Siman 306

It is written: "If you restrain your foot because of the Shabbat, from pursuing your affairs on My holy day, etc., and you shall honor it by not doing your own ways, from finding your own affairs and speaking a word." Behold, it is forbidden to engage in any matter of business or trade on Shabbat even if there is no primary labor involved, and this is "your affairs," meaning mundane affairs. And we were warned regarding the action and also regarding speaking of them, and the laws of speech will be explained in siman 307. And our sages, of blessed memory, expounded (150a): that speech is forbidden, but contemplation is permitted, for it is permitted to contemplate his business in his heart. Nevertheless, for the sake of the delight of Shabbat, it is a mitzvah that he should not think of them at all, and it should be in his eyes as if all his work is completed. And the sages only permitted contemplation when he does not have preoccupation of the heart and worry through the contemplation, such as when his business is proceeding well with success and without distraction of the soul. But when he has worry and preoccupation of the heart through the contemplation—it is forbidden, for behold, you have no greater nullification of the delight of Shabbat than this. And it is brought in the Mechilta: "Six days shall you labor and do all your work"—that all your work should be in your eyes as completed when the holy Shabbat arrives, for behold, a person cannot do all his work in one week; rather, a person should see on every Shabbat as if his work is completed, and you have no greater delight than this (Tur). And so we say in the prayer: "A rest of peace and tranquility and quiet and security, a perfect rest in which You find favor," and in the Grace After Meals we say: "That there should be no distress or grief on the day of our rest" (Beit Yosef in the name of the Ri). And the reward for this is very great, and even in this world it is repaid to him in his sustenance, as we learned there in a Baraita: A story of a certain pious man for whom a breach opened in his field and he considered fencing it, and he remembered that it was Shabbat and he abstained and did not fence it (even during the week, and he penalized himself because he contemplated this on Shabbat). And a miracle was performed for him and a caper bush grew in it, and from it was his sustenance and the sustenance of the members of his household; see there.

And what is this that is written "from finding your affairs," for is it not already written "doing your affairs," and what is this expression "finding"? Rather, this is its explanation: even to find your affairs is forbidden—meaning, that he performs now a matter that is completely permitted, which contains neither a melakha nor a shevut but is entirely permissible, only that through this he will find for himself the melakha that is forbidden to be done on Shabbat due to melakha or due to shevut—this is also forbidden. And even though this is nothing but thought, as is understood, and thought is permitted, yet in truth the sages, of blessed memory, explained in Eruvin (39a) that a matter where it is not recognizable that his intention is for the sake of something forbidden on Shabbat is indeed permitted, but a matter where it is recognizable is like speech and is forbidden.

How so? For example, if one walks in his field to see what it requires regarding hoeing or weeding and the like, or if one walks in his factory to observe what it requires, for everyone understands that he is calculating in his heart regarding the matter of business. And likewise in their times, when the bathhouses were immediately after the city gate, and he stands at the entrance of the city gate until dark, for everyone sees that his intention is to go to the bathhouse when it becomes dark. And likewise we learned in the Mishnah (150.): "One may not wait for dark at the techum to hire workers," meaning that he stands at the end of the techum until dark, and everyone sees that since he stands at the end of the techum—presumably his intention is for a matter forbidden on Shabbat, and he waits for dark at the techum so that immediately when it becomes dark he will go outside the techum and hire workers there or another matter forbidden on Shabbat. But within the techum—it is permitted, for no person notices this and it is like contemplation. (Tosafot ibid. s.v. "ve-ein", and the words of the Magen Avraham in siman 307 subsection 13, who wrote that in waiting for dark at the techum it is forbidden even without it being evident, and rejects the words of the Maggid Mishneh and the Shulchan Aruch based on the words of Tosafot there, is very astonishing, for behold Tosafot also intended thus, and likewise the Eliyah Rabbah in subsection 2 challenged him. Furthermore, according to his words, why is it permitted to wait for dark to bring his animal, since even when it is not evident it is forbidden, and according to what I wrote it works well, and delve into it.)

But he may wait for darkness at the techum boundary to bring his animal, because this matter could have also been done in a permitted manner, for if there were huts there, each within seventy cubits and a remainder, it would have been considered within the techum. And similarly, it is permitted to wait for darkness at the techum boundary to bring from there detached fruits that are not muktzeh, because they have a side of permissibility if there were partitions from there until his house. But attached fruits or muktzeh are forbidden, as with them you cannot find a side of permissibility (Gemara ibid.). And similarly, it is forbidden to wait for darkness at the techum boundary to bring from there a small animal that cannot walk on its legs and he must carry it on his shoulder, as there is no side of permissibility for this on Shabbat, for living creatures are muktzeh and are forbidden to be moved. But it is permitted to wait for darkness in order to guard the small animal and the attached fruits, for guarding is permitted on Shabbat as well, and it turns out that he waits for darkness for a permitted matter. And if he went for the sake of guarding and afterwards changed his mind to bring them, it is also permitted (the HaGra"z). And within the techum everything is permitted, since a person does not notice this as I wrote in the previous section. And that which our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 1, that the same law applies that it is forbidden to stroll to find a horse or a ship or a wagon to depart in, thus far his words, this refers to a case where the matter is recognizable that he is strolling for this purpose (Magen Avraham sub-section 3), or that his intention is regarding the techum boundary (and so it appears, that he is standing on this matter, see there).

However, it must be understood, since we have said that at the end of the techum it is forbidden even if they do not know for what purpose he waits for nightfall, but rather that at the end of the techum they will say that it is presumably for a forbidden matter as I wrote in section 3, if so, what benefit is there that he waits for nightfall for a permitted matter? For they will still suspect him of waiting for nightfall for a forbidden matter. However, the matter is simple, for when he waits for nightfall for a permitted matter, they will see afterward that they suspected him in vain. Furthermore, regarding the essence of the matter, it is impossible to forbid in such a case, for what is the reason we forbid when they suspect him and why do we care? Rather, since speech is forbidden and contemplation is permitted, if so, when they suspect him, it departs from the category of contemplation and enters the category of speech because it is recognizable for what purpose he does so, as I wrote in section 2. But when he waits for nightfall for a permitted matter—what is it to us if they suspect him? For with him there is neither speech nor contemplation here (so it appears to my humble opinion).

If his animal was standing outside the techum—he may call to it and it will come. And even though through his calling it goes outside of its techum, such as if its techum was a different techum than that of the owner, for example if he handed it over to a shepherd before the Shabbat as will be explained in siman 397—nevertheless, it is permitted to call it, for a person is not warned regarding the techum of his animal. However, it is forbidden to bring it by hand if it is outside of its techum (Gemara 53b), and even if it is standing outside of his own techum he may call to it, and we do not fear that he will be drawn after his animal and go outside the techum, for since it is a rabbinic prohibition—we do not need to fear, as in siman 350 regarding one who stands in a reshut hayachid or in a reshut harabim and drinks in a karmelit, where we do not fear that he will bring the vessel to himself, and here too it is so.

Our sages, of blessed memory, expounded from that which is written, "from pursuing your business and speaking a word," that your business is forbidden but the business of Heaven is permitted, and that is to prepare for the business of Heaven, such as waiting at the boundary until dark and the like, as will be explained. And there is a question regarding this: if so, let us also expound: "doing your business" and not the business of Heaven, and it should be permitted to perform a shevut for the business of Heaven. However, the explanation of the matter is as follows: certainly when the Torah forbade melakhah on Shabbat, it forbade it even for the business of Heaven if not for the saving of a life, for it is written: "You shall not do any melakhah," and it did not distinguish between the melakhah of a commoner and the melakhah of Heaven. Therefore, regarding the sacrifices, the Torah needed to explicitly permit the burning of the limbs of the daily afternoon sacrifice of the eve of Shabbat when the fire had taken hold of them, from the verse "You shall not kindle a fire in all your dwellings," for in your dwellings you may not kindle, but you may kindle for the limbs and fats of the eve of Shabbat, as is found at the end of the first chapter of Shabbat, see there. And consequently, when the shevutim were forbidden to everyone—they were forbidden even for a matter of a mitzvah, except in the Temple, for there is no shevut in the Temple, and even this is not regarding all shevutim (Tosafot Eruvin 102b, starting with "And the upper," see there). Therefore, that which is written: "doing your business"—the business of Heaven is also included. But here where it is written: "pursuing your business and speaking a word," just as "speaking a word" does not refer to the speech of Heaven, for on the contrary, it is a mitzvah on Shabbat to speak the speech of Heaven, so too "pursuing your business" does not refer to the business of Heaven.

Therefore, it is permitted to wait at the techum boundary until dark in order to attend to the needs of a bride, or the needs of the deceased, or other needs of a mitzvah matter, such as bringing the bride her needs, or for the deceased a casket and shrouds and anything similar to this. He may also say to his fellow that he should wait until dark so that he may bring it to him, for since he himself is permitted to do so, all the more so may he tell his fellow to do this. He may also say to him: "Go to such-and-such a place tomorrow to buy this, and if you do not find it in such-and-such a place, go to such-and-such a place; and if you do not find it for a maneh, take it for two hundred." This is provided that he does not mention to him a fixed purchase sum—that is to say, that he should not say to him not to add beyond such-and-such an amount of money—for this is actual buying and selling, and "doing Heaven's affairs" was not permitted, and only "finding" was permitted; and as long as he does not fix a set price, it is all included in "finding." Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 3: That if it is impossible for him unless he mentions a purchase sum, it is permitted in any case, for this is a mitzvah need; and some forbid in any case, and such is the primary ruling. Thus far his words. For the one who permits holds that since there is no actual purchase here, it is all included in "finding," meaning to find for the sake of the purchase; and those who forbid hold that a fixed price is included in "doing your affairs," which is forbidden as has been written. And all the more so is it forbidden to say to the one from whom he is taking the item: "I have taken from you for eight dinars, give me two more dinars' worth and I will owe you ten," for this is certainly forbidden as it is like an actual purchase (and it seems to me that regarding this everyone agrees it is forbidden, even though from the arrangement of the wording of the Rema it does not appear so, see there and examine carefully).

It is a known matter that it is forbidden to take payment for Shabbat even for something that is permitted to be done on Shabbat, such as payment for guarding, unless it is by inclusion with other days, such as when one takes payment for a week or a month, so that the day of Shabbat is included within the other days. And even regarding the guarding of a mitzvah matter it is so, and we do not say in this case that "the affairs of Heaven are permitted." And this is what we learned (Bava Metzia 58a): One who hires a worker to guard the cow, to guard the child, to guard the seeds—meaning, a treasurer of the Temple who hired a worker to guard the Red Heifer or the children who are prepared for this or the seeds for the Omer—they do not give him payment for Shabbat; therefore, responsibility for Shabbat is not upon him. If he was hired for the week, hired for the month, hired for the year, hired for the seven-year cycle—they give him payment for Shabbat since it is by inclusion; therefore, responsibility for Shabbat is upon him. Behold, we have learned that even for a mitzvah matter it is forbidden, for this is not included in "finding [your own affairs]" but rather included in "your affairs," as this is not a preparation for a matter but a complete shevut, even though they did not speak explicitly. (And this is the reasoning of the Tur who wrote: "it is forbidden for him to take payment for Shabbat," and the Bach wondered why he changed from the wording of the Gemara, see there; and to me it is settled, for here regarding the matter of Shabbat this is the essence of the law, but I wonder at the wording of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch section 4 who wrote this law regarding hiring in general, and did not write the primary novelty that even for a mitzvah matter it is forbidden, which is the primary point belonging to this siman. And they wrote according to the wording of the Rambam at the end of chapter 6, but the Rambam is not dealing there with the laws of the affairs of Heaven, see there and examine carefully.)

And when he hired him for a month or for a week and he demands from him a portion of his wages, it is forbidden for him to say: "Give me for Shabbat," but rather he says to him: "Give me the wages of the week" or "the wages of the month," or "give me a portion of the wages of the week and the month." And likewise he may say to him: "Give me the wages of ten days." And it seems to me that he may also say to him: "Give me the wages of seven days," even though it appears as if he is also mentioning Shabbat—it is permitted, since it is by way of inclusion, and this is like a week. However, even if he hired him for a month, but he stipulated with him that he would pay him every day according to what is due for the day—he is called a day laborer, for if he dismisses him in the middle of the week, he will not pay him for the whole week but only according to the days, and therefore he is called a day laborer and it is the wages of Shabbat (Magen Avraham, subsection 7). Therefore, if they spoke that he would pay him for the whole week even if he dismisses him in the middle of the week—it is permitted. Therefore, those who lend with interest according to a heter iska should act such that when he pays him, he should not calculate days but rather a week, so that it should not be the wages of Shabbat, and so it is in all matters. But for a reduction—it is permitted even to calculate for each day, and only regarding profit is it forbidden to calculate by the day (ibid., and so it is in Ketubot regarding the matter of a rebellious wife on page 64a, the difference between an addition and a reduction, see there).

And since it has been explained that even for the purpose of a mitzvah, sechar Shabbat is forbidden, therefore it is forbidden to hire chazzanim to pray on Shabbat and to give them such and such for this, unless they are hired for a week, or for a month, or for a year. And even though the primary intent is for the sake of Shabbat as is known, nevertheless the hiring is for the week, as is the custom of the chazzanim who take wages for the week. However, with us it is a daily occurrence that itinerant chazzanim pray on Shabbat and take wages for this according to what the gabba'im agree upon with them, and according to this it is a complete prohibition. And even when they give him a weekly wage, there is one who says that he must pray every day (Magen Avraham, subsection 9), and our custom is not so. But one could say that because they are obligated to go to a brit milah and to a wedding it is permitted; yet as is known, the primary hiring is for the prayers of Shabbat, Yom Tov, Rosh Hashanah, and Yom Kippur, and according to this it constitutes sechar Shabbat and it requires further study.

This is the wording of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 5: "It is forbidden to hire chazzanim to pray on Shabbat, and there is one who permits," thus far his words. And behold, the Tur later in siman 585 ruled for the prohibition, and brought proof from that which we brought in section 9 regarding one who hires a laborer. And our teacher, the Beit Yosef, there in section 5 wrote: "One who takes payment... does not see a sign of blessing," see there. And even though here it appears that he holds like the first opinion, as he writes the second in the name of "one who permits" according to his way, nevertheless, it appears that because he saw that such is the custom of the world, he did not rule there definitively for the prohibition. And the one who permits brought proof from that which is in Pesachim (50b) that four types of coins have no sign of blessing in them, and one of them is the payment of meturgemanim who stand before the sage on Shabbatot and make the words heard to the masses, see there, for it says the reason is that it appears like Shabbat wages. This implies that there is no prohibition, but only that one does not see a sign of blessing. And there is one who says the distinction is because there, regarding one who hires a laborer, the mitzvah is not dependent on Shabbat, but regarding meturgemanim and chazzanim, it is dependent only on Shabbat (Taz ibid. subsection 7). And it is not understood, for on the contrary, since it is designated for Shabbat, it should be more of a prohibition. And the two opinions are in the Mordechai, Ketubot, end of chapter 5, and the one who permits says the reason there is since it is a matter of a mitzvah (and so wrote the Magen Avraham in subsection 8). And it is not understood, for is it to be said that one who hires a laborer for the guarding of the Parah Adumah is not a matter of a mitzvah? And it appears that this is what they mean: since this mitzvah must of necessity be done on Shabbat, like the meturgemanim and chazzanim, and there is no one who wants to do it for free, therefore it is necessary to pay them, and they truly do not act well and therefore do not see a sign of blessing. However, they also do not perform a prohibition, for regarding them it is like payment for idleness, as they do not take payment for the Shabbatot but rather for their toil in this throughout the entire week. Thus it is found that those who give are under no prohibition, for they are compelled to this according to the law, and those who receive do not take Shabbat wages but rather payment for idleness of the weekdays. And although with us there is no necessity for the singing chazzanim, as a simple man is able to pray before the amud, nevertheless, since the masses perceive this as a mitzvah and for the honor of Shabbat and Yom Tov and also for pleasure, it automatically becomes like a mitzvah; and also for the traveling chazzanim, they consider this Shabbat pleasure, and the money is given by way of a donation, therefore there is no prohibition in the matter (so it appears in my humble opinion to find merit, and the words of the Beit Yosef there require further study).

Matters of Heaven may be spoken of, such as calculations of a mitzvah, like a calculation of tzedakah or a calculation of what is needed for a seudat mitzvah, and likewise to pledge tzedakah. And even though one may not consecrate or evaluate on Shabbat, this is because an utterance to the Most High is like delivery to a commoner, and it turns out that he is transferring from his domain to the domain of the sanctuary. However, our tzedakah, whether for the poor or for the beit knesset, has the status of a commoner, as written in Choshen Mishpat siman 95, and consequently there is no transfer here from domain to domain on Shabbat, but merely speech of a mitzvah, and it is like a neder, and it is permitted to vow a neder of a mitzvah on Shabbat. And perhaps even if he delivers some object to the treasurer of tzedakah on Shabbat—it is also permitted, because he certainly already donated this from the eve of Shabbat. However, it is better not to deliver to the treasurer on Shabbat (and see Taz subsection 2 and Magen Avraham subsection 11).

And likewise, it is permitted to oversee the affairs of the public on Shabbat, for there are no greater "Heavenly matters" than this, even when the matters are of a mundane nature, such as in affairs of livelihoods and boundary disputes and the like, for all needs of the public are a great mitzvah. And even though no shevut or shevut of "speaking to a non-Jew" was permitted for the sake of public needs, nevertheless, mere speech—the prohibition of which regarding one's own affairs is because of "and speaking a word"—this is considered "Heavenly matters," and it is permitted to speak of them and to arrange matters through mere speech (Magen Avraham, subsection 12). And likewise, it is permitted to arrange a match for a young man and a young woman on Shabbat through mere speech, because this is a matter of a mitzvah, and all the more so to speak with a teacher that he should teach a child Torah, or with a craftsman to teach him a craft, for this is also a mitzvah, because if he has no craft, he will engage in robbery. And specifically to speak if the teacher or the craftsman wishes to be hired, but it is forbidden to conclude with him by way of a kinyan, and also to mention to him the amount of the price is forbidden, for only the speaking of this was permitted.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 6: "There are those who say that in a place where it is customary to give the one called to the Torah a Mi Shebeirakh and he vows to charity or to the chazzan—it is forbidden to fix on Shabbat how much he will give. But the custom is to be lenient, for it is permitted to fix charity." Thus far his words. That is to say, this is not like buying and selling where he pays such and such for the aliyah, but rather it is merely charity, and it is the way of those who ascend to the Torah to fix charity, and it is permitted to fix charity. And even when they give to the chazzan and he is wealthy—nevertheless, it is like charity, since they give to him for the mitzvah of the prayer (Magen Avraham, subsection 15).

And in a place where they sell the mitzvot and there are those who hesitate regarding this, for this is literally like buying and selling, as this one gives such-and-such and this one adds to it; nevertheless, this is not like buying and selling, for is there a monetary value in this? Rather, it is like one who says: "If I merit this aliyah, I give such-and-such to tzedakah," and this one says: "I add to the tzedakah if I merit this aliyah." Therefore, there were some of the early pious ones who were accustomed to pay the beit din everything they desired to give for the aliyah, even though the second person added more and it remained with the second person, because they considered this like one who vows to tzedakah. However, according to the law it is not so, for he vowed upon a condition (see Magen Avraham ibid.), and the custom of Israel is Torah and there is no reason to doubt it at all. And it is obvious that to sell seats in the beit knesset is forbidden on Shabbat and Yom Tov, for this is literally like buying and selling, as he sits in the place. But other mitzvot such as an aliyah to the Torah, and hagbahah, and gelilah, and opening the ark, and wine for kiddush and havdalah—it is permitted, for this is nothing but mere tzedakah, as I have written.

The Rambam wrote in chapter 23, law 12: "And so too it is forbidden to buy and to sell and to hire and to lease, a decree lest one write." Thus far his words. And I do not know why this is necessary, for behold the prohibition is clear because of 'pursuing your business and doing your affairs on My holy day,' for even speech is forbidden regarding this (113b), and so wrote the Tosafot there, and it will be explained at the beginning of siman 307. However, also in Rashi (Beitzah 37a) it is found in this wording: "And buying and selling is forbidden from the Scripture, as it is written: 'pursuing your business and speaking a word,' or alternatively, buying and selling leads to the writing of bills of sale. And if you say it would be a decree upon a decree—it is all one decree." Thus far his words. And perhaps our teachers said this as an additional reason to 'pursuing your business.' And so too a gift is like a sale, as it goes from domain to domain and is forbidden on Shabbat, but for a matter of a mitzvah and for the need of Shabbat—a gift is permitted (Magen Avraham subsection 15 and Beit Yosef siman 527). And even though buying and selling is certainly forbidden even for a matter of a mitzvah, in truth a gift is not comparable to buying and selling, for regarding a gift 'pursuing your business' is not so applicable, as this is not to profit but because of love. And even though we find in the Gemara regarding the matter of a gift that were it not that he derived benefit from him he would not have given him a gift, and a gift is like a sale (Megillah 26b), nevertheless this is not in order to profit, and its law is like hekdesh, which is forbidden to consecrate on Shabbat. But that which is the need of the day is permitted, as I wrote in siman 339, and it is explicitly stated so in the Gemara at the beginning of the chapter 'Shoel': "A person may consecrate his Pesach offering on Shabbat and his Chagigah offering on Yom Tov," and also 'lest one write' is not applicable to a gift, for writing in a ledger is specifically in matters of negotiation. And there is one who wondered about that which they give gifts to the groom on Shabbat (ibid.), but in truth there is no prohibition in this, for it is called a matter of a mitzvah, as it is a mitzvah to gladden a groom and bride. And it is also the need of the day, for since the custom on the first Shabbat after the marriage is to make a feast, and it is a time of joy for the groom and the bride, it is certainly permitted to gladden them with gifts. And so is the custom to give the bride gifts then, and there is no trace of a prohibition in this at all, and the custom of Israel is Torah (so it appears in my humble opinion).

The Rambam wrote there: "Whether one sells by word or by delivery—it is forbidden, whether with scales or without scales. And just as it is forbidden to weigh, so too it is forbidden to count and to measure, whether with a vessel, by hand, or with a rope." Thus far his words. And we say at the end of Shabbat that it is permitted to measure on Shabbat a measurement of a mitzvah, such as measuring a hole to see if it has an opening of a tefach regarding the bringing in of tumah, see there; and it is permitted to measure a mikveh to see if it contains forty seah. And even a measurement for a charm, which women have held the practice of measuring the belt of a sick person for healing and whispering over it—it is permitted, for it is a measurement of a mitzvah.

In Choshen Mishpat siman 73 it was explained that one who was indebted with money to his fellow and swore to repay him on a certain day of a certain month, and that day occurred on Shabbat, if he did not repay him before the Shabbat—he must give him a mashkon on Shabbat and they shall appraise it, for without appraisal it is not repayment (Sma ibid.), or he must transfer to him ownership of the object itself (Bach ibid.). And we explained there in section 10 that this is when he claimed it from him on Shabbat, for even though he performs a prohibition by claiming it on Shabbat, nevertheless, after he claimed it—the oath takes effect upon him. However, if he did not claim it—he does not transgress; see there. And there is one who forbids the appraisal and the measurement (Magen Avraham subsection 16), but in my humble opinion it is not so, for behold, measurement for a mitzvah is permitted as has been written, and the same law applies to an appraisal for a mitzvah, and here it is a great mitzvah to fulfill his oath. And if he obligated himself specifically to money—there is no remedy for this, for muktzeh was not permitted to be moved for this sake; rather, he should transfer to him ownership of the room where the money is placed and he will acquire the money by way of chatzer, as has been written there. And there is one who says that he should command a non-Jew to give him the money (Magen Avraham ibid.), but how shall the lender receive them unless the non-Jew places them in the house of the lender. And it is obvious that if it is possible to appraise and measure by means of a non-Jew—it is better than by means of an Israelite, and then it is forbidden by means of an Israelite. And if he has a mashkon from a non-Jew and comes to exchange it on Shabbat—it is permitted, provided that the non-Jew takes out the first mashkon by way of a garment, and if not—it is forbidden, and it will be explained in siman 325 with the help of Heaven.

The needs of a bride and the needs of the deceased—it is permitted to speak of them on Shabbat, as it is speech regarding a mitzvah. And this is specifically regarding a matter that concerns their actual needs, but it is forbidden to tell a non-Jew to go outside the techum on Shabbat to the relatives of the bride so that they may come to the celebration, or to the relatives of the deceased so that they may come to eulogize him; since this only concerns their honor, it was not permitted for this purpose. However, regarding a sick person, when he says to send for his relatives and he is a dangerously ill person—one is obligated to send a non-Jew for them, even to hire a non-Jew on Shabbat to go, for we are concerned for the sick person that his mind might become unsettled if they do not fulfill his words; and several matters were instituted regarding acquisitions for the benefit of a sick person, as is explained in Choshen Mishpat siman 250. Nevertheless, that the Israelite himself should perform a rabbinic prohibition—this was not permitted, for this is not a cure but merely a concern. Therefore, regarding the matter of "pursuing your own affairs and speaking of them," we are concerned for this, but not regarding a matter of a complete prohibition. And it appears to me that if the doctor says there is danger if they do not fulfill his words—behold, he is like any dangerously ill person, and it will be explained in siman 328 with the help of Heaven.

The Rambam wrote in chapter 6, law 11: "One who purchases a house in Eretz Yisrael from an Arab—it is permitted for him to tell a non-Jew to write a deed for him on Shabbat, for telling a non-Jew on Shabbat is prohibited by their words, and for the sake of the settlement of Eretz Yisrael they did not decree regarding this matter. And so too one who purchases a house from them in Syria, for Syria is like Eretz Yisrael regarding this matter." Thus far his words, and this is explicitly stated in Gittin (8b). The great Rishonim explained that the intention is not to purchase on Shabbat, for this is certainly prohibited, but rather that if he purchased on the eve of Shabbat and it is necessary to tell a non-Jew to write—it is permitted (Magen Avraham, subsection 19, in the name of the Rosh and the Rivash). The Tur omitted this, for perhaps he holds that in this time, in its destruction, this does not apply.

And know that it is clear to me, in my humble opinion, that a great printing error fell in the Shulchan Aruch, section 11, where they wrote: "It is permitted to buy a house in Eretz Yisrael from a non-Jew on Shabbat, and he signs and records it in the archives." Thus far his words. And it must be said as follows: "It is permitted for one who buys a house in Eretz Yisrael from a non-Jew to tell the non-Jew to sign, and he records it in the archives," for so it is explicitly in the Gemara and in the Rambam there. And there is no difference regarding which script it is, for in any script and language, one who writes intentionally is liable to stoning, and unintentionally is liable to a sin offering, as the Rambam wrote in chapter 11, law 10. This is his wording: "And one who writes in any script and in any language is liable." See there, and all the Rishonim wrote so. And it is necessary to say so, for even with two marks one is liable, as is written in siman 340. (And in the Hagahah it is written in this section that in their script it is only prohibited by rabbinic law, see there. And it is a great mitzvah to erase it from the books, and many of the heretics depend on this in our many sins, and there is no place for this in the law and Heaven forbid to say so; and so wrote the Magen Avraham later in siman 340, subsection 10, and so the author of the Mishnah Berurah elaborated on this, and in the Levush he did not write this and so the Graz, and there it was printed as needed, see there. And that which the Levush wrote that it is only prohibited by rabbinic law—his intention was regarding the speaking to a non-Jew, as the Eliyah Zuta wrote there, and so wrote the Eliyah Rabbah, subsection 24.)

It is permitted to announce a lost object on Shabbat, even if it is a muktzeh item that is forbidden to be moved on Shabbat, for returning a lost object is a positive commandment and this constitutes matters of Heaven. And if they must also announce their own lost objects on Shabbat—it is consequently also permitted (see Magen Avraham subsection 11). And it is permitted to release communal bans on Shabbat even though it is not for the sake of Shabbat, for since Shabbat is a day of assembly for the masses and it is impossible to do this on a weekday—it is consequently like communal affairs which it is permitted to speak of. But to announce a prohibition on Shabbat—it is only for the needs of Shabbat, such as the annulment of vows which are only for the sake of Shabbat, as I wrote in siman 341. However, a matter that concerns the regulation of the city—it is permitted on Shabbat (Magen Avraham subsection 24). And the general rule of the matter: any matter that is understood that this announcement concerns the regulation of the city or the regulation of the public, such as they were accustomed at fairs to announce regarding one who does not pay his debts (ibid. and Bach siman 307), because this matter, even though it is an individual matter, nevertheless concerns the conduct of commerce for the public—it is included in communal needs and it is permitted to announce on Shabbat, and thus they conducted themselves before the giants of the world.

But to announce on Shabbat regarding land being sold that anyone who has a claim upon it should come and declare it, and if not, he shall lose his claim—it is forbidden, for this is like the issuing of a legal ruling on Shabbat. Rather, they may announce in a general manner that anyone who has a claim should come and declare it; even though it is understood on its own that if he does not come and declare it his claim is void, nevertheless, they do not utter the words explicitly and it is not like the issuing of a legal ruling. And even though it is the need of an individual, nevertheless, this is called a need of the public, meaning, for all sellers and buyers of lands and houses (see Magen Avraham subsection 26 and the Gra subsection 25). Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 13: "And so too it is forbidden to announce wine on Shabbat, for it is like buying and selling." Thus far his words. And we have not known of this custom. And it appears that they would announce who has wine to sell so that they might take it for kiddush and for havdalah; however, to make known the amount of the price certainly appears forbidden, and so wrote the great authorities. And there are those who wrote that they announced even the amount of the price, but it does not appear proper to do so (see Magen Avraham subsection 28 and Taz subsection 4).

One who was informed that they want to kill his daughter or to remove her from the community—it is a mitzvah to set his steps to the road even on Shabbat to endeavor in her rescue, and even beyond three parsas, and even to travel in a wagon with horses or to ride. And if he does not want to—they compel him, for this is pikuach nefesh for which one desecrates the Shabbat. And it is not specifically her father, for the same law applies to any person. And that which will be explained in siman 328, that if they coerce a person to a transgression one does not desecrate Shabbat to rescue him—this is regarding a one-time transgression, for what benefit is there in the rescue from this transgression, will he not perform the transgression of desecrating Shabbat? But in a case that concerns all the days of life—it is better to desecrate one Shabbat so that she will not desecrate the Shabbats of all the days of her life, as we say regarding pikuach nefesh as will be explained there (and see Taz subsection 5 and Magen Avraham subsection 29). And if she herself is negligent in this—it requires further study (and see Beit Yosef), and one should act in this according to the understanding of the matter.