Siman 380

Residents of a courtyard where one of them forgot to give a portion for the eruv, or who willfully did not want to give a portion for the eruv, and all the other residents of the courtyard made an eruv—behold, this person prohibits them, and it is forbidden for all of them to carry out from their houses to the courtyard or from the courtyard to their houses. And what is their remedy—the sages ordained that he nullifies his domain to them and that is sufficient, as he says, "my domain is nullified to you" or "my domain is acquired by you," and there is no need for a kinyan sudar. And it is permitted to nullify on Shabbat, for this is not like a sale but merely a removal of domain, and if there are many residents of the courtyard—he must nullify to each and every one.

This is the wording of the Rambam at the beginning of chapter 2: One must renounce to each and every one explicitly, and he says: "My domain is renounced to you, and to you, and to you." Thus far his words. And the Tur wrote that he should say: "My domain is renounced to you and to you," or he should say "to all of you" collectively. Thus far his words. And there are those who wish to say that according to the Rambam "all of you" is not effective, for perhaps his intention is only for the majority, for the majority is like the whole, and not for everyone. (Taz subsection 1) And this is nothing but a wonder, for behold even regarding a bill of divorce for a woman the phrasing "all of you" includes everyone, (end of chapter 6 of Gittin, see there) and certainly the Rambam also holds so, but it is not his way to explain extensively. And because in the wording of the Gemara (69b) "My domain is acquired by you, my domain is renounced to you," and it says there (70a) that one must renounce to each and every one, he wrote the phrasing thus: "to you, and to you, and to you," for he preserves the wording of the Shas, as is known. And just as we say that the intention of the Shas is not specifically to each one individually, so too we say regarding the wording of the Rambam, and such is the primary ruling, and so ruled the great Acharonim. (Eliyah Rabbah and Tosefet Shabbat, and there is a printing error in the Eliyah Rabbah) And if he did not renounce to everyone—it is not effective, and even though those to whom he renounced have already made an eruv, and it turns out that this domain is also included in the eruv, for it is not so, since at the time of the eruv this domain was not included.

There is a doubt whether it is effective if he subsequently nullifies only for those whom he did not nullify for previously, or perhaps since he did not act according to the enactment of the sages—there is no partial nullification, and he must now nullify for everyone, even for those whom he nullified for previously. And it appears that it is not effective, for whichever way you look at it, since he initially gave to these, how can he give to those? And perforce you must say that he retracts his nullification, because it is within his power to retract, as will be explained; if so, whichever way you look at it, the previous nullification does not stand, for he has retracted, and therefore he must specifically nullify for everyone together.

It further appears to me that the bitul must specifically be in their presence, for granted that with all kinyanim one can acquire through a kinyan via another person not in their presence, for "one may act to the benefit of a person in his absence." However, here it is merely words, only that the sages ordained that it should be effective, and they only ordained it in their presence, as is clear from the phrasing "my domain is nullified to you." And if he wishes to transfer it to them through a kinyan, who is to say that it is permitted to perform a kinyan on Shabbat? It is certainly forbidden. However, while it is still day, when he does not wish to join the eruv, or is unable to join the eruv—it appears that he can transfer his domain to them through a kinyan via another person, for so it is clear from the wording of the Tur and Shulchan Aruch, who wrote that he can nullify even after it gets dark, implying that it is certainly so while it is still day. And even though we learned in a Mishnah (69b): From when may one grant domain? Beit Shammai say: while it is still day, and Beit Hillel say: after it has become dark—and they did not say "even" after it has become dark, and there is a significant reason for this to forbid bitul while it is still day, for why should he need bitul when he can join the eruv? Nevertheless, it was certain to our teachers that the intent of Beit Hillel is "even after it has become dark," and certainly while it is still day. (And so it is clear from the commentary of the R'ri and the Bartenura, and so it is implied explicitly in the Yerushalmi, see there; and from Rashi, 71a, starting with the word "Lo," it is implied that bitul is effective through a messenger, see there.)

The Tur wrote that if he does not wish to nullify his domain to them but rather to rent it—it is effective like nullification. Thus far his words. This is the opinion of the Rosh (in the chapter "Hadar," siman 13) who cited in the name of the Maharam that regarding an Israelite it must specifically be nullification and not renting, and he disagrees with him, for regarding an Israelite renting is also effective. However, in the Mordechai there he ruled that renting is not effective regarding an Israelite, and so it is explained from the words of the Rambam at the end of chapter 2, who wrote regarding a Sadducee that one does not rent from him, because he is not like a gentile; see there. Behold it is explained that renting is not effective regarding an Israelite, and so it is explained from the wording of Rashi on the Mishnah in "Hadar." (Beit Yosef) And one could say regarding their reasoning, that the renting which the sages permitted regarding a gentile is a flimsy renting, as I wrote in siman 382, and the enactment was only for a gentile for whom nullification is impossible. And to perform a complete renting—it is certainly forbidden on Shabbat, due to the prohibition of buying and selling. But to perform a complete renting on Erev Shabbat—it appears that all agree it is permitted. (Magen Avraham, subsection 6, and see Turei Zahav, subsection 2) And in the Yerushalmi (Hadar, halacha 3) it is explained according to the opinion of those who forbid, as it says there: "The halacha is—an Israelite nullifies and the gentile rents"; see there. Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 3 brought two opinions on this, and it appears that the majority of opinions are for prohibition, and such is the opinion of the Yerushalmi. However, regarding a complete renting on Erev Shabbat—there is no proof from the Yerushalmi for a prohibition, for it does not deal with this. (And one should not ask that if so, Rabban Gamliel in the Mishnah in "Hadar" who exerted himself with the Sadducee, should have rented from him on Erev Shabbat with a complete renting, for one could say that the Sadducee did not want this, and so one must say according to the opinion of the Rosh and the Tur, and examine this carefully) (From Rashi 69a it is implied like the Rosh)

Regarding the nullification of domain, if one wishes to nullify only his portion in the courtyard and not his house—he may do so, and if he wishes, he may also nullify his house. One who nullifies without specification, saying "my domain is nullified to you"—has nullified only the domain of his courtyard and not the domain of his house. The reason is that their primary necessity is for the courtyard. And what is the law when he has nullified? If he nullified to them only his portion in the courtyard, or in an unspecified manner which is as if he explicitly nullified only his portion in the courtyard—they are permitted to carry out from their houses to the courtyard and he is also permitted, for he is merely like a guest, since he has no domain in the courtyard. However, from his house to the courtyard and from his house to their houses—it is forbidden both for him and for them. Therefore, some say that he must lock his house so that he does not come to carry out in violation, for out of habit he will forget and carry out, and he should not open it except when he wishes to exit or enter, and he should lock it immediately after his exiting or entering. And even though in a courtyard that is not joined by an eruv—we did not require the locking of his house, this is because everyone is forbidden; but here, where everyone else is permitted to carry from their houses to the courtyard—we fear that out of habit he will also carry out, therefore we required him to lock as a reminder so that he will remember that it is forbidden to carry out from his house to the courtyard. And if he nullified to them the domain of his house as well—they are permitted to carry even from his house to the courtyard and to the houses, and he is also permitted, for he is considered like a guest. However, he is not permitted until after they have taken possession of the courtyard, as will be explained in the next siman. (And one should not ask: when he nullified only his courtyard, why should it be forbidden to carry from his house to the courtyard since he is like a guest? For it can be said: since he did not nullify the domain of his house—he is not like a guest regarding his house.)

Just as an individual who did not join the eruv can nullify his domain to the many who did not join the eruv, so too can these many nullify their domain to him when there is a necessity for this, such as when he is compelled to carry out from the house to the courtyard. And so it is taught in the Tosefta (Chapter 5): "The residents of a courtyard, one of whom forgot and did not join the eruv—he must nullify his domain. If it was a house of mourning or a house of feasting and they wished to nullify their domain, the authority is in their hands" (so it should be read). And even though even when he nullifies the domain of his courtyard and his house he would be able to carry from his house, as has been explained, it can be said that it is difficult for him to nullify the domain of his house, so that those entering and exiting do not increase upon him. (And prior to this it is stated there in the Tosefta: "It is a mitzvah for a person to nullify domain; if he was a great man—the authority is in his hands." Thus far his words. That is to say, that if he is a great man and it is not fitting for him to nullify his domain to them—they shall nullify to him. And even though in the Gemara 68a it is stated that Rava nullified his domain, it can be said that there it was a necessity because of an infant who required hot water for a milah, as is explained there.)

However, there is a difference between the nullification of an individual to many and the nullification of many to an individual. For in the nullification of an individual to many, we said that even the individual is permitted to carry, because he becomes like a guest to them. But many to an individual—it is not so, for many do not become guests to an individual. And the reason is because everyone knows that they are not guests, and only regarding an individual to many is the matter not noticeable. But many to an individual, and even an individual to an individual—such as where there were only two in a courtyard and they did not make an eruv, when one nullifies his domain to his fellow—he does not become like a guest to him. Therefore, if the residents of the courtyard who made an eruv nullify their domain to the one who did not make an eruv—he is permitted to bring out from his house to the courtyard, but not from their houses if they did not also nullify the domain of their houses to him. And if they did nullify—he may bring out even from their houses to the courtyard, but they are forbidden even from his house to the courtyard, and we do not say that they should be like guests, because many do not become like guests to an individual. And even if they nullified the domain of their houses—they are forbidden to carry even from his house to the courtyard, and even if he took possession of the courtyard first—it does not avail. And the same law applies if there were only two, and one of them nullified to his fellow—the one who nullifies is forbidden even in that which belongs to his fellow, and his fellow—is permitted even in his own, and likewise in the house of his fellow if he also nullified the domain of his house to him. And everything is for the reason that has been explained, that an individual to an individual—does not become like a guest.

It is a simple matter that just as for one individual who did not join the eruv, nullification of domain is effective, so too two or more who did not join the eruv may nullify their domain. That is to say, each of those who did not join the eruv shall nullify his domain to each of the residents of the courtyard who did join the eruv. And so too, they may all nullify even to one who did not join the eruv, if there is a need for this. But they shall not nullify to two who did not join the eruv, for this is of no benefit, as they forbid one another since they did not join the eruv, and it is like two who dwell in a courtyard and did not join the eruv, who forbid one another. And even if he said to one: "I nullify to you on the condition that you turn back and nullify to your fellow"—it is also not effective, and we do not say that he made him an agent to transfer ownership, (Rashi 70a, s.v. "lo") for since at the time he transferred it to him he was not permitted to carry, he cannot transfer it to his fellow, (ibid.) rather they must nullify only to one of those who did not join the eruv. And just as we said that many with an individual do not become guests, so too many with many. Therefore, many who did not join the eruv who nullified their domain to many who did join the eruv—those who nullify are not permitted to take out to the courtyard even from the houses of those who joined the eruv to whom they nullified their domain, according to all the laws that have been explained. And it seems to me, that two become guests with more than two, but three are considered many. And so too it seems to me that an individual whom we said becomes a guest with many—even if he is not an individual in his house, for he has a large family, nevertheless he is called an individual. And conversely, many whom we said do not become guests—even if they are individuals, for we follow the houses.