Siman 307

It is written: 'and speaking a word' — that your speech on Shabbat should not be like your speech on a weekday (113b). Rashi explained: such as buying and selling and accounts. The Tosafot raised a difficulty, for this is already derived from 'pursuing your own affairs,' see there. I do not understand; is not 'pursuing your own affairs' a matter of action, where one performs a permitted action through which he approaches that which he desires to do on Saturday night which is forbidden on Shabbat, as I wrote at the beginning of the previous siman, such as walking to the end of the techum to hire laborers? Whereas here it is speech regarding a business matter, and what is the connection between one and the other? This is also evident from the words of the Rambam at the beginning of chapter 24, see there. The Tosafot explained that even mere words that do not pertain to business — one is not permitted to increase them on Shabbat as on a weekday, and they brought this from Midrash Vayikra parashah 34: that Rashbi had an elderly mother, and he told her that one should not speak much on Shabbat. In the Yerushalmi (end of chapter 15): "Rabbi Abahu said: Shabbat is for Hashem; just as the Holy One, Blessed be He, rested from speech, so too you must rest from speech... Rabbi Chanina said: it was only with difficulty that they permitted greeting someone with peace on Shabbat," see there.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch adopted both opinions, as they wrote: "'And speaking a word'—that your speech on Shabbat should not be like your speech on a weekday. Therefore, it is forbidden to say, 'I will do such-and-such a thing tomorrow' or 'I will buy such-and-such merchandise tomorrow' (like Rashi), and even regarding idle chatter, it is forbidden to engage in it excessively" (like Tosafot). Thus far their words. And it appears that for the primary halacha they adopted the view of Rashi, and what they said in the Midrash and Yerushalmi is a measure of piety, as it is proper for every person to do so for the honor of the Shabbat. And proof for this is from the words of our teacher, the Rema, who wrote: "And people for whom the telling of news and novel matters is a pleasure for them—it is permitted to tell them on Shabbat just as on a weekday. But one who does not find pleasure—it is forbidden to say them so that his fellow may find pleasure in them." Thus far his words. And it must be understood, for if it is a prohibition of "and speaking a word," how was it permitted because of pleasure? If so, we should also permit speaking matters of buying and selling, and likewise we should permit "pursuing your affairs" in a matter where he has pleasure. Rather, it is certainly because the essence of "and speaking a word" is according to the explanation of Rashi, and the explanation of Tosafot is a measure of piety, and since he has pleasure in this, we do not rule so stringently (so it appears in my humble opinion. See Magen Avraham subsection 1 who wrote regarding this matter of "I will do such-and-such a thing tomorrow," that it is forbidden even for a matter of a mitzvah. And it is a wonder, for the affairs of Heaven are permitted, and the Eliyah Rabbah already raised a difficulty against him. And what he wrote from Sefer Chasidim is regarding a different matter, where one says "I will sleep on Shabbat in order to perform a mitzvah tomorrow," and this is certainly forbidden, for he acts for the sake of tomorrow; and see Tosefet Shabbat and Machatzit HaShekel who labored to resolve this, but it is not the primary point, and delve into this).

It is stated in the Gemara (116b, 149a): that it is forbidden to read secular documents. The Tosafot explained this as, for example, promissory notes and similar matters of business, but regarding general letters there is no prohibition. Rashi, of blessed memory, initially explained it as letters, and afterwards emended that it refers specifically to documents of buying and selling, and the reason is simple, because of "pursuing your own affairs and speaking of them." And one must wonder about the Rambam in chapter 23, law 19, who wrote: "It is forbidden to read secular documents on Shabbat, so that it should not be like the manner of a weekday and he might come to erase." Thus far his words, and the Semag wrote similarly. And it is a great wonder why they required this reason (and the Bach remained with "it requires further study," see there). And it seems to me that they wrote this intentionally, for certainly regarding reading aloud it is because of "speaking of them," but regarding reading in the heart and contemplating without speech, surely contemplation is permitted. And it comes to teach us that in this—even with contemplation it is forbidden, for the reason that he might erase when he sees some error in the calculation. And this is clear from the words of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch in section 13, who wrote: "Secular documents, which are promissory notes and accounts and all greetings—it is forbidden to read them, and even to contemplate them without reading is forbidden." Thus far his words. And it is difficult, for surely contemplation is permitted, rather it is because of the reason of the Rambam, and therefore it is forbidden to contemplate any writing of business and account on Shabbat.

And that which they wrote, that even a letter of greeting is forbidden—and this is the first explanation of Rashi—is because such is the opinion of the Rashba, the Rosh, and the Ran there (Beit Yosef). But the Ramban agreed with Rashi, Tosafot, and the Rambam, that it is permitted to read letters of greeting, and they wrote that such is the custom. And even the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, who forbade it, wrote in section 14, and this is their wording: "To read a letter sent to him, if he does not know what is written in it—it is permitted; and he should not read with his mouth, but rather look into it. And if it was brought for him from outside the techum—it is good to be careful not to touch it." Thus far their words.

The explanation of the matter is: if he does not know what is written in it—it is permitted to read, for perhaps there is some matter of pikuach nefesh in it. He should not read with his mouth but rather look into it, because to know what is written there, contemplation is sufficient, and even if it is a business letter, he has not violated "speaking of [forbidden] matters," since contemplation is permitted. This is not the case when he reads with his mouth and the letter is of business—he has committed a prohibition. And regarding that which he should not touch it, this is because there are those who hold that a letter that comes from outside the techum is muktzeh. And even though a food item that comes from outside the techum for the sake of an Israelite is permitted to be moved, as I wrote further on in siman 515, that is because it is permitted to another Israelite, as written there, and consequently it is impossible for it to be muktzeh in moving for this Israelite since others are permitted to eat it. But a letter—it is rightly muktzeh for all Israelites (see Beit Yosef). But in truth, if we are concerned for muktzeh, how is it permitted to read it? Therefore, there are those who hold that for another reason he should not touch it, because we are concerned that perhaps the Israelite will take the letter from the hand of the non-Jew, and it will turn out that the non-Jew performs the lifting and the Israelite performs the placing, and this is prohibited by rabbinic law. However, even this is only relevant when bringing from a reshut harabim to a reshut hayachid and not from a karmelit, and since nowadays we do not have a reshut harabim—there is no concern in this. Furthermore, when the non-Jew stood in the house of the Israelite, the placing was already completed, for the standing of his body is like the standing of an object; but in this, it can be said that we are concerned that before he stands, the Israelite will take it from his hand. And in truth, many permit this, and the Levush also wrote that he did not see people practicing this, see there, and all the more so in our times when they bring it from the post office—this is not included in the category of something that comes from outside the techum for the sake of the Israelite, for the post office goes without the intent of this letter, and only some have the custom not to receive it from the hand of the one who brings it from the post office. And if the letter is sealed—it is prohibited to tell the non-Jew to open it, but rather he should say to him: "I cannot read it," and he will open it on his own. And indeed, he should only read it once with contemplation and not with the mouth, and afterwards he should not move it further and should hide it away (and see Taz subsection 12 and Magen Avraham subsection 20).

And due to the prohibition of reading secular documents, the sages, of blessed memory, prohibited one who invited guests and prepared for them types of delicacies, and wrote in writing how many he invited and how many delicacies he prepared for them—it is prohibited to read it on Shabbat. And it is not only necessary to say that it is prohibited in writing, for there is a concern lest he erase one of the guests so as not to invite him or one of the delicacies, but even if it is written upon the wall at a height, where there is no concern lest he erase, and even if we do not concern ourselves with that which we maintain in siman 275 regarding the concern lest he tilt [the lamp], for there is no distinction between whether he can tilt it or cannot tilt it, such as when it is at a height, for the rabbis did not differentiate, as was written there. Nevertheless—here it is prohibited, because of a decree lest he read secular documents, which are documents of debts and accounts, in which even contemplation without reading is prohibited as was written. But if he engraved into the wall with a sunken engraving—it is permitted, for in this erasing is not applicable, and a wall is not easily confused with a document and we do not decree this because of that. But when the letters are protruding—it is prohibited, for we decree lest he erase, meaning that he will cut the protruding letters, and even if it is several [stories] high, for the rabbis did not differentiate as was written in siman 275. But on a tablet or a ledger, even if the letters are engraved—it is prohibited to read it, for he may come to confuse it with a document. (The Tur and Shulchan Aruch section 12 who wrote regarding that which is written at a height that the reason is because of the decree of secular documents, see there, it is difficult, for according to what they ruled in siman 275 like Rabbah that even if it is two stories high, see there, there is no need for this reason, and it requires further study and examine it well.)

And behold, regarding our shamashim who call the invitees to a wedding or a brit milah, and they prepare a document from the eve of Shabbat and on Shabbat they read from the document whom to call, it is a great wonder how they do so, for this is against the law that has been explained. And it may be said that the reason is that specifically the homeowner himself is forbidden to read from the document lest it occur to him to erase or to add and write, but the shamash, behold, it is not in his power to subtract or to add, and therefore there is no concern regarding him lest he erase or write. And that we should concern ourselves lest the homeowner demand the document from him to examine it - we do not concern ourselves, for we have not found such a decree. And also there is no concern lest he read from mundane documents, for regarding a matter of a mitzvah they did not decree, and this is "Heavenly matters" and the needs of the public, and how could we decree in this because of mundane documents (and see Bach and Magen Avraham subsection 16).

A wall or a curtain that has forms of strange animals, or portraits of people depicting events, such as the war of David and Goliath, and they write "this is the form of so-and-so" and "this is the portrait of so-and-so" — it is forbidden to read it on Shabbat, a decree lest one read mundane documents, and even to look into it is forbidden just as with mundane documents, as I wrote in section 3. However, on a weekday — it is permitted, and there is no concern for being drawn after it as in the law that will be explained in the next section, because it is a small matter and there is no concern for being drawn after it (Magen Avraham, subsection 21). And this is regarding the writing beneath the portrait, but regarding the portrait itself, they said in the Gemara (149a) that even on a weekday it is forbidden to look at it, as it is said: "Do not turn to the idols, etc." see there. However, the Tosafot wrote there: "It appears that this is specifically when it is made for the sake of idol worship, but when it is made for beauty — it is permitted to look at it, and such is the custom." And in another place it is explained from their words that even for beauty it is forbidden (Avodah Zarah 50a), but even according to this, only "looking" is forbidden, meaning to deepen one's vision and contemplate it, but a mere seeing — we have no problem with it (ibid. subsection 23).

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 16: "Poetic verses and parables of mundane conversation and words of passion, such as the book of Immanuel and likewise books of wars—it is forbidden to read them on Shabbat. And even on weekdays it is forbidden because of 'the seat of scoffers,' and one violates 'do not turn to idols'—do not turn to that which is of your own mind (see Rashi there). And regarding words of passion, there is additionally the concern of inciting the evil inclination; and he who composed them and he who copied them, and it goes without saying he who printed them, cause the public to sin." Thus far his words. And the same law applies to one who goes to theaters and circuses, which are types of play and types of stratagems (ibid. subsection 22). And it seems to me that newspapers are not included in this, and it is permitted to read them on weekdays, for they inform of what is happening now, and this is necessary for many people to know, both regarding what pertains to business and regarding other matters. But matters that have already passed from the world, why should we know them? And likewise all matters of vanity that contain play and lightheadedness, and all the more so words of lust—it is a great sin, and in our many iniquities, they have now spread through the printing presses and it is not within one's power to protest against them.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote regarding this, and this is his wording: "It seems correct to specify that which is forbidden regarding mundane conversation and stories of wars (on Shabbat) — this is specifically if they are written in a foreign tongue, but in the holy tongue — it is permitted, and such is the custom to be lenient in this." Thus far his words. And they questioned him: is it as if the language itself possesses holiness? For in the bathhouse one may say mundane matters in the holy tongue (see Turei Zahav subsection 13 and Magen Avraham subsection 24). And in my humble opinion, it appears that this is the explanation: behold, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote three things: parables and proverbs, and words of passion, and books of wars. Now, words of passion are certainly a severe prohibition due to the provocation of the evil inclination, but as for the other two, why are those who delight in them forbidden? For it has already been explained that those people for whom the telling of rumors and matters of novelty is a delight for them, they are permitted to speak of them on Shabbat, as I wrote in section 2; if so, why are those who enjoy mundane conversations and stories of wars forbidden? However, the truth is that to speak and to hear is permitted for those who delight in this, but to read them, there is a decree because of "documents of commoners." And regarding this, our teacher, the Rema, says that the prohibition is only when it is written in a foreign tongue, for then there is reason to decree because of documents of commoners. But when they are written in the holy tongue — it is not relevant to decree, for documents of commoners are not written in the holy tongue. Therefore, those who delight in this — are permitted to read them, and there is no decree of documents of commoners in this, and it is not because of the holiness of the language. (The Eliyah Rabbah writes in subsection 40 that Josippon and the Chronicles of R. Yosef HaKohen and the like are not included in this, as one can learn from them much fear of Heaven and matters of mussar, and they are permitted even in a foreign tongue and on Shabbat.)

They further wrote in section 17: "It is forbidden to study on Shabbat and Yom Tov except for words of Torah, and even in books of wisdom it is forbidden. And there is one who permits, and according to his reasoning it is permitted to look at an astrolabe on Shabbat, which is a tool of stargazers, and to turn it and move it as mentioned below in siman 308." Thus far his words. Meaning that for those who forbid studying this, it is automatically muktzeh since it is not fit for anything on Shabbat, but for those who permit—it is permitted to move it, as it is not muktzeh. And the one who forbids is the Rambam in the Commentary on the Mishnah (chapter 23) who wrote, and this is his wording: "That it is forbidden to study on Shabbat and on Yom Tov except in the books of the prophecies and their explanations, and even if that book was in one of the wisdoms." Thus far his words. For since the Shabbat is holy, we should only engage in matters of holiness. And so it is implied in the Yerushalmi (chapter 15, halacha 3) which says there: "Shabbats and Yamim Tovim were only given for eating and drinking; Shabbats and Yamim Tovim were only given to engage in them with words of Torah. One verse says: 'It is a Shabbat for Hashem,' and one verse says: 'An assembly for Hashem your G-d,' how is this—give a portion to Talmud Torah and give a portion to eating and drinking." Thus far his words, and it implies explicitly that it is not for other matters. And those who permit are the Ramban and the Rashba (Beit Yosef), and the proof for this is that they only decreed against secular documents. And if it should enter your mind that it is also forbidden to study wisdoms, why specifically secular documents? However, in truth there is no dispute here and both opinions are true, for certainly according to the core law it is impossible to forbid, yet as a measure of piety that every person should conduct themselves so as to honor this holy day, it is a proper mitzvah that besides words of Torah nothing should be heard from his mouth on the day of Shabbat. (And to ask of a demon for the sake of healing—whatever is permitted on a weekday is permitted on Shabbat, as I wrote in Yoreh Deah siman 179, and see what I wrote there, and see Magen Avraham subsection 26. And so too all types of incantations for healing are permitted on Shabbat, and it is forbidden to speak on Shabbat matters of sorrow.)

It is forbidden to hire laborers on Shabbat, as it is written: "from pursuing your own affairs." And even if one does not finalize the transaction with them, but merely speaks with them regarding whether they will hire themselves out and the like—it is forbidden due to "and speaking a word." And even to tell a non-Jew to hire laborers for him is forbidden even without a transaction, due to "and speaking a word," and even though the Israelite does not need that labor until after Shabbat. For anything that he is forbidden to do—he is forbidden to tell a non-Jew to do it, as telling a non-Jew is a shevut, and furthermore because speaking of this is forbidden due to "and speaking a word" (and this requires further study in Shabbat 150, see there). Therefore, a matter that is merely a stringency that he does not do himself—it is permitted to tell a non-Jew to do it (Magen Avraham, subsection 2). And even to tell him before Shabbat to do it on Shabbat is forbidden for the first reason, for anything that he is forbidden to do himself—he is forbidden to tell a non-Jew even before Shabbat to do it on Shabbat (and with this the matter requiring further study can be settled, and examine this carefully). But for the reason of "and speaking a word," there is no issue here, for behold, he is not saying this on Shabbat itself. And so too if he does not tell him on the eve of Shabbat to do it on Shabbat but rather to do it without specification—it is also permitted, since he is not designating for him to do it on Shabbat, and more will be explained regarding this. And so too it is permitted to say to him after Shabbat: "Why did you not do so this past Shabbat," and even though from this the non-Jew will understand that his desire is for him to do this for him this coming Shabbat, nevertheless since he does not tell him explicitly—it is permitted. And this is in a manner when it is permitted for the non-Jew to do this thing according to the details that were explained in siman 252, and there are those who disagree as will be explained.

And behold, the Tur disagrees with this, and this is his wording: "And in the Sefer HaMitzvot he permitted saying to him after the Shabbat, 'Why did you not do so on Shabbat?'... but it stands to reason slightly toward a prohibition." Thus far his words. And so our teacher, the Rema, at the end of this siman wrote that anything that is forbidden to tell a gentile to do on Shabbat is forbidden to hint to him to do, but it is permitted to hint to him a labor to do after Shabbat. Thus far his words. And it is possible to say that only to hint to him on Shabbat is forbidden, but to hint to him during the weekdays is permitted (and therefore he did not provide a gloss in section 2 on the words of the Beit Yosef, as he did not concern himself with the words of the Tur as written in the Beit Yosef and the Bach, see there).

And so it seems primary for the law, that to hint to him on weekdays regarding what he did not do on the previous Shabbat so that he will know for the future—it is permitted even with a clear hint, such as saying to him: "Why did you not do such and such last Shabbat," but on Shabbat itself—it is forbidden. And it seems in my humble opinion that this is regarding a clear hint, meaning: "Why did you not do such and such," but with a mere hint, such as regarding the opening of a letter where he says to him: "Why did you not open the letter"—it is certainly forbidden. But when he says: "I cannot read the letter because it is closed," why should it be forbidden? For behold, he does not mention a matter of melakhah, and just as we find among the early authorities who said: "Wipe your nose," and through this they understood that they must remove the carbon from the candle, or if he says: "I am very cold" and through this he kindles the oven—it seems that it is permitted, for behold there is no "speaking a word" here, and what the non-Jew understands, why should we care. And there is one who says that according to our teacher, the Rema, all types of hints are forbidden on Shabbat (Magen Avraham subsection 31), but according to my humble opinion the primary view is as I have written. (And I have support from the Maharit who used to say on Shabbat: "The candle is not shining," and the maidservant would understand and cut the head of the wick, as the Knesset HaGedolah wrote, cited by the Ba'er Heitev subsection 24, see there).

It is forbidden to give money to a non-Jew on the eve of Shabbat and say to him: "Buy for me tomorrow," but it is permitted to say to him: "Buy for yourself, and if I need it, I will buy it from you after Shabbat." And even though the non-Jew understands that he says this to him because it is forbidden for him to say it on his own behalf, nevertheless, what do we care since he does not tell him to buy on his behalf, and this is nothing more than a hint. And similarly, it is even permitted to tell him to buy on his behalf, provided that he does not say to him: "Buy for me on Shabbat" or "tomorrow," but rather requests him to buy on his behalf without specification, for he could buy after Shabbat, and if he buys on Shabbat, he acts on his own initiative. However, if Shabbat is the market day—it is also forbidden in such a case, for this is also like saying to him: "Buy on Shabbat." And similarly, it is forbidden for him to give an item on the eve of Shabbat to sell, for this is like saying to him: "Sell on Shabbat." But when the market day is not on Shabbat—it is permitted to give him garments or other objects to sell them, provided that he does not tell him to sell them on Shabbat. And all this is on the eve of Shabbat, but during all the days of the week, it is permitted to give him objects to sell or to give him money so that he may buy on his behalf, even though the market day is on Shabbat, for since it is now several days before Shabbat, he certainly has the ability to sell and buy before Shabbat, and if he himself waits for Shabbat—he acts on his own initiative (and this is from the clarification of the words of the Magen Avraham and the Taz, subsection 3, see there).

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 4: "One who hired a non-Jew to transport his merchandise, and the non-Jew came and took it from the house of the Israelite on Shabbat—it is forbidden, and it is proper to punish the one who does this." Thus far his words. That is to say, the essence of the matter is permitted, such as where he contracted with the non-Jew and not for daily wages, but nevertheless he should not receive it from the house of the Israelite on Shabbat but rather a little before nightfall, as has been explained in siman 252. And even if he designated a place for his merchandise—it is forbidden, for it has already been explained there that on Shabbat itself there is no permission at all. Therefore, it is proper to fine him according to his wealth, whether with money or with another matter according to what they see fit. However, if he was inadvertent in the matter—there is no need to punish him, and he is believed to say that he was inadvertent. And so too if he appointed him to take it before Shabbat, and the non-Jew was negligent and received it on Shabbat and he was unable to protest against him—there is no prohibition upon him, for what could he do. And if he received it while it was still day—there is no prohibition in that he transports it on Shabbat, for he is laboring for himself (Magen Avraham, subsection 6), and the details of these laws were explained there. (And the Taz wrote in subsection 3: that even that which is permitted with the sun, such as giving garments to a launderer and the like, one should not say to him: 'See that I need them on the conclusion of Shabbat,' for this is like telling him to do it on Shabbat. And so too if he gave him money to buy something on Erev Shabbat close to evening, and said to him: 'Behold I am traveling on my way on the conclusion of Shabbat'—it is forbidden, for this is like telling him: 'Buy it on Shabbat.' And so too regarding what has been explained that it is permitted if he did not designate for him to buy it on Shabbat and also the market day is not on Shabbat and also he did not say to him: 'Behold I am traveling on the conclusion of Shabbat' that it is permitted in such cases, nevertheless if he bought it on Shabbat—the Israelite shall not benefit from this on that same Shabbat, and this is like a non-Jew who performed melacha for the sake of the Israelite where it is forbidden to use it, see there. And I do not know the comparison, for there a melacha was performed for him, but here only a transaction of buying and selling was performed for him, and in the essence of the matter no melacha was performed, and it requires further study, and examine it well).

It is a known matter that all shevutim are forbidden even in a place of a mitzvah, and even in a place of loss, and even in a place of pain or slight illness. So too the shevut of amirah le'akum if it involves a Torah prohibition—that is, telling him to perform a melakhah d'oraita—and it was only permitted in a place of complete illness even if there is no danger, as we maintain: "An ill person who is not in danger—one tells a non-Jew and he performs [the act]," and it will be explained in siman 328. However, a shevut of a shevut, such as telling a non-Jew to perform something that is forbidden to an Israelite by rabbinic law—such as to buy for him or to sell for him, which in an optional matter is forbidden as has been explained—but in a matter of a mitzvah, or in a place of slight illness or great pain, or if there is a great loss in the matter, it is permitted; for a shevut of a shevut in a place of a mitzvah was not decreed by the sages (Eruvin 68a, see there), and all these are considered like a place of a mitzvah.

And this is the opinion of the Rambam in chapter 6, law 9, and this is his wording: "A matter that is not a melakhah and is only forbidden to be done on Shabbat because of a shevut—it is permitted for an Israelite to tell a non-Jew to do it on Shabbat, provided that there is some illness there, or he needs the matter for a great necessity, or for the sake of a mitzvah. How so? An Israelite tells a non-Jew on Shabbat to climb a tree or to float upon the water in order to bring him a shofar or a knife for milah, or he brings him from courtyard to courtyard that do not have an eruv between them hot water to wash a minor who is in pain, and similarly anything like this." Thus far his words. And according to this opinion, even in a city that does not have an eruv, if it is not a reshut ha-rabbim—as we hold that a city that does not have six hundred thousand people is not a reshut ha-rabbim—it is permitted to tell a non-Jew to bring him his tallit to the beit knesset, or a siddur or a Chumash, and similarly a food item that he needs for Shabbat or a drink that they forgot to take from erev Shabbat or that would have spoiled if he had taken it yesterday, for the enjoyment of Shabbat is a matter of a mitzvah; and similarly to send portions to a guest, for it is also like a matter of a mitzvah; and similarly in a case of great loss or a case where there is from this great pain or some illness, and such is the custom of the world. And even though our teachers the authors of the Tosafot disagree with this, and they hold that only for the mitzvah of milah was a shevut d'shevut permitted and not for other mitzvot, and certainly not for what has been explained, and the reason is because milah itself overrides Shabbat (Tosafot Gittin 8b). And the Tur brought both opinions and did not decide, see there; nevertheless, the world holds like the Rambam. And it is similarly clarified from the words of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 5, who stated anonymously like the opinion of the Rambam and brought the opinion of the Tosafot in the name of "some who forbid," and later in siman 586 he did not bring the forbidding opinion at all, and above in siman 276 they brought the opinion of the Ittur to be lenient for the needs of the public even regarding a complete shevut, see there. And some permit even in a reshut ha-rabbim to bring through a non-Jew, for the reason that if there were partitions—the Israelite himself would have been able to bring (Beit Yosef and Taz subsection 4 in the name of the Raviah). And there are some shevutim that the sages permitted, such as in the purchase of a house in Eretz Yisrael, and there are some that they forbade even through a non-Jew, such as in extinguishing which is a melakhah she-einah tzerikhah le-gufah, and one does not compare the decrees of the sages to one another. However, in a place where they did not say explicitly—we hold like the opinion of the Rambam which is the middle path, and so it is proper to rule (see Magen Avraham subsection 7 and Taz ibid.).

Our Sages, of blessed memory, said (150a): Calculations of no consequence—it is permitted to calculate them on Shabbat. That is to say, regarding a matter that has no practical application or benefit, such as calculations of the state and the like, and even his own calculations that have already passed from the world, for in this "seeking your own affairs and speaking a word" is not applicable, since he has no affair in this and it is like other idle matters spoken on Shabbat, which also is not an adornment for Shabbat and any person of spirit should not do so, as I wrote in section 2; however, there is no prohibition of shevut of "seeking your own affairs etc." But if he still needs to pay the workers, or if he has a doubt whether the calculation with them was finished or not—this is prohibited by law, for this is "your affairs" and is prohibited by complete law, and so too anything similar to this.

Even though it is forbidden to say to one's fellow: "I wish to hire you for a certain matter," for it is forbidden to say this even to a non-Jew as has been explained, and certainly to one's fellow Israelite, as this is the essence of the prohibition of "pursuing your affairs and speaking of them," nevertheless, it is permitted to say to one's fellow: "Does it seem that you will stand with me this evening?" And even though both of them know for what purpose he will require him, this is nothing more than thought and is permitted (Rashi 150a, s.v. "Hanireh"). However, he should not say to him: "Be ready with me this evening," for this is like a command from him, as if he is saying "I need you for my business." But when he says: "Does it seem etc." — he makes it dependent on him, as if he is saying: "I will see if you will stand with me this evening," and this is nothing. Therefore, when speaking in a foreign language one must be careful how to speak, but the explanation of the matters is as we have said, and likewise to a non-Jew it is permitted to speak thus.

Since speech is forbidden and thought is permitted, therefore, anything that is forbidden to do on Shabbat—it is forbidden to say that one will do it tomorrow. However, if the thing that he says he will do tomorrow has an aspect of permissibility, such that if this aspect existed they could do it even on Shabbat—he may say: "I am doing this tomorrow," even when the aspect of permissibility is not present. How so: for he may say: "To such-and-such a city I am going tomorrow," for there is an aspect of permissibility if there were buildings adjacent to one another within seventy cubits and a fraction, such that it would all be within the techum. And the reason for the matter: for there is nothing here but thought, since according to the speech there is no prohibition here, as even in a permitted case this language is used; it is only that they know in their hearts that the permission is not currently prepared, and it returns to being a matter of thought. And so too anything similar to this that has an aspect of permissibility to do today—he may say to his fellow that he will do it tomorrow, provided that he does not mention to him hiring. And it is obvious that specifically to go tomorrow he may say, but not to travel in a wagon or to ride on a horse or to travel on the railroad, for for these things there is no permission on Shabbat. Therefore, in the vernacular where they always speak with the language of traveling—it is forbidden, but to set sail in a ship tomorrow—it is permitted, for there is permission even on Shabbat.

And know that there are some of our teachers who said that the reason we require the side of permissibility is in a case where one says: "I am going to such-and-such a city tomorrow, come with me," for if not so, it is obvious, for what is he saying (Magen Avraham subsection 11 in the name of the Ramban and the Rashba), meaning that there is no benefit in this statement, and this is not "pursuing your affairs" and is like other idle words. And according to this, one may also say: "I will ride tomorrow, I will do work tomorrow" (ibid.) since he has no benefit in this. And so it is explained from the wording of the Rambam at the beginning of chapter 24, who wrote: "'Pursuing your affairs and speaking of them,' therefore it is forbidden for a person to walk for his affairs on Shabbat and even to speak of them, such as speaking with his partner regarding what he will buy tomorrow, etc." Thus far his words. And even though he wrote afterwards: "And so a person may say to his fellow: 'I am going to such-and-such a city tomorrow,' for if there are huts there, etc." see there, and he did not write: "that he should say to him 'come with me,'" this is because the wording of the Gemara is such, and the intention is to say to him "come with me."

And indeed there are those who disagree on this, and this is the opinion of our teacher, the Rema, in section 8, who wrote: "And so too one should not say, 'I will do such-and-such a thing tomorrow.'" Thus far his words. And also our teacher, the Beit Yosef, there, who wrote: "He may say to his fellow: 'To such-and-such a city I am going tomorrow,' and so too it is permitted to say to him: 'Come with me to such-and-such a city tomorrow,' since today he could go by means of burganin." Thus far his words. And it is explicitly implied that the reason also applies to the first clause, where he does not say: "Come with me." And so it is explained from the words of our teachers, the authors of the Tosafot, there, who raised a difficulty regarding this, and this is their wording: "It is a wonder, why specifically him? Even to his fellow he can also say: 'Go for me to such-and-such a city tomorrow, etc.'" See there. And if it should enter your mind that the intent of the Gemara is also such, what is the difficulty? Rather, certainly they hold that even without "Come with me" it would be forbidden, were it not for the reason of burganin. And so it is explained from the Tur who wrote in this language, see there. And also the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch did not bring any dispute regarding this, and in his great work it is explicitly proven that there is no dispute here, see there. And I say that in truth there is no dispute here, as we will explain with the help of Heaven.

For behold, in this all agree that if it is not for some benefit, "pursuing your affairs and speaking of them" is not applicable; for if one goes and speaks to himself, "I will conduct great business, I will buy houses," and the like, is this "pursuing your affairs"? This is nothing but idle words and matters of no consequence. Therefore, our sages, of blessed memory, were precise to say: It is permitted to say to his fellow, "To such-and-such a city I am going tomorrow." And why did they say "to his fellow"? Rather, when he says it to himself it is empty talk, but when saying it to his fellow there is certainly substance in this and he needs to know this, for in such cases it is properly "pursuing your affairs," and this is the intention of all the poskim. And the Ramban and the Rashba explained the matter as saying to him: "Come with me," meaning that it is as if he says to him: "Come with me." And the main thing depends on the intention: if his intention is merely for idle conversation, it is like matters of no consequence, but if he says it to his fellow so that his fellow shall know of it, it is forbidden if there is no permission on Shabbat itself. (And this is the intention of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch who wrote the language we brought, and this is its explanation: that he says to his fellow, "I am going so that you shall know of this," and likewise if he explicitly stated to him "Go with me," and examine this carefully.) (And the Magen Avraham in subsection 11 understood this as a dispute, but in my humble opinion it is as I have written.)

But regarding a matter that has no side of permissibility to do today, even if it only involves a rabbinic prohibition—for example, if one has muktzeh fruits outside the techum—since it is impossible for him to bring them today, it is forbidden to tell his fellow to bring them tomorrow. And even if they are within the techum, it is forbidden, since they are muktzeh (ibid. subsection 12 and Taz subsection 8). Similarly, it is forbidden for him to wait until dark at the edge of the techum so that he may hurry at night to go there to bring them; however, in this case it is permitted within the techum, and the reason for the matter we explained in the previous siman, section 3, see there. But he may wait until dark at the edge of the techum in order to hurry to go there to guard them, for even today they have a permissibility regarding guarding were they within the techum. And if he did not intend to wait until dark except to guard them, he may also bring them afterward, and the reason we explained there. Similarly, it is forbidden to say, "I will do such-and-such a thing tomorrow" if the thing is forbidden to do on Shabbat, if he intended some benefit in his speaking, as I wrote in the previous section. And it is permitted to wait until dark within the techum to pluck fruits and herbs from his garden and his ruin when the matter is not clearly evident, for if the matter were evident, it would be forbidden even within the techum, as I wrote in the previous siman. And this is the reason why they forbade at the edge of the techum, because the edge of the techum is evident to all, as I wrote there. And it is permitted to say to his fellow, "Guard for me the fruits that are in your techum and I will guard your fruits that are in my techum," and all is for the reason that was explained, that there is a permissibility were they within the techum. (See Magen Avraham subsection 13 regarding what he questioned from Eruvin and from Tosafot there, and he wrote that the edge of the techum is forbidden even without the reason of being evident, see there; and we have already critiqued his words there in subsection 3, see there and reflect upon it.)

The sages taught in the Mishnah at the beginning of chapter 23: "A person may request from his fellow jars of wine and jars of oil, provided that he does not say to him, 'Lend me' (halveini). And if he does not trust him, he leaves his garment with him and makes an accounting with him after Shabbat." And it is explained in the Gemara that the distinction between the language of "requesting" (she'elah) and the language of "lending" (halva'ah) is that "lending" leads to writing, while "requesting" does not lead to writing. Rashi explained that this is because a loan is for a long duration, as we established: "An unspecified loan is thirty days," and he will come to write in his ledger, "I lent such and such," so that he will not forget; but a request is returned immediately, and he will not come to write. And the Tosafot explained that it is because the language of "lending" implies it is not returned in its original form (ba'ayin) and he will come to write, while "requesting" is returned in its original form and he will not come to write. And even though jars of wine and oil are not returned in their original form, nevertheless, since he mentions the language of "requesting," he will remember and will not come to writing.

And in a foreign language, where there is no distinction between the language of a loan and the language of borrowing, he must say: "Give to me for recognition," and he may also conclude "and I will return and give to you" (Taz subsection 9), for if not so, it would be the language of a gift and he would not agree to this; therefore, he reveals to him that he will return and give to him, and he only says this to him for the sake of recognition. And now we are not careful in this, because among us it is not the habit to be written in a ledger except for a loan of money, and not a loan of vessels, food, or drink, and also among us it is the practice to claim even a loan immediately (Magen Avraham subsection 14). And that which the Mishnah permitted to leave a mashkon—specifically for something that is a need of Shabbat, but for something that is not a need of Shabbat—they did not permit giving a mashkon, for this is also somewhat like an act of acquisition. And when he gives a mashkon, he should not say to him: "Here is a mashkon," for this is like a weekday activity, but rather he should leave the mashkon with him without words. And just as one may not borrow on Shabbat something that is not a need of Shabbat, so too one may not repay on Shabbat something that is not a need of Shabbat, for this also somewhat resembles buying and selling. Except that for a need of Shabbat—it is permitted, for the matter is evident that it is for the honor of Shabbat. And so too to repay something that is a need of Shabbat, such as if he borrowed wine or oil from him in the middle of the week—he may repay him other wine or other oil on Shabbat, if the lender needs it (it seems to me). (And there are those who wrote regarding the prohibition of repayment that it is for the reason that perhaps he will erase, and I wonder, for our teacher, the Rema, in section 11 prohibits all repayment even with the language of borrowing, and that which he wrote: "Just as one may not borrow etc."—is not exact, as is proven from the words of the Rivash brought by the Magen Avraham subsection 15 regarding pidyon haben, for there writing is not relevant, see there and examine closely.)

It has already been explained that no shevut was permitted on Shabbat because of a loss. Therefore, merchandise that is being ruined on Shabbat by rain or something else, or if a flood of water comes and ruins his property, or if a barrel of wine was cracked and will go to waste—it is forbidden to say to a non-Jew: "Go and save my property." Rather, in this case they permitted calling a non-Jew and showing him, even though he knows for certain that he will save it for him. And likewise, he may say: "Whoever saves will not lose," and they will automatically come to save in order to profit, just as they permitted saying regarding a fire: "Whoever extinguishes will not lose." And even though there is one who says that only regarding a fire did they permit saying this and not regarding another loss—nevertheless, one who is lenient has not lost (Levush and Magen Avraham subsection 27).

And know that this which is forbidden for the Israelite to say to the non-Jew: "Go and save," this is when the non-Jew will be forced to save by means of a melakhah de-oraita. But if there is no melakhah de-oraita but only a shevut de-rabbanan—it is permitted to say to him explicitly: "Go and save and I will pay you," for it has already been explained in section 17 that regarding a shevut de-shevut in a case of loss, the sages did not decree, and all the more so when the loss is great. And they only forbade amirah le-akum regarding a matter where he needs for the saving to perform an av melakhah or a toldah. And according to this, he must know or ask a teacher what is a de-oraita prohibition and what is a de-rabbanan prohibition, and in a matter in which there is no shevut at all but only a bit of exertion—he may save even by himself, and this will be explained in siman 335 and in siman 338 with the help of Heaven. And the essence of the matter is that regarding the saving of a loss on Shabbat, a person should not act on his own but rather by asking a sage, the mara de-atra, and he will instruct him in this path he shall go according to the law of our holy Torah.

The Rambam wrote in chapter 6, law 8: "An Israelite who told a non-Jew to perform this labor for him on Shabbat, even though he has transgressed and they lash him with lashes of rebellion—he is permitted to benefit from that labor in the evening after he waits the time it takes to be performed. And they only forbade in every instance to wait the time it takes to be performed because of this matter: for if you were to say it is permitted immediately, perhaps he will tell a non-Jew to perform it for him, and the matter will result in being ready immediately. Since they forbade it until he waits the time it takes to be performed, he will not tell him to perform it for him, for behold, he gains nothing since he is delayed in the evening for the time it takes to perform this thing that was performed on Shabbat." Thus far his words. And even though regarding one who performed labor himself on Shabbat he ruled there in law 23: that if he performed it intentionally, it is forbidden to him forever, see there, this is because he performed a Torah prohibition. According to this, it appears that if he himself performed a rabbinic prohibition, he is permitted to benefit on the conclusion of Shabbat after the time it takes to be performed, just as with telling a non-Jew regarding a Torah prohibition. And if he told a non-Jew to perform a rabbinic labor for him, it is possible that he does not need to wait the time it takes to be performed. And so too if he told him inadvertently to perform a Torah prohibition, it is also thus. There are those among the poskim who hold that in the case of an intentional act regarding a Torah prohibition, it is forbidden to him forever as with his own labor (Beit Yosef in the name of Rabbeinu Yerucham), but our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 20 ruled without attribution like the Rambam, see there. And this is regarding a matter that is not public, for a matter performed in public is forbidden forever, as written in siman 325 (Magen Avraham, subsection 28), and so it was explained in siman 244.

He further wrote there in law 21: "A non-Jew who enters the house of an Israelite and brings his objects there—it is permitted, and even if he said to him: 'Place them in this corner'—this is permitted." Thus far his words. And it is not understood, for what novelty is there in this? Behold, there is no prohibition here since the objects belong to the non-Jew and he is depositing them with him, and why should he not say to him: "Place them in this corner"? Also, the source of the law is hidden from me (and see Maggid Mishneh, and it appears that he also wondered about this). And it appears according to my humble opinion that this is what he meant: that even if the objects will remain the Israelite's, such as if they had already spoken between them that the Israelite desires these objects and now he brought them, and they do not belong to the Israelite for the time being but rather after Shabbat he will acquire them from him—it is also permitted. And this is exactly like the law that our teacher, the Rema, wrote at the end of this siman, and this is his wording: "Non-Jews who bring grain on Shabbat to an Israelite who is owed by them, and the Israelite gives him his key to his storehouse, and the non-Jew places them there and they measure and count—there is one who permits because the non-Jew is engaged in his own work and it does not belong to the Israelite until after the measuring, and he shall calculate with him afterwards." Thus far his words. And this is exactly like the law of the Rambam according to how we explained his words. But if they brought the Israelite's own merchandise—it is obvious that it is forbidden to receive it from them on Shabbat, and if they do not want to wait until the conclusion of Shabbat and if they take them to another place damage will reach the Israelite, it appears to my humble opinion that he is permitted to say to them: "Do what you wish, I am unable to receive them on Shabbat," and automatically they will unload the merchandise in his courtyard of their own accord, and he shall not speak with them until the conclusion of Shabbat. For even though in the house and in the courtyard of an Israelite it is forbidden, as is written in siman 252, nevertheless, what can he do when they came of their own accord (and see Magen Avraham, subsection 32).

Our teacher, the Rema, further wrote there: "Non-Jews who make cheeses on Shabbat and the Israelite sees it, he may purchase them from him, for in any case the non-Jew acts for his own sake; and even though the Israelite stays with the herd for a month or months and he acts with the intent to sell it to the Israelite—it is permitted." Thus far his words. That is to say, that the non-Jew makes cheeses from his own animals and his desire is that the Israelites will take them from him, and he hires an Israelite to stand there during the milking and the making of the cheeses; and since the cheeses are not yet the property of the Israelite, there is no prohibition in his making them on Shabbat. And even though they will ultimately come into the possession of the Israelite, nevertheless, they are not currently the property of the Israelite. And the Israelite may stand there during their making for the sake of kashrut, and even if the Israelite receives them in payment of his debt—it is permitted, since they are currently the property of the non-Jew (see Magen Avraham subsection 33; and regarding what the Rema wrote previously that it is forbidden to hint etc., we explained his intention in section 14).

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 21: "It is forbidden to say to a non-Jew on Shabbat, 'Take this meat and cook it for your own needs,' even if his sustenance is not upon him. But it is permitted to tell him to do work for himself." Thus far his words. Meaning that this which we hold: "Telling a non-Jew is a shevut," this refers to our labors. But his own—it is permitted to say to him: "Cook for yourself and bake for yourself," for it is nothing. Nevertheless, if he gives him the meat—it is forbidden, because the meat of an Israelite was cooked on Shabbat, and so too anything similar to this. And know that many times it is stated in the Gemara that regarding anything that is a shevut, they did not decree upon it during bein hashemashot for the sake of a mitzvah; therefore, it is permitted to say to a non-Jew during bein hashemashot, "Light the candle for me," or other labor. And so too he may himself perform a shevut during bein hashemashot in a case of a mitzvah, and therefore he may designate the name for ma'aser during bein hashemashot. But to separate it, behold we learned: "One may not tithe certain produce." And some say that if he was preoccupied all day—it is permitted, and this law requires further study (and see Magen Avraham subsection 30 and Eliyah Rabbah subsection 48) and more will be explained regarding this in siman 342, and whether they also did not decree during bein hashemashot on Saturday night will also be explained there with the help of Heaven.