages only decreed against the bread of the five species of grain, namely wheat, barley, spelt, oats, and rye, as this is a significant matter and leads to social closeness. However, bread of legumes, rice, millet, and similarly of other things, is not included in the general category of bread that they prohibited. Thus wrote the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, section 1. According to this, in the region of Reisin where they eat bread of buckwheat, which they call blintzes or kugelach or retsnikes, which they bake in a pan, it is permitted to eat theirs if they do not grease the pan with something forbidden to us. For most grease the pan with hemp oil, which they call "oil," or with rose oil, which they call "patsansna masla," and there is no prohibition in this. But if they grease it with lard or other animal fats, it is forbidden. And one should deliberate on this, for perhaps since they eat much of this there every day, it is like actual bread. Yet it appears that we should not decree of our own accord what the sages, of blessed memory, did not decree. Similarly, bread made from buckwheat is permitted, as this is not included in the decree of bread [Pri Megadim in the Mishbetzot Zahav, subsection 2] [and see section 14, and these do not ascend to the table of kings].

And regarding this bread of legumes, rice, and millet, our teacher, the Rema, wrote in these words: And it is also not forbidden on account of bishul akum if it does not ascend to the table of kings. Thus far his words. The explanation of his words is that certainly bread is not included in the decree of their cooking, except that those which are not included in the category of bread, such as bread of legumes, rice, and millet, are consequently included in the category of cooked foods. For this reason he said that if they do not ascend to the table of kings, they are consequently not forbidden on account of their cooking as well [the Gra, subsection 4]. And hold this principle in your hand: that they removed bread from the category of their cooking and were very lenient in this because it is a necessity of life, but anything that is not included in the category of bread, they did not remove from their cooking [ibid.]. And the great later authorities challenged him, for from the language of the Tur it implies explicitly that it certainly does not ascend to the table of kings, and so wrote the Levush [Taz, subsection 3 and Shach, subsection 5]. However, in the Responsa of the Rosh, rule 19, it is stated explicitly like the wording of our teacher, the Rema, "if it does not ascend to the table of kings," see there [and it is brought in the Beit Yosef]. And on the contrary, the language of the Tur requires further study, see there [and what the Shach wrote, that his intention refers to a cooked dish, is a wonderous thing, see there].

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 4: In a place where a Yisrael baker is not found, according to the opinion of those who permit purchasing bread from their baker, if a Yisrael baker arrived there, the bread of their baker is forbidden until the Yisrael baker sells his bread; and after the bread of the Yisrael is finished, the bread of their baker returns to its permissibility. Thus far his words. However, it appears to me that the bread which he already purchased from their baker while there was no Yisrael baker, it is permitted to eat all of it even if a Yisrael baker arrived, since he already purchased it in a state of permissibility, and only to purchase from their baker is forbidden, even the bread that he already prepared; but regarding that which is in his hand, there is no logic to forbid it. [And behold, even regarding meat of stabbing that they brought into the Land, see Chullin 17a, see there; and all the more so regarding the prohibition of bread, for they certainly did not decree in such a case].

He further wrote in section 5: Some say that one who has bread in his possession, or if there is an Israelite baker and there is their baker who makes bread more beautiful than his, or of another type that the Israelite baker does not have, it is permitted to buy from their baker in a place where they practiced permissiveness regarding the bread of a baker. For since his mind is more at ease with this baker's bread due to its importance in his eyes, this is like bread for which he is hard-pressed. Thus far his words. For since it was permitted entirely, it was permitted whenever there is no Israelite baker like him. So wrote the Rashba in Torat HaBayit there. And even though they only permitted it because of being hard-pressed, and in this case there is no pressure, nevertheless, ultimately they permitted the bread of a baker; as long as there is no Israelite bread like it, it remains in its permitted status.

And behold, our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 2 regarding the permission of a baker, and this is his wording: And there are those who say that even in a place where the bread of an Israelite is available it is permitted. Thus far his words. And this is a much greater leniency, for it implies that even when the bread of the Israelite is not inferior to their bread, it is nevertheless permitted. And one must say the reason is that these "those who say" hold that the decree of bread did not spread at all, and there are places that did not accept the prohibition upon themselves at all. And so wrote the great later authorities [Shach and Pri Chadash, subsection 8]. And one should not ask that if so, even the bread of a householder should be permitted since the decree did not spread there at all, for indeed there are those who explain the intention of this opinion in this manner [ibid.]. Nevertheless, it appears more likely that it refers only to a baker and not to the bread of a householder, for even though this decree did not spread, nevertheless they cautioned themselves regarding the bread of a householder [and so wrote the Pri Chadash there]. And even regarding a baker one should be careful if there is an Israelite baker and the bread is as fine as their baker's bread. And during the Ten Days of Repentance one should be careful in every case [Shach, subsection 9]. And behold, in our country everyone is always careful in this throughout the entire year in every case. And in distant places where Israelites are few and there is no Israelite baker, they eat from their baker but not from the bread of a householder, except when one has nothing to eat at all and is hungry, for then he is able to eat even the bread of a householder. And so it is proper to do and one should not deviate.

And in the words of our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, there is a difficulty here, for in section 2 they wrote according to the opinion of the Rambam that one should not be lenient at all regarding the bread of a householder, yet in section 8 they wrote: There is one who forbids, but in a place where a baker is not found at all, it is permitted even that of a householder and one does not need to wait for kosher bread, and so we practice; thus far their words. And this is not according to the opinion of the Rambam [Pri Chadash, subsection 18]. And if we were to say that in truth this opinion disagrees, he should have brought it in section 2. Therefore, it appears to me that they hold that even the Rambam admits to this, for while it is true that he holds they did not grant leniency regarding the bread of a householder, however, this is all when there is at least their baker and there is no Israelite baker, for then they permitted the baker's bread and not the householder's bread, as this is what is dealt with in section 2. But in a place where there is no baker at all, neither an Israelite baker nor their baker, in such a case the sages did not decree, and therefore one does not need to wait for kosher bread. And that which they wrote in section 16: There is one who forbids, that one who is careful regarding their bread and is on a journey, if there is Israelite bread within four mil he should wait; thus far their words. This is not a contradiction to what was written in section 8, for this was written for one who is careful—beyond four mil even one who is always careful does not need to be careful; but one who is not always careful does not need to wait at all. And this is what our teacher, the Rema, concluded in this wording: And it has already been explained above that we practice to be lenient; thus far his words. And his intention is to section 8. And know that four mil is if he needs to go there, but when he does not have a path there or if he needs to turn back, there is no measure of four mil here [Pri Chadash, subsection 28]. However, for the measure of a mil one must wait [Chachmat Adam]. And there is no difference in all this between a good path and a poor path, or between one traveling in a wagon or riding on a horse or walking on foot, for the sages made their measures equal.

There is a dispute among the Rishonim regarding that which they permitted the bread of a palter and prohibited the bread of a baal habayit, as to what the intention is in this: whether we follow the essence of the bread—who baked it—or after the one in whose hand it is found now. For some say that if the bread is now in the hand of a baal habayit it is prohibited even if a palter baked it, and if it is now in the hand of the palter it is permitted even if a baal habayit baked it [the Ra'ah in Bedek HaBayit there]. But most of our teachers do not hold so, for we follow the essence of the bread, as our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 7. This is his wording: The bread of a baal habayit is prohibited forever, even if a palter purchased it from him, and even if he sent it to the home of an Israelite; and likewise, even if an Israelite sent it to another, it is prohibited forever. And that of a palter is permitted forever, even if a baal habayit purchased it from him, for they did not follow in this prohibition after the one in whose hand the bread is now, but rather after the one who had it at the time of baking. Thus far his words. And this is the opinion of the Rashba, and the Rosh, and the Tur, and such is the primary ruling. And one should not ask that if so, how did we write at the end of section 4 that a palter who invited one to his home, his bread is like the bread of a baal habayit—meaning it is prohibited—behold at the time of baking it was the bread of a palter? For it is not comparable, as an invitation to his home is the essence of creating closeness, and certainly it is prohibited in such a case [and like the second excuse of the Shach, subsection 12; and although the Pri Chadash, subsection 12, does not hold so, nevertheless so it appears to me as the primary ruling, and so wrote the Pri Megadim there in the name of the Pri Toar, that inviting him is worse; see there].

In a place where they have the custom of permission regarding the bread of a palter, even if it is kneaded with eggs or if eggs are smeared upon its surface, it is permitted. For what should we be concerned about? If because of blood in the eggs, the majority of eggs do not contain blood; and if because of the eggs of an impure bird, such are not found among us; and if because there is in the eggs the status of bishulei kochavim, as is written in siman 113, behold the primary element is the flour and the eggs are nullified relative to the flour. However, a panada that a palter made—which is dough with fat—even though the fat is kosher, nevertheless it possesses the status of bishulei kochavim, and the reason will be explained there.

However, our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 6, and this is his wording: There are those who forbid bread that has eggs smeared on its surface because they are substantial and are not nullified relative to the bread, and they are subject to bishul akum, and such is the custom. Those kneaded items called kichelach or types of sweets called lekach are categorized as bread, and in a place where they practice leniency regarding the bread of gentiles, they too are permitted, and we do not say that they are subject to bishul akum. There are types of kneaded items called kichelach that they make on irons, and they grease the iron at the time of baking with milk or lard; regarding those, one must be careful to forbid them, and such is the custom. Thus far his words. Their bread that is kneaded with their milk, butter, and cheese is obviously forbidden everywhere; only in a place where they eat the butter of gentiles, as will be explained in siman 115, if it was kneaded with butter alone, it is permitted. Know that what our teacher, the Rema, wrote at the beginning of his words to forbid bread that has eggs smeared on its surface, the intention is not where they smear a minimal smearing in the manner that we smear the challot on the eve of the holy Shabbat, for certainly this is permitted as it has no substance, and it is an a fortiori argument from lekach and kichelach. Rather, the intention is that one actually smears eggs on its surface, where they boil many eggs in a pan and pour them over the bread, such that there is a substance of the eggs. And behold, it is a simple matter that kichelach are specifically those whose batter is thick and has the form of bread; but if they make their batter thin like pfannkuchen or blintzes, this is cooking and not baking, and it is forbidden [see Shach subsection 10, and there is a printing error there, and it should be: specifically whose batter is thick; and see Pri Megadim there, and there is no doubt in this, and examine it well]. And see what I wrote in section 30.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 13: One who is not careful regarding their bread who reclined with a homeowner who is careful regarding their bread, and on the table was Israelite bread and the bread of idolaters which was finer than the Israelite bread, and the homeowner broke bread from the finer loaf, he is permitted during that entire meal to eat of their bread. Thus far his words. Meaning, since we hold in Orach Chaim siman 168 that the homeowner is obligated to break the challah, that is, to recite the blessing of HaMotzi, and there is an obligation to recite HaMotzi over the finer bread as is explained there; therefore, if there were no guest with him who is not careful regarding their bread, he would have to recite HaMotzi over the inferior Israelite bread since he does not desire to eat from their bread. But since there is a guest with him who is not careful, and the guest must fulfill his obligation through his blessing, and since the guest must break bread over the finer loaf, the homeowner is also forced to do so. And since he broke bread over it, he is forced to eat this bread during the entire meal, for it is not for the honor of Heaven that he should perform a blessing over this bread and then abstain from it during the entire meal due to a concern of prohibition. Therefore, since it was permitted for the blessing, it was permitted for the entire meal. [I have explained according to the words of the Shach subsection 21 and the Taz subsection 8, not like the Bach, see there. Nevertheless, it seems to me that this was in their days when the homeowner recited HaMotzi and those reclining fulfilled their obligation through his blessing, but now that everyone blesses for himself, they have no connection to one another, and the homeowner should eat from his bread and the guest from their bread, as is the opinion of the Bach; and examine this.]

In any event, it is clear from what we have written that the permission to eat their bread throughout the entire meal is only because of the blessing of Hamotzi and not for any other reason. If so, what is this that our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 15? This is his wording: There are those who say that one who is careful regarding the bread of idolaters and eats with others who are not careful is permitted to eat with them because of enmity and strife; since if he does not eat bread with them, which is the main part of the meal, there will be enmity, they permitted it to him because of enmity, and one should not learn from here to other prohibitions. Thus far his words. For the matter is such: when one eats with another, enmity is not applicable, for what do you see that this one should follow that one and not that one follow this one? Therefore, there is no permission except based on the blessing of Hamotzi. But one who eats with two or more people should follow the many, and it is in this that our teacher, the Rema, deals. For the summary of the matters is that it is effective because the bread is a light prohibition and its prohibition did not spread, they were lenient regarding it in many things, and one should not compare this to other prohibitions.

The kutach of Cutheans is permitted and we are not concerned regarding the bread within it, and similarly, in any place where their bread was mixed into another food, it is nullified by a majority, whether in liquid or in dry matter. However, it is forbidden to mix it initially in order to eat it. And similarly, one who is careful regarding their bread is permitted to eat from a bowl with one who is not careful regarding it, and even though the taste of their bread is mixed with our bread, he need not be concerned for this. And the reason is as I have written, that they were very lenient regarding this prohibition. And similarly, we are not concerned regarding their bread that is in a sour drink, such as barsht and the like, and as I have written in section 12, see there.

And know that in the Gemara this wording is found: Ravina said, the halacha is that this bread, where a Kutite stoked the fire and an Israelite baked, or alternatively, an Israelite stoked and a Kutite baked, or alternatively, a Kutite stoked and a Kutite baked and an Israelite came and raked the coals, it is permitted. Thus far the wording of the Gemara. And before our teachers, the Rishonim, there was a different version of the text, and this is its wording: Rabbi Yochanan said, there are three labors involved in bread; therefore, this bread where one stoked, etc. And from the words of all the Rishonim it is explained that the three labors are: stoking the oven, raking the coals, and placing the bread into the oven. And it is explained from this that if an Israelite performed one of these three labors, there is no prohibition at all, whether the bread belongs to an Israelite or whether the bread belongs to star-worshippers. And some say that this permission applies only to the bread of an Israelite, and the opinion of the Tur is also thus, see there; but their words were rejected, for there is no distinction at all, as I wrote in section 10.

And they further eased regarding bread with many leniencies, for even less than the raking of coals is effective, as our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, wrote in section 9: If a gentile lit the oven and an Israelite baked in it, or if an Israelite lit and a gentile baked, or if the gentile lit and the gentile baked and an Israelite came and stirred the fire slightly, this is permitted. And even if he only threw one piece of wood into the oven, he has permitted all the bread within it, for the matter is only to serve as a reminder that their bread is forbidden. And if he blew upon the fire, it is like raking. Thus far their words. And there is no difference whether he blew with his mouth or with a bellows; even if the coals are glowing and the wood is burning, blowing is effective, because through the blowing one adds more heat, and every bit of heat hastens the cooking. And as the Rashba wrote, every splinter adds to the heat of the oven and hastens the cooking, and here too it is similar [Pri Chadash, subsection 19].

And an even greater leniency they wrote in section 10, and this is their wording: If they baked in an oven by means of a kutei three times in one day, and they rendered the oven kosher by means of a wood splinter during the first two times, but on the third time they did not render it kosher, it is permitted. Thus far their words. And the reason is that since during the last baking there remained some visible part of the burning coals from the first heatings, which rendered the oven kosher through the casting of a wood splinter [Beit Yosef]. And more than this they wrote, and this is their wording: And some say that if one rendered the oven kosher one time, and the oven did not stand for a twenty-four hour period without heating, even if they baked in it thus for several days, everything is permitted by the power of the first rendering of kashrut, and one may rely on this. Thus far their words. And the reason is that it is known that as long as the oven is still hot, a minimal heating is effective, and it turns out that the first heating is as if it still exists, such that through it a substantial heating is not required, and it is all considered like the first heating where they rendered it kosher by casting a wood splinter [Issur Ve-Hetter]. And behold, all these are great leniencies, and only in a time of pressing need may one rely on this, but ab initio one requires one of the three explained in the Gemara, which are: heating the oven, or raking the coals, or placing the bread into the oven. And know that regarding any doubt in this matter, we follow the lenient path; for example, if there is a doubt whether an Israelite rendered the oven kosher or not, or any other doubt, we follow the lenient path. So it is written in the Sha'arei Dura, and it is simple, for even regarding a complete rabbinic prohibition we establish that a rabbinic doubt is judged leniently, all the more so regarding a light prohibition such as this.

They further wrote a great leniency in section 12, and this is their wording: If a non-Jew baked the bread without the stoking of an Israelite and without a wood splinter, even if the surface of the bread formed a crust in the oven, the stoking of an Israelite is effective as long as the bread requires the oven and is still improved by its baking. And there is one who says that even if he removed the bread, there is a remedy to return it to the oven by means of an Israelite if it is improved. Thus far their words. Meaning, that its baking was not yet completed properly, for if its baking was completed, it certainly is not effective [and so it appears from the Pri Chadash, subsection 22]. But when its baking was not completed, even if there are those who eat with such baking, nevertheless, if there are those who delay it further in the oven, the stoking is effective [and perhaps in such a case specifically stoking is required and not the throwing of a wood splinter, or perhaps there is no distinction, and it requires further study].

And even though many leniencies were granted in this matter, nevertheless, the bread of an Israelite that a star-worshiper baked without any validation of stoking the fire or throwing a wood chip, it is forbidden for him even to sell to a Cuthite due to the concern that perhaps the Cuthite will sell it to another Israelite. There is no remedy for this except to make it into pieces, for when it is not a whole loaf, one does not buy it from a Cuthite. Therefore, any forbidden bread in the hand of an Israelite, he should do so. And therefore they were accustomed not to buy pieces of bread from a Cuthite, for we concern ourselves that perhaps it is forbidden bread and an Israelite sold it to him thus. However, the bread of soldiers, even though they are cut, is permitted, for there is no concern in this, and it is known that they cut and distribute to them [Bach]. And all this is in a place where they eat their bread, but in a place where they do not eat it, it is permitted to sell to them even a whole loaf [Atteret Zahav subsection 7, who wrote that the bread of an Israelite has the law of cooked foods according to the opinion of the Tur, see there; and this requires further study, for it has already been explained in section 10 that we do not rule like the Tur, see there, and as the Shach wrote in subsection 1].

Bread found in the marketplace: we learned in a Mishnah in tractate Machshirin, chapter 2: A city in which Israel and idolaters dwell, etc., if one found bread in it, we follow the majority of the bakers. And if it was dough-bread, meaning the bread of a householder, we follow the majority of those who eat dough-bread and coarse bread. And in Eruvin [64b] it is stated: If one found bread on the road, we follow the majority of wayfarers; if they are a majority of Israel, the bread is permitted, and if not, it is forbidden. And it appears that half-and-half is forbidden, and even though it is a light prohibition, nevertheless, with less than a majority it is impossible to be lenient.

Since it has been explained that the sages were lenient regarding bread but not so regarding their cooking, we must explain what is called bread and what is called cooking; for perhaps that which is made in a pot, which they call panva or skvarda, is not called bread. However, we have learned this matter from the law of challah in siman 329, and there it was explained that dough whose consistency is thick, even if it is by means of liquids such as oil and honey, and even if it is made in a pan, it is bread and is liable for challah. And any whose consistency is thin and not by means of liquids, even if it is made in a pan, it is also bread. Only those whose consistency is thin and by means of liquids, these have the law of a cooked dish and not bread [and so wrote the Rivash, siman 28, and the Pri Chadash, subsection 17]. And those rounds that one pinches, bagels or krentzlich, even though in the middle of the baking they place them in boiling water, nevertheless it is complete bread and has the law of pat.