Siman 38

One who betroths a woman upon a condition: if the condition is fulfilled, she is betrothed; and if not, she is not betrothed and does not require a get. This applies whether the condition was from his side, such as that he will give her a maneh or the like, or whether the condition was from her side, that she must fulfill it—provided only that the condition was made properly according to the laws of conditions that will be explained in this siman. For if it was not made properly, it is nothing, and the condition is void while the act of kiddushin remains valid in any case [and that which a condition does not involve asmachta—will be explained in siman 42, section 11].

If the condition was not fulfilled due to an accident that befell him—nevertheless, the kiddushin are void. And even though regarding an accident the Merciful One exempts him—this applies to matters between himself and himself, and not what is between him and another; for what does the other care about this one's accident? And even though in matters of gittin there is also a claim of accident, except that due to the enactment they nullified the claim of accident as written in siman 144, and behold a get is also between him and his wife; however, it is not comparable, for a get depends only on his will and not on her will, and therefore when he is compelled by accident there is a claim of accident. This is not the case regarding kiddushin, for a woman is only betrothed with her consent; behold, she does not agree to the kiddushin unless he fulfills his condition [Ran chapter 3]. We wrote this reasoning in Choshen Mishpat siman 21, see there. Its source is from the Yerushalmi [chapter 3, halacha 2], where R. Yochanan and Resh Lakish disagree on this reasoning, and the halacha follows R. Yochanan. However, in the Yerushalmi there, it is stated that R. Yochanan himself, at the time of his death, commanded his daughters to act according to Resh Lakish, for the reason that perhaps the matter will come before a dayan who will see fit to rule like Resh Lakish and the matter will come to ruin, see there.

And there is a doubt whether we say that there is no claim of ones in kiddushin regarding all types of conditions, or specifically regarding a condition that is for his benefit or for her benefit, such as the giving of money or some other benefit; but regarding a general condition in which there is no benefit, such as if he said, "Behold you are betrothed to me on the condition that I come here within thirty days, and if I do not come, the kiddushin shall be void," and he was prevented by ones and did not come—whether the kiddushin are void and there is no claim of ones, or whether there is a claim of ones and the kiddushin are not void. And likewise the opposite, if he said, "On the condition that I do not come here within thirty days, and if I come, the kiddushin shall be void," and it was his desire to come and void the kiddushin but he was prevented by ones and did not come—whether there is a claim of ones and the kiddushin are void, or there is no claim of ones and the kiddushin are upheld. And likewise there is a doubt whether, even if we say that by the letter of the law there is a claim of ones in such a case, if there is a rabbinic enactment in this matter that there should be no claim of ones, as in gittin.

There are some among the Rishonim who wrote that if one said, "Behold, you are betrothed to me if I do not come from now until such-and-such a day," and he was prevented by an unavoidable accident and did not come—there is a claim of an unavoidable accident and she is not betrothed, and the rabbinic enactment regarding gittin does not apply to this. Conversely, if he said, "Behold, you are betrothed to me if I come," and he was prevented by an unavoidable accident and did not come—in this case, there is certainly no claim of an unavoidable accident, neither regarding gittin nor regarding kiddushin according to the fundamental law. For since the matter was nullified, even though it was nullified due to an unavoidable accident, nevertheless the condition was not fulfilled. He brought a proof for this from the incident of one who said, "Behold, this is your get on the condition that you give him my cloak," and the cloak was lost, and the sages said that she does not have the ability to give the value of what the cloak was worth and the get is void [the seventh chapter of Gittin]. And behold, she was prevented by an unavoidable accident; rather, it is certain that as long as the condition was not fulfilled, even due to an unavoidable accident, there is no claim of an unavoidable accident [Shittah Mekubetzet in the name of the Ra'ah, the beginning of Ketubot].

It is found that according to this opinion, the law is like the first opinion, that in every case where the condition is for the fulfillment of a matter—such as the giving of money or some other benefit to be performed—and he was under duress and did not perform it, there is no claim of duress by law, even in cases of gittin in such a manner. And even in a matter that is not regarding a benefit, such as "if I come," and he was under duress and did not come, there is no claim of duress. And the enactment that the sages instituted in gittin that there should be no claim of duress is only when the condition was for the absence of an action—that he should not come—and the condition was fulfilled by way of duress. In this, by law, there is a claim of duress, for it is impossible to say that the condition was fulfilled, since it was fulfilled by way of duress and this is not a fulfillment. Therefore, in kiddushin there is a claim of duress, and in gittin the sages instituted that there should be no claim of duress.

But there are some of the Rishonim who wrote that this question was asked of the early Geonim, whether there is a claim of ones in kiddushin, and he responded that it is a legal doubt. And there is one who wished to say that they do not disagree with the first opinion, and according to the reasoning we wrote, that if he did not fulfill the condition due to ones, in this case there is certainly no claim of ones, for what does she have to do with his ones—ultimately the condition was not fulfilled. And that which the Gaon responded, that it is a legal doubt, this is when the condition was fulfilled due to ones, such as if he said, "Behold you are betrothed to me on the condition that I do not come until such-and-such a day," and he was under ones and did not come; for according to the law there is a claim of ones, except that in gittin the sages enacted that there should not be a claim of ones, and the Gaon was in doubt whether the sages also enacted this in kiddushin or not.

But it is not so, for we have found that they also asked the opposite regarding a man who betrothed on condition "if I do not come by such-and-such a time, the betrothal shall be void," and he did not come; they asked before Rav Shmuel, the head of the Kallah, whether there is a claim of accidental duress regarding betrothal. Thus far his words. [The Ittur, letter Kof, and the Avnei Miluim cited it]. It follows that he was in doubt even if he was prevented by accidental duress from fulfilling the condition, unless we say to distinguish between a condition that pertains to his benefit or her benefit and a general condition that does not pertain to a benefit, like the doubt we wrote in section 3. For if we say so, the law would be that in a condition involving the giving of money or another benefit, where he was prevented by accidental duress and did not fulfill it, according to all opinions there is no claim of accidental duress. However, from the words of the later authorities, it implies that they do not hold of this distinction [see Beit Shmuel, end of subsection 1]. And there are several proofs for this reasoning that we wrote, that in a matter pertaining to a benefit, there is certainly no claim of accidental duress [and what the Beit Meir wrote does not seem correct, as the Avnei Miluim wrote, see there].

In all matters one may make conditions and whatever condition they desire, except for one who makes a condition against that which is written in the Torah or makes a condition for something that is impossible to fulfill. And so it appears to me that one should not make a condition in kiddushin that she must stand by the condition all the days of her life, such as "on the condition that you do not drink wine all the days of your life" or "that I shall not drink all the days of my life." For just as in gittin it is impossible to make a condition that she must stand by all the days of her life, as was written in siman 143, because this is not "severance" since all her days she is bound to him, so too in kiddushin this is not a "joining" with a condition that stands all their days such that upon their violating the condition they would separate from one another. And one must deliberate on this, for perhaps only in gittin is it so because it is written "severance" and this is not severance, but not in kiddushin; however, reason tends toward the view that gittin and kiddushin are equal in this, and the poskekim did not mention this. And in all other conditions one may make conditions, whether in kiddushin of money or a document, or in kiddushin of cohabitation. And even though we hold that there is no condition in chalitzah, as was written in siman 169, because any act that cannot be fulfilled through a messenger cannot have a condition imposed upon it, as was written there, and kiddushin of cohabitation cannot be fulfilled through a messenger; nevertheless, since kiddushin of money and a document can be fulfilled through a messenger and one can impose a condition upon them, the same applies to kiddushin of cohabitation, as the forms of marriage are compared to one another. Furthermore, it appears to me that in kiddushin of a document with a condition, one should not write the condition in the document of kiddushin, just as with a get, as was written in siman 147; see there.

Stipulating against that which is written in the Torah, how so? Behold, if one stipulated on the condition that "I shall not be beholden to you regarding the mitzvah of onah" – his condition is void and the kiddushin are valid, for it is not within the power of a person to void a matter from the words of the Torah. However, in a matter of money, his condition is valid, such as if he said to her "on the condition that I shall not be obligated to you for sustenance and clothing" – his condition is valid, for this is not a transgression of the words of the Torah, as it is within the hand of every person to forgo his money. And also, this is specifically when she waives it to him, but if he said "on the condition that you have no claim against me for food or clothing" – this too is called stipulating against that which is written in the Torah, and so it is proven in the Shas. And some say that even if one stipulates regarding a rabbinic matter in a thing that is not of money, his condition is also void, for everything the sages ordained, they ordained similar to a Torah law. And there is one who wishes to say that regarding rabbinic matters, even in a matter of money his condition is void, for they made a reinforcement for their words more than those of the Torah; but all the poskim disagree with this, and only regarding the ketubah alone did the sages ordain so, so that she should not be light in his eyes to divorce her, as I wrote in siman 66. And he may stipulate that she shall sustain him and provide for him.

If he said to her, "on condition that you eat pork," or on condition that you perform any other prohibition—this is not like stipulating against what is written in the Torah, for it is in her power not to eat and not be betrothed to him, and something that is in her power is called such because it is within her ability to eat. But if he said to her, "on condition that so-and-so performs a prohibited act"—this is not a condition, for behold, the so-and-so will not agree and it is not in her power that the so-and-so should fulfill it, and it is like a condition that is impossible to fulfill; and there is no difference between a Torah prohibition and a rabbinic one [it appears to me]. But if he stipulated with her regarding a monetary matter of another, such as "on condition that so-and-so gives me his courtyard" or "on condition that he marries his daughter to his son"—it is a condition, for it is in her power that the so-and-so will fulfill it, as she can increase the dowry and gifts for him until he agrees to this.

A condition that is impossible to fulfill – how so? For example, if he said to her, "on condition that you ascend to the firmament," or "that you descend to the depths," or "that you swallow a reed of four cubits," or "that you bring me a reed of one hundred cubits," or "that you cross the Great Sea on foot" – this is not a condition. And thus the sages said: Any condition that is impossible to fulfill in its end, yet he stipulated it from its beginning, he is merely mocking her with words and the matter is established. And even if it is possible to do this thing in a manner that is not the way of nature, only through holy names and the like, it is not called possible to fulfill, and so too anything similar to such things. But if he said to her, "on condition that you give me one hundred maneh," it is called possible to fulfill even if she is poor; since it is within the power of other people who are wealthy to fulfill this thing, we do not follow her specific status, and so too anything similar to this. And many more laws of conditions will be explained in siman 143, see there.

If he made a condition with her involving two conditions, and one of them is regarding that which is written in the Torah or is impossible to fulfill, it is explained from the words of the Rambam that one is void and the second remains standing, and so it is implied from the language of the Shas. And we do not say that just as with the one condition he exaggerated with words, so too with the second; rather, the one remains standing and the one is void. And this is like "acquire you and a donkey," where we establish that he acquires half, as is written in Choshen Mishpat siman 210. And know, that even though in the Yerushalmi it is explained that even onah is like a monetary matter, and so it is in the Tosefta of Kiddushin, nevertheless, the way of our Shas is not so, for bodily pain is not subject to forgiveness, and so ruled all the poskim.

The Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote: One who betroths upon a condition and returned after several days and canceled the condition, even though he canceled it between him and her not in the presence of witnesses—the condition is canceled and behold she is betrothed unconditionally; and similarly if the condition was from the woman and she canceled it between her and him—the condition is canceled. Therefore, one who betroths upon a condition and entered the huppah unconditionally or cohabited unconditionally—behold she requires a get even though the condition was not fulfilled, lest he canceled the condition when he cohabited or when he entered the huppah. Thus far his words. And some say that we require that he cancel the condition specifically before witnesses, and similarly when he entered the huppah unconditionally before witnesses then she requires a get, and without this it is not effective. And some say that the cancellation of the condition is not effective unless it was regarding a matter of money, for money is within one's power to waive and behold it is as if he said "I have received it," but regarding other conditions, cancellation and waiver are not effective, such as one who stipulated on the condition that she has no blemishes or vows, the kiddushin are immediately void when she has blemishes or has vows upon her, and what use is the cancellation of the condition? And regarding money, waiver is effective even after the objection, for it is as if the condition was fulfilled.

The opinion of the Rambam is that since he made the condition for his own benefit, his intention is not that the kiddushin be immediately voided, but rather the matter is suspended until the facts regarding the defects and the vows become known; and as long as he did not object to them—she is betrothed [Ran, chapter 7 of Ketubot]. However, if he did object to them, she is not betrothed even if he later retracted and waived his objection [ibid.], for as soon as he objected, the kiddushin were voided. This is not similar to what will be explained regarding "on condition that I am wealthy" and he is found to be poor, or poor and he is found to be wealthy, where even if she said "in my heart I intended to be betrothed to him"—she is not betrothed. For that case is even worse, since she said that in her heart she did not object even at the time of the kiddushin, and nevertheless they explicitly stated this condition, and matters of the heart are not matters. But in this case, he objected at the time of the act, yet he suspended the matter until he could settle his mind on it, and the kiddushin were suspended; if so, afterwards, when the objection departed and he became reconciled to the defects and the vows, the kiddushin were finalized [ibid.], and there is no concern of bereirah in this, as I wrote in section 68.

And according to the opinion of the Rambam, witnesses are not required, for since the reason is due to waiver, and as I have written, it is effective even between him and her; and even if he brought her under the chuppah alone and did not have relations, we say perhaps he waived, and all the more so if he brought her in and had relations. Nevertheless, even if he brought her in and had relations, we do not say that he certainly waived, but rather it is a case of uncertain kiddushin, and if another man came and betrothed her even after the relations, she requires a get from both of them, for even though he had relations, there is a concern that perhaps he had relations based on his condition and thought that the condition would be fulfilled. Therefore, if before the relations or the entry into the chuppah it became known that the condition would not be fulfilled and he brought her in and had relations – it is a complete kiddushin. However, she does not have a ketubah, for regarding the matter of the ketubah, he stands by his original condition.

And those who disagree with him hold that it is not due to the reason of waiver, but rather that when he cohabited, we say that he betrothed her anew with this cohabitation, and similarly with entry into the huppah; and according to this, witnesses are certainly required, for all kiddushin require witnesses [the Rosh]. And some say that entering without cohabitation is nothing [the Ran], for according to this logic that the concern is because he betrothed her anew, this is only through intercourse and not through entry into the huppah, except that one must be concerned for the one who holds that one also betroths through huppah. And regarding the practical law, one must be concerned for the opinion of the Rambam [ibid.], and our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, in section 35 brought only the opinion of the Rambam, of blessed memory; and even if he cohabited or entered immediately after the kiddushin, she requires a get, since the reason is due to waiver, we concern ourselves that he waived immediately [and Rashi and Tosafot, Ketubot 73a, starting with the words "But," hold like those who disagree, see there; and the Rif and the Rambam ruled like Ulla in the name of Rabbi Elazar, 74a, that where he cohabited everyone agrees, and they only argue where he entered and did not cohabit, and the halacha is like Rav, see there].

If before the cohabitation he said explicitly that he relies upon the first condition—it appears that according to everyone she does not require a get, though there are those who are stringent even in such a case, for we concern ourselves that perhaps at the time of the act he waived it [Shiltei Gibborim], but this does not appear to be so from all the poskim [see Chelkat Mechokek and Beit Shmuel there]. And regarding one who betroths without specification and vows or blemishes were found upon her—it will be explained in siman 39.

Some say that one who betrothed on a condition that extends for some time and married her within that time—the condition is certainly nullified and the kiddushin are not dependent upon it, and even though he did not fulfill the condition in its time, she is betrothed, and the reason is that since they did not care to wait until the time of the conclusion of the condition, they certainly nullified the condition so that the kiddushin would not be dependent upon it. Nevertheless, if the condition was regarding a monetary matter, such as "on condition that he gives her a maneh within a year from the day of the kiddushin" and he married her within the year, even though the condition of the kiddushin is nullified and the kiddushin are not dependent upon it, nevertheless the money remains an obligation upon him to pay if he admitted that he did not pay, and if there is a denial between them, it will be explained before us with the help of Heaven.

However, the poskim did not cite this law at all, and it appears to me that they do not hold of this law. For since in our Shas they said regarding one who betroths upon a condition and has intercourse, she requires a get due to the doubt that perhaps he waived the condition, and if she received kiddushin from another, she requires a get from both of them as I have written; whereas according to the approach of the Yerushalmi, he certainly nullified the condition. And even though one could say that our Shas did not speak of a condition extending over time, but rather, for example, a condition regarding blemishes and vows where he did not know she had them and thought she had no blemishes or vows, therefore they are only kiddushin of doubt; but in a condition extending over time, surely he knew that it is still possible to transgress the condition, and nevertheless he married her, he certainly waived the condition—nonetheless, from the language of the Shas which said "one who betroths upon a condition and has intercourse requires a get," and the get is due to the doubt, it implies that in all matters of condition the law is so. And also the Yerushalmi can be explained in another manner [it is in chapter 3, halacha 2, and they explain that this which Rabbi Abahu retracted was not a retraction from his words, but rather this is the explanation: that the condition was that whoever retracts from the kiddushin until a certain time shall give such and such, and he married her within the time, and Rabbi Abahu said to him "go give," meaning sustenance, and he replied "I have not acquired a wife," meaning it is still in her power to retract, and he conceded to him, and he went back and said whoever retracts shall give according to their condition. And it asks what did he innovate in this, and answers that he made it an act of beit din, meaning that he strengthened the condition so it should not be as an asmachta but as an act of beit din. And according to the explanation of the Ran, it is difficult what it says "she does not retract," for the condition was upon him; see there and examine carefully].

If a contradiction arises between the man and the woman regarding the fulfillment of the condition or its nullification, such as if he betrothed her on the condition "that I give you a maneh" or "I speak for you to the government" or "that I go to such-and-such a place," and he says "I gave to you," "I spoke to the government," "I went to such-and-such a place" and the kiddushin were finalized, and she says "you did not give," "you did not speak," "you did not go" and the kiddushin were nullified; if the condition was until a fixed time or if the condition was the negation of an action, such as on the condition "that I do not go" or "that I do not speak," and he says "I did not go," "I did not speak" and the kiddushin were finalized, and she says "you went," "you spoke" and the kiddushin were nullified, and so too anything similar to this; or if the condition was upon her regarding fulfillment or negation and there is a contradiction between them—there are some of our teachers who hold that regarding kiddushin she is believed and regarding divorce he is believed, for the burden of proof rests upon the one who seeks to extract from his fellow. It appears that the intent is that regarding kiddushin, where he comes to establish the kiddushin and to hold her to him and she comes to nullify the kiddushin and to remove herself from him as she was before the kiddushin, the husband is called the one extracting from his fellow, for he comes to extract her from her own domain where she was previously and to bring her into his domain; therefore she is believed. And regarding a get it is the opposite, for she comes to remove herself from his domain where she was until now—she is called the extractor and the burden of proof is upon her. And he who says that the condition was fulfilled, his law is like one who says to a woman "I betrothed you" and she says "you did not betroth me," where he is forbidden to her relatives and she is not forbidden to his relatives. And consequently also the opposite: when she says that the condition was fulfilled and she is betrothed and he says that it was not fulfilled—he is believed and she is called the extractor, as she comes to extract from him the obligations of a husband to his wife, and the burden of proof is upon her, and it becomes like one who says "you betrothed me" and he says "I did not betroth you," where she becomes forbidden to his relatives. And so it is explained in the Yerushalmi: The time arrived, he says "I gave" and she says "I did not receive," Rabbi Yose said: since he seeks to forbid her to himself, he must bring proof. This is his wording. And there is no difference in a contradiction between a condition of "arise and act" and "sit and do not act," unlike the one who says that in "sit and do not act," even if the other contradicts him and says that he transgressed and acted, he is not believed and we do not fear that he actually transgressed; for it is not so.

However, the essence of this law is perplexing to me, for if according to his words she is a married woman because the condition was fulfilled, what benefit is there in her denial? And what does this matter have to do with "one who extracts from his fellow," for that is only regarding the inability to extract money and not regarding a prohibition. And one also cannot say it is because she has a chazakah of being unmarried, for it has already been explained in siman 30 that whenever an act of kiddushin has been performed, the chazakah of being unmarried is removed from her; see there. To what is this comparable? To one who betrothed her on a condition and cohabited, where we establish that she requires a get but does not have a ketubah; evidently, money is one thing and prohibition is another, and how can we permit her without a get? Therefore, it appears to me that the intent of the Yerushalmi and the poskim is to say that she is believed and we do not compel her to be his wife, but nevertheless, we do not permit her without a get, and we compel him to give a get since according to his words she is a married woman. And so too the reverse, when she says that the condition was fulfilled and he denies it—we also compel him to give a get. And even though we establish regarding one who says "you betrothed me" and he says "I did not betroth her" that we do not compel him to give a get but rather we request of him to give a get, it is different there where he denies it entirely, but here where there was kiddushin between them and the denial is only regarding the condition—certainly we compel him to give a get since according to her words the condition was fulfilled. And since this is so, it must be said that both of them are forbidden to the relatives in every case, unlike what I wrote in the previous section [however, in the Ran chapter 3 in the name of the Ramban he wrote that she is believed and permitted to the market, but in the Rashba this wording is not present and it requires further study; nevertheless, it appears clear to me as I wrote].

If one says the condition was fulfilled and the second does not deny it but rather says "I do not know," our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 39 that there are those who say that regarding any condition that is "arise and act," neither of them is believed to say that he fulfilled the condition that was incumbent upon him to fulfill, but rather he requires witnesses; however, regarding a condition that is "sit and do not act," each of them is believed if his counterpart does not deny him. And there are those who say that even regarding "arise and act" he is also believed as long as his counterpart does not deny him. Thus far his words.

And one must clarify regarding this the reason of the first opinion, why he should not be believed even regarding "arise and act" since the other does not contradict him. They wrote the reason is that it is similar to one who says, "I lent you a maneh" and the other says, "I do not know." Even though in a case of "certain and uncertain," the "certain" is preferred, nevertheless, to extract money from its possession we do not say the "certain" is preferred [Ran], as is written in Choshen Mishpat siman 75. So too here, his "certain" does not have the power to extract her from her prior status. Nevertheless, it is a case of doubtful kiddushin even according to this opinion, for behold, even there, if he wishes to fulfill his obligation toward Heaven he is liable to pay, and is also liable to swear that he does not know, as is written there. And although one could distinguish that there it is a "poor uncertainty" because he should have known, and therefore he is liable to an oath and also to pay if he wishes to fulfill his obligation toward Heaven, whereas here it is a "good uncertainty" because why should she know if he fulfilled the condition or not—nevertheless, on the contrary, it can be said that since it is not incumbent upon her to know, how can we say that we do not concern ourselves with his words? And this is certainly the reason for the second opinion which makes it certain kiddushin, and therefore even according to this opinion it is doubtful kiddushin.

And we found in the Tosefta [chapter 3] that there is a dispute regarding this, as it is taught there: One who says to a woman, "Behold, you are betrothed to me on the condition that I speak on your behalf to the government," she is betrothed immediately until he says "I did not speak" – these are the words of Rabbi Meir; and the Sages say: If the condition is fulfilled she is betrothed, and if not she is not betrothed. Thus far his words. Behold, Rabbi Meir holds according to the second opinion, that we maintain the presumption that he will fulfill the condition, and if so, all the more so when he says "I have fulfilled it"; and the Sages hold according to the first opinion, that one must know with certainty that the condition was fulfilled, and if not, it is a case of doubtful kiddushin [Rosh chapter 3, section 4], and between Rabbi Meir and the Sages – the halacha follows the Sages.

And if the condition was regarding "sit and do not act" and he says that he fulfilled it – according to all opinions he is believed. And if he says that he violated the condition and did the thing that he was required not to do – he is also not believed to nullify the kiddushin and to say that he violated it through "arise and act" and to remove the action from its prior status of presumption. And some say that even if both of them say that they violated the condition through "arise and act" – they are not believed [Beit Shmuel, subsection 69]. But this is not clear, for behold they have a migo to separate from one another by writing a get. However, according to this, even when he himself says that he violated the condition, why should he not be believed with this migo according to Torah law, since he can divorce her against her will? Rather, one must say that this is like a migo in the place of a presumption to remove the action from its prior status of presumption, and if so, it could be even when both of them say so. And regarding a condition of "arise and act," if he says that he did not do it and the kiddushin are nullified – certainly he is believed. And if both of them say that the condition was fulfilled, it seems correct to say that they are believed to make them certain kiddushin, for behold they have a migo to perform kiddushin with one another, and furthermore, because it is within their power to waive the condition [ibid.]. And in every place where we said that he is not believed or both of them are not believed, it means that they are kiddushin of doubt, and if she received kiddushin from another, she requires a get from both of them. And it appears to me that a condition that is dependent on the hand of another and not in his hand, such as "on the condition that so-and-so goes to such-and-such a place" or "that he does not go" – according to all opinions he is not believed without clarification by way of witnesses in any case, even regarding a condition of "sit and do not act" where he said that he did not do it, since the matter is not in his hand; for behold, even regarding other prohibitions one is not believed in a matter that is not in his hand, as is written in Yoreh Deah, siman 127, and all the more so in matters of a married woman.

How is the law of a condition? The Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote in chapter 6 that regarding any condition in the world, whether in kiddushin, or in divorce, or in buying, or in selling, or in other monetary laws – four things are required in a condition, and these are the four things of every condition: that it be doubled, and that its affirmative precede its negative, and that the condition precede the act, and that the condition be something that is possible to fulfill. And if the condition lacks one of them, behold the condition is void and it is as if there is no condition there at all, but rather she shall be betrothed or divorced immediately and the sale or the gift shall be established immediately and it is as if he did not make a condition at all since the condition lacked one of the four. Thus far his words. And all this we learned from the condition of the children of Gad and the children of Reuven that Moses our teacher stipulated with them, and the Torah was meticulous to write all these details – we learn from this that they are indispensable. And there are those who add further that it is necessary that the condition be one thing and the act be another thing, and it will be explained before us with the help of Heaven.

A double condition, how so? That he repeats the matters and says, "If you give me a maneh, you are betrothed to me, and if you do not give, you are not betrothed," just as the verse repeated, "If the children of Gad and the children of Reuven pass over... and if they do not pass over" (Numbers 32:29-30). And the positive before the negative—that he says, "If you give you are betrothed, and if you do not give you are not betrothed," and he should not say the negative before, "If you do not give and if you give." And if he mentioned the negative before the positive and went back and mentioned the negative after the positive, such as if he said, "If you do not give you shall not be betrothed, and if you give you are betrothed, if you do not give you are not betrothed"—it is a valid condition as if he mentioned the positive before the negative, and we do not consider the first negative at all. For thus the sages of blessed memory ordained regarding the get of a dangerously ill person ab initio, so that he should not begin with misfortune first, as I wrote in siman 145, see there. And the great Acharonim decided that the primary concern is that he should not conclude his words with the positive; therefore, even if he preceded the positive before the negative, if he concluded with the positive, such as if he said, "If you give you are betrothed, and if you do not give you shall not be betrothed, and if you give you are betrothed"—we seize the latter expression and the condition is void, and this is not a matter of "seize the first expression" or "seize the latter expression," but rather that anyone who performs an act and stipulates a condition—the primary thing for him is that which he concludes his words with.

However, the essence of this law is a wonder to me, for if we had not found "the positive before the negative" in the condition of the children of Gad and the children of Reuven, we would not have said so based on logic; and even though we only learn from there that which there is logic to say so [Tosafot Ketubot 74a], nevertheless, "the positive before the negative" is not from the perspective of logic [Makneh 61] for why is the positive before the negative stronger than the negative before the positive? And even so, we do not require it exactly as it is written, and if he also preceded the negative to the positive, if he also said the negative after the positive we have no concern with it, as I have written; if so, even if he said the positive once more after the negative, what do we care since there was also a positive before the negative? And from where do we say that the essence for him is that which he concluded? For it is not a matter of logic [however, according to the Tosafot Yeshanim in Kiddushin 62a, Shmuel's law regarding a person on his deathbed is necessitated from the verse "ha-naki," examine it and you will find it, but according to the Tosafot there and the Ritva it is not so, and examine carefully].

And know, that "yes" is defined by the fulfillment of the matter we are engaged in even if it is against the will, such as with a get of a person on his deathbed where "if I die" is defined as "yes" and "if I do not die" as "no," even though the will is that he should not die; nevertheless, the act of the get is only because of the death, and so too in all similar cases. But in a matter that one is compelled to do from both sides of the issue, such as in the drinking of the sota where the Torah decreed she must drink, it is properly defined as "yes" if she did not become defiled since this is our will [this is according to the Tosafot there and not according to the Tosafot Yeshanim and the Ritva], and so several great authorities agreed, and we have already explained this in Choshen Mishpat siman 207 section 2, see there [and the difficulty of the Taz in the introduction to Yoreh Deah is answered].

Regarding the condition preceding the act, the Rambam is divided from the other poskim; for according to most poskim, the act also refers to the speech, meaning that he must precede the speech of the condition to the speech of the act, such that he says, "If you give me a maneh, behold you are betrothed to me, and if you do not give, you are not betrothed." But if he said, "Behold you are betrothed to me if you give me a maneh, and if you do not give, you are not betrothed," where he preceded the speech of the kiddushin to the condition—the condition is void even if he gave the money of the kiddushin afterward. However, the Rambam interprets "condition preceding the act" as referring to the act of kiddushin, that first he must state the condition and afterward give the money of the kiddushin; and if he preceded the act to the condition, meaning that he gave her the money of the kiddushin and then stated the condition—the condition is nothing, and behold she is betrothed and the condition is void.

This is the wording of the Rambam there: How so? One who says to a woman, "If you give me two hundred zuz, you are betrothed to me with this dinar, and if you do not give me, you shall not be betrothed," and after he stipulated this condition he gave her the dinar – the condition is valid, etc. But if he said to her, "Behold you are betrothed to me with this dinar," and he placed the dinar in her hand and completed the condition and said, "If you give me two hundred zuz you shall be betrothed and if you do not give me you shall not be betrothed" – the condition is void because he preceded with the act and placed it in her hand and afterwards stipulated, and even though it was all within the time of a continuous utterance – she is betrothed immediately and does not need to give him anything. Thus far his words. And even though this is no novelty at all, for we establish in kiddushin that within the time of a continuous utterance is not like the utterance itself – this is all regarding one who reconsiders within the time of a continuous utterance, but in a statement of one continuous sequence, certainly if not for the fact that he preceded with the act, the condition would be valid [this is the intent of the Beit Yosef to resolve the difficulty of the Tur, and so wrote the Acharonim].

And behold, even though the Rambam, of blessed memory, in placing the act before the condition also placed the verbalization of the act first, nevertheless it is implied from his wording that he was only particular regarding the actual act itself, that it should not precede the condition, but regarding the verbalization of the condition we have no concern [the Maggid Mishneh]. And according to his approach, several conditions in the Gemara where they preceded the verbalization of the act are settled. And according to the approach of all the poskim, it must be said that it is not exact, just as the Shas did not mention a double condition in all conditions. And according to the approach of the Rambam, it is impossible to depict an act preceding a condition except in kiddushin of money or a document, and not in kiddushin of cohabitation, where he states the condition before the witnesses of seclusion prior to the cohabitation. And as for the fact that the Rambam, of blessed memory, also preceded the verbalization of the condition to the act even though this is not a requirement according to his approach, it seems to me because he holds that the manner of the fulfillment of the act is at the time of the verbalization of the act; therefore, since he must delay the fulfillment of the act, he must necessarily also delay it in verbalization, and in the precedence of the act to the condition, he must necessarily also precede the verbalization of the act, and nevertheless this is not a requirement [and with this is answered what they questioned against him from Gittin 75b, Rava challenged, etc., and there in the ordinance of Shmuel we require the condition first, etc., see there and examine carefully].

And even though the wording of the Mishnah, "Any condition where the action is at its beginning, its condition is void" [Bava Metzia 94a], appears somewhat like the words of the Rambam, of blessed memory, nevertheless, all our teachers, the Rishonim, the poskim, and the commentators, disagree with him, and the halacha follows the many; only as a stringency should one be concerned for his opinion. And even according to their words, if at the beginning of his words he preceded the condition to the action, and in the double condition he preceded the action—for example, if he said, "If you give me two hundred zuz, behold you are betrothed to me, and you shall not be betrothed if you do not give"—it appears that it is effective and is called "condition preceding the action" [Mishneh LaMelech chapter 6 and the Maharit in his novellae], for in the double condition we have no concern regarding this; and even though there are those who are uncertain about this, nevertheless, this appears to be the primary view. And even though in the condition of the children of Gad and the children of Reuven, even in its doubling, Moshe Rabbeinu preceded the condition to the action, certainly this is the way of the language, but it is not a requirement; for behold, the reason that one must precede the condition is because when one precedes the action, it is established without the condition, but in the double condition where he says that the action shall not be, how can we say that the action is established without the condition just because he preceded saying that the action shall not be established.

Some say that we do not require the condition to precede the act except in a matter where the act is performed immediately in that same standing; however, if the act will be performed after some time, such as in a gift where Reuven commanded to give a maneh of his property to Shimon on a condition and he preceded the act to the condition—we have no concern regarding it. And this reasoning inclines somewhat toward the opinion of the Rambam to also be particular regarding the act itself, except that the Rambam was not particular at all regarding the speech, whereas this opinion is particular regarding the speech like most of the poskim, but nevertheless, this is when the act is performed immediately and therefore if he preceded the speech of the act, the act is established immediately; but when there is no act here yet, why should we care about the precedence of the speech of the act to the condition? And there are some of the Rishonim who did not make this distinction. See there.

And some say further that even if he preceded the giving of the kiddushin money to her hand but did not say anything to her, and after he gave it to her he said to her, "If you give me a maneh, behold you are betrothed to me," and doubled his condition—it is a valid condition even though he gave the kiddushin money beforehand. This is because when he gave it to her without specification, it is not kiddushin but rather a deposit, and afterwards he preceded the condition to the act and it became kiddushin money. According to this, she must say "yes," according to the law of a deposit as was explained in siman 28. And according to the Rambam in such a case, even if he preceded the speech of the act, it is a valid condition, since the act of kiddushin was formed after the speech, for prior to this it was a deposit. But if at the time of the giving he said to her, "Behold you are betrothed to me"—no condition is effective even within the time of a speech, as I have written. And also regarding a gift the law is so, for when he gave him a gift he acquired it immediately, and no condition is effective afterwards even within the time of a speech.

There is one who is uncertain whether only a condition for the future requires all the laws of conditions, or whether even a condition for the past—such as "Behold, you are betrothed to me if I have done such-and-such a thing" or "if you have done it"—requires placing the condition before the act and a double condition or not. For it could be said that specifically regarding a condition for the future we say that the cancellation of the condition that will come after the act cannot come and cancel the act unless the condition was made according to its law; but regarding the past, what need is there for the laws of conditions? Behold, from that moment it becomes clarified whether the act will be fulfilled or not, and this is no worse than "from now," which will be explained as not requiring the laws of conditions because the act takes effect from now, and here too the clarification is from now [Mishneh LaMelekh chapter 6]. However, we see regarding the condition of a sotah that it is for the past: "If a man has lain with you, if he has not lain," and we require a doubling of the condition [ibid.]. And there are some of the great authorities who decided that for the past we do not require the laws of conditions [Divrei Emet and Yad HaMelekh], for this is like a condition that is impossible to fulfill; for it is well understood that with a condition for the future it is in his power to fulfill it or cancel it, but regarding the past, what was is what will be, and it is not in his power to fulfill it or cancel it. And regarding a sotah, in truth we do not require all the laws of conditions; only doubling is required so that we do not learn the negative from the positive, but not all the laws of conditions. And the Rambam in the Laws of Sotah did not mention the laws of conditions at all, see there. And the law requires further study, for this distinction is not found among the Rishonim, and there are also those from whose words it is implied that there is no distinction between the past and the future [for if not so, Tosafot would not have raised any difficulty on page 62a, beginning with the word "HaNaki"].

A condition that is possible to fulfill, how so – it has already been explained in section 11, and there is no difference whether the condition is upon the man and the woman or whether it is upon others. And even though when it is upon another he does not have the power to fulfill it, nevertheless it is called "within his power" since it is within his power to increase his mohar and gifts until he fulfills the condition, as I wrote in section 10, see there. And the Tur wrote that we require that the act can be fulfilled by a shaliach, and we have already explained in section 8 that in kiddushin this law is not relevant, see there. And the Rambam, of blessed memory, did not mention this detail at all in the laws of conditions, for there is no practical difference except for chalitzah, and there he explained this law. And in all other matters in the world there is no practical difference, for in monetary laws there is nothing that cannot be fulfilled by a shaliach, and likewise in gittin and kiddushin, and even kiddushin through intercourse because "becomings" are compared to one another as I wrote there. And regarding nedarim and shevuot, even though they cannot be fulfilled by a shaliach, nevertheless there is no practical difference in this, for in truth we do not find that the sages required the laws of conditions for them, and only regarding the matter of "from the negative you hear the positive" is it mentioned in nedarim [11a], for this is a matter of logic even if we do not require all the laws of conditions [see Rambam chapter 1 of Nedarim halakha 20 and in the Hassagot there, and according to what I wrote it is well understood, and delve into it] [and it is not similar to the doubling where the positive comes first and the negative is clearly understood, and nevertheless the sages compared them to one another because the subjects are of one matter, and delve into it].

A condition in one matter and an act in another matter, how so? That the condition should not be in the matter of the essence of the act, such as if he says, "If you return to me the paper that the get is written upon, you are hereby divorced, and if you do not return it to me, you shall not be divorced," and the condition contradicts the act, for if she returns the paper to him, with what will she be divorced? And this matter we also learn from the condition of the children of Gad and the children of Reuben, where the condition was if they cross the Jordan and the act was to give them a possession on the other side of the Jordan. And some say that this is specifically in a case where he did not use the language of "on condition" (al menat) that you return the paper to me, for the get does not take effect until she returns the paper to him, and the condition contradicts the act; but if he said "on condition" that you return the paper to me, and we hold that anyone who says "on condition" is like one who says "from now," and if so, the get is established immediately and the condition will be fulfilled afterward and the condition does not contradict the act—it is not like a condition and an act in one matter. And according to this, also in kiddushin the law is so: if he gave her a dinar for kiddushin and said to her, "If you return the dinar to me, you are hereby betrothed to me"—this is not a condition, for the condition contradicts the act; but if he said "on condition"—it is kiddushin. However, in kiddushin, for another reason it would not be kiddushin in a gift on condition to return, because it is similar to chalifin as I wrote at the beginning of siman 29, see there; but in kiddushin of a document with "on condition," it would be kiddushin.

And so it is implied from the Tur, who wrote regarding a condition and an act in a single matter, "if the dinar with which I betroth you is mine," and he did not write a greater novelty even regarding "on condition," and even though in betrothal of money even "on condition" is not effective because it is similar to exchange, but in betrothal of a document "on condition" is effective, and so the Tur ruled regarding a get in siman 143 that "on condition that you return the paper to me" – the condition is effective, see there [what the Beit Shmuel wrote in subsection 7 regarding the Tur – it requires further study].

And so it is implied from our teacher, the Rema, who wrote at the end of siman 32 regarding betrothal by document that if he said, "on condition that the paper is mine" – she is not betrothed, and it is implied that with "on condition that you return the paper to me" – she is betrothed, as he wrote there in section 14, see there. However, it can be said that this is because he holds that we do not require this detail at all in the laws of conditions, as there are those who hold thus, as will be explained; or because he holds that all the laws of conditions are not a hindrance regarding a stringency, as will be explained, and this law is a case of uncertain betrothal, and he only mentioned there that which is simple to us that it is not a betrothal, as we will explain his opinion in section 45 with the help of Heaven.

And there are some of our teachers who hold that even in the case of "on condition that you return it to me," it is also considered a condition and an act in one thing, but they hold that we do not require this law of the condition being in one thing and the act in another thing at all in the laws of conditions; and so it is implied from the opinion of the Rambam, of blessed memory, who did not count this law among the laws of conditions. Therefore, in the case of "on condition that you return it," it certainly works, for it is like one who says "from now," and without "on condition" it does not work. And this we do not need to learn from the condition of the children of Gad and the children of Reuven, for it is a simple logic that since he says "if you return the paper to me, you are betrothed to me," and when do the betrothal take effect? At the time she returns the paper to him—if so, with what is he betrothing her? And we only needed to learn from the children of Gad and the children of Reuven regarding "on condition." However, we do not rule accordingly, as I have written. Therefore, the Rambam did not need to mention this matter, just as he did not need to mention among these rules that one who stipulates against what is written in the Torah, his condition is void, for this matter is explained through logic, that it is not within a person's power to stipulate a condition that he will transgress the words of the Torah. And so too, it is not within his power to impose a condition to nullify the act entirely, such as if he says "if you return the paper to me, behold you are betrothed or divorced," and this is nothing but as one who puts her off with words, and the condition does not work and the act stands. Nevertheless, this requires further study, for we find regarding the Rambam in the Laws of Divorce, chapter 8, that he wrote that if he said "behold this is your get and the paper is mine"—she is not divorced, and in the case of "on condition that you return it to me"—behold she is divorced, and he did not mention what the law is if he said "if you return the paper to me."

And according to what I wrote, that even with "on condition" (al menat) it is a condition and an act in one thing, except that we do not require the condition to be in a different matter than the act, the law regarding "on condition" is that it is a condition; and if she returned the paper to him afterwards—the condition is fulfilled and she is betrothed or divorced, and if not—she is not betrothed and she is not divorced, just as in "take this etrog on condition that you return it to me" which was explained in Orach Chaim siman 658, see there. However, there is one who says that even with "on condition" the condition is void and there is no need to return the paper, and he holds that "on condition" is also a condition and an act in one thing, and we learn from the condition of the children of Gad and the children of Reuven that this is not a condition, and the act stands and the condition is void [Beit Shmuel ibid. according to the opinion of the Rosh in chapter "HaMevariach," and it is not certain as the Korban Netanel wrote there].

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 4 that there are those who say we require the condition to be regarding one matter and the act regarding another matter, but if everything is regarding one matter – it is not a condition, and one should be concerned for his words as a stringency. Thus far his words. And according to this, it is not a clear law except if he said "this is your get and the paper is mine," that she is not divorced, and similarly regarding kiddushin. But whenever he spoke in the language of a condition, whether he said "on condition that the paper is mine" or "on condition that you return the paper to me," and whether he used the language "if the paper is mine" or "if you return the paper to me" – in all of them it is a case of uncertain kiddushin or uncertain divorce in every instance, whether she returned the paper to him or whether she did not return it. For if she returned it, it can be said perhaps we do not require the condition and the act to be in two matters and it is a complete condition, and when she fulfilled the condition, she is betrothed or divorced. And regarding "on condition," there is also reason to doubt whether perhaps this is a condition in one matter and the act in another matter, and when she fulfilled the condition, she is betrothed or divorced; or perhaps this is a condition and an act in one matter and we require that it not be in one matter and the condition is void, and automatically when she fulfilled the condition, she has nothing with which to be divorced. Except that it can be said that regarding "on condition that you return it," she is betrothed or divorced even though she fulfilled the condition, for since we hold that anyone who says "on condition" is like one who says "from now," behold the paper was hers, and what do we care that she returned it afterwards. And if she did not fulfill the condition and kept the paper for herself, it is also an uncertainty, for perhaps we hold that we require the condition in one matter and the act in another matter, and this is all in one matter and the condition is void and the act stands even though she did not fulfill the condition; or perhaps we do not require it and it is a complete condition, and when she did not fulfill it, the kiddushin or the divorce was voided. And regarding "on condition that you return it," there is a further uncertainty whether perhaps this is not called "in another matter," as I have written.

That which we explained in the previous section regarding the words of our teacher, the Rema, we explained according to the understanding of one of the great Acharonim, but according to this, how did our teacher, the Rema, rule above at the end of siman 32 that when he betroths her with a document and says to her "on condition that the paper is mine" she is not betrothed? For it should be a case of doubtful kiddushin, and we have already brought there in section 14 one who holds so, but how is it possible that he would contradict himself from there to here?

Therefore, it appears to me that our teacher, the Rema, holds that certainly for the law we follow the Rambam, that we do not require regarding the laws of conditions that the condition and the act be separate matters; however, as a stringency, one must be concerned for the opinion that holds that we do require this. But all this is only when he says "on condition that you return the paper to me," for "on condition" is like "from now," and it is possible for the kiddushin to take effect, for at the time of the kiddushin the paper is hers, and only according to the Rambam is it a complete condition, and if she did not return the paper she is not betrothed, and according to those who disagree the condition is void and the act stands even if she did not return it. And all this is regarding "on condition that you return," but regarding "on condition that the paper is mine" or "if you return the paper to me" or "if the paper is mine" – in all these it is as if he said "behold this is your get and the paper is mine," where she is not divorced, and the same law applies to kiddushin. And the reason for the matter is that since the kiddushin and the divorce do not take effect until the paper is returned to him, this is not kiddushin at all, for with what would the kiddushin and the divorce take effect? And it is not necessary to state according to the Rambam, who holds that we do not require regarding the laws of conditions that the condition and the act be separate matters, and if so it is a condition, and since the condition took effect the kiddushin did not take effect as they have nothing upon which to take effect; but even according to those who disagree, where it is possible to say that the condition is void and the act stands, nevertheless we do not say so, for this is like an actual uprooting of the matter. And this is exactly the opposite of what we wrote in section 41, that in such a case even according to the Rambam the kiddushin stand because it is as if he is putting her off with words; but according to this reasoning we say that it is as if he toyed with her and this is not within the category of divorce and kiddushin at all. Therefore, the Rambam in chapter 8 of Divorce wrote only regarding "on condition that you return the paper to me" that the get is valid, but in other manners such as "if" or "on condition that the paper is mine" she is not divorced, and similarly in the Gemara only the language "on condition that you return" was mentioned [Gittin 75a]. And in practice, one must be concerned for stringency according to all opinions [as I have written, it is close to the opinion of the Chelkat Mechokek subsection 5, and his words require study for the end of his words contradict the Tur, and also according to what I have written, such is not the opinion of the Tur].

The opinion of the Rambam and several of our teachers is that in every matter we require a double condition and all the laws of conditions—whether in kiddushin and divorce or in monetary laws. And there are some of our teachers who hold that in monetary laws we do not require the laws of conditions, and we have already explained this in Choshen Mishpat siman 207, see there. However, there are some of our teachers who hold that according to the essential law we do not rule like Rabbi Meir that we require a double condition and all the laws of conditions, but rather in gittin and kiddushin, because of the severity of forbidden relations, we require it [Rashbam Bava Batra 137b and the Rash the Elder cited in the Rosh ibid.], and they brought proof from the Yerushalmi [chapter 3 of Kiddushin], and also in all the conditions mentioned by the sages of the Shas, all the laws of conditions are not explained. But most of our teachers, the Rishonim, disagree on this and hold that according to the essential law we rule thus, that any condition that does not contain the laws of conditions, the condition is void and the act is valid, and in every place that the Shas mentions any condition, we require all the laws of conditions, and the Shas did not mention this in every place because it did not come to inform us of this novelty [Tosafot Sukkah 41b], and the Yerushalmi they explained that this is what it means: that even though by law without the laws of conditions the condition is void and the act is valid, nevertheless because of the severity of forbidden relations we are stringent that if she received kiddushin from another, she requires a get from both of them [Tosafot Gittin 75a], and besides this, the approach of the Yerushalmi is not like the approach of our Shas, for our Shas holds according to several poskim that with "on condition that" one does not need the laws of conditions at all, and the Yerushalmi holds that even with "on condition that" one needs the laws of conditions [see there in Mareh HaPanim].

This is what our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 4: that there are those who say that these four conditions are not required except in a case where a stringency results from them, but not where a leniency results from them. Thus far his words. And even if the four things were not present, it is a case of uncertain kiddushin and uncertain divorce, and if another man betrothed her, she requires a get from both of them. And although there are those who say that according to this opinion we only do not require a double condition and the "positive before the negative," but a condition before the act and a condition that is possible to fulfill are required even according to this opinion, because logic dictates these two things; for even if we do not learn it from the condition of the children of Gad and the children of Reuven, nevertheless, how is it possible to stipulate a condition that is impossible to fulfill, as this is nothing but an exaggeration of words? And likewise when the act is at the beginning—especially according to the system of the Rambam regarding a literal act—how is it possible that the speech of the condition comes and nullifies the act? Nevertheless, since our teachers, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, wrote that according to this opinion we do not require all four things, we are obligated to be stringent in this as well. However, it is possible that because they hold that regarding "condition before the act" this refers to the speech of the act, as has been explained, but in a literal act according to the opinion of the Rambam, it is possible that they too admit that when the act is at the beginning, the condition does not subsequently come and nullify it. Nevertheless, since this is not explicitly explained in their words, one should not be lenient in the stringency of forbidden relationships. And also regarding a condition that is impossible to fulfill, it is implied from the Rambam that according to all opinions we require that it be possible to fulfill, for regarding "from now" and "on condition," the Rambam does not require the laws of conditions, as will be explained, and even so he wrote that we require that it be possible to fulfill. Nevertheless, it is difficult to be lenient in a matter of a forbidden relationship in a matter that is not explicit and agreed upon by all the poskim.

The Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote: Anyone who says "from now" does not need to double his condition nor to precede the condition to the act, but even though he preceded the act—his condition is valid. However, he must stipulate a matter that is possible to fulfill, and if he stipulated a matter that is impossible to fulfill—this is like one who exaggerates in speech and there is no condition there. And anyone who says "on condition" is like one who says "from now" and does not need to double the condition nor to precede it to the act. Thus far his words. For since the act takes effect from now, it naturally takes effect with the condition he stipulated with him; but a condition with "if," since the condition comes to void the act so that it should not take effect from now—it is not a condition if he did not double it [Beit Shmuel, subsection 4], and so too the other laws of conditions. And regarding that which the Rambam did not mention that we do not require in "from now" that the positive precede the negative, it appears to me that he did not need to mention it, for since we do not require that he double it, it follows naturally that the precedence of the positive or the negative is not relevant to this, as this is only relevant to the doubling of the condition. And there is one from whose words it is implied that even in "from now" we require the positive to precede the negative [ibid.], but it appears to me as I wrote. And even if he said "it shall not be kiddushin from now if you do not give me two hundred zuz, and if you give me they shall be kiddushin from now"—it also works according to the Rambam and the poskim who stand by his approach, that in "from now" and in "on condition" we do not require the laws of conditions, except for a matter that is impossible to fulfill because it is like one who exaggerates in speech.

But many of our teachers disagree with the Rambam and hold that even with "from now" and with "on condition," we require a double condition and all the laws of conditions. And even though in the condition of the children of Gad and the children of Reuben the condition was not with "on condition" but rather "if they cross, if they do not cross," nevertheless, there is no difference between one and the other. For even though he stipulated the fulfillment of the act from now, nevertheless, this is all dependent on the fulfillment of the condition, and if the condition is not fulfilled the act is void; if so, in this case as well the condition comes to void the act, and it follows that it requires the laws of conditions, for if not so, its power is not strong enough to void the act. The Tur wrote that his father, the Rosh, agreed with this opinion, and our teacher, the Beit Yosef, brought both opinions and did not decide, and it follows that one must follow the stringency of each side. And in the Yerushalmi it is explained that even with "on condition" one requires the laws of conditions, and it is possible that the Yerushalmi holds that "on condition" is not like "from now," and according to this, with "from now" it is possible that even the Yerushalmi would hold that it does not require the laws of conditions. But in Yerushalmi Gittin it implies explicitly that it also holds that anyone who says "on condition" is like one who says "from now"; see there. And according to this, the Yerushalmi holds like those who disagree with the Rambam, of blessed memory.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote that there are those who say that even if one did not specify all the laws of conditions, but merely said plainly that he is conditioning like the condition of the children of Gad and the children of Reuven—it is a complete condition. Thus far his words. For since he says that the power of this condition shall be like the power of their condition, it is automatically as if he specified all the regulations of conditions. Nevertheless, that the condition must precede the act must be stated explicitly, and he must say, "If you give me two hundred zuz, behold you are betrothed to me like the condition of the children of Gad and the children of Reuven." But if he says the opposite, "Behold you are betrothed to me if you give me two hundred zuz like the condition of the children of Gad and the children of Reuven"—it is not effective, for behold he says the opposite and we see that he did not condition like their condition. And this law, that when he says "like the condition of the children of Gad and the children of Reuven" it is effective as if he specified all the regulations of conditions, is agreed upon in the halacha. And even though there are some of the Rishonim who did not determine this law as a clear matter, nevertheless the Rosh in a Responsum ruled so explicitly, as the Tur wrote in Choshen Mishpat at the end of siman 241, see there; and see what I wrote in Choshen Mishpat siman 207, section 6.

The Rambam wrote at the end of chapter 7: One who betroths a woman and they retracted immediately, whether he or she, even though they retracted within the time of a speech-utterance, their retraction is nothing and she is betrothed. Thus far his words. And they transcribed it in the Shulchan Aruch, section 34. From this wording, it is implied that it is a certain betrothal, and if another came and betrothed her, she does not require a get from him. There are some of the Rishonim who said that it is a doubtful betrothal, and if another came and betrothed her, she requires a get from both of them; and this is a stringency that they applied to gittin and kiddushin, for even though in the entire Torah one can retract within the time of a speech-utterance, nevertheless, due to the stringency of forbidden relations, they were stringent in this [Rashbam Bava Batra 130a, and so it is implied from the Nimukei Yosef there]. But the Rambam and many of the Rishonim hold that according to the fundamental law, it is impossible to retract even within the time of a speech-utterance. The reason for the matter is because in other matters that are not so stringent, when a person performs them, he does not perform them with a finality of mind, and his intent is that he can retract within the time of a speech-utterance; but gittin and kiddushin, which are very stringent, a person only performs them with complete consent, and therefore retraction is not effective even within the time of a speech-utterance [Ran Nedarim 87a]. Furthermore, for even a condition one cannot impose when the action preceded it, as I wrote in section 31, and all the more so to nullify the matter entirely. And even though according to the Rambam this is specifically when the performance of the action preceded, but regarding speech we do not have this, nevertheless, this is regarding the imposition of a condition and not regarding a complete retraction [it appears to me]. See what I wrote later in siman 141, section 141.

Nevertheless, I am in doubt even regarding this, whether this rule—that one cannot retract even within the time of a speech-pause—applies even when the act of kiddushin has not yet occurred. For example, if he said to her, "Behold, you are betrothed to me with this dinar," and within the time of a speech-pause he said to her, "Behold, the dinar is a gift or a deposit to you," and afterward he placed the dinar in her hand. Or, perhaps it is specifically when he retracted within the time of a speech-pause following the giving that it is ineffective, but if the giving occurred afterward, they can retract. From the language of the Rishonim, it is somewhat implied that specifically after the act of kiddushin he cannot retract, and so it is implied from the words of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch in siman 141, section 59, see there. However, before the act he can retract, and when he gave it into her hand immediately, it was for the sake of the second statement. And even though regarding a condition one cannot speak after the statement of the act according to most Rishonim, this is a scriptural decree that we derive from the condition of the children of Gad and the children of Reuven; but a total retraction, perhaps he can retract, and it requires further study for the law [and there is no proof from the fact that the Shas counted it together with a blasphemer, for there the speech is the act, and from tearing in Nedarim chapter 7 there is a proof to the contrary, see there].

And specifically regarding the matter of the kiddushin themselves, within the time of a kedei dibbur is like after a kedei dibbur, but a witness testifying regarding a matter of kiddushin may retract within a kedei dibbur as with any testimony [Rivash siman 267], and likewise she who said "I was betrothed" and retracted within a kedei dibbur—she is believed, as has been written in siman 47.

It has already been explained in section 13 that they have the ability to nullify the condition and the kiddushin are completed even without the fulfillment of the condition. There is a distinction between the nullification of a condition in kiddushin and the nullification of a condition in divorce; for with a condition in divorce, the husband can nullify all conditions, but in kiddushin he can only nullify a condition that was for his benefit, such as "on condition that she has no blemishes" or "that she give me two hundred zuz." However, a condition that is for her benefit—he does not have the ability to nullify, and the kiddushin are not completed until he gives to her, unless she nullifies it. The reason is simple: for divorce depends only on him and his will, while kiddushin depends on the will of both of them. In section 13 several opinions were explained regarding the nullification of conditions, see there. [As I have written, so it is in the Responsa of the Rosh brought by the Beit Yosef at the end of this siman, and in the Shulchan Aruch section 38 where he wrote "but etc. granted that he can nullify the condition etc.," he means regarding other conditions, and the phrasing is not precise].

And just as they have the ability to nullify the condition, so too they have the ability to add to it or subtract from it. Therefore, the Rosh, of blessed memory, ruled regarding one who went to a distant land and betrothed upon a condition, "If I come from now until twelve months, she shall be betrothed from now," and before he went they both agreed to extend the time, and twelve months passed and he did not come, but he came before the final time—it is a betrothal. For any act performed upon a condition, one can nullify it or add or subtract from it. This is because we learn from the condition of the children of Gad and the children of Reuven that there is power in a condition to nullify the act, and were it not that we learn from this, it would not be in the power of a condition to nullify the act; rather, we learn from them, and you have only its novel law. And since the act is an independent matter and the condition is an independent matter, and it is fit to be upheld without the fulfillment of the condition except that we learn from the children of Gad and the children of Reuven, if so, he can nullify the condition, which is an independent act and is mere speech, and speech comes and nullifies the speech of the condition and the act remains [Responsa of the Rosh]. And even if the money was consumed, it is a betrothal retroactively when the second condition is fulfilled, and they can also exchange from this condition to another condition [it appears to me]. And this is all according to the approach of the Rambam that we explained in section 13 and according to the reason we explained in section 14, and not according to the opinion of those who disagree with him there. And as for our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 37, he ruled this law and was not concerned for the opinion of those who disagree, because he holds regarding the law of nullification also like the opinion of the Rambam, and he did not bring in section 35 the opinion of those who disagree with him, as I wrote there.

And there is one who raised a difficulty against our teacher, the Beit Yosef, who ruled this law, from what he himself wrote in Yoreh Deah siman 228, section 39: regarding one who swore to repay his fellow by a certain time, the lender may say, "I consider it as if I have received it," but to extend the time he is not permitted unless he stipulated that he may extend it. And in truth, the source of this law in Yoreh Deah is from the Rashba, and he indeed disagrees with the Rambam regarding the law of nullifying a condition, as written in section 13, for he holds that not every condition can be waived except in a matter of money, see there. According to this, in truth, according to the Rambam, even there they can extend the condition. Or perhaps it can be said that there even the Rambam admits that just as in kiddushin the man does not have the ability to extend the time without the knowledge of the woman when the condition is for her benefit, so too regarding an oath, the Holy One, Blessed be He, is as it were the second party, such that without His knowledge it is impossible to change anything in the condition, except for a waiver where the lender says, "I consider it as if I have received it," for then he has fulfilled his condition and discharged his obligation of the oath; but for the condition to remain and to change something within it is not within the power of man since an oath is involved.

The Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote at the beginning of chapter 7: One who says to a woman, "Behold, you are betrothed to me on the condition that my father desires it," if the father desired it – she is betrothed; if he did not desire it, or if he remained silent, or if he died before he heard the matter – she is not betrothed. "On the condition that my father does not protest," if he heard and protested – she is not betrothed; if he did not protest or if he died – behold, she is betrothed. If the son died and afterwards the father heard – we instruct the father to say "I do not desire it" so that there shall be no betrothal and she will not fall before a yavam. Thus far his words.

And his opinion is explained that when he says "on condition that he desires," the intention is that he shall agree explicitly and say "I desire," and if he said at the time he heard that he does not desire, the kiddushin are void even if he agrees afterwards, for the condition was regarding the first speech, for if not so, she would forever be forbidden until he dies [Beit Yosef] because perhaps he will desire afterwards; and even if he did not say at the time of hearing that he does not desire but rather remained silent – the kiddushin are void immediately [ibid.] for if not so, if he remains silent she would always be forbidden until the death of the father, and this is not a logical reasoning, and we assess their intent that such was the condition: that at the time of hearing, if he says "yes" – it is kiddushin, and if he remains silent and certainly if he says "no" – the kiddushin shall be void immediately, and therefore he equated the law of "did not desire" to "remained silent" and in both of them the kiddushin are void, [and the difficulty of the Ran is answered, and he versioned in the Gemara 63: the first clause is with one reason etc. like the version of Rashi, except that he explains that the first clause is like "if we say" there].

And when he said "on condition that he does not protest," the intention is also regarding the time of hearing, for if he protests at the time of hearing, the kiddushin are nullified and nothing will avail afterwards; and if he remains silent at the time of hearing, the kiddushin are immediately established and his protest will not avail afterwards. Therefore, if the father died before the hearing, the kiddushin are established, for he will not protest anymore. And it does not seem correct to say that the intention of the condition was specifically that he should hear and not protest, for if so, he should have said "on condition that he hears and does not protest"; and since he said only "on condition that he does not protest," his intention was only regarding the absence of protest and not regarding the hearing. And that which he wrote, "if the son died and afterwards the father heard, they instruct him to say 'I do not want'" – the intention is not that they instruct him after a period of time, for certainly once he remained silent at the time of hearing it no longer avails, but rather the intention is that they watch him at the time of hearing, at the time they are occupied with that matter or within the time it takes to speak a greeting from his hearing, and he should protest then. And if he said "on condition that he remains silent," the law is also like when he said "on condition that he does not protest," except that with "on condition that he remains silent," a protest does not avail even within the time it takes to speak a greeting from his hearing, for as soon as he remained silent the kiddushin were established, and in kiddushin, within the time it takes to speak a greeting is like after that time, as has been explained. However, with "on condition that he does not protest," a protest within the time it takes to speak a greeting avails, for the language implies that he should not protest immediately, and perforce one must give a small amount of time for his protest, which is within the time it takes to speak a greeting, as is the way of people. But with "on condition that he remains silent," the intention is immediately upon his hearing [Kesef Mishneh and Lechem Mishneh], and this is the difference between "on condition that he remains silent" and "on condition that he does not protest." And it appears to me that according to this, also with "on condition that he desires," meaning that he says "yes," it is also within the time it takes to speak a greeting from his hearing, for what difference is there between one and the other? And it is possible that they are not similar, for in a condition that he desires, he must desire immediately upon his hearing and they do not give him any time at all; but in "that he does not protest," the intention is that he does not protest after a bit of settled mind, and that is within the time it takes to speak a greeting or as long as they are occupied with that matter; and "on condition that he remains silent" is also truly immediate [what the Maggid Mishneh wrote, that his words are like the Rashba and like the Tosefta, requires great study; and if within the time it takes to speak a greeting avails as I wrote, it would be possible to answer, but there it is explicitly stated "lest he desire after an hour"].

Many of our teachers disagree with the Rambam and hold that when he said "on condition that my father says yes," the intention is not regarding the time of hearing; rather, whenever he says "yes," the kiddushin are established. And even if he said he does not want to, nevertheless, whenever he consents afterward and says "yes," the kiddushin are established. And so we have learned in the Tosefta [chapter 3]: "On condition that my father consents," even though the father says "I do not want to" – she is betrothed, lest he consent after a while. Thus far its words. That is to say, she is in a state of doubtful kiddushin forever until the father dies and does not consent, since he did not set a time for his consent. And any condition that depends on an action and no time was set for it, as long as that action is fulfilled, the condition is fulfilled [Ramban, Rashba, and Ran].

And if he said, "on condition that he does not protest," even if the father consented initially when he heard—she is not certainly betrothed, lest he yet protest. And if he protested—the kiddushin are immediately voided even if he subsequently said, "I am willing." Therefore, when the son dies, they instruct the father to say, "I am not willing," even if he already heard and consented, so that the kiddushin will be voided and she will not be bound to a yavam. And why do we say regarding "on condition that he does not protest" that once he protests the kiddushin are immediately voided, while regarding "on condition that he says yes" his protest is of no effect when he subsequently says "yes"? Because there the condition was in the form of "arise and act," that he should say "yes," and therefore as long as the condition is fulfilled, it is effective. However, "on condition that he does not protest" is a condition in the form of "sit and do not act," and regarding any condition of "sit and do not act," as long as the action is performed, the condition is voided, provided he did not set a time for the condition ibid. And so too regarding "on condition that he says yes," once he said "yes" and the condition was fulfilled, it is of no effect even if he retracts afterward, just as it is of no effect regarding the condition that he does not protest—which is "sit and do not act"—when he uprooted it and performed it, even if he subsequently consents. And regarding "on condition that he does not protest" when he consented initially, where we said that he has the power to protest and void the kiddushin, this is because his consent does not pertain to the condition, just as regarding "on condition that he says yes" we are not concerned with the fact that he did not consent initially. For we must look at the wording of the condition: whenever the wording of the condition is fulfilled when the condition is "arise and act," or whenever the wording of the condition is uprooted when the condition is "sit and do not act" and he uprooted it, then it is a fulfillment of the condition or a voiding of the condition, and we are not concerned with what was before this or what will be afterward.

However, if the condition was "on the condition that he remains silent," there is a different law regarding this: that if he remained silent at the time of hearing—she is certainly betrothed, even if he protests afterward. And even though this too is "sit and do not act" like "on the condition that he does not protest," why is his protest afterward effective there, while here it is not effective? Because he expressed the language of the condition in the language of an action and not in the language of "sit and do not act," its law is like a condition of action. And just as with "on the condition that he says yes," once he has said yes the kiddushin are finalized, so too with "on the condition that he remains silent," once he has remained silent the condition is fulfilled and the kiddushin are finalized [ibid.]. And if the father died before he heard—the kiddushin are finalized; and see what I wrote in section 59.

And others further disagree with the Rambam, for he holds that when one says "on condition that father desires," the meaning is that he must say "yes," whereas they hold that the meaning is that he remains silent and does not protest [the Rosh and the Tur, and so it appears from Rashi and Tosafot]. And some say further that "on condition that he desires" is like "on condition that he does not protest" [the Ramban]. And we maintain according to the stringency, that one who says "on condition that he desires," we must be stringent according to the words of all of them: like "on condition that he says yes," and like "on condition that he remains silent," and like "on condition that he does not protest" [Beit Shmuel, subsection 19].

And regarding that which we wrote, that in one who says "on condition that he does not protest," even if he initially consented, if he protested afterward the kiddushin are void, our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 10 that there are those who say that if he said "yes" one time, he can no longer protest; thus far his words. And this is the opinion of the Tur. And it appears to me that the Tur does not make them certain kiddushin, but rather a doubt, for behold his father, the Rosh [chapter 3, section 7], was in doubt about it, and from his words it appears his opinion leans more toward [the view] that he can protest, see there. And how could the Tur not bring his opinion at all? Rather, his intention is also for doubtful kiddushin [see Beit Yosef, and according to what I wrote it is well-settled]. And regarding the law, we have no practical difference in this, since there is a dispute in this matter, it automatically becomes a doubt. However, in "on condition that he says yes," even the Tur admits that even if he protested at first, if he said "yes" afterward, it is certain kiddushin [Rashal], since the condition is in the form of "arise and act." Furthermore, from his condition this is proven, for if his intention was that when he protests the first time the kiddushin should be void, why did he have to stipulate that he say "yes"? Let him stipulate that he should not protest. Rather, certainly this is what he meant: that as long as he says "yes," even after his protest, let it be kiddushin [Taz], and so it is explicit in the Tosefta that we brought. And it is possible that even according to the Rambam, who holds that the intention is for the first time from the hearing as I wrote, this is only in "on condition that he desires" and not in "on condition that he says yes," but the commentators of his words did not write so. And automatically, regarding the law, in all manners it is doubtful kiddushin. And all these laws have practical application also in conditions of monetary laws [Ran].

If he said, "on condition that he says yes," and he heard and remained silent, according to the Rambam the kiddushin are void, and according to the rest of the poskim it is a doubt until the father dies, for perhaps he will yet say "yes." Therefore, if the son died, she is forbidden to the world according to the poskim, for perhaps the father will say "yes" and she will be bound to the yavam. However, she is permitted to the yavam in any case, for if he says "yes," then according to the poskim she is a yevama, and according to the Rambam she is like a stranger; and likewise, even if he does not say "yes," according to the poskim she is no worse than a stranger. Similarly, if she performs chalitzah from the yavam, she is able to marry a stranger. The Tur wrote likewise in the name of the Ramah. And there is one who says that she should not perform chalitzah but only undergo yibbum [Bach], on the grounds that perhaps he will never say "yes" and her chalitzah is not a chalitzah and she would be permitted to a kohen, and it turns out we would require an announcement for the priesthood, as we are concerned for this in siman 156. And it appears to me that it is not comparable, for there, there is a remedy to wait until the matter becomes known as is written there, but here, where it is impossible for her ever to marry a stranger until the father dies, and it is possible that she does not desire to marry the yavam or he does not desire her, therefore she must necessarily perform chalitzah, and when she requires an announcement, we will announce it then [and with this, what Rashi wrote in Yevamot 119b, s.v. "to her fellow forever," will be understood].

And regarding that which has been explained, that according to all opinions if he said "on condition that he remains silent," if he was silent at the time of hearing she is betrothed even if he later protested, our teacher, the Rema, wrote that nevertheless, if he was not in his house when he heard, and when he came to his house he protested—it is a protest, for the fact that he was silent initially was because he was not in his house. Thus far his words. And there are those who disagree with him, for this is only regarding the betrothal of his daughter when she received it without his knowledge because he was not in his house; in that case, we certainly say until he comes to his house and protests, as he does not need to protest and reveal his mind when not in his place. However, the son is not in the domain of his father, but rather it is a mere condition, and he did not say "on condition that he remains silent in my presence," and immediately when he heard and was silent in whatever place he was—the betrothal was established. However, it is certain that if while on the road he did not become aware that the son made the betrothal dependent upon him, and when he came to his house he became aware—certainly only then is it called the time of hearing, for as long as he did not know that the son made it dependent upon him, why should he remain silent or protest? And it is possible that our teacher, the Rema, is dealing with such a case. And likewise, even if he heard that he made it dependent upon him, but he did not know the details, and when he came to his house he became aware of the details—it also appears that this is called the time of hearing, for when he did not know the details, why should he protest or remain silent and agree?

In Ketubot [73b] it was taught in a Baraita: "I am having relations with you on the condition that my father desires it," even if the father did not desire it, she is betrothed; Rabbi Shimon says: if the father desired it, she is betrothed, if the father did not desire it, she is not betrothed. And the Gemara explains that the first Tanna holds that "on the condition that he desires" means "on the condition that he remains silent," and he has remained silent. But Rabbi Shimon holds it means "on the condition that he says yes," and he did not say "yes." And in Gittin [25b] the Gemara establishes this dispute with another reason: that the first Tanna holds a person does not intend his relations to be relations of zenut and he resolved in his heart for a complete betrothal even if his father will not desire it [Rashi]. But Rabbi Shimon does not hold this, therefore if the father desired it she is betrothed and if not she is not betrothed. And the Gemara establishes that Rabbi Shimon holds of bereirah, and therefore even though at the time of the act of relations it is a doubt whether he desires or does not desire, we say that from the time of the act of relations it is a betrothal when it is clarified afterwards when he says "I desire it" [ibid.]. And this is not like other conditions that a person stipulates which are in his power to fulfill and his intention is to fulfill them when he stipulates them, and when the condition is fulfilled it becomes a get or betrothal retroactively and the reason is not because of bereirah. However, a condition that is not in his power and at the time of the condition it is a doubt and the condition is fulfilled on its own, it is bereirah [ibid. and so wrote the Tosafot in Yoma 56a s.v. De-Rabbi Meir at the end of the passage and in Sukkah 24a].

The Rambam, the Tur, and the Shulchan Aruch did not bring this law at all. It appears to me that their reason is that they hold like the sugya in Gittin, and the halacha is not like the first Tanna because there in Ketubot it is proven that specifically when one betrothes upon a condition and afterwards has relations we concern ourselves that perhaps he waived his condition, as I wrote in section 13, but when one betrothes through biah upon a condition, he certainly does not waive it. And we do not rule like Rabbi Shimon, for we rule that regarding Torah matters there is no bereirah. Therefore, they did not write this regarding kiddushei biah; for in kiddushei kesef, when he says "on condition that my father consents," we do not need the reasoning of bereirah, since with kesef she can be betrothed with this kesef even afterwards when the father consents, and we will not need to say the matter was clarified retroactively. However, in kiddushei biah, the kiddushin must necessarily take effect at the time of the act, for afterwards the biah is no longer present, and perforce we come to the law of bereirah. And even if we say that here too the kiddushin take effect retroactively, for anyone who says "on condition" is like one who says "from now," nevertheless it is not similar to all other cases of bereirah where the matter is subsequently revealed only regarding the past time; but in this case, the matter is revealed only afterwards for the future time, and automatically, since the kiddushin certainly take effect for the future as there is no bereirah here, they therefore take effect also retroactively. Therefore, even though there in Ketubot they disagree regarding the expression "on condition that he consents" as to what it is, the poskim were not concerned for it because of the sugya in Gittin [and the difficulty of the Beit Shmuel in subsection 18 and the difficulty of the Pnei Yehoshua in Kiddushin 63a, starting with the words "on condition," are settled; see there and examine carefully].

Any condition for which he set a time for its fulfillment, when the time has passed and it was not fulfilled—the kiddushin are void. And any condition for which he did not set a time—the time is forever. Therefore, if he said to her, "Be betrothed to me with this perutah on the condition that I give you a maneh"—whenever he gives the maneh, the kiddushin are fulfilled. And if he said that he never wants to fulfill his condition—we do not compel him to fulfill it, and his kiddushin are void and she does not require a get. Nevertheless, a person of spirit should not marry her without a get, for perhaps he will say later that he wants to fulfill the condition and disqualify her to the second husband. And even though according to the law this is nothing, even according to the poskim who disagree with the Rambam regarding "on the condition that father says yes" and hold that even if at first he said "I do not want," when he says "yes" later the kiddushin are fulfilled as I have written, that is regarding a condition that is not dependent on the one performing the kiddushin and is not within his power to be fulfilled. But regarding a condition that is in his power to fulfill immediately and he does not want to, and says that it is not his will to fulfill it—the kiddushin are void immediately. However, nevertheless there is a rumor, and he will disqualify her with this rumor [Bach and Acharonim, and so wrote the Beit Yosef himself in Bedek HaBayit, and they did not see the end of Bedek HaBayit, and see Beit Shmuel subsection 60].

But if he says that they shall fulfill it, and now it is not yet his will to fulfill it but his will is to fulfill it after some time—certainly the authority is in his hand. Nevertheless, we only wait for him up to twelve months, according to the law of one who claims to marry, for whom we wait such a time. After twelve months, if he does not fulfill it, even though the kiddushin are still pending and standing, nevertheless we write a letter of rebellion against him and conduct ourselves with him according to the law of a rebel which will be explained in siman 77. And if he died before the condition was fulfilled, she does not even require chalitzah and is permitted to a kohen. However, if she waived the condition during the lifetime of the one who betrothed her, the kiddushin are completed immediately as if they had fulfilled it. And some say that even after his death, if she waived the condition, the kiddushin take effect retroactively and she is a married woman. And all these matters apply when he did not take her in marriage before the fulfillment of the condition, but if he took her in marriage before—she is betrothed immediately even if the condition was not fulfilled, for presumably at the time of her entry into the chuppah she waived the condition, and he is obligated to give her her ketubah. And even though we explained regarding one who betrothed her on a condition and took her in marriage without specification that it is only a case of doubtful kiddushin, that is regarding a condition where it is not known to him if it was fulfilled or not, such as blemishes and vows and the like; but in this case where she knows that he did not fulfill the condition and she consented to enter the chuppah, she certainly waived the condition. And some say that here too it is a case of doubtful kiddushin.

If he said to her, "Be betrothed to me with this perutah on the condition that I work with you as a laborer" or "I will speak on your behalf to the government," if there are witnesses that he worked with her as a laborer or spoke on her behalf to the government—she is certainly betrothed, and she cannot say, "I did not need this labor" or "I did not need these words that you spoke." For since he performed labor in the manner of a laborer or spoke to the government in the manner of those who speak, if the matters spoken to the government are known, and even if they are not known, she also cannot say, "I did not need these words," for he has fulfilled his condition, and since benefit reached her from the words or from the labor, she is certainly betrothed. And so too if she admits that he fulfilled the condition, her admission is like witnesses. If she certainly denies him and there are no witnesses here—she is believed regarding herself. And if she does not deny him and there are no witnesses—she is betrothed out of doubt. We have already explained these laws from section 20 until section 25, see there. [See Chelkat Mechokek sub-section 20 and 21, and Beit Shmuel; and see Beit Yosef who wished to make a distinction between the Tosefta and the Tosafot, but the Chelkat Mechokek did not hold so, and so wrote the Ketzot HaChoshen].

And specifically when the kiddushin were with other money and this speech and action were a condition, but if he betrothed her with this, such as if he gave her nothing and said to her, "Be betrothed to me in exchange for the wage of my working for you as a laborer" or "that I shall speak on your behalf to the authorities"—she is not betrothed even if he acted and spoke. And the reason is that we establish that "the wage exists from beginning to end," and for every perutah's worth that she gained through his action and his speech, it remains a debt upon her, and it results in one who betrothes with a loan, and she is not betrothed, as was written in siman 28, section 46; see there.

If he said to her, "on condition that I have a maneh," if it is known by witnesses that he has a maneh—meaning they saw a maneh in his possession—even if they do not know clearly that they are his, nevertheless, there is a presumption that whatever is in a person's hand is his unless it is known that they belong to others. And so, if we saw a maneh in his possession and the presumption is that they are his, she is certainly betrothed. If it is known that he does not have it, she is not betrothed. And if the matter is not known, whether he has it or not, she is betrothed out of doubt even if he says he does not have it, for we concern ourselves that perhaps he retracted his intent for the kiddushin; since he betrothed her initially with this intent, there is a basis for the matter that he has it and now he is retracting, and therefore it is a case of doubtful kiddushin. And even if she also says that he does not have it, it is of no avail and it is a case of doubtful kiddushin for the reason that has been explained. It is not similar to other conditions where when both of them admit the kiddushin are voided, for in this case it appears like a retraction, as I have written.

If he said to her, "on condition that I have a maneh in the possession of so-and-so," if it is known by witnesses that he has a maneh in the possession of so-and-so—she is certainly betrothed. And if it is not known—she is betrothed out of doubt, even if that so-and-so says that he has nothing of his in his possession, and even if he and she also say that he has nothing in his possession—it is a case of doubtful kiddushin for the reason that has been explained. And if that so-and-so says that he has a maneh in his possession and he also says so, and she says "I do not know"—it is only a doubt [Beit Shmuel, subsection 30]. And if she also says that he has a maneh in the possession of so-and-so, it is as if both of them say that the condition was fulfilled, and she is certainly betrothed. And in these laws, when the condition was "on condition that I have," even if she certainly denies it and says that he does not have—it is not effective to nullify the kiddushin even according to the one who holds that regarding other conditions she is believed to say that he did not fulfill the condition, as I wrote in section 20; however, regarding conditions such as these she is not believed for the reason that has been explained, unless there are witnesses, and even one witness is not effective to remove it from the status of doubtful kiddushin [it appears to me].

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote in section 16: "On the condition that so-and-so says that I have a maneh in his possession," if he said, "He has it in my possession"—she is betrothed; if he did not say, "He has it in my possession"—she is not betrothed. Thus far their words. And it means to say that the condition was that even if it is clarified by witnesses that I have a maneh in his possession, nevertheless, if he does not say it, she is not betrothed, and there is no doubt here since the condition was not fulfilled as he did not speak. And conversely, it appears to me that if he said, "He has it in my possession," and it was not clarified that he has it—it is only a doubtful betrothal when she says that she does not know for certain as I have written, for one cannot say that the condition was only regarding his speech, as from the Tosefta [chapter 3], which is the source of this law, it appears that this is an additional condition beyond the clarification that he has a maneh in the possession of so-and-so. Furthermore, it appears to me that everything follows the context, for if the conversation between them was that he has a maneh in the possession of so-and-so and that he should betroth her on this condition, and she did not consent until so-and-so also says it, and he betrothed her with this language "on the condition that so-and-so says"—certainly this is in addition to the clarification. But if there was no prior conversation between them and at the time of the betrothal he said this language to her, since that so-and-so said that he has it in his possession—it is a certain betrothal for the condition has been fulfilled; however, specifically when he truly has a maneh in his possession, for it does not depend on speech alone, but rather that they believed him regarding his speech.

If he said to her, "on condition that I have a maneh in such-and-such a place," if it is clarified that he has it in that place, and similarly if both of them admit it—she is certainly betrothed. And if it is not in that place that he said—she is betrothed out of doubt, lest he has it in that place and he intends to ruin her status and retract the kiddushin, and all this is for the reason that has been explained. This is unless there are witnesses that he does not have it in that place, for then the kiddushin are void even if he has a maneh in another place, even in a place close to that place; for since the condition was regarding that specific place, there is certainly an insistence, as it can be said that she only desires to go to that place, and therefore if it is known that it was not based on an insistence specifically on that place, if it becomes known that he has it in another place—it is close to being certain kiddushin, and in any case it is kiddushin of doubt.

And even if he said to her another phrasing, "on condition that I show you a maneh," the intention is not regarding that of others when he shows her, but rather regarding a maneh of his own. And until he shows her a maneh of his own, she is not betrothed with certain kiddushin but rather a doubt of kiddushin, for that which he said "on condition that I show you" is an additional condition, that even if it becomes known through witnesses that he has it, she is not satisfied until she sees it with her eyes. Therefore, even if there are witnesses that he is able to show her, she is not betrothed until he shows her. And as long as he has not shown her, they are not even a doubt of kiddushin, for behold, the condition has not been fulfilled, except that it is in his power to show her whenever he wishes since he did not set a time for the condition. And he must show her from his own property specifically and not that of others. And even if the money is in his hand as an iska from another, and since he is dealing with them they are like his—it is nothing, for her intention was not for this. And there are those who say further that even if he has a maneh from his portion of the profit from this iska, since they have not yet divided it, it is not like his own. And there is one who says that this is only when the time for division has not yet arrived and the profit is subordinated to the principal, but when the time for division has arrived, it is like his own even though they have not yet divided it. And even though the receiver of an iska has the status of a worker and can divide whenever he wishes even within the time, as is written in Choshen Mishpat siman 176, however, here it is in a manner where it is impossible for him to divide, such as when he received it with another, for then it is not in his power to divide before the time. And it is possible that even if he does not have a partner, it would not be like his own when the time for division has not arrived, for granted that it is in his power to divide, nevertheless, as long as he has not divided it is not like his own, for who knows if he will consent to divide or if the owner of the iska will find a pretext for him so that he cannot divide; this is not the case when the time for division has arrived, for then it is truly like his own.

If he showed her a maneh of his own and it is encumbered to a creditor—she is betrothed, and specifically when he did not encumber it to the creditor "from now," and therefore we do not concern ourselves with the encumbrance, for all people have encumbrances upon them, and it is not similar to a business venture in which he has a profit but they have not divided it, which is not effective, for there they were not yet his and had not yet come into his hand; but this maneh is always his and even now it is his, and an encumbrance does not nullify it such that it should not be considered his. However, with an encumbrance "from now," it is not considered his, for if he does not pay him, they are the creditor's "from now" and they are not his; therefore, it is a case of uncertain betrothal [it appears to me]. And if he has a maneh from wages owed to him, if he has already finished his work—they are as his, and if not—they are not as his, for wages are not paid until the end [it appears to me]. And if he has gift money with someone, if this giver transferred ownership to him through another—it is as his, and if not—even though he promised to give and will certainly fulfill it, nevertheless this is not as his, for he has not yet acquired them [it appears to me].

There are those who say that there is a distinction between if he said "on condition that I have" and "on condition that I show you." For in "on condition that I have," if he did not have it at the time of the kiddushin, she is not betrothed even if he profited afterward or found a lost object. However, in "on condition that I show you," even if he did not have it at the time of the kiddushin and he profited afterward or found a lost object and showed it to her—she is betrothed, for he said to her "on condition that I show you," that he would show her at a later time, and he has indeed shown her. And if he said "on condition that I show you a maneh that I have," it is of no avail what will come into his possession at a later time, since he also said that he has it, it is necessary that he have it at the time of the kiddushin. And likewise there is a distinction, for in "on condition that I have," even if it was not clarified that he has it, it is a case of uncertain kiddushin because we concern ourselves that perhaps he has it. But in "on condition that I show you," it is not so, and we do not concern ourselves that perhaps he showed it to her; for there (in the former case) there is no physical act and we concern ourselves due to doubt, but in "I will show you" there is a physical act that he must show her, and why should we concern ourselves with this? And likewise, it is not similar to "I will work with you as a laborer" or "speak to the authorities," where even though they are positive acts we concern ourselves, for there she cannot contradict him and perhaps he truly worked or spoke, and also it is not the way to do this before witnesses. But in "I will show you," since she says he did not show her, why should we concern ourselves, and also it is the way to show her in the presence of witnesses. And it appears that even if he says that he showed her and she contradicts him—she is believed; however, according to what was written in section 21, she requires a get and we compel him to give a get. And behold, even though there are those who disagree and hold that even in "on condition that I show you" he must have the maneh beforehand, and what he will have afterward is of no avail, for if not so, there is no limit to the matter, and at any time she demands him to show her he will say "I still have time to show you," meaning to say that perhaps some further profit or some lost object will happen upon me. However, the Tur did not bring this opinion at all, and likewise our teacher, the Rema. And the reason for the matter is that certainly there is a limit to this, for whenever she demands him to show her and he does not show her—the kiddushin are voided, for such is the condition "on condition that I show you," meaning to say on condition that whenever you demand it, I am obligated to show you. Nevertheless, as long as she has not demanded it, he has time forever as long as he did not set a time in the condition; and even if he profited afterward—the kiddushin also take effect when he shows it to her. And likewise if he said to her "on condition to bring you a maneh," its law is like "I will show you," that even if he profits afterward it is of avail, provided that it be specifically his own. And if he said "to bring you a maneh that I have"—he must have it beforehand, just as in "on condition that I show you a maneh that I have."

If he said to her, "on condition that I have a beit kor of land," if there are witnesses that he has it—she is certainly betrothed; and if not—she is betrothed out of doubt, perhaps he has it and he says he does not have it in order to ruin her, according to the reason explained regarding a maneh in section 73, for since he said it, there is a basis to the matter that he has it. And if he said, "on condition that I have a beit kor of land in such-and-such a place," if he has it in that place—she is certainly betrothed; and if not—she is betrothed out of doubt, perhaps he has it there and he intends to ruin her, and there is a specific preference for this place over another place, for perhaps she desires to go only to that place, and furthermore, perhaps the fruits that grow in this land are better than in the other land; therefore, if it is known that she did not have a specific preference for that place—its law is like the maneh that we explained. And there are those who disagree regarding land, that we do not suspect that perhaps he has it there and it is not known, and in this it is not similar to a maneh, for regarding land, if he had it in that place it would be known to all; and our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, did not bring this opinion at all in section 20 [and see the Gra, subsection 32].

If he said to her, "on condition that I show you a beit kor of land" – she is betrothed specifically when he shows it to her, and he does not fulfill it by bringing witnesses that he possesses it, as has been written regarding the maneh. And in this case, it is effective even if he possesses it afterwards, which is not the case with "on condition that he has," as has been written regarding the maneh. However, he must show her specifically his own and not that belonging to others, even if he rented it from others or holds it through sharecropping or leasing. And even with ancestral sharecroppers where for generations the land has been held in sharecropping by his ancestors and from him it will go to his offspring, nevertheless it is not effective, for it is not his, and if he should ruin it, the owner of the land has the power to remove him. But if the land is his, even if he pays tax from it – she is betrothed, for the land is his. However, the practical difference is that if all the people of the place pay tax from their fields, then even if he only has exactly a beit kor, she is betrothed, for she knew that he pays tax. But if not everyone pays tax – the betrothal is not certain until he has a beit kor of land that does not yield tax, which is to say that he must have more than a beit kor such that the excess is worth the value of the tax. And if not, she is not certainly betrothed but rather doubtfully. And the sages did not distinguish between superior, intermediate, or inferior quality land.

The beit kor of earth must be fit for sowing, the entire beit kor. And if there were in it crevices ten tefachim deep and four by four wide, as written in Choshen Mishpat siman 218 regarding the matter of a sale, or rocks ten tefachim high and four by four wide, if the crevices were full of water—they are like rocks and are not measured with it, because they are not fit for sowing, and there must be a beit kor aside from the crevices and the rocks. But if the crevices do not contain water and are fit for sowing—they are measured with it. And even though regarding a sale it was explained there in Choshen Mishpat that even if they are not full of water they are not measured, for the reason that a person does not want to give his money for one field and have it appear to him like two or three places, regarding a woman this reason is not relevant, for what difference does it make to her? Behold, he exerts himself and gathers the produce. Nevertheless, if the beit kor was in truly separate places that are completely divided—they do not join together, and it must be in one place; for even though she is not particular about the interruption of crevices and rocks, nevertheless they are one field, which is not the case when it is in truly divided places. And if there was a pit full of water in the field, even though it is not fit for sowing—it is measured with it, for it is a necessity of the field and its improvement. And specifically crevices full of water are not measured because they do not suffice to irrigate the field and are not a benefit to the field, which is not the case with an actual pit [Ran]. And if the crevices and the rocks are less than ten tefachim—they are measured with the beit kor, for they do not have a name of their own, and the crevices are called the basins of the ground into which the water drains, and the rocks are called the ridges of the ground, for such is the way of most lands. However, if there are many such bad places in the beit kor—certainly this is not land. And it appears to me that their measure is a beit four kabin, and that they be swallowed within five kabin within the majority of the field, as written in Choshen Mishpat there regarding the matter of a sale. And in that which there is a doubt there—it is a doubt regarding the kiddushin here [as mentioned above].

The sages taught in the Mishnayot of Kiddushin [48b]: If one betrothed a woman and said to her, "on condition that I am wealthy," and he is found to be poor, or even the reverse, "on condition that I am poor," and he is found to be wealthy; "on condition that I am a kohen," and he is found to be a Levi, or "a Levi," and he is found to be a kohen; "on condition that I am a natin," and he is found to be a mamzer, or "a mamzer," and he is found to be a natin; "on condition that I am a resident of a town," and he is found to be a resident of a city, or "a resident of a city," and he is found to be a resident of a town; "on condition that my house is near the bathhouse," and it is found to be far, or "far," and it is found to be near; "on condition that I have a maidservant" or "a grown daughter," meaning an important one, or if he said to her "on condition that she has a maidservant" or "a daughter who is a baker," and it is found that he does not have one, or "on condition that he does not have one," and it is found that he does; or if he said to her "on condition that he has a wife and children," and it is found that he does not, or "on condition that he does not have," and it is found that he does—in all these cases, the kiddushin are void. And so too in similar cases. And even if she said, "In my heart I intended to be betrothed to him even if the condition is not fulfilled," she is not betrothed. It makes no difference whether she received the kiddushin herself or whether she told an agent to receive them under such conditions and he deviated from his agency—she is not betrothed. And we do not say that she is merely indicating a preference to the agent and there is no strictness in this, for since she stipulated "on condition," there is strictness in this, unless she said so explicitly at the time of the kiddushin; when he stipulated "on condition of such and such," she replied to him, "Even if it will not be as you said, I am satisfied," and he did not reply to her otherwise—for then she is betrothed in any event. And so too if the condition was upon her regarding such matters and it was found that she deceived him—the kiddushin are void, even if he says now, "In my heart I intended to betroth her in any event," for matters of the heart are not matters, unless he said explicitly at the time of the kiddushin after he stipulated the condition that even though it will not be so he is satisfied—for then his kiddushin are kiddushin.

In all the matters that have been explained and their like, even though there are things for which it is not understood why there was an objection, and on the contrary, there are instances where the condition is found to be for the better, such as "on condition that I am poor and he is found to be wealthy," nevertheless, since there was a condition between them, we are not to seek reasons, and the condition must be fulfilled properly; and if it changed, she is not betrothed. For every person has a mindset that is not grasped by others, and one may choose the inferior over the superior and object to a matter in which there is no objection for another person. And so it is implied in the Tosefta [chapter 2], as it is taught: "On condition that I am Yosef" and he is found to be Yosef and Shimon, "on condition that I am a perfumer" and he is found to be a perfumer and a tanner, "on condition that I am a town-dweller" and he is found to be a town-dweller and a city-dweller—she is betrothed. "On condition that I am nothing but Yosef" and he is found to be Yosef and Shimon, "on condition that I am nothing but a perfumer" and he is found to be a perfumer and a tanner, "that I am nothing but a town-dweller" and he is found to be a town-dweller and a city-dweller—she is not betrothed. Thus far its words. Behold, even in a change of name from Yosef to Shimon there is an objection, even though there is no reason why she objects [and so it is implied from the wording of Rashi 49a, s.v. "ben krakh," see there; and the Gemara there which considers certain reasons is according to Rabbi Shimon, see there].

But there are some of our teachers who wrote for all these matters reasons stated in the Yerushalmi, that it is possible that there is an objection to the change of the condition even if the change is for the better. Such as "poor and he was found to be wealthy" – she can say, "I do not desire the great expenditure and the great disturbance that exists with the wealthy, for every person requests from him and disturbs him" [as is the explanation of the Yerushalmi]. And likewise "from a large city to a small city" – there is a reason that in a large city there are all the pleasures that a person seeks and not in a small city. And "from a small city to a large city" – there is a reason that in a small city there is more rest than in a large city, for the noise is not as great as in a large city. And "in my house far from a bathhouse and it was found to be close" – there is a reason that she can say her desire was to be jumping and skipping in my going and in my returning, and for this a long path is needed. "On condition that he has a wife and children and he does not" – she can say, "My desire was for companionship and not to sit alone." And regarding the praise of lineage, such as from a Levi to a Kohen and from a Kohen to a Levi, a Mamzer to a Natin and vice versa – if the deception was to a lower level, she can say, "I specifically desired one of lineage." And if the opposite – she can say, "I do not desire one of lineage lest he act haughtily toward me." And likewise regarding a maidservant and a daughter when he stipulated that he has them and he does not – she objects because they were needed for companionship and she wanted an important maidservant or a baker. And the opposite, when he said that he does not have them and he does – it is obvious that there is an objection, for she does not desire an important woman lest she tell lashon hara about her, and because of her importance they will believe her.

And according to this, there are some among the great Acharonim who wrote that we require in all the conditions that one stipulates some measure of concern when there was a change, but if there is no concern at all due to the change—the kiddushin are not voided due to the change. And according to this, that which is in the Tosefta regarding a change of name from Yosef to Shimon is not well-settled, for what concern is there in this? But it appears to me, in my humble opinion, that certainly in every condition that a person stipulates, there is according to his mind some concern, even if for most people this is not a concern, whatever concern it may be. Since he stipulated thus, the condition must necessarily be fulfilled, and if not, the kiddushin are voided. And the Yerushalmi, on the contrary, comes to teach us that you should not say that these conditions are like the words of madmen and we should not look upon them since he stipulates things contrary to the mind of every person; for this it says that it is possible this man or this woman, according to their lowly mind, have some concern in this. And you have no condition in the world that would not be, according to the mind of the stipulator, some concern. And even regarding names, there are those of deficient mind who are particular about names, that this name indicates good and there is its opposite, and you have no matter in the world that is not, according to the mind of the speaker, some concern.

We further learned from the Tosefta that regarding a condition, we do not follow the assessment of intent but only the literal wording of the condition. For from a perfumer to a tanner there is a great objection, and according to the assessment of intent, when he says "on condition that I am a perfumer," it appears that her desire is for a craft of pleasant fragrance, and all the more so that she does not desire a foul odor like a tanner. Nevertheless, the Tosefta ruled that when he did not say "that I am only a perfumer" but rather "on condition that I am a perfumer," he may also be a tanner if he is also a perfumer, and so too in any similar case. The general principle of the matter—we do not interpret conditions but follow the literal wording.

We further learned in the Tosefta: "On condition that I am a poor man" and he was a poor man and became wealthy; "on condition that I am a wealthy man" and he was a wealthy man and became poor; "on condition that I am a perfume-seller" and he was a perfume-seller and became a tanner; "on condition that I am a tanner" and he was a tanner and became a perfume-seller; "on condition that I am a town-dweller" and he was a town-dweller and became a city-dweller; "on condition that I have children" and he had children and they died; "on condition that I have no children" and he had none and afterwards they were born to him—she is mekudeshet. "That I am nothing but a poor man" and he was wealthy and became poor; "that I am nothing but a wealthy man" and he was poor and became wealthy; "that I am nothing but a perfume-seller" and he was a perfume-seller and became a tanner; "that I am nothing but a tanner" and he was a tanner and became a perfume-seller; "that I am nothing but a town-dweller" and he was a town-dweller and became a city-dweller; "that I am nothing but a city-dweller" and he was a city-dweller and became a town-dweller; "that I have no children" and he had children and afterwards they died; "that I have children" and he had none and afterwards they were born—she is not mekudeshet. This is the general rule: anything that is fulfilled at the time of kiddushin, even if it is nullified afterwards—she is mekudeshet; and anything that is not fulfilled at the time of kiddushin, even if it is fulfilled afterwards—she is not mekudeshet. Thus far its words. And it seems clear that there is a printing error in the second clause from "that I am nothing but a perfume-seller" until "town"—and it should say as follows: "that I am nothing but a perfume-seller" and he was a tanner and became a perfume-seller; "that I am nothing but a tanner" and he was a perfume-seller and became a tanner; "that I am nothing but a town-dweller" and he was a city-dweller and became a town-dweller; "that I am nothing but a city-dweller" and he was a town-dweller and became a city-dweller, etc., so it should say. And this fact that the Tosefta changed the language of the second clause from the first—for in the first clause it teaches "on condition that I am" and in the latter clause "that I am nothing but"—it comes to teach us a novelty: that even if he said "that I am nothing but," where I would have said that the primary insistence is on the future and not on the time of the kiddushin, it comes to teach us that its law is like "on condition that I am," for the primary condition is regarding the time of the kiddushin [it appears to me; and in the Beit Shmuel subsection 44, and also "when he is a town-dweller" etc., there is a printing error and his intention is not clear, and perhaps he intended the Tosefta that we brought previously, cited in the Shulchan Aruch section 33, see there].

And similarly, if he said to her, "Be betrothed to me with this cup of wine," and it was found to be of honey, or "of honey" and it was found to be of wine—she is not betrothed if the cup was covered and she did not see what was in it, even if she said, "In my heart I intended to be betrothed to him" as has been explained. However, if the cup was uncovered—she is betrothed, for she saw that it did not contain what was according to the condition, and by accepting it, she consented. Nevertheless, the Rashba wrote in a responsum that one should not rely on this, and there is no compelling proof that these are certain kiddushin; therefore, he should betroth her another time. And it seems simple that with an uncovered cup, if she said, "In my heart I intended to be betrothed to him since I saw what was inside it"—other kiddushin are not required. And similarly, if he said to her, "Be betrothed to me with this gold denar," and it was found to be of silver, or "silver" and it was found to be gold—the law is also as with the cup. And if he said, "Be betrothed to me with one denar," and it was found to be two denars—she is betrothed, for this is not a change, as "within two hundred is a maneh." However, if he said, "There is only a denar in this," and it was found to be two—it appears that it is a change. But "Be betrothed to me with a silver denar" and it was found to be gold—she is not betrothed in any case, for it is a complete change, even though gold is worth much more than silver; for in this we do not follow an assessment of intent, but rather after the words they spoke as has been explained. [And the Tosafot 48b who wrote that it is because she needs to complete a silver ornament, this is not meant precisely, but rather so that she should not appear like a fool; but in truth, even if she does not need it, and so wrote the Bach.]

If he betrothed her without specification and without a condition, and he wishes to void the kiddushin because he says, "I thought she was a kohenet and she is a levite," or "a levite and she is a kohenet," "wealthy and she is poor," "poor and she is wealthy," or she says, "I thought he was thus and he is not thus," even if there is a strong assessment that they thought so, nevertheless, since they did not make a condition—matters of the heart are not matters, and she is betrothed. This is except for blemishes and vows, where it is a case of uncertain kiddushin as I wrote in siman 39, because all people are particular about this and it is like an explicit condition, and likewise regarding an aylonit. However, in the Yerushalmi, chapter 3, halacha 4, there is a dispute, and there is one who holds that if there is an assessment that he thought so, it is kiddushin only to be stringent and not to be lenient, see there; and one must be concerned for this regarding the prohibition of a married woman.

Our Sages, of blessed memory, said: If he said, "on condition that I know how to read," he must read the Torah and translate it into the Targum of Onkelos the proselyte. And some say that if he knows how to read and translate three verses, it is sufficient. And it appears to me that in this time, when we do not translate in public during the reading of the Torah, the intention of "knows how to read" is that he knows how to read with the cantillation marks in the manner of our readers. And if he said to her, "on condition that I am a reader," he must know the Tanakh with fine precision, and all the more so he must know how to translate the Torah as has been written, and this was in the time of the Gemara as has been written.

If he said to her, "on condition that I know how to study [lishnot]," he must know mishnayot, and it is possible that even if he does not know all the mishnayot but only a portion of them it is sufficient, and the law requires further study [ibid.] – and this is according to the explanation of the Rambam. But according to the explanation of Rashi, the meaning is that he studies the laws given to Moses at Sinai. And some say that if he knows the midrashim of the Talmud, which are the expositions that the Talmud derives from the verses of the Torah, and this is like Sifra and Sifrei – she is betrothed; and the primary view is like the first opinion [the Gra]. And if he said, "on condition that I am a Tanna," he must know how to read the Mishnah, Sifra, Sifrei, and the Tosefta of R. Hiyya and R. Oshaya, and the reading refers to understanding the plain meaning and proficiency in them. And it appears to me that this too is according to their language and the order of their study, but in our language, when one says "on condition that I am able to study," it is like "able to learn," and there is no fixed measure for this, rather as long as he is considered among the laymen who learn.

If he said to her, "On condition that I am a student," as long as they ask him one matter in his studies and he knows it, he is called a student and she is betrothed; and even if that one matter is in the laws of the festival that they teach the public among the simple matters near the festival so that all the people will be expert in them, and even if he knows Masechet Kallah—it is sufficient. And if he said, "On condition that I am a sage," as long as they ask him a matter of wisdom in the Torah, meaning a matter that depends on reasoning in any place, and he says it, for it is a sign that his intellect is straight and he is a sage in the Torah. And we require "in any place," for since it depends on the reasoning of his intellect, what difference does this place make to me or another place make to me? Nevertheless, we follow the majority of his reasonings, for would you say that if in a few instances he does not hit upon the truth in his reasoning he is not a sage? Behold, in every matter we follow the majority. And also in this, it appears to me that now, according to our languages, if there is another implication in these words, one must follow the intent of the language that the people of the province are accustomed to.

If he said to her, "on condition that I am a mighty man," we do not say that he must be like Avner ben Ner or like Yoav ben Tzeruyah, but rather anyone whose peers are afraid of him because of his might. "On condition that I am a wealthy man," we do not say like Rabbi Elazar ben Charsom or like Rabbi Elazar ben Azaryah, but rather anyone whom the people of his city honor because of his wealth; and it is known that in a small city one is called wealthy for a small sum, and in a large city one is not called wealthy for such a sum, and therefore it depends on the place where he dwells [it appears to me].

If he said to her, "on condition that I am a tzaddik" – even if he is a complete rasha, she is betrothed out of doubt, lest he meditated on repentance in his heart. The reason we concern ourselves with this is as I wrote in section 73, that it is a strong assessment, since he made this a condition, there is a basis for the matter that it is so. And even if the stolen items are still in his possession and he has not returned them to their owners, nevertheless, perhaps he resolved in his mind to return them; in any case, it does not depart from the status of doubtful kiddushin [ibid.]. And if he is presumed to be a beinoni – it is also a doubtful kiddushin. And if he is presumed to be a tzaddik – it is a complete kiddushin; and even though a tzaddik would not say of himself that he is a tzaddik, as this is a boundary of pride, nevertheless, regarding kiddushin, when the woman only desired him on this condition, this is not pride, and a person knows his own soul [so it appears to me]. And there is one who says that if he says he meditated on repentance in his heart – he is believed to make it a certain kiddushin since she cannot contradict him; but this does not seem so, for how could we believe a complete rasha to make it a certain kiddushin.

If he said to her, "on condition that I am a rasha," even if he is a complete tzaddik, it is nevertheless a case of doubtful kiddushin, for perhaps he meditated upon committing transgressions. And even though the Holy One, Blessed be He, does not join a bad thought to an action, perhaps he meditated upon idolatry in his heart, for such a thought is joined to an action. And likewise, a thought of epikorsut or denial of the words of our Sages, of blessed memory, renders him a complete rasha even if he does not perform evil deeds. And why do we concern ourselves with this? Because there is a basis for the matter, as I wrote in the previous section.

Likewise in all matters, such as if he betrothed her "on condition that I am a calculator," "on condition that I am a mathematician," "on condition that I am a scribe," "on condition that I am an artist," "on condition that I am a tailor or a shoemaker or a blacksmith or any other type of craft" – if he is established in his city as an expert in this wisdom or in this craft, even though in the large cities where there are great sages and great craftsmen his wisdom and craft are considered as nothing, nevertheless, since in his place he is considered a sage or a craftsman – it is kiddushin. And if not – it is kiddushi safek, for in any case she cannot be released without a get, as perhaps others do not know of his wisdom and his craft; for it is no worse than "on condition that I am a tzaddik" and he is found to be a rasha. And all this is for the reason we explained, that there is a basis for the matter, unless the man is established as a fraud, and then it is possible, in conjunction with all the sages of the place, to nullify the kiddushin.

In section 13 and in section 54 it was explained that they have the ability to nullify the condition so that the kiddushin shall take effect even without the fulfillment of the condition; and a condition that is for his benefit alone, he may nullify it, and that which is for her benefit alone, she has the ability to nullify, and the detailed laws regarding this were explained there. However, the opposite—to nullify the kiddushin and retract them even when the condition is fulfilled—there is a distinction in this between a condition of "if" and a condition of "from now" or "on condition," which is like "from now." How so? If he gave her a perutah and said to her, "If I give you a maneh within thirty days, you shall be betrothed to me with this perutah"—the kiddushin do not take effect until the time they are given to her, and consequently, prior to this, she may retract her consent to the kiddushin and the fulfillment of the condition will not avail. Therefore, if another man betrothed her before the condition was fulfilled, she is betrothed to the second, for this is like an explicit retraction on her part since she was betrothed to another. And all the more so that he can retract if the fulfillment of the condition falls upon her and her fulfillment will not avail; only his retraction is when he says explicitly that he retracts from the kiddushin. But if he betrothes another woman, there is nothing in this, for he may take as many wives as he desires. And it appears to me that even in this time when there is the cherem of Rabbeinu Gershom, there is no nullification of the first kiddushin in this. And one who retracts from the kiddushin must retract before witnesses, for otherwise he would not be believed [it appears to me]. And the one upon whom it is to fulfill the condition, if he wishes to retract, he needs nothing, but rather he shall not fulfill the condition.

And there is no distinction in this between kiddushin of money and kiddushin of a document, for in all of them when they retract from the kiddushin there is no need for a get at all, even in kiddushin of a document that contains a date, where in such a case regarding gittin we are stringent as was written in siman 143 because we say the date of the document proves its status and it is possible that its law is like "from now" as has been explained there; however, regarding kiddushin we do not say so, for there is no distinction between one kiddushin and another, and furthermore, the sages did not institute a date for a document of kiddushin as was written in siman 32. And also in kiddushin of cohabitation the kiddushin are voided when the condition is not fulfilled, and even though according to this the cohabitation is found to be cohabitation of zenut, nevertheless, since they retracted – they retracted.

But regarding a condition of "from now" and "on the condition," there is a different law, for since upon the fulfillment of the condition the kiddushin take effect retroactively, her retraction is not effective when the condition is fulfilled. And if she received kiddushin from another before the condition was fulfilled and afterwards the condition was fulfilled—the kiddushin of the second are nothing. And if he said to her, "on the condition that I give you a maneh within thirty days," if he gave it to her within thirty days—it is kiddushin retroactively, and if he did not give it to her within thirty days—she is not betrothed. And if she received kiddushin from another within thirty days—she is betrothed and not betrothed until thirty days, and when thirty days are completed, if the first did not fulfill his condition—the kiddushin of the first lapse and the kiddushin of the latter are finalized and she does not require a get from the first, and if the first fulfilled his condition—she does not require a get from the second.

There is a further difference between a condition of "if" and "from now" or "on the condition," for with a condition of "if," where the kiddushin take effect upon the fulfillment of the condition, it is impossible to betroth her except with kiddushin of money, for even if the coins are consumed by that time, the kiddushin remain valid for the reason that will be explained in siman 40. However, regarding kiddushin of a document, some say that the kiddushin do not take effect then unless the document is in his possession at that time, as is written there. According to this, it is obvious that with kiddushin of intercourse he cannot betroth her, for the intercourse will not exist then at the time the kiddushin take effect. But with "from now" and "on the condition," he can betroth with whichever kiddushin he desires, since the kiddushin take effect retroactively. And that which we wrote in section 99 regarding kiddushin of intercourse, that when the condition is not fulfilled it is an act of zenut, this is only with "from now" and "on the condition," but with a condition of "if," one should not betroth her with intercourse; and there it will be explained with the help of Heaven.

In siman 137 it will be explained that if one said to his wife, "Behold you are divorced except for so-and-so," it is not a get, for we require "severance" and it is lacking; but if he said to her, "On condition that you do not marry so-and-so," it is a get, for this is like all conditions. And regarding kiddushin, one who says to a woman, "Behold you are betrothed to me except for so-and-so"—meaning, that she should not be forbidden to him, but rather she shall be a married woman to the whole world and to so-and-so like an unmarried woman, such that kiddushin that he might betroth her would take effect to forbid her to him—it is the opinion of many of our teachers that this is not kiddushin at all, for kiddushin is compared to divorce, as it is written, "And she shall go out... and she shall become." And so implies the plain meaning of the Gemara [Gittin 82b]. However, the Rambam, of blessed memory, in chapter 7 was stringent in the matter and wrote that it is a case of doubtful kiddushin, and so ruled our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 39. Therefore, in practice, she requires a get from him and is forbidden to the priesthood [for he interprets that which Abaye said there, "if you say the law follows Rabbi Eliezer," that this applies even according to the Rabbis, unlike the commentary of Rashi; and as for what the Lechem Mishneh questioned, that if so there is also a practical difference regarding yibum, it appears to me that the Rambam holds like the question of Tosafot in the heading beginning "For example," and interprets that indeed according to what is taught later you cannot find such a case, and "And rather... how can you find such a case" is not a difficulty but a question; see there and examine carefully].