Siman 313

Building is one of the primary categories of labor, and it is stated in the Yerushalmi, chapter Klal Gadol (chapter 7, end of halacha 2): What building was there in the Mishkan? That they would place planks upon sockets. And it asks: Was it not temporary? Meaning, for they did not stand permanently, as they would encamp and travel, encamp and travel. And it concludes: This implies that temporary building is considered building; building from the side is considered building. And the commentators explained: even though it is not a complete building. And it seems to me that this is the explanation: for an ordinary building consists of walls with a roof, and here we learn that even without a roof it is considered building, for upon the planks there was no roof but rather spread curtains, and an ohel according to the approach of Rashi (125b) only exists with a roof, and even according to those who disagree with him, it also only exists with a permitting partition, as will be explained at the beginning of siman 315, and ohel is a derivative of building, as will be explained there; therefore the Yerushalmi informs us that building even from the side is considered building. It further says there: This implies even when placed upon another thing. Meaning, that you should not say that building is only when one attaches the building to the ground, for here the sockets are attached to the ground, and the planks are upon the sockets. And it further wanted to prove that even building upon vessels is considered building, for it thought that the sockets were like vessels, and they rejected this, for the sockets are like the ground and not like vessels, see there. And regarding the law, it seems to me regarding building upon vessels that a complete building is considered building, for even regarding vessels themselves, where we hold that there is no building in vessels, nevertheless a complete building is considered building, as will be explained in siman 314, and all the more so regarding building that is upon vessels. However, when it is not a complete building, it is not considered building, and see section 2.

The sages taught in the Mishnah (102b): One who builds, how much must he build to be liable? One who builds—any amount, meaning that there is no fixed measure for this. And the reason is: for so is a homeowner who has a hole in his beautiful mansion, and is fastidious about a small hole in it and plugs it; and so too in the Mishkan, when a worm fell into it and made a small hole, he would drip lead into it and plug it (Gemara). Therefore, one who levels a stone is liable, meaning that he seats the stone and levels it until it settles into the floor of the building's foundation and seats it in the ground, and even though he did not apply mortar, it is "building any amount" and he is liable (Rashi). And I am astonished that I did not find this law in the Rambam, chapter 10. And it appears to me that the Rambam interpreted the Gemara not like Rashi, as we say there: Shmuel said: One who levels a stone is liable; and it asks against him and concludes: There are three types of building—the bottom, the middle, and the top. The bottom requires leveling and earth; the middle also requires mortar; the top by mere placement. And Rashi explained that Shmuel's statement stands as it is, that for leveling he is liable, and that which it says "leveling and earth," Rashi explained as the earth around it to support it, and that is "leveling," see there. But the Rambam interprets that it rejects Shmuel's view, and for leveling alone one is not liable until he places earth upon it and it is buried within the earth, and that is a complete building and there is no need to mention it. Therefore he wrote there in law 12: If one person placed the stone and another placed the mortar, the one who placed the mortar is liable (and this is regarding the middle), and in the top layer, even if he brought up the stone and placed it upon the mortar, he is liable, etc. Thus far his words (and this is regarding the top). And he wrote further that one who builds upon vessels is exempt, see there, and this is from the Yerushalmi that we brought. And we have already explained that this is not regarding a complete building, and even though he wrote it without qualification, nevertheless it is necessary to say so as I have written, for it is no worse than the vessels themselves. (And also the Rambam, who wrote in chapter 22, halacha 26, that there is no building in vessels, holds in chapter 10 that there is building in vessels, and the distinction is as I have written, between a complete building and an incomplete one, and as the Maggid Mishneh wrote there in halacha 13, and that the Geonim wrote so, see there, and so wrote the Tosafot at the beginning of "One who builds," see there and examine carefully), and see in section 10.

The derivatives of building: the Rambam wrote there in law 12, and this is his wording: "One who builds any amount is liable. One who levels the surface of the ground in a house, such as by lowering a mound or filling a depression—this is building and he is liable… The derivatives of building: one who makes a permanent tent, and likewise one who makes earthenware vessels such as an oven or a barrel before they are fired—this is a derivative of building and he is liable. And likewise, one who curdles cheese—this is a derivative of building, and he is not liable until he curdles the volume of a dried fig." Thus far his words. And some say that this is only by rabbinic decree (Maggid Mishneh there). And what is the similarity of curdling to building? Because anyone who gathers part to part and attaches everything until they become one body—this is a derivative of building (the Rambam, chapter 7, halacha 6).

And similarly, one who inserts the handle of an ax into its wood—this is a derivative of building, and similarly anything resembling it. And similarly, one who fastens wood to wood, whether he fastened it with a nail or whether he fastened it with the wood itself until they are unified—this is a derivative of building and he is liable. And similarly, one who makes any hole whatsoever in a chicken coop so that light may enter for them—he is liable on account of building, and even though we hold that any opening that is not made for bringing in and taking out is not an opening (Gemara 146b), nevertheless, a chicken coop is so, for it is made to bring in light and air and to take out the foul vapor (ibid.). And similarly, one who returns the door of a cistern, or of a cellar, or of an annex—he is liable on account of building (Eruvin 102a), and similarly that of a house. But not that of a chest, a box, or a cabinet, as will be explained in section 27.

In the Yerushalmi there they said: One who braids a vessel of form, who drew a form on a vessel, and one who blows into a glass vessel, and one who makes a vessel in a mold—all of these are on account of boneh. But in our Shas (75b) we say: One who forms a form on a vessel and one who blows into a glass vessel—is liable on account of makeh b'patish, for it holds that the category of building does not apply to this. And the halacha is like our Shas; therefore, if they warned him regarding these two on account of boneh—he is not liable.

Soter is a primary category of labor, and specifically when one tears down in order to build. However, in the case of one who tears down in a destructive manner—he is merely a destroyer and is exempt. Soter existed in the Mishkan, for since it is the opposite of building, it follows that since there was building there was tearing down, as it is unavoidable that they did not spoil some construction and tear it down in order to rebuild it. And know that in the Gemara (31b) we say that according to Rabbi Yose, tearing down in order to build in its place is considered soter, but if it is not in its place, it is not considered soter. The halacha is not according to Rabbi Yose, and therefore the Rambam, of blessed memory, did not mention this. And there is a question regarding this, according to the majority of poskim for whom we hold like Rabbi Shimon regarding a labor that is not needed for its own sake and one is exempt, and therefore in the case of one who extinguishes in order to kindle, he is not liable unless through the extinguishing the kindling is improved more than if there had been no extinguishing, such as one who extinguishes to produce charcoal, as I wrote in siman 278; if so, in the case of tearing down in order to build, let us also not hold him liable unless the building is improved by the tearing down more than if there had been no tearing down here, and this matter is never conceivable. But according to the Rambam it works well, for he ruled like Rabbi Yehuda that for a labor that is not needed for its own sake one is liable, as he wrote in chapter 1. And the answer to this: since we learn all the labors from the Mishkan, therefore regarding extinguishing where we find that there was in the Mishkan a greater improvement through the extinguishing, for they needed to produce charcoal to melt the gold and the silver, therefore for us as well it requires this. This is not the case regarding soter, for even in the Mishkan it was not possible for it to be so, therefore we hold him liable in all manners (Tosafot 31b, s.v. "ve-soter"). And the derivatives of soter are simple, for all derivatives of boneh, in their tearing down they are derivatives of soter, and if they are in order to build—he is liable (and so it is regarding mattir and kore'a).

Makeh b'patish is the completion of any labor, for an artisan strikes with a mallet upon a sheet to smooth it at the completion of the labor (Rashi 73a). And anything that involves the completion of a labor—one is liable on account of makeh b'patish (75b), and these are the derivatives of makeh b'patish. And it is stated in the Yerushalmi, chapter Klal Gadol (beginning of Halacha 2), that any labor for which the sages did not find a basis in any primary category of labor, they based it upon makeh b'patish; see there.

This is the wording of the Rambam there: "One who strikes with a hammer a single strike is liable, and anyone who does something that is the completion of a labor—this is a derivative of striking with a hammer and he is liable. How so: One who blows into glass vessels, or one who forms a shape on a vessel even a partial shape, and one who scrapes any amount, and one who makes a hole of any size, whether in wood, in metal, in a building, or in vessels—this is a derivative of striking with a hammer and he is liable; and any opening that is not made to bring in and take out—one is not liable for its making." Thus far his words. And behold, that which he wrote: 'one who scrapes any amount,' this is a baraita there (103b) and Rashi explained: "One who scrapes beams or parchments is liable on account of smoothing." Thus far his words, but the Rambam explains it on account of striking with a hammer. And it must be said that he explains 'scraping' as meaning that at the completion of the labor he scrapes the vessel to clean it. And also regarding what he wrote that for making a hole one is liable on account of striking with a hammer, I am astonished, for he himself ruled regarding one who makes a hole in a chicken coop that he is liable on account of building, as I wrote in section 4, and behold in the Gemara there (102b and 103a) it compares one to the other. Furthermore, according to the one in the Gemara who holds that a hole is on account of striking with a hammer, they established it in the Gemara there that it refers to piercing with an iron borer and leaving it inside, for that constitutes the completion of the labor, see there, and why did he not clarify this? It requires great study.

He further wrote: "One who pierces an abscess on Shabbat in order to widen the opening of the wound in the manner that physicians do—behold, he is liable on account of makeh b'patish, for this is the craft of the physician. But if he pierced it to extract the pus within it—behold, this is permitted." Thus far his words. Rashi explained it on account of boneh, but to the Rambam it did not appear so, for this is not within the category of building, but rather it is the completion of the physician's craft. However, when he opens it for the pus, he does so many times and it is not a completion of a craft. (And the Maggid Mishneh wrote that even though there are those who establish this at the beginning of the chapter "Eight Creeping Creatures" according to Rabbi Shimon, and he ruled according to Rabbi Yehuda, he does not hold like that version, but rather like the first version that it refers to a lancet; see there. And the reason appears to me to be because Shmuel said at the beginning of Shabbat regarding these three that one is exempt and it is permitted, and an abscess is one of them, and Shmuel holds according to Rabbi Yehuda regarding a labor that is not needed for its own sake, as we say in Kirah 42a. See there.)

He further wrote: "One who hews a stone in any amount is liable for the category of makeh b'patish. One who aligns a stone in the foundation of the building and adjusts it with his hand and seats it in its proper place is liable for the category of makeh b'patish." Thus far his words. And it appears that this is what Shmuel said at the beginning of the chapter HaBoneh: 'One who aligns the stone is liable,' and concludes that this refers to the bottom stone of the foundation which we cited in section 2. And I am astonished how it is possible to explain it as being due to makeh b'patish, for the Gemara considered them together: the upper, the middle, and the lower, and the first two are from the prohibition of boneh, as the Rambam himself wrote and we cited his words there, and he omitted the lower one; and for this reason we wished to say there that he rejected it from the halacha, so how is it possible to say that this is due to makeh b'patish? Furthermore, makeh b'patish is the completion of the labor, whereas aligning is the beginning of the building. It is understandable regarding a hewer, who is not yet engaged in building but rather hews stones from the mountain, but regarding one who aligns it in the building, how does it relate to the completion of the labor? And even if we say that the foundation of the building is considered on its own, surely in the foundation itself many stones are also needed as is understood, and there is no completion of the labor in a single stone, and this requires great study. (And the Kesef Mishneh in the name of the Ramak challenged him as to why he did not explain that he places earth before it as is stated in the Gemara, see there; therefore it seems clear to me that the Rambam did not intend this at all, and regarding this one must say as I wrote in section 2 that he rejected it from the halacha, and here he intended that which is stated in the Yerushalmi, chapter Klal Gadol, end of halacha 2: 'The builder who seated the stone at the top of the layer is liable,' and the Pnei Moshe explained: at the top of the layer of the building to complete it, see there; and it appears that it is the cornerstone at the top which is the completion, and delve into this.)

He further wrote: "One who picks off growths that are upon garments, such as those growths found on wool vessels—is liable on account of makeh b'patish, provided that he is particular about them. But if he removed them in a casual manner—he is exempt. One who shakes out a new black tallit in order to beautify it and to remove the white wool clinging to it in the manner that craftsmen do—is liable for a chatat, and if he is not particular—it is permitted." Thus far his words, and we have already cited this in siman 302 and it was explained there, see there. And one who opens the neck-opening on Shabbat—is liable on account of makeh b'patish (48a according to Rashi, see there), and similarly one who finishes the work of ovens, for after he fired them in the kiln he smears a coating upon it and this is the completion of the work, and he is liable on account of makeh b'patish (74b), and similarly one who makes a reed beehive and cuts the protruding reeds after he finishes it is liable on account of makeh b'patish, for this is the completion of its work (ibid.), and there are further matters that we reckoned in siman 302 that involve makeh b'patish.

And know that regarding the primary explanation of makeh b'patish in the Mishnah of the primary categories of labor, Rashi explained, and this is his wording: "It is the completion of any labor, for thus an artisan strikes with a mallet upon the anvil to smooth it at the completion of the labor." Thus far his words. And at the beginning of [the chapter] HaBoneh, Rashi explained, and this is his wording: "That he shatters the stone from the bedrock with it; after he has hewn around the stone and separated it somewhat from the mountain, he strikes a great blow with a hammer and it breaks apart and falls, and this is the completion of the labor of stone-hewers. And anyone who completes a labor on Shabbat—it is a derivative of makeh b'patish." Thus far his words. And this is the essence of makeh b'patish. However, in the Mishnah of the primary categories of labor, he changed his explanation because in the Mishkan there was no labor of stones, and we must find every labor in the Mishkan. Therefore he explained: for thus an artisan strikes with a mallet, etc., and this was in the Mishkan (Tosafot Yom Tov).

And behold, from the wording of Rashi it is somewhat implied that regarding any labor in the world, when one completes it on Shabbat, he is liable for the category of makeh b'patish. And according to his interpretation, it is necessary to say regarding what they said in several places that one is liable for makeh b'patish—and it is difficult: what is the novelty?—however, the novelty is that even if the completion is something in which there is no labor at all, such as removing threads from a garment and the like. And so it is explained from the wording of the Ran, who brought the interpretation of our teacher, Chananel, and this is his wording: "Makeh b'patish—that the craftsman strikes with a hammer upon the vessel to straighten its curvature... and in this manner, even though it is not a labor in its own right, he is liable for it because of the completion of the labor." Thus far his words.

But if so, it is not understood what they said in the Gemara (75b): "Rava and Rav Zera both said: Anything that involves the completion of a craft—one is liable on account of makeh b'patish." And it is difficult, for in every melakhah there is a completion of a craft, so what is this "Anything etc.," which implies that there are melakhot that do not involve the completion of a craft? And if we say that the intention is even though there is no melakhah in this at all, but in truth there is makeh b'patish in all melakhot, if so, he should not have spoken with this wording, but rather he should have said: "Every completion of a craft is liable on account of makeh b'patish, even in a matter where there is no melakhah." But from the wording "Anything etc." it implies explicitly that there are melakhot that involve the completion of a craft, and there are those that do not.

And in truth, it appears in my humble opinion that so it is, and this is its explanation: that any melakha that does not have in the completion of its work an action separate from what preceded it—the concept of completion of work does not apply to it, for the entire melakha is one and the completion is not divided from what preceded it. But in melakhot where their completion is after the completion of the primary work, such as the tailor who removes the threads from the garment, or one who uproots a stone from the mountain, who after completing his work strikes it a great blow, or one who strikes with a hammer on a sheet to smooth it, or one who picks off the lint on garments after weaving, or who removes white wool to beautify it—this is makkeh b'patish. And I have clear proof for this from the Commentary on the Mishnah of the Rambam, and this is his wording: "And makkeh b'patish... and therefore any repair of a work and its completion, such as polishing and rubbing and types of beautification—they are all derivatives of makkeh b'patish, and this is what they said: 'Anything that involves the completion of work—one is liable on account of makkeh b'patish.'" Thus far his words, and this is according to our words. (And regarding the essence of makkeh b'patish he wrote, and this is his wording: "And makkeh b'patish even at the time of the completion of work, as those who strike with hammers do, for it is their custom to strike blows upon the anvil itself at the time of the striking." Thus far his words, and the phrasing "even etc." requires further study, for it is only at the completion of work, and it can be settled, and examine it well.)

One who makes a permanent tent is liable on account of building; therefore, one may not make a temporary tent ab initio, nor may one demolish a temporary tent, as a decree lest one make or demolish a permanent tent, and if one made or demolished a temporary tent, he is exempt. It is permitted to add to a temporary tent on Shabbat (the Rambam, chapter 22, halacha 27). Therefore, a window plug—that is, a board or any other thing with which they close the window—they may close it even if it is not tied to the window, as it appears like a thing unto itself. This is not a temporary tent that is forbidden ab initio, but rather this is called an addition to a temporary tent and is permitted, and even in a chimney that is in the roof it is permitted for this reason (Magen Avraham, subsection 1). And the explanation of the matter: we do not say that this is like an addition to the building and is no better than a temporary tent, for it is not so, as this is not an addition, and it is similar to adding to a temporary tent which is permitted. And behold, if they already closed it with it, there is no novelty in this, but even if they have not yet closed it with it, they may close it with it if he thought about it on the eve of Shabbat to close it with it, like all things where thought is effective, as I wrote in siman 308, section 40.

And there are cases where thought alone is not effective, and even though for the preparation of muktzeh thought is effective, nevertheless, because this pertains to the prohibition of building, thought will not be effective unless one performed some action upon it. For example, a reed that one prepared for locking with it, meaning that he inserts it near the door in the wall, and this appears more like building than the window plug which is not near the ground, whereas the reed is near the ground; therefore, an action is required while it is still day, and it is not sufficient with thought that he thinks about it from yesterday, but he must prepare it for this. And in this too there is a dispute, for according to Rashi (126b) it is not enough that he prepares it for this use of locking the house, but it must also be fit for another use, for then it has the status of a vessel and is not like adding to the building, such as a reed that is fit for turning olives and the like. And according to Rabbeinu Tam, it is sufficient that he prepared it for this use of locking the house. And in the words of the Rambam there is no definitive proof, for he wrote that it must have the status of a vessel according to the language of the Gemara; however, if they used it while it was still day for locking the house—it is sufficient, for anything that has already been used has the status of a vessel (Ran ibid.). And for this reason, there is one who says that also regarding a window plug, thought alone is not sufficient and a constructive action is required, but because a window plug is presumably plugged while it is still day and a reed is not plugged (ibid.); however, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch did not mention this opinion at all. And regarding the dispute of Rashi and Rabbeinu Tam, it appears that since it is a rabbinic matter, we can rely on the approach of Rabbeinu Tam to be lenient, which is that it does not need to be fit for another thing, but once he prepared it and performed an action upon it and designated it for this—it is sufficient. And according to this, this is called a vessel whose primary function is for a permitted use, for behold, to lock the door is permitted on Shabbat. But according to the approach of Rashi, that we require it to be fit for another thing, if that thing is something prohibited on Shabbat, like a reed for harvesting olives—it is called a vessel whose primary function is for a prohibited use, except that it is permitted to lock with it according to the law of a vessel whose primary function is for a prohibited use, which is permitted for the sake of its use or its place, as I wrote in siman 308.

And behold, even though we were stringent regarding a reed, nevertheless we were only stringent that it must have the status of a vessel, but we did not require that it be tied to the door. However, there is a matter in which we require specifically that it be tied to the door while it is still day; otherwise, even if he intended and also performed an action upon it while it was still day and prepared it for this use, or even for another use—it is not effective, because this object enters into the threshold and appears more like building. Therefore, a bolt, which is a peg with which they lock and which they insert into the threshold below, and it more closely resembles building—this is not sufficient, and they may not lock with it unless it is tied while it is still day.

And how shall the tying be: If there is a glustra at its head, meaning that it is thick at one of the heads and fit to crush with, such that it resembles a vessel, we are lenient regarding it, that even if it is tied with a thin rope that is not fit for it to be lifted by—for if one were to lift it with the rope, it would break—nevertheless, it is a distinction. And even if it is not tied to the door itself but rather to the bolt of the door, and even if the rope is long and does not hang at all in the air, such that it would appear to be a vessel belonging to the locking of the door, but rather it is dragged on the ground, and even if it is entirely resting on the ground. But without any tying at all—a glustra is not effective even though it resembles a vessel; nevertheless, since it is inserted into the ground, it resembles building.

And if there is no knob at its head: if it is tied to the door itself—it is sufficient even with a thin rope that is not fit to lift it by, and even if it is entirely resting on the ground. And if it is not tied to the door but rather to the bolt of the door, the knot must be strong so that it is fit to be lifted by it. And even so, it does not need to be hanging; rather, even if it is entirely resting on the ground it is permitted, for there is no prohibition except when one removes it and places it in a corner. And it appears to me that if it is hanging—it is permitted even with a thin rope, for certainly there is more of a distinction in hanging by a thin rope than resting on the ground with a strong rope.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote in section 2 that every bolt of which we spoke refers to a case where the threshold is high, and when one inserts it into the threshold, it does not pierce the ground. However, if the threshold was diminished in a manner that when one inserts the bolt it pierces beneath it into the ground—it is considered building and it is forbidden to lock with it. Thus far their words. And if one made a handle for it and it resembles a mallet—it is proven that it is a vessel and it is permitted (Magen Avraham, subsection 5). And know that the intention is not when it was made from the outset to pierce into the ground, for certainly if they did so from the outset and made a hollow in the ground to the extent of the bolt's insertion, as is the custom among us in small houses—it is certainly permitted like a bolt that is inserted into the threshold, for the threshold is also attached to the ground. The prohibition is only when it was made from the outset to be inserted into the threshold, and they did not make a hollow in the ground at all, and now the threshold became ruined and consequently its insertion is into the ground, such that it pierces the ground—in this case it is certainly like building (this is the intention of the Taz, subsection 2). And it appears to me that in such a case it is forbidden even with a handle. However, in any event, among us where the bolts are attached to the door with nails and go up and down by means of a link and are inserted on Shabbat in the place they are inserted during the week—it is permitted to raise it and lower it on Shabbat, and such is the widespread custom, and all the more so regarding the bolts in the windows, and there is no hesitation in this at all.

And know that at the end of Shabbat (157a) they said: It happened that they plugged a window on Shabbat because of tumah, so that it would not enter the house, as there was a corpse in the other house; see there. And there is one who says that this permission is only to close it before he dies, but after death, since he performs a benefit so that the tumah will not enter—it is like one who fixes (Magen Avraham, subsection 1 in the name of R. Y. HaLevi). And there are those who disagree with him, for the vessels that were already there have become tamei, and the benefit is only for the vessels that will come afterward, and this is not a fixing but rather a causation to save from tumah (ibid.). And it is true that Rashi explained there that they plugged it before the death, and this is because afterward there would be no benefit for the vessels in the house, for the tumah would enter immediately (ibid.).

And there are things for which neither thought, nor action, nor tying is effective, unless they are elevated from the ground, for otherwise it is like adding to the building. And this is what we learned in Eruvin (101a): "A door in a muktzeh, and thorns in a breach, and mats—one may not lock with them unless they are elevated from the ground." This means that certainly a doorway made for frequent entry and exit—one may lock with it even if it never had a hinge and it drags on the ground; but a door in a muktzeh, which is a wide area behind the houses that is not used frequently, and the homeowner does not care to make a proper door for it that would be fixed, but rather stands it up against the doorway and when he opens it he casts it to the ground, and there are those that are hanging but drag on the ground (Rashi). And similarly thorns in a breach, which are thorns that he made into bundles and prepared them to plug a breach with them, and sometimes he opens it, and a mat of reeds (ibid.) with which he plugs a breach and sometimes opens it; and since all of these are not permanent doorways and the form of a doorway is not so visible upon them—therefore one may not lock with them on Shabbat, because he performs an act of building. And even if he intended and performed an action, such that it is tied but drags on the ground when he raises it onto the lintel—it appears like building (ibid.). And they explained in the Gemara there that this is when they do not have a hinge, which is the thing the door is inserted into and the door turns upon it, which we call "krokes," for if they have a hinge, it is visible to all that this is a door, and tying and hanging are sufficient even if they drag on the ground. And not only that, but even if they do not have a hinge now but they had a hinge—it is also permitted, for even though the hinge was lost, nevertheless there is some recognition from this that it is a door. However, that which we required to be hanging—this is when they never had a hinge, and the reason we were more stringent with them than with a bolt is because a bolt is a small matter, and similarly a reed and a window-plug. But these doors which are large in size and appear very much like building—therefore we were stringent with them until they are elevated from the ground. And they are not similar to other doorways that are used frequently, but these are not used frequently, and when he plugs them it is for a long time, and automatically it appears like building according to their large size.

And behold, according to what has been explained, the recognition of a hinge is superior to all of them. Nevertheless, there is a type of opening for which even the recognition of a hinge is not effective, and this is what they said there: "A 'widow' door that drags—one may not lock with it." And what is a "widow" door? That the door is made of a single board that has no mate, or even if it is made of several planks but it has no lower threshold, and when they open it, they detach it and place it on the ground—and it is not effective even if it has a hinge, for since it does not have the form of an opening like other openings and they also detach it onto the ground, it clearly appears like building, and it is worse than all the matters that have been explained, because of its large size and for the reason that they detach it onto the ground, and it is more stringent than all that has been explained (see Taz subsection 4 and Magen Avraham subsection 8 who labored over the reason, and according to what I have written it works out well, and examine it closely). But a door made of many planks is permitted even though they detach it when opening it if it has a threshold, and the same law applies in a place where they lock with many planks and there is a groove above and below in the place where they insert the planks—that their law is like a door since they are not a single board like every door. And there is one who permits even with a single board if it is made for frequent entry and exit (Bach and Magen Avraham subsection 8), and one may rely on this, for behold, according to the Rambam it is more lenient, as will be explained.

And according to what has been explained, it is not effective for a door of a single board even when it has a lower threshold, and when it does not have a threshold, it is not effective even if it was joined from several boards. However, according to the opinion of the Rambam in chapter 26, law 9, the prohibition only applies if it is of a single board and does not have a threshold, but one of these is sufficient. This is the wording of the Rambam: "A door that had a single board that they pull out and lock with: if it did not have a base below like a threshold which proves regarding it that it is a vessel prepared for locking—one may not lock with it, and if it has a threshold—one may lock with it." Thus far his words.

Furthermore, it is clarified to me from the words of the Rambam not like the words of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, who held that the prohibition of all these laws is due to the category of building, and this is the approach of Rashi. However, from the Rambam it appears explicitly that only the window plug is due to the category of adding to a building, and he wrote it in chapter 22, which deals with this there. But the reed and the bolt and these doors that were explained are not due to the category of building, for everyone sees that they are made for an opening; rather, the prohibitions are due to the category of muktzeh, for without the preparation, each one according to its measure, it is muktzeh. Therefore, he wrote them in chapter 26, for there the entire chapter is regarding the law of muktzeh; see there. And the matter is that even though regarding every matter of muktzeh thought is effective, as I wrote in siman 305, section 40—this is for ordinary uses, but for uses of that which is attached—we require the status of a vessel for each and every one according to its matter. Furthermore, it appears to me from the precision of his wording that all these things are when one comes to use them now for the first time, but if they have already used them for the doors—behold, there is no muktzeh in them and they are prepared and ready. This is not the case according to the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, who follow the approach of Rashi, where there is no difference. And according to this, there is a great practical difference in the law, and the poskim did not write anything regarding this and it requires further study, for so it appears in my humble opinion clear from the words of the Rambam and from his arrangement; see there.

It has already been explained in siman 308 that the doors of a house, and those of a cistern and a cellar, and anything attached to the ground—it is forbidden both to remove them from their hinges and to return them to their hinges, due to building and dismantling. However, the doors of vessels, such as those of a chest, a box, and a cabinet—it is permitted to remove them, because there is no building in vessels and there is no dismantling in vessels, but to return them is forbidden, for the reason that we decree lest one fix them firmly and it would be a complete building, and in a complete building there is building even in vessels. And it was explained there that window shutters of houses and the doors are forbidden both to remove and to return, and there are those among the masses who do not know of this prohibition, and it is necessary to inform them. And even by means of a non-Jew it is forbidden, for in building attached to the ground it is a complete prohibition, and telling a non-Jew is a shevut (Taz, subsection 5).

And behold, standard chests, boxes, and towers have their openings on top, and consequently there is no distinction between the upper hinge and the lower hinge. However, those whose openings are from the side like the doors of a house, and they have two hinges, one above and one below, the primary hanging is on the upper one; for if it is removed from the upper one, it will perforce fall, but if it is removed from the lower one, it will stand on the upper one alone. And since it has been explained that to return them is forbidden due to the concern "lest he hammer," therefore if even the lower one came entirely out of its place—it is forbidden to return it due to the concern "lest he hammer," but if part of it came out—he may press it until he returns it to its place. For since the upper one remains in its place, he can easily return the lower one. But when part of the upper one comes out—it is forbidden to press it and return it to its place, for since it is the primary one, we concern ourselves even with part of it "lest he hammer." And so too when the hinge is in the middle—it is forbidden, a decree on the middle on account of the side. And even though on Yom Tov we do not decree, as I wrote in siman 519, this is because of the joy of Yom Tov as is explained there, but on Shabbat we do decree.

And behold, all of this refers to their hinges which were made of wood, and the hinges were from the substance of the wood of the doors—one protrusion above at the upper edge and a second protrusion below at the lower edge, and corresponding to them was a hole above in the lintel into which the upper one was placed, and a hole in the threshold corresponding to the lower hinge and it was placed within it. And behold, our hinges which are of iron, and the irons are attached with nails to the openings, and corresponding to them are thick irons called "crooks" which are made with a hollow space and the irons are placed within them, and in vessels similarly with small ones of this type and everything is of iron—and in this it seems that "lest he hammer" is not applicable, for the hole is wide and hard and pressing will not avail at all, and this will be explained with the help of Heaven in siman 314, section 17.

A bed of joints, meaning it is made of various joints, and travelers carry it and when they come to lodge they set it up and connect all the joints according to their links, and place each link upon its joint until it is stretched and fit for lying down—it is forbidden to set it up and tighten it, for this is similar to building, and in its tightening there is makeh b'patish, and if he fastened it with force, he is liable for a chatat. It appears that the tightening alone is only a rabbinic prohibition, but if they fastened it with pegs, in this case one is liable for a chatat (so wrote the Ran at the end of chapter 3). And if its manner is to be loose, such that they are not particular if it is not fastened so strongly and it is somewhat close to wobbling—it is permitted (see Magen Avraham subsection 11, and in my opinion the Ra'avad and the Smag did not disagree and their intention is as I have written, and examine it closely). And this law has no relevance to our iron beds that at night one extends and in the morning is folded, for this is completely permitted, as it is always in its completeness and one does not dismantle each joint individually; it is no worse than a door folded from several pieces and made upon links, and when they open it, it folds, and when they close it, it extends, and so too is it here, and such is the custom of the world and there is no one who is concerned for it.

And a cup made of sections — it is permitted to take it apart and reassemble it on Shabbat, because it is not the way to tighten it so much (Tur), and according to this, when they are made of segments and one tightens them — it is certainly forbidden (Magen Avraham, subsection 12). And some say that the law of the cup is like the bed, and if its way is to be tightened, even though it is currently loose — it is forbidden, unless its way is to be loose. And such is the law regarding a shtender of the synagogue if it is on segments, and so too all vessels. However, meal utensils made of many sections, such as we have a spoon, fork, and knife as one vessel only that at the time of eating one takes them apart and afterwards connects them, and similarly drinking vessels — in such cases it is permitted to take them apart and reassemble them, for specifically a cup and such cases where one is not required to take it apart every time and they are as if made for permanence, the terms building and destroying apply to them, which is not the case for meal utensils and drinking vessels whose way of use is such, they are not in the category of building at all and this is nothing more than like a key (so it is explained in the Taz, subsection 7 and in the Magen Avraham, subsection 12).

A beam that broke may be supported with the side-boards of a bed, which are a vessel, and the like. However, if it is not a vessel but merely wood, even if it was prepared for this while it was still day and is not muktzeh—nevertheless, one may not support it with it, as it appears like building (Magen Avraham, subsection 14). However, if they supported it with it while it was still day and it fell on Shabbat, it seems to me that it is permitted to return it. And when one supports it with the side-boards of a bed, he should not support it with such force that the beam rises upward slightly, for this is certainly like building; rather, the support should only be so that it does not fall further. It is also necessary that they be somewhat loose in a manner that he can remove it from there, for if not so, it is forbidden because of nullifying a vessel from its readiness, and therefore he should be careful not to wedge them there. And it has already been explained in siman 308 that a bench that broke, if one of its legs slipped out—it is forbidden to return it to its place. And to place that slipped side upon another bench, there is one who is stringent to forbid it, but in a case where it broke—it is permitted, as I wrote there in section 37.

A courtyard that was ruined by rainwater—one may scatter straw in it, and it is not considered like adding to the building, because his intention is not to nullify it to the ground but rather to take them from there afterward for animal fodder or for clay. However, if his intention is truly to leave it on the ground—it is a complete prohibition, as he adds building to the ground, and behold, even leveling pits carries a Torah prohibition, and all the more so in such a case. And even when his intention is to take them from there, he should not do so in the manner he does on a weekday, but rather he should perform a change, which is that he should not scatter with a basket or with a box, but rather with the bottom of the box, that he should overturn it and bring the straw on its bottom, which is to say, by means of a change. But by hand—it is forbidden, and by means of a non-Jew—it is permitted (Taz, subsection 10), and it is good to refrain from this on Shabbat, and among us there is no custom at all to do so even on a weekday. And to cover saliva or excrement—it is permitted with straw that is not muktzeh. And we have already explained in the name of the Rambam that one who fastens wood to wood, whether with a nail or with the wood itself until they are joined—behold, this is a derivative of building and he is liable for a sin offering, and likewise one who fastens the wood into the ax, and one who removes it from the ax is a destroyer, and see in section 4.