Siman 309

The Rambam wrote in chapter 25, law 19: "Fruits that are forbidden to eat, such as fruits that are not tithed, even if they are liable for tithes by rabbinic law, or first tithe from which its terumah was not taken, or impure terumah, or second tithe and consecrated items that were not redeemed according to their law—it is forbidden to handle them. But demai, since it is fit for the poor, and likewise second tithe and consecrated items that one redeemed even though he did not give the fifth—it is permitted to handle them." Thus far his words. And all the more so that a carcass and a treifah and any matter that is forbidden even by rabbinic law, such as wine used for idolatry and their milk and cheese—that they are forbidden in handling; however, that which is fit for an animal is permitted in handling. And likewise all vessels that are forbidden for use because they were forbidden through the cooking of meat with milk or the cooking of treifot, even if they are not of their day—they are forbidden in handling, since they are forbidden for use ab initio; however, if they are fit to place in them food for an animal or for birds—they are permitted in handling. And likewise an Israelite handles terumah, since it is fit for a kohen.

Even though muktzeh is forbidden to be moved, nevertheless, if one moves the muktzeh by means of something else—it is permitted when there is a need for this. Therefore we learned: A man may take his son even though the stone is in the son's hand; for example, a son who has a longing for his father such that if he does not take him he will become ill, and the son is compelled to hold the stone in his hand and if they take the stone from him he will cry, they permitted the father to hold the son by his hand while the son holds the stone. And even though it is somewhat as if he himself is holding the stone—nevertheless they permitted this because of the distress of the child. But if there is no longing—they did not permit it. And even if there is a longing, they only permitted it with a stone, but if the child holds coins in his hand, it is forbidden even to hold the child by his hand while he walks on his feet—it is forbidden, lest the coins fall from the hand of the child and he comes to bring them with his hands. And some say that in such a case where the child walks on his feet and the father holds him by his hand—it is permitted, for they never decreed that one may not stand next to a child who carries coins, and the prohibition is only when he carries the child with the coins in his arms, but to hold him by his hand involves nothing, and in a place of danger everything is permitted.

A basket that was perforated and one plugged it with a stone and tightened it—it is permitted to handle it, for it has become a wall; so wrote one of the commentators on the Shulchan Aruch (Magen Avraham, subsection 3). But I do not understand, for if so, what novelty is there in this? And in my humble opinion, it appears that specifically regarding the stone in the cover that will be explained, they said in the Gemara (125b) that it requires tightening, for if not, it falls into the water; but regarding a stone in a basket, it does not require tightening, and this is the novelty, that by mere placement it becomes a wall. (And the words of the Machatzit HaShekel are difficult, and it appears that in the Magen Avraham there is some error, and so wrote the Eliyah Rabbah, subsection 4, that here it does not require tightening, see there.)

And so too a stone in a kiruyah, which is a hollowed gourd in which they hang a stone to weigh it down in order to fill it with water; if it is tied well so that it does not fall, it is permitted to fill with it, for the stone is like the gourd itself as it is nullified to it. And if not, it is forbidden even if he prepared it from the eve of Shabbat, because it falls. And behold, in the Gemara (ibid.) they used the language of tightening, since he tightened it, he made it a wall. However, Rashi, of blessed memory, explained that the tightening is by means of tying, see there. But the Bartenura in the commentary on the Mishnah there wrote that he tightened it well, see there, and it implies that tying is not required. But the Tur and Shulchan Aruch, section 2, wrote "tying," and it implies specifically tying. However, in the Yerushalmi on this Mishnah it is explicitly stated not like Rashi, as it says: "The stone in the kiruyah... since it is afutza within it, it is like its body," see there. And "afutza" is a term for tightening and not a term for tying, as it is found there in the chapter "Kira" (halacha 7) that the wick is afutza within the lamp, meaning pressed. And so too in the Mishnah in chapter 9 of Ohalot (Mishnah 3) regarding a beehive: "If it was damaged and plugged with straw or afutza; which is afutza—any that does not have a handbreadth in one place," see there. It follows that it is a term for pressing, and so explained the Aruch, see there. And so it is explicit in the Yerushalmi there that a stone in a basket is not pressed, see there (not like the Magen Avraham in the previous section). And it appears to my humble opinion that for the law one may rely on the Yerushalmi.

A basket full of fruit with a stone inside it, and the stone is muktzeh since the basket is not perforated such that it would serve as a wall, and it turns out that the basket is a base for a forbidden item and a permitted item. If they are wet fruits such as figs and grapes, they did not trouble him to take them one by one until he takes them all and afterwards shakes the stone out of it, because it is a great exertion, and therefore they permitted him to move the basket as it is with the stone. However, if they are dry fruits that are not ruined when he shakes them onto the ground—he should shake them and shake the stone with them and not carry it with them. And so too even with wet fruits, only that they are placed in small baskets within the large basket—he should take them out of the basket and shake out the stone and afterwards put them back in (Magen Avraham subsection 4 in the name of Tosafot). And all this is when he only needs the fruit or the basket, but if he needed the place of the basket—he may move it as it is.

According to what we have written, so ruled the Rambam in chapter 25 and the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch in section 3. And according to Rashi and Tosafot there from the Gemara (beginning of chapter Notel), even with moist fruits they do not permit moving the basket as it is, unless it was a damaged basket. But with a whole one—one must take the fruits from there and shake out the stone; see there. However, in any event, even according to those who are lenient, it was not permitted to move it as it is except in a case of great exertion, as I have written. And we have learned from this that that which we permit in a base for a forbidden thing and a permitted thing—it is not a complete permission, but rather only in a time of pressing need when one is forced to it. (And one must also say regarding that of the oven (47a): "When we were at Rav Nachman's, we would move the brazier on account of the ash, even though there were wood splinters upon it"—this is specifically in a case of necessity, and in the Or Zarua HaGadol at the end of siman 86 it remained a wonder.)

And so too, one may move impure terumah with pure terumah when they are in one vessel. In what case are these words said? When the pure was on the bottom, and they were fruits that would be soiled on the ground if he were to shake them out. But if they were walnuts or almonds and the like—he shakes the vessel and takes the pure and leaves the impure, unless he needs the place of the vessel as has been written; and such is the law regarding chullin with impure terumah, or any types of permitted things that were placed together with forbidden things in one vessel.

If one forgot a stone on the mouth of a barrel or coins on a pillow—it does not become a basis, and one may tilt the barrel on its side and the stone falls, and one may shake the pillow and the coins fall. And this is specifically when one does so for the sake of the pillow, but it is forbidden to do so for the sake of the coins so that they will not be stolen (Magen Avraham, subsection 5), for tilting from the side for the sake of a forbidden object is forbidden, except in the case of a corpse as written in siman 311. And if the barrel was among other barrels in a manner that one cannot tilt it in its place—one may lift it as it is with the stone to another place to tilt it there so that the stone will fall from upon it, for this is also tilting from the side for the sake of a permitted object.

And this is regarding one who forgets, but in the case of one who places intentionally with his knowledge so that they remain there at the onset of Shabbat—it is forbidden to tilt and shake, for the barrel has become a basis for the forbidden stone, and similarly the pillow for the coins. And in siman 308, section 43, we explained why we do not say that in the case of one who places it, the stone becomes a cover for the barrel and would not be muktzeh at all, see there, for we explained three reasons regarding this. And not only that, but even if the stone fell off on its own during Shabbat—the barrel is forbidden for handling, for since it was set aside during bein hashmashot, it is set aside for the entire day, as we already explained there in section 9 that regarding this muktzeh the halacha is not according to Rabbi Shimon, see there. And this is the opinion of Rashi, that by placing the muktzeh so that it will be upon the permitted item during bein hashmashot—it becomes a basis for the forbidden item. But the opinion of Rabbeinu Tam is that it does not become a basis unless he places it with the intent that the muktzeh will be there for the entire Shabbat, but if he placed the muktzeh only with the intent that it be there during bein hashmashot alone, that is, at the onset of Shabbat and not for the entire day—it does not become a basis for the muktzeh, and it is permitted to tilt and shake on Shabbat, and one may rely on this opinion in a case of loss (Bach and Magen Avraham, subsection 7). And it is obvious that if he placed it on Erev Shabbat with the intent to remove it from there before the onset of Shabbat, and afterward he forgot and did not remove it—this is called "forgot" (ibid. subsection 6 in the name of Terumat HaDeshen).

And there is a great question regarding this: why is it forbidden in the case of one who places a stone on the mouth of a barrel? For in the barrel there is wine, as Rashi and the Bartenura explained; if so, the barrel should be a base for both the permitted and the forbidden (Eliyah Rabbah, subsection 9). And there is one who answered that because the stone is placed on the mouth of the barrel and it is impossible to reach the wine without removing the stone, therefore both the barrel and the wine become a base for the stone (Tosefet Shabbat, subsection 14), but why did the poskim not mention this?

Furthermore, they asked how we can find our hands and feet according to the first opinion, which is the opinion of Rashi, that when one leaves it to be there during bein hashemashot, it becomes a basis and is forbidden for the entire Shabbat even after the muktzeh is removed from it; and if so, when they place the candles on a tablecloth and their primary purpose is for the onset of Shabbat, how is it permitted to move the tablecloth the next day even after the candles were removed by a non-Jew, for has it not become a basis for the candles? (Taz, end of subsection 1, and he remained with "it requires further study"). And there is one who says the reason for the permission is that, behold, in a temporary manner it is permitted as will be explained, and therefore the candles on the tablecloth are like a temporary manner, for he does not desire to place them on the tablecloth but rather on the table, only that he cannot clear a place on the table without the tablecloth, and therefore the tablecloth does not become a basis (the Ha-Geraz in section 9). And this is not a clear reason, for on the contrary, since he cannot place them except on the tablecloth, it follows that this is not like a temporary manner. And it seems more likely to me that the reason is that the table becomes a basis for the tablecloth and the candles, and likewise the tablecloth becomes a basis for the table and the candles, and it is a basis for a forbidden thing and a permitted thing, and it is permitted to move it when there is a need for this, as has been explained. And especially as they are accustomed to place the lechem mishneh at the time of lighting the candles—the tablecloth does not become a basis for the candles alone, and this reasoning we mentioned in siman 277, section 10, see there. However, according to what was written regarding the barrel, that it is not a basis even for the wine because it is impossible to reach the wine without removing the stone, and therefore they are all bases for the stone, if so, here too, behold it is impossible to take the tablecloth without the candles, and if so, they are all bases for the candles.

Therefore, it seems in my humble opinion that the matter is as follows: certainly, if at one moment the forbidden and the permitted were placed upon some location—this location becomes a basis for a forbidden thing and a permitted thing, for both of them govern it at one time. This is not the case if the permitted item was placed upon it long ago, and close to bein hashemashot the forbidden item came upon it—behold, the object was designated for the time of the onset of Shabbat only for the forbidden thing. For if not so, even regarding the primary rule of a basis for a forbidden thing, what do you see to say that the permitted item becomes a basis for the forbidden? Let us say the opposite, that the forbidden becomes a basis for the permitted. Rather, it is certain that the primary significance is with that which one is occupied with close to the onset of Shabbat. And according to this, our custom regarding the tablecloth is well-settled, for since close to bein hashemashot they place the tablecloth and the candles on the table—the table becomes a basis for a forbidden thing and a permitted thing, and likewise the tablecloth. But regarding wine that is in a barrel, where the wine has been inside the barrel for a long time and the stone comes upon it close to bein hashemashot—they all become bases for the stone (and the Levush implies that he was explaining a case of an empty barrel, see there, and his words are puzzling).

There is one who says that it does not become a basis unless he placed the muktzeh item upon it so that it should rest there well, but that which is placed in a random manner, such as when they are accustomed to placing these objects in a chest because he has no space to clear a place for every object at the bottom of the chest—in such cases it is not considered "placing" but rather "forgetting" (the questioner in Terumat HaDeshen siman 193). And there are those who disagree regarding this, for there is no permission except in the case of forgetting, but regarding intentional placement there is no distinction in this (Terumat HaDeshen ibid.). And one should not ask that according to this, why does the pure terumah not become a basis for the impure in section 7, for that is because the basket becomes a basis for both of them, and so too anything similar to this. (And the Magen Avraham subsection 6 agreed with the questioner and his words are not compelling, as the Eliyah Rabbah subsection 9 and the Tosefet Shabbat subsection 14 wrote, but the Gaon Rav Zalman in section 9 ruled like the Magen Avraham, see there; and in my humble opinion it appears that this does not depend on randomness or lack of randomness but rather on primary and secondary, and it will be explained in siman 310 with the help of Heaven, and with this the proof of the Magen Avraham there from the Rashba regarding a sack that contains a purse of coins is also removed, see there; however, one who is lenient in a rabbinic matter has not lost out.)

If a person placed a muktzeh object upon the object of his fellow—we do not say that it becomes a basis for a forbidden object, for a person cannot forbid the object of his fellow without his knowledge. Even regarding severe prohibitions in a matter involving no action, we hold that a person cannot forbid an object that is not his, such as one who bows down to the animal of his fellow, as is written in Yoreh Deah siman 4, and certainly so regarding the rabbinic prohibition of muktzeh. However, in a case where it can be said that it is pleasing to the owner, such as Reuven who placed a vessel of Shimon under a lamp of Shimon so that when the lamp falls it will not fall upon the table, and the lamp fell upon the vessel, there is room for doubt whether it becomes muktzeh or not. And likewise there is room for doubt when he himself did so, and the lamp fell into the vessel during bein hashemashot and afterwards fell from the vessel, whether the vessel becomes muktzeh for the entire Shabbat (ibid. subsection 8 in the name of the Or Zarua). And the Tosafot wrote (44b s.v. yesh) that when a gentile or a child placed it with the knowledge of an Israelite it is muktzeh, see there. But there is no proof from this, for it can be said that this is the explanation: such as where the Israelite requested them to do so (and the Magen Avraham there wrote that from Tosafot 44b it implies a prohibition, and his intention was this, but there is no proof as I have written).

And even though we have distinguished regarding a base for a forbidden object between one who places and one who forgets—in that for one who forgets, it does not become a base for the entire Shabbat—nevertheless, regarding an object that he knew would necessarily have the muktzeh fall into the vessel during bein hashemashot, it becomes a base and is forbidden for the entire Shabbat. For example, a coop of hens, since it is certain that their eggs will fall there, if a chick-egg is found there—meaning an egg that contains a chick—it is like one who places and not like one who forgets (Tosafot 45b, s.v. 'de-it'), and so too anything similar to this. And know that it is a simple matter that even though in a case of forgetting it does not become a base and is permitted for handling, this is when the muktzeh is cast off from it, but not while it is upon it; rather, he tilts it on its side and it falls. Unless it was among the vessels, for then he lifts it and tilts it on its side and it falls, as has been explained. And similarly, if he needs the place of the vessel to be vacant and tilting and shaking it here will not suffice for him, he may handle it with the muktzeh that is upon it in order to clear the place, and it will be further explained in siman 310 with the help of Heaven.