Siman 111

The sages taught in the Mishnah of Terumot [Chapter 7, Mishnah 5]: Two baskets, one of terumah and one of chullin, where a seah of terumah fell into one of them and it is not known into which of them it fell, behold I say: It fell into the one of terumah; and therefore, the basket of chullin is permitted to non-kohanim. And so it is taught in a baraita in Pesachim [9b]: Two baskets, one of chullin and one of terumah, and before them were two seahs, one of chullin and one of terumah, and these fell into those, they are permitted, for I say: The chullin fell into the chullin, and the terumah fell into the terumah. And this deals with rabbinic terumah, or with the terumah of fruits which is rabbinic, or with terumah in this current time which is rabbinic, as is explained there [44a].

And the reason for the matter is that we hold the principle that a doubt regarding a rabbinic law is ruled leniently, and here too it is a doubt whether the terumah fell into the chullin and prohibited them or into the terumah, and it is a rabbinic doubt, and we attribute that it fell into the terumah and the chullin are permitted as before. And from this our teachers, of blessed memory, the Rashba, the Tur, and the Shulchan Aruch, learned that in a similar case regarding all rabbinic prohibitions, such as where a rabbinic prohibition fell and there is a basis to attribute that it did not fall into the permitted substance, we so attribute, as will be explained with the help of Heaven according to the specific laws that exist in this. And so too even regarding Torah prohibitions, but where from the Torah the prohibition was nullified and only a rabbinic prohibition remains, we also attribute, for so it is proven in the Gemara that regarding a Torah prohibition with a rabbinic measure we also attribute [the Rashba in Torat HaBayit, Bayit 4, Shaar 2, proved this from Pesachim 44a, which raised a difficulty for Rabbi Yochanan from two pots and two baskets, and if you say a kezayit in the time of eating a half-loaf is from the Torah, why do we say "for I say," but if it were rabbinic it is well; behold this is explicitly stated there, see there and examine carefully].

And I have a great question regarding this: behold, the Tur later in siman 121 brought in the name of the Ittur that in the Yerushalmi Terumot it is explained that a clay vessel in which one cooked terumah is permitted after twenty-four hours to be purged three times and used for chullin. The Ittur learned from this that for all prohibitions, we permit clay vessels with purging three times after twenty-four hours. The Tur brought there in the name of the Rashba who hesitated about this, for perhaps we do not learn from terumah in this time, which has no Torah foundation, for other prohibitions that have a Torah foundation; see there, and thus we rule; see there. If so, how did the Rashba, the Tur, and the Shulchan Aruch learn this law even regarding rabbinic measurements and Torah prohibitions from terumah? For these terumot—whether terumah of fruits or terumah in this time—have no Torah foundation. And perhaps they hold that terumah of fruits is called having a Torah foundation during the time when terumah applies by Torah law, as is somewhat implied in Yevamot [81a; and see Tosafot Beitzah 4a]. However, since we see that the Gemara in Pesachim there learned from terumah for the checking of chametz, it proves that we do learn from it. If so, why did they not learn for the law in siman 121? And perhaps this law that we attribute was found further regarding stains in Niddah, as written in siman 190; therefore, they learned for all prohibitions.

This is the wording of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 1: Two pots, one of permitted matter and one of forbidden matter, and before them are two pieces, one permitted and one forbidden; if the piece is from a rabbinic prohibition, such as the fat of the gid, and these fell into those, they are permitted, for we attribute it by saying the forbidden fell into the forbidden and the permitted into the permitted, and even if the permitted matter in the pot is not greater than the forbidden piece before it [so it should be]. And such is the law if there was only one pot here of slaughtered meat into which one of these two pieces fell and it is not known which it is, we attribute that the permitted one fell, even if the permitted matter is not greater than the forbidden. Or, if there was only one piece here of a rabbinic prohibition and there are two pots, one permitted and one forbidden, and it is not known into which it fell, in this too we attribute to be lenient. Thus far his words.

And behold, that which he wrote regarding the fat of the gid is not exclusive, for the law is the same even for the cheese of gentiles and the like; even those things that have a basis in Torah law, we also attribute [Shach, subsection 2]. And some say that regarding the stringent prohibitions of a minute amount, we do not attribute even in a rabbinic prohibition [ibid. subsection 3 in the name of the Nimukei Yosef]. And there is one who disagrees with this [Pri Chadash, subsection 2]. However, in a davar sheyesh lo matirin, we certainly do not attribute [Kreiti u-Pleiti]. And know that there is no difference in all these laws whether the pieces are small or large, being fit to be served to guests, for nevertheless we say "I say" [that the prohibited item fell into the already prohibited pot]; since this too is only a rabbinic prohibition, we say "I say" [Shach, subsection 5]. And so it is in everything that will be explained in this siman, even regarding a Torah prohibition with a rabbinic measure [ibid. in the name of the Nimukei Yosef]. And likewise, there is no difference whether the two pots were equal, or one was larger than the second, or the prohibition was more severe than the second; in all of them, we attribute.

And that which he wrote, "and such is the law if there was only one pot here, etc.," some say that this is specifically when the two pieces were recognizable individually before their falling—which was of permission and which was of prohibition—and after the falling it is impossible to recognize them. For if they were not recognizable beforehand, since they were mixed one with one, it becomes a case of "a prohibition has been established," and each one is essentially the prohibition itself, and we do not say regarding this that a doubt in a Rabbinic matter is ruled leniently. For it is well regarding two pieces and two pots: even if they were mixed initially, granted that each one is like the body of the prohibition, nevertheless, in the end there is only one piece of prohibition here. And when we judge regarding the piece that fell into the permitted pot that this is the kosher one, and regarding the piece that fell into the prohibited pot that this is the prohibition, the body of the prohibition is necessarily removed, for it is impossible for both of them to be the prohibition. Therefore, the permitted pot is certainly permitted, and it should not be more stringent than if there were one piece of prohibition and two pots, where we hang the status. But with two pieces and one pot, and both were established as a prohibition, and one of them fell into the pot—since we are not judging the second one at all because it did not fall—if so, how is it possible to permit it? For was it not established as a prohibition? Rather, it certainly deals with a case where they were recognizable beforehand and were not established as a prohibition [this is the intent of the Shach, subsection 4, and the difficulty of the Pri Chadash, subsection 3, is answered; see there and examine carefully].

However, this is all if we say that we do not say "safek derabbanan" for leniency in a place of a "chazakat issur," but according to the opinion we wrote in the rules of "safek sefeika" that even where an "issur" is established we say "safek derabbanan" for leniency, we are not concerned with this [Pri Chadash there]. And one should not ask according to the first opinion—that where an "issur" is established it is forbidden—what is the practical difference between whether they were recognizable or not recognizable, for even if they were recognizable it is called an established "issur," since if one ate from two pieces, one of "chelev" and one of fat, he is liable for an "asham talui" [ibid.]; for it is not so, as there we are judging the moment of eating, and certainly he did not know then with clarity, for if he had known, there would be no "asham talui" here, but here we are judging the moment before the falling, and if at that time they were not recognizable, it is called an established "issur" [thus it appears to me to resolve the words of the Shach from the difficulties of the Pri Chadash; however, for the law, it appears more like the Pri Chadash, and there is no practical difference between recognizable and not recognizable, and so it appears from the Perishah, and so wrote the Kreiti U'Pleiti subsection 2, and he brought proof from Terumot chapter 10, mishnah 5: two baskets etc. and it is not known, one of them fell, it does not make "dimua" etc. see there; and it is not a decisive proof, for what is the relevance of "dimua" to "telyah," as wrote the Chavat Daat subsection 1, but what the Chavat Daat wants to decide from the mishnah to the contrary is also not so, for the essence of the laws of terumah is in the matter of "dimua," see there and examine closely]:

And behold, three laws have been explained here: two pieces and two pots, and one pot and two pieces, and one piece and two pots. And behold, the first law of two pieces and two pots is the most stringent of them all, for an forbidden item certainly fell, but it is not known where it fell; and furthermore, one piece certainly fell into the permitted item, but it is not known which one it is. This is not the case in the second law, one pot and two pieces, for even though there is a certain falling, nevertheless there is no certain falling of a forbidden item. And so too in the third law, one piece and two pots, for even though there is a certain falling of a forbidden item, nevertheless there is no certain falling into the permitted pot. And the third law is more stringent than the second law, for in the third there is a certain falling of a forbidden item, which is not the case in the second [Pri Chadash]. And this is why our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote regarding the third law, "in this too we attribute leniently," which implies that in this case there is more reason to be stringent, and this is in contrast to the second law and not in contrast to the first law [ibid.]. And there are those who were pressed regarding this language, but it appears clearly as I have written [Ateret Zahav subsection 1 and Perishah, who were very pressed regarding this, but the matters are clear as the Pri Chadash wrote, see there].

That which has been explained, that in all these cases we assume a lenient attribution even if the permitted matter is not greater than the forbidden matter, to what does this apply? When the forbidden matter is also not greater than the permitted matter. But if the forbidden matter is greater than the permitted matter, we do not assume a lenient attribution. This is the wording of the Tur: But if the forbidden matter is greater than the permitted matter, we do not assume a lenient attribution to such an extent. Thus far his words. The explanation of his words is that even though according to the reason that was explained—that we assume there is no prohibition at all in the permitted pot, and we assume that the forbidden matter fell into the forbidden pot or did not fall at all—and if so, what does it matter to us if there is a small or large amount of forbidden matter? Nevertheless, we do not assume a lenient attribution to such an extent. The reason is that, in truth, this is nothing more than a mere attribution. If so, we require at the very least that even if the forbidden matter fell into the permitted matter, it would not be entirely forbidden. If the majority is from the forbidden matter, it is as if it is entirely forbidden. Therefore, we do not assume an attribution in a case of more than half against half.

And some say that regarding the second law, namely one pot and two pieces where it is possible to say that the forbidden substance did not fall at all, we rely on this even when the forbidden substance is greater than the permitted substance. For it is well understood that in the first and third laws, where the forbidden substance certainly fell, but we rely on saying that it fell into the forbidden piece and not into the permitted piece—since in any event it certainly fell, it must not be greater than the permitted piece. But in the second law, why should we care [Shach subsection 6 and Pri Chadash subsection 4]. However, from the wording of the Tur and the Rashba in his book Torat HaBayit, it is explicitly implied that all the divisions are equal in this law. And so it appears, for ultimately, even in the second law, this is nothing more than a mere supposition, and perhaps it is not so; therefore we require at the very least that even if the forbidden substance fell into the permitted piece, it would not be entirely forbidden. And so it appears to be the primary ruling [and such is the apparent opinion of the Kereti U'Peleti and the Derisha, see there]. And see what I wrote in section 22.

And there is a question regarding this: how is it found in the third law of two pots and one piece of forbidden food, where there is a doubt whether it fell into the permitted food or into the forbidden food, that the forbidden food would be greater than the permitted food and there would be a doubt as to which pot it fell into? For since we know that the forbidden food is more than the permitted food, presumably it is known what the measure of the forbidden food was and the measure of the permitted food; if so, let us examine now the pot of permitted food and see if there is an excess over the previous measure or not. It is understandable when both are equal, for one can say that he only knew the measure of the forbidden food, which was one piece, and now there are found in the pot of permitted food two equal pieces, as it can be said: perhaps the forbidden food did not fall here and these two were previously in the pot. And similarly, it can be said that one is forbidden and it is equal to the permitted food. And likewise, if the permitted food is greater, it also deals with such a case where he knew the measure of the forbidden piece and now he found in the pot three pieces similar to one another, or even if one of them is slightly larger than the remaining ones, it is also permitted because it can be said they are all permitted, and if you say one is forbidden, it is nullified; which is not the case when the forbidden food is greater. And the answer to this is, for example, that we knew that the forbidden food was the size of a fist, and the measure that was in the pots we did not know, and now after the doubt arose we find in the pot of forbidden food and the pot of permitted food a piece the size of a fist and another piece smaller than it. It turns out that if we say the forbidden food fell into the permitted food, perforce the large piece is the forbidden food and the small one is the permitted food, and the forbidden food is larger than the permitted food; however, it can be said: perhaps the piece like a fist in the pot of forbidden food is the piece that fell into the pot, and the piece like a fist in the pot of permitted food was already inside it. And in this we say that we do not hang the matter to be lenient. But when the pieces are equal, there is no longer a doubt if the forbidden food is greater. And if we saw initially that the forbidden food was the measure of the small piece in the pot, certainly the permitted food is greater [Derisha]. However, in simplicity it can be said that previously he knew, but afterwards they removed the forbidden food from the pot [Shach, subsection 7] and there did not remain in it except the taste; or that it was spilled and he does not know from which pot it was spilled [Kereiti U'Pleiti, subsection 8]; or that the pot's contents shrunk significantly and it is impossible to determine the measure [Pri Chadash, subsection 6]; or that he himself did not see it at all previously, but rather he heard from another that the forbidden food was more than the permitted food, and since he did not see it at all, now upon finding several pieces in the permitted pot he cannot know if it was also like this beforehand or if it was increased by the forbidden food [Taz, subsection 2]; or that previously there were large pieces and afterwards they were cut into small pieces, and automatically it is impossible to determine the matter.

Regarding a Torah prohibition, we do not apply a dependency, for the rule is that in a matter of doubt regarding a Torah law, we rule stringently, unless the permitted substance was greater than the prohibited substance and it is a case of "kind with its own kind," where according to Torah law it is nullified by a majority. However, according to Rabbinic law, sixty parts are required when there is a transmission of flavor, such as when they are in broth; in such a case, we also say "I say" as we do with a Rabbinic prohibition. How so? Two pots, one of slaughtered meat and one of nevelah, and a piece of nevelah fell into one of them: if the permitted substance in the permitted pot is slightly greater than the piece of nevelah, we apply a dependency to be lenient, because according to Torah law, "kind with its own kind" is nullified by a majority, but the sages required sixty. Therefore, if the permitted substance with the prohibited substance is "kind with a different kind," which requires sixty according to Torah law, we do not apply a dependency to be lenient until the permitted substance exceeds the prohibited substance by sixty. [And that which is written in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch, section 4, "If the two pots were of one kind and the prohibition etc.," is not precise, as written by the Taz and the Shach, subsection 9, and it deals with a piece that is fit to be served to guests, for otherwise, it would be permitted even according to Rabbinic law with sixty.]

This law of attributing is only in the manner that we have explained, that when it is attributed that it fell into the other pot, it does not ruin it since it was already forbidden regardless, such as where the other was of forbidden matter. But with two pots of permitted matter, it is impossible to attribute it to the other, for if so, you come to forbid it; and what have you seen to forbid this one and permit that one? Therefore, both of them are forbidden, unless in one of them there is enough to nullify the forbidden matter and in one there is not enough to nullify, then we attribute it to that one which has enough for nullification, for behold, you are not ruining it. Therefore, if one pot was already forbidden from the falling of forbidden matter into it, and afterwards this pot stood with one pot of permitted matter and a rabbinic forbidden matter fell into one of them and he does not know into which it fell, we attribute it to that which was already forbidden, for behold, you are not ruining it since it was already forbidden. But conversely, where previously the forbidden matter fell into one of them and it is not known into which it fell, and both of them were of permitted matter, and afterwards forbidden matter fell into one of them and it is known into which pot it fell, we do not attribute the previous falling to it as well; for since initially both were forbidden, it is impossible to afterwards remove one of them from its previous status because of the forbidden matter that fell afterwards, because it was already established in a state of prohibition. And it appears that this is specifically when the previous falling became known before the second falling; and see what I wrote in siman 201, section 210.

This is the wording of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, section 5: If there were two pots of permitted food and before them were two pieces, one of forbidden food and one of permitted food, and one fell into this one and one fell into that one, both are forbidden, even with a rabbinic prohibition, for it is impossible to attribute it to one more than to the other. In what case is this said? When neither of them contains enough to nullify the forbidden food. But if one of them contains enough to nullify the forbidden food, both are permitted, for I say the forbidden food fell into that which has enough to nullify it. And the Tur concluded that there is no difference whether the two pots belong to one person or to two people. Thus far his words. Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, omitted this, and below his reason and the reason of the Tur will be explained; and see what I wrote in section 18.

They further wrote: If there were here two pots of permitted food, and a prohibited substance fell into one of them and it is known into which it fell, and then a prohibited substance fell again into one of them and it is not known into which it fell, I say: to the place where the first prohibited substance fell, the second fell as well. But if a prohibited substance fell into one of them and it is not known into which it fell, and afterwards a prohibited substance fell into one of them and it is known into which it fell, both are prohibited. Thus far his words. And we have already explained the reason in section 13. And our teacher, the Rema, wrote regarding this: specifically when there is not sixty to nullify the prohibited substance that fell there, but if there was sixty to nullify the prohibited substance that fell there, it is as if no prohibited substance fell there at all. Thus far his words. And his intention is regarding the first clause: when do we hang the second on the first? When there was not enough in the first for nullification and it became prohibited; then we hang the second on it as well, because you are not ruining it, for it is already ruined. But if there was enough in it for nullification and it did not become prohibited, it is impossible to hang the second on it, for behold, you are ruining it, and it is like two pots of permitted food. And I do not know what this comes to teach us; and one cannot say that it comes to teach us that in the latter clause, if previously there was enough in both of them to nullify the prohibited substance, and afterwards the second fell into one pot known to us, that we do not prohibit the other pot—behold, this too is a simple matter, for based on what logic would we prohibit the former? Behold, there was enough in it for nullification, and the second prohibited substance fell into the other. And it appears to me that it comes to teach us this: behold, all these laws—that we hang the ruin on the ruined, and when there is no ruined thing here both are prohibited—exist also regarding stains later in siman 190, regarding two women who wore one garment and a stain was found. If one was pure and one was impure, we hang the stain on the impure one, see there, for the reason is also because we hang the ruin on the ruined; and when both are pure, both are impure, see there. Nevertheless, it is explained there that even when both are pure, if one is more likely to see than her companion, such as one who is young and one who is old, or one who is pregnant and one who is not pregnant, we hang the stain on the one who is likely to see, and she is impure and her companion is pure. Consequently, sometimes we hang it on one more than the other even though she is also not ruined, if only there is a reason for the matter. According to this, it would be possible to say here as well that this fact—that we hang the second fall on the first fall when it is known into which pot it fell—is not because you are not ruining it, but because it is more prone to a fall, and the proof is that the first time it fell into it. According to this, even when it is not yet ruined, such as when there was sixty in the first fall, nevertheless we would hang it on it as with a stain. To this, he comes to teach us that here it is specifically if it is ruined, and it is not similar to a stain; for there, we are witnesses that one woman is more prone to seeing blood than another, but here it is not so. For just because the first fall was in it, shall we say also that the second fall was in it? For this is not a comparison to a stain. And the proof for this is that behold, in the latter clause, we do not hang the first fall because of the second; and if it were because of being prone to falling into it, why do we not hang the first on the second just as the second on the first? Rather, certainly the reason is only because of ruin alone [and even if the prohibition is rabbinic, such as where it was nullified according to the Torah, nevertheless we hang it on it; so wrote the Taz in subsection 7].

They further wrote: If there were here two pots of permitted food and a prohibited substance fell into one of them, and it is not known into which it fell, and there is not enough in one to nullify the prohibited substance but there is enough in both of them to nullify it, both combine to nullify it. And not only this, but even if one is in the house and one is in the attic they combine, and the same law applies even to one hundred [for anything that enters into the doubt combines to nullify it]. In what case does this apply? When both belong to one person, because whenever they belong to one person they are destined to be mixed; but if they belong to two people, they do not combine. Thus far his words. And consequently, the same law applies even when they belong to one person but are not destined to be mixed, whether from the side of prohibition, such as when one is of meat and one is of milk, or from the side of opposing tastes, such as when one is sweet and the other is sour, and so too anything similar to this, they do not combine [Shach subsection 18 and Taz subsection 8]. And all this is regarding a rabbinic prohibition or a Torah prohibition with a rabbinic measure, but regarding a Torah prohibition with a Torah measure, they do not combine at all even for one person, unlike the one who wishes to be lenient in this [ibid. subsection 19]. And so too, even regarding a rabbinic prohibition and belonging to one person, if they are from two towns they do not combine, for so it is proven in the fourth chapter of Terumot [Pri Chadash subsection 16].

And there is a great question regarding this, for if so, in the law explained in section 14 regarding two pots of permitted matter and two pieces that are both forbidden if there is not enough in one of them to nullify it, why should they both not combine for nullification as in this law? And some say the reason is that combination is only in a single falling of forbidden matter, but in two fallings—one of forbidden matter and one of permitted matter that fell into the two pots—they do not combine since there is a falling in each one [Bach and Perisha in the name of Maharshal]. And some say that there is no difference in this, for ultimately the forbidden matter is only one piece, and why should the second pot not combine? Rather, in truth, combination is effective there as well, but they were not dealing with that law, and after they wrote this law, it follows that there also it is so. And that which they wrote, that there is not enough in one of them to nullify, refers to a place where combination is not effective, such as one of meat and one of milk and the like [Taz sub-section 6, and Shach sub-section 13, and Pri Chadash sub-section 12].

And it is possible to say that this is the intention of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 5, who omitted the words of the Tur who wrote there that there is no difference whether the two pots belong to one person or to two people, as I wrote in section 14, see there. But the Tur explicitly wrote the opposite, and so explicitly wrote the Rashba in Torat HaBayit, see there. And there is one who wanted to press and say that we are dealing with a Torah prohibition [Shach, subsection 19], and the difficulty is evident, for this entire matter is only rabbinic. Therefore, one must say that they hold to distinguish between one falling and two fallings. And regarding that which those who disagree asked, that ultimately the prohibition is only one piece, and why should the two pots not combine, for behold, both pots entered into the doubt—it appears to me that there is no difficulty at all. For behold, the principles of these laws are in the fourth chapter of Terumot, and according to the halacha there, anything that entered into the doubt elevates, and anything that did not enter into the doubt does not elevate. However, there are Tannaim there who hold that even those that did not enter into the doubt elevate; for example, if there are fifty white figs and fifty black figs, Rabbi Yehoshua holds that even if a white fig fell into them, the black ones assist in nullifying. And similarly, if a black one fell, the white ones assist in nullifying. And Rabbi Eliezer holds that even if it is not known what fell, both do not combine for nullification. And Rabbi Akiva holds that when it is known what fell, the second species does not assist in nullification, but when it is not known what fell, they combine; and the halacha is like Rabbi Akiva. There is further a dispute there regarding one who presses a litra of dried figs onto the mouth of a jar and does not know which one it is, where there are many jars here. And behold, all the upper parts of the jars entered into the doubt, but the lower parts did not enter into the doubt at all. Nevertheless, Rabbi Eliezer holds that the lower parts combine for nullification, and therefore even if there are not one hundred jars there, the lower parts combine and the terumah is nullified by them. And Rabbi Yehoshua holds that since the lower parts did not enter into the doubt, they do not combine for nullification, and one specifically needs one hundred jars; and the halacha is like Rabbi Yehoshua. It turns out that in this Mishnah, the reasoning of Rabbi Eliezer is the reverse of what he holds in the previous Mishnah, for there he is stringent and here he is lenient, and similarly the reasoning of Rabbi Yehoshua is the reverse, and their reasons must be understood.

The Yerushalmi explains the reasoning of Rabbi Yehoshua in the previous Mishnah is because if he wishes, he may grind them all, the black and the white, and they will all be mixed together, and therefore they join together to nullify. And even though one may not nullify a forbidden substance l'khatchilah, this refers to where one increases the permitted substance in order to nullify them, but here he only changes them from how they were, it is permitted [Tosafot Yom Tov, see there]. And the reasoning of Rabbi Yehoshua in the second Mishnah was not explained, neither in the Yerushalmi nor in the commentators of the Mishnah [and what the Tosafot Yom Tov wrote there according to the Yerushalmi that they are two Tannaim requires great study, for that is not the explanation, and the Pnei Moshe already challenged him there]. And it seems to me that his reasoning is that anything that is in one circle joins together, and white and black are in one circle; but that which is on the mouth of the jar is not one circle with the lower ones and is like two vessels, and since they did not enter into the doubt, they do not assist to nullify. And the logic of Rabbi Eliezer is the opposite, that black to white are not fit for joining since they are always recognizable on their own [Tosafot Zevachim 73a], but the lower ones to the upper ones are fit for joining. However, in any case, there are those who hold that sometimes even those that did not enter into the doubt join together for nullification, like lower ones to upper ones, and similarly with black and white, only that the halakhah is like Rabbi Akiva [and know that regarding what was said that according to Rabbi Eliezer even when it is not known what fell, black and white do not join together, we wrote this according to the explanation of the Rambam in the Mishnah, see there; and the Rash and the Bartenura did not explain it so, see there].

And according to this, it appears explicitly that whenever it is in one vessel, the combination is very easy, for even those that did not enter into the doubt at all combine for the bitul; consequently, the bitul does not depend on one thing alone, and that is in everything that entered into the doubt. However, there is a difference also between one vessel and two vessels, as has been explained. Therefore, I say that just as in one vessel those that did not enter into the doubt assist to nullify, so too conversely in two vessels: sometimes even those that entered into the doubt, if there were two falls, each fall into one of the vessels, they no longer have any connection to one another. And there is a great reason for the matter, for specifically when the doubt is a complete doubt do we combine two vessels with one another; but in a place where there is some knowledge, such as when it is known to us that one fell into one vessel and one into another vessel, even though this is not complete knowledge—since we do not know which fell into this one and which into that one—it is considered partial knowledge like complete knowledge, and they do not combine with one another [see Nedarim 87b in the Ran s.v. Rabbi Meir, that the sages hold that partial knowledge is like complete knowledge, and even for the one who does not hold so, that is from a scriptural derivation, see there; and also that is so it should not be like actual knowledge for leniency, but here to be stringent, it appears that it is like complete knowledge, and examine this].

And behold, it has already been explained that we learned all these laws from the mishnayot of Terumot. And behold, we have learned in the Tosefta of Terumot [chapter 8]: If there were before him two mortars, one of chulin and one of terumah, and he gave from one of them but does not know from which of them he gave, I say he gave from the chulin. Thus far his words. And the reason is simple, for in a doubt regarding a rabbinic law, we rule leniently. And according to this, also regarding rabbinic prohibitions, if there were here two pots, one of permitted food and one of a rabbinic prohibition, and he gave from one of them but does not know from which of them he gave, I say he gave from the permitted one. And the reason the poskim did not cite this is because it is simple that in a doubt regarding a rabbinic law, we rule leniently, as in the previous laws.

The Rashba, of blessed memory, in his book Torat HaBayit [Bayit 4, Shaar 2] raised a great difficulty: since a doubt regarding a Rabbinic law is ruled leniently, if so, in the case of two pots, one of permitted food and one of forbidden food, and before him were two pieces, one of permitted food and one of forbidden food, and these fell into those, they are permitted because we attribute it, saying that the forbidden piece fell into the forbidden pot and the permitted piece into the permitted pot. And so it is in all the laws that were explained regarding this. And it was explained that it is necessary that the forbidden food not be more than the permitted food, but when the forbidden food is more than the permitted food, we do not attribute it. Why do we not attribute it? Is it not a doubt regarding a Rabbinic law which is ruled leniently? And he answered that since there is certainly a falling of forbidden food here, but it is not known into which it fell, we do not say in such a case that a doubt regarding a Rabbinic law is ruled leniently; see there. Therefore, it is not similar to the law explained in the previous section, for there a falling of forbidden food was not established, which is not the case in these laws [and in the second law in section 8 it must also be said so, and examine it].

He further brought there the opinion of the Ramban, of blessed memory, regarding this law in section 16, that in the case of two pots of permitted food and a prohibited substance fell into one of them, both combine for nullification. And this is the law of the litra of dried figs in section 18; this is only if they belong to one person or to two people and they came to ask at the same time. But if they came to ask one after the other, we permit it for both of them even if there is not enough for nullification in both of them, and this is similar to the "two paths" explained in many places in the Gemara. And the Rashba, of blessed memory, disagrees on this, see there. And there are some of the great authorities who agreed with the words of the Ramban [Shach subsection 19 and Pri Chadash subsection 18]. But the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch do not hold so, and their reasoning appears to be that one should not learn matters of prohibition from matters of ritual impurity [and even though in Pesachim 10a they learned regarding chametz in the case where a mouse came and took, etc., it can be said that there is another leniency there, perhaps it ate it, and it was like a double doubt, see there and examine closely].

And some say that this which has been explained, that both of them combine for nullification, is only in a case where there is no imparting of flavor, such as dry in dry; but in a liquid where there is imparting of flavor, we are not lenient to combine the two pots [the Ra'ah in Bedek HaBayit, cited in the Shach, subsection 20]. And likewise, some say that this is only according to the one who does not hold of chanan regarding other prohibitions, for according to the one who holds of chanan, the combination is of no avail, as it has already become nevelah [Bach]. But all the great later authorities disagreed with this, for whenever everything enters into a state of doubt and it is destined to be mixed, we view it as if it is already mixed, and behold, there is enough in this to nullify the prohibition [Shach, subsection 17, and Taz, subsection 10, and Pri Chadash]. And it is not similar to what was written in siman 99, that regarding chanan an addition is of no avail even before the prohibition became known, for there it became known afterward where it fell, and if so, at the time of falling, everything did not enter into a state of doubt; however here, where it did not become known at all, everything entered into a state of doubt [ibid.].

And nevertheless, our teacher, the Rema, wrote that there are those who are stringent that even with one person where they are destined to be mixed, one should not be lenient, and for the purpose of a great loss, one may be lenient with one person; however, one should not eat it until after he mixes them together, for then the forbidden substance has already been nullified. Thus far his words. And this is not like one who nullifies a forbidden substance, since according to the essential law this is not necessary at all, as indeed there are those who disagree with this [Taz ibid.]. And behold, it is true that the Rashba certainly did not hold this way, and nevertheless, in the Issur V'Heter, rule 26, he brought this in the name of the great ones, and it appears they did not intend to follow the opinion of the Rashba, but rather it was they who were stringent in this. And their reason appears to me to be that since a matter that is not destined to be mixed does not join together for nullification, as I have written, if so, who is to say that this matter is typically mixed? Therefore, they required that he not eat them until he mixes them [and the difficulty of the Taz, subsection 10, is answered].