Siman 311

A corpse, even though it is the greatest form of muktzeh, nevertheless the sages applied many leniencies regarding its handling, whether due to the reason of muktzeh or the reason of carrying in places where it is rabbinically forbidden to carry, such as in a karmelit and the like. There are two reasons for this: the first is due to human dignity, so that the deceased is not disgraced before the living and the living are not disgraced by it; and the second is that it was established by the sages that since a person is very distraught over his deceased relative more than over his property, if we do not open for him some path of permission, he will act in a forbidden manner. The primary reason is due to human dignity, for if it were only due to the reason of being distraught, it would only be relevant to permit it in a situation where he might come to a greater prohibition than what we permit him, and this only applies to a fire, for if you do not permit him, he will come to extinguish it. But in other matters, such as when it lies in disgrace or lies in the sun, this reason is not relevant, for what more could he do than handle the corpse? In this, the reason is due to its dignity, for we hold: "Great is human dignity, for it overrides a rabbinic prohibition," as they even permitted it for the sake of cleansing, as was written in siman 312. This is the general principle of the matters, and the details will be explained before us. There is also a great principle in this: if it is possible to handle it in a permitted manner, we do not permit handling it in a forbidden manner, as will be explained with the help of Heaven.

Therefore, a corpse lying in a place where there is fear for it because of a fire, if there is a loaf of bread or a child—one may move it by means of them, for he places the loaf or the child upon it and moves them, as this is the lighter way since he does not move the corpse alone. And if he does not have a loaf or a child and the corpse is lying on a bed and he has another bed—he moves it by means of overturning it from bed to bed until he brings it to a safe place from the fire. For even though he moves the corpse alone, nevertheless this is not direct movement but rather movement from the side. And if the bed became a base for the corpse, if the corpse was upon it during twilight—it is forbidden to move even after the corpse is no longer upon it, for the reason: "Since it was set aside during twilight, it is set aside for the entire day," and if it was not upon it during twilight—it is permitted to move afterward, as was written in the previous siman. And some say that a bed never becomes a base for a corpse, for the bed is not needed for the corpse and the entire essence of a corpse is to place it on the ground, and this is the opinion of the Ba'al HaMaor, but the Rosh disagrees with him, and so it is implied from the other poskim (Magen Avraham, subsection 2). And if the corpse is lying on the ground or he does not have two beds, and he also does not have a loaf or a child—he moves it in its usual manner with complete movement, for they permitted this regarding a corpse as has been written.

And in all this, there is no difference whether he moves it to that same courtyard where carrying is permitted, where he must seek out the easiest method first as has been written, or whether he moves it to another courtyard that they did not eruv together or to a karmelit, for moving it to a karmelit is also permitted, as will be explained, in the case of a corpse that is close to putrefying; and if they permitted it because of putrefaction, all the more so because of a fire. And even in such cases, he must seek out the easiest method first regarding the matter of muktzeh. And some hold that in such cases, he should not carry it by means of a loaf or a child so as not to increase the amount of carrying, and this will be explained later in the laws of putrefaction. However, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 1: And all this is in the same domain; meaning that regarding a fire, moving it to a karmelit was not permitted, for he holds that putrefaction involves more disgrace than burning, and when moving it was permitted, it was permitted only for putrefaction and not for burning. And he inferred this from the wording of the Rambam in chapter 26 who wrote: "And a fire broke out in a courtyard in which there is a corpse." And many great authorities took issue with him, for it is an a fortiori argument from putrefaction, as certainly a fire is a greater disgrace than putrefaction. And that which the Rambam wrote: "And a fire broke out in a courtyard in which there is a corpse" — has a different intention, for it was only permitted when the fire broke out in the courtyard of the corpse, for then the turmoil and panic are great, and regarding this the sages, of blessed memory, said: A person is panicked over his deceased, and if we do not permit it to him, he will come to extinguish it, and it is permitted for him to move it even to another courtyard and to a karmelit. But if the corpse is not in the courtyard where the fire is, he is not so panicked, and it was only permitted to him by means of a loaf or a child and to a courtyard with an eruv (and the Magen Avraham, subsection 3, defends the Beit Yosef, but the later authorities disagreed with him).

And behold, according to what has been explained, they did not permit in a fire when the corpse is in another courtyard, and the poskim did not speak of this, and the wording of the Shas is also unspecified: "One may rescue a corpse from a fire." And also the wording of the Tur who wrote: "A corpse that is lying in a place where one fears for it because of a fire etc.," and he did not clarify his words, except that from the wording of the Rambam we inferred this. And the reasoning is also such, for when the fire is not in the courtyard where the corpse is, one is not so panicked, and is obligated to seek out a loaf or a child, and to take it out to a place where carrying is permitted. However, it is certainly so that if afterwards the fire reached the courtyard where the corpse is—its law reverts to being as if the fire broke out in the courtyard where the corpse is, and it is permitted with all the matters that have been explained. But until the fire reaches there—it was not permitted except by means of a loaf or a child and to a merged courtyard, and so it appears primary for the halacha.

A corpse lying in the sun, and for the time being it is not decomposing but over the course of the hours it could decompose—the sages did not permit for it all of these leniencies, and they only eased for him to move it from the sun to the shade by means of a loaf or a child and within that same courtyard, and more than this they did not permit. Therefore, if he does not have a loaf or a child—he shall not move it at all, even to flip it from bed to bed, for moving from the side for the sake of a forbidden thing is called moving. And it has already been explained in siman 308, section 16, that they did not permit a loaf or a child except for a corpse alone, and even according to those who hold that even a vessel whose primary function is for a forbidden use is permitted by means of a loaf or a child, nevertheless, regarding muktzeh similar to a corpse they only permitted it for a corpse as written there, and more than this they did not permit. And perhaps you will say that if so, what shall we do when there is no loaf or child here, indeed in this the sages provided another remedy as will be explained.

And thus the sages taught (43b): "A corpse lying in the sun, two people come and sit by its side. If it is hot for them from below, this one brings a bed and sits on it and that one brings a bed and sits on it. If it is hot for them from above, they bring a mat and spread it over them. This one tilts up his bed and slips away and goes off, and that one tilts up his bed and slips away and goes off, and the partition is found to have been made on its own," see there, for the mat remains spread over the beds and it protects the corpse from the sun. And to do so initially for the sake of the corpse is forbidden, and even though a vessel may be moved for the sake of a thing that may not be moved, nevertheless there is the making of a tent here, and even for the sake of the living they did not permit it for the purpose of a partition and a tent; therefore they first bring beds for sitting. And as for that which they must wait until it is hot for them from below, when they could immediately bring beds for sitting, rather, in truth it is a stringency that they applied in this matter so that it should be very evident that this is for the sake of the living (Tosafot ibid. s.v. 'cham'). And so too specifically when they first spread the mat over their heads and afterwards when they slip away the mat remains on the beds, but to spread it initially over the beds is forbidden on account of a tent (ibid. s.v. 'uforsin' and in Rashi there). And since at the time of the making it was evident that it was for the sake of the living, they are then permitted to slip away from under the mat and it shall remain over the corpse (ibid. s.v. 'venishmat'). And this permission is in a place where there is no loaf of bread or child, or where there is no place of shade, or even if they desire not to move it from its place. For even though there is great exertion in this, nevertheless one may do so since at the time of the making he does it for the sake of the living as we have written. (See Turei Zahav subsection 6 for what he answered to the difficulty of the Beit Yosef, and this is the intent of the Magen Avraham subsection 17, and this is also the intent of the Tosafot ibid. s.v. 'cham' as we have explained. And nevertheless it is difficult, for if so, why did Rav Sheshet say: 'Go out and say to Rabbi Yehuda, who says a vessel is not moved except for a thing that may be moved, Rav Huna already interpreted it... from this law.' But in this law everyone agrees for the sake of a distinction as we have written, and we do not rule like Rabbi Yehuda, and this is the intent of the Beit Yosef in his difficulty. And it is a severe difficulty, unless we say that the intent of Rabbi Shimon is not exactly like Rabbi Yitzchak, and it is a forced explanation, and delve into it.)

And there is a question regarding this, for here we said that it is forbidden to make this partition for the sake of the deceased, only for the sake of the living, yet in Eruvin (44a) regarding the wall of a sukkah, that one may stand up a bed and spread a sheet over it so that the sun does not fall upon the deceased, see there; evidently it is permitted for the sake of a deceased person. Our teachers, the authors of the Tosafot, answered that there too the intention is like here, to do it for the sake of the living, and the Gemara did not concern itself with elaborating there. And in Eruvin they answered another answer, that there in a sukkah, if the deceased begins to smell they will be required to leave the sukkah, and it turns out that there too it is for the sake of a living person so that he does not leave the sukkah. (And one must look further into the Magen Avraham, subsection 18, who wrote in the name of the Tosafot simply that if they will be required to leave it is considered for the sake of a living person and is permitted, yet the Tosafot wrote this only regarding a sukkah where there is a mitzvah in its dwelling. And it must be said that he wrote this from his own reasoning, for certainly if he will be required to leave his house it is also called his need, and the Tosafot who wrote regarding a sukkah did so because there we are dealing with a sukkah, but for the law there is no difference, and so it appears, and delve into it.)

The Rambam wrote at the end of chapter 26: "A corpse that has putrefied in a house and is found to be disgraced among the living, and the living are disgraced by it—it is permitted to remove it to a karmelit, for great is human dignity, which overrides a negative commandment in the Torah, which is: 'You shall not deviate from the matter that they tell you, right or left.' And if they had another place to exit through—they do not remove it, but rather they leave it in its place and they exit." Thus far his words. For since it has already putrefied, it no longer has any utility, rather the disgrace is when it is together with the living, and therefore when the living have another place, why should we move the corpse. And behold, from the arrangement of the wording of the Rambam, it is clear that only regarding a corpse that putrefies did they permit removing it to a karmelit, and not regarding one lying in the sun. And so it is clear from the words of the Shulchan Aruch, for even though regarding a fire we permitted this in section 3, this is certainly because the panic is great that it should not burn, which is not the case regarding one lying in the sun, where they did not permit even other leniencies, as I wrote in section 5. But such is not the opinion of Rashi, of blessed memory (94b), for regarding that incident where they permitted removing it to a karmelit, he wrote: "that it was lying in disgrace, or in a fire, or in the sun," see there. And this is also the opinion of the Tur, who wrote: "And if it is lying in the sun or in disgrace, such as if it is putrefying, if he has a loaf of bread or a child, he places it upon it and moves it even from a private domain to a karmelit, etc." Thus far his words. And likewise he wrote that without a loaf of bread and a child they did not permit even to turn it from bed to bed, see there, and he wrote this regarding both of them: regarding the sun and regarding putrefaction, and according to him the two laws are completely equal. And it is a wonder that we would not permit moving it indirectly in the case of putrefaction, yet they permitted removing it to a karmelit, and they were more stringent regarding muktzeh than regarding carrying (as the Magen Avraham wrote in subsection 5, see there).

And behold, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote according to the wording of the Rambam, that a corpse that has become putrid may be removed to a karmelit, and if the living have a place to exit—they should exit. And our teacher, the Rema, wrote concerning this: "And some say that even if it has not yet become putrid, but is close to becoming putrid" thus far his words, and it is implied from his words that in this case as well, if the living have a place to exit—they should exit and leave the corpse as it is. And this is a wonder, for since it has not yet become putrid, why do we not see a remedy for its sake so that it will not become putrid. And in truth, the Tur did not mention this, and in his opinion, even if the living have a place to exit, they should remove the corpse (Magen Avraham, subsection 7) so that it will not become putrid, and only the Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch mentioned this law, and that is specifically when it has already become putrid, for the corpse has no benefit in its removal, as I have written. But from where did our teacher, the Rema, derive to say that even when it is close to becoming putrid we do not attend to the corpse itself, for the stench is only a disgrace to the living and not to the corpse. And it appears that he inferred this from the wording of the Rambam who wrote: "And it is disgraced among the living and they are disgraced by it," learn from this that the disgrace is not only to the living, and the disgrace of the corpse is also only when it is among the living, and consequently, when the living exit from it, it has no disgrace, and so wrote the Maggid Mishneh in the name of the Ra'avad (as written by the Magen Avraham in subsection 6).

When they permitted moving it to a karmelit, the Tur wrote that this requires a loaf or a child, and in the name of the Ramban he wrote that, on the contrary, it is forbidden by means of a loaf or a child, for that which was rectified regarding the prohibition of muktzeh we would ruin regarding the prohibition of hotza'ah, and why should we move the loaf or the child to a karmelit. And there are some of our teachers who hold that by means of a child it is permitted to move it even to a reshut harabim, for there is no Torah prohibition here, as the hotza'ah of a corpse is a melakhah she'einah tzerikhah legufah, and we hold like Rabbi Shimon that for a melakhah she'einah tzerikhah legufah one is exempt, unlike the words of the Rambam who ruled like Rabbi Yehuda regarding a melakhah she'einah tzerikhah legufah, as written in siman 242. And regarding the child, one is also exempt if he is able to walk on his feet due to the principle that "a living being carries itself," and even if he cannot walk—one is exempt because he is secondary to the corpse, for since he is a human species, he is secondary to it. But by means of a loaf—it is forbidden, for the loaf is not secondary to the corpse, as it is not of its species, and one is liable for its hotza'ah. And the Rambam did not mention a loaf or a child at all, and the opinion of Rashi, Tosafot, and the Tur is to move it to a karmelit specifically by means of a loaf or a child, and one may rely on them in practice (as only the Ramban inclines toward a prohibition, and see the Ran there who disagrees with him).

When they permitted it due to the disgrace of the deceased—it is not specifically the disgrace of stench, for the same law applies to other disgrace, such as when they transport him on a ship and empty and reckless people gather there and make sport of the deceased, and so too anything similar to this; and likewise if he is lying in a narrow room where the air is difficult for those sitting near him. The same law applies that they are permitted to tell non-Jews to move him, such as by means of a loaf or a child, and this is in a karmelit and not in a public domain. However, regarding matters pertaining to the burial—it is forbidden even by means of a non-Jew, because there is disgrace to the deceased that the Shabbat should be desecrated for him in the business of his burial. But to take him out for his honor so that he may be placed in a clean place until the conclusion of Shabbat—in this, it is certainly pleasing to him and to the living, and not what pertains to the burial, for that is possible to do at the conclusion of Shabbat. (See Magen Avraham subsection 13, and I do not know why he required the reason that it is a shevut that does not involve an action, for since in a karmelit it is a shevut of a shevut, and a shevut that does not involve an action—it would be telling a non-Jew regarding a Torah prohibition, as the Tosafot wrote in Bava Kamma 80a, starting with the words "One says" in the name of the Behag; however, according to the version of Rashi in Eruvin 68a, it works out well, and examine it closely.)

Our teacher wrote in section 2: That it is forbidden to move the deceased by means of a loaf or a child for the needs of kohanim or another matter, but by means of a non-Jew there are those who permit it, and so I have seen practiced for the purpose of a mitzvah or a wedding. Thus far his words. And the Maharil ruled that by means of a loaf or a child it is permitted to move it for the needs of the living (ibid. subsection 14), and he wrote that such is the custom, and it is a wonder that he did not cite his opinion at all. And it appears that his reasoning is that it is certainly more lenient by means of a non-Jew without a loaf or a child than by means of an Israelite by means of a loaf or a child, for by means of a non-Jew it is a double rabbinic prohibition in a case of a mitzvah, for this is also like a mitzvah so that the kohanim should not be distressed to leave their homes on Shabbat, and all the more so for a wedding or another mitzvah or a great need. But a loaf and a child—it was only permitted for the sake of the deceased itself, as is explained in the Gemara, and therefore since non-Jews are common among us—it is better to do it through them, and for this reason he did not write the words of the Maharil. And perhaps in a place where it is impossible by means of a non-Jew it is permitted by means of a loaf or a child, since the Maharil permitted it and testified that such is the custom. And there is one who says that indirect movement, that is to say, to turn it from bed to bed—is permitted for the needs of kohanim, for even though it was explained that a loaf and a child is more lenient than indirect movement, and since he forbids by means of a loaf and a child all the more so indirect movement should be forbidden, however it is not comparable, for here where the place is needed for the kohanim it is like "for the sake of its place" and is permitted as will be explained, for this is indirect movement for the sake of a permitted matter (ibid. subsection 14).

The kohanim cannot compel the relatives of the deceased to take him out for their sake, even when they are unable to enter the beit knesset to pray because of the deceased, and even on a weekday (Kessef Mishneh there). And the reason is simple, for they can say that it is a disgrace for them to move the deceased from place to place, and if it is because the kohanim are unable to perform a mitzvah due to this, they are exempt by law. Therefore, in a place where the custom is that they purify the deceased at the cemetery, since even without the kohanim they would be forced to take him out before the time of burial—consequently they have the power to compel the relatives to take him out immediately (ibid.). However, if the relatives want to take him out for the sake of the kohanim because they are not particular about this—they may take him out whether on a weekday or on Shabbat according to the permissions that have been explained, because for the deceased himself this is certainly not a disgrace, for what does he care if he is here or in another place (ibid.). And all this is regarding healthy kohanim, but if there is a sick kohen who cannot leave—it is obvious that they compel the relatives to take him out so that the kohen does not violate a Torah prohibition (ibid.), or they should see to it that the tumah does not reach the room that the kohen is in, meaning that there should not be a space of a tefach there, as I have written in Yoreh Deah siman 371.

And know that this which we said, a loaf or a child—it is not specifically so, for the same law applies to any garment or other permitted object. And there is a question regarding this: if so, how do we find a case where we would require a loaf or a child? For any corpse presumably did not die naked, and if so, they should move it by means of the shirt that is upon it. However, it is possible that the garments upon it at the time of death are nullified to it, and they themselves are muktzeh like the matter of a base for a forbidden object (see Beit Yosef). Nevertheless, there are some of the great authorities who hold thus, and as our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 4, and this is his wording: "There is one who says that they only required a loaf or a child for a naked corpse, but if it is in its clothing—one does not require a loaf or a child." Thus far his words. And one must say according to this opinion that it does not become a base for the corpse, for that is like one who forgets. And furthermore, it is possible to say that this is better than other cases of a base where there is a connection between one and the other, but what is the connection of a garment to a corpse? And specifically regarding shrouds in which it is buried, they are nullified to the corpse, as we say in Chullin (125a), because shrouds are related to the body of the corpse, but the garments in which it died and will not be buried with it—they are not nullified to it. (And regarding that which they question from David, where they required a loaf and a child as is found in Shabbat 30b, the Taz and the Magen Avraham in subsection 16 already answered that his garments are muktzeh because it is forbidden to use them and they burn them, for it is forbidden to use the garments of a king; see there).

And that which has been explained, that a corpse lying in the sun may not be overturned from bed to bed because "tilul min hatzad" is considered "tiltul," this is when the tiltul is only for the sake of the corpse, for thus we maintain that tiltul min hatzad for the sake of a forbidden object is forbidden. But if he needs the place of the corpse for the sake of the living, or if he needs the object upon which the corpse is resting and it did not become a "basis" as I have written, or if he died on Shabbat and since it was not a basis during bein hashemashot it is permitted after the muktzeh has been removed from it—it is permitted to overturn it from bed to bed, which is tiltul min hatzad, since this is for the sake of a permitted purpose, and thus we maintain that tiltul min hatzad for the sake of a permitted purpose is permitted. And it has already been explained that the permission by means of a loaf or a child is only for a corpse alone, and some say also for a "kli shemelakhto le'issur." But for absolute muktzeh similar to a corpse, they only permitted it for a corpse alone, for in truth it is a forced permission to do something initially whereby the muktzeh becomes secondary in order to move it, and by what means does it become secondary? They only permitted it for a corpse due to its honor. And also regarding "melakhto le'issur" for those who hold so, because its muktzeh is light, as it is permitted even by itself for the sake of its use or its place, but not for absolute muktzeh (and see Turei Zahav subsection 5, and the entire pivot of his words we have already explained with the help of Heaven).

According to what has been explained, we have learned that a deceased person who died on Shabbat, or before Shabbat and there was no time to bury him and they did not place him on the ground before Shabbat—it is forbidden to move him from his place, and he shall lie in his bed until the conclusion of Shabbat. And even by means of a loaf or a child it is forbidden, unless they fear for his spoilage, such as if he is placed on pillows and blankets where he could spoil until the conclusion of Shabbat, or if it was a fat person, or if there is heat in the house, or if it is difficult for the living to be with him in one room, or if there are children who are afraid of the deceased as is the way of children, or if there is a sick person in the house and it is difficult for him to look upon the deceased, and anything similar to this—for then they place some garment upon him and move him to a cold room or to a cellar. And if it is possible to move him by means of a non-Jew—it is better to do so, and if it is possible to close the room and open a window opposite him so that the wind shall come there so that he does not spoil—it is better to do so, and so we instruct in practice.

And even though a corpse is forbidden in tiltul, nevertheless the sages permitted anointing the corpse with oil in a place where such is their custom, and likewise to rinse it with water if it is soiled, for in this they do not move it but rather touch it, and it has already been explained that muktzeh is not forbidden in touching but only in tiltul. And even according to those who hold that even touching the muktzeh for the sake of the muktzeh does not have a clear permission—nevertheless, regarding a corpse it is permitted for its honor. And likewise it is permitted to remove the pillow from under it so that it does not smell, and the pillow does not become a basis for it because of the reasons we have explained, provided that they are careful in all this not to move a limb, for if they move it, it is tiltul of muktzeh. And if its mouth was opening further—one ties the jaw with a kerchief or with a belt in a manner that it will not continue to open, but not in order that what has opened, or part of it, should close, for if so he would be moving a limb, and muktzeh is forbidden in tiltul even regarding a part of the muktzeh. And this is not like nullifying a vessel from its readiness, for he is able to remove the kerchief or the belt from it whenever he wishes, as he will not move it by their removal, and likewise it is forbidden to close the eyes of a corpse for the reason of moving a limb. (See Magen Avraham subsection 20 who wrote that it is forbidden by means of a non-Jew unless he stipulated from the eve of Shabbat, and I wonder, is there a melakhah in this? And also the Eliyah Rabbah subsection 22 disagrees with him, see there, and such is the custom.)

When his limbs have become contorted and they need to be straightened, they should do this by means of a non-Jew, but by means of an Israelite—it is forbidden. And there are places where an Israelite does this, and they say that there is danger in this (Eliyah Rabbah, subsection 23 in the name of the Ma'adanei Yom Tov), and if it is a tradition, we shall accept it; at the very least, those who do so should place some object on the place of the contortion and press with the object until the limb is straightened (ibid.), and we do not permit it except by means of a non-Jew. And it is stated in Shabbat (151b): They bring a cooling vessel and metal vessels and place them on his belly so that it does not swell, and they plug his orifices so that air does not enter them, see there, and among us this is not known at all. And if he was very soiled from mud or excrement—they wash him with cold water by means of a non-Jew (see Magen Avraham and Eliyah Rabbah there).

Since it has been explained that tilting from the side for the sake of a permitted object is permitted, and for this reason if one forgot coins on a pillow—he shakes the pillow and they fall, as is written in siman 309. Therefore, if one buried a radish in the earth—he may take it even though in taking it he moves earth from its place, for this is tilting from the side and for the sake of a permitted object. Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 8 three conditions for this: specifically when it has not taken root in the earth, for when it has taken root it is like being sown, and when he takes it—he is liable for the category of uprooting; but when it has not taken root, even though it added a bit of growth due to the moisture of the ground—we have no concern with it, for this is not sowing. And we also require that he does not intend for sowing; and even though wheat that one sowed in the ground—it is permitted to take them as long as they have not taken root, as is written in siman 310, it is different here, for since they added a little due to the moisture of the ground—it is like sowing if he intended for sowing (and this answers the difficulty of the Magen Avraham, subsection 22). And we also require that some of its leaves be revealed and he takes them by the leaves from the ground, for when they are not revealed, even though he could stick a spindle or a needle into it and take it as mentioned below regarding fruit in straw, here it is forbidden, because it would appear as if he is making a hole. But some say that even here it is permitted to stick into the earth, and so it is in the Yerushalmi at the end of the first chapter of Kilayim, and we do not fear that he might come to level the hole, for in a field we do not fear this, as why would he need to level a hole that is in a field. Therefore, in a house or in a courtyard—it is forbidden in such a case for this reason (ibid. subsection 21).

And that which we said, that tilting from the side for the sake of a forbidden object is forbidden—this is regarding tilting by hand. However, regarding tilting with the body, which is tilting in an unusual manner—even in such cases it is permitted. And this is what we learned: "Straw that is on the bed, one may move it with his body" (141a). And straw is muktzeh, as it is generally for fuel in a place where they fuel with straw, and he moves it with his body so that it will be buoyant and soft for lying down (Rashi). And even though he needs the straw to lie upon it, and it is tilting for the sake of the muktzeh, nevertheless, since he only moves it with his body—it is permitted. And there are those who truly hesitate, that if his intent is for this—it is forbidden, and they only permitted it if he needs the bed and not the straw, but the straw prevents him from lying on the bed (see the Rosh there and see Magen Avraham subsection 24). And if he designated it while it was still day to lie upon the straw, and all the more so if he performed an action and placed a pillow or a bolster upon the straw while it was still day—he may move it even with his hand, for he prepared it while it was still day and it is not muktzeh, and it has already been explained in siman 308, section 40, that preparation for muktzeh is effective in several ways, see there.

Fruits hidden in teven or straw that is muktzeh, one may stick a needle or a spindle into them and take them, and the straw is shaken off on its own, for this is tiltul min hatzad for the sake of a permitted object. And it is not similar to a radish, which is forbidden in such a case because it appears like making a hole as I have written; this is not the case with teven or straw, where a hole is not applicable as is understood, for there is no hole except in earth. And fruits hidden in sand or earth in his house that he piled while it was still day and designated a corner for them—it is not muktzeh and he may take them directly, as I have written in siman 308, section 64; see there.

And know that regarding the law of a radish buried in the ground in section 19, our teacher, the Rema, wrote that it is permitted to take it even if he left it to remain there for the entire Shabbat, for there is no status of basis for a forbidden object regarding food. Thus far his words. And his words are puzzling, for the Tosafot wrote explicitly at the beginning of the chapter "Kol HaKelim" regarding fruit buried in straw that it refers to one who placed them with the intent to take them, but if he intended to leave them for the entire Shabbat - it becomes a basis for a forbidden object; see there. And there is one who explained his intention that he intended to eat them on Shabbat whenever he would desire to eat them (Taz, subsection 10), but if so, it is not relevant to say that there is no status of basis regarding food, for certainly there is a basis, rather that here he intended that it not be a basis. And so too in the source of the law in the Kolbo it is explained explicitly that since his intention is that the food should not serve the earth, but rather the earth should serve the food, therefore it does not become a basis (and as the Magen Avraham wrote in subsection 23). And in my humble opinion, it appears that certainly food that is not fully cooked, like that in "Kol HaKelim" there (123a), which said "an unripe fig buried in straw," and Rashi explained that it was not fully cooked and he buries it so that it will cook, see there, and so too a cake buried in coals so that it will bake, since at this moment it is not fit for eating, and the straw for them is like ground for seeds - regarding this, the Tosafot correctly wrote that for the entire Shabbat it becomes a basis. But a radish buried in the ground, which is already cooked and he only buries it so that it will not spoil - it correctly does not become a basis, for behold the earth guards it, and the guard is nullified to the food and not the food to the guard, and this is a good and straightforward reasoning with the help of Heaven.