Siman 301

Carrying out from a reshut hayachid to a reshut harabim is among the avot melachot and was present in the Mishkan, for one is not liable except for a melachah the likes of which was in the Mishkan, as has been written in siman 242. And besides it being in the Mishkan, it is explicit in the Torah, as it is written: "And Moshe commanded and they passed a voice through the camp saying: Let no man or woman do any more melachah for the contribution of the sanctuary, and the people were restrained from bringing," behold, it called bringing "melachah" (the Rambam, chapter 12). And there it was carrying out from a reshut hayachid to a reshut harabim, for Moshe was sitting in the camp of the Levi'im which is a reshut harabim, because all of Israel turned there, and he was saying to Israel: Do not bring out from your reshut hayachid to my reshut harabim (beginning of the chapter "HaZorek" (Shabbat 96b)). And even though regarding all the melachot we did not need to find this melachah explicit in the Torah, for since it was in the Mishkan it is included in "you shall not do any melachah," nevertheless, because the essence of carrying is an inferior melachah, as the essence of the object did not change and only its location changed, whereas all the melachot involve a change in the essence of the object, therefore if the Torah had not revealed that it is a melachah, we would not have known that it is a melachah (Tosafot, beginning of Shabbat, s.v. "Pasht"). And in Yirmiyah (17:22) it is also explained that it is a melachah, as has been written in siman 242; see there.

Our sages, of blessed memory, said (ibid.) that taking out is a primary labor, and bringing in from a public domain to a private domain is a derivative labor. It is a wonder regarding the Rambam, who wrote there that taking out and bringing in are among the primary labors; see there. And similarly, one who throws from a public domain to a private domain, or from a private domain to a public domain—is liable, for it is a derivative labor of taking out (ibid.). And one who carries four cubits in a public domain or throws—it is a law given to Moses at Sinai that it is included in taking out (ibid.), and it is also considered a derivative labor. And there is also handing from a private domain to a private domain through a public domain when they are on the same level, which is also a derivative labor of taking out, and it will be explained in siman 346 with the help of Heaven. And the liability of a public domain is only up to ten handbreadths from the ground, except for handing, and it will be explained there.

And the one who carries out, or brings in, or throws, or transfers is not liable until there is in the object he carried out a measure as will be explained. Likewise, he is not liable until he performs by himself both the akirah and the hanachah, and carries out the entire object into the reshut harabbim. Therefore, a basket that is full of objects, even if it is full of mustard, and he carried out most of it from this domain to that domain—he is exempt until he carries out the entire basket, and so too anything similar to this, for the outer vessel makes everything inside it into a single object, and it all becomes just one object. And this is what they said in the Gemara (91b): "The binding of a vessel is considered a binding," meaning that the outer vessel binds them all to be as one. And so too if he paused in the middle in a reshut hapatur—he is exempt, and this is what we learned in the Mishnah (ibid.): "One who carries out foodstuffs and placed them on a threshold that is a karmelit, and then took them out again—he is exempt, because he did not perform his labor all at once."

And likewise, he is not liable until he carries out or throws in his usual manner, but backhandedly, which is to say in an unusual manner—he is exempt. How so: One who carries out whether with his right hand, whether with his left hand, whether inside his lap, which is to say in some garment placed in his lap or pockets sewn into garments which are called "keshena," or if he went out with coins or another object tied in his sheet—he is liable, for he carried out in the manner of those who carry out. And likewise, one who carries out on his shoulder—he is liable, even though the shoulder is higher than ten tefachim in the reshut harabim, because such was the burden of the sons of Kehat, as it is written: "they shall carry on the shoulder," and we learn all the melakhot from the Mishkan. And in the Yerushalmi (Chapter 10) it is explicitly stated regarding that which is written: "And the charge of Elazar... the oil for the light, etc."—one oil in the right hand and one oil in the left hand, and the incense in his lap, and the griddle-cakes on the shoulder (Rashi 92a).

But one who carries out with the back of his hand—meaning he placed an object on the palm of the hand, which is the side where the nails are, and carried it out—or with his foot, or with his mouth an object that is not food, or with his elbow, which is the "ellenbogen," where he bent the arm and placed an object inside it and carried it out, or with his ear—where he inserted the object into his ear or placed it on the ear—or with his hair—where he tied the object in his hair and carried it out—or in a pocket that he sewed into his garment and the opening of the pocket is facing downward, and nevertheless it does not fall because the opening of the pocket is narrow. The Rambam wrote regarding a pocket: "that he sewed into his garment, and the opening of the pocket is downward between garment and garment at the edge of his garment." Thus far his words. Or in his shoe or in his sandal or in socks—he is exempt because he did not carry it out in the manner of those who carry out. And all of these are exempt according to Torah law but forbidden by rabbinic law, for all exemptions of Shabbat are "exempt but forbidden," and see in section 99.

It is stated in the Gemara there: "One who carries a burden on his head is exempt," and from Rashi there it is implied that this is specifically when he does not hold the burden with his hands, but if he holds it with his hand, he is liable; see there. And the Rambam wrote there: "One who carries a burden on his head, if it was a heavy burden such as a full sack or a chest and a cabinet and the like, which he places on his head and holds with his hand—he is liable, for such is the way of carriers, and it is found to be like one who carries on his shoulder or in his hand. But if he took a light object, such as if he placed a garment or a book or a knife on his head and carried it out, and he is not holding it with his hand—behold, he is exempt, for he did not carry it out in the manner of carriers, as it is not the way of most of the world to carry objects resting on their heads." Thus far his words, and this is like the words of Rashi, of blessed memory. And his intention is not that with a light burden when he holds it in his hand he is liable, for if so, he contradicts the first clause which requires specifically a heavy burden; rather, he is stating the common way of things, that with a light burden one does not hold it with his hands, and the intention of Rashi must also be said so (and so it appears from the Maggid Mishneh, see there and examine carefully). But I wonder, for if so, also regarding one who carries on his shoulders he should have made such a distinction, as it is known that on the shoulders one only carries a heavy burden. And so it is implied in the Yerushalmi, where Rabbi Yosei asks: "If so, if one carried out the volume of a dried fig on his shoulder, is he liable?" See there, and it is in the language of wonder. And it is explicitly implied in the Mishnah there that "on his shoulder" is similar to "in his hand" and he is liable in any case, and it requires further study. (And it must be said that the Yerushalmi indeed asks this, for from the Mishnah it is proven to be similar to "in his hand," yet it is not the way to carry a small burden on one's shoulder. And it answers that we learn it from Elazar, but also in its answer there a deficiency appears, for the version there is not as Rashi wrote on the Mishnah that we brought in section 4, and it does not consider at all by name that which is on the shoulder, and so too in the Midrash Bamidbar at the end of chapter 4; see there and it requires further study.)

There are many laws regarding hotza'ah concerning the manner of the removals and the placements and the domains, and all of them will be explained with the help of Heaven in siman 347, for that is their place. Here we must explain the measures of hotza'ah, and the Rambam explained them in chapter 18, and how much the measures of hotza'ah are on Shabbat. And not specifically hotza'ah, for the same law applies to bringing in, transferring, throwing, and handing, but because hotza'ah is the av melakhah—therefore they are all included in its name, but they have one law.

This is the wording of the Rambam there: "One who carries an object from a private domain to a public domain, or from a public domain to a private domain—is not liable until he carries out an amount that is of some use. And these are the measures for carrying: One who carries human food—the volume of a dried fig, and they combine with one another, provided that there is the volume of a dried fig from the food itself, excluding the peels, the pits, the stems, the fine bran, and the coarse bran." Thus far his words. And even those peels that are eaten with the fruit, such as the peels of lentils and the peels of any tree fruit—nevertheless, we require something significant, and behold, even the fine bran and the coarse bran are eaten by people when they are together with the flour, and for the measure of challah they combine, as is written in Yoreh Deah siman 324, yet nevertheless regarding the matter of Shabbat they do not combine for this reason, and so too here (Gemara end of chapter Kelal Gadol). And this is the very reason why we require the volume of a dried fig and it is not sufficient with the volume of an olive as with all Torah measures, because we require something significant, and the dried fig is larger than the volume of an olive, and all the measures are a law given to Moses at Sinai. (And it is alluded to in the verse 'A land of wheat and barley etc.', and a fig is the volume of a dried fig for the carrying of Shabbat as is found at the beginning of Eruvin, and it is larger than the volume of an olive as is proven in HaMatznia 91a, and the precise measure of a dried fig has not been clarified for us, and see Tosafot Eruvin 80b s.v. 'Agav').

He further wrote: "The amount of a quarter of a revi'it, and if it was congealed - the size of a kezayit." Thus far his words. And the reason is as we learned in a Mishnah: One who carries out wine - the amount for the dilution of the cup of blessing, which is a revi'it, and all wine carries upon it three parts of water, and therefore a quarter of a revi'it is sufficient. And even though the three parts of water are not here, nevertheless, since the primary importance is the wine and the water is considered as nothing compared to the wine, and on Shabbat we require only something of importance - therefore a quarter of a revi'it is sufficient (Gemara ibid. 77a). And I wonder how the Rambam ruled thus without qualification, for this was only with the wine of their days, but our wines do not accept so much water. And therefore the Tanna actually taught: "the amount for dilution," meaning every wine according to the measure of its dilution, and our wines which do not accept dilution at all - require a revi'it. And in the Gemara where Rav Nachman said: "A cup of blessing - it must have in it a quarter of a revi'it etc." - he spoke regarding the wines of his time, but how did the Rambam rule without qualification a quarter of a revi'it? And this requires great study. And that which is congealed is a kezayit - because a revi'it, when it congeals, will stand at a kezayit (Gemara ibid.), and why is a full revi'it required here - because congealed wine does not accept dilution (Rashi ibid.).

He further wrote: "Milk of a pure animal—the amount of a swallow; and milk of an impure animal—enough to paint one eye. Human milk and the white of an egg—enough to put in a compress; oil—enough to anoint the small toe of a one-day-old infant; dew—enough to rub into a collyrium. And a collyrium—enough to rub with water; and water—enough to wash the surface of a mortar. Honey—enough to put on the head of a sore; blood and all other liquids and all wastewater—a revi'it." Thus far his words. (Milk of an impure animal is in the Yerushalmi there). And the measure of "the amount of a swallow" was not specified, and some say it is a mouthful, but it does not appear so in Yoma (80a), yet it is more than a kigrogeret (Tosafot ibid.). And that which he wrote: "water—enough to wash the surface of a mortar," apparently it is against the Mishnah which said: "water—to rub a collyrium with them," but in the Yerushalmi there it explains that this is regarding water of dew, but ordinary water—enough to wash the surface of a mortar, and in the Yerushalmi it says "to rinse," and it is all one. And even though from our Shas it does not appear so, for it says there (78a) that drinking water is common, see there, and this is certainly regarding ordinary water, yet the Rambam was not concerned for it since in the Yerushalmi it is specified so, and in our Shas it is not so specified. (And according to the Yerushalmi, that which Shmuel said there: "Every liquid heals and protects," meaning the eye forms a crust, "except for water"—this is regarding water of dew, see there).

One who carries out straw of grain—its measure is like the full mouth of a cow, and even if he carried it out for a camel, whose mouth is larger than that of a cow—he is liable (76a). And straw of legumes, even if he carried it out without specification—he requires like the full mouth of a camel, which is more than the mouth of a cow, because a cow does not eat this straw except through difficulty. And if he carried out straw of legumes like the full mouth of a cow for a cow—there is a dispute in the Gemara there between Rabbi Yochanan and Resh Lakish: Rabbi Yochanan exempts, for eating through difficulty is not called eating, and Resh Lakish holds him liable—for it is called eating. And according to the rules of the Shas, the halacha follows Rabbi Yochanan against Resh Lakish, yet the Rambam ruled there that he is liable, for his version of the text was "Rabbi Oshaya" and not "Resh Lakish," and the halacha follows him against Rabbi Yochanan (Kessef Mishneh there). However, this is not necessary, for even according to our version of the text it works out well, since it says there previously that Rabbi Yochanan retracted and agreed with Resh Lakish; see there. Furthermore, since the reason depends on whether eating through difficulty is called eating or not, and we have already established in Choshen Mishpat siman 391 that it is eating, and it is explicitly stated so at the beginning of the chapter Keitzad HaRegel; see there (19b).

Amir, which are the stalks of ears of grain—the measure is the full mouth of a lamb; grasses—the full mouth of a kid, as its measure is smaller than the mouth of a lamb, but amir is not fit for a kid. However, regarding grasses that are fit for both—one follows the stringency (Rashi). And even if one carried it out for the sake of a lamb—he is liable, like the straw of grain that one carried out for a camel in the previous section. Garlic leaves and onion leaves, if they were moist—the measure is like a grogeret, because they are fit for human consumption, and if they are dry—the full mouth of a kid. And all of these do not combine with one another for the more stringent measure among them, but they do combine for the more lenient among them. How so: if one carried out straw of grain and of legumes, if there is in both of them the full mouth of a cow—he is exempt, and if the full mouth of a camel—he is liable; and so too amir and grasses and anything similar to them.

One who carries out wood—the measure is enough to cook a dried fig's bulk of a chicken egg, which is the easiest of all eggs to cook, and furthermore, not to cook it alone, for that requires much wood, but rather when it is beaten with oil or other liquids and placed in a stew pot, which hastens the cooking. And one who carries out a reed—the measure is enough to make a pen that reaches his fingertips. And there is reason to doubt in this time when we do not write with a reed what its law is, and it appears that its law is like other wood; and even in their time, if it was thick such that it was not fit for writing or if it was crushed—its measure is like wood.

We learned in the Mishnah (chapter 9): "Spices — enough to spice a light egg," and Rashi explained: like a dried fig's volume of a light egg, which is a chicken egg, and certainly this is so, and it is learned from the previous law. However, the Rambam wrote: "enough to spice an egg," and perhaps his intention is also this, and he relied on the previous matter. And so it is explicit in the Yerushalmi (chapter 8, halacha 5) and this is its wording: "Every egg that we learned regarding vessels — is like an actual egg; regarding Shabbat — it is like a dried fig's volume of an egg." And we further learned: that all types of spices join together with one another, and it is explained in the Gemara — they taught this regarding types of sweeteners, since they are fit to sweeten the pot. That is to say, that in the term "spices" everything is included, even salt, as the Yerushalmi there asks, and this is its wording: "And it is difficult: do cumin and salt join together?" in wonderment, and it also answers — they taught this regarding types of sweeteners, see there. And it is a wonder regarding the Rambam who wrote simply that spices join together with one another, and even more so his words in the Commentary on the Mishnah require further study, where he wrote: like pepper and ginger etc., and behold pepper is not among the types of sweeteners (and see Tosafot Yom Tov). And it appears that the Rambam explains "types of sweeteners" — not specifically, but rather those things that sweeten the pot, and therefore from the combination of pepper and ginger and other things — the pot is sweetened. And the Yerushalmi only excluded salt, which is only so that it should not be tasteless, but all other types of spices — join together, and he explains the Gemara accordingly. (That which it said: "this too is fit to sweeten" — this is its explanation, that all types of spices together are fit to sweeten the pot to make it flavorful.)

One who carries out a peppercorn — any amount, as it is fit for the scent of the mouth (Shabbat 90.). And it is not our pepper (Rashi), for our pepper is included in spices, and its measure is enough to spice a dried fig from a light egg, and so it seems to me is the measure of salt. And itran, which is the waste of tar (20:) — any amount, as it is fit for a pain of half the head. A good scent — any amount, a bad scent — any amount, and so too a dye with which they dye purple — it is any amount, for it has a good scent (Rashi), and with a bad scent they fumigate the sick (ibid.). And types of fragrant spices — any amount, for every type of scent is any amount. And it seems to me that this is regarding spices that stand only for smelling, for if they are spices that enter into foods — behold they are included in spices, and their measure was explained in the previous section. And types of hard metals, such as copper and iron — any amount, for it is fit to make from it a small goad. (Gemara) And a leaf of a rose in the winter — one, and it is a type of lily, and the Gaon reads "the wick of the rose," which they make from dyed cotton in the form of a rose, and they call it a rose (Aruch). From the dust of the altar and from the stones of the altar and worn-out scrolls and their wraps — any amount, because they put them away to hide them. And a coal — any amount, and one who carries out a flame — is exempt, so wrote the Rambam there. And I wonder, for behold in the Gemara (Beitzah 39.) it is explained that this is only when he fanned it out, meaning that he pushed the flame with his hand to the outside, but if he carried it out on a splinter or a shard — he is liable, even though in the splinter and the shard there is no measure, see there, and he should have explained this. But if he carried out from the accessories of idol worship any amount — he is exempt, even though Rabbi Yehuda said in the Mishnah (90.) that he is liable because it is a commandment to destroy it, and in the Yerushalmi it says there that even Rabbi Shimon admits to it, even though he holds that a labor not needed for its own sake is exempt, because Rabbi Shimon admits regarding prohibited items of benefit, see there, and certainly the Rambam who ruled that a labor not needed for its own sake one is liable — nevertheless he ruled not like Rabbi Yehuda, because in our Talmud at the end of the chapter "Klal Gadol" on the Mishnah of "everything fit to put away," it says there to exclude the wood of an Asherah, see there, consequently we do not hold in this like Rabbi Yehuda. And even if he is liable for a labor not needed for its own sake — however, this is repulsive and he is exempt. (And with this one can settle the words of the Tosafot 94. starting with "the corpse" who wrote that Rashba brought that Rabbi Yehuda holds a labor not needed for its own sake one is liable from this Mishnah, and behold according to the Yerushalmi even Rabbi Shimon admits, but our Talmud disagrees in this and examine it closely)

It appears to me that regarding all measures of "any amount"—nevertheless, there must be some substance to it, except that there is no fixed measure for this. And the proof is from types of metals which are of "any amount" because it is fit to make from it a small goad, and behold, even the smallest of the small requires some measure. And so too, things for smelling are of "any amount," and behold, nevertheless, one must have some grasp in his hands, for if not so, it has passed and gone away; rather, it is certain that some substance is required. And if because of the expression "any amount"—our teachers, the authors of the Tosafot, already wrote in Shabbat (63b, s.v. "arig") that even "any amount" has some small measure, see there. (And although one may be precise there in their words from what they themselves wrote earlier in s.v. "minayin l'arig" that initially his intention was not to add, etc., and if so there is no proof, see there well; however, in any event they wrote so, and examine this.)

One who carries out garden seeds that are not edible and are only for planting is liable for less than a k'grogoret. It has not been clarified how much its measure is, for "less" includes slightly less and much less. The Rambam in the Commentary on the Mishnah wrote: "close to a k'grogoret," and explains—slightly less; however, even this has not been clarified as to how much slightly less, and perhaps in any case it requires more than half of it. One who carries out cucumber seeds—two seeds, and from gourd seeds also two, and likewise from Egyptian bean seeds. One who carries out bran—enough to place on the mouth of a crucible of gold refiners (78b), for in a place where there is no charcoal, they refine gold with a fire of bran (Rashi), and according to this, nowadays this is not applicable. Bran for us is only for animal feed, and its measure is the fill of a kid's mouth. One who carries out coarse bran, and this is the waste remaining in the sieve, if he carried it out for human consumption—its measure is a k'grogoret, and if for an animal—its measure is the fill of a kid's mouth, and if for dyeing—enough to dye a small garment. Shoots of shrubs and carobs, as long as they have not sweetened—a k'grogoret, for they are fit for a human, and once they have sweetened they are only for an animal—and its measure is the fill of a kid's mouth. But luf, mustard, lupines, and all other pickled items, whether they have sweetened or whether they have not sweetened—their measure is a k'grogoret, and we are not experts in these species.

We learn in the Gemara (90b): One who carries out seeds—and Rashi explained, date seeds—if for planting, two; if for eating, the equivalent of a pig's mouthful, and how much is a pig's mouthful? One. If for fuel, enough to cook a light egg, which is the equivalent of a dried fig's volume of it. If for counting, as they are placed as a sign of testimony for every simple dinar (Rashi), two. And the Rambam wrote: One who carries out seeds, if for eating, five; and if for fuel, they are like wood; and if for counting, two; and if for sowing, two. Thus far his words. And presumably, this was his version of the text in the Gemara. And in the Yerushalmi (Chapter 7, Halacha 2): "Median wheat—two; because they are precious, they treated them like garden seeds that are not eaten," and so it is there at the end of Chapter 9, see there. And the Rambam did not bring this, and perhaps since in our Gemara this was not brought, he presumably holds that their measure is like a dried fig like all foods; however, it is difficult to reject the Yerushalmi since there is no one who disagrees on this, and it requires further study.

One who carries out hyssop for food—the size of a dried fig; for an animal—the full mouth of a kid; for wood—the measure of wood for sprinkling [the measure of sprinkling], and its measure is explained in Tractate Parah chapter 12—enough to dip the tops of the stalks and sprinkle, see there. And one who carries out nut shells, pomegranate shells, isatis, or madder, and these are types of dye, and also nut shells, the intention is the green shell that is while it is still on the tree—enough to dye with them a small cloth the size of the opening of a sevakhah, meaning that at the top of a sevakhah made like a braid one places a small cloth (Rashi 89b), and a sevakhah is what girls place on their heads (the Rambam). And so too, one who carries out urine forty days old, or Alexandrian natron, or soap, or kimonia, or ashlag, and these are also types of herbs and types of earth that clean like soap—enough to wash with them a small cloth the size of the opening of a sevakhah, and so too all other cleaning agents. And if he carried out soaked dyes—enough to dye with them a sample for the hem of a weaver's reed, and this is a very small amount. And specifically with the dyes as they are, one needs enough to wash etc., because a person does not trouble himself to soak dyes for the sake of a sample (90a).

Ink - enough to write two letters, whether one carried out dry ink, or carried out the ink on a quill, or carried out in an inkwell called a "tintar" (p.). And the Rambam wrote there: "One who carries out ink on a quill - its measure is enough to write two letters from it, but if he carried out the ink by itself or in an inkwell - there must be more than this, enough for the quill to draw from it to write two letters. If there was in the inkwell enough for one letter and on the quill enough for one letter, or in the ink alone enough for one letter and on the quill or in the inkwell enough for one letter - this is a doubt whether they combine or not," and it is a query in the Gemara there. And it is simple that the same law applies even to enough for three letters, one in the ink and one on the quill and one in the inkwell - it is also a doubt, but two letters in two quills or in two inkwells - they combine and he is liable (Tosafot ibid.). And if it is difficult, for even without this he should be liable for the quill or for the inkwell - for it can be said that since they contain ink, they are secondary to the ink, just as when one carries out a living person on a bed - he is exempt even for the bed, for the bed is secondary to him (Rashi ibid.). And even with less than the measure the law is so, as we learned in a Mishnah (93b): "One who carries out food less than the measure in a vessel - is exempt even for the vessel, for the vessel is secondary to it." And if he carried out enough for two letters and wrote them while he was walking - he is liable even though there is no placement, for their writing is their placement, and their placement is on the paper, and all the more so if he stood to rest, for he is liable even without writing, for the standing of his body is considered like the standing of the object. And if he carried out enough for one letter and wrote it, and returned and carried out in one lapse of awareness another letter and wrote it - he is exempt, because the first letter has already diminished, and it is like one who carried out half a dried fig and placed it and returned and carried out another half a dried fig, which do not combine, for he only carried out half a measure and half a measure. And this is when he lifted the first one beforehand as will be explained, or diminished a bit from the first and burned it, and here too it is so, for when he wrote it on the paper it must necessarily diminish a bit when it dries somewhat (see Rashi ibid.).

One who carries out blue dye with which they paint the eyes—the measure is enough to paint one eye, for men do not paint their eyes and only women do, and modest women who go about wrapped and leave only one eye revealed paint only that one. Therefore, in villages where they do not require such modesty and go about with both eyes revealed, one is liable for enough to paint both of them, and so too in any place where it is not their way to adorn themselves except with two eyes. This applies when one carried it out for adornment, but if one carried it out for healing—in any case, one is liable for enough for one eye. Pitch and sulfur—enough to make a small hole; a vessel in which they place quicksilver, one plugs its mouth with pitch or sulfur and pierces a thin hole within the plug in order to bring it out (Rashi 78b). Wax—enough to place over the mouth of a small hole of wine, but not of oil and honey, for wine flows through a small hole more than oil and honey (ibid. 80a). Glue—enough to place on the head of the board that is at the head of the hunters' reed, for they place a small board at the head of a reed and put glue upon it and the bird sits upon it and is stuck to it, and one must place a great deal there so that the bird will be stuck to it (ibid.). And grease—enough to smear under a wafer the size of a sela; and Rashi explained grease as fat or oil (78b). And it is difficult, for regarding oil the measure was explained in section 10 as enough to anoint a small limb, see there. And it is possible that this and that are the same measure, or it is possible that there are two types of oils, and that which is fit for this is not fit for that.

One who carries out earth—its measure is enough to make a seal for a letter, and they wrote that this is a type of red earth. But ordinary earth—certainly it is not according to this measure, rather it is soil whose measure will be explained—enough to cover the blood of a bird. Clay—enough to make the mouth of a crucible of gold refiners. Manure or fine sand—enough to fertilize a leek, and this is kaplotot. Coarse sand—enough to mix with a full ladle of plasterers. Hardened clay, which is crushed brick—enough to make the mouth of a crucible of gold refiners, and likewise clay is according to this measure as I wrote, and he measured enough to fertilize clay of this measure. Lime—enough to smear the small finger of girls, for they would smear their faces with lime because it removes the hair and they beautify themselves with this. Soil and ash—enough to cover the blood of a small bird. A pebble or a stone—enough to throw at an animal so that it feels it, and it is the weight of ten zuzim. A shard—enough to hold a revi'it in it.

One who carries out a rope—sufficient to make a handle for a basket, and there is no distinction between a plain rope and an Egyptian rope, and the handle is for the purpose of grasping it. Papyrus (on "reed and rush" the Targum translates "reeds and papyrus")—sufficient to make a loop for a sifter or a sieve to hang them by. And there is room for doubt whether this is even with moist papyrus which is fit for animal fodder (Shabbat 112a), or specifically with dry papyrus, whereas with moist papyrus its measure is a kid's mouthful. And the leaves of palm branches—sufficient to make a handle for a basket, an Egyptian basket made from palm fibers. Bast that grows around the palm tree like a garment—sufficient to place over the mouth of a small funnel to strain wine. Fibers—sufficient to make a ball the size of a walnut (Tosefta chapter 10). A bone—sufficient to make a spatula, which is a spoon designated for physicians, and its measure is known to them (Aruch). Glass—sufficient to scrape the head of the weaver's tool, which is a piece of wood used by weavers with a sharp head (Rashi 81a), or sufficient to split two threads at once.

One who carries out two hairs from the tail of a horse or from the tail of a cow is liable, for they are put away for the trapping of birds. If he carried out one from the stiff hair of a pig, he is liable, as it is fit for a shoemaker to place it at the head of the stitching. Palm fibers, which are the threads of the wood—two, for two heddle-eyes in the weavers' house. Palm strips, which are the barks of the branches—one, as it is fit to hollow out a gourd (Aruch). From cotton, and from silk-wool, and camel hair, and rabbit hair, and sea creatures, and all other spun materials—enough to spin a thread the length of four tefachim (Tosefta ibid.). One who carries out from a garment, or from a sack, or from a hide—as their measure for impurity, so is their measure for carrying out: a garment three by three, a sack four by four, a hide five by five. And it appears to me that here as well they combine according to the more lenient among them and not according to the more stringent among them, as with animal food in section 12, and also regarding impurity it is so, as we learned in chapter 27 of Kelim, see there. It further appears to me that a mat is six by six for carrying out just as for impurity there; however, from the language of the Shas (79a) which brought this Mishnah, and there a mat is also included, and it says regarding this: "And it was taught regarding it: the garment, the sack, and the hide—as the measure for impurity, so is the measure for carrying out; and a mat, infer from this"—infer from this that it is not so, and the reason for this I do not know, and also in the Rambam a mat is not found, and it requires further study.

One who carries out hide that has not been processed at all but is still soft—its measure is enough to wrap a small weight whose weight is a shekel. If it was salted but has not yet been treated with flour or gallnuts—its measure is enough to make an amulet. If it was treated with flour but has not yet been processed with gallnuts—its measure is enough to write a get upon it. If its processing was completed—its measure is five by five, and according to Rashi specifically when they boiled it in hot water and it hardens so that it is difficult to sit upon it, and it is made to cover beds and sideboards (79a). And the reasons for these measures are because when the hide is in this state it is only fit for this, and therefore it is possible that as it improves, its measure is larger than before it was improved, as is explained from this law.

One who carries out processed parchment—enough to write upon it the parashah of Shema in tefillin, for tefillin are written on parchment, and Shema is the smallest of all the parashiyot. Duxustos—enough to write upon it a mezuzah, because it is written on duxustos, as I wrote above in siman 32 and in Yoreh Deah siman 288, and for tefillin duxustos is invalid. And what duxustos is has been explained there. And one should not ask why regarding tefillin he is liable for one parashah, whereas for a mezuzah we require a measure for the entire mezuzah; because a mezuzah consists of only one skin, and with two skins it is invalid as I wrote there, but the tefillin of the head consist of four parchments, and if so, one parashah is fit for one compartment of the head tefillin. Paper—enough to write upon it two letters of a tax collector's knot, which the tax collectors give to the one who pays the tax, and they are larger than our letters. And one who carries out a tax collector's knot is liable even though he already showed it to the tax collector and was exempted by it; nevertheless, he always carries it with him to show that he is a man who pays. And erased paper—enough to wrap over the mouth of a small flask of pelyton, which are good spices. And if there is enough in its white space to write two letters of a tax collector's knot, he is liable.

One who carries out a living person is exempt, for a living being carries itself. This is not because of the lightness of the burden, for one is liable even for a burden less than this, but rather because in the Mishkan they did not carry people, as this is not of the labors of the Mishkan (Tosafot 94a, s.v. "she-hachai"). The explanation of the matter: even though we do not require every single detail to be exactly like the labor of the Mishkan, but rather once this labor existed in the Mishkan, one is liable for this labor even in that which was not in the Mishkan—nevertheless, since the carrying of a living person is different from all other burdens, for in all other burdens the carrier carries it entirely, but a person carries himself, and it turns out that the carrier is not carrying him in his entirety. Indeed, if this thing had been in the Mishkan, he would be liable, but since it was not in the Mishkan, then this labor was not in the Mishkan. But one who carries domestic animals, wild animals, or birds is liable, for they let themselves hang (Gemara ibid.), meaning they make themselves heavy toward the bottom and do not carry themselves, and it is like all other burdens. It can also be said that it was in the Mishkan, for they would carry the reddened rams that were needed for the labor of the Mishkan. So too a child who cannot step with his feet—one is liable for him, and so too a sick person and so too one who is bound, for all these do not carry themselves and are like all other burdens. And also in the Mishkan it can be said they were present, for the women who spun, if they had a child, they would carry him, and so too when one of the craftsmen became ill, they necessarily carried him, and one who is bound and one who is sick are all one. (See Tosafot ibid., and this is according to Rav Natan and not according to the Rabbanan, and examine it closely.)

And know that there is an error among the masses who carry children and infants in a place where it is forbidden to carry, and they are accustomed to say that regarding a living being one is exempt, and they desecrate the Shabbat; for an infant who is unable to walk—one is liable for him from the Torah as has been written. And it was only permitted to assist him in walking, which means that he stands on the ground; if he is able to lift one leg and set down one leg—one is permitted to hold him by his hand and assist him in walking. And even a large child who is able to walk and "carries himself," although from the Torah one is exempt—it is forbidden by rabbinic law, like all exemptions of Shabbat which are "exempt but forbidden," as has been written in siman 242, and therefore one is obligated to inform the masses of this so that they do not stumble.

One who carries out a living person on a bed is exempt even for the bed, for the bed is secondary to him. And likewise, even if he was wearing clothes and wearing rings of silver and gold on his fingers, he is exempt, because they are secondary to him. But if the clothes are not on him in the manner of a garment but rather he carries them on his shoulder, he is liable; and likewise when the rings are not on the fingers but rather in his hands, he is liable, for in such cases they do not become secondary to him. And likewise, if he carried out a living child who is able to walk, and a pouch is hanging from his neck, which they hang for him to play with or to quiet him from crying, he is liable for the pouch, for a pouch of money is not secondary to the child. But things that are customary to hang on a child are nullified to him and he is exempt. (This law of a child is at the beginning of the chapter "Notel," and there it is according to Rabbi Natan who exempts for all living creatures; and if so, the Rambam who ruled like the Rabbanan should not have brought this law, and therefore I wrote "who is able to walk." However, regarding the essence of the law where the Rambam ruled not like Rav Nachman, it is difficult for me, for Rava ruled there like Rav Nachman, and how could he rule not like Rava? But regarding the Rambam it is not so difficult for me, for there it also says that Rava holds like Rabbi Shimon regarding a labor not needed for its own sake, and despite all this he ruled like Rabbi Yehuda as I wrote in chapter 1; but for all the poskim who disagreed with him and ruled like Rabbi Shimon because of that statement of Rava, as the Maggid Mishneh wrote in chapter 1—if so, regarding this matter of "a living being carries itself," we also hold like Rav Nachman because of that statement of Rava, and delve into this.)

We learned in the Mishnah (90b): A live pure hagav—any amount; dead—the size of a dried fig, for a live one is put away for a child to play with. Rabbi Yehuda says: Even an impure one, any amount, for it is put away for a child to play with. And the Rabbis hold that an impure one is not to be given to a child, for perhaps it will die and he will eat it, and the halakhah follows the Rabbis. According to this, one must wonder about the Rambam who wrote there without qualification: "One who carries out a live hagav—any amount, and dead—the size of a dried fig," and did not distinguish between impure and pure. And it appears in my humble opinion that certainly the halakhah follows the Rabbis that it is forbidden to give an impure hagav to a child for the reason we explained; however, if he did give it—behold, he has assigned it importance and is liable for any amount, for it is no worse than anything that is not fit to be put away but one put it away—for one who puts it away is liable, as will be explained, and therefore the Rambam wrote without qualification. And that which is forbidden to give to a child—its place is not in Shabbat, and it is included in all the prohibitions regarding a child that he explained at the end of Ma'akhalot Assurot. And know that in the Yerushalmi it says that a dead impure hagav is not the size of a dried fig but rather the size of a pig's mouthful, see there, and the Rambam did not concern himself with it because in our Gemara it does not imply so. And a tzipporet keramim, whether live or dead—any amount, for it is put away for medicinal purposes, and similarly anything like this, and it has not been clarified for us what a tzipporet keramim is (and see Aruch, entry palya).

A corpse, a carcass, and a creeping animal—as is the measure of their impurity, so is the measure of their carrying out: a corpse and a carcass in the measure of a kezayit, and a creeping animal in the measure of a ke'adashah. If there was exactly a kezayit there and one carried out a half-kezayit from it—he is liable, for he has accomplished something through his actions, as the measure was diminished from being able to impart impurity. But if he carried out a half-kezayit from a kezayit and a half—he is exempt, and so too in any similar case regarding other impurities. And know, that all of this is according to Rabbi Yehuda who holds one liable for a melakhah she'einah tzerikhah legufah, and therefore the Rambam ruled so there, as he follows his consistent view in chapter 1 that for a melakhah she'einah tzerikhah legufah—one is liable. But according to many of our teachers who ruled like Rabbi Shimon—here too he is exempt, for Rabbi Shimon disagrees regarding this in the Mishnah (93b), since he does not need the actual carrying out of the impurity, but rather only that they should not be defiled by it. And even if he carries out a corpse to bury it, which is a need of the corpse—he is exempt, for although the corpse needs this, he himself does not need this (Gemara 94a).

All the measures that have been explained apply only to one who carries out in an ordinary manner; therefore, we require each and every item to be according to what it is fit for in its own measure. However, one who carries out for sowing, or for medicine, or to show a sample from it, or anything similar to this—is liable even for any amount, because for these purposes even any amount is fit. And it is not only necessary to say if he carried them out now for these purposes, but even if he put something away for sowing, or for medicine, or for a sample, and forgot why he put it away and carried it out in an ordinary manner—he is liable for it for any amount, for he carried it out based on his initial intent, and if he forgot, he will remember afterward. And this applies only to the one who put it away, but any other person is not liable for it except according to the measures that have been explained, and we do not say that this person becomes liable through the intent of that person. And so, even if this person carried it out for one of these purposes and became liable for any amount—nevertheless, another person is not liable except according to its measure. And even this man himself, if he retracted from this and nullified it from what he intended for it for one of these purposes, and even if he did not nullify it explicitly but rather threw this item into a storehouse after he carried it out, even though its place is recognizable—his initial intent has already been nullified, for he did not perform an action with this but merely a thought, and a thought removes a thought. Therefore, if he went back and carried it out—he is not liable except according to its measure (91a).

And the sages taught in the Mishnah at the end of the chapter "Klal Gadol": "And they said yet another general rule: anything that is fit to be stored away, and people store away its like, and another person carried it out on Shabbat—he is liable for a chatat." And this is its explanation: anything that is fit to be stored away, meaning it is of the type made for human needs, and people store away its like, such that in this quantity there is a measure worthy of being stored away—every person is liable, even the wealthy person for whom this is not significant at all—nevertheless, he is liable. However, anything that is not fit to be stored away or where people do not store away such a measure, and it only became precious to one individual and he stored it away—this person is liable and all other people are exempt for it. And what is a thing that is not fit to be stored away even in a large measure? It is explained in the Gemara, for example, menstrual blood, even though one might store it to feed it to a cat; or wood from an asherah, even though there is a mitzvah in removing them from the house—nevertheless, it is not called "fit to be stored away" and no one is liable except the one who stored it. And according to the Yerushalmi one is liable for wood from an asherah, as I wrote above in section 15, but it is not so according to our Talmud, as I wrote there.

One who carries out half a measure is exempt, and likewise anyone who performs any of the labors half a measure is exempt, and it is a known matter that all exemptions regarding Shabbat mean "exempt but forbidden." And it is not similar to a half-measure of four cubits, which is permitted even ab initio, for there it is not fit to be joined together, as I have written in siman 242, section 35, whereas a half-measure is fit to be joined together. And we have already explained there that a half-measure regarding all labors except for carrying is forbidden by the Torah, just as with other prohibitions, and this matter is explicit in Rashi (74a, s.v. "ve-chi"). However, in the Tosefta of Beitzah (chapter 4, halacha 2) it is explicit that a half-measure on Shabbat is only on account of shevut, see there, and it requires further study.

If one carried out a half-measure and placed it down, and then returned and carried out another half-measure - he is liable. But if he first lifted the first half before he placed the second half - it is treated as if it were burned, and he is exempt. If one carried out a half-measure and placed it down, and then returned and carried out another half-measure and passed it over the first within three tefachim - he is liable even though he did not place it down, for anything less than three is considered as attached, and regarding one who passes an object, he does not require placement on something, for since he holds it in his hand - it is like placement on something. Therefore, one who throws an object over it within three - he is liable only when there was placement on something, and otherwise he is exempt, and it is not similar to one who passes an object; thus the Rambam ruled there. And in the Gemara there is a dispute regarding this, for Rava holds (page 80) that within three one requires placement on something, but Rav Hilkiya disagrees with him (page 97), and the Rambam ruled here and in chapter 13 like Rava, but Rabbeinu Chananel and the Ramban ruled like Rav Hilkiya (Maggid Mishneh chapter 13 halacha 17) (and see Tosafot page 80, beginning with "Veha").

If one carried out a half-shiur and then carried out another half-shiur, in one he'elam—he is liable; in two he'elamot—he is exempt. And in one he'elam he is liable even if the he'elamot were not identical, such as if one was with intent regarding the Shabbat and ignorance regarding the melakhah, and the other was the reverse (Rashi 71a, s.v. "Ketzirah"), and we have already explained this in siman 242, section 19. And there it is regarding two full shiurim, that they should be as one he'elam, and it stands to reason that the same law applies to two half-shiurim, that they should combine. On the contrary, regarding a half-shiur the knowledge must be clearer than regarding a full shiur, for Rabban Gamliel holds at the end of Perek HaBoneh that knowledge does not affect a half-shiur at all, and even though we do not rule accordingly—nevertheless, in any event, it is simple that it is no worse than two full shiurim.

However, even in one lapse of awareness, he is only liable when he carried out into one domain where there is no interruption of another domain between this half and that half; therefore, even though the halves are not adjacent to one another—nevertheless, they are placed in one domain. But when there is an interruption of a reshut hayachid between them, or if he brought them from a reshut harabim into a reshut hayachid and there is an interruption of a reshut harabim between them—he is exempt. But when a rabbinic domain such as a karmelit interrupts between them—we have no concern with it and he is liable (so the Rambam explained according to Rabbah there. And not like Abaye and Rava, for the halacha is not like the students in the place of their teacher, so wrote the Maggid Mishneh, halacha 24, see there).

One who carries out less than the minimum shiur and before he placed it down it swelled and became the minimum shiur, and similarly one who carries out the minimum shiur and before he placed it down it shriveled and became less than the minimum shiur - he is exempt, for the shiur was lacking either at the time of the akirah or at the time of the hanachah. And even if there was the minimum shiur at both times but in the middle it was spoiled, such as if he carried out the minimum shiur and it shriveled and before the hanachah it swelled - this is also a doubt whether he is liable or not, for perhaps we require the minimum shiur from its beginning until its end. And it is not similar to an unintentional act, where one is liable when he was unintentional at its beginning and its end even though in the middle he was intentional, as I wrote in siman 242, and this matter is explicit in the Gemara (102a) see there; nevertheless, here there is a doubt that perhaps there is "rejection" regarding Shabbat, meaning that perhaps since it became smaller than the minimum shiur it was rejected from its status, just as there is "rejection" regarding mitzvot (Gemara 91a). And see what I wrote in Yoreh Deah siman 85, section 16, that in this law there is a distinction between Shabbat and other prohibitions.

One who carries out the volume of a dried fig for eating and it shriveled before the placement, and he intended for it for planting or for medicine for which a minimum measure is not required—he is liable, since in the removal and in the placement there is liability even though the intentions were not equal to one another. And therefore, since it is not required that the intentions be equal, consequently—this is also the case regarding leniency, such as where he carried out less than the minimum measure for planting, for which he is liable, but before the placement he intended for it for eating—he is exempt, for its minimum measure is lacking according to his intention at the time of the placement. And if it swelled before the placement and became the minimum measure—he is liable, for even if he had remained silent and had not intended for eating, he would have been liable based on the first intention. (See in the Gemara 91a, and the Rambam there wrote that it became the minimum measure before he changed his mind for eating, see there, for if not so, there would be a bit of time where he was not clearly liable, for it would be a doubt as I wrote in the previous section, and examine this closely)

In the Gemara (ibid.), it remained in doubt regarding one who threw a kezayit of terumah into a contaminated house where there were foods less than a kebeitzah, which is the measure of impurity for foods, and this kezayit combined to form a kebeitzah: do we say that since it combines regarding the matter of impurity, it also combines regarding the matter of Shabbat, or perhaps for Shabbat we require a kegrogeret. And specifically where he threw it, for now the prohibition of Shabbat and impurity come simultaneously, as even regarding the matter of Shabbat he is not liable for throwing until it comes to rest; but if he brought it in—he is certainly not liable, for regarding the matter of Shabbat the liability is created immediately when he enters, as the placement of his body is considered like the placement of an object, and regarding the matter of impurity—there is no liability until it is near the foods (Tosafot ibid.). And similarly, specifically a kezayit of terumah, but less than a kezayit, even though it completed the kebeitzah, since there is no prohibition to eat it in impurity—it does not combine regarding the matter of Shabbat; and similarly, a kezayit of chullin—is not effective, because there is no prohibition in the eating of chullin in impurity (ibid.).

But the Rambam wrote there in law 27: "If one threw a kezayit of food into a tamei house, and this kezayit completed the food that was already there so that the whole became a kebeitzah—this is a doubt whether he is liable for the kezayit because it completed the measure regarding tumah, or if he is not liable." Thus far his words. And it appears that in his version, the word 'terumah' was not written in the Gemara, for since there is a kezayit, which is a significant amount everywhere, and it combines to a kebeitzah which is effective for tumah—there is a doubt as he wrote, but less than a kezayit—it has no significance, and we do not say 'since it combines regarding tumah—it also combines regarding Shabbat.' And it appears to me that this is only regarding food that was made susceptible to receive tumah, but if it was not made susceptible—it appears that it certainly does not combine regarding Shabbat (so it appears in my humble opinion, and see there in the Mishneh LaMelekh).

One who carries out foods less than the minimum measure in a vessel is exempt even for the vessel, for the vessel is secondary to it. The Rambam explained there that this is because his intention is not for the carrying out of the vessel, but for the carrying out of what is inside it. Thus far his words. From this it is clarified that if his intention was for the carrying out of the vessel, he is liable. This law is a Mishnah in the tenth chapter (93b), and in the Yerushalmi there it is clarified that this is only regarding foods that require a vessel, such as oily fruits like mulberries and the like, but when he does not require a vessel, he is liable; and so wrote the Ra'avad there. However, the Rambam did not bring this, because in our Gemara it does not imply so. Similarly, one who carries out a living person on a bed is exempt even for the bed, for the bed is secondary to the person. This is specifically when he is not bound, and is an adult who is able to walk, but a small child who is unable to walk or one who is bound—he is liable for the person, as I wrote in section 27. And one who carries out a peddler's basket, even though it contains many types and even if he carried them out in his palm—he is only liable for one, because all of them are one carrying out, and so too in any similar case.

We were commanded by the prophets that just as the Torah forbade carrying objects from a private domain to a public domain or from a public domain to a private domain, so too were we commanded regarding our actual walking, that there should be a change on Shabbat from the weekday. The prophet said: "If you restrain your foot because of the Shabbat," and we expound (113a) from this and also from the verse "and you shall honor it by not following your own ways" — that your walking on Shabbat should not be like your walking on the weekday. For on a weekday, it is a person's way to run after his business and to take large strides even though it is hard for the eyes (ibid.); however, on Shabbat — there is a prohibition to run and to take large strides, but rather one walks heel to toe like a man of rest. And how much is a large stride — more than a cubit, and that is because the sole of the foot is half a cubit, and between foot and foot is about half a cubit, and more than this is a large stride, unless it is impossible for him with less according to the measure of his leg and his way of walking. But for a matter of a mitzvah, such as going to the beit knesset or the like — it is permitted and a mitzvah to run, for these are the matters of Heaven, and it is written (ibid.) "from pursuing your own matters" — your matters are forbidden, but the matters of Heaven are permitted. (The Magen Avraham, subsection 2, wrote in the name of the Agudah that it is called a large stride when one uproots his second foot before the placement of the first, see there, and it is difficult to be careful in this and we are not accustomed to it at all, and Rashi there explained — more than a cubit in one stride, see there.)

And this matter is included in the category of Oneg Shabbat, as we say "a day of rest," and those who rest do not run nor do they take a large stride. Therefore, one for whom jumping and running is a pleasure, such as those youths who play with one other and take pleasure in their jumping and running—it is permitted even ab initio, since this is their pleasure. Similarly, to run to see some matter that one takes pleasure in—it is permitted even though at the time of the running he exerts himself a bit, but in any case this is his pleasure, that he takes pleasure in hurrying to see the thing he desires to see, since this is not due to business or weekday activities. (See Magen Avraham subsection 4, and it requires further study, for there it is for the purpose of reading). And it is stated in the Tosefta of Shabbat (Chapter 17): "One may not run on Shabbat in order to exercise, but one may stroll in his usual manner even the entire day." And this is its explanation: there are those whose cure is to run in order to exercise and sweat, and this is forbidden on Shabbat for two reasons: one because of medicine, and the second because at the time of the act the running is difficult for him and he suffers, but he does it for the sake of the cure. However, to stroll in his usual manner—it is permitted even if he has a cure in this, since it is not evident that he does this for the sake of medicine, and he does not suffer but rather takes pleasure in the manner of a stroll. And this is what our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 2, that it is permitted to stroll on Shabbat; thus far his words. That is to say, even though he intends it for medicine, like all foods that a person eats for medicine, for if not so, what is he teaching us? Why should strolling be forbidden? (And with this, the hesitation of the Magen Avraham subsection 5 is settled well; and see Taz subsection 1 and Eliyah Rabbah subsection 7, and according to what I have written, everything is settled well, and delve into it).

And even though it is forbidden to take a large stride on Shabbat, and likewise to jump when he has no pleasure from it, nevertheless, if he was walking and reached a water channel and has three paths before him: the first is to walk through the water, the second is to go around it, and the third is to jump over it. Behold, the first path, to walk in the water—is completely forbidden when walking for a discretionary matter, due to the decree lest he wring out the garments that will become filled with water, and only for a matter of a mitzvah did they permit it by means of a change, as will be explained. And the second path, to go around—there is also great exertion, and therefore the third path is better, namely, to leap and jump over it. And even if it is wide in a manner that he cannot place his first foot down before he uproots the second—nevertheless, it is better that he leap than that he go around, for he increases in walking. But if it is very wide—he is forced to go around, and this is better than walking in the water for the reason of wringing as I have written. And if there is no way to go around and when he walks he will be forced to walk in the water—it is completely forbidden unless for a matter of a mitzvah. And from this we have learned that if there is no water in the channel—that he must walk through it and ascend from it if it is impossible for him to leap over it, and leaping is better than descending into it and walking and ascending from it, for that is exertion like going around, but this depends on how great the depth is.

And if he was going for a matter of a mitzvah, such as to greet the face of his teacher or the face of one who is greater than him in wisdom and the like, and he needs to cross a stream of water: if he is able to leap over it—he should leap, and this is better, just as in a voluntary matter. And if he is unable to leap—he should go around it, and if he is also unable to go around—it is permitted for him to walk through the water, and this is the opinion of the great authorities later in siman 613. However, the opinion of our teacher, the Rema, there is that since they permitted him to walk through the water—it is better than going around it, for he increases in walking. And how should he act when he walks through the water—he should perform a change, which is that he should not bring his hand out from under the edge of his shirt. This means that one who crosses through water raises his garments very high, and places his hand under them until his hand protrudes from the edge of his garments so that they do not fall, and on Shabbat it is forbidden for him to do so; rather, he should walk in his garments in his usual manner, and in this there will be a reminder for him and he will not come to perform squeezing. And it is forbidden to cross in his sandal, for since he is unable to tie it and fasten it well—we are concerned lest it fall and he come to carry it in a place where it is forbidden to move objects, such as in a public domain or a karmelit. But a shoe—it is permitted, for it is fastened to his feet. And this is according to their form of their shoes, and now it is necessary to understand according to our forms which shoe is capable of falling from his feet and which is not capable of falling. And it appears to me that all our shoes are impossible for them to fall, and only the overshoes called "galoshes" are prone to fall, and it is forbidden to walk in them in somewhat deep water.

And in all these manners they also permitted one who was going to guard his fruits so that they would not be stolen, for this is permitted on Shabbat, as he is doing nothing but preventing the feet of the thieves, and guarding his property is also considered like a mitzvah. Nevertheless, there is a distinction between guarding his fruits and a matter of a mitzvah, for in a matter of a mitzvah they permitted even upon the return to go by way of a water channel just as during the going, according to the details that have been explained, for if we do not permit him upon the return - he will not want to go there. But in guarding his fruits - they only permitted him the going and not the return, and if he refrains - let him refrain. Furthermore, because of the loss of his property he will not refrain from his going, which is not the case regarding a matter of a mitzvah. (See Turei Zahav subsection 3 who asked why this was not counted in Beitzah among the things where they permitted their end because of their beginning, and it is not difficult at all, for there it involves several prohibitions, but in this case there is no prohibition but merely a concern.)

Since it has been explained that hotza'ah is a primary category of labor and one is liable for it to stoning, and if unintentional to a chatat, therefore one must know what is called carrying a "burden," as it is written: "And do not carry out a burden etc." — what is called a "burden," for that which a person walks in his clothes is not relevant to call them a "burden," for if not so, should he then walk naked on Shabbat? And likewise their ornaments are not relevant to be called a burden, for an ornament is not a burden. Therefore, anything that a person wears in the manner of wearing, and likewise ornaments with which they adorn themselves — is permitted, and only what he carries in his hands or on his shoulder is called a "burden." And know that those who carry some burden and make it like a garment, such as one who carries a handkerchief to wipe the nose and makes it like a handkerchief wrapped around the neck, if he does not have a handkerchief on his neck — it is permitted, but if he has a handkerchief wrapped around his neck — it is forbidden, for it is a burden. And if in the winter time he wraps it around the upper garment at his neck because of the cold so that it should not dominate him — it is also permitted, but if he wraps it around his hand or around his leg — it is simple that it is a complete burden, and he is liable to stoning or a chatat. And there are those who wrap it in the garment in the place of the belt to make it like a belt, and I do not see a permission for this thing: first, since it is not his way to carry a belt, and furthermore that this is not the way of a belt, for it is a different kind, and when a person carries this handkerchief in the place of a belt they will mock him. However, it is possible that if he undoes the hooks of the garment in a manner that the garment remains open and it is not pleasant to walk thus — he wraps the handkerchief to tie the two sides of the garment, and the hooks are not a burden, for they are secondary to the garment, and in such cases it is possible to permit, and even this is by way of pressing necessity (so it appears in my humble opinion), and proof for this is from section 103, see there.

And know that because of the severity of the prohibition of hotza'ah and because of the strength of habit, as a person is accustomed to this at all times and every hour, the sages were compelled to establish safeguards regarding this. That is, there are ornaments that they decreed against wearing due to the concern that one might remove them to show them, and specifically this prohibition applied to women, who are prideful and love to boast before their friends, and there are many detailed laws regarding them and they will be explained in siman 303. And there are those they prohibited for the reason that it is loose and they feared it might fall and one would come to carry it four amot in the reshut harabbiim, and there are those they prohibited because with such a gait people would laugh at him and he would remove them and carry them four amot in the reshut harabbiim, and there are things they prohibited because of marit ayin, and there are those they prohibited because even though it is their way to wear them in war, such as armor as will be explained and it is a garment, nevertheless, when it is not a time of war—it is like a burden, and they decreed against this as will be explained.

Therefore, anyone who goes out with an object that is not an ornament and is not in the manner of a garment, and carried it out in the manner that people usually carry that object—is liable; for if he carried it out not in the manner of those who carry, such as with the back of his hand—he is exempt, as I wrote in section 5. Likewise, any ornament that is loose, which can easily fall off—it is forbidden to go out with it, and if he went out—he is exempt from a sin offering. And a woman shall not go out with ornaments that are typically removed and shown, and it will be explained in siman 303 whether it is forbidden only to the reshut harabim, or even in a courtyard or in a house; see there.

Therefore, a man may not go out with a sword, even if it is girded at his waist, as one goes out with it in such a manner on a weekday; nor with a bow in any such manner; nor with a shield, which is a protection for his head and body against the enemy; nor with a mace, which is an iron staff; nor with a spear, which one carries at the side of the body in the manner of men of war. And if he went out, he is liable for a chatat. The reason is because these things are not essentially ornaments, rather for men of war they are like his garments, but for ordinary people, they are a burden (as is evident from the words of Rabbi Ovadia in the Mishnah, chapter 6, mishnah 4, see there). Therefore, for a man of war, such as one who serves in the king's army, they are like his garments. And it appears clear to me that all these cases are spoken of not when they are carried in his hands, for in such a manner even with an ornament one is liable for a chatat, but rather it is spoken of where they are hanging on his garments (and so it is evident from the Magen Avraham, subsection 27). And I saw one who wrote that a spear is carried in his hand, and if it were an ornament it would be permitted even in such a manner, and therefore it is permitted to take out a staff with a beautiful knob to a karmelit (Tiferet Yisrael in his commentary on the Mishnah). And Heaven forbid to say so, and it is a great error, for if so, when we decree regarding a woman "perhaps she will remove it and show it," what of it, for it is an ornament? And even if it is not the way of this ornament to be carried in the hands, nevertheless, ultimately this is not an ornament when carried in the hands. Therefore, in a reshut harabim, he is liable for a chatat, and in a karmelit, it is prohibited by rabbinic law, and such is the primary ruling.

And so, a man may not go out neither in armor that he is wearing, nor in a helmet, which is a hat of iron, nor in greaves, which are leggings of iron, even though they are made like complete garments, because they are not garments except for men of war. Therefore, if he went out, he is not liable for a sin offering, because they are like garments and it is only forbidden by rabbinic decree for the reason we have written. And he may not go out in tefillin; and it is not only necessary to say if we say that it is forbidden to don them on Shabbat and Yom Tov because it is not the time for tefillin, but even if we say it is the time for tefillin and there is no prohibition—nevertheless, we concern ourselves that perhaps he will need the latrine and remove them, and come to carry them four amot in the public domain. And if he went out, he is not liable for a sin offering even if there is a prohibition to don them, because he carries them in the manner of their wearing on a weekday and it is not a burden according to the Torah (Gemara 61a). And so, one whose foot is small may not go out in a large shoe, for perhaps it will fall from his feet and he will come to carry it four amot in the public domain; but he may go out in a large shirt, for he will not strip it off and remain naked, and it will not fall off on its own. But a garment—it appears that it is forbidden, and it is not only necessary to say if there is a concern that it will fall off on its own, but even if it will not fall off on its own—we concern ourselves that perhaps they will mock him and he will strip it off and carry it (so it is explicit in Rashi 141b, beginning with "But," see there). And so, he may not go out in one shoe if he does not have a wound on his foot, lest they laugh at him and he comes to bring it. But if he has a wound on his foot—he may go out in the one without the wound and they will not mock him, for they see that he has a wound on his other foot and cannot wear a shoe. And there are those who forbid in such a case, and in the Gemara (61a) there is a dispute regarding this, and it is proper to be stringent (Taz subsection 4).

It appears to me that regarding all those items about which they decreed that one may not go out with them due to the concern that perhaps they will fall, or perhaps people will mock him, or he will need to go to the beit hakiseh, and similar concerns—they only decreed in a reshut harabim and not in a karmelit. And for us, who do not have a reshut harabim, we do not decree. A proof for this is from that which Abaye and Rava disagree in the first chapter (11b) regarding that which we learned in a Mishnah: "A person may not stand in a reshut hayachid and drink in a reshut harabim etc."—a decree lest the vessel be brought to him. And what is the law in a karmelit: for Abaye holds that regarding hotza'ah they decreed a decree upon a decree (see Tosafot ibid. s.v. 'Amar'), and Rava holds that they did not decree and it is permitted in a karmelit, see there, and as is explained below in siman 350. Behold, it is explicit that in a place where they decreed due to a concern of tiltul, they only decreed in a reshut harabim. And even though regarding women's ornaments they prohibited even in a karmelit for the reason of "perhaps she will remove it and show it"—there it is different, for they prohibited even in a house and a courtyard. And the reason was explained by Rashi on the Mishnah at the beginning of the chapter "Bameh Ishah," and this is his wording: "And all those mentioned above are prohibited even in a courtyard, lest she become accustomed to them in a reshut harabim, and it is a single decree that they decreed that she should not adorn herself with them on Shabbat at all." Thus far his words. But regarding other decrees, they only decreed in a reshut harabim (so it appears in my humble opinion).

The Rambam wrote in chapter 19, law 3: "A ring that has a seal upon it is among the ornaments of a man and is not among the ornaments of a woman, and one that does not have a seal upon it is among the ornaments of a woman and not among the ornaments of a man. Therefore, a woman who goes out with a ring that has a seal upon it, or a man with a ring that does not have a seal upon it, are liable. And why are they liable? Is it not that they carried them out in a manner unlike those who carry out, for it is not the way of a man to carry out on his finger except a ring suitable for him, and likewise a woman, it is not her way to carry out on her finger except a ring suitable for her? Because sometimes a man gives his wife his ring to hide it in the house, and she places it on her finger at the time of carrying, and likewise a woman gives her ring to her husband to repair it at the craftsman's, and he places it on his finger at the time of carrying until he reaches the craftsman's shop; thus it is found that they carried them out in their manner of carrying them out—and therefore they are liable." Thus far his words. And this is the approach of the Rif and most of the poskim, and it is in the Gemara (62a). And from this we have learned that it is called a manner of carrying out even though it is not his constant way to wear it so, but only occasionally—it is called a manner of carrying out and he is liable. And so too regarding a garment it is thus: if it is his way to wear it occasionally in this manner, it is called a manner of clothing and it is permitted to go out in it. (In the Yerushalmi chapter 6, end of halacha 3, it says: If it was made for this and for that, meaning for an ornament and to seal with it, if he carried it out to seal with it—he is liable; if he carried it out for the sake of an ornament—he is exempt even regarding the seal, for even the seal is subordinate to the ornament, see there.)

He wrote further: "A woman may not go out with a ring that does not have a seal upon it even though it is among her ornaments, as a decree lest she take it out in the reshut harabbim to show her friends in the manner that women always do, and if she went out with it—she is exempt. But a man—it is permitted to go out with a ring that has a seal upon it, because it is an ornament and it is not his way to show it, and all the people have the custom not to go out with a ring at all." Thus far his words. And the opinion of Rashi, of blessed memory, is that it is also forbidden for a man, but the opinion of Rabbeinu Tam is like the Rambam, and it is also proven in the Yerushalmi that for a man there is no concern of removing and showing. And our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 9: "But a thing that is an ornament for a man and for a woman—it is forbidden also for a man." Thus far his words, and this is from the wording of the Rosh and the Tur, and it is from the Yerushalmi. And the reason is that since it is fit for both of them—the sages did not differentiate, and since the woman is forbidden—the man is also forbidden. And behold, now that women also go out with ornaments and we are not concerned with removing and showing for reasons that will be explained in siman 303, if so, it follows that a man is also permitted. And he wrote further: that a ring in which a stone is set, and likewise if letters are written on it—it is called "without a seal," for it is not called a seal unless letters or forms are engraved in it. Thus far his words, and it has already been explained in Yoreh Deah siman 141 that protruding forms are forbidden even on a weekday; see there.

And know that in the time of the Gemara, it was not the way of a man to wear on his finger a ring that does not have a seal upon it, but now in our times many wear such rings for ornament as is known, and it is simple that this matter depends on the way of the place and the time (Magen Avraham, subsection 15). And according to this, nowadays it is permitted to go out with a ring that does not have a seal upon it, and so wrote the Ran there, and this is his wording: "There is one who says that now a man may go out even with a ring that does not have a seal upon it, for even though we say in the Gemara 'and their opposites for a man'—this is according to their generation, when men were not accustomed to a ring that does not have a seal upon it. But now that they have become accustomed to it—it is for them like an ornament and is permitted." Thus far his words. And our teacher, the Beit Yosef, did not bring this, because in his great book he wrote that from the Rambam it does not appear so, as he did not distinguish between time and time; see there. And I do not understand, for it is known that the Rambam copies the wording of the Shas, and perhaps in the days of the Rambam and in his country it was as in the time of the Gemara. Furthermore, he brought what the Rambam wrote, that the people were accustomed not to go out with a ring at all. And I do not know what the relevance of a custom is to the law; certainly from the attribute of piety it is proper to do so, and this is the wording of the Maggid Mishneh there: "And it is the custom of the pious in those lands, and if it were possible to return all places to that custom—it would be very good." Thus far his words; behold, this custom was not in every place, and as is explained from the words of the Ran. Furthermore, he wrote there in the name of our teacher Yerucham: that even though nowadays a ring that does not have a seal upon it is an ornament for a man—it should be forbidden on the grounds that it is also an ornament for a woman, and anything that is an ornament for a man and a woman—is forbidden; see there. However, behold now women also wear ornaments as I have written, and how shall we forbid for a man more than for a woman. Therefore, it seems in my humble opinion clear that certainly it is proper and correct not to wear rings on the fingers on Shabbat, and behold the Rambam, who wrote only the principles of the laws of the Gemara, nevertheless wrote this custom because it contains a fence for Shabbat. However, from the essential law, one should not rebuke those who wear rings of gold and of precious stones on their fingers on Shabbat, since it is permitted from the essential law, and our teacher, the Beit Yosef, himself brought this later in siman 303, section 18; see there.

The Rambam further wrote (chapter 19, halacha 5): "A woman who goes out with a perforated needle is liable, and the man is exempt. And a man who goes out with a non-perforated needle is liable, and the woman is exempt, because it is among her ornaments, and it is only forbidden due to a decree lest she show it to her friends." Thus far his words, and this is the approach of the Rif there. And the Rosh already wondered there, how can the man be liable for a non-perforated needle, for it is an act of carrying in an unusual manner; see there. That is to say, for we are certainly dealing with a case where the needles are pinned into the garments, for if they carry them in their hands—is it not always a burden, and if so, it is carrying in an unusual manner. And so one must ask regarding the woman, how can she be liable for a perforated needle in such a case. And there is one who answered that with a single needle, it is the manner of carrying when pinned in one's garment, for it is not the manner to carry a single needle in the hand (Bach). And these are wonderous words, for the Rambam explicitly ruled there in law 21 that even a tailor who goes out with a needle pinned in his garment is exempt because that is not the manner of carrying; see there, and all the more so any person. Therefore, it seems clear to me that the Rif and the Rambam also hold this way, but here they are not dealing with this matter, rather they came to teach that it is the manner of a man to go out with a perforated one and a woman with a non-perforated one. And regarding that which they are exempt from the perspective that it is not the manner of carrying—it will be explained further on, and here the practical difference is for the core of the law, that for a woman a non-perforated one is an ornament, but the reverse—it is a burden and forbidden by rabbinic law even when not in the manner of their carrying.

The Tur wrote: "And he shall not go out with a needle that is stuck in his garment, whether it is perforated or not perforated, and if he went out—he is exempt." Thus far his words. And the reason is because it is not the typical manner of carrying them out, and it is prohibited by rabbinic law in both cases. And the law of a needle for a woman was explained in siman 303, see there; and according to what we have explained, the Rif and the Rambam also hold accordingly. And there is another opinion that regarding a perforated one, even a man is liable, and this is what our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 8: "He shall not go out with a needle that is stuck in his garment, whether it is perforated or not perforated, and if he went out: regarding a perforated one—he is liable, and regarding one that is not perforated—he is exempt; and some say the opposite." Thus far his words. And there is no practical difference in this, for according to all opinions it is prohibited for a man to go out with a needle stuck in his garment, whether perforated or not perforated, and such is the halacha. However, it seems in my humble opinion that if the needle is with him in the place of hooks, where it connects two ends of the garment to one another—it is permitted, just as with a woman when she secures her headbands with it, as written in siman 303. And even though for a woman there are distinctions there between one needle and another, see there, this is because it is the way of a woman to adorn herself with this one and not with that one, but for a man—adornment is not relevant, and therefore if the needle serves in the place of hooks—why should it be prohibited. (See Tosafot, Shabbat 11b: regarding the matter that it is not the typical manner of carrying out when it is stuck in his garment, they wrote in the heading starting with 'And if' and this is their wording: "And that which we learned in the Mishnah, that if a woman went out with a perforated needle she is liable for a sin offering—there it is entirely the typical manner of carrying out in that way." Thus far their words. And it is not understood why, and this is the opposite of all the poskim we have cited, and the Magen Avraham in siman 303, subsection 7, cited this, see there, and the Machatzit HaShekel explained that this is the explanation: that when it is stuck in a garment—it is the typical manner of carrying out, and Rabbi Meir only disagrees when it is stuck in a specific place, see there. And I do not know what he is saying, for there it was taught: 'with a needle that is stuck in his garment,' see there, and the Pri Megadim explains there that for a woman it is the typical manner of carrying out in that way, because it is her way to sew her household items, see there. And this too is astonishing; is a woman any better than a tailor who is exempt according to Rabbi Meir? And it seems to me that their intention is when she goes out with her headbands, only she is not securing the headbands with it; however, all the poskim did not understand it so, and delve into this.)

Our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, wrote in section 11: "An object made for ornament and for use, such as beautiful silver keys in the form of an ornament—it is forbidden, for the observer will say that he is carrying it out for the purpose of use; and some permit it if it is of silver. Nevertheless, it is forbidden to go out with a case of spectacles even though the case is of silver, for the spectacles themselves are a burden. And if the key is of copper or iron—even if it is attached and fixed to a belt it is forbidden, and some have written that it is the custom in this to permit." Thus far their words, and their words require explanation.

And this is its explanation: After it has been explained that every type of ornament is permitted, and a thing that is not an ornament but rather for use is a burden, and according to this we should have permitted if a thing is an ornament and made for use as well, such as beautiful silver keys that are fit to be used as an ornament, and what do we care if they are also used, yet they brought from the Yerushalmi that it is forbidden. And the reason must be said that because one who sees that they are being used will say that the primary purpose of its carrying out is for the need of its use, and there are those who permit who interpret the Yerushalmi with a different intention, and therefore those of silver which are beautiful are permitted, but those of iron and copper are not an ornament, as they have no beauty and are forbidden. And it is not only necessary to say if they are by themselves, but even if attached and fixed to a belt it is forbidden, and we do not say that it is nullified regarding the belt, since it is a key and it is an important use—it is not nullified to the belt, just as tzitzit are not nullified regarding a garment because of their importance, as will be explained in this siman. And nevertheless, there are those who wrote that in this it is customary to permit, and that is when it is attached and fixed at the end of the belt, with which they themselves gird the body, and with it the knot of the belt is completed like hooks, and it has the form of a key, for in such a case it is nullified to the belt and included within the category of the belt even if of iron and copper. But when it hangs in the middle of a belt and it is a vessel by itself—it is forbidden. And even when it is at the end of the belt—specifically when his intention is to carry out the thing for the sake of a belt, but if his intention is to carry out for the sake of a key—it is forbidden, and this matter is explained in the Yerushalmi that we brought at the end of section 54, see there.

And they say further that even according to the most lenient of these opinions—nevertheless, it is forbidden to carry eyeglasses in a silver case where the case is tied to a chain of silver or gold and hangs around his neck as an ornament. For even if we say that the case is nullified to the chain, or even if the case itself is made as an ornament together with the chain—nevertheless, the eyeglasses within it are not nullified regarding the chain and the case, for this is the primary use and it is a significant use, and is necessary for all those who are nearsighted, for it is obvious that this is more significant than tzitzit regarding a tallit. And regarding the eyeglasses themselves, there is no permission even if we make them of silver and gold, for everyone sees that it is a functional vessel and is not an ornament. And even if we weave them into the garment so that there be no concern lest they fall, similar to what they do now and call "pince-nez"—it is a complete prohibition and one is liable for a chatat, for it is a complete functional vessel, and this is not in the category of a garment at all but rather in the category of a functional vessel, like a spoon, a fork, and a knife. And one cannot say that we should permit it because he needs to see a book with them, just as it is permitted for a lame person to walk with a staff when it is impossible for him to walk without a staff, as will be explained. For this is no comparison, for there the staff is in place of a leg, but here he is able to walk without them, and if it is because he cannot see a book without them—let him not study. And if we do not say so, we should permit him to also carry a book to study in. And even if he is not permitted to walk without the eyeglasses, such as if the doctors commanded him to always walk with them—nevertheless, it appears that it is forbidden and he should sit in his house. However, it is possible that in such a case there is room to permit it when woven into his clothing in a manner that it is impossible for them to fall, for since he does not remove them from his body—they are like one of his garments, and so it appears to my humble opinion for the halacha. But if he needs them only to look into a book—it is forbidden to walk with them and he is liable for a chatat, and those who are lenient in this desecrate Shabbat and are destined to give an account, and the simpletons passed on and were punished.

And from these matters that have been explained, one must learn that a timepiece, which is called a "zeiger," even if it is very beautiful and made of pure gold—it is forbidden to go out with it, and there is a liability for a chatat in a reshut harabim, and one who is lenient in this is destined to give an account. For it is obvious that it is a functional vessel for the purpose of knowing the hours, but they beautify it just as they beautify every functional vessel; and the proof is that if it breaks and does not run for a long time, he will put it away and not wear it until he repairs it. And even if they hang a gold chain on it that is made for an ornament—nevertheless, it is obvious that it is not nullified to the chain any more than the tzitzit are not nullified to the garment. Therefore, in a place where there is no eruv, it is forbidden to carry the timepiece on Shabbat on one's body, and not because of a stringency but from the core of the law, and one who carries it is liable for a chatat. And one who errs to treat it as an ornament—he errs in a matter of Mishnah, for an ornament is only something that is not a vessel for any use except as an ornament, such as nose-rings and rings and gold chains, but anything whose essence is made for some purpose is a functional vessel and not an ornament.

It was taught in a Baraita (11b): A tailor may not go out with his needle tucked into his garment, nor a carpenter with the chip behind his ear, nor a wool-comber with the cord behind his ear, nor a weaver with the wool-plug behind his ear, nor a dyer with the sample around his neck, nor a money-changer with the dinar behind his ear; and if he went out, he is exempt but it is forbidden, because this is not the typical manner of hotza'ah, and even a craftsman in the manner of his craft is exempt—these are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: A craftsman in the manner of his craft is liable, and any other person is exempt. And seemingly, according to the rules of the Shas regarding Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Meir, the halacha follows Rabbi Yehuda; nevertheless, the Rambam in chapter 19, law 21, ruled like Rabbi Meir, because the sugya proves this to be so, as the Maggid Mishneh wrote; see there. (And in the Hagahot Maimoniyot he remained in a state of "needs further study"; see there.) And Rashi explained: "A craftsman who takes out in the manner of his craft, for he is accustomed to go out sometimes in this way on a weekday, etc." Thus far his words. And afterwards he wrote: "And it appears to me that all those listed here are only because those of that craft place them upon themselves when going out to the marketplace so that people will recognize which craft he belongs to and hire him for work." Thus far his words. And it appears to me that there is no practical halachic difference between the wordings, rather Rashi, of blessed memory, explained the matter of why he does so—so that they will recognize, etc.

And I saw one who wrote that it refers to it being tucked into his garment in a place where it is not the way to take it out entirely in that manner, but rather he did so to show that he is a craftsman. However, in a place where it is the way to tuck it in during the weekday occasionally—he is liable (Magen Avraham subsection 19). And I wonder at this, for if so, Rashi should have explained that according to his second explanation this is not the same place as his first explanation, yet it clearly implies that the places are one and the same. Furthermore, the Gemara there raises several difficulties regarding this matter, and if it enters your mind that there is a distinction between one place and another—it should have answered that here it refers to this place and there to another place, and from several words of our teachers it is explained that there is no distinction in this, and such is the primary view. (And what he wrote from the Tosafot there, we have already explained their words in section 58, see there. And I saw in the Machatzit HaShekel that the Chemed Moshe raised a difficulty against him, and his book is not in my possession to see it, and see the Pri Megadim in the Taz letter 10 who wavered on this matter, and in my humble opinion the primary view is as I have written, and examine it well.)

A zav may not go out with a pouch that he makes to save himself from his discharge, so that he does not become soiled by the discharge. And even though this is a labor not needed for its own sake, for he does not need the act of carrying itself but only so that his clothes do not become soiled—nevertheless, according to the Rambam, we hold that for a labor not needed for its own sake, one is liable. And even according to the majority of the poskim who disagree with him—it is also prohibited by rabbinic law. And similarly, a niddah woman who ties a cloth before her so that she does not become soiled by her niddah blood—she is prohibited from going out with it, unless it is an apron made in the manner of a garment from her front and from her back. But if it is from her back alone and she ties it with straps from her front—it is prohibited (Magen Avraham, subsection 2). But if she ties it so that the blood does not cause her pain and she does not suffer—she is permitted to go out with it, and this is what we learned in the Mishnah (64b): "A woman may go out... and with a compress that she prepared for her niddah status." But without tying—it is prohibited, for it may fall and she will come to carry it.

And even though it has been explained from this that anything a person carries in order to protect himself from filth is a labor not needed for its own sake, nevertheless, regarding something that is the manner of a garment, even if he only wears it for the purpose of protecting from filth, it is permitted to go out in it on Shabbat. Therefore, it is permitted to wear a garment because of the rains, even an ugly garment, as we say in Nedarim (55b): "One may go out in a thick sack, etc." This is the wording of our teacher, the Rema, in section 14: "And therefore it is permitted to wear a garment because of the rains or a hat on his head, but it is forbidden for a woman to place a cloth over her veil because of the rains, for this is not the manner of a garment." Thus far his words. That is to say, when it only covers the head it is not the manner of a garment, but when it also covers her body, it is the manner of a garment (Taz subsection 7 and Magen Avraham subsection 23). However, if her intention is that the rains should not cause her distress, it is permitted in any case, even if she is protected from filth through this (ibid.). And according to this, when it rains and he covers his hat with a kerchief, it is forbidden, since he only covers his head. However, if he also covers the face so that the rains will not cause him distress, it is permitted, even though his intention is also to protect the hat from filth, as I have written.

An amputee whose leg was severed—he may not go out with his kab, which is to say that he makes a sort of mold of a leg and carves into it a bit to place the head of his thigh inside it. And he does not make this to walk with it, for perforce he requires his staff, rather his intention is so that he should not appear missing a leg but rather as one with a lame leg. And since it is not a necessity for his walking—it is forbidden; according to Rashi (66a) because it is a burden, and according to the Tosafot there it is not because of a burden, for it is like a shoe, but rather because we fear perhaps it will fall and he will come to carry it. And there are those who explain this case of an amputee in another manner, and that is that his thigh is bent behind him and at the head of the thigh in place of the foot he makes for himself a kab to show as if he has a foot (Tosafot ibid. according to the explanation of the Rav Porat). And if this kab reaches the ground and he steps upon it—it is certainly permitted; rather [the prohibition is] when this kab does not reach the ground, for regarding this he has another support that reaches the ground, and this kab he makes only so that he will have the form of a foot. And since it does not reach the ground—we fear perhaps it will fall and he will come to carry it. (So it is explained in Tosafot, see there). And according to the first explanation—even when it reaches the ground it is forbidden. And in the Shulchan Aruch, section 15, only the first explanation was brought. However, it seems to my humble opinion that even according to the first explanation, if he steps upon it well, even though without a staff he cannot walk, yet as it appears if the kab falls the staff will not avail—it is permitted to go out with it and we do not fear lest it fall and he will come to carry it, for behold if it falls he will not be able to walk.

And an amputee who is unable to walk at all on his stumps but rather sits on a chair, and when he uproots himself from his place he supports himself with his hands and his stumps and pushes himself forward, and he makes supports of leather or of wood for the ends of his stumps or his hanging legs, and when he leans on his hands and uproots himself he also leans slightly on his legs—one may not go out with them on Shabbat, for since they are hanging and do not rest on the ground, they might sometimes slip off. But with the chair and the small stools that are in his hands, meaning those he leans upon at the time he pushes himself forward—it is permitted to go out with them. And an amputee in both legs who walks on his stumps and on his knees and makes leather supports for his stumps—he may go out with them on Shabbat, for in this case it is not relevant to say they might slip off.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 16: "And so too it is permitted to go out in a wooden shoe into which the foot enters and there is no concern that it will fall off, and so too in pantofles that are removed quickly and automatically, and there are those who are stringent and forbid." Thus far his words. That is to say, in a wooden shoe it is permitted only when the foot enters it, so that it is attached to his foot. But in one much larger than his foot—it is forbidden, for we concern ourselves that perhaps it will fall off. But pantofles which are of leather—it is permitted even if they are large, for they are removed quickly, since they are of leather or covered in leather fastened and do not slip off, since he is able to walk in them. And it is not similar to a minor in a large shoe where it is forbidden to walk in it, as written in section 52, for there it is not the size of his foot at all, but here it is the size of his foot only with much room, and there are those who truly are stringent in such cases and compare it to a minor in a large shoe. And there is one who wrote that the primary view is like the first opinion, because it is not the way to walk barefoot in the public domain, and if it falls from his foot—against his will he will put it on (Taz end of subsection 27), and it is not similar to a minor in a large shoe in which it is impossible to walk at all. And one may rely on this in a time of pressing need, particularly in this time when no person walks barefoot. And every person should be careful not to walk barefoot on Shabbat due to the honor of Shabbat even when he walks barefoot during the week, and also so that he will remember that it is Shabbat, except in a place where everyone walks barefoot. And aside from shoes, a person should also not go out on Shabbat in other garments as he goes out during the week, without some other thing by which he will remember that it is Shabbat, and will not come to desecrate it. And aside from this, behold 'and you shall honor it by not doing your own ways'—that your clothing of Shabbat should not be like your clothing of the week, as written above in siman 262, see there.

A lame person who cannot walk without a staff—it is permitted to walk with it even if it is not tied to him, for it is not a burden, as for him it is like his leg. And we also do not fear that perhaps it will fall from his hand and he will carry it in his hand, since it is impossible for him to walk without it. But when he is slightly lame, or he is an old man and it is possible for him to walk without a staff, and in his home he walks without a staff and takes it so that his walking will be more expansive—it is forbidden even if he supports himself with it, for since he can walk without it, it is a burden. And all the more so it is forbidden for a healthy person to walk with a fine staff, for it is a complete burden, and the concept of an ornament does not apply to something one holds in his hand. And a sick person who has risen from his illness—his law is like a lame person if he cannot walk at all without a staff, and this means that even in his home he walks with a staff. But otherwise—it is forbidden. However, the old man and the weak and the slightly lame when he needs to walk on the frost, or during a time of frost when it is impossible for him to walk without the staff lest he fall because of the slipperiness, for even for a healthy person walking is difficult as is known—it is permitted for him to walk with a staff (Taz, subsection 12).

And know that all these for whom we forbade walking with a staff—this is in a place where there is no eruv, but when there is an eruv—they are permitted even though there is in this a weekday activity, and a healthy person—it is obvious that he is forbidden to walk with it even with a beautiful staff, and this is literally a weekday activity, nevertheless all those for whom in any case walking with the staff is better for them—they are permitted to walk with a staff. And that which the Tur wrote: "They do not go out in a chair, and this is where he sits in a chair and people carry him, and if many need him—it is permitted" see there, this is also in a place where there is an eruv (Magen Avraham subsection 27).

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 18 that it is forbidden for a blind person to go out with a staff, thus far his words, since he is able to walk without a staff—it is a burden. And in a place where there is an eruv, it is certainly permitted, and likewise on ice it is permitted for him to walk with a staff. And it appears in my humble opinion that the prohibition is only for a blind person in his own place, where he knows his way somewhat due to habit. But when he comes to another place—it is known that it is not within the ability of the blind person to walk at all without a staff with which he feels in front of him, and he is like a lame person, and without a staff he will fall into a pit or stumble over something.

And one who is imprisoned and has shackles on his legs, which were called "kletzlach" as they did in ancient times—he is permitted to walk in them, for this is not a burden, as for him it is like a garment, and there is also no concern that they will fall from his legs, for they are fastened well (Beit Yosef). And they may not go out with anketamin, which is a kind of donkey that the jesters make, and it appears as if he is riding upon it while he carries it and walks with his legs; and likewise they may not go out with kashrim, which are high stilts that have a seat for the sole of the foot and they walk in them in the mud. And likewise they may not go out with perami, which are a kind of mask that the jesters carry on their faces to frighten the children, for all of these are a burden. And likewise they may not go out with a box on his head or a basket or a mat, even though he carries them as a covering for the head, for they are a complete burden. But they may go out with a sack, a sheet, or a thick wrap, even though they are thick and coarse garments that only simple people go out in and during the rainy season—nevertheless, they are garments, for "sack" means a garment made of sackcloth, and it is permitted to go out in them, and so we learned in the Tosefta chapter 10, see there; and even without rain it is permitted to go out in them (Magen Avraham subsection 30).

One may go out with wool or a sponge that is upon a wound, and even though this is not a garment, since they heal—they are like an ornament for him. And likewise with the skin of garlic or an onion that he placed for healing, or with a malugma, a ratiya, or an isplanit, for anything that is for healing is like an ornament. And if they fell off the wound—he may not return them, for it is like memareiach. And all the more so that he should not place them initially unless there is danger or he places them by means of a non-Jew, and the details of these laws are not in this place and will be explained with the help of Heaven in siman 328. And it is permitted for him to bind the ratiya with a string or a cord so that it does not fall off him, and he may walk with it and tie it and untie it. But to wrap a string or a cord over it for the sake of beauty and not for the sake of binding—it is forbidden, for they are not nullified to it and it is like a burden, but those needed to bind it—are nullified to it (see Magen Avraham subsection 31). And likewise one may go out with types of herbs that they tie with knots and hang for healing, and specifically if an expert provided them or it is known that these herbs are effective. But without this—it is forbidden (so it appears to me).

And so too it is permitted to go out with an expert kame'a because it is like an ornament for him, but with a kame'a that is not expert—it is forbidden to go out even to a karmelit. And what is an expert kame'a: according to Rashi, of blessed memory, if the owner of the kame'a is established as an expert—his expertise is effective even for other matters that he has not yet been accustomed to, and so too this kame'a that is established for healing—it is permitted to go out with it even if others wrote it, since this incantation is established to heal. And so it is implied from the wording of the Rambam who wrote there in law 12: "And what is an expert kame'a—this is one that healed three people or one that a person made who healed three people with other kame'in, and if he went out with a kame'a that is not expert—he is exempt because he carried it out in the manner of a garment" thus far his words. And it is possible that what he wrote 'this is one that healed three people'—refers specifically to this writing, but it seems more likely that his intention is like Rashi, of blessed memory.

But our teachers, the authors of the Tosafot, have another approach in this, and the Rosh, the Tur, and the Shulchan Aruch agreed to this. Namely, "the man is established but not the amulet" — for example, if he wrote one incantation in three scrolls, and the three of them healed three people, each one healing one person; for now the man is established for every instance of this incantation that he shall write, as he has been established through three incantations. But for other incantations — he has not been established, and also the amulet is not expert of its own accord but rather on account of its writer. And the practical difference is that if another person writes it, it is not established; and also this expert, when he loses his expertise, such as if he writes and it is not effective — he has lost his expertise even for this one. And "the amulet is established but not the man" is called such as when he wrote one incantation in a scroll and healed with it three times, for that scroll is expert for anyone who carries it; even though it only healed one person — nevertheless, it healed him three times, and this scroll itself has been established as expert, but not another scroll, even with this same incantation and even by this same writer. And "the man and the amulet are established" is called such as when he wrote this incantation in three scrolls, and each scroll healed three times for three people or for one person — the man has been established for this incantation in every scroll that he shall write, and these three scrolls have been established for every person.

But if he wrote three amulets for one person and they healed him three times—neither the man nor the amulet is established, for we attribute it to the fortune of the sick person, and only this sick person is permitted to go out with it, unless the man lost his established status as has been written. (In the Magen Avraham, subsection 39, there is a printing error as the Machatzit HaShekel wrote). And why do we not attribute it previously, when each letter healed three times for one person, to the sick person? Because there were three letters, and we would need to attribute it to the fortune of all three, and therefore we attribute it more to the man.

And know that that which we say, that both were established—this is when the two establishments occurred together. For example, if he wrote an amulet for Reuven and it healed, and an amulet for Shimon and it healed, and another amulet for Shimon and it healed twice, such that as of yet no amulets were established by three times and he also was not established by three people, and afterward he healed with the third amulet for Levi and both establishments occurred together. But if he gave three amulets to three people and they healed and the person was established—the amulets are no longer established, for we attribute it to the establishment of the person. And if it is difficult, what is the practical difference—there is a practical difference if the person lost his establishment, as has been written (ibid. subsection 38).

It is permitted to go out with an expert kame'a, whether it is a written kame'a or a kame'a of roots, whether for a person with a life-threatening illness or for a person with a non-life-threatening illness. And it is not specifically when he already has the illness and hangs it for healing, but even if the illness has not yet seized him, but he is from a family that has this illness and he hangs the kame'a so that he will not be caught by the illness—it is permitted. However, with a kame'a that contains verses, it is forbidden to go out with it unless it is covered with leather (Gemara 61a), so that when he enters the beit hakise it will not be revealed. And he may tie and untie the kame'a in the reshut harabim, and we do not fear that perhaps he will carry it four amot in the reshut harabim, for those who possess a kame'a are concerned not to move from their place without the kame'a. Provided that he does not tie it with a ribbon or a ring and go out with it to the reshut harabim, for then there would be suspicion that they will say he goes out with it for the sake of an ornament and this is forbidden, as it is not an ornament, and the physician is believed to say of himself that he is an expert.

We learned in the Mishnah (67a): One may go out with a locust egg—a type of grasshopper, and it is for an earache; and with a fox tooth as a segulah so that the sick person shall sleep; and with a nail from a crucified man, which is for healing upon a wound and for a third-day fever. The version before us is: "These are the words of Rabbi Meir, but the sages say even on a weekday it is forbidden because of the ways of the Amorite," and according to this, one should have ruled to forbid like the sages. However, the Rambam and the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch in section 27 ruled to permit, and this is based on the Yerushalmi which reads: "These are the words of Rabbi Yose, and Rabbi Meir forbids," and the halakhah follows Rabbi Yose. And even according to our version, the halakhah follows Rabbi Meir, because we say in the Gemara there: Abaye and Rava both say: Anything that has in it a matter of healing—meaning that the experience has been verified that it is effective—does not have in it a matter of the ways of the Amorite, and these have been verified by experience. This is what the Rambam wrote: "And that is provided that the doctors say it is effective," meaning that the experience has been verified by them that it is effective, and all the more so regarding that which doctors give as natural remedies according to the wisdom of medicine, it is permitted. But one who performs an act that has no natural healing, and also experience has not verified it—it is forbidden even on a weekday because of the ways of the Amorite. However, types of incantations are permitted, since they involve no physical act, provided they are not from the incantations of idolatry; and similarly, those that were tested and are not effective are forbidden. And there is one who is concerned regarding any amulet that is not from an expert because of the ways of the Amorite, and the Rashba in the Responsa (siman 413) elaborated greatly on these matters and did not bring up a clear conclusion, see there. And the clear matter in this is: "You shall be wholehearted with Hashem your God," and one should only utilize expert doctors and prayer to Hashem and charity, for this certainly is effective.

One who has a wound on the sole of his foot and ties a coin upon it to protect it so that his foot is not struck, and the manner of the segulah in this is that it be a hard object and of silver metal which has a type of moisture, and that there be an image upon it (Gemara and Rashi 65a), and so wrote the Rambam in the Commentary on the Mishnah, that this is among the segulot, see there. And there is one who says that if it does not heal but only protects so that his foot is not struck—it is forbidden (Magen Avraham, subsection 41), but it does not imply so in the Gemara there, and also logic does not dictate so, and so the great authorities ruled for leniency (Eliyah Rabbah, subsection 51 and Tosefet Shabbat, subsection 55 in the name of Maharshak, see there), and so is the primary ruling for the halachah.

Children may go out with zagin, which are small bells, when they are woven into their garment. But if they are not woven—it is forbidden, for we fear lest they fall and one will come to carry them; and similarly, sewn ones are like woven ones. (See Magen Avraham subsection 32, and it requires further study, for the Tosafot explicitly wrote on 67a, beginning with the word "Benei," that when it is not woven we fear lest it snap, and why compare it to section 9? And regarding what he brought of all the words of the Tosafot—they wrote this according to Rabbi Oshaya and not according to Rava, and so it is explicit in the Bach, and so wrote the Tosefet Shabbat, and see Machatzit HaShekel, and there is no sense in his words. And behold, the Levush also wrote that it is because it may slip and be reattached, and it requires further study as to who compelled him to this, for the reason is simple: because it may fall and one will come to carry it, and examine this well.)

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 23 that it is only effective for something to be attached to a garment if it is a thing whose way is to be attached there, but if one attached there a thing whose way is not so—it is forbidden. And those green circles that the kingdom of Persia decreed that every Jew must wear one of them on his garment—it is permitted to go out with it even if it is not sewn to his garment but only slightly attached there, and similarly it is permitted to go out with the cloths with which one wipes the nose, called "pazzolet," if it is attached to the garment, and that which it is permitted to go out with woven bells—specifically when they do not have a clapper and do not produce a sound. Thus far his words, and his words require explanation.

And this is its explanation: For behold, the Mishnah permitted going out with bells woven into a garment, and consequently, the same law applies to those sewn into a garment, for even with what is sewn there is no concern that perhaps it will fall and he will carry it in his hands. But with tying—it is forbidden, as we concern ourselves that perhaps it will fall (and so wrote the Taz in subsection 14 in the name of the Smag, that specifically sewing is permitted). However, even with weaving and sewing, it was only permitted for something that is the way of the world to do so, like bells in their time. But if one wishes to attach some ornament to a garment by weaving or sewing in a manner that is not the way of the world—it is forbidden because it does not become secondary to the garment, and it is a burden; and all the more so with something that is not an ornament at all, it is forbidden. And if you should ask, if so, how do we carry the green circles—this is no question, for on the contrary, this is more lenient even than the ornament of bells, and does not require weaving or sewing but rather a slight attachment; for since they are compelled by the government to wear this on the garment, behold, they are afraid to go out without it and they guard it so that it does not fall, and it is like the seal of a slave (in the Gemara 58a). And even though there we concern ourselves that perhaps it will fall and he will place the garment on his shoulders—this is because its attachment is light, as will be explained in section 87, but here it is attached well, only not through weaving or sewing.

And afterward he says that this permission applies even to something that is neither an ornament nor a decree but a bodily necessity, such as a handkerchief with which one cleans the nose—one is permitted to attach it to a garment by means of weaving or sewing and it is nullified relative to the garment, but with a knot—it is forbidden. And regarding the belt, it is not effective even with sewing, because the belt is not significant enough for the handkerchief to be nullified relative to it, and it constitutes a burden (Magen Avraham subsection 34, and what he wrote regarding "kapuna" and "matlit," we do not know what they are). And know that there is one who permits tying the end of the belt to the end of the handkerchief with a knot that is not permanent, and it will be like a long belt (Taz subsection 14). And this permission is not understood: first, that it requires sewing, and even if we say that a strong knot is like sewing (and so it is explicit in the Bach), nevertheless a knot that is not permanent is certainly not like sewing, and there is concern for the undoing of the knot and it will fall and he will come to carry it. And besides this, everyone sees that they are two things and this is not entirely a belt, and therefore one should not permit this. (Also the Eliyah Rabbah subsection 43 and the Gra"z hesitate regarding this, see there; and the Tosefot Shabbat wrote that for a garment it requires sewing and for a belt tying is sufficient, see there, and there is no reasoning in this. And what our teacher, the Rema, wrote not to make a sound, and the Magen Avraham questioned in subsection 35 that it is only forbidden with a musical instrument, see there, it appears that the intention of our teacher, the Rema, is also thus, that they make a sound like the sound of a musical instrument.)

We learned in the Mishnah (60.): A man may not go out with a hobnailed sandal; and this is of wood, and they insert nails into it from above to strengthen the lower part with the upper (Rashi). And it is stated in the Gemara that this is specifically when the nails come to strengthen, but for beauty—it is permitted, and a sign of beauty is when there are five or seven nails in each sandal. And if he placed a leather shoe inside and sewed it—it becomes a shoe and not a sandal and is permitted, and likewise if he made the nails like a type of hook, and this is like our "patkeves"—it is permitted, for they only decreed against simple nails, and likewise if he covered it entirely with nails so that the ground would not wear it away—it is permitted. And the reason for this decree was because one time many of Israel were killed on Shabbat from some fear caused by these sandals, and they decreed against them not to wear them and not to move them on Shabbat and Yom Tov. And now this law does not apply as the Tur wrote, for our hobnailed shoes are not included in this, as they only forbade according to the form they had then, and also ours are of leather and not of wood. Therefore, this was not brought in the Shulchan Aruch, and the Rambam mentioned this briefly, see there (the Tur wrote that there are those who followed a custom of prohibition, see there, but we have not heard of this).

The Rambam wrote there in law 18: "A slave may go out with a seal of clay that is on his neck, but not with a seal of metal, lest it fall and he carry it." Thus far his words. But regarding one of clay—when it falls it will break, and why would he carry it? And it is explained in the Gemara (58a) that a seal that is on his garment—even one of clay is forbidden, for we fear that it will fall and break, and because of his fear of walking without a seal—he will strip off the garment and place it on his shoulders; see there. And it appears that its attachment to the garment was loose, for if it were attached by sewing or weaving—why should we fear that it will fall? And the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch did not bring this because nowadays we do not have slaves, and also the Rambam was brief in this as I have written.

The Rambam wrote (ibid.): "One who wraps himself in his tallit and folded it from here and from there in his hand or on his shoulder, if he intended to gather its corners so that they would not be torn or so that they would not be soiled—it is forbidden, but if he gathered them to adorn himself with them according to the custom of the people of the place—it is permitted. One who goes out with a tallit folded and placed on his shoulder—is liable, but he may go out with a sudar that is on his shoulder even though a thread is not tied to his finger. And any sudar that does not cover his head and most of his body—it is forbidden to go out with it. If it was a short sakhnit that is not wide—he ties its two ends below the shoulders and it is found to be like an avnet, and it is permitted to go out with it." Thus far his words. (The first law is the 'gutter' mentioned in the Gemara 147a, which says there: "If it is for the purpose of gathering—it is forbidden, to adorn—it is permitted," and the second law is according to the wording of the Gemara there: "If a tallit was placed on his shoulder—he is liable for a chatat. It happened with Hyrcanus that he went out with a sudar on his shoulder... and the sages said even though a thread is not tied etc." And the words of the Taz, subsection 2, are difficult, see there, and the law that it must cover his head and most of his body is also there on side b, and also the sakhnita is there, see there).

And the explanation of the matters is clearly as follows in my humble opinion: That this is like our tallit of mitzvah in which one wraps his entire body until his entire body from before him and from behind him is covered by it, and there is one who, because he would have pity on the edges of the tallit that hang over his hands and also reach before him, folds its two edges from here and from here, and holds them in his hand or places them on his shoulder, and the tallit hangs behind him until below, only over his hands it is not spread out. And it appears from behind him in the middle like a gutter, for due to the gathering of the sides it becomes thick at its sides and in the middle like a gutter, for this is the explanation of "gutter" in the Gemara there. And it depends on his intention: if his intention is to have pity on the tallit—it is forbidden, and if it is to beautify himself, as even now the fastidious do not desire that the tallit should hang over the hands but only over the shoulders—it is permitted. And also the Aruch, in the entry "gutter," explained thus, see there, and it was brought in the Tosafot, see there. And regarding this, the Rambam wrote only "forbidden," but there is no liability for a chatat in it, for in any event he is wearing it as a garment. (And therefore he preceded this law to "folded" even though in the Gemara "folded" comes first, because he was dealing previously with a rabbinic prohibition of a slave's seal, and he included this with the seal, see there, and both are rabbinic, see there.)

And afterward he wrote: "One who goes out with a tallit folded and placed upon his shoulder is liable." This is the explanation: for a tallit is large in its quantity such that it wraps the entire body, and if his desire is to carry it only on his shoulder, there is one who spreads it out entirely and afterward folds it from here and from there as has been written, and there is one who does not spread it out, but rather while it is folded into two or four he wears it upon his shoulder alone—in this case he is liable for a sin offering, because in such manners it is not a garment at all. And this is regarding a tallit, but a sudar which is not so large, for the married Torah scholars were accustomed to carry them upon their heads, and they spread out over the shoulders as is proven in Kiddushin (29b), and in Shabbat (77b) they said: "Sudara—the secret of Hashem is to those who fear Him," and likewise in Pesachim (111b): "The sudar of the master is like a Torah scholar," see there. And therefore, even if he did not carry it on his head but only until the shoulders, it is permitted, and the reason is that the sudar is normally used in this way, because it is not large and there are at its edge a kind of stiff threads protruding, and he holds them in his hands so that it should not fall, and they are like a kind of loops, and even if the thread is not tied to his finger but he merely holds them in his hands. And then he says: And any sudar that does not cover his head and the majority of his body, meaning that even though the sudar is much smaller than a tallit, nevertheless it should not be so small that it does not cover his head and the majority of his body, and if it was truly a short scarf that does not cover his head and the majority of his body—he should not wear it as a garment, but rather he should make it like a belt and tie its two ends by means of loops below the shoulders around the body, and all these matters have no relevance to our clothes, as is understood.

But our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 29, section 31, and section 34, inclined all matters toward another intention. This is his wording in section 29: One who goes out with a tallit folded upon his shoulders—that is, after placing it on his head he raises its edges onto his shoulders—is liable for a sin-offering. But if it is not folded upon his shoulders, but rather hangs down in its breadth below his shoulders—it is permitted; for since he wraps himself in his tallit and his shoulder and body are covered by it, even though it is shortened a bit from below, it is permitted. According to this, it is permitted to wrap oneself in his tallit under the cloak and bring it to the beit knesset. Thus far his words. Our teacher, the Rema, added to say: Even though he places the right side upon his left shoulder, for it is the way to wear it so, and it is only for adornment and is permitted. Thus far his words. (And this gloss was printed in section 30 by error, as the Taz wondered there; the truth is that it belongs to section 29, and so it is explained in the Beit Yosef, see there, and there is no need for all that they labored over in this, and examine it well.)

And behold, this interpretation regarding a folded tallit was written by Rashi, of blessed memory, see there, and likewise the Tur; however, this is not the approach of the Rambam. Nevertheless, it is possible that regarding the law, the Rambam would not disagree with this ruling. And regarding this law, if he lifted the entire length of the tallit from its bottom edges to the top and wrapped it around his shoulders—this is not a garment at all, even if the corners hang down in front of him, and he is liable for a chatat. But if he let it hang down below his shoulders, even though much of it is wrapped on his shoulders in a manner that the tallit does not reach all the way down—nevertheless, it is the way of a garment, since it covers most of the body from behind. And this is like the way we wear the tallit on Shabbat when walking to the beit knesset, even though he places the right side over his left shoulder, and this is like the way we do during the wrapping, as is known. However, according to what we explained regarding the intent of the Rambam in section 89 concerning the first law of folding it from here and from there, it is necessary that the tallit hang down from the sides of the shoulders over the arms as I wrote there. And so it appears from the interpretation of the Aruch, and so it appears to me from the words of the Tur from the precision of his wording, see there (for if not so, what element of adornment is there in this, and delve into this).

Indeed, the words of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, are puzzling based on his own words that he wrote afterward in section 30: "It is permitted to go out into the public domain with a tallit around the neck," thus far his words, and this contradicts what he wrote previously, that even on his shoulders it is forbidden, and certainly so when it is only around the neck. The source of this law is from the responsa of the Rashba, for they asked him regarding a certain place where they wear the tallit around their necks, and he replied: All the land of Spain is accustomed to go out thus for the sake of modesty even in a courtyard, and it is a manner of garment for them, see there; and the commentators have already labored over this (see Taz at the end of section 19 and Levush). In my humble opinion it is clear, that here we are not dealing with a tallit like our tallitot, but rather with a small tallit like a scarf (and so it is explicitly stated in the Beit Yosef, see there). And this is like the shawls among us, and some call them "scarf," which they wrap around the neck, and it is for beauty and modesty, and our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in the Shulchan Aruch did not see fit to elaborate and explain, as is his way in the Shulchan Aruch.

There are those who wrote: The scholars who hang the scarf on their shoulders as an ornament—it is forbidden to go out with it, but in Constantinople they are not careful, and those who are meticulous tuck the ends of the scarf into their belts, and now there is no concern lest it slip off, and it appears that it is necessary to tie it to the belt (Magen Avraham subsection 42 in the name of Knesset HaGedolah). This is also similar to the question of the Rashba, of blessed memory, regarding small scarves like our shawls. And those who forbid it, forbid it for the reason of a tallit folded over his shoulders, which is forbidden, and in Constantinople they permit it according to the opinion of the Rashba, for it is not similar to a tallit as I have written. However, there is a concern lest it fall and he come to carry it, therefore they tuck the ends into the belt, and one should be stringent to tie it to the belt. And we walk with scarves because it is the habit to insert the right side into the left side of the garment, and the left side into the right side, and with ours, according to appearances, there is no concern lest they fall because they are narrow in width and long in length, and protrude significantly in front of him. (Also what the Magen Avraham wrote in subsection 43 in the name of the Maharil, that it is permitted to go out in our tallitot, see there, it also must be said that either his intention is that it should hang down below his shoulders or that it is a tallit katan like a scarf, like our scarf, and his intention is also like the Rashba.)

And in section 31, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote: One who goes out wrapped in his tallit and folded it from here and from there, etc., according to the wording of the Rambam that we brought in section 88. And afterwards he wrote: "And these words apply to their tallitot, which were a single four-cornered sheet, but our garments, when he is dressed in them and puts his hands out from within them—it is permitted to grasp some of them in his hand to raise them so that his hems do not get dirty in the mud, or so that they do not hinder him from walking." Thus far his words. And from this it appears that he understood the intent of the words of the Rambam, what he wrote: "and folded it from here and from there"—meaning that he folded it from bottom to top, and not as we explained in section 89, that he folds from the sides onto the shoulders. And behold, according to his interpretation, this is also like the law of a folded tallit according to his interpretation, except that there he raised it completely to the shoulders, and here he raised only the hems upward significantly. And I do not understand, for in such cases how does beautification apply? However, regarding the law, we have no practical difference in this. And behold, in our garments, he permitted even not for beautification, since they have sleeves and the hands are placed in them—it is a complete garment. (And the Taz, section 21, disagrees in this, see there, and all his words require investigation and the words of the Beit Yosef are correct, and so wrote the Eliyah Rabbah, subsection 53. And it is possible that even the Taz only prohibited when he raises them completely to the top, and in this his words are certainly correct, and also the intent of the Beit Yosef is so, as will be explained in the next section.)

However, this permission is only when one raises them from the ground, and in any case it appears to all that the status of a garment is upon it; but if one raised it until high up—it is certainly forbidden. And this is what the Maharil wrote (the Magen Avraham cited him in subsection 44): "Those women who pull back and fold their garments under their arms to raise them so that their hems do not get soiled—it is forbidden... but they may raise them with their hands without any folding." Thus far his words. And this is the explanation: if they raise them until high up under their arms—the name of "garment" is nullified from this; rather, they should raise them with their hands without folding, for automatically they will not raise them until high up, as is understood (and so wrote the Magen Avraham there). And also, even regarding raising from the ground, the Levush wrote that if one does not wear them on the sleeves to insert one's hands into them—one should not raise it much until near one's shoulders, see there; and in any case, it seems to me that to raise it a little, there is no concern. (In the Levush the language is not well-ordered, for he concluded with that which he did not open with, but the intention is as I have written, see there.)

And in section 34, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote: "A person may go out with a sudar folded over his shoulder even if there is no string wrapped around his finger, and if the sudar does not cover his head and the majority of his body—it is forbidden to go out with it, unless he tied its two ends from his shoulders to one another." Thus far his words. And it is from the wording of the Rambam, except that he added "folded over his shoulder," and in truth this wording is found neither in the Gemara nor in the Rambam, only the Tur wrote this. And it is very puzzling, for if so, what is the difference between a sudar and a tallit, and they have already wondered about him (Taz, subsection 24). Furthermore, if it should enter your mind that it is so large, if so, how is it relevant to say: "if it does not cover his head and the majority of his body." And the Tur in truth did not write this wording, see there, but rather it is certainly a small sudar, and there are those that cover his head and the majority of his body and there are those that do not cover. (And this is the saknita mentioned in the Gemara there, and the Tur explained regarding saknita the opposite, a large sudar that hangs between his shoulders and his head is wrapped in it, and we are concerned lest it fall and therefore he must tie it, see there. And the Taz, subsection 24, elaborated at great length and it is difficult to ascertain his intent, but from the end of his words it appears that he also agrees with what we wrote in section 89, that when they carry the tallit from the beit knesset one must drape it over the hands if he prays in this manner, see there and examine closely.)

We say in the Gemara (147b): "One who goes out with coins tied in his sheet is liable for a chatat," and in this wording the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote in section 32, and the Rambam wrote it in chapter 12. And in truth, seemingly there is no novelty in this, for this is a complete act of hotza'ah. However, the primary novelty is that we do not say that this is hotza'ah in an unusual manner, and is only prohibited by rabbinic law, because it is the way of coins to be in a purse and not tied in a sheet—and it comes to teach us that he is liable, because such is the way of shopkeepers. And this is what they said in the Gemara there: "And a shopkeeper who goes out... is liable for a chatat; and not only a shopkeeper, but any person, except that it is the way of a shopkeeper to go out with coins tied in his sheet."

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 33: "It is forbidden to go out on Shabbat with coins or with silver and gold that are sewn into one's garment." Thus far his words. And he did not write the language of "liable" as with those tied in one's sheet, because this is certainly carrying in an unusual manner, and therefore it is forbidden only by rabbinic law. And behold, the Rambam wrote in chapter 12, law 13: "But one who carries with the back of his hand... or in a pocket that he sewed into his garment and the opening of the pocket is facing downward... - he is exempt," and we brought this above in section 5. And if so, it implies that specifically when the opening of the pocket is facing downward it is carrying in an unusual manner, but if its opening is facing upward - he is liable. And it must be said that when the coins are sewn without a pocket - it is carrying in an unusual manner in any case, but when they are placed in a pocket and he sewed the pocket into his garment - it is the usual manner of carrying unless its opening is facing downward. And according to this, when one puts the coins in a pocket or in another object and sews it into his garment - he is liable for a chatat, and there is a practical legal difference in this as we will explain with the help of Heaven.

And behold, our teacher, the Rema, wrote regarding this: "There are those who permit it in a case of loss where he fears that it will be stolen from him if he leaves them in the house and departs from them, and so we are accustomed to be lenient if he must go out. However, if he is able to remain sitting in his house and not go out—he should not go out, and in a place where this is not necessary and he can leave them in the house—one should be stringent." Thus far his words. And the reason is that since it is carrying in an unusual manner (Magen Avraham, subsection 46), they permitted it in a case of loss. And according to this, based on what we have explained, the permission is only when he sews the coins themselves without a pouch. But when they place them in a pouch and he sews the pouch—it is a Torah prohibition and he is liable for a chatat. And since merchants now practice this permission, as they do not wish to grant trust to the innkeeper over a large sum, and they sew the coins into their garments, they should be careful not to sew them in a pouch or in any other wrap. However, if he wraps them in paper and sews them—it appears that this is like being without a pouch, for one does not make a pouch out of paper. Nevertheless, the better way is that they should not leave the inn the entire Sabbath day as our teacher, the Rema, wrote, and it is better to pray in private and not go to the beit knesset than to practice this permission; but the merchants have treated this as a complete permission, and therefore they should be careful at the very least not to place them in a pouch, as I have written.

There is one who says that just as we permitted when they are sewn into his garment, so too even if they are not sewn, and he holds the coins between his garment and his flesh—it is permitted due to loss (Taz, subsection 23). And there is one who says that if they are not sewn—it is completely forbidden (Magen Avraham, ibid.), and so it appears to me to be the primary view, for this is close to a liability for a chatat, as they are certainly in a pocket, for if not so, how would he carry them? And regarding a pocket, we have already explained that even when sewn, it constitutes carrying in the usual manner and he is liable for a chatat. And regarding that which was explained that for coins tied in his sheet one is liable for a chatat, our teacher, the Rema, wrote: that in a house it is permitted even if they are not tied, provided only that they are perforated. Thus far his words. For when going out to the public domain—he is liable because of carrying, but in a house or a courtyard with an eruv—there is no carrying here. And even though there is still a prohibition of muktzeh, regarding this he says that this should be permitted, as he is not holding them in his hands but rather they are tied in his sheet, and they are nullified to the garment in this manner so that it should not be like moving muktzeh with the hands. Furthermore, if the coins are perforated such that they are fit to hang them on the necks of sons and daughters as an ornament—it is permitted to move them even if they are not tied, only that he carries them near his garment or in the pocket of the garment. But to actually move them with his hands—certainly there is no permission for you even with perforated ones (Magen Avraham, subsection 45; and what he wrote regarding moving them outside the eruv requires great study and should not be permitted; and examine this carefully).

It has already been explained in section 73 that one may go out in thick garments, such as garments made of sackcloth, a curtain, or a thick cloth. The Rambam wrote in chapter 19, law 17: "The pillow and the bolster, if they were soft and thin like garments—it is permitted to take them out resting on one's head on Shabbat in the manner of a garment; but if they were hard—they are like a burden and are forbidden." Thus far his words. And certainly his intention is not for our pillows and bolsters, which contain feathers and the feathers are their primary substance, for with them wearing is not applicable; rather, his intention is for soft bedding, such as thick sheets that are spread upon the beds. And according to their manner, for they would go about wrapped, just as today they also go about thus in the lands of the Ishmaelites, therefore if they are soft—they are like a garment, and if they are hard—they are like a burden. Therefore, with hard felts—it is forbidden to wrap oneself in them and bring them through a reshut harabim or a karmelit, but if they are not very hard—it is permitted. And felts, this is what is called "feltz," and in our country this is not the manner of a garment at all even with soft ones, and only because of the rains are there women who wrap themselves in sheets and the like, and certainly it is permitted in such cases. And consequently, even without rains when they go out in them one should not rebuke them, as I wrote in section 73. But men, it is not their manner at all to carry them even in the rains—and they are forbidden to go out in them, for with us it is certainly like a burden, and nevertheless, for the law it requires further study.

It is permitted to go out on Shabbat in two garments, one over the other, whether for his own need or for the need of his fellow; that is to say, his intention is to bring it to his fellow in a manner that is the way of wearing a garment. And the reason is that since it is the way to wear several garments because of the cold or because of adornment, it is therefore always called the way of wearing a garment. And there is no difference whether they are two shirts or two cloaks, which is an upper garment, or other two types of garments, and similarly two belts one over the other even without a garment separating between them. And some prohibit two belts one over the other unless a garment separates between them, for it is not similar to two garments, as in the cold there is benefit from the second garment and it is the way to do so, but with two belts what benefit does he have, and it is not the way to do so and it is a burden, and only with the separation of a garment may he gird a belt over each garment. However, if it is the way of this garment to gird over it two belts, one above and one below, it is certainly permitted (Taz, subsection 25). And the women who have garments and in them belts are sewn to gird with them, and afterwards they gird another belt of silk or of silver, if it is their way in this, it is certainly fine; however, it is better that they should not gird the sewn belts, so that the belt will be a necessity. And in any case there is no prohibition in the sewn belt, and it is not a burden because it is nullified relative to the garment (Magen Avraham, subsection 49. And he wrote: it is good that they should not gird, see there, but there is no prohibition in this as I wrote, and such advice we wrote in section 48 regarding a handkerchief, see there), and see in section 106 and in section 107.

To wear two coverings on the head—it is certainly permitted, for so our fathers walked, with a small covering on the head and a large covering over it like a hat. And this is what our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 36, that it is permitted to wear two hats one over the other, see there—his intention is also thus, for two truly large hats are certainly forbidden, as no person walks thus and it constitutes a burden, and his intention is only as I have written. And it appears to me that in a place where there is government strictness against one who walks with a small covering under the large one and they punish for this—it is forbidden to walk there in such a manner, for it is obvious that one must fear that a policeman will meet him, and out of fear he will remove it from his head and hide it in his garment, as has happened several times in this matter. And one may wear two socks and two shoes one over the other, as is the custom in the world now to walk thus, as is known.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 37: "It is permitted to go out on Shabbat in hand-covers called 'guantes' and in our language 'hentshukh,' and there is one who is stringent to require that he sew them to the sleeves of his garments on Friday or that he tie them to them with a fine permanent knot, and it is proper to be concerned for his words." Thus far his words. The reason of the one who permits: for behold it is a garment like all garments, for all garments are for the body and these are a garment for the hands. And the reason of the one who prohibits is because it is known that it is impossible to feel the body well with the hand-covers, and we fear that he will want to feel and will remove it from his hand and carry it four amot. Therefore we require sewing or tying (Beit Yosef), for in such cases it is like one thing with the garment. And there is one who says that with tying it is not nullified to the garment, and it is a burden when he removes it (Taz, subsection 26). And regarding an 'ervil' and in our language 'mufta,' which is where both hands are warmed in it—it is certainly permitted, for even if he removes one hand, it will remain on his second hand (ibid.). But regarding 'hentshukh'—it is proper to be stringent and such is the custom, but if the cold is great, one should permit it plainly.

He further wrote in section 44: "One who comes to rescue his garments from a fire—he wears all that he can wear and wraps all that he can wrap, and he undresses and returns and wears and carries out." Thus far his words, and it is an explicit Mishnah (120a). And one should not ask, for even without a fire we permitted wearing two garments in section 103, as it can be said that in a fire they permitted even many one on top of the other, for this is certainly forbidden without a fire because it is not the way of people to do so even in the cold as is known, but in a fire they permitted even many.

A kila, which is a type of garment spread out like a curtain and has many straps with which it is stretched and the straps hang down—it is permitted to wrap oneself in it and go out into the reshut harabim, and the straps are not considered a burden, for they are nullified relative to the kila. Therefore, a belt that has straps hanging from it which are made to tie the shoes on one's feet—it is permitted to go out into the reshut harabim with the belt, even though the straps are hanging and are not tied to the shoes, for they are nullified by way of the belt. However, if the straps are of silk, which are significant—they are not nullified and it is forbidden if the shoes are not tied with them. And such is the law for anything that was severed from the garment but one end of it is attached, such as loops: if they are not significant—they are nullified, and it is permitted to go out in the garment, and if they are significant—they are not nullified. And with us, a house garment called a "shtub khalat" which has long laces and they are sewn behind it and one wraps them around the garment like a belt—they are certainly nullified relative to the garment, and it is permitted to go out in the garment even at a time when it is not tied and they hang behind the garment, and similarly the laces of the trousers—they are nullified to the trousers. And those who wear "shleykes" on the shoulders which they connect to the "kneplach" that are on the trousers with the loops of the "shleykes," if the "shleykes" are not connected, meaning that he did not insert their loops into the "kneplach" of the trousers—it is forbidden for him to go out to the reshut harabim or to a karmelit, because they are a thing unto themselves and constitute a burden. And there is one who says that when there is one strap and the second was severed and his intention is to repair it—that it is forbidden to go out in it, for it is not nullified to the garment, and these are words of error. (The Chayei Adam brought this from Tosafot 139b) (This is only regarding tzitzit as is explained in the Rambam and in the Ran, and examine this closely)

Therefore, one who goes out on Shabbat in a tallit that is not made with tzitzit according to the halakhah is liable for a chatat, because those strings are significant to him and his mind is upon them until he completes them and makes them tzitzit, and the significance of a mitzvah constitutes significance. And it appears to me that if his intention is to cast them away, they are not significant and are nullified. And if it is made with tzitzit according to the halakhah, even though we do not have tekhelet, it is permitted to go out in it on Shabbat, because now its mitzvah is fulfilled in this manner with the lavan alone, as I wrote above in siman 13. And even on Shabbat at night, which is not the time for tzitzit, it is permitted, since this is the manner of its wearing. Nevertheless, it appears to me regarding a tallit gadol that it is forbidden to go out with it on Shabbat night, since it is not his manner to wear it at night, except for the night of Yom Kippur, for then we wear it and it is permitted to go out in it. However, if he did go out, he is not liable for a chatat, for it is a garment of a mitzvah (so it appears to me).

The Tur wrote: "A hat, if it is not tight on his head—it is forbidden to go out with it into the reshut harabim, lest the wind blow it off and he come to carry it. And if it is tight: it is permitted according to Rashi even if it protrudes a tefach, and according to Rabbeinu Tam if it protrudes a tefach—it is forbidden due to ohel even in a house, and if it does not protrude a tefach—it is permitted even in the reshut harabim." Thus far his words. And this is the opinion of the Rambam, of blessed memory, at the end of chapter 22, and this is his wording: "A hat that they make for the head which has a surrounding brim that makes a shadow like an ohel over his garment—it is permitted to wear it. But if he extended from the garment around his head or opposite his face like an ohel, and it was tight on his head and the brim that he extended was very stiff like a roof—it is forbidden, because he is making a temporary ohel." Thus far his words. And it results that according to Rashi, our hat which they call a 'shlyapa' or 'hat' or 'kapelyush', if it is not tight—it is forbidden lest it fall from his head and he come to carry it four amot in the reshut harabim, but when it is tight on his head—we are not concerned, and likewise when it is deep such that his head enters into it, it is permitted. And likewise if it is not the way to walk in the street without this hat—it is permitted, for if it falls he will pick it up and place it on his head immediately (Magen Avraham, subsection 52), and all the more so if he does not wear a small covering on his head, such that he would remain with an uncovered head, for we are not concerned. And likewise, only in the reshut harabim are we concerned and not in a karmelit, and therefore nowadays it is permitted according to Rashi, of blessed memory, and all the more so if it is tied with a strap under his throat.

But regarding the matter of ohel, Rashi does not hold of this, and one may say the reason is because there is no ohel without partitions, and furthermore that there is no ohel except in something like a building and not in a garment, just as there is no ohel in the covers of vessels, as will be explained in siman 315 with the help of Heaven. And furthermore, an ohel that is made all at once is not called an ohel, for the prohibition of ohel is due to building, and every building is made little by little (the Ran wrote this reasoning in the chapter "Tolin" in the name of our teacher Yonah, of blessed memory, see there), and see what I wrote in siman 315, section 12.

But the opinion of Rabbeinu Tam and the Rambam, and likewise the opinion of Rabbeinu Chananel: is that when it is a tefach wide—the concept of ohel applies to it when it is stiff, for certainly with something soft the concept of ohel does not apply. Therefore, if one extended the tallit over his head even more than a tefach—we have no concern with it, but with something stiff the concept of ohel applies. And even if we say that these teachers of ours also hold by those rules of ohel that we explained in the previous section, nevertheless they hold that with this hat the concept of ohel applies, because it is made for shade from its inception to protect the eyes (see Turei Zahav in siman 315, subsection 11). And if it goes on a slope like the "breitl"—the concept of ohel does not apply (Magen Avraham subsection 51), and furthermore, the prohibition according to this system due to ohel is only when the intention is for it to be for shade, and with us the intention is not for this, as is known. And it appears to me that those who are concerned for their eyes and place a wide piece in front of the eyes called "brillik," even though it is a tefach wide and it is stiff and his intention is for shade—nevertheless there is no prohibition in this, because it goes on a slope, and also because certainly even according to those who prohibit due to ohel it is not a complete ohel, as is understood, and therefore one should not prohibit it for those with eye ailments.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 40 wrote: "A hat that extends a tefach beyond one's head—it is forbidden to place it on one's head even in a house because of the law of ohel." Thus far his words. And he was not concerned to clarify that this is specifically regarding a stiff hat, and he was brief in this. And afterwards in section 41 he wrote: "To go out on Shabbat with a hat on one's head that is made to protect against the sun, there is one who forbids it because perhaps the wind will lift it, etc." And he adopted both opinions stringently, and it is a wonder. And he was precise to write first "to place it on his head" and afterwards "to go out," because according to the reason of ohel, if he was wearing it before Shabbat—it is permitted, and according to the reason of falling—it is forbidden even in such a case. And the world conducts itself with leniency in the matter (see Bach, Eliyahu Rabbah, and Tosefot Shabbat), for they hold like Rashi, as the Smag and the Ran and other Rishonim agreed with Rashi, and so wrote the Maharil (Eliyahu Rabbah). And there is no prohibition of ohel in this, and as for the concern of falling, we do not have a reshut harabim, and also for other reasons that have been explained. And there are those who refrain from placing the tallit over their heads out of concern for ohel, for the tallit that is on both sides is like walls and that which is on his head is a roof and it is an ohel, and there is no sense or reason in this. And in the Gemara (138b) they said this in the language of a wonder, see there, for it is soft and folds and the way of wrapping is such, and now there is no one who is concerned for it, and on the contrary, the essence of prayer is such.

The parasol, which they call a "shirm" or "regenson," which is made to protect against the sun and against the rains and forms a tent over a person's head, and has many hooks and loops and upon its opening becomes like a structure on Shabbat—it is forbidden to carry it over one's head even in a courtyard, for this is a complete ohel and is made as an ohel to protect the head and the body, and all the more so to open it and to close it, for there is in this a semblance of building, and it contains a semblance of a Torah prohibition, and the giants of the world have already forbidden it. And one who wishes to permit it with empty words testifies about himself that he has no fear of Heaven, and in truth it is a complete prohibition according to the law and not from the side of stringency; see what I wrote in siman 315, section 12.

The sages taught in the Mishnah at the beginning of the tenth chapter of Eruvin (95a): "One who finds tefillin—he brings them in pair by pair." That is to say, if he found them in a place where they are protected from dogs and from beasts so that they will not soil them—he is not permitted to wear them on Shabbat even if they are not protected from thieves, for thieves surely will not degrade the tefillin, and this is explicit at the end of the first chapter of Beitzah (15a), see there. However, if they are not protected from dogs—the sages permitted him to wear them as on a weekday. And even though Shabbat is not the time for tefillin, nevertheless it is not a burden, since they are worn in the manner of a garment on a weekday. And according to the essential law as explained in the Gemara there, since Shabbat is not the time for tefillin—he may wear two pairs at once, for there is room on the head to place two tefillin, and likewise on the arm, for on a weekday it is forbidden in such a case because of "do not add," but on Shabbat "do not add" is not applicable since he does not intend for the sake of the mitzvah of tefillin. But even though such is the law, nevertheless it is impossible to rule thus consistently, for this is only when the tefillin are very small such that there is room for both of them, which is not the case when they are somewhat large, and when he places them not in their proper location—it is a burden (Magen Avraham, subsection 54). And it may also be said that he was not permitted more than what he is able to carry on a weekday (ibid. in the name of the Maharsha).

And there are further detailed laws regarding this: namely, if it is a time of danger, such as in their days when there were several periods of decrees not to don tefillin, he covers them and proceeds. And even without danger, if they do not have retzuot, and it is possible that they are not tefillin but rather amulets—for in their days they were made in the form of tefillin—he is likewise not permitted to carry them; rather, due to the doubt, he covers them and proceeds. And so too, even if there are retzuot, which is a sign that they are certainly tefillin, nevertheless if there are not yet knots in the retzuot—behold, he has no ability to wear them, for to make a knot of tefillin on Shabbat is a permanent knot, and he would be liable for a chatat, and he should act as will be explained. However, if he can make something like the knot of tefillin with a loop—he must do so (this is explicitly stated in Eruvin 97a, see there). And so too, if there are many tefillin in such a manner that if he were to bring them in pair by pair he would not bring them in until nightfall—he should wait with them until dark and bring them; and if he is afraid to wait until dark because of bandits—he moves them less than four amot at a time, or gives them to his fellow and his fellow to his fellow until he reaches the outer courtyard. And if there are few of them—he brings them in pair by pair as we have said, and he brings them in by way of wearing them until he has brought them all in. (In the Tur and Shulchan Aruch all these details were not explained, because now it is an uncommon matter).

There is one who says that a woman is forbidden to wear tefillin when she finds them on a path on Shabbat, and even though regarding a matter that is a garment for one it is considered a garment also for the second even though it is not his way to go out in them, women are different as they are like a nation unto themselves (Magen Avraham, subsection 54). And consequently, a woman who went out into the marketplace in a tallit with tzitzit—she is liable for a sin offering for the tzitzit, for they are not nullified to the garment as I wrote in section 108. Nevertheless, a matter that is a complete garment for a man—a woman may also go out in it (ibid.), and it is only regarding tefillin and tzitzit, which we do not allow women to wear even if they desire, that their law is not like men, which is not the case with other garments. However, this is certainly so if there is a concern that they will mock her when she wears such a garment—she is forbidden to wear it, for perhaps they will mock and she will remove it and carry it in her hands. (And that which we learned "whether a man etc." is explained in the Gemara, see there.)

One who finds a sefer Torah in a field—he sits and guards it and waits for nightfall over it, and takes it and comes home; and in a time of danger, he leaves it and goes his way. And if rains were falling and it could become blurred—they permitted him to wrap himself in it, in the parchments, in the manner of a garment, and he then wears a garment over it from above and enters with it. And this is a Tosefta in the eighth chapter of Eruvin, and the poskim ruled accordingly. And it is simple that if he is afraid to sit until night—he carries it less than four amot at a time or gives it to his fellow, etc., as with tefillin. (See Turei Zahav subsection 78 that giving it to his fellow is preferable to less than four amot at a time, but it seems to me that this is regarding money, but regarding matters of holiness, less than four amot at a time is more preferable, for giving it from fellow to fellow is a disgrace. And know that it is not specifically a sefer Torah and tefillin, for the same law applies to mezuzot, and so too all books, even printed ones, he should not leave them in disgrace and their law is as I have written.)

We learned in the Mishnah (146b): One whose garments fell into water on the way, meaning his clothes fell into water on Shabbat, he may walk in them and need not fear that they will suspect him of having laundered them (Bartenura). And we also do not fear that he will come to wring them out, because the sages did not burden him to strip off his clothes due to this concern, for great is human dignity (Tosafot Yom Tov), and furthermore, as a matter of law we hold that we do not fear that he might wring them out, as will be explained. But he may not spread them out to dry them because of appearances, so that they do not suspect him of having laundered them on Shabbat. And even in the innermost chambers where there are no onlookers—it is forbidden, for anything that the sages forbade because of appearances—it is forbidden even in the innermost chambers, in a matter where there is reason to suspect him of a Torah prohibition (Tosafot Ketubot 60a, s.v. 'mema'achan', and see the Ran in the first chapter of Beitzah). And they only forbade spreading them out on Shabbat, but if he spread laundered garments on the eve of Shabbat—he is not obligated to remove them on Shabbat, because the primary suspicion is only when he spreads them on Shabbat, for then there are grounds to suspect him of having laundered them today, for if he had laundered them yesterday he would have spread them yesterday, and they will not say that they fell into water because they do not know of this (Levush).

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 47: "A person may not spread out his garments on Shabbat even from perspiration." Thus far his words, and this is from the Tosefta at the end of chapter 17; see there. And know that there is one who says that this is specifically when they were soaked in water, but if a small amount of water fell—it is permitted to spread them out, for with a small amount of water there is no concern that they will say he laundered them (Magen Avraham, subsection 55 in the name of the Yereim), and it is not similar to perspiration which spreads throughout the entire garment and they will say he laundered it. But with a small amount of water that fell on a portion of the garment, they will not suspect him, for they see a portion of it is dry (and the difficulty of the Magen Avraham there is answered).

Garments soaked in water—it is forbidden to dry them near a fire, because of the prohibition of melaben and because of the prohibition of mevashel, and therefore even with a slight soaking it is forbidden (ibid. subsection 57). However, in a place where the hand is not scalded by it—the prohibition of cooking does not apply, and consequently there is also no prohibition of melaben here, for if it were not so, it would also be forbidden in the sun (ibid.). And regarding a slight soaking, we have already explained that it is permitted, for if it were a heavy soaking, it would be forbidden anyway because of marit ha-ayin, so why would we need the reason of melaben and mevashel? However, even with a heavy soaking there is a practical legal difference in this law, namely, when one warms them while wearing them, for in such a case there is no marit ha-ayin and it is forbidden for these reasons (from the Ma'aseh Yom Tov).

A person may dry himself with an aluntit, which is a garment used for drying oneself after washing, and bring it in his hand, and we are not concerned that he might come to wring it out. And why are we not concerned? Because everyone who washes dries themselves, and if you forbid drying oneself, he will not be able to wash, and this is something that is impossible (Ran in the chapter "Chavit"). And even in this time when we are not accustomed to washing on Shabbat, it is also permitted, since they did not issue a decree regarding this (Magen Avraham, subsection 58). However, he should not hand the aluntit to the bath-attendants, as they are suspected of wringing. Now, our teacher, the Rema, in section 46, regarding items soaked in water which are forbidden to be dried near a fire, wrote, and this is his wording: "And it is forbidden to handle them lest he come to wring them out, and this is when he is particular about its water." Thus far his words. And according to this, one could say that also regarding an aluntit, although we permitted him to bring it in his hand in a place where there is an eruv and we were not concerned about wringing for the reason that has been explained, nevertheless, after he has brought it to his house, it should be forbidden to handle it further, for then the reason we explained does not apply, obviously. Nevertheless, it does not imply so, and the reason seems to be that since we permitted him to bring it, it is impossible to forbid it afterwards in handling. Furthermore, with items soaked in water, he is certainly particular about its water, whereas with an aluntit he is certainly not particular, as it is the way of the world to dry oneself with an aluntit (and so it appears in the Gra, see there). And he further wrote: that it is forbidden to walk on Shabbat in a place where he could slip and fall into water, lest his garments become soaked and he come to wring them out. Thus far his words. And his intention is when he goes there to stroll and the like, for if his path is through there, what can he do? And the essence of this law of one whose garments became soaked deals with such cases (it appears to me), and see above, section 45.

It is permitted to wash one's hands in a river on Shabbat, provided that one does not carry them with the water upon them four amot outside the river, and also that one does not push the water in the river beyond four amot, for the water is a karmelit. And that which is prohibited beyond four amot outside the river—this is when outside the river is also a karmelit, for then there is no prohibition to carry from the river to its exterior less than four amot, as one is carrying from a karmelit to a karmelit. But if outside the river is a reshut harabim or a reshut hayachid—then even less than four amot is prohibited, and one must dry them while one's hands are still over the river (and so wrote the Mishna Berura). And the law of one who washes in a river will be explained in siman 326.

Those afflicted with scabs who have wounds on the head, they make for them hair from combed flax or from carded wool and they are permitted to go out with them on Shabbat, for regarding them this is like a garment or an ornament and not like a burden. However, one must prepare them from before the day for this, so that they will not be muktzeh as I wrote in siman 308. Therefore, we require either that he performed an action with them, such as dyeing them or binding them from before the day for this intention, or that he went out with them for one hour from before the day. And similarly, it is permitted to go out with a wrap that they hang on the neck for one who has a wound on his head or on his arm, for such was their custom in this, and similarly it is permitted to go out with rags wrapped on the hand or on the finger when he has a wound, for regarding him it is like an actual garment. And there is one who requires that he go out with it for one hour from before the day (Taz, subsection 29), and there is one who does not require this (Magen Avraham, subsection 62), and so it appears is the primary view. And in any case, designation is certainly required, for if not so, it would be muktzeh, and only designation through an action is not required according to this opinion. (The Be'er Heitev, subsection 35, brought in the name of the Derekh HaChaim that it is forbidden to walk in shoes with iron spurs in the manner of horse riders, and that is when they have sharp points. But without sharp points, only with an iron arch, it is permitted; see there.)