Siman 438

The Rambam wrote in the second chapter, law 7: We do not fear that perhaps a weasel dragged chametz to a place where one does not bring chametz. For if we fear from house to house, we must fear from city to city, and there is no end to the matter. He checked on the night of the fourteenth… Thus far his words. For if we fear the dragging of a weasel, if so, how could you find a place where one does not bring chametz that does not require checking? We should fear that a weasel dragged it there. However, from this there is not such a proof, as one could say that you find it in a place where a weasel cannot go. But from the reason that there is no end to the matter—one need not fear even in a place where weasels are common (Tosafot 9a, starting with "Ein", see there).

And this is when we did not see that a weasel took a piece of chametz. But if we saw that it took it—a new bedikah is required. And why do we not hang the matter on the assumption that it ate it? Because a doubt of eating does not remove the certainty of chametz (Gemara ibid.). And even though it is a common doubt, as presumably it ate it, nevertheless it does not remove the certainty of chametz (Tosafot ibid., starting with "And if"). And there is room to doubt if this is specifically when one did not perform bitul, as it is a doubt regarding a Torah law, but in a doubt regarding a rabbinic law when one performed bitul—we should not be so concerned. Or perhaps: even in a doubt regarding a rabbinic law we say a doubt does not remove a certainty. (And the Chok Yaakov, small subsection 1, wrote: that even regarding a rabbinic law we say this, see there. And for me it requires further study, for the Gemara there stands upon the Mishnah of "we do not fear," and in the time of the Mishnah they had not yet said that one who performs bedikah must perform bitul. And that case of a Chaver who died and that case of a collapse that are brought regarding this were Torah matters. And it requires further study.)

And not only that, but even if we saw a mouse enter a searched house with a loaf in its mouth, and one entered after it and found crumbs, even in the amount of the entire loaf—one must return and search the house for the loaf that it brought in, because it is not the way of a mouse to crumble. And these crumbs came from elsewhere and not from that loaf, and all the more so if the crumbs are less than the amount of the loaf. And one must search that room that the mouse entered, and no more. And the other rooms are a doubt, and it will be explained in the next siman (Magen Avraham, subsection 1). For this is a doubt upon a doubt. And there is no difference between a large loaf and a small one. And likewise a dog or a rooster—it is also not their way to crumble. And therefore, if they took it and one found even in its entirety, if they are crumbs—this is not from this loaf, but rather it is another, and it requires searching even if he nullified the chametz (Chok Yaakov, subsection 1).

But if a child entered a searched house, and he does not possess the maturity for us to rely on his statement that he ate it, and they found crumbs after him—he does not need to return and search, for the presumption is that he ate it. And these crumbs are from him—it is because it is the way of a child to crumble. If so, these crumbs are those that fell from him at the time of eating. And there is no distinction between whether there are enough crumbs to account for the entire loaf, or whether there are not. For if there are enough—we say that he did not eat anything, and crumbled it. And if there are not—we say he ate part of it and crumbled part of it. And only if no crumbs are found at all do we not attribute it to his having eaten it all, and one must search. And some say that this is specifically when there are enough crumbs to account for the entire loaf. But if there are not—we do not attribute it to say that he ate the remainder, for a doubt of eating does not remove a certainty of chametz. And it appears to me that in all this there is no distinction between whether he performed bitul or did not perform bitul. For when we attribute—we attribute even without bitul, because it is like a certainty. And when we do not attribute—we do not attribute even with bitul, if we say that a doubt does not remove a certainty even in a rabbinic matter (and as I wrote at the end of section 2 in the name of the Chok Yaakov).

If a mouse entered a house with a loaf in its mouth, and afterwards we saw a mouse that exited from there with a loaf in its mouth – we say the first that entered is the last that exited. And there is no need to search. But if the first was black and the second was white, or if he recognizes that this is not the mouse that entered – he must search. And we do not hang the matter on the possibility that this mouse dropped it from its mouth and this one took it, for a doubt does not remove a certainty. Furthermore, even if a mouse entered with a loaf in its mouth, and afterwards a weasel exited with a loaf in its mouth, for presumably the mouse is afraid of the weasel and cast it down and the weasel took it; nevertheless, we do not hang the matter on this, since the mouse was not also seen in the mouth of the weasel. Therefore, if the weasel exited from there with a mouse and a loaf in its mouth – he does not need to search, for certainly this is the loaf that was in the mouth of the mouse. Thus the Rambam ruled in the second chapter, law 13, see there.

It must be understood, for all of these are inquiries in the Gemara (10b). It is understandable regarding the earlier ones, as the Shas says "and if you say," and the method of the Geonim is that every "if you say" is like a resolution. However, the final law of a mouse and a loaf in the mouth of a weasel—this remains in the Gemara as a teiku, see there. How then did he rule leniently? The Maggid Mishneh wrote that every teiku regarding a rabbinic matter is ruled leniently, see there. That is to say: it refers to when he nullified the chametz. The Rambam did not need to explain this, for he writes the law for us according to the halacha, that one who searches must nullify. And so wrote the Tur, that all of these are inquiries, and if he nullified—we follow the leniency, and when he did not nullify—we follow the stringency, see there, because the Tur does not hold that the initial inquiries were resolved. But according to the Rambam regarding the initial laws—even without nullifying we follow the leniency, since the inquiries were resolved. (And from the Rambam it implies explicitly that they are all equal in law, and it requires further study.)

The Rambam wrote (ibid.): A snake that entered a hole with bread in its mouth—one is not obligated to bring a charmer to remove it. Thus far his words. And the reason: Since one would need to incur expenses to hire a charmer, the sages did not trouble him (Gemara ibid.). And even though regarding the search for chametz we say: A person is pleased to perform a mitzvah with his money—that is regarding certain chametz. But here it is a doubt, for perhaps the snake will bring it outside or eat it (Tosafot ibid.). And this too is an unresolved inquiry, and it must also be said that this deals with one who has performed bitul, and it is a rabbinic matter, and a doubt is ruled leniently.

He further wrote: An olive-sized volume of chametz on the ceiling beams—we obligate him to bring a ladder to take it down, for sometimes it might fall from the ceiling beams. If there was chametz in a pit—we do not obligate him to bring it up, but rather he annuls it in his heart and that is sufficient for him. Thus far his words, and so he wrote in the Shulchan Aruch, section 2. And behold, according to our version of the Gemara there, according to the rule of the Geonim that "if you find reason to say" constitutes a resolution—even in a pit he is obligated to bring it up, for it says there: "If you find reason to say, sometimes he will go down there and come to eat it," see there. Rather, the Rambam had a different version (Maggid Mishneh). And I wonder at our teacher, the Beit Yosef, that he should have brought that according to our version it is not so. And it seems to me that in this he relied on the Tur, for the Tur wrote that even regarding the ceiling beams it is a doubt, and if he annulled it—he does not need to take it down, and all the more so in a pit. Therefore, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, even though regarding the ceiling beams he was stringent like the Rambam; nevertheless regarding a pit, where according to the Tur even according to our version he does not need to bring it up—he left the matter as it is.

And know that regarding this, that the Rambam was required to explain here "he nullifies it in his heart and that is sufficient," even though in all the laws that have been explained a nullification is specifically required, as I wrote in the name of the Maggid Mishneh in section 6; it is only because there it deals with a case where it occurred after the bedikah that a mouse entered etc., and he had already nullified after the bedikah. But here it deals with the time of the bedikah, therefore he says "he nullifies it in his heart," meaning: that he should rely on the nullification that he will perform afterward, and intend also for this loaf. And the Ra'avad in the Hassagot wrote that here too it deals with after the bedikah and the nullification, and afterward they found it, see there. But at the time of bedikah – in every case he is obligated to bring it up, for this is like one who hides it in a pit. And his reasoning appears to be: because since this law was stated alongside the laws of the mouse, presumably it deals with the same case. (The Maggid Mishneh wondered at the Ra'avad, and according to our words it works well. And examine it closely.) And if it fell into a well of water – the chametz is as if it were destroyed (Mekor Chayim).