Siman 382

The sages taught in the Mishnah (61b): "One who dwells with a kutei in a courtyard—he does not restrict him, until there are two Israelites dwelling in two houses, and they restrict one another." And they explained in the Gemara that this is the matter: that by the essential law, the dwelling of a kutei does not restrict the Israelite, but the sages were concerned lest he learn from his actions. Therefore, if he is only one in the courtyard—they did not find it necessary to enact a decree, because it is an uncommon matter, for he is afraid of the kutei, who is suspected of robbery, and consequently he will leave and not dwell there. However, when two Israelites dwell in two houses, and this matter is common, since they are two they are not afraid of him, and the sages said—that their eruv is of no benefit at all until they rent the domain from the kutei. That is, the domain that he has in the courtyard—they must rent from him, and without this—the eruv is nothing. And they only restricted when the two Israelites dwell in two houses, and they restrict one another. But if they dwell in one house, even though in such a case they would not be afraid of him, and it is common that they dwell—nevertheless they did not decree in such a case, because this itself is uncommon, that two householders should dwell in one room, for when they dwell in two rooms—it is called "two houses," and they restrict one another, as I wrote in siman 366 and siman 370.

And should you say, what benefit is there that he will not learn from his actions so that he will depart from there, since you have permitted it to him by means of renting. They explained in the Gemara (62a) that this matter will not come easily to the Israelite, because the gentile fears sorcery, and will not want to rent it to him; see there. And Rashi, of blessed memory, explained there another reason (starting with the words "Rather") and this is his wording: "Lest he learn from his actions—the sages burdened the Israelite dwelling with him and caused him loss, so that it would be difficult in his eyes to give payment every single Shabbat and he would depart from there." Thus far his words. And our teacher Yehonatan on the Rif wrote in this wording: "So that he will not learn from his actions—they were stringent and required them that the Israelite rent from them, and he will not want to rent it to him because he will fear sorcery, and he will say in his heart: I want to give him my portion as a gift and despite all this he does not want to carry in it until I rent it to him for less than the value of a perutah, certainly he intends sorcery, and he will not rent to him. And because of this the Israelite will depart from his house, and will not learn from his actions." Thus far his words. And all these matters seemingly contradict one another.

Indeed, all the words of the sages are established, and it is all one matter. We must understand why the Kuti would fear sorcery, and whether renting is something not practiced among people; rather, the matter is as follows: the sages permitted this renting with a tenuous rental and for less than the value of a perutah, as will be explained. And the Kuti knows that less than the value of a perutah is not considered money to the Israelite, and despite all this, the Israelite only desires this rental and not a gift. And the Israelite does not want a gift because the sages enacted thus, that specifically rental is required. But the Kuti will not understand why it is so, for less than the value of a perutah is like a gift, so why would he not desire a gift and only a rental of less than the value of a perutah? Therefore, the Kuti will suspect that there is a concern of sorcery. (And this is the intention of the Ri). Indeed, this is well if he rents from him for less than the value of a perutah—he will fear sorcery; but what shall we do if he rents from him for a perutah or for more than a perutah, for then he will not fear sorcery? To this Rashi, of blessed memory, came to explain, that this will be difficult in the eyes of the Israelite to give a full payment every single Shabbat, and consequently he will leave from there. That is to say, when the Kuti sees that he gives full money for this—he will not rent to him for a long time but only for one Shabbat, and on the next Shabbat he will request more money, and consequently it will be difficult for the Israelite and he will leave from there. (So it appears in my humble opinion).

In the Yerushalmi (the third halakha returned) it is stated: The halakha is that an Israelite annuls and the Kutite leases. And it asks: Why should the Kutite not annul? And it answers: Because we fear lest he retract, for after annulment he can indeed retract, as I wrote in the previous siman, and the Kutite will certainly retract, and there is no reliance of the mind here. But when he has leased from him—he cannot retract, for leasing acquires; see there. And from this, there is seemingly clear proof for the position of the Rashbam and the Tosafot, which we brought in Choshen Mishpat at the beginning of siman 194, that a Kutite acquires land with money, and not like the Rambam in chapter 1 of Zekhiya, that he has no acquisition in land except with a deed, as I wrote there. However, we explained there in section 7 that regarding the leasing of land, even the Rambam admits that it is acquired with money; see there. And we learned from the Yerushalmi that after he has leased—he cannot retract, and more will be explained regarding this in section 14. (And there is no proof, for the Yerushalmi might not hold like our Shas, that the reason is because he fears sorcery, for one could say that it does hold so. And that which it asks why annulment should not be effective is because with annulment he will certainly fear sorcery, for the matter of annulment is not prepared for him at all; and delve into this.)

Renunciation of domain also does not avail without leasing. For example, if many Israelites dwell in a courtyard, each in a house for himself, and they did not make an eruv, or they made an eruv and one of them forgot to give a portion in the eruv, or even if they all made an eruv but did not lease from the gentile, if they all wish to renounce domain to one so that he will be considered as an individual in relation to the gentile—it is forbidden. And there is one who says the reason is that since in these circumstances it is common for them to dwell, the concern returns to its place that perhaps he will learn from his deeds. (Taz subsection 4) However, this reason was rejected in the Gemara (63b), because renunciation of domain to one is an uncommon matter, and the rabbis did not decree regarding it. Rather, the reason is that if so, the law of eruv will be forgotten; and in the Gemara there, it refers to a gentile who did not want to lease, and of necessity the law of eruv would be forgotten. However, even if he is willing to lease, and only on this Shabbat there was some reason that they did not lease from him, in which case the law of eruv certainly will not be forgotten, for on the coming Shabbat they will lease from him—nevertheless, it is forbidden to renounce, for since if he had not been willing the renunciation would not have availed, one should not distinguish between being willing and not being willing, for shall his statement cause the renunciation? (Tosafot 66a and the Rosh there siman 9) But when they leased from him and require renunciation—they may renounce. (And in the Magen Avraham subsection 4 there are brief and truncated words, and so wrote the Tosefet Shabbat)

There is no need for rental except in the case of a koti who dwells with him in one courtyard and prohibits it to him, or even if he dwells in another courtyard but the courtyards are one within the other, and there is no path for the inner one except through the outer one, and then rental is also required according to the details that will be explained. But in two courtyards open to one another, and each one has an opening to the reshut harabim or to the mavoi, and in one courtyard the koti dwells and in the second courtyard two Israelites dwell, even though he sometimes passes through their courtyard, nevertheless since he does not have an essential right of passage—there is no need for rental, and they may bring in and take out from this courtyard to that courtyard through the opening and through windows even vessels that rested in the house, and they do not need to rent from him. And they did not decree in this case lest one learn from his actions, since they do not have one essential path for all of them, and they do not have such closeness. And see in siman 390, section 3.

But regarding courtyards one inside the other, the Rambam wrote in chapter 2, law 11, and this is his wording: "Two courtyards, one inside the other, and an Israelite and a Kuti dwell in the inner one and one Israelite in the outer one, or an Israelite and a Kuti were dwelling in the outer one and one Israelite in the inner one—this one prohibits the outer one until he rents from him, for the feet of two Israelites and a Kuti are present there, and the inner one is permitted in the inner one." Thus far his words. For in the inner one he is a lone individual in the place of a Kuti, but in the outer one another Israelite and a Kuti always tread upon it, and it is like two Israelites and a Kuti in one courtyard. And in chapter 4, law 22, he wrote: "And if there was a Kuti in the inner one, even though he is one—he is like many, and he prohibits the outer one until they rent his place." Thus far his words. And the intention is even if the Israelite is also a lone individual in the outer one—nevertheless it is prohibited; so our teacher, the Beit Yosef, explained in his great book, for this is worse than one courtyard, for the reason that not everyone knows that there is only one Israelite, and in one courtyard they know better.

But Rashi, of blessed memory, explained in the Gemara (75b) that the intention is when there are two Israelites in the outer one, and the novelty is that even though no Israelite dwells with him in his courtyard, and it is his right of passage alone that prohibits them, and so wrote the Tur. Therefore, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 17 brought the opinion of the Rambam and the opinion of the Tur, but all the great Acharonim disagree with our teacher, the Beit Yosef, and they hold that even the Rambam does not intend his words for when there is one Israelite in the outer one, for in such a case it is obvious that it is permitted, and such is the primary ruling. (Taz subsection 18, and Magen Avraham subsection 14, and Eliyah Rabbah subsection 20, and Tosafot Shabbat end of subsection 29) And on the contrary, there are those who are even more lenient, that even when an Israelite and a Cuthean are in the inner one and an Israelite is in the outer one—that even the owner of the outer one is permitted, since the Israelite is a "foot permitted in its own place." (Maggid Mishneh in chapter 2 there in the name of "there are those who disagree," see there) But the Rambam and the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch do not hold so—and they prohibit, for this does not pertain to a "foot permitted in its own place," since the reason is lest they learn from his deeds as I have written, and such is the primary ruling.

A courtyard in which an Israelite and a gentile dwell, and it is a case of an individual in the place of a gentile and it is permitted, as has been explained, but on the side of the Israelite's house there was another house of an Israelite that does not open to the courtyard, and also between the Israelite owner of the courtyard and the other Israelite there is no doorway between them, only windows are between them through which they can make an eruv via the windows—the sages forbade making an eruv via the windows. (74b) And even though it is permitted to make an eruv via windows, as has been explained in siman 372, here it is forbidden for another reason, because it is forbidden to make an individual in the place of a gentile. (75a) That is to say, for the sages were concerned that he would learn from his actions, and only regarding an individual they did not forbid, for the reason that it is not common for him to dwell there. But when they make an eruv between them via the windows—behold, they will use it together, and he will not be afraid to dwell there. Therefore they forbade them, so that they should not use it together and he will remain truly an individual, and he will depart from there. (Rashi ibid. s.v. 'forbidden')

And the opinion of Rashi, of blessed memory, is that the same law applies even if there is a doorway between an Israelite and an Israelite—they are also forbidden to make an eruv between them, for the reason that has been explained. And that which they specified "windows" in the Gemara is because it is not common to make a doorway between one house and another, but for the law there is no difference. However, Ri, the author of the Tosafot, wrote—that specifically when there is no doorway between them, but when there is a doorway between them—they are permitted to make an eruv. And the reason is that when there is a doorway, in any case the Israelite will not be afraid to dwell there, since the second Israelite can come constantly through the doorway—the Cuthean will be afraid and will not harm him; therefore, there is no benefit in our forbidding the eruv to them. And if it is difficult, if so, let us require that he rent from the Cuthean—this is impossible, for the sages permitted every individual in the place of a Cuthean, and they did not distinguish between whether he has a doorway from another house or does not have a doorway, for since in the courtyard he is an individual—they permitted it to him. And only when there is no doorway but only a window—in this the sages saw fit to forbid the eruv, for in this there will be a benefit so that he will leave from there, as has been explained. But regarding a doorway where there is no benefit—they did not forbid the eruv.

The Rambam, of blessed memory, in chapter 2, law 15, wrote this law in one style, and this is his wording: "A courtyard in which Israelites and a Kuti dwell, and there were windows open from this Israelite's house to that Israelite's house, and they made an eruv by way of the windows—even though they are permitted to take out from house to house by way of the windows, they are prohibited from taking out from house to house by way of the doorways because of the Kuti, until he rents. For the many do not become as an individual through an eruv in a place where there is a Kuti." Thus far his words. And behold, according to this, on the contrary, the Rambam has a great leniency: for even though the sages prohibited making an eruv in a courtyard where two Israelites and a Kuti dwell without renting from the Kuti—this is when they make an eruv by way of the doorways to carry in the courtyard. But by way of windows—they can make an eruv to carry from house to house by way of the windows, and not by way of the doorways.

And behold, in my humble opinion, it would seem clear that the Rambam does not hold of the previous law. For according to his approach, even in a place where an eruv is not effective without renting—nevertheless, they permitted them to make an eruv via windows without renting. All the more so regarding the previous law, where he is truly an individual and the second Israelite has no connection at all to this courtyard—that the Israelites are permitted to make an eruv between them via the windows. And the matter is a fortiori: if in a prohibited place we permitted him an eruv via windows, all the more so in a permitted place. However, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, brought the law of Rashi in section 19, and in section 20 he brought the law of the Rambam, see there; and it implies that he holds they do not contradict one another. The commentators of the Shulchan Aruch also remained silent on this, and I do not know their reason. The Tur indeed did not bring the law of the Rambam, and it requires great study.

The rental that one must rent from the gentile—one does not need to specify to him that he is renting from him in order to permit carrying, but rather he rents from him without specification, and the carrying is automatically permitted, and there is no need to write any document regarding the rental. And he may rent from him even for less than the value of a perutah, for to him it is considered money. And it is permitted to rent from him on Shabbat, for this is not like buying and selling, as it is a flimsy rental, and it is nothing more than requesting permission to permit them to carry, for the sages were very lenient regarding the matter of the rental itself and did not wish to be stringent in this.

We have already written in section 4 that it is explicitly explained in the Yerushalmi that after he has rented from the gentile, he cannot retract. And so wrote Rashi on the Mishnah of "Ha-dar," and this is his wording: "For if they rented from him—how can he retract, for he has already taken the money." Thus far his words. However, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch in section 6 wrote: "As long as the gentile does not retract—the rental is effective, even for a long period." Thus far his words. And it is explained from this that he can retract. And there is one who says that this is when he rented it without specification and he retracts before the first Shabbat, for the Israelite has not yet taken possession. But once Shabbat has entered, such that the Israelite has taken possession of it—he cannot retract, and if he rented it for a set time—he cannot retract until the conclusion of the time. (Magen Avraham, subsection 6). And according to this we must say that what our teacher, the Rema, wrote regarding this: "And he cannot retract from his rental until he returns the money," thus far his words—this is when he retracts before the first Shabbat. And when he retracts before the conclusion of the time—he cannot retract, even if he wants to return the money. And when he rented it without specification and retracts after the first Shabbat—behold, he can retract without returning the money, for he can say that the rental was for the Shabbat that passed.

But some say that he may retract even within the time period if he returns the money. (Taz, subsection 8) And so it is explained from the wording of our teacher, the Rema, for it is difficult to interpret that it refers to his retraction before the first Shabbat as has been written; and so it is explained from the wording of Rashi that we cited, who wrote: "for he holds the money," implying that if he returns the money—he may retract. And also the intent of the Yerushalmi is such, as it says there that if he retracts he is a robber, see there, but when he returns the money—he is not a robber. And the reason he may retract is because it is a tenuous rental, as has been written. Nevertheless, there are some of the poskim who wrote that before the first Shabbat and similarly within the time period—he cannot retract, even if he returns the money, (Bach and Eliyah Rabbah, subsection 8) and this is not according to our teacher, the Rema. And it is possible that since this is a rabbinic matter—they may rely on those who are lenient. And also in the name of the Ramban they wrote, that within the time period he cannot retract at all, even with the return of the money. (Tosefot Shabbat, subsection 11 in the name of Responsa of the Ramban, see there) And the Tur and the Mordechai wrote that one does not need to rent specifically every Erev Shabbat, to exclude one of the early authorities who required renting specifically every Erev Shabbat. (Hagahot Ashri, beginning of chapter Hadar from Or Zarua)

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 7: "If they rented it from a gentile for a known time, when the time expires—one must return and rent it a second time. And one must return and make an eruv, for the first eruv does not return and awaken" Thus far his words. And it is very puzzling: why should the eruv be disqualified? For in a case where one made an eruv by way of a doorway and the doorway was closed by sand and opened on Shabbat—the eruv returns to its fitness, as is written in siman 374. And in his great book, he brought this in the name of the Ramban, see there. And perhaps he holds that since this is from the enactment of the sages, that an eruv without renting is nothing—it is as if the eruv was completely nullified. And it is not similar to a doorway being closed, for the enactment of the sages does not apply to that. And there is a further distinction to be made: for in the case of a closed doorway—it is in his power to open it, which is not the case with renting—it is not in his power, for if the gentile does not want to rent, they certainly cannot rent from him against his will. And it seems to me that even our teacher, the Beit Yosef, only said this when one Shabbat passed for them without renting, for then it is called a nullification of the eruv. But if within that same week they returned and rented from him—it is not called a nullification of the eruv.

If he rented from him for a known time, and within that time he rented his dwelling to another koti—the first rental is not nullified, because the first lessor is still the owner, for upon the conclusion of the rental of the second, it will return to the first. (Taz, subsection 10) And according to this, even if the second protests, and even if he wants to return the money—we do not listen to him, for the owners are the first ones. And according to this reason, it is not specifically when he rented it for a known time, but even if he rented it indefinitely. However, this is not implied by the wording of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 8 regarding this law, where he wrote: "that he rented it for a known time." Therefore, the primary reason appears to be as the Levush wrote: that since he rented it for a known time, and it is not in his power to retract without returning the money—it is as if the first stipulated with the second that he cannot retract until the time. See there. Therefore, if he rented it indefinitely, they must rent from the second. (And so wrote the Tosefot Shabbat in subsection 14. Also the Eliyah Rabbah, subsection 9, disagrees with the Taz, and wrote that it makes no difference if he rented to another or sold to another within the time—the second is obligated to fulfill the condition of the first. And it is simple that if the koti rented to an Israelite—he gives a portion in the eruv and it is sufficient.)

There is one who says that if they rented from a kutei for a period of time and he died—the rental is nullified, and they must rent from the heir. (Taz, subsection 9) And the proof for this is from what is explained in siman 371, that when he dies—the heir must make an eruv anew, and the eruv of his father is not effective. (ibid.) But this is not a valid comparison, for the reason for eruv is because of residence, and the heir was not residing there. And what relevance does this have to rental, for the heir must fulfill what his father sold or rented, as he is unable to inherit that which his father gave to another. And this is not only according to the opinions explained in section 15 that he himself could not retract, but even according to the one who holds that he could have retracted by returning the money, nevertheless, as long as he did not retract—it belongs to the renter, and there is no need to rent from the heir until the conclusion of the time. And all the more so if the heir did not protest against them, for they certainly may carry until the time they established with the deceased.

Five who dwell in one courtyard, each and every one does not need to rent from him; rather, one rents from him on behalf of everyone. And it seems to me that he does not need to tell him that he is renting on behalf of everyone, for even if he rents for himself, what of it? Since the courtyard now belongs only to the Israelite. And the rental must be with good will. But if they compel him to rent—it is not effective. Even if he rented until now and now does not want to rent—it is forbidden to compel him. And it is not similar to eruv, where one who is accustomed to join the eruv and now retracts—that they can compel him, as I wrote in siman 367, for that is regarding an Israelite. But the gentile—Heaven forbid that we should compel him (Taz, subsection 12), and they can only rent from his wife, his hired hand, or his sharecropper, as will be explained.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 1: "An Israelite who lent or rented his house to a gentile—he does not prohibit upon him, for he did not lend or rent him his house so that he should prohibit upon him. But if the house belongs to a gentile and an Israelite rented it from him, and he dwells in the house with him—the rental is not effective regarding the rental of the eruv" thus far his words. And the reason is simple, for the rental of the eruv is that he rents to him his portion in the courtyard. But through the rental of the house, does the gentile not still retain a portion in the courtyard? And there are those who raised a difficulty against our teacher, the Rema, from what will be explained in siman 384, that a guest who enters with permission prohibits immediately, and why should the renter or the borrower not prohibit? (Be'er Heitiv and Taz ibid.) And it seems to me that it is not a difficulty at all, for there it deals with those whom he is forced to allow to stay, such as the guesting of the king's army, and there it will be explained with the help of Heaven.

He further wrote: "An Israelite who rented or lent a house to his fellow, and a Cuthean dwells there, even though he has a grasp in the house—it is not effective, and they must rent from the Cuthean." Thus far his words. That is to say, that the Israelite landlord also dwells there, and consequently, since there are two Israelites—they must rent from the Cuthean, when the Cuthean dwells in his own house and it was not rented from an Israelite, and the Israelite landlord has a grasp, meaning items that may not be moved on Shabbat in the house of the second Israelite, and I would have said—that in this case it is considered as if the landlord also dwells in it, and it turns out that both of them dwell in one room, and rental is not required. He comes to teach us—that it is not effective, for just as an eruv is not effective without rental, so too a grasp is not effective.

The sages were lenient to allow leasing from the wife of a Kuti; even though he protests against her, she may lease. And so too, one may lease from the hired hand or the sharecropper of a Kuti. He is called a "hired hand" when he is for the work of the entire year, and he is called a "sharecropper" when he hired him for the days of the harvest and the gathering (Rashi 64a), and one may lease from them even though he protests. And there is one who is concerned to say that regarding a hired hand or a sharecropper, when he protests, they cannot lease (Bach), but from the Tur and Shulchan Aruch section 11 it is clear that they are also like his wife, and such is the primary view (Taz subsection 13). And it appears to me that also from his son, his daughter, his son-in-law, his daughter-in-law, and the like, when they dwell there in the courtyard, they may lease like his wife, for they are no worse than a hired hand or a sharecropper. And the hired hand or sharecropper of the hired hand or the sharecropper is also like his own hired hand or sharecropper, for the sages were lenient in this so that there would merely be the name of a lease.

The sages further said (64a) that if he does not wish to rent out—one of the residents of the courtyard should draw close to him until he gives him permission to place his objects in the courtyard, and he becomes like one who lends him his domain, and he becomes like his hired hand or his laborer, and he rents to them without his knowledge. And some say that even renting is not necessary, for since the Israelite is his hired hand or his laborer—he gives his eruv and it is sufficient. This is the opinion of the Tur, and Rashi (ibid.) explained likewise, as this is implied by the wording of the Shas, which says that a hired hand or a laborer gives his eruv and it is sufficient, because he is considered as if he dwells together with the gentile, and the house and the courtyard are his regarding this matter, that renting is not necessary. However, the Rambam ruled that he is like his hired hand or his laborer, and they must rent from him. And the Rambam would explain that the Gemara is dealing with the hired hand or laborer of an Israelite, (see Beit Yosef) and this is possible even for an Israelite who is not a resident of the courtyard. (Levush)

When he lends him his domain to place his vessels therein, even if he does not place them—it is fine, since he has permission. However, in such a case, he must perform some form of kinyan with him. (Magen Avraham, subsection 8) And likewise, he must give him permission to place his vessels in any place he desires in the house, for if he designates for him a specific place in the house that he lends him, since he is not like his agent in the entire house—it is not effective for him to be considered like his hired hand or his resident. And there is one who wrote that even in such a case, when the gentile also has permission to place his vessels in this place—it returns to being considered like his hired hand or his resident, (Bach and Magen Avraham, subsection 9) for since both of them have permission in one place—the Israelite is considered like his hired hand or his resident. And likewise, even if the gentile does not have permission to use it there, but he has permission to remove the Israelite from this place at any time—he is also considered like his hired hand or his resident, (Bach and Machatzit HaShekel ibid.) for this is called the Israelite being under his domain, and automatically his law is like his hired hand or his resident.

If one rented from his employee or his dependent for a limited time, and within this time the non-Jew removed him from being his employee or his dependent—nevertheless, until the time expires the rental remains valid, since he had the authority to rent it out at that time—all that he did is valid. But if he rented from him without specification, once he was removed—the rental is voided, for presumably he only rented it out until the time that he would be his employee or his dependent. And the same law applies if one rented the authority from the treasurer of the official, and he was removed entirely from the official. If he rented it for a time—it is effective until the time, and if without specification—the rental is voided. However, this is when he is removed entirely from the official, but if he only removed him from the treasurership, and nevertheless gives him a stipend from his house—he is called his employee and dependent, and they may rent from him, and automatically the first rental also remains valid, even if he rented from him without specification. And according to what has been explained, in places where they make an eruv for the entire city, and it is necessary to rent the authority from the official of the city, if an Israelite has some service with the official—he is considered like his employee and dependent, and they rent the authority of the city from him for many years, so that even when he is later removed from his appointment the rental will remain valid, as has been explained, and it is good to rent from him for fifty years or the like. But if they rented without specification and he was removed from his appointment—the rental is voided as I have written, and they must rent from another if one was appointed in his place, or from a non-Jew who has service there.

Our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, wrote in section 15: "If an Israelite and a gentile dwell in one house—one must rent from the gentile and make an eruv with the Israelite, if each has a dwelling for himself. The same law applies to two gentiles dwelling in such a manner in one house—one must rent from both of them." Thus far their words. And it is simple that the intent is that each one dwells in a room for himself, (and so wrote the Gr"z), and if so, what novelty is there in this? And it must be said, that we do not say the Israelite is considered like his hired hand or his resident, and similarly the gentiles dwelling in such a manner, that each one is considered like the hired hand or resident of the others, and it would suffice that we rent from one, and in the case of a gentile and an Israelite to rent from the Israelite or that his eruv would suffice—it comes to teach us that it is not so; since a room is designated for each one for himself, they have no connection to one another. But if there is no division of domains between them, but rather they are all partners in the entire house—certainly the Israelite is considered like his hired hand or his resident, and similarly with the gentiles—each one is considered like the hired hand of the others. And this is why they were precise to say "if each has a dwelling for himself." (And so it is explained from the source of the law from Tosafot 66a, s.v. 'me'arev', who brought this from the Yerushalmi, see there; and it is a wonder that before us this is not found in the Yerushalmi. However, there is another statement in the Yerushalmi, chapter 6, halacha 3, similar to this, see there and examine it carefully.)

It is stated in the Gemara (64a) that Rava asked Rav Yosef: If there were five hired workers and five Israelite gleaners with a Kuti, what is the law? And he answered him: If they said "his hired worker and his gleaner" to be lenient, would they say "his hired worker and his gleaner" to be stringent? And Rashi explained that the question was since his hired worker and his gleaner can rent out and are like owners, and if so, when each one dwells in a room alone—if it were their domain, they would all need to give a share in the eruv—and now that it is the domain of the Kuti, do they need an eruv? And likewise, when there are residents in the courtyard, if they need to give a share in the eruv. And he answered him, that we do not say "his hired worker and his gleaner" to be stringent, and they are as if they are not there, and are nullified relative to the Kuti who is the master of the house. And based on this, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote in section 16: "If a Kuti has five hired workers or five Israelite gleaners dwelling in his house—their dwelling is not considered a significant dwelling such that they would prohibit one another." Thus far his words. And our teacher, the Rema, concludes with this wording: "For the hired worker (so it should be said) of a Kuti—does not prohibit, if he rented from the master of the house." Thus far his words. That is to say, when there are residents in the courtyard, and they rented the domain from the Kuti or from one of the hired workers and gleaners—they then do not prohibit, even though each one dwells in a room by himself. And in truth, the Ritva wrote there that it deals with a case where they do not eat there and do not sleep there, but otherwise—they are obligated in an eruv. But such is not the opinion of the Tosafot (72b), who brought proof from this law for what was explained in siman 370, section 15, regarding one who keeps a teacher or a scribe in his house and uses all the vessels of the master of the house—that he does not prohibit, see there, and so too regarding a hired worker and a gleaner. And our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in his great book added another reason for this, and this is his wording: "For since it is possible that tomorrow it will occur to the master of the house to switch their rooms... it is not called a designated place." Thus far his words. And also there regarding a teacher or a scribe this was said, and there another reason was explained—that he did not lend them his domain to prohibit him, see there. And it seems to me that this reason does not apply here, for there the master of the house does so entirely for free. But regarding a hired worker and a gleaner—he is doing his work. However, the primary reason for this law is as we said, that this is not called a designation and permanence of place. But when a Kuti or an Israelite rented a room to an Israelite, this is not in the category of a hired worker and a gleaner—and he prohibits, and must give a share in the eruv of the courtyard.

A kuthite who rented his house to his fellow kuthite, if he retained any grasp in the house, such that he has permission to place his vessels there—one may rent from him, since the house is his and even now he has a grasp of the hand in the house. And even if he did not retain any grasp, but if it is within his power to remove the renter from the house at any time he desires—it is also called that the house is still his, and one may rent from him. But if he has no grasp, and also cannot remove the renter until his time—it is not effective unless one rented from the renter. And so too if there is an Israelite who has a grasp in the house of the kuthite—one may rent from him, for he is no worse than his hired hand or his worker; so ruled our teacher, the Rema, in section 18, see there. And he holds that the law is not specifically so regarding a landlord, but rather anyone who has permission to place his objects in his house in any place he desires—he is considered like his hired hand or his worker, for so wrote the Rivash in the responsa (Siman 428). And specifically that he can place them in any place he desires, but if he has a specific corner for this—he is not like his hired hand or his worker, according to the details that were explained in section 24. (And I do not know what the Rema added, for this was already explained in section 12, see there.)

And know, that in a courtyard of non-Jews where two Israelites do not dwell—it is permitted for anyone who comes there to carry on Shabbat throughout the entire courtyard, and from houses to the courtyard and from the courtyard to the houses. Our teacher, the Rema, wrote at the end of this siman: "A ship that has many Israelites in it, and they have designated rooms—they must make an eruv and rent the domain from the non-Jew who owns the ship, or include it in the rental fee of the ship." Thus far his words. That is to say, because for the rental of the ship itself, one cannot also fulfill the rental for the permission of the eruv, as I wrote in section 20. However, there we wrote the reason was because of the courtyard, but here too the entire length of the ship is like a courtyard. And it is obvious that this refers to when they do not assist him in the business of the ship, for if not so, they should be considered like his hired hand or his resident. (And among us it is not customary to make an eruv on the large ships, because for the most part an Israelite does not have a designated room. And if some of them have designated rooms—the rooms of the non-Jews intervene between them. However, if there are only two designated rooms in the ship for two Israelites—they are forbidden to carry from room to room, and they are not careful in this. And it requires further study, for certainly one must be careful in this, and look closely.)