Siman 308

Regarding the reasons for muktzeh, the Rambam wrote at the end of chapter 24, and this is his wording: "The sages forbade moving certain objects on Shabbat in the manner that one does during the weekday. And for what reason did they touch upon this prohibition? They said: If the prophets warned and commanded that your walking on Shabbat should not be like your walking during the weekday, nor the speech of Shabbat like the speech of the weekday, as it is said, 'and speaking a word,' all the more so that moving objects on Shabbat should not be like moving objects during the weekday, so that it should not be like a weekday in his eyes, and he will come to lift and arrange vessels from corner to corner or from house to house, and he will come to store away stones and the like; for behold, he is idle and sitting in his house and will seek something to occupy himself with, and it will be found that he did not rest, and the reason stated in the Torah, 'so that he may rest,' will be nullified. Furthermore, when he examines and moves vessels whose primary function is for a prohibited labor, it is possible that he will occupy himself with them a little and come to perform a labor. Furthermore, because some of the people are not craftsmen but are idle all their days, such as the pleasure-seekers and those who sit on street corners, who all their days rest from labor; and if it were permitted to walk and speak and move objects like other days—it would be found that they did not rest a recognizable rest. Therefore, resting from these matters is a rest that is equal for every person, and because of these matters they touched upon the prohibition of moving, and forbade that a person should move anything on Shabbat except for vessels that he needs." Thus far his words.

The Ra'avad raised a difficulty against him, for in the Gemara (124b) it is explicitly stated that the moving of muktzeh was forbidden because of the prohibition of carrying out, for moving is a necessity for carrying out, as it is impossible to carry out without moving, and if they treat moving lightly, they will treat carrying out lightly (Rashi there). Furthermore, it was taught there (123b): "At first they would say three vessels may be moved on Shabbat... they permitted and again they permitted and again they permitted until they said: All vessels may be moved on Shabbat except for a large saw and the pin of a plow." Furthermore, they said there: "In the days of Nehemiah son of Hacaliah this Mishnah was taught, for at first... because they treated the Sabbaths lightly, as it is written: 'In those days I saw in Judah people treading winepresses, etc.'" see there, and how did the Rambam innovate reasons of his own.

And it seems to me that the words of the Rambam are correct and necessary, for if it should enter your mind that the beginning of the decrees of muktzah started in the days of Nehemiah, how did they permit and repeatedly permit them? For a beit din cannot nullify the words of their predecessors unless they are greater in wisdom and number than the former ones, and it is not logical that the later ones were greater than the former ones, nor is it logical that in the days of Nehemiah himself they permitted and repeatedly permitted them. Furthermore, in the days of Nehemiah there were the prophets Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi, and when they prohibited, who would dare afterward to permit what they prohibited? And Ezra was also with them. Furthermore, who compelled them to permit what they prohibited? Rather, it is certainly a different matter, and this is the presentation of the things:

For behold, we have already explained at the beginning of siman 243 that the shevut laws of Shabbat are not like all other rabbinic prohibitions, and they are like Torah law. This matter the Rambam explained to us at the beginning of chapter 21, where he wrote: "It is stated in the Torah 'you shall rest,' even from matters that are not melakhah—one is obligated to rest from them; and there are many matters that the sages prohibited as a shevut," and the Maggid Mishneh explained that the Torah handed this over to the sages, see there. And in the Mekhilta, and in Torat Kohanim, and in the Sifrei, it is stated several times: "'Shabbaton' is a shevut." And above we explained the matter in the name of the Ramban, of blessed memory, that it is impossible for it to be otherwise at all, for if not so, there is no Shabbat here; and that the prophets warned regarding the shevut laws and called it a desecration of Shabbat, see there. And at the time of the giving of the Torah, Moshe our teacher commanded us regarding all the shevut laws of Shabbat according to the word of Hashem, and the Torah included them in the term "you shall rest," for without the shevut laws there is no resting at all. And all the words of the Rambam in these chapters follow after the introduction of his words at the beginning of chapter 21. Rather, the Holy One, Blessed be He, commanded us thus: that these shevut laws do not enter into the count of the melakhot, and one is not liable for them to stoning or a chatat offering, but the Holy One, Blessed be He, obligated us to observe all the shevut laws as they are with us today.

And according to this, the prohibitions of muktzeh were also in effect since the Torah was given, and their law then was like after they went back and permitted and went back and permitted, as is explained in the Gemara there: that they permitted an object whose primary use is for a prohibited purpose for the sake of the object itself or for its space, but not from sun to shade; and an object whose primary use is for a permitted purpose even from sun to shade, as we have it today, as will be explained with the help of Heaven in these simanim. However, in the days of Nehemiah son of Hachaliah, when they were lax in the desecration of Sabbaths from the time they were in Babylon, he and Ezra and Haggai, Zechariah, and Malachi and the Men of the Great Assembly arose and decreed further stringencies upon their generation, and they did not permit more than three vessels. And these were not fixed decrees for all generations, and so our teachers, the authors of the Tosafot, wrote explicitly in Bava Kamma (94b, s.v. "In the days of"): that they only decreed this for that generation. Therefore, afterwards, when they saw that they returned to being careful regarding the Sabbath, they permitted and went back and permitted until it remained according to the previous laws and according to the halacha we have. And this is what the Rambam, of blessed memory, explained regarding the previous reasons for muktzeh, and he explained with his great understanding that if there is no muktzeh there is no cessation of labor and the rest of the Sabbath is nullified, and this is all included in "you shall rest" mentioned in the Torah, as he wrote at the beginning of chapter 21, and it is obvious that it is also a great fence for carrying, as is explained in the Gemara.

It is a known matter that throughout the entire tractate of Shabbat, Rava Yehuda and Rabbi Shimeon disagree regarding muktzeh and nolad, for Rabbi Yehuda forbids and Rabbi Shimeon permits, and the halacha was decided according to Rabbi Shimeon. And according to the opinion of the Rif and the Rambam and most of the poskim, we also hold like Rabbi Shimeon regarding nolad; therefore, the Rambam did not mention the prohibition of nolad at all regarding Shabbat. And so wrote the Tur in siman 495, and this is his wording: "And regarding Yom Tov they were more stringent than regarding Shabbat concerning muktzeh... however, our teacher Tam would distinguish, saying that the halacha is like Rabbi Shimeon only regarding muktzeh, but regarding nolad the halacha is like Rabbi Yehuda." Thus far his words. And all of our teachers do not hold so, and therefore you will see that the Tur and Shulchan Aruch in these simanim, from this siman until siman 313, which speak of matters of muktzeh, did not mention nolad at all. Furthermore, you will see that in siman 320 they wrote the laws of squeezing fruits, and the prohibition is due to a decree lest one squeeze, see there, and they did not mention it due to the reason of nolad. And so too at the beginning of siman 322 where they wrote: "An egg that was laid on Shabbat—it is forbidden due to the reason of a decree of Shabbat following Yom Tov and due to the reason of hachana," as is written there, but due to the reason of nolad it would not be forbidden, and this is because we hold like Rabbi Shimeon, and as we say at the end of Shabbat: that in all of Shabbat—the halacha is like Rabbi Shimeon. However, regarding absolute nolad, which is to say a new thing that was not in the world at all—Rabbi Shimeon admits that it is forbidden (Tosafot Eruvin 46a, s.v. 'Kol'). And an egg we consider as having existed in the world, which is to say it was in the innards of the hen and has now emerged outside, and so too the liquids that were absorbed in the fruits (so it appears in my humble opinion).

And if you should ask: since we hold according to Rava that the law follows Rabbi Shimon who does not hold of muktzeh, if so, what are these laws of muktzeh that are forbidden? The answer to this is: certainly even Rabbi Shimon admits to many types of muktzeh, such as muktzeh of living creatures, as we say (45b) that even Rabbi Shimon admits that while they are alive they are forbidden to be moved. And so too, muktzeh of dried figs and raisins that he set out to dry and pushed away with his hands—he admits (ibid.), and so too, muktzeh due to monetary loss, Rabbi Shimon admits (157a). And so too, an object whose primary function is for a forbidden use, to move it from the sun to the shade without any need—Rabbi Shimon admits that it is forbidden (Tosafot 36a, s.v. "Ha Rabbi Shimon"), and so too, a foul-smelling thing—even Rabbi Shimon admits that it is forbidden to move (Rashi 46a, s.v. "Aval," see there), and so too, anything that does not have the status of a vessel at all, such as pebbles and dust and anything similar to these—Rabbi Shimon admits (ibid. in the Gemara where it asks: "If so, all pebbles"). The general rule of the matter: anything that is not fit for Shabbat at all, such as living creatures and money and lamps and all types of metals that are not vessels, and so too, things that he would be careful with so as not to use them except for the forbidden matters designated for them, such as a slaughtering knife and a large saw and similar items, and this is called muktzeh due to monetary loss, and so too, muktzeh of pushing away with hands—in all of these, Rabbi Shimon admits.

Rather, what is this muktzeh about which Rava Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagreed and the halakha follows Rabbi Shimon: This is regarding a thing that is fit for use now, but there is upon it muktzeh in practice or in name, such as muktzeh due to repulsiveness, like an earthenware lamp that they lit on a weekday which is repulsive, and similarly muktzeh due to storage, and similarly an object whose primary function is for a prohibited use to perform with it a permitted act. And the halakha was decided like Rabbi Shimon, that an object whose primary function is for a prohibited use is permitted for the sake of the object itself or for the sake of its place. And that which is prohibited from sun to shade is because the person has no need for this, and it is like pebbles and dust. However, there is a permission for this if he wants to save it from damage by the sun—he should see to use it for some purpose, as will be explained before us with the help of Heaven (and the Magen Avraham, subsection 8, brought this in the name of the Yerushalmi, see there). And similarly regarding what is prepared for a human if it was prepared for dogs, such as a healthy animal or a bird that died on Shabbat, for Rabbi Yehuda holds that what is prepared for a human is not prepared for dogs, because he removed his mind from the dogs, and Rabbi Shimon holds that it is permitted, and the halakha follows Rabbi Shimon. And there are two types of muktzeh that Rabbi Shimon admits to: muktzeh due to a mitzvah, and a base for a prohibited object, and that is the lamp at the time that it is burning, because the vessel is secondary to the flame while it is in it (Rashi 47a, s.v. "for the object"). And this is what they said in the Gemara (45a): "You have no muktzeh according to Rabbi Shimon except for the oil in the lamp at the time that it is burning, since it was set aside for its mitzvah and set aside for its prohibition." That is to say, it has two types of muktzeh: muktzeh due to a mitzvah, for a Shabbat lamp is a mitzvah, and muktzeh due to its prohibition, which is that it becomes a base for the flame which is absolute muktzeh. And from this we learned all types of base for a prohibited object, as they will be explained with the help of Heaven.

However, there is one matter in which Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Shimon disagreed and the halacha follows Rabbi Yehuda, and the Behag explained the reason is because Rabbi Meir also holds like Rabbi Yehuda, and Rabbi Shimon is thus a single opinion against many. This is regarding muktzeh of bein hashemashot, such as a lamp that was lit during bein hashemashot and was extinguished, for Rabbi Yehuda holds: "Since it was set aside during bein hashemashot, it is set aside for the entire day," and Rabbi Shimon holds that once the muktzeh status is removed, it is permitted, and in this the halacha follows Rabbi Yehuda. This is the wording of the Behag in chapter 3 of the laws of Shabbat: "And where there were chicks upon it during the entire bein hashemashot, it is forbidden to move it the entire day, since it was set aside during bein hashemashot, it is set aside for the entire day... and the halacha does not follow Rabbi Shimon regarding a lamp that was lit on that same Shabbat, since Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda agree with each other regarding a stove, and he is a single opinion against many." Thus far his words. And he wrote similarly there in chapter 24 that in everything the halacha follows Rabbi Shimon except for this, see there. And these are the general rules of the laws of muktzeh, and the details will be explained in these simanim with the help of Heaven.

Any type of vessel or any type of utilitarian vessel, such as chairs, tables, beds, and chests in which objects are stored, or beams designated for sitting, even if they are very large and heavy, since the status of a vessel is upon them—they are permitted to be moved on Shabbat. And we say in Eruvin (102a): "There was a certain beam in the house of Rabbi Pedat," and a "beam" is a kora (Rashi), which ten people would lift and place against the door, for it was a load for ten people, and he permitted it because the status of a vessel was upon it, as it was fit to sit upon (ibid.). And that mortar in the house of Mar Shmuel which held a half-kor—Mar Shmuel permitted placing it against the door. He said: The status of a vessel is upon it. (And regarding that which is in Shabbat 35a concerning a large basket, the Tosafot and the Rosh rejected it from the halacha there, because of this passage in Eruvin. And even though in Eruvin there they made a distinction in the matter, and according to their words there, anything that is not normally moved during the weekday is forbidden, and according to this, our commodes and sofas and armoires would be forbidden to be moved. But the halacha is not so, for the Rif and the Rosh brought this passage from Eruvin in the chapter "Kol HaKelim," and so too the Rambam in chapter 25, law 6 brought this, and that passage in Shabbat there they did not bring, and the Rosh rejected it from the halacha as I wrote, and so too the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch in section 2, and therefore the primary ruling is like the words of the Tosafot in Shabbat there.)

All vessels may be moved on Shabbat except for muktzeh due to monetary loss, which means that one is protective of them and does not use them for anything other than their designated craft, such as a slaughtering knife, or a circumcision knife, or a barber's razor for shaving head hair, or a scribe's knife used for repairing their quills. Similarly, any homeowner who has a small knife for repairing quills and the like—they are forbidden to be moved, because they are not fit for a permitted craft due to their high value. This is muktzeh due to monetary loss, for which even Rabbi Shimon agrees, as I have written. And even for the sake of the object itself or its place—meaning for the sake of a permitted use or if one needs its place—it is forbidden to move it, for he completely removes his mind from it and it is like pushing it away with his own hands. Furthermore, even if it is inserted in a sheath with other knives, it is forbidden to move it, and we do not say that since it is inserted together with other knives he is not particular about it. However, the sheath does not become a base for it such that it would be a base for a forbidden object and be forbidden to move, for it is also a base for the other knives, and it is a base for a forbidden object and a permitted object and is permitted. And such is the law for a spice mallet that one is particular about so that it does not become soiled—it is like muktzeh due to monetary loss, since he removes his mind from using it. But when he is not particular, it is permitted. And such is the law for vessels designated for merchandise that one is particular about; but if he is not particular, it is permitted. Ordinarily, if its price is expensive, he is presumably particular, and if its price is not expensive, it is permitted, unless he placed it in storage (Magen Avraham, subsection 3). And it is a simple matter that any type of merchandise in a shop is forbidden to be moved; and it is not only necessary to say this regarding merchandise that is not fit for wearing or use, but even if it is fit for use, he is presumably particular about them and they are muktzeh due to monetary loss and forbidden. But food and drink in a shop—it is permitted to take and eat, for we do not have muktzeh due to storage regarding food and drink, as will be explained in siman 333 with the help of Heaven.

The Rambam wrote at the beginning of chapter 25: "There is a vessel whose function is for permitted use, and it is a vessel in which a thing done with it on a weekday is permitted on Shabbat, such as a cup to drink from, a bowl to eat in, a knife to cut meat and bread, and a (small) axe to crack nuts and the like. And there is a vessel whose function is for prohibited use, and it is a vessel with which it is forbidden to do on Shabbat the thing that is done with it, such as a mortar and millstones and the like, for it is forbidden to pound and to grind on Shabbat. And any vessel whose function is for permitted use, whether it was of wood or of earthenware or of stone or metal—it is permitted to move it on Shabbat whether for the sake of the vessel itself (this is 'from sun to shade' in the Gemara), or for the sake of its place (of the vessel), or for the sake of his body (of the person). And any vessel whose function is for prohibited use, whether of wood or of earthenware and stone and metal—it is permitted to move it on Shabbat whether for the sake of his body or for the sake of its place, but for the sake of the vessel itself—it is forbidden."

"How so: one may move a wooden bowl to eat from it, or to sit in its place, or so that it should not be stolen, and this is for its own sake. And likewise, if one moved it from the sun so that it should not dry out and break, or from the rains so that it should not swell and be ruined—this is moving for its own sake and is permitted, because its function is for a permitted use. And likewise, one may move millstones or a mortar to crack nuts upon them or to climb upon them to a bed, and this is for the need of its body, or to sit in its place. But one may not move it so that it should not break nor so that it should not be stolen, and likewise anything similar to this. And anything that is not a vessel, such as stones, money, reeds, beams, and the like—it is forbidden to move them." Thus far his words.

It is stated in the Yerushalmi in chapter 4 (halacha 2) and Beitzah (beginning of chapter 5), that nets were spread in the sun and were being damaged because of the heat, and they are a kli she-melakhto le-issur, for it is forbidden to move them from the sun to the shade. And they asked Rav what to do, and he told them that they should now intend to place them under their heads, and it would be for the use of its space and permitted; see there. And we learned from this that any kli she-melakhto le-issur that one wants to move so that it will not be stolen or from the sun to the shade, if he can find a use for them that is permitted to be performed on Shabbat—he should intend to do so and do so (Magen Avraham, subsection 8). And even though this is an artifice, nevertheless it is permitted for the sake of a loss. (And the Korban HaEdah explained there that he intended from the eve of Shabbat and it became a kli she-melakhto le-heter, but it is not so as the Magen Avraham wrote, and the Pnei Moshe intended correctly in his explanation; see there.)

And behold, regarding a utensil whose primary use is for a permitted purpose, it has been explained that it is permitted to move it even from sun to shade and so that it will not be stolen. Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 4 that without any need at all—it is forbidden to move it, and only holy writings and food are permitted to be moved even without any need at all; see there. And it is not understood, for since he moves them—certainly he has some intention in this. And it must be said that this is, for example, where he is merely occupied in a purposeless manner, and has no intention at all in its moving. However, if he has pleasure in the fact that he moves it, granted that regarding a utensil whose primary use is for a forbidden purpose we would not consider this a physical need, nevertheless, regarding a utensil whose primary use is for a permitted purpose—it is certainly permitted. (And regarding the essence of this law there are those who disagree, as the Maggid Mishneh wrote there; and regarding what he wrote that it appears so from the Rambam, in my humble opinion there is no proof, for he employs the language of the Talmud according to his custom, and the Ran is in doubt about this in the chapter "Kol HaKelim." And what the Maggid Mishneh wrote, that why did Rava need to say "from sun to shade," let him say "without any need at all," I do not understand; for are we dealing with fools? Even on a weekday when a person moves an object it is for some intention. And also the Rashba in "Kirah" in the sugya of "a utensil is only handled for an object that may be handled" is as one in doubt about this, see there; however, who would come to be lenient in a matter that the Beit Yosef ruled upon and there is no one who disagrees with him, and examine this well.)

Regarding the matter of a corpse, it will be explained in siman 311 that even though it is forbidden to move a corpse, as there is no greater muktzeh than this, nevertheless they permitted moving it when there is a need for the matter by placing a loaf of bread or a child upon it. And they said in the Gemara (142b) that they only permitted this for a corpse alone, and nevertheless there are those who permit moving any vessel whose primary function is for a prohibited use, even from sun to shade or so that it should not break, by means of a loaf of bread or a child. And that which they said, that they only permitted it for a corpse—this is regarding muktzeh similar to a corpse, such as pebbles and stones and dust. But a vessel, even if its primary function is for a prohibited use—it is permitted. And there are those who disagree on this, and it will be further explained in siman 311 with the help of Heaven.

Tefillin, even though they are not to be donned on Shabbat, nevertheless they are not muktzeh and it is permitted to move them for any need whatsoever, even from the sun to the shade, for they are not like a vessel whose primary use is for a prohibited purpose, as there is no prohibition to don them when one does not intend for the sake of the mitzvah. And behold, therefore it was explained in siman 301 that one who goes out in tefillin on Shabbat is not liable, because this is the manner of a garment. And they are only not like sacred writings, which are permitted to be moved for no need at all as I wrote in section 15, and tefillin are not so, but as long as there is some need—it is permitted. And some say that since it was explained in siman 31 according to the Zohar that it is prohibited to don them on Shabbat and Yom Tov—they have the status of a vessel whose primary use is for a prohibited purpose, which is only permitted for the sake of its use or its place (Taz subsection 3 and Magen Avraham subsection 11). And according to this, there is no permission except for the sake of their place, for "the sake of its use" is not applicable to tefillin, as is understood. Nevertheless, one who relies on the first opinion has not lost out, for if not so, let us say that they are muktzeh due to monetary loss, as he certainly is particular about them. Rather, certainly since they resemble sacred writings—the name muktzeh does not apply to them at all (Tosefot Shabbat subsection 21). And Megillat Esther—likewise it is not muktzeh, even though we do not read from it on Shabbat when Purim falls then, for nevertheless it is sacred writings. And there is one who prohibits (Pri Chadash), and it appears more likely to be permitted (Eliyah Rabbah), and more will be explained regarding this in siman 688 with the help of Heaven. And lulav and etrog on Shabbat are muktzeh, because he is particular about them as I wrote in siman 658. And a shofar is not subject to being particular about it, and its law is like a vessel whose primary use is for a prohibited purpose, and it is permitted for the sake of its use or its place. And blank paper, if he does not set it aside for writing and is not particular about it—it is permitted to move, as it is fit to cover a vessel with it or for wiping. But if he sets it aside for writing—behold he is particular about it, and its law is like muktzeh due to monetary loss (Magen Avraham subsection 10), and it is prohibited to move. And all the more so papers upon which accounts are written, for it is prohibited to move them because he is particular about them. But past accounts or letters for which there is no need—behold they are fit to cover vessels with them or for another matter, and they are not muktzeh unless he threw them into the trash, for then they require designation from the eve of Shabbat as will be explained. And tzitzit when they are not in a garment—are muktzeh.

And know that there are general rules regarding muktzeh, namely that a vessel whose function is for both prohibited and permitted use is treated as a vessel whose function is for permitted use (ibid. subsection 9). Similarly, when we permitted a vessel whose function is for prohibited use for the purpose of the object itself or its space, one is not obligated to put it down when removing it from its space; rather, once he holds it in his hand, he is permitted to move it to whatever place he wishes to set it down there. And even if he forgot that this is muktzeh and took it in his hand, he is permitted to move it and set it down in the place he wishes. And the general rule is that after the muktzeh is in his hand, he has the ability to set it down in the place he wishes and is not obligated to throw it from his hand, for the prohibition is the taking into his hands. Similarly, it is permitted to move muktzeh by blowing, and likewise with his feet to push it to another place, and likewise with the back of his hand, for since it is movement in an unusual manner, it is not called movement (ibid. subsection 7). And all muktzeh is permitted with mere touching, for only the movement is prohibited; therefore, if by touching it will sway, such as a lamp hanging in the air, it is prohibited to touch it, but when he does not sway it, it is permitted. Therefore, it is permitted to touch the lamps in the synagogue that stand on the table or are attached to the wall even at the time when the candles are burning in it. Similarly, it is permitted to touch a hot oven in which fire is burning, and similarly it is permitted to take a permitted object that is resting on the muktzeh, and even if the muktzeh sways a bit, for movement from the side for the sake of a permitted object is permitted, as will be explained in siman 309 with the help of Heaven, and all these are fixed laws. (And only regarding what we wrote that when he holds the muktzeh in his hand he is entitled to move it to whatever place he wishes, there are some of the great authorities who said that this is only regarding vessels whose function is for prohibited use, but regarding absolute muktzeh, he is obligated to remove it immediately from his hand. And likewise, there is one who says that this law applies only when he took it in a permitted manner, and not when he forgot and took the muktzeh in his hand.)

All vessels that were broken on Shabbat—it is permitted to handle their shards. This is provided that they are fit for some use, even if it is not similar to their original use, such as shards of a kneading trough to cover the mouth of a barrel, or shards of glass to cover the mouth of a jug; but if they are not fit for any use, they are forbidden to be handled. And know, that regarding this law, Rabbi Yehuda and the sages disagreed in the Mishnah of "All Vessels" (124b): for Rabbi Yehuda forbids it unless they are fit for a use similar to their previous use, and the sages permit it, and the halacha follows the sages. And it is explained in the Gemara that they disagree on this reasoning: for Rabbi Yehuda holds it is nolad since on the eve of Shabbat it was not fit for this use, and the rabbis hold it is mukhan, meaning that this is not nolad since it is fit for some use or other, and it is only called nolad on Yom Tov regarding the matter of kindling with shards of vessels, for it is obvious that they did not stand for kindling from the eve of Shabbat—that is nolad, but this is not called nolad. Thus it results that even according to the method of Rabbeinu Tam that we brought in section 6—it is also permitted. And I saw one who explains that the sages hold that it is nolad, but they do not hold of the prohibition of nolad, and according to this, for Rabbeinu Tam it would be forbidden in such cases until it is fit for its original use (Magen Avraham, subsection 15). And it is not so, for the sages hold that it is not nolad (and so it is explained by the Taz, subsection 5, and so wrote the Eliyah Rabbah, subsection 15, and the Ateret Zekenim, subsection 26), except if a non-Jew made a vessel on Shabbat—for that is certainly called nolad, and it depends on the dispute. However, we have already written in section 6 that most of the poskim permit nolad on Shabbat, and the halacha follows the many.

It is a simple matter that if the shards are in a place where people tread and they could cause injury, such as shards of a glass vessel and the like, or if they broke on the table and could injure the hands—one may remove them, for in a place of public injury the rabbis did not decree (Gemara 42a). However, it is better to gather them by means of a broom called a "besem" or wings of birds made for sweeping, and this is permitted even not in a place of known injury, such as shards of an earthenware vessel and the like, for this is "tilul min hatzad" for some need, which is permitted. And regarding that which they tread upon the shards and they are broken by this—there is no prohibition, for it is a "davar she'ein mitkaven," and there is no prohibition in breaking them in such a manner unless one breaks them with his hands (Magen Avraham subsection 16).

And know that according to what has been explained, there is no difference between a vessel that broke on Shabbat and one that broke on Erev Shabbat, for even in one that broke on Erev Shabbat they must be fit for some use, for if not so, it is like pebbles and dust which are muktzeh. And on the contrary, in one matter it is more lenient when it broke on Shabbat than when it broke on Erev Shabbat, for if it broke on Erev Shabbat and he threw the shards into the trash—it is muktzeh even if they are fit for some use, since he pushed them away with his hands and nullified their status as a vessel. But when they broke on Shabbat—it is of no effect that he throws them on Shabbat into the trash, for since at twilight the status of a vessel applied to it, he cannot on Shabbat nullify its status as a vessel (Darkhei Moshe letter 4 and Bach). And also there is no difference between whether the entire vessel broke or whether a shard broke from it, for also in such cases even if it broke on Shabbat, if it is only fit for some use—it is permitted. And there is one who wishes to say that when a shard broke from it on Shabbat we specifically require that it be fit for its original labor, and there is no difference in this (Bach, and this is also the intention of the Magen Avraham subsection 17 and the Taz subsection 6).

And according to this, a shard from a clay vessel that broke or from a glass vessel, even though the entire vessel—meaning the main body of the vessel—remains intact, if this shard is fit for some use, such as to cover a vessel or the like, whether it broke on the eve of Shabbat or whether it broke on Shabbat, there is no muktzeh in it and it is permitted to be moved. And even in a place where vessels are not commonly found there to cover them, for we do not require that one immediately perform the fit usage with it; rather, since it is fit for use, it is permitted. This is unless it broke on the eve of Shabbat and he threw it into the trash while it was still day, for then it is forbidden to move it, as we have written. And even if the one who threw it was a wealthy person for whom it is not significant, nevertheless, even for a poor person for whom it is significant, it is forbidden to him, for muktzeh for a wealthy person is muktzeh for a poor person when the owner has set it aside. This is unless the poor person took it while it was still day and designated it as a cover, for then it is permitted both to him and to the wealthy person, since it is no longer his, and the poor person, the owner, designated it for use, as will be explained in section 75.

And this, that it is effective if it is fit for covering a vessel—this is regarding a shard that comes from a vessel, for since it had the status of a vessel while it was yet day, it does not depart from the category of a vessel on Shabbat unless it is fit for nothing at all. However, a thing that has no connection to a vessel, such as pebbles and stones, or vessels that were broken before Shabbat and were thrown before Shabbat into the trash and a poor person did not lift them before Shabbat, for then on Shabbat their law is also like pebbles and stones and even if they are fit for covering vessels—it is forbidden to move them on Shabbat even if he wants to cover a vessel with it, unless he designated them while it was yet day for this. And this is a great principle in muktzeh, that anything that does not have the status of a vessel upon it while it was yet day—it is absolute muktzeh which is forbidden to move even for the sake of its use or its place. And a wick is called a vessel, and the remnants of a wick are called pebbles. And if the wick is fit for some permitted use—it is permitted to move it for the sake of its use or its place, but a candle of tallow or of wax which are not fit for any permitted labor in the world—they are forbidden even for the sake of their place, since they have no use for themselves at all, automatically they are like pebbles and stones, not like those who err in this and say that a whole candle is permitted to be moved (Magen Avraham, subsection 18). And so too our lamps in which they light candles or oils, such as "leuchters" and "lampen," even though they did not light in them on that Shabbat or even if they have not lit in them yet at all—they are absolute muktzeh like pebbles and stones, since they are not fit for any permitted labor. And it is not similar to those in the time of the Gemara, who would burn oil in complete vessels, and it is proper to remember this and not to err in this, and we have already mentioned this also above in siman 279, section 1, see there, and so too wood is absolute muktzeh (Turei Zahav, subsection 7).

Doors are functional vessels, for they are used to open and to lock. However, the doors of a house, even though they are vessels, nevertheless since they are attached to the ground—there is no greater muktzeh than this, and when they are detached, whether on a weekday or on Shabbat, they are forbidden to be moved, because they were not prepared for moving (Rambam ibid. Halacha 6). And it is obvious that if they were detached on a weekday and one designated them for a detached use, such as to eat upon it or to sleep upon it and the like—that it is permitted; but if they were detached on Shabbat, the designation is of no use, for since it was muktzeh during bein hashemashot, it is muktzeh for the entire day. And all the more so to detach them on Shabbat from the irons called "hooks," for there is in this a prohibition of shattering. And according to this, even if every day it is their way at night to detach them and sleep on them—on Shabbat it is forbidden due to the shattering of a building, and if they want on Shabbat to sleep on them, he should detach them while it is still day and designate them for the use of sleeping. And all the more so it is forbidden to lock them on Shabbat due to the prohibition of building, and likewise also the windows it is forbidden to remove and to return, for they are attached (Magen Avraham subsection 22).

But doors of vessels, such as those of a chest, a box, or a cabinet—one may remove them but it is forbidden to return them, due to a decree lest one hammer them firmly with pins and pegs, and it would be a completion of the work and he would be liable for the category of makeh b'patish (Rashi at the beginning of the chapter "Kol HaKelim"). But regarding building—it does not apply here, for there is no building or destroying in vessels (and one must further investigate the Magen Avraham, subsection 21, who wrote not according to Rashi, see there). Therefore, all vessels that may be handled on Shabbat, their doors that were detached from them on a weekday—they are permitted to be handled, and likewise when they were detached on Shabbat, because the status of a vessel is always upon them and they are always fit for their use, for even when they are detached one can cover the vessels with them.

But regarding a chicken coop, even though it is not a complete building, nevertheless, since it is attached to the ground—it is forbidden both to remove and to return [the doors]. And when they have been detached, they are forbidden for handling like the doors of a house, for since they are in any event attached to the ground—they are subject to building and tearing down, and consequently they are muktzeh. And so too the doors of porticos and cattle stalls and the doors of pits, even though they are made loosely and the doors are hung loosely, nevertheless, since the buildings are attached to the ground—they have the laws of the doors of a house.

And this is all regarding doors that hang on iron or on ropes, and they are like the building itself. But mere covers, such as the covers of a pit or a cistern, even though they belong to the building, nevertheless since it is a mere cover, if there is a distinction that this is a cover, such as if they have a handle—then it is permitted to move it, and without this there is a concern of building since it serves it. And the covers of vessels where the vessels are attached with clay to the ground—they do not require a handle, since they are not actual buildings. And nevertheless, it is forbidden to move them until he prepares them and performs an action upon them and readies them for this while it is still day, or that he uses them while it is still day, for since they have some attachment to the ground, although we do not require a handle—nevertheless some distinction is required. And if the barrel is buried entirely in the ground, its cover requires a handle, for this is a pit and a cistern. And even covers of vessels that have no attachment to the ground at all, there is one who says that it requires some preparation, for this does not have the status of a vessel like a shard broken from a vessel. But from the words of the Tur and Shulchan Aruch section 10 it does not appear so (see Magen Avraham subsection 23 who wrote this as a settled ruling, and in my humble opinion it is as I wrote). And know, that it appears that in a place where preparation is effective—thought is also effective, as will be explained regarding palm branches, and such is the opinion of one of the great authorities (Tosefet Shabbat subsection 36 and the difficulty of the Eliyah Rabbah subsection 25 is resolved).

A hand needle, and this is a small needle with which one sews clothes—it is permitted to handle it in order to remove a thorn with it, according to the law of a vessel whose primary function is for a prohibited use, which is permitted for the sake of its use, and the same law applies that for the sake of its place it is permitted. And specifically when it is whole, but if its point or its eye was removed—it is prohibited. And even though when the eye is removed it is still fit to remove a thorn with it, however, they explained in the Gemara (123a) two reasons for this: One, because it was nullified from being a vessel regarding the matter of tumah—it was also nullified regarding the matter of Shabbat; and the primary reason is because when its point or its eye is removed, a person throws it among the shards, and it turns out that he himself nullifies it from the status of a vessel, and therefore it is not similar to a shard of a vessel which is permitted to handle when it is fit for a use. And a new one that was not yet perforated—it is permitted to handle it, because sometimes one reconsiders it and makes it a vessel as it is to remove a thorn with it (Gemara ibid.). And know that in Kelim chapter 13 we learned there: A needle whose eye or whose point was removed—it is pure; if he prepared it for stretching, to stretch the clothes—it is impure. And if so, also regarding the matter of Shabbat it is so when the eye is removed, but when the point is removed, behold it is not fit for the removal of a thorn. (And see Magen Avraham subsection 24, and see in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch section 11 who wrote, "A whole needle etc." And it seems to me that it is a printing error, and thus it should say: "A hand needle," and so it is in the Gemara and the Rambam there, because there is a sack-maker's needle, and it is large and is not fit for the removal of a thorn, and is prohibited for handling, and delve into this.)

In the time of the Gemara, they would sit on mats, and therefore the remnants of mats that wore out, even though they are no longer fit to be sat upon—nevertheless, it is permitted to move them, because the status of a vessel has not been revoked from them, since they are still fit to cover some filth with them, and even if they do not have three by three [handbreadths], and they are like a vessel whose primary use is for a permitted purpose and are permitted even from the sun to the shade. And if he threw them into the trash while it was still day—it is forbidden to move them, as with all fragments of vessels that he threw into the trash. And it appears to me that now in our countries, where it is known that we do not use mats for sitting or for lying down and most of them are for merchandise, even the mats themselves are muktzeh like an object whose primary use is for a forbidden purpose, and they are not permitted except for the sake of their physical use or their place. And the remnants of mats in this time, we see that even without specification they are as if he threw them into the trash, and therefore it appears in my humble opinion that they are completely forbidden like pebbles and stones, unless he designated them while it was still day for some permitted use. And if he designated them for a forbidden use—its law is like a vessel whose primary use is for a forbidden purpose, which is permitted for the sake of its physical use or its place and not from the sun to the shade (so it appears in my humble opinion clear regarding the laws of a mat and its remnants).

Rags, which are the remnants of worn-out garments, if there is not in each of the pieces three fingerbreadths by three fingerbreadths, which is the minimum measure for tumah—it is forbidden to handle them, because they are not fit even for the poor, and they are nullified from the status of a vessel. And if they have three by three: if they belong to a poor person—they are permitted for handling for him and for all poor people, because they keep them to make a patch for their garments, and it is like the remnants of vessels that are fit for some use, and they are permitted for the sake of their physical use or their place. But for the wealthy—it is forbidden to handle them, unless there is in each of them three handbreadths by three handbreadths, for then they are significant even for the wealthy. And consequently, those of the wealthy that are less than this—are muktzeh even for the poor, since the homeowner set them aside, and if he threw them into the trash—in any case they are forbidden for handling. But a complete garment or a complete vessel that he threw into the trash—they are permitted for handling, for his intent is nullified against that of all people. And know, that the neighbor follows the homeowner in these details (the HaGr"z). And some say that all garments, even if there does not remain in them three by three—are permitted for handling, because they are fit to cover something repulsive with them, and these measures apply to ritual tallitot that wore out which are forbidden for a degrading use. And the primary view is like the first opinion, for such is the implication of the plain language of the Shas and the poskim (ibid.) that the fact that they are fit for such a degrading use—is not called by this the status of a vessel. And if he designated it while it was still day for some permitted use—it is permitted in any case, and it is simple.

The mold of the shoe which is called a "kapul" — its primary use is for a prohibited labor, and it is permitted for the sake of its use or its place. Therefore, a shoe, whether new or old, in which the mold is placed and tightened within it — it is permitted to remove it, whether he removes the mold from within the shoe or whether he removes the shoe from upon the mold, for this is for the sake of its place, which is that he needs the hollow of the shoe where it sits. And also for the sake of its use it is permitted, such as to cover a vessel with it or the like, according to the law of a vessel whose primary use is for a prohibited labor. Therefore, to bring it in for its own sake, such as if rain is falling upon it or if it is lying in the sun — it is forbidden to move it, unless it is his intention to use it for some permitted use, as I wrote in section 14 based on the Yerushalmi, see there; and so too regarding all whose primary use is for a prohibited labor, the law is such.

And our sandals, even those that have straps and the straps were broken—it is permitted to move them, because they are fit to be worn even without the straps, and the status of a vessel remains upon them in any case. And it seems to me that our shoes and sandals, even if they are torn above or below or from the sides, if they are only fit to be worn in some manner—they are permitted to be moved. However, if the majority of the shoe is torn in a manner that a person would be ashamed to go out in it—its law is like the shards of vessels that are not fit for use at all, and their law is like pebbles and stones which are completely muktzeh, and they are forbidden even for the sake of their own use or their place (it seems to me). And regarding them, the measure of three by three does not apply, for that is only regarding garments which are soft, and likewise stockings and trousers and all types of clothing. But shoes and sandals which are hard, and also are not fit to cover the opening of a vessel because of their filth—they are forbidden to be moved. (And that which the Magen Avraham questioned in subsection 21 from a spiked sandal, where it says there to cover the opening of a vessel, see there, it is not a difficulty, for there even with a new one where there is no filth it is forbidden, and that which he wrote that it is fit for another use, are they not hard?)

However, the sandals that existed in the days of the sages of the Shas have a different law, because they had a different form, for without straps it was impossible to wear them, and they had two straps sewn to their two sides, one on the outer side and one on the side between the legs, and they would wrap one over the other and walk in them. And if both straps were severed—it is nullified from the status of a vessel, and it is like shards of vessels that are fit for nothing. And even if one of them was severed, if the one between the legs was severed—it is permitted because it is possible to repair it and wear it, but if the one on the outer side was severed—it is forbidden to be moved, for if they repair it, it will be visible to all and it is a disgrace and they will mock him, and therefore it is nullified from the status of a vessel.

But how is it possible to repair it on Shabbat? Thus the sages said: that if it snapped while he was walking in a karmelit—it is permitted for him to take moist papyrus suitable for animal fodder, which is permitted for handling, and wrap it around the sandal and tie it so that it does not fall from his foot. But with a string or a cord—it is forbidden to tie or wrap, for we fear perhaps he will leave them there forever, and it will be found that he made a permanent knot. But the papyrus he will untie after Shabbat, for it is not the way to walk thus. And even with moist papyrus they only permitted it in a karmelit, where it is impossible to hide the sandal there lest they steal it, and to handle it from a karmelit to a courtyard is forbidden. But when it snapped in a courtyard or in a place where handling is permitted and he can hide it—even with papyrus it is forbidden; rather, he should hide it. And it seems to me that if he does not have another sandal or another shoe—it is permitted to tie it with papyrus, and only in a public domain is it impossible to do so even if the papyrus is within his four cubits, for we fear perhaps he will carry it out beyond his four cubits, but in a rabbinic karmelit—we do not fear (it seems to me). And to tie with a slipknot—it is permitted even with a string or a cord.

A shirt that was laundered and hung to dry by means of a reed, where they placed the reed inside the shirt and hung it on it on Erev Shabbat, and the reed was not designated for this purpose and even now they did not designate it for this, and it remains in its state of muktzeh as before—for had they designated it for this, the status of a kelli would have been conferred upon it—and now that they did not designate it, how may they remove the shirt from it? They should slip the shirt off the reed, for in such a case one does not move the reed. However, it is forbidden to remove the reed from the shirt. And it is not similar to the mold of a shoe in section 31, for the mold has the status of a kelli upon it, but its work is for a forbidden purpose, and it is permitted for the sake of its place; this is not so regarding the reed, which is absolute muktzeh that is not a kelli, and it is forbidden even for the sake of its place. Therefore, if they inserted a kelli into it, even a kelli whose work is for a forbidden purpose, one may remove the kelli from within it as with the mold of a shoe.

A kira that has had one of its legs detached—that is, its supports which are made like legs—it is forbidden to move it for the sake of its use or its place. And even though a utensil whose primary function is for a forbidden act is permitted for its use or its place, and in this case where one of its legs was detached the status of a utensil was not nullified from it, nevertheless it is forbidden for another reason: a decree lest he hammer it in (Gemara 138b), meaning, lest he return the leg to it and hammer it in strongly, and become liable for the category of building. And even though there is no building regarding utensils, nevertheless, complete building is forbidden, as I wrote in siman 313, and furthermore, it is at least forbidden by rabbinic law. And this is not like a decree upon a decree, for regarding a matter that is close to being done we decree, and furthermore, there is in this the concern of striking with a hammer, which is the completion of the labor.

Therefore, a long bench from which one of its legs was detached on Shabbat, or even before Shabbat, and certainly if two of its legs were detached—it is forbidden to move it and place it on another bench to sit on it, unless he sat on it in this manner once before Shabbat without reinserting the leg, for then there is no concern that he might change his mind and reinsert it to fix it firmly on Shabbat. But when he did not sit—it is not effective. And even though regarding the matter of muktzeh even thought is effective, as will be explained regarding palm branches, here where we decree lest he change his mind and reinsert it—as long as he has not sat, we are concerned. And to reinsert the leg into it on Shabbat—it is forbidden even loosely, a decree lest he fix it firmly, unless it is its way to always be loose, for then it is permitted to reinsert it as I wrote in siman 313. And all this is when it was detached, but if one or two legs broke, meaning that a bit of the leg remained inside the hole, such that it is impossible to reinsert the leg as is understood—it is permitted to take the bench and place it on another bench and sit on it, even if he did not sit on it before Shabbat, for here there is no concern that he might reinsert it, since its one end remains in the hole (Taz, subsection 14). And even on Shabbat he may do so, for the status of a vessel has not been nullified from it, and it is permitted in moving. And likewise, if it has been several days since the leg was lost and he must necessarily make another leg—even in the case of being detached there is room to permit (ibid.), for in such cases there is no concern that he will fix it firmly.

It is stated in the Gemara (124b): That bricks remaining from a building are permitted for handling, because those that remain are for sitting upon and they become like vessels, for it is not the way to designate the remaining ones for building. Nevertheless, if he gathered them and arranged them one upon the other, he has revealed his intent that he designated them for building and they are forbidden for handling, for they do not have the status of vessels. And it appears to me that this was in their days, when it was their way to sit upon them, but now they are complete muktzeh in every case, for it is not our way at all to sit upon them, and also the remaining ones are generally standing for building, or for the making of ovens which are like building. And so it appears to me conversely regarding what the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote in section 19, and this is their wording: "A ladder of an upper story which is large and made for plastering a roof—it is forbidden to handle it. But that of a dovecote—it is permitted to incline it from place to place, but he shall not carry it from dovecote to dovecote, so that he does not act in the manner he acts during the weekday and come to hunt." Thus far their words. And behold, that of a dovecote does not exist among us at all, and also a ladder of an upper story which is forbidden to handle, even though it is certainly a vessel like all vessels, and even if we say it is called "its labor is for prohibition"—nevertheless it should be permitted for the need of its essence or its place. And it must be said that since it is made for plastering the roof, it is like the building itself and like the doors of the house (Magen Avraham, subsection 38). And according to this, our ladders which are not made for plastering the roof are vessels and it is permitted to handle them for the need of their essence or their place, and it seems that such is also the custom.

A thorn that is lying in the reshut harabim, and there is concern that many may be injured by it—it is permitted to carry it less than four amot at a time until he removes it to the sides of the reshut harabim, and through a non-Jew it is permitted to bring it even into a courtyard. And even though there is also a prohibition of muktzeh in this—nevertheless, in a place of public injury they did not decree. And if the thorn is in a karmelit, and as in our streets which are not a reshut harabim—he may carry it in his usual manner even a great distance in one lifting, for in a place of public injury they did not decree on a rabbinic shevut, and one may not learn from a thorn to other matters (see Magen Avraham subsection 37).

Regarding a matter of muktzeh that one wishes to use on Shabbat for a permitted purpose, such as stones or wood for sitting, there is a dispute in the Gemara (50a) regarding what preparation is required for this: One said that we require specifically an actual physical act, such as tree branches called hariyot that one wishes to prepare for sitting, he must tie the branches while it is still day. And one said that even thought is sufficient, meaning that he should think while it is still day to sit on them tomorrow. And one said that even this is not required when he sat on them while it was still day, even without an act and without thought. The Rif and the Rambam in chapter 25, law 21, ruled that sitting alone is sufficient, and so ruled Rav Shimon HaZaken in the Tosafot there, and certainly thought is effective, except that it is the opinion of the Ramban that sitting is superior to thought, and thought is not effective (see Beit Yosef). And the opinion of Rabbeinu Tam in the Tosafot there is that we require specifically an act, but such is not the opinion of most of the poskim, and also Rav Hai Gaon holds that sitting slightly while it is still day is sufficient. This is also the opinion of the Rosh and the Ran as written in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch, section 2: Hariyot of a palm tree, meaning branches that one cut for burning—they are muktzeh and it is forbidden to move them. If he sat on them slightly while it was still day—it is permitted to sit on them on Shabbat, and certainly if he thought about them while it was still day to sit on them even on a weekday, or if he tied them to sit on them. Thus far his words. (This is the wording of the Tur, and the Beit Yosef prioritized tying over thought, and this is his wording: "and certainly if he tied them or thought," see there, and there is no practical difference except that the wording of the Tur is more precise, and examine this.)

However, in the words of the Rambam there, there is room for investigation regarding this, and this is his wording: "A layer of stones that one thought about while it was still day: if he arranged them—it is permitted to sit on them the next day, and if not—it is prohibited. Palm branches that one cut for wood and reconsidered regarding them on the eve of Shabbat for sitting—it is permitted to move them, and likewise if he sat on them while it was still day—it is permitted to move them." Thus far his words. And since regarding palm branches he ruled like all the poskim that thought or even sitting while it is still day is sufficient, if so, why regarding a layer of stones did he rule that it requires thought and an action. The Maggid Mishneh answered that palm branches, because there are those that stand for sitting and there are those that stand for wood, were only prohibited because of his thought that he cut them for wood, and therefore thought for sitting is sufficient as it removes it from his first thought. But a layer of stones, there are none that stand for sitting, and because of this it requires an action; see there. And based on this, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 21: "But a layer of stones, even though he thought about them while it was still day—it is prohibited to sit on them unless he arranged them, the explanation being: he ordered them." Thus far his words. And according to this, regarding our wood, an action is required (Magen Avraham, subsection 40).

But these matters are very puzzling, for besides this being against the opinion of the Rif and many of the poskim, how is it possible to say so? For if so, why did he further require in a course of stones thought in addition to the action? Furthermore, regarding palm branches, he ruled that even sitting alone is sufficient; why then did he not mention this regarding a course of stones at all? And truly, in my humble opinion, this is not the intention of the Rambam at all, and regarding a course of stones as well, a bit of sitting while it is still day is sufficient, but the matter is understood that we require the object to be fit for sitting, for if it is not fit, what use is the sitting or even the thought, as is understood. And a course of stones, if they are arranged at a great height—behold they are not fit for sitting, and perforce one must arrange them in a manner that they will be fit for sitting. And this is what he says, that here, not only is sitting upon them of no use, but even thought is of no use since they are not fit until he arranges them, and automatically, once he has arranged them, nothing more is needed. And according to this, the Rambam says as follows: that regarding an object that is not fit for what he desires—it is necessary to perform some action, but an object that is fit, such as palm branches—thought and even sitting while it is still day is effective. And according to this, that which our teacher, the Rema, wrote: "And some say that the law of stones is like the law of palm branches, and such is the primary view," thus far his words, and this is the opinion of the Rif and the Mordechai, and in my humble opinion there is no dispute here at all, for if they are merely fit for sitting—even the Rambam agrees, and when they are not fit—it is necessary to make them fit, and automatically this is their action and nothing else is needed. And in my opinion, it is an explicit Mishnah in the chapter Kol HaKeilim (Shabbat 125a): "The stone in a gourd: if they fill with it and it does not fall—they may fill with it, and if not—they may not fill with it," and Rashi explained: that it is a hollow gourd that they fill with water, and because it is light it floats, and they place a stone in it to weigh it down, see there. And it is difficult for the one who holds that thought is effective, for here he certainly thought to fill with it, and why may they not fill with it when it is not tied? Rather, it is certainly because if it falls, it is automatically not fit for drawing water and thought is not effective, and it is necessary to perform some action so that it will be fit for drawing water.

And one should not ask why we learned in a Mishnah (142b): "A stone that is upon the mouth of a jar—one tilts it on its side and it falls," and they said in the Gemara: "They only taught this in the case of one who forgets, but in the case of one who intentionally places it, it becomes a basis for a forbidden object," and the Rif and the Rambam ruled accordingly, and so ruled the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch in siman 309; for since they ruled that it suffices if he sat upon it while it was yet day, if so, here too it should suffice with the placement that he placed the stone while it was yet day. However, the Ran, of blessed memory, already raised this difficulty there and answered: that specifically regarding palm branches does this help, because it is their way to be sat upon, but a stone, which is not its way to be placed upon the mouth of a jar to seal it—placement while it is yet day does not help, see there; and this is like the reasoning of the Maggid Mishneh that we brought.

However, the Rashba, of blessed memory, explained it in another manner (the Ran cited him in chapter 4), for the Rashba does not hold of this reasoning, and to him everything is equal according to our reasoning. For they asked him: One who designates a stone to crack nuts with it, is it permitted to move it? And he replied that it is permitted, but we require that he designate it forever for this use. But if he designated it only for this Shabbat—it is not effective and requires an action, and this is the reason regarding the stone upon the mouth of the barrel, for by placing it, it becomes a base for a forbidden object because he did not designate it forever, see there. Behold, the Rashba does not hold of the distinction of the Ran and the Maggid Mishneh that we require an object that stands for this or that its way is such, and the Ran, of blessed memory, there also rejected his words and holds that even for one Shabbat designation is effective, rather there it is because its way is not such, as I have written. (And with this it settles well on page 125b regarding the dispute of Rabbi Ami and Rabbi Assi and that which the Gemara said: "And they follow their own reasoning," and the Tosafot there wondered about this, see there; however, according to the words of the Rashba and the Ran, a stone placed upon the mouth of a barrel is different, and therefore in this Rabbi Ami is stringent and the halakha is like him, and examine this carefully.)

In my humble opinion, the view of the Rambam is a third view, as I have written, for he does not distinguish between one thing and another like the view of the Rashba, nor do we find in his words that we require designation forever. According to him, the matter depends on this: if the object is fit for use as it is—then thought is sufficient, and even a mere sitting is enough. And that which is not sufficient regarding a stone upon the mouth of a barrel by placement, is because it is also understood intuitively that to seal a barrel with a stone requires some preparation, and without this it does not sit well. Therefore, he holds that by placing it, it becomes a base for a forbidden object, as we explained regarding a layer of stones. (And for this reason the Gemara there compares the case of a stone upon the mouth of a barrel to the case of a layer of stones, but Rabbi Assi holds that a stone is more lenient than a layer of stones, for a layer of stones without some preparation is not fit at all, but a stone upon the mouth of a barrel—it rests however it is. And Rabbi Ammi holds that they are similar to one another. Therefore, they ruled like Rabbi Ammi in this because Rav also holds accordingly in the chapter "Notel," see there. And even though there is no proof from Rav, for he follows his own reasoning in the chapter "Bameh Tomnin" (Shabbat 50a) that even with palm branches one requires an action, nevertheless, at any rate regarding this case of a stone upon the mouth of a barrel—Rabbi Assi is a solitary view against them, and delve into this.)

This is the wording of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 22: "It is forbidden to cover the mouth of a barrel with a stone or a piece of wood, or to close a door with them, or to strike a faucet with them; even if he designated it while it was yet day—it is forbidden, unless he designated it for this purpose permanently. However, if he designated it for this Shabbat alone—no. And these words apply to something that is not typically designated for such use, such as those we mentioned; but for any object whose typical use is such, for example, to crack nuts with it—designation for one Shabbat is sufficient. And there is one who says that it makes no difference, and there are those who say that he must perform some act of preparation upon it while it is yet day." Thus far his words. And behold, the first opinion is the view of the Ran, and the second is the view of the Rashba that for everything one requires permanent designation, and the third is the view of the Mordechai, that for a stone one requires some act (see Beit Yosef). And according to what I wrote regarding the view of the Rambam, it depends: if the object is merely fit—a bit of use while it is yet day is permitted, and all the more so if he thought about it while it was yet day. And it appears that since muktzeh is rabbinic—one may rely on the lenient view. And the view of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, appears to have taken the view of the Ran, which is the first opinion, as the primary one; and above in siman 257 regarding insulation, it implies that we do not require permanent designation, and regarding insulation an act of preparation is not applicable to the stones (Magen Avraham, subsection 44). And likewise it is a simple matter that to sit on a heavy stone that does not move from its place when one sits on it—nothing is required, for muktzeh was not forbidden for touching, only for moving; therefore, one is able to sit on a stone or a large beam even though they are muktzeh (ibid., subsection 41). And likewise to sit on grass—it is permitted, since they are attached to the ground, and when he moves them by his sitting on them this is not considered moving, for behold they are attached to the ground and there is no moving here. And even if perhaps through his sitting on them some of them will be uprooted—it is an unintended act and it is not a psik reisha, and the proof for this is from what will be explained in siman 336 that it is permitted to walk upon them, see there.

It is permitted to cut a branch from a palm tree while it is still day and designate it for a permitted purpose on Shabbat, such as to wave over the table to drive away flies or to remove crumbs from the table, or to intimidate a child or to play with it, and then it is permitted to handle it on Shabbat. And it seems to me that if one designates it at the time he cuts it—then according to all opinions there is no need for permanent designation, for there is an action here, and similarly when one takes a branch from a broom called a "besom." However, if at the time of the action he did not think of anything—he subsequently needs permanent designation, according to the opinion that requires permanent designation as has been explained in the previous section, and when he designates it for these things it is called a complete kelli. But on Shabbat—it is forbidden to have it detached by a non-Jew (Taz, subsection 17), and even if he detached it on his own—it is forbidden to handle, for it is muktzeh, as designation is not effective on Shabbat. And even if the non-Jew detached it on the eve of Shabbat, if the Israelite did not know of this until Shabbat—it is muktzeh. And there is room to doubt whether the designation of a non-Jew is effective, and similarly regarding any matter of muktzeh whether his designation is effective. And it seems that it is not effective, since for the Israelite it was muktzeh during bein hashemashot due to his lack of knowledge of it—it is set aside for the entire day.

Combed flax and carded wool that one places on a wound, if he intended for them from before the day to place them on the wound, or if he placed them on the wound for one hour from before the day, or if he colored them with oil, which reveals his intent that they are designated for the wound, or if he tied them with a string to place them on the wound on Shabbat, for in these cases there is intent or action or usage from before the day—if so, there is no issue of muktzeh regarding this. And regarding healing there is also no issue, as it is only like a garment so that his clothes do not scratch against the wound. And some say that intent alone is not sufficient, and it requires further study, for regarding moving them, according to everyone, intent is sufficient. (See Magen Avraham subsection 46 who raised this difficulty, and see Tosefet Shabbat subsection 69 who settles the words of the Beit Yosef, and there is no practical difference in the law as the primary view is like the first opinion, as is proven from the Beit Yosef section 24 who wrote it in the name of "some say")

Dry skins, whether belonging to a craftsman or belonging to a homeowner—it is permitted to move them, for they are fit for sitting. But moist ones—they are not fit for sitting and are forbidden to be moved. And some say that the skins of large livestock, whether moist or dry—are permitted to be moved, but those of small livestock—are forbidden, as they are not so fit to sit upon, unless he designated them while it was yet day to sit upon them. And it appears to me that this was in the time of the Gemara, when they would sit on the ground and were accustomed to sit on skins spread on the ground. But nowadays—all types of skins are muktzeh, for we are not accustomed at all to sit on skins, unless he designated them while it was yet day for spreading or for lying upon, and their law is like vessels whose primary function is for a forbidden use, which are permitted for the sake of the object itself or its place but not from the sun to the shade, for certainly the status of a vessel applies to this.

Planks of a homeowner—they are permitted for handling, as one is not fastidious about them regarding using them, but those of a craftsman—it is prohibited, as he is fastidious about them, and it is not permitted unless he designated them while it was still day to place bread upon them for guests or for another use. And planks of merchants and shopkeepers—they are also like those of a craftsman, for since they place merchandise upon them, they are certainly fastidious. Nevertheless, it appears that their law is like a vessel whose primary function is for a prohibited use, which are permitted for the sake of their use or their place. (And in our times, planks of a homeowner are not common, but those of craftsmen exist also among us.)

Bones that are fit for dogs, even if they were separated from the meat on Shabbat—it is permitted to remove them with his hands from the table, for they are not muktzeh since they are fit for dogs. And even though during the day they were prepared for man and not for dogs—we hold like Rabbi Shimon who reasons: "Prepared for man is considered prepared for dogs." And if it is because of nolad, we hold that nolad is permitted on Shabbat, as I wrote in section 6. And indeed, according to the one who reasons that nolad is forbidden—they are forbidden to be moved, but we hold that nolad is permitted, according to the opinion of most of the poskim. And so too shells that are fit for animal fodder, even if they were peeled on Shabbat, and so too crumbs that do not have the size of a kezayit, for their default status is that they stand for animal fodder—and it is permitted to remove them from the table. But hard bones that are not fit for dogs, and shells that are not fit for animal fodder like the shells of walnuts and almonds and eggs and the like—it is forbidden to move them, rather he shakes the entire table and shakes them to a corner or outside. And the table does not become a base for a forbidden object, for they only said this when the muktzeh was upon it during twilight and not in the middle of Shabbat, for there is no muktzeh for half of Shabbat, and furthermore, for he did not intend to leave them there all day, and furthermore, for it is a base for the forbidden and for the permitted, since bread was also on the table. And furthermore, for this is not intentional placement, since he does not care where they fall, and their law is like one who forgot, which does not become a base (see Magen Avraham subsection 50). And if he wished—he throws them with his tongue behind him, meaning that at the time of his eating he throws the shells with his tongue, and it is better behind him than before him, for why should he cast shells before him and make the place repulsive, and see in section 55.

And nevertheless, this is not like a graf shel re'i which is permitted to be moved by hand, for this is not so repulsive. And one should not ask that if so, how is it permitted to shake the table-top, for is this not movement from the side for the sake of a forbidden object, which is prohibited as written in siman 311? For it can be said that this is better than movement from the side. Furthermore, since it is somewhat repulsive, granted that it is not exactly like a graf shel re'i which is permitted to be moved directly, nevertheless, movement in this manner is certainly permitted. And if there is bread on the table—it is permitted to lift the entire table-top and move it with the shells, because they are nullified to the bread. And therefore, even though it will be explained in siman 309 that regarding a base for both a forbidden and a permitted object they did not permit direct movement when one can shake it off, see there, nevertheless here they permitted it because they are nullified to the bread. But if there is no bread there—they did not permit placing a loaf next to them and moving it directly as they did with a corpse, and some say that here too it is permitted, and the main view is like the first opinion (see Magen Avraham, subsection 51). And if he needed the place of the table, even if there is no bread upon it but only bones and shells that are not fit for dogs or livestock—it is permitted to lift the table and move them, for since the table did not become a base for them for the reasons that have been explained, he is moving a permitted object, and the forbidden object is moved on its own. And only in a place where shaking it off is sufficient for him did they not permit him to move it directly, but not when it is impossible for him in another way.

Bundles of straw and bundles of soft wood that are fit for an animal: if he designated them for animal fodder, it is permitted to move them even if they are very large. But if he did not designate them, they are muktzeh, because their standard use is for fuel. Therefore, in our lands where straw is not used for fuel but rather for animal fodder or to lie upon, it is permitted to move it. And there are places where they are used to cover roofs, and they are forbidden to be moved like stones and pebbles, for they have no status of a vessel at all, and everything is according to the place. And dried grass which is called "hay"—it is used for animal fodder and is permitted to be moved.

Any item that is fit for the consumption of a species of beast or bird that is common—it is permitted to handle it. And even if it is not fit for the species of beast or bird that are the majority, such as the squill which is only fit for deer and mustard which is only fit for pigeons—it is permitted to handle them in a place where deer and pigeons are common, that is, in a place where it is the way of ordinary people to raise them and they are accustomed to this, and it is not sufficient that they are common only among the ministers. And an item that is only fit for a beast or bird that is not common in that city, if he has some of that species of beast or bird—it is permitted to handle the food fit for them, and if not—it is forbidden. Therefore, it is forbidden to handle bones in a place where dogs are not common, such as if he is spending the Shabbat in a field or in an inn that has no dog, whether they were separated from the meat on the eve of Shabbat or whether they were separated on Shabbat. And this is regarding soft bones, but hard ones—it is forbidden in every place, and they are absolute muktzeh like stones and pebbles.

Date pits, in places where it is the practice to feed them to animals—it is permitted to move them. Nevertheless, a distinguished person should be stringent upon himself not to move them except by way of a change, such as placing near them a piece of bread or another item permitted to be moved and moving them together, because in many places they do not feed them to animals at all; therefore, he should be stringent regarding them even in a place where they do feed them. And all peels and pits that are not fit for an animal—one eats the food and throws them with his tongue behind him. He should not throw them with his hands, nor should he throw them with his tongue in front of him and rely on his intention that when many of them gather before him it will be in his eyes like a graf shel rei and it will be permitted to remove them by hand, because it is forbidden to create a graf shel rei initially, and also not with all things is it possible to consider them like a graf shel rei.

The Rambam wrote in chapter 26, law 17: One may not handle glass shards even though they are food for ostriches, and this is the bat haya'anah, nor bundles of branches even though they are food for elephants, nor luff even though they are food for ravens, because these and their like are not common among most people. Thus far his words. Therefore, one who possesses them—it is permitted to handle what is fit for them as we have written, such as when one raises them for work or for beauty. However, it is forbidden to raise them in order to kill them and sell the meat, for it is forbidden to engage in commerce with a thing that is forbidden to eat, as we have written in Yoreh Deah siman 117.

He further wrote there: "One may handle tainted meat, meaning it is putrid, because it is food for a wild beast. And one may handle raw meat, whether unsalted or salted, because it is fit for a person, and likewise salted fish. But the unsalted [fish]—it is forbidden to handle it." Thus far his words. And in our places where wild beasts are not common—it is forbidden to handle tainted meat, but the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, section 31, wrote: because it is fit for dogs, and dogs are common everywhere and it is permitted to handle it, and the Rambam adopted the language of the Gemara (128b); see there. And regarding the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, it can be said that in the time of the Gemara wild beasts were common, therefore it says: because it is food for a wild beast, and in the time of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch they were not common, therefore they wrote for dogs (ibid. 150), but the language of the Gemara does not imply so; see there. However, the Tosafot there explained that "tainted" is not putrid but rather it is unsalted meat, and so it is in the commentary of Rashi in the Rif; see there and it requires further study (and see the Derisha).

And also regarding what he wrote concerning raw, unsalted meat, that it is because it is fit for a person, and so wrote our teacher, the Beit Yosef, there is wonderment, for in the Gemara there they said that this is only regarding a wild goose and not regarding other meat; see there. Therefore, in truth, the Tur wrote regarding unsalted meat that it is because it is fit for dogs; see there. And even though it is designated for a person, it has already been explained that we hold like Rabbi Shimon, that what is prepared for a person is prepared for dogs. However, there is one who says that this is when he wants to give it to dogs, such as if it died, but raw meat he will surely not give to dogs, and if so, even according to Rabbi Shimon it is muktzeh (Taz, subsection 20). And I do not see a necessity in this, for do we force him to give it to dogs? Since it is merely fit for dogs—it is not muktzeh. And I saw that they brought other versions in the Gemara regarding this matter (Eliyah Rabbah, subsection 69, and see Derishah), and if so, it is impossible for us to stand upon the clarification of their intention. However, as for the law for us, all raw meat is muktzeh, for we do not eat raw meat at all, even a wild goose, and also to dogs they will not give it, as they take pity on it, and this reasoning was written by the Ba'al HaMaor and the Rosh (see Magen Avraham, subsection 56). And a raw egg that was laid yesterday, it seems to me that it is not muktzeh, for many people drink them raw. And cold raw fat—likewise, we do not eat it and it is muktzeh (ibid.), and a non-Jew who slaughtered an animal on Shabbat—it is permitted in handling (ibid.), and furthermore, he does not remove anything from his mind.

A kamin, even though one may not go out with it even to a karmelit (ibid. subsection 57), nevertheless it is not muktzeh and is permitted to be handled. And the reason appears to be that in a house or a courtyard, if one wishes to carry it, who would protest against him? And there is one who permits even to a karmelit (ibid. in the name of the Rashal). And even according to the one who forbids (ibid.), nevertheless in a courtyard and in a house it is permitted, and we do not decree lest he go out into the public domain, for we do not decree this regarding something that is held for healing; and in any event, it is far from being muktzeh. And it is obvious that all types of medicines are permitted for a healthy person to handle when he needs to give them to a sick person.

Any filthy matter, such as excrement, vomit, and feces, whether of a human or of chickens and the like, and similarly of beasts and of dogs and pigs, and similarly a dead mouse and a dead weasel and even a dead chicken and similarly all types of carcasses; however, the feces of horses appear not to be foul-smelling and are not considered like a vessel of excrement, though it is possible that a sensitive person would be repulsed by this as well—all of these, if they are lying in a house or in a courtyard in a place that is used constantly, it is permitted to remove them by hand to a refuse heap or to a latrine. And it is obvious that if one can do so by means of a non-Jew, he should do so by his means, and similarly it is better by means of a minor than by means of an adult. And the reason it was permitted to remove it by hand is that human dignity is great. And similarly, if they are in an alleyway in a place where people walk, he may move it to the sides; but if they are lying in a courtyard in a place that he does not use, and certainly if it is lying in a refuse heap in the courtyard or in another courtyard, it is forbidden to handle. And similarly in the latrine itself, if the place where one must sit is not clean and it is impossible to sit there, it is permitted to clean the place (ibid. subsection 59). And if the place is not a place where people sit, but rather he is afraid for the child lest he become soiled, to clear it by hand is forbidden, unless it is by means of a non-Jew; however, he may overturn a vessel upon it.

There is reason to be in doubt regarding a graf shel rei when it was present from the eve of Shabbat and he was able to clean it while it was still day, as he knew he would need to sit there on Shabbat, whether if he did not clean it while it was still day it is permitted to clean it on Shabbat. And in the Gemara (121b) it implies explicitly that specifically when it is found on Shabbat, see there. And so it stands to reason, for since he was able to do it while it was still day—we should not permit it to him on Shabbat unless it is by means of a non-Jew (and from what will be explained in section 63 it does not imply so, and it requires further study).

And even though it was permitted to remove a graf shel rei, which is the vessel that contains the repulsive matter, and likewise a chamber pot of urine, nevertheless, to return the vessel to the house was not permitted, for it is muktzeh since it is not fit for use, unless one placed water into them, and the water is fit for the drinking of an animal. And this is if, when he poured out the excrement or the urine, he placed the vessel on the ground; but if he is still holding it in his hand, it is permitted to move it and place it in the location designated for it, according to the law of all muktzeh, that if one is merely holding it in his hand, it is permitted to move it to another location, as I wrote in section 18. And likewise, if the vessel is a functional vessel for pouring wastewater into it, it is also permitted to be moved, and it is a daily occurrence that they pour out the wastewater and return the vessel to its place to pour more into it. And likewise, if it is needed for an infant for his needs, it is permitted in any case to move it, for anything that is for the need of a person who requires it is permitted to be moved.

One may not create a graf shel rei’i ab initio, which is to say, to bring something that is destined to become repulsive so that afterwards he will be forced to remove it; and why should we cause the moving of muktzeh for no reason in a place where there is no necessity. Nevertheless, if he transgressed and did so—it is permitted to remove it. And so too in a place of damage—it is permitted to create a graf shel rei’i ab initio in order to save from damage, like the incident brought in the Gemara (Beitzah 36b) where rain was falling in the mill-house and the millstones were being ruined, and they permitted him to bring his bed in there and establish his residence there, and it would be permitted to remove the millstones from there, and so too anything similar to this. And specifically to make a permanent residence there, but for a temporary residence—it was not permitted (see Magen Avraham subsection 62 who wrote: the phrasing "in order to remove it" is not precise, and I do not know why, for such is also the wording of the Tur and the Beit Yosef, see there, and so it is necessitated, and examine this closely).

A person may bring in a basket full of earth while it is still day and do with it all his needs on Shabbat, and it is not muktzeh since he designated it while it was still day. And even according to the one who requires an action, he does not require it here, for earth is not fit for an action; and all the more so for us, as we hold that an action is not required, as I wrote in section 40. However, we require that he designate a corner for the earth where it shall be placed, and from there they shall take it for what is needed, for if he did not designate a place for it, it is nullified to the ground and it is forbidden to move it. And for this reason, it is also not effective if he says on the eve of Shabbat: "I hereby prepare all the earth found in the courtyard for my use," and even if in another matter it would be effective, in this sort of case it is not effective, because it is nullified to the ground. And it appears to me that in a house that has a floor—one does not need a corner, for there nullification to the ground is not applicable, as it is not resting on the ground. And those who heap sand in one place and hide produce in it, such as radishes and the like—it is permitted to take them on Shabbat, for the sand was designated for this and is not muktzeh, and see siman 498 section 31.

It has already been explained that the muktzeh of living creatures is the most stringent muktzeh, for even Rabbi Shimon admits to it, and therefore it is forbidden to move any domestic animal, wild beast, or bird. And there are women who do not know of this and hold a hen on Shabbat, and they must be informed that this is a great prohibition. Nevertheless, it is permitted to overturn a basket before chicks so that they may ascend and descend. And we do not say, how can we move a vessel for the sake of a muktzeh item, for we hold: "A vessel may be moved even for the sake of an item that may not be moved on Shabbat" (43a, see there). And while they are upon it—it is forbidden to move it, and if they were upon it during twilight, "since it was set aside during twilight, it is set aside for the entire day." But in the middle of Shabbat it is permitted to move it when they descend, for there is no muktzeh for half a Shabbat. And one should not say, since while they are upon it it is forbidden to move it, how is it permitted to overturn the basket before them, for is he not nullifying a vessel from its prepared state? For it can be said that since it is their way to descend—this is not a nullification of a vessel from its prepared state, and furthermore, it is within his power to make them fly off by means of a sound (Tosafot ibid.).

Any animal, beast, or bird, except for a hen, one may assist them in walking in a courtyard; that is, one holds them by their neck and their sides and leads them if they need this for the sake of preventing suffering to living creatures, for if not so, even in such a manner it would be forbidden. But in a public domain—they did not permit it, for we decree lest he lift them and become liable, as regarding an animal we do not say "a living being carries itself," as was written in siman 301, but in a courtyard they were not concerned about this regarding the prohibition of muktzeh. And it appears that the same law applies in a karmelit, it is permitted, provided that he is careful that they do not lift their legs from the ground, for behold they are muktzeh and forbidden to be moved, except for a hen, which it is forbidden to assist in walking because by its nature it lifts itself from the ground and it turns out that he is moving it. And the Rambam wrote regarding the reason: "Because it slips from the hand and it turns out its wings are plucked" (end of chapter 26). And it appears to me that he was forced to this, for if we say that it lifts itself, behold it is included in the rule that "a living being carries itself." Rather, it is certainly for another reason, and he considers it a psik reisha, for if not so there is no prohibition in the matter, but one may push it with his hands until it enters (see Magen Avraham section 169 who wondered about the Rambam, and according to what I wrote it works out well).

A woman may lead her son even in the reshut ha-rabim, and this is when he lifts one foot and places one foot, for in such a case even if she should lift him—a living being carries itself. Provided that he is not so small that he drags his feet, for in such a case we do not say "a living being carries itself," and there is a liability of a chatat in this if she lifts him. Therefore, if he is bound or ill, even if he is large—it is forbidden, and even in a karmelit it is forbidden to drag him, for this is like actual carrying. But when he lifts his one foot and places one foot and he is healthy and not bound—it is permitted, for when he leans on her, one foot is always on the ground, and only his other foot is lifted above the ground, and he relies on his mother. (And the Me'or holds that even when lifting one foot one is liable if he carries him and he does not carry himself, but nevertheless because of the distress of the infant they did not decree lest she lift him, and according to this even in dragging it is permitted, since they have one law, and behold it is not so and it requires great study, and his words are at the beginning of the chapter "Notel" and were cited in the Magen Avraham subsection 71. And what the Magen Avraham wrote regarding the law of a bag hanging on the neck of an infant, we have already explained this in siman 301, for there all the laws of hotza'ah were explained.)

And it has already been explained that muktzeh is permitted for touching but not for moving, and it has likewise been explained that by blowing it is permitted to move it if it is light such that it moves by way of blowing, and likewise with one's foot or in an unusual manner it is permitted. However, it appears that all this is for some need, but for no need at all - why should one do so.

It is stated in the Gemara (124b): The cover of a barrel that was broken—it and its fragments may be moved on Shabbat, when they are fit for covering a vessel (Rashi). And one may not trim (cut) a fragment from it to cover a vessel with it or to support the legs of a bed with it. Rashi explained: One may not repair it by removing its protrusions and its points on Shabbat, for he makes a vessel and it is "striking with a hammer." Thus far his words. However, the Rambam in chapter 26, law 3, wrote: "The cover of a barrel that was broken, it and its fragments—it is permitted to move them, but if he threw it to the refuse heap while it was still day—it is forbidden to move it. A vessel that was cracked, one may not detach a shard from it to cover with it or to support with it." Thus far his words. And he does not explain like Rashi that it is because of repairing the protrusions and points, but rather this is the explanation: when did they permit the fragments—when they were already detached from the vessel. But when they are not yet detached, even though they were so cracked that they are ready to separate—nevertheless, it is forbidden to detach it by hand. (And such is the explanation in the Shulchan Aruch, section 44, see there, and he did not bring the explanation of Rashi, because according to the Rambam it is forbidden even without this, and examine this closely.)

The balls that are played with are muktzeh, for they are not fit for any use. And even to cover vessels with them they are not fit, because they are soiled with mud and dust that adheres to them during play, and consequently it is forbidden to play with balls on Shabbat. And some say that since they are fit for play, and in the playing there is no prohibition for those who find pleasure in this—therefore they are permitted for handling and one may play with them. And there are those who permit only on Yom Tov and not on Shabbat, but it is not the primary view (Magen Avraham, subsection 73), and such is the custom to be lenient. However, in the Yerushalmi, chapter 4 of Taanit (halacha 5): a certain city was destroyed because they would play with a ball on Shabbat, and so it is in the Midrash Eichah on the verse: "The Lord has swallowed up and has not pitied," see there.

Silk worms are carried under the armpits, and there they are warmed and give birth, and consequently on Shabbat it is forbidden to carry them due to two things: because it is a burden, and furthermore because he brings forth life on Shabbat, and for this reason it is also forbidden on Yom Tov. And there are those who forbid moving a garment of shaatnez on Shabbat, for since it is not fit for wearing or for covering—it is consequently muktzeh, and there are those who permit it, for the status of a vessel is upon it. However, it is certainly the case that it cannot be judged as more than a vessel whose primary function is for a forbidden purpose, and it is likewise permitted for the sake of its own use or for its place (and so wrote the Magen Avraham in subsection 74 in the name of the Yam Shel Shlomo, and what he wrote in the name of the Agudah to forbid it entirely is a wonder).

It is permitted to handle a fan on Shabbat for the purpose of driving away flies, for this is a human need; and similarly, brooms with which one sweeps the floor—it is permitted to handle them. And according to the one who holds in siman 337 that it is forbidden to sweep the house, its status is that of a vessel whose primary function is for a forbidden act; however, we hold that with our floors it is permitted, for they are paved as was written there, and consequently their primary function is for a permitted act. The Rashba, of blessed memory, permitted handling the astrolabe on Shabbat, which is a tool of stargazers, because he permits the study of wisdom on Shabbat. But according to the Rambam, who forbids on Shabbat anything other than the study of Torah, one must have doubt regarding the matter, and it has already been explained in siman 307 section 11, and we explained there that according to the essential law it is certainly permitted; see there.

Our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, wrote in section 51: "Regarding that which indicates the hours, which they call an orologio, whether it is made of sand or of another type, there is a doubt whether it is permitted to move it, and the custom has already spread to forbid it." Thus far their words. And the reason is that it is similar to a measuring vessel and its primary function is for a forbidden purpose; and if it is because through it they know the time to pray and to study, nevertheless, the act of measuring itself is not a mitzvah, and can one perform a mitzvah through a forbidden matter? (Magen Avraham, subsection 78, in the name of the Maharil). Furthermore, for this purpose he is not compelled to move it with his hands, for he is able to come and see what hour it is currently in the day.

And all of this was in their days when they did not have regulated time-tellers, but now that they make small ones of silver and gold and carry them in their bosom as an ornament—it is obvious that they are permitted in handling, and such was the custom of the giants of the world (as the Sha'arei Teshuva wrote in subsection 49 in the name of the Panim Me'irot and the Chacham Tzvi and the Gaon Rabbi Naftali and others, see there). However, this applies to the small ones and not to the large ones that stand against the walls of the house, for these certainly have the status of vessels whose primary function is for a prohibited use, and they are not permitted in handling except for the sake of the object itself or its place, and likewise their keys and weights (see Sha'arei Teshuva ibid.).

There are times when even an object that is fit for use on Shabbat, but because the owners are wealthy and for them such an object is fit for nothing, and it is not their way to use it and it is standing to be thrown into the trash, it consequently becomes muktzeh, for the status of a vessel has been nullified from it. And then even a poor person is forbidden to move it since the owners set it aside, unless the poor person acquired it before Shabbat and it became his, for then it is permitted to be moved. Nevertheless, the wealthy person is forbidden from moving it even if the object belonged to a poor person from before, and only wealthy people who dwell in the house of poor people are permitted to move them, because regarding this matter the neighbor is nullified to the homeowner, even though the neighbor is wealthy and the homeowner is poor. And all this is when the thing is not significant to him because of his wealth, but if it were muktzeh to him due to a prohibition, such as wine to a nazir—it does not become muktzeh because of this, since others are permitted to use it, and therefore even the nazir himself is permitted to move it, and so too anything similar to this (and see Tatz subsection 25 and Magen Avraham subsection 79 who wrote at length on this; however, the law is as I have written, and so wrote the HaGra"z, see there).