Siman 381

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote: "One who renounces his domain and afterwards brought out [an object] from his house to the courtyard, if inadvertently—he does not prohibit [the others]; if intentionally—he prohibits, for he retracts from the renunciation he made. And if they already took possession of it, by bringing out [objects] from their houses to the courtyard or by bringing in from the courtyard to their houses—he cannot retract from his renunciation; and according to Rashi—taking possession is only effective if they took possession after it became dark" thus far their words, for while it is still day, taking possession is not applicable, as on a weekday there is no prohibition of carrying, for even without his renunciation they would have been able to bring out. (Taz and Magen Avraham subsection 3) And it appears to my humble opinion, that for this reason, even if the one who renounces brought out [an object] while it was still day—this is not a retraction from his renunciation, unless he brought it out after it became dark. (And so it appears from Rashi and Tosafot 69a, s.v. 'hotzi', where Rashi explained because he is a desecrator of Shabbat and cannot renounce, and Tosafot wrote that in an incidental case he is not categorized as a transgressor and can renounce, see there; and this is only on Shabbat, and examine this closely)

The reason he can retract his bitul is because there was no kinyan involved, but merely a removal of authority. Therefore, when he returns and takes possession of it, it is his. Only if they took possession first do they acquire the authority, as with all takings of possession in kinyanim. There is a question regarding this: why do we not say "since it was permitted for Shabbat, it is permitted" as in all matters, and why do we care that he returned and took possession? The Rosh, of blessed memory, (Chapter 8, section 6) answered that since he returned and took possession intentionally, we see from this that he did not truly nullify it, and never removed his mind from it, and it turns out it was never permitted at all. There is one who answered that we only say "since it was permitted, it is permitted" regarding a matter that depends on the onset of Shabbat, and then we say since it was permitted at its onset, it is permitted for the entire day. This is not the case with bitul reshoot, which is effective even after dark and does not depend on the onset of Shabbat. Therefore, we require that it remain in effect for the entire Shabbat, and if it was nullified, it was nullified. (Taz, subsection 1, see there, who did not mention the words of the Rosh at all; and since the Rosh did not answer thus, we see from this that even if the permission is in the middle of Shabbat we say "since it was permitted, it is permitted." However, from that which we hold "there is no muktzeh for half a Shabbat," there is proof for the reasoning of the Taz. And according to the Rosh, we must say that muktzeh is different, as it depends only on bein hashmashot "since it was set aside etc." And see Eliyah Rabbah who was not comfortable with the reasoning of the Taz, and he too did not mention the words of the Rosh; in my opinion, the reasoning of the Taz is correct, and delve into this.)

There is one who says that "retraction" is only defined as taking out, where the one who nullified took out from his house to the courtyard and took possession of the courtyard. However, if he brought in from the courtyard to the house—it is not defined as retraction, unless he also nullified the domain of his house, for then even bringing in is defined as retraction. (This is the intent of the Magen Avraham, subsection 1, as the Machatzit HaShekel wrote.) And the reason is simple, for when he brings in from the courtyard to his house, even though it is forbidden for him to do so when he has not nullified the domain of his house, nevertheless, in that he does not allow the vessels to remain in the courtyard and brings them into the house—on the contrary, there is proof that his desire is to withdraw from the courtyard. But if he also nullified the domain of his house, behold, by his bringing into the house he returns and takes possession of the house—and automatically the entire nullification is voided. But our teachers, the authors of the Tosafot, wrote explicitly (68b, s.v. "ve-hotziu") and this is their wording: "And that which is taught nearby, 'one who gave his permission and took out prohibits'—it is not specifically 'took out,' but even 'brought in'." Thus far their words. And it is forced to say that their intent is when he also nullified the domain of his house, for from where would he say so? And the reason appears to be that since it is forbidden for him to bring in and he brought in—learn from this that he retracted his nullification. And even though now too he is performing a prohibition, nevertheless, if he had not retracted his nullification he would not have done so. (And I saw in the Tosefet Shabbat that he brought from great authorities who rejected the words of the Magen Avraham because of this, and the Tosefet Shabbat wants to settle it, see there; and the Ha-Gaon Rav Zalman ruled like the Magen Avraham and did not bring the words of the Tosafot, see there.)

We hold that there is bitul reshut from one chatzer to another chatzer. That is to say, not only in one chatzer, when one of the residents of the chatzer forgot and did not make an eruv, that he can nullify his domain in the chatzer to the residents of the chatzer, but even that a resident of this chatzer can nullify his domain in this chatzer to a resident of another chatzer, if it is only necessary for this. Whether both of them made an eruv together, such as two chatzerot, one inside the other, and they made an eruv together and placed their eruv in the outer one, and one from the inner one forgot and did not make an eruv—as was explained in siman 378 that both of them are forbidden—this resident of the inner one who forgot and did not make an eruv can nullify his domain to each of the residents of the inner one, and also to each of the residents of the outer one, and he alone will be forbidden and all of them will be permitted. And when they take possession—he will also be permitted according to the law of a guest, according to the laws that were explained in the previous siman.

And behold, in that which has been explained there is no such great novelty, since they prohibit one another—they have the ability to nullify; rather, even in a place where they do not prohibit one another—they may nullify. For example, two yards with an opening between them, and each one has an opening to the public domain, such that they do not prohibit one another, and each one made an eruv for itself and they did not make an eruv together—nevertheless, each one can nullify its domain to its fellow. And this means that all the residents of the yard nullify their domain in their yard to the residents of the other yard, so that they will be permitted to carry from their house to the second yard, and the residents of the yard shall be prohibited. And similarly, two yards, one inside the other, and they did not make an eruv except for the outer one alone, such that the inner one prohibits it as written in siman 378, the inner one can nullify its domain to the outer one; and this means the right of passage that the inner one has over it—it nullifies it to the outer one, so that it shall not use it nor pass over it except at a time when it needs to exit, and the outer one will be permitted. And there is a great novelty in this, that even the right of passage, which is a necessity that cannot be avoided—nevertheless, nullification is effective, and this means to minimize the right of passage as much as possible.

And similarly, there is bitul reshut in a ruin. That is to say, if there were two houses and a ruin between them, and each house belongs to one individual, but the ruin belongs to both of them, and they forgot and did not make an eruv, and they are forbidden to carry from the ruin to the house and from the house to the ruin—one can nullify to his fellow his portion in the ruin. Then the one who nullifies will be forbidden to carry, and for the one to whom it was nullified—it is permitted to carry. And there is a greater novelty in this, that even for something that does not have a complete use—bitul is effective.

The Tur and Shulchan Aruch wrote in section 4: "There is bitul reshut from house to house, for if there were two houses with an opening between them and they did not make an eruv—one may nullify his reshut to his fellow. And even the one who nullifies is permitted to take out from his house to the house of his fellow, but he cannot take out from the house of his fellow to his own house, for then he would be returning and re-establishing possession of the reshut he nullified. And so too if he has a room open to his house, and he nullified the reshut of his house—it is forbidden to take out from the room to his house." Thus far their words. And this is based on the foundation that has been explained, that an individual regarding an individual—is not considered a guest, and therefore it is forbidden to take out from the house of his fellow to his own house. And that which he is permitted to take out from his house to the house of his fellow—this is for the reason that was explained in section 3 regarding bitul of a chatzer, that he is not called one who retracts his nullification except when he brings into the chatzer, for then it is like returning and re-establishing possession of it, but not when he takes out from the chatzer to his house; see there. And here too it is so, when he nullified his house—it is forbidden for him to bring into his house and not to take out from it.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote: "For there are those who say that one should not nullify from house to house unless he leaves for himself one room that he did not nullify, and then it is permitted to bring in even from the house of his fellow to his house. And it is good to be stringent ab initio." Thus far his words. And the reason for this opinion is that he holds that in all nullifications it is necessary to leave one thing without nullification, such as nullifying his courtyard but not his house, and when he nullifies his house as well, he should leave one room that he did not nullify. And the reason for the matter is that since we hold that through nullification he too is permitted to carry, because he becomes like a guest with them, if so, the law of eruv will be forgotten entirely. (Tosafot 64a, s.v. 'im ken') But the matters are perplexing, for it has been explained that an individual regarding an individual does not become a guest, and how is it permitted to bring in and take out? (Magen Avraham, subsection 7) And even if we say that it deals with an individual who nullifies to many, and if so, perforce these many made an eruv among themselves, for if not so, the nullification is not effective, and how will the law of eruv be forgotten? (ibid.) And it requires further study.

And behold, these difficulties are also difficult regarding the words of our teacher Isaac the Elder there in Tosafot. And what appears to my humble opinion is that he holds that this principle—that many do not become guests of an individual, nor an individual of an individual—applies to a courtyard in which all were partners, and now when the many nullified their domain to one, it is impossible to consider them as guests, since the matter remains as it was before, and everyone knows that the courtyard is in partnership, as I wrote in the previous siman, section 8; see there. However, regarding nullification from house to house, where each house belongs to an individual on his own, and they were never partners in the house, if so, one may certainly say that even when many nullify to an individual and all the houses become like his—they all become guests of his, for it does not remain as it was before, since now the individual uses the houses, which was not the case previously, and everyone sees that the houses are his, and all are like guests with him. And so too, an individual to an individual becomes a guest for this reason. And automatically all are permitted both to take out and to bring in from all the houses, and he is also permitted even to bring into his house. And it does not appear like he is returning and taking possession and retracting his nullification, for it is clearly seen that this is not so, since they also carry into his house. And it is not similar to a courtyard, where previously they all carried from their houses to the courtyard, and now too it is so, therefore it appears like a retraction of his nullification. But in a house—it does not appear like a retraction, since there is a change from before. And besides this, the concern of retraction is only before they took possession and not afterward, as I wrote in section 1. And now, if we permit nullification from house to house—they will not make an eruv at all and will nullify to one, and everyone will carry. Therefore, it is necessary that he leave one room that he does not nullify, and it will be forbidden to take out from it to the houses, and then there will be a distinction between nullification and an eruv, and these are the very words of our teacher, the Rema. And because these reasonings belong only to the Ri, the author of Tosafot, therefore he wrote that "it is good to be careful ab initio," meaning that certainly several of the poskim disagree with these reasonings, but ab initio one should fulfill the requirement of the Ri the Elder, the author of Tosafot. (So it appears to my humble opinion.)

Renunciation of domain is only effective in a place where an eruv would have been effective while it was still day. However, in a place where they could not have established an eruv while it was still day—they cannot afterwards renounce on Shabbat. For example, two houses on two sides of a public domain, and gentiles came and surrounded them with a partition on Shabbat, and a partition made on Shabbat is considered a partition, as was written above in siman 362. Nevertheless, one cannot renounce the domain to his fellow, since they were unable to establish an eruv between them on Friday, for renunciation was only instituted as a remedy for an eruv, and when the essence of the eruv is not applicable—it is not relevant to remedy it with renunciation. Nevertheless, an heir renounces domain, for if his testator did not establish an eruv on Friday and died on Shabbat, and the heir comes to dwell there on Shabbat, such that he prohibits them as was written in siman 371—he can renounce his domain. And we do not say, "Behold, he was unable to establish an eruv on Friday," for it is not so, as an heir is the leg of his father, and his father certainly had the ability to establish an eruv, and therefore he too can renounce.

One may nullify, and return and nullify again. That is to say, since the nullification is performed as a regulation so that one will be able to take out his needs, therefore if there were several people who did not form an eruv and it is only possible to nullify to one person, as was written in the previous siman, what is to be done if this person himself who nullified now needs to move his vessels? And even though it has been explained that the one who nullifies may also move objects, as he becomes like a guest to them, this applies to an individual with many, but not many with an individual nor an individual with an individual, and in a courtyard everyone agrees that this is the case. Therefore, the sages permitted that everyone should nullify to this person until he takes out what he desires, and afterwards they nullify to that person who nullified until he takes out, and so too afterwards to a third person, and so on forever. Whether in this courtyard or in two courtyards, where initially this courtyard nullifies to that courtyard until they perform their needs, and afterwards this courtyard returns and nullifies to the first. And we do not say that this is like a joke or mockery—for it is not so, as this is how the sages enacted. (Section 8: like Rav ibid.)