Siman 310

It has already been explained that we hold according to Rabbi Shimon who is lenient regarding muktzeh; therefore, muktzeh due to repulsiveness, such as a piece of wood upon which they hang meat and fish, or an earthenware lamp from their days in which they did not kindle during twilight and the like—these are permitted for handling. And so too regarding muktzeh due to storage, such as types of food and types of drinks placed in storage, like in shops and cellars which are for merchandise—nevertheless, they do not have the status of muktzeh. And the general rule is that no detached food fit for eating is muktzeh for Shabbat, for dates and almonds and other fruits standing for merchandise—it is permitted to eat from them on Shabbat. And so too all types of drinks, even those sealed from above—one may break the seal and eat and drink, as we learned in the Mishnah (146a): "A person may break a barrel to eat dried figs from it." However, there are many details in this law, and they will be explained with the help of Heaven in siman 314.

And we have already explained in siman 308, section 7, that regarding muktzeh through an intentional rejection—Rava Shimon concedes. However, this matter requires clarification, for it does not depend on intentional rejection alone, but rather that the object must also be unfit during bein hashmashot, such as a lamp that one lit before nightfall, where he performed the muktzeh with his own hands and it is forbidden during bein hashmashot because of the fire. And similarly, dried figs and raisins that he set out to dry, and at the time he sets them out they are still fit for eating, but afterwards they spoil and are not fit for eating until they dry completely; and regarding this muktzeh, Rava Shimon concedes, for since he rejected them with his own hands and they are also unfit for eating in the interim—his mind is not on them until they dry completely and he removes them from there. Therefore, even if they are fit on Shabbat—they are forbidden according to Rava Shimon because he removed his mind from them, and he does not sit and wait for them as with a burning lamp where he sits and waits for when his lamp will go out (44a), and it is like a cup and a bowl, where Rava Shimon concedes that they are forbidden to be moved even after it went out, because he does not sit and wait. (And this is the intent of the Tosafot 45a, starting with the words "Heicha" and "Ela," see there. And even though for us there is no practical difference, since even regarding a lamp that went out we do not rule like Rava Shimon, for regarding "since it was set aside" we rule like Rabbi Yehuda, nevertheless even according to Rava Shimon it is so.)

Therefore, wheat that one sowed in the ground and eggs that are under a hen, as long as they have not spoiled—it is permitted to take them and eat them. For even though he pushed them away with his hands, nevertheless, since they are fit for eating, he does not remove his mind from them according to Rabbi Shimon, and we establish the law like him. And it is not similar to a burning lamp which is forbidden for us, for there, during twilight it was not fit, whereas these were fit during twilight; and if it is because he pushed them away with his hands, we establish the law like Rabbi Shimon. And this is what the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote in section 2, that even wheat that one sowed in the ground and has not yet taken root, and eggs that are under the hen—it is permitted to move them. And so too dates gathered before their ripening which one gathers into baskets and they ripen on their own—it is permitted to eat from them before their ripening. But dried figs and raisins that one places in a muktzeh to dry them—they are forbidden on Shabbat because of muktzeh, for they stench before they dry; since he knew they would stench, he removed his mind from them. And since there are two factors: he pushed them away with his hands and they are not fit—it is muktzeh." Thus far his words, and the intention is as I have written. And dates, even though they are not fit for eating, nevertheless, he did not push them away with his hands; on the contrary, he brought them closer to eating by gathering them into baskets. (And the Maharshal disagrees with the Tur as the Bach wrote, and according to what I have written, the words of the Tur are clear. And the Bach answered his difficulty, and according to what I have written it works out well with simplicity, and the words of the Magen Avraham in subsection 1 are obscure, and delve into it.)

A non-Jew who placed dried figs and raisins in a storage area in order to dry them and they are his—they are not muktzeh, and if he gives from them to an Israelite on Shabbat and he is able to eat them—it is permitted to eat them, for the principle of rejection does not apply to them and the principle of preparation does not pertain to them since they do not have Shabbat prohibitions; consequently, muktzeh does not pertain to what is theirs. And in the Yerushalmi, chapter 3 of Beitzah (halacha 2), there is a dispute regarding this, whether that which belongs to a non-Jew requires preparation, and we hold like the one who said it does not require it, as will be explained in siman 498, see there. And from this it is proven also for any object belonging to a non-Jew that an Israelite is permitted to eat on a weekday and only on Shabbat is there a prohibition of muktzeh—it does not pertain to what belongs to a non-Jew, but muktzeh vessels are forbidden even regarding what belongs to a non-Jew, as is understood.

We hold that there is no muktzeh for half of the Shabbat. The explanation of these matters: regarding an object that was muktzeh during bein hashemashot, we say, "since it was set aside during bein hashemashot, it is set aside for the entire day." However, regarding an object that was set aside in the middle of Shabbat, but during bein hashemashot the object was fit, and only in the middle of Shabbat it was not fit—whether regarding a prohibition of eating or a prohibition of tilting—if it was subsequently rectified, it is permitted, for it returns to its permitted state. But an object that was muktzeh during bein hashemashot is forbidden, for in this we hold not like Rabbi Shimon but like Rabbi Yehuda, as has been written.

If the item was not muktzeh during bein hashemashot but the owners thought it was muktzeh—it is of no concern, for even though he set it aside of his own volition, it is a setting aside in error. Therefore, a lamp that was not lit during bein hashemashot and the owners thought it had been lit—it is permitted to be moved in the case of their lamps, for our lamps are forbidden in any event, as I wrote in siman 277 and in siman 308, see there. And so too with dried figs and raisins that were muktzeh, and when bein hashemashot arrived they had already dried and were fit for eating, even though the owners did not know at that time that they had dried and it later became known to them that they had already dried during bein hashemashot—they are permitted to be eaten on Shabbat.

However, this is specifically when they are completely fit during bein hashemashot, but if they are fit and not fit, in that there are people who eat them when they are at this stage and there are those who do not eat them, in this case there is still a need for the designation of the owners: for if he designated them—they are permitted, and if he did not designate them—they are forbidden, and even if another designated them—it is nothing. And it appears to me that even if it is his way to always eat when they are at this stage, and now he did not know that they were at this stage—nevertheless they are forbidden without designation, since there are people who do not eat—this is not a muktzeh in error. And likewise, his designation is of no benefit if they are not fit at all for eating, and his designation is nothing, as this is like one who designates wood and stones for eating. And dates upon which they place water in a vat from Erev Shabbat and they are not fit, and on Shabbat they became fit—they are permitted (Taz subsection 4 in the name of the Beit Yosef), for there is no muktzeh except with dried figs and raisins (Beit Yosef), because they are completely unfit, but the dates immediately become fit and there is no rejection in them.

Any object that is forbidden to be moved—it is forbidden to place a vessel beneath it on Shabbat so that it will fall into it, for he nullifies the vessel from its prepared state since it will become forbidden to be moved, and there is in this a prohibition of building and tearing down as I wrote in siman 265. However, it is permitted to overturn a vessel over it on Shabbat, for a vessel may be moved even for the sake of an object that may not be moved, provided that he does not touch it in a manner where through the touching it may come to be shaken, such as an egg or the like. And even an object that will not be shaken and is muktzeh is not forbidden by mere touching, as I wrote in siman 308; when the primary intention is for the sake of the muktzeh, such as here where he overturns a vessel over the muktzeh—it is not proper to touch it (see Magen Avraham subsection 3 and Taz subsection 5). And there is no absolute prohibition in this, rather one should restrain himself from this, for since his entire involvement now is with the muktzeh to overturn a vessel over it, if we permit him to touch it, he may easily move it from its place (so it appears to my humble opinion).

An object that is permitted to be moved and one placed upon it while it was still day an object that is forbidden to be moved—the lower object is also forbidden because of the forbidden object resting upon it, and this is called a "basis for a forbidden object." Regarding the reason for why it becomes a "basis," we explained in the previous siman, section 12; see there. Therefore, a bed that has coins upon it on Shabbat and they were not upon it during bein hashmashot—for example, if they were placed on Shabbat with the knowledge of the owner by a non-Jew or by a minor—the bed becomes a basis for the coins and is forbidden to be moved. If the coins were removed, it is permitted to be moved. However, if he placed them before nightfall so that they would be on the bed during bein hashmashot or for the entire Shabbat, according to the opinions explained in the previous siman, section 9, even if they fell from the bed, it is forbidden to be moved; for since it was set aside during bein hashmashot, it is set aside for the entire day. The prohibition of a "basis" applies even for the purpose of its own use or its place, like the law of the muktzeh itself. And it is obvious that if the permitted object became a basis for a vessel whose primary work is for a forbidden purpose, it is permitted for the purpose of its own use or its place, like the muktzeh itself. All of this applies when one places it intentionally, but if he forgot coins on the bed or placed them unintentionally, it does not become a basis, and he shakes it and they fall, as I wrote in the previous siman, section 8; see there.

And know that in the Gemara (44b) it is stated: Rava said: A bed that one designated for coins—if he placed coins upon it even on a weekday, it is forbidden to move it on Shabbat, for since he designated it for a forbidden purpose, it becomes muktzeh, like a lamp that one designated for lighting. The Rif and the Rambam in chapter 25 omitted this, for this is not according to the halacha, as we hold like Rabbi Shimon regarding muktzeh, and Rava holds like Rabbi Yehuda as is stated there in the Gemara. For us, designation does not raise or lower the status; rather, the main point is that if there are coins upon it, it is forbidden to be moved due to the law of a basis when he placed them intentionally, or if he placed them upon it during bein hashemashot, it is forbidden to be moved due to the law of "since it was set aside [at the onset of Shabbat]," for in this we hold like Rabbi Yehuda, as I wrote in siman 308 section 9; see there. And this is even without having designated it, but designation makes it muktzeh due to a general prohibition, and in this we hold like Rabbi Shimon. According to this, a pouch in which one puts coins: if there are no coins in it and there were also no coins in it during bein hashemashot, it is permitted to be moved, and if it is fit for some permitted use, its law is like a vessel whose primary function is for a permitted use. And even if it is not fit for a permitted function, nevertheless, at any rate, it is permitted for the sake of its own use or its place. And all the more so the pockets attached to garments, if there are no coins in them and also during bein hashemashot there were none in them, they are completely permitted. Therefore, our portmonnaies made for putting coins inside them, and likewise our port-tobaccos made for putting tobacco inside them to smoke them with one's mouth, if they are empty and also did not have coins or tobacco in them during bein hashemashot, they are permitted to be moved, for they are fit to put some permitted item inside them, and they are like a vessel whose primary function is for a permitted use. And even if we judge them as having a forbidden function, for the sake of their own use or their place it is certainly permitted. (And it seems that all of these, besides the pocket in the garment, are called vessels whose primary function is for a forbidden use, and only regarding a bed did our teachers say that it is not so, because most beds are for lying upon, which is not the case with these, which are like all vessels whose primary function is for a forbidden use. However, from the words of our teacher, the Rema, in section 7 it does not imply so, since he wrote that according to those who forbid—and it is the system of Rabbeinu Tam that will be explained—the pouches are forbidden and permitted for the sake of their own use or their place, see there; it is explicitly clear that according to the Rif and the Rambam they are completely permitted like vessels whose primary function is for a permitted use, and this requires further study, and delve into it.)

However, the method of our teacher Tam in the Tosafot there is that the halacha follows Rav, that if he merely designated it for coins—the bed is forbidden for handling even if there were no coins upon it during twilight, provided he placed coins upon it during the weekday. And it is explicit there in the Tosafot that for the purpose of the object itself or its place it is permitted (see there in the heading starting with "Bed"), and so wrote the Hagahot Ashri there. But the wording of the Rosh there is as follows: "And Rabbeinu Tam explained that Rabbi Shimon admits regarding a bed that he designated... for a person is particular about it and designates a place for it, just as it is regarding weaving pins and looms at the beginning of Kol HaKeilim" Thus far his words. And seemingly, since he compares it to this—it should be muktzeh due to monetary loss and forbidden even for the purpose of the object itself or its place, and such is the opinion of one of the commentators of the Shulchan Aruch (Magen Avraham, subsection 5). But it is very astonishing, for how does monetary loss apply to this? Granted, weaving pins and looms are weavers' tools or dyers' tools, as is explained there, that they are particular about them because of their craft so that they do not become damaged, like a slaughtering knife; but the bed, in what way will it be damaged such that it would not be fit for placing coins? And it seems clear to me that the opinion of the Rosh is also like the Tosafot and Hagahot Ashri, and he only explained the matter of what connection a bed has to coins; to this he says that since he designated it for coins—he is particular about it not to use it regularly for another use, and we find similar to this regarding weaving pins and looms, that even though they are fit for another use—he is particular about them. But he does not compare the particularities to one another, for there the particularity is due to monetary loss so that they do not become damaged, and regarding a bed this does not apply. And this is the opinion of our teacher, the Rema, who wrote in section 7 even according to this view that the bed is permitted for the purpose of the object itself or its place, see there, and so wrote our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in his great book, see there. And there is one who challenged them from the words of the Rosh, and in my humble opinion the law is with them as I have written. (See Magen Avraham subsection 5, and I wonder at him that he did not see in the Tosafot where it is explicitly so as I have written, and also what the Magen Avraham wrote regarding Tosafot page 36a is even more astonishing, for there they wrote so according to Rabbi Yehuda and not according to Rabbi Shimon, see there at the end of the heading starting with "This is Rabbi Yehuda." And what he wrote from Hagahot Maimoniyot, there too he did not write "like dried figs and raisins," but rather "similar to dried figs," see there, and its explanation is as I wrote in the explanation of the Rosh. And what he wrote in the name of the Ra'avan, his book is not with me, and what he wrote that in this everyone admits it is a vessel whose primary work is for a forbidden purpose, this is certainly so, even though from the Rema it does not imply so as I have written, and delve into it.)

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 7 that according to the opinion of Rabbeinu Tam, it is forbidden to handle a money pouch even if one removed the money from it while it was still day, unless one performed an action upon it and tore it from below, thereby removing it from its designation, and such is the custom; however, for the purpose of the object itself or for the purpose of its space—it is permitted. And so too regarding a pouch sewn into a garment: since the primary purpose of the garment is for wearing, if one removed the money from there—the garment is permitted to be worn, for the pouch is nullified relative to it. But if one forgot the money—it is permitted to handle the garment, for we do not say that the entire garment becomes a base for the money, since the money is not on the main part of the garment. However, one should not wear it on Shabbat, for we fear perhaps he will go out in it. Thus far his words.

And behold, that which he wrote that according to this view it is forbidden to move a money pouch without money except for the need of its own use or its place, it is clear from his words that according to the view of the Rif and the Rambam, it is entirely permitted like a vessel whose primary use is for a permitted purpose. And behold, regarding pouches sewn into garments, it is certainly so; however, regarding pouches that stand on their own, it would seem from the perspective of logic that everyone holds they are called "whose primary use is for a forbidden purpose" (as the Magen Avraham wrote at the end of subsection 7). And our teacher, the Rema, holds that since the pouch is fit for all things, it is not called "whose primary use is for a forbidden purpose," and this is not similar to other vessels whose primary use is for a forbidden purpose. And that which he wrote regarding a pouch sewn into a garment, that if one removed the money it is permitted to wear it because the pouch is nullified to it—his intention is regarding the matter of going out with it into the public domain, for if it were because of the prohibition of muktzeh, he would not need the reason of nullification, since for the need of its own use it is permitted as I wrote previously; rather, he comes to say that it is not considered like a burden in the public domain due to the reason of nullification (ibid. subsection 6). And that which he wrote that if one forgot, it is permitted to move the garment since the money is not on the main part of the garment, behold, for "forgot" one does not need this reason, for behold, in a case of forgetting it does not become a basis; rather, this is what he means: had it been on the main part of the garment, even on Shabbat one would have to shake off the money, but now even this is not necessary. However, there is one who says that even in such a case one must shake it off (ibid. subsection 7), and also even in a case of placing it intentionally, since it is not on the main part of the garment, the garment does not become a basis (ibid.). And our teacher, the Rema, also holds so, but he employed the term "forgot" because it is forbidden to intentionally place money there, lest one go out with it into the public domain (ibid.), and it is also forbidden to insert one's hand into the pouch (ibid.). And if the pouch stands on its own but is tied to the garment, then the garment becomes a basis when there is money in the pouch, for since it stands on its own it has importance; and so too a drawer in a table when there is money in it—the table is forbidden to be moved for this reason, unless there is also a permitted item on the table, and it becomes a basis for a forbidden thing and a permitted thing (ibid.), and I do not know why the table drawer should not be subordinate to the table, and it requires further study. (And that which the Magen Avraham learned from the "mokhni" in the Gemara, I wonder at it, for there the primary moving is by means of the mokhni, whether according to the explanation of Rashi that it is a wheel, or according to the explanation of Rabbeinu Tam that it is the stand upon which the chest rests, or according to the explanation of the Ra'avad that it is a wheel, as he wrote in the third chapter of the Laws of Vessels, and this is his wording: "for its entire use is by means of the mokhni" see there, and the primary moving is the mokhni, and what similarity is there to a drawer in a table? Therefore, it seems in my humble opinion that it is permitted in such cases as well, and delve into this.)

It has already been explained that a base for a forbidden object and a permitted object is permitted, and we explained in siman 309, section 6, that even this was permitted with difficulty in a time of pressing need, see there, for if not so, one must shake off the forbidden object. It is also necessary that the forbidden object and the permitted object be upon it during bein hashemashot, for if the forbidden object alone was upon it during bein hashemashot, it does not avail that he places the permitted object on it during Shabbat, as the essence of the base is during bein hashemashot. Conversely, if the forbidden object was not upon it during bein hashemashot, even without the permitted object, it does not become a base for the entire Shabbat, but only while they are upon it; and in such a case, he may place the permitted object upon it ab initio and move it (Taz, subsection 8) if he is compelled to do so, such as when he cannot shake off the forbidden object or if there would be a loss to him when he shakes off the forbidden object (Bach).

This is the wording of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch in section 8: "A vessel upon which there is a prohibited item and a permitted item—it is permitted to handle it. For example, a coal-pan that has upon it from before the onset of the day ash (that was kindled on the eve of Shabbat) which is permitted to handle to cover with it saliva or excrement, and it also has upon it wood splinters which are prohibited to handle—it is permitted to handle the coal-pan as it is. And this is provided that the permitted item is more significant than the prohibited item, but if the prohibited item is more significant than the permitted item—it is nullified to it and it is prohibited to handle it." Thus far their words. And it was not explained what the law is when both are equal in significance, and there is one who wrote that it is prohibited (Tosefot Shabbat, subsection 18). And it is not clear to me, for if we infer from what they wrote: "And this is provided that the permitted item is more significant," it implies that when they are equal it is prohibited; yet we can infer the opposite from the concluding clause, from what they wrote: "But if the prohibited item is more significant etc.," it implies that when they are equal it is permitted. Rather, there is no inference from this, for such is the way of the language. And from the perspective of logic, it is simple that when both are equal they are not nullified to one another. And so it appears explicitly from the words of the Hagahot Maimoniyot (Chapter 26, letter 7) who wrote that a chest that has within it food and coins, if the coins are not the primary content—it is permitted to handle the chest. Thus far his words. Behold, it is explicit that if only the coins are not the primary content, even though the food is also not the primary content—it is permitted; for if not so, he should have said: 'if the food is not the primary content—it is prohibited to handle.' And also from the source of the law in the Gemara (47a) this is proven to the one who looks there, whether according to the explanation of Rashi or according to the explanation of Rabbeinu Tam, see there. (Regarding that which was taught 'in the Galilee,' for according to the explanation of Rashi it is because the prohibited item is significant to them, and according to Rabbeinu Tam because the permitted item is not significant to them, see there. And know that regarding the matter of significance, the Magen Avraham wrote in subsection 9 that it depends on him even if for the whole world it is not so, see there; and the proof is not from the Galilee, for that is a province, but the proof is from what is written there: 'are the grains in the house of Rebbi significant?' see there and examine carefully.)

And our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, further wrote there: "And the reason for the permission of this carrying is because it is not possible to take the ash alone, even if he throws it from the coal-pan (when he needs the ash) or if he needs the place of the coal-pan. But if he only needs the body of the coal-pan, he shall not carry it as it is; rather, he shall shake out the ash and the wood splinters in their place and take the coal-pan. And so too, if he is able to shake out the forbidden item alone—he shall shake it out and not carry it with the permitted item." Thus far their words. And this is all based on the foundation that we wrote: that this which they permitted regarding a base for both—they only permitted by way of necessity. And according to this, it is to be understood regarding every matter of a base for both: if there is a necessity in carrying both of them, such as if he fears on account of damage or on account of theft and the like—it is permitted to carry them, and if not—he shall shake out the forbidden item. And this has already been explained, that regarding one who forgot, the concept of a base does not apply. (And the law that the Beit Yosef wrote in section 9 is that which we brought in the previous section from the Hagahot Maimoniyot). (See the Beit Yosef in the name of the Ramban that if the forbidden item has no importance—the concept of a base does not apply).