Siman 37

The daughter is under the authority of her father all the days of her minority and her girlhood until she reaches maturity, and the father may betroth her without her consent to whomever he wishes, as it is written: "I gave my daughter to this man" (Deuteronomy 22:16), and the verse deals with a na'arah, as it is written there: "And they shall bring out the na'arah," etc. The money of the kiddushin belongs to the father, for he acquires everything through her—her findings and the work of her hands—and likewise her ketubah if she was widowed or divorced from erusin, as it is written: "In her girlhood in her father's house" (Numbers 30:17), for all the benefit of girlhood belongs to her father. However, once she has married, her father no longer has authority over her, for she has departed from his authority to the authority of the husband, and his authority over her is severed even in her minority [see Tosafot Ketubot 46b and the sugya there, and we have explained according to the truth that it is so, and therefore the Tur wrote the laws of her findings and the work of her hands here, and examine carefully].

And similarly, her handiwork belongs to her father; if she is supported at his table, he takes all of her handiwork, and if she is not supported, he takes the excess over her sustenance. And if her handiwork does not suffice for her sustenance, or if she earns nothing at all, whether he is obligated to provide for her will be explained in siman 71. And similarly, if she found a lost object—it belongs to the father even if she is not sustained by him; and although there are some of our teachers who hold that when she is not sustained her find is her own, nevertheless, most of the poskim agreed that her find is always his, and as written in Choshen Mishpat siman 74, see there. And according to the opinion of the Rambam in chapter 17 of Gezeilah and the Tur there, even when she is sold as a maidservant her find is his, see there; and similarly, when she is widowed or divorced from erusin and takes a ketubah, her ketubah is his, but from nissuin he has no authority over her even in her minority.

Therefore, the father accepts the kiddushin of his daughter from the day she is born until she reaches bogrut. Even if she were a deaf-mute or insane and the father betrothed her, she is a complete eshet ish according to the Torah. Even though she will never reach a state of legal competence, nevertheless, since the Torah granted the father the right to accept the kiddushin of his daughter during her ketannut and naarut, there is no distinction between one of sound senses and a deaf-mute or insane person. Nevertheless, when she reaches bogrut, even though for all matters she is like a ketannah, nonetheless regarding kiddushin she is like an adult, and she is no better than one of sound senses over whom the father has no authority once she has reached her bogrut. The father can betroth his daughter whether through kiddushin of money or a document, or through kiddushin of intercourse, by secluding her with him in the presence of witnesses and the father, and the father says, "Behold, I am handing over my daughter to you for kiddushin of intercourse," and he says, "Your daughter is betrothed to me through this intercourse that I shall have with her." However, kiddushin of intercourse is only applicable to a daughter of three years and one day, for with less than this, her intercourse is nothing; for even if the father handed her over for kiddushin of intercourse—she is not betrothed.

Kiddushin do not take effect upon a fetus, but once its presence as a fetus is recognized, the kiddushin take effect according to the opinion of the Rambam, and this will be explained in siman 40. Similarly, kiddushin do not take effect upon a nefel. That which was explained, that from the day she is born the kiddushin take effect, this is when it is established for us that her months were complete; however, when it is not established for us, they are only kiddushin of doubt, lest she is not a nefel. But with a certain nefel, they are not kiddushin even during the time of its vitality, for it is as if dead. It is worse than a fetus whose presence was recognized, for there, when she is born, she is viable, but the nefel is as if dead. Nevertheless, if the father of the nefel received kiddushin for her and afterwards the person betrothed her sister, even though according to the law the kiddushin certainly take effect with her sister, nevertheless one should be stringent and require her to have other kiddushin when the nefel dies. It is also forbidden for him to come upon her sister while the nefel is alive, but according to the law the main point is as I have written.

There is one who is uncertain regarding a gift given to a ketannah or a naarah, whether it belongs to the father like a find or the money of kiddushin or not, and there is one who holds that it belongs to her father. However, we find that which the Rashba wrote in a responsum that the gift does not belong to the father. And so it stands to reason, for the Torah only granted the father a find, where there is no other mind transferring ownership to her; but this person who gave her a gift certainly did not intend to transfer ownership to the father since he did not give it to him, and how can we hand it over to the father? And it is not similar to a slave whose gift belongs to his master, for it is revealed to all that a slave has no acquisition without his master; but regarding a daughter, it is not revealed to all, and behold, even a wife's hand is like her husband's hand, and nevertheless, regarding a gift, the principal does not belong to the husband and he only consumes the usufruct. And however, regarding a ketannah who does not have the mental capacity to guard the object—her gift belongs to her father, for he certainly only gave it to her for joy and his primary intention was for the father, as we explained in Choshen Mishpat siman 270 section 4, see there.

If the daughter becomes a bogeret—her father has no authority over her, and she is like all other women who are only betrothed with their own consent. Regarding an aylonit, the time of her maturity will be explained in siman 155, and all signs of ketanut, naarut, and the signs of bagrut will be explained there; likewise, it will be explained there if the testimony of women is effective for this, see there. Who is trusted regarding the counting of the years will be explained in siman 169. It is implied from the poskim that even the father is not trusted regarding the counting of the years, like all relatives, as it is explained there that it is not effective. And that which the father is trusted to forbid his daughter, which will be explained in this siman, this is when there is clarification regarding the years aside from him, for then he is trusted to say, "I betrothed her."

And just as adulthood removes her from the authority of the father, so too marriage removes her from the authority of the father. If she married in her minority, where her father married her off, and she was widowed or divorced during the lifetime of her father – she does not return to his authority even if she is a minor. However, if she was widowed or divorced from erusin, she returns to the authority of her father until she reaches adulthood. But from nisuin, even if she entered the chuppah and did not have relations – her law is like one who is married. And from where did we learn that a married woman does not return to the authority of the father? From nedarim [Rashi Kiddushin 18b], as it is written: "But the vow of a widow, or of her that is divorced, even everything wherewith she hath bound her soul, shall stand against her" (Numbers 30:10), and she does not return to the authority of the father. According to this, it is possible that even if the father delivered her to the messengers of the husband and he died, she does not return to the authority of her father, as in the case of nedarim [Ketubot 49a, see there], and it requires further study for the practical law.

The Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote in chapter 3, law 13: If she was betrothed before she reached adulthood without her father's knowledge—she is not betrothed, even if the father consented after she was betrothed. Even if she was widowed or divorced from that betrothal—she is not forbidden to a kohen, and both she and her father can object; whether she was betrothed in his presence or whether she was betrothed not in his presence—she is not betrothed. Thus far his words. And it is implied from his words that if at the time of the act he consented to the betrothal, even though he did not tell her to be betrothed, it is a betrothal; however, if he consented afterward it is not effective, and we do not concern ourselves that perhaps at the time of the act he also consented. And it is not only necessary to say not in his presence, for he did not know of it, but even in his presence, since he remained silent he certainly did not consent then, and that which he consented afterward is a change of mind and therefore it is not effective; and even if he received a get from the one who betrothed her, which is a complete proof that he consented afterward—she is not forbidden to a kohen.

And there is one who holds regarding the opinion of the Rambam, of blessed memory, that when he betrothed her in the presence of the father and he remained silent and afterwards consented, it is a betrothal, as his end proves his beginning that even at the time of the act he consented, and certainly if he explicitly consented at the time of the act it is a betrothal. Nevertheless, even if we knew that he consented at the time of the act, they can afterwards object, both the father and the daughter. And even though the father can betroth her against her will, that is when he betrothes her of his own volition; but when he did not betroth her, rather she betrothed herself and he only consented—she can object afterwards. And so too he can object afterwards even though he consented at the time of the act. And this is what the Rambam wrote, that both she and her father can object; that is to say, even if it is known to us that he consented at the time of the act, nevertheless they can object afterwards.

And when we know that he consented at the time of the act, even if the kiddushin were not in his presence, nevertheless, since he knew that he was betrothing her and he consented, it is a complete kiddushin even according to the opinion of the Rambam, provided that one of them did not protest afterward as has been written. And one should not ask that in any case, if the kiddushin were completed at the time of the act when he consented, by what means would they be voided afterward by their obstruction? And if they were not completed at the time of the act, when would they be completed? For behold, according to the Rambam, subsequent consent is not effective, and if so, one must perforce say that they were completed at the time of the act, and how then could the kiddushin be voided afterward based on their obstruction? For it can be said that certainly the kiddushin are completed immediately, but this is like one who betroths on the condition that neither of them obstructs afterward. And even though he did not explicitly state this, nevertheless, such is the case according to the matter, for since he gave her the kiddushin and not to the father, it is like an explicit condition that if afterward one of them regrets it, the kiddushin shall be voided [as mentioned above according to the opinion of the Rambam, of blessed memory].

But many of our teachers disagree with him and hold that even if he did not know of the kiddushin at all, and afterwards when he heard he consented—it is kiddushin from the time that he heard and consented. And even if he did not consent immediately when he heard, but rather remained silent and did not protest and afterwards consented, his end proves his beginning and it is kiddushin from the time of hearing, even if the money was consumed before the hearing. And even though one might ask: with what shall the kiddushin take effect at the time of hearing, for behold the money is already gone? For it can be said that this is like one who betroths a woman with money on the condition that the kiddushin take effect after thirty days, where she is betrothed after thirty days even if the money was consumed, as written in siman 40; see there. And even though he did not say to her, "Be betrothed to me after your father consents," nevertheless, this is exactly as if he had said so, since the kiddushin are dependent upon the father.

And there are some of our teachers who hold that when the father consents, the kiddushin take effect from the time he betrothed her. The reason is that since he consented afterward, it is automatically as if he said to her, "Go out and receive your kiddushin" [the Rosh]. Furthermore, every person desires to marry off his daughter and it is a benefit for him, and one may act for a person's benefit in his absence [the Ran]. And if he did not consent, it is not kiddushin, for this is not an absolute benefit [ibid.]. According to this reason, it is effective even for a ketannah, even according to the one who holds that he cannot say to his ketannah daughter, "Go out and receive your kiddushin," as will be explained in this siman. Similarly, according to this reason, it is effective even if she explicitly stated at the time of receiving the kiddushin that her intention was not to act as the father's agent [Beit Shmuel there], for according to this reason that it is a benefit for him, one may act for a person's benefit in his absence and her agency is not required, for it is like one who says to the betrother, "Go and betroth my daughter."

And some say that if the money was consumed, it is not kiddushin. Their reasoning is that they hold that the kiddushin take effect from the time of hearing when he consented, and when the money has been consumed, with what would she be betrothed? It is not similar to one who betroths a woman after thirty days in siman 40, for there, since she knew that the kiddushin would not take effect until thirty days, the money is not with her as a loan, as I wrote there. However here, where she did not know the time the kiddushin would take effect, it follows that as soon as the money was consumed, the money is as a debt upon her; and afterwards, when the father heard and consented, it is like one who betroths her with a loan, and she is not betrothed [it appears to me].

And according to these opinions that have been explained, that it is effective even when the father consented afterward—immediately when he consents they become kiddushin, either from the time of the consent or from the time of the kiddushin according to the opinions that have been explained, and their subsequent obstruction is no longer effective. However, before the father consented and she retracted and protested the kiddushin—the father's consent is no longer effective, and certainly if the father protested it is not kiddushin. And one should not ask why her retraction is effective, for behold the father consented afterward and he can betroth her against her will? For it can be said that since at the time of the kiddushin he had not consented and she retracted before his consent, the entire act of receiving the kiddushin was nullified and his consent is no longer effective [see Rashi 46a, s.v. "yekholin"], and if his desire is to betroth her against her will, he himself should receive kiddushin from the betrother afterward, but her reception has been nullified.

And know, that in all these laws there is no difference whether her father previously betrothed her to this man who performs the kiddushin or whether he did not betroth her. For in a case where we said the kiddushin are kiddushin according to all the opinions that have been explained, they are kiddushin even if he did not betroth her at all for the reasons that have been explained; and in a case where they are not kiddushin, they are nothing even if he himself betrothed her first. And even though according to most poskim who hold that they are kiddushin even when he consents afterward, it would have been appropriate to say that where he betrothed her they are kiddushin immediately for he certainly consents—and it is no worse than what will be explained, that where he revealed his mind that he desires to betroth her to a certain person and she betrothed herself to him, we are concerned for kiddushin—nevertheless, we do not say so; for while it is true that he desires the match, nevertheless it was his will that he himself should betroth her. And this that we are concerned for in a revelation of mind, this is when the father is there at the time of the receipt of the kiddushin. And according to this, where he betrothed her and the father is here at the time of the kiddushin, certainly we are concerned for the kiddushin and they are kiddushin of doubt.

And there is one who says that when he has performed a shiddukh, we are always concerned for kiddushin, and so it appears to me from the words of the Rambam, who did not mention shiddukh at all; and it can be said that he holds that without a shiddukh there is no concern for kiddushin at all, and with a shiddukh it is a case of doubtful kiddushin even if she received the kiddushin not in the presence of the father, and where he consented at the time of the act according to the Rambam. According to the rest of the poskim, even if he consented afterward, it is certain kiddushin even without a shiddukh. However, in the Tur and the Shulchan Arukh, section 11, it is explained according to the first opinion. Nevertheless, in practice, one should be stringent, for there are those who say that even if the father heard and remained silent and did not protest, it is as if he consented, and although most poskim disagree on this and all the great authorities agreed that specifically with explicit consent it is kiddushin, there are also those of our teachers, the Rishonim, who hold that when the father is far away, one must certainly be concerned lest he consented. If so, all the more so one should be stringent where he performed a shiddukh in any case, to say that it is doubtful kiddushin. And there is one of the Rishonim who holds regarding a ketannah like the Rambam, that even subsequent consent does not avail even where he performed a shiddukh, and regarding a naarah, even where he did not perform a shiddukh and even if he did not explicitly consent when he heard but rather remained silent and did not protest, it is complete kiddushin, and we have not found a companion for him among all the poskim. Nevertheless, regarding a naarah, there are those who are stringent to require her to have a get and to announce that the get is only a mere stringency. And why must they announce? So that they should not say she is a completely divorced woman and kiddushin does not take effect with her sister. Thus far his words.

Regarding a minor who was betrothed without the knowledge of her father in a case where we have said that it is not a betrothal—she does not even require mi'un. However, a minor, and all the more so a naarah, who was betrothed without the knowledge of her father and also married without knowledge, several of our teachers agreed that she requires a get and also mi'un in the case of a minor; and the mi'un is in order to publicize that the get is not a complete get, so that they should not say that betrothal does not take effect with her sister, and consequently, in the case of a naarah, she requires a public announcement as I wrote in the previous section. Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, ruled in section 11 that even if she married, her law is the same as if she were only betrothed, and so wrote the Tur; and the Rambam did not mention this law at all [and I wonder at the Yam Shel Shelomo chapter 2, section 9, see there and examine closely], and it appears that he did not have the version of this law in the Gemara at all [and this is the intent of the Beit Yosef, and the Beit Shmuel wondered in subsection 14 in vain]. And the reasoning of the poskim who hold that if she was betrothed and married without knowledge it is worse than if she were only betrothed, is that since the father remained silent regarding both matters, she becomes like an orphan during the lifetime of the father, or that he renounced the right that he has in her, or his silence is an admission; for granted, if she were only betrothed, it could be said that he is angry and remains silent because of this, but he would not remain silent to such an extent [Ran]. And this is only when the father is in the city or near it, but when he is far away, there is another law for this and it will be explained before us [and so it is in the Gemara: she was betrothed without knowledge and married without knowledge and her father is here, see there 45b].

A minor who was betrothed without the knowledge of her father, and the father did not hear of it at all or he is in a distant place, and in the meantime the daughter reached majority such that she left the authority of the father and remained silent and did not protest the kiddushin, if he had relations after she reached majority, it is obvious that she is a completely forbidden married woman in all respects, for he certainly had relations for the sake of kiddushin since he knows that the kiddushin of a minor are nothing; and even if he did not designate witnesses for his relations, nevertheless, since the matter is public, it is as if there are witnesses. However, if it is explicit that he had relations not for the sake of kiddushin, it is relations of zenut [Responsa of the Rashba], but we do not suspect him of this [ibid.]. And even if he did not have relations after she reached majority, nevertheless she is a doubtful married woman, for her silence upon her majority is like an admission of the kiddushin, and it is not similar to the silence of a father where he might be angry, for regarding her this does not apply. And this is like an orphan who was betrothed by her mother, where when she grows up the kiddushin grow with her even if he did not have relations, and it is according to the law a case of doubtful kiddushin as will be explained in siman 155. And even though some say it is not similar to there, for there it is at least kiddushin by rabbinic law, whereas here when her father is alive it is not so, nevertheless according to the law she is a doubtful married woman, and especially according to what will be explained that when the father is in a distant place, some say that there are kiddushin even in her minority which are rabbinic kiddushin like an orphan. However, even if the father is here and remained silent and she reached majority and did not protest, it is according to the law a case of doubtful kiddushin, and so ruled our teacher, the Rema, in section 11.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote in section 12: A minor girl who betrothed herself to someone regarding whom the father revealed his mind that he desired to betroth her to him—we are concerned that perhaps he consented. Thus far their words. And it must be said that this deals with a case where it was in his presence and he revealed his mind that he desired that she receive the kiddushin, or even not in his presence in such a case where he specified that his will is that she receive the kiddushin; for if not so, what is the advantage over one who arranged a shidduch, which is not effective as written in section 15? And the Tur concludes that it is kiddushin as long as he did not arrange a shidduch with another and went to the trouble of returning to arrange a shidduch for her to a second. Thus far his words. And the Tur holds that the reason we are concerned that perhaps he consented is not because it is as if he made her an agent to receive the kiddushin; for if so, how can he retract? Behold, she acted on his agency and received the kiddushin, and a person's agent is like himself according to the one who holds that in such a case agency is effective even with a minor girl, as will be explained. Rather, the Tur holds that he did not object to her reception, but these are not complete kiddushin, and therefore when he arranged a shidduch with another, the kiddushin she received were nullified. And our teacher, the Beit Yosef, omitted this because he holds that the reason is that she becomes like his agent, and immediately when she received the kiddushin he cannot retract [see Chelkat Mechokek subsection 23 and Beit Shmuel subsection 24, and according to what I wrote all is well, and from Kiddushin 45b there is no proof at all, for there he did not reveal his mind that he desired that she receive the kiddushin, see there and examine carefully].

If she was betrothed with her father's consent and married without her father's consent, if the father comes and protests—her marriage is nullified and her status is that of an erusa. Therefore, in all the laws that exist between an erusa and a nesua, such as inheriting from her when she dies, for in the case of a nesua the husband inherits from his wife and in the case of an erusa he does not inherit from her; and similarly, if he was a kohen, he contracts tumah for his nesua and does not contract tumah for his erusa; and similarly there is a difference regarding the ketubah and burial. If she married without her father's consent, even though the father himself betrothed her and she is an eshet ish according to the Torah, nevertheless the law of a nesua does not apply to her, whether her father is here or whether he went to a distant land, for they are not fully married since it is within the father's power to protest. And some say that even if the father died before she married and she married after his death, her status is not that of a fully nesua, since the kiddushin are according to the Torah and her marriage is not from the Torah, and it is worse than the kiddushin and marriage of an orphan. However, Rabbeinu Tam, of blessed memory, already disagreed with this view and said that since the father died and there is no longer a concern that he will come and protest, it is a full marriage; and she is not under the authority of the brothers and they cannot protest like the father, for a person does not bequeath the rights of his daughter to his sons, and it is a full marriage and the husband inherits from her.

There are some of the early Geonim who said that just as the sages instituted kiddushin and nisuin by means of the mother and the brothers for a minor orphan, or by means of herself alone as is written in siman 155, so too they instituted for one who went to distant lands and left his home that the mother or brothers can betroth her to whomever they see that the matter is proper before them. And these are kiddushin and nisuin derabbanan, and when she leaves him she requires miun like all minor orphans, and when she grows up and did not perform miun, the kiddushin grew up with her. And if the father comes even during her minority, she does not require other kiddushin for her kiddushin are good kiddushin derabbanan, unless he wishes to make them kiddushin from the Torah he may do so, but they shall not say the blessings for they are in vain since they already blessed for her from the institution of the sages [it appears to me]. And that which they said in the Shas regarding a minor who was betrothed without her father's knowledge that they are not kiddushin at all and do not even require miun – this is when the father is here or near her, and not when he is in distant lands. And there are those who explain the matter that this is when he left his home empty and because of distress he left his home, for certainly it is pleasing to him in this that his wife did to betroth their daughter to one suitable for her, and it is simple if his wife is a woman of valor that he relies upon her in all her actions that then this minor is like an orphan during the father's lifetime; but if he is a merchant and traveled to distant lands to trade and stayed there a long time, certainly it is not his will that they betroth her without his knowledge [Mordechai].

But there are some of our teachers who disagree with all of these matters, for we do not find this enactment in the Gemara; on the contrary, in the entire sugya of a minor who was betrothed without her father's knowledge, where there are many difficulties and discussions, how could the Shas have omitted to say that it refers to a case where the father is in a distant place and she has permission to be betrothed? Therefore, they ruled that these are not kiddushin and she does not even require mi'un upon leaving him. However, nevertheless, one should not forbid her to him or remove her from him, for this is not like an act of zenut, and she is not considered a single woman to him since she is with him by way of kiddushin and marriage. Furthermore, even if the father came and protested the kiddushin, nevertheless, as long as he did not betroth her to another—she is permitted to remain with him and his cohabitation is not an act of zenut. And if she remained with him until she grew up and he cohabited with her in her adulthood—the kiddushin are finalized and they are Torah kiddushin, provided the father did not receive kiddushin from another during her minority. But when he did not cohabit with her in her adulthood—they are not even a doubt of kiddushin, and it is not similar to what was written in section 18, see there, for here, as soon as the father protested, her kiddushin were completely nullified. And if the father betrothed her to another before she grew up—we remove her from the first and hand her over to the second. And it appears that she does not require a get from the first; however, from the words of our teacher, the Rema, in section 14, it is explained that she requires a get from him, and it is possible that his reason is because of appearances, for everyone saw how she was with him for a long time as husband and wife, and there would be rumors if she left without a get. And our teacher, the Rema, wrote that regarding the law, one should be stringent like the first opinion.

And there are some of our teachers who added further to say that, on the contrary, when her father is in a distant place it is worse than when he is here, and we do not allow her to sit under him because there is a concern that perhaps he accepted kiddushin on her behalf and she is a married woman. But the great ones among our teachers did not agree with him, for if so, if her father died in a distant place she would be forbidden all her days; rather, certainly we do not concern ourselves with this, for we establish her in her status of being unattached and we do not concern ourselves that perhaps he betrothed her, just like the wife of a kohen whose husband is in a distant place and she eats terumah by Torah law and we do not concern ourselves that perhaps he died, for we establish him in his status of being alive. And so too here, at every moment she is permitted to the one to whom they betrothed her, for at every moment we establish her in her status of being unattached, and on the contrary, there are those who say exactly the opposite—that whenever her father is in a distant place, if she betrothed herself to another it is a case of uncertain kiddushin by Torah law, for we concern ourselves that perhaps if the father heard he would be pleased and she would be uncertainly betrothed, for that which the sages, of blessed memory, said that we do not concern ourselves that perhaps the father was pleased, that is when he is here and not when he is in a distant place. And according to this opinion, she would not leave even with mi'un but only with a get, however most of the poskim do not hold so, as we have explained.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 14: It happened that one who divorced his wife and agreed with her that she would care for his daughters to sustain them, raise them, and marry them off, and she did so, and the father came and protested the marriage of his minor daughters, and they ruled that if he commanded her to marry them off and raise them, what she did is done and he cannot protest, provided that he commanded this before witnesses, for an agent for receiving [kiddushin] requires witnesses as was written above in siman 35; but if he said that she should have the power to marry them off when they grow up and she married them off in their minority—there is nothing in her actions and he can protest, for she deviated from what he commanded her. Thus far his words. And even when he did not protest, there are no kiddushin here at all even according to those who are stringent in an ordinary case, since she violated his words, and she leaves even without me'un according to all opinions. But when he said to raise them and marry them off, we do not say that his intention was to marry them off in their adulthood, but rather he said two things to her—to raise them, meaning to bring them up, and also to marry them off even in their minority; and it appears to me that this is because he said three things—to sustain them as well, as was written, but if he only said to raise them and marry them off, it is possible to say that his intention was to marry them off only in their adulthood, and therefore it would be a case of doubtful kiddushin. And one should not ask that even though he made her an agent for receiving the kiddushin, why should we not concern ourselves that perhaps he cancelled her agency before she betrothed them? For it can be said that certainly if he claims this we concern ourselves with it, and although we do not believe him with certainty, nevertheless they are only doubtful kiddushin; however, in this incident he did not claim this, but rather that he protests now, and he does not have the power to protest as they ruled, and it has already been explained in siman 35 that even in agency without witnesses one should be stringent, except that with witnesses they are complete kiddushin.

Just as the father can betroth her himself, so too can he betroth her through his agent, except that it is a greater mitzvah through himself than through his agent, as was written in siman 35. And likewise, he can betroth her through herself, and thus our sages, of blessed memory, said: A man may say to his minor daughter, "Go out and receive your kiddushin," and all the more so a naarah. And all the previous laws that were explained—that when she received kiddushin without his knowledge and he consented, it is kiddushin as was written—follow this path: that she has the capacity to receive the kiddushin with her father's will, for if not so, of what use is his consent.

However, the reason for this matter must be explained: why is her acceptance effective through his command? It is understandable regarding a na'arah, for she is his agent to receive the kiddushin, but regarding a ketanah, she is not subject to the laws of agency, so what benefit is there in her acceptance? There are some of our teachers who hold that, in truth, this is not by way of agency; rather, when he says to her, "Go out and receive your kiddushin," it is as if he is giving her his right that the Torah granted him to receive kiddushin for her, and she may receive kiddushin from whomever she desires [Rashba], and all of his authority is removed from her and she is in her own domain like a gedolah. And even though a ketanah does not have the legal capacity to acquire for herself, it has already been explained in Choshen Mishpat siman 243 that through the intent of another who grants possession, a katan has the legal capacity to acquire [Tosafot ibid.]. And according to this opinion, that this is not by way of agency but rather a removal of authority from her, he does not need to say it to her in the presence of witnesses, but even between him and her [and the Rema in section 7 does not hold of this reason].

And some of our teachers maintain another reason for this, that just as a woman who said "Give to my dog and I will be betrothed to you" or "Give upon the rock and I will be betrothed to you" and the rock is hers—when he gave, it is kiddushin, so too this ketannah is no less than a dog or a rock [Ra'avad and Ramban]. And even though there she said this to the one performing the kiddushin and here the father did not speak at all with the one performing the kiddushin, nevertheless, since he said to her "Accept your kiddushin," it is as if he said "Whoever gives to you, I consider it as if he gave to me," and this is as if he said to the one performing the kiddushin "Give to my daughter and she shall be betrothed to you." And this opinion maintains regarding the rock and the dog that by his giving upon the rock or to the dog she is betrothed to him by this alone, as is written in siman 30 section 26, see there; and they do not maintain as is written there in section 27 that he must afterwards give into her lap, for according to this opinion what benefit would her acceptance provide? And also this opinion does not maintain that the rock is by reason of chatzer as is written there and that the daughter is also by the law of chatzer, for if so, the father would need to stand at her side according to the law of chatzer, which requires that it be guarded by his knowledge or that he stand at the side of the chatzer [and see what I wrote in section 32]. Rather, they maintain the reason of arvut as is written there in section 28, that this is like "Give a maneh to so-and-so," see there, and here too they touched upon it from the law of arvut. According to this, even if he commanded the one performing the kiddushin to give to another ketannah who is not his daughter and that by this his daughter shall be betrothed to him—it would also be kiddushin [Beit Shmuel, subsection 7]. However, the reason of arvut would only suffice for kiddushin of money and not for kiddushin of a shetar, and indeed some say so, that this law applies only to kiddushin of money [see Ran, first chapter, starting with the words "He wrote"]. But there is another reason for this, that it is as if it reached his hand, and this is like what he said: "Whoever gives to you, I consider it as if he gave to me" [Beit Shmuel]. And most of the poskim do not maintain this reasoning [this is the approach of the Tosafot Rid, that even regarding a get this is effective in such a case; see Avnei Miluim, subsection 3, who also wrote thus, and one must further study the Beit Shmuel; and according to this opinion, indeed, this law does not apply to a shetar, and so it appears from the wording of the Ra'avad brought in the Rosh, first chapter, section 15, see there; but in the Baraita there, a shetar is also explicitly mentioned, and it seems to me that they maintain like the Tosafot Rid, and this is the difficulty of the Rosh there as the Ran wrote, and examine it closely].

And there are some of our teachers who said that this entire law is due to the principle of shlichut. And even though there is no shlichut for a minor, this is when one performs shlichut through him to acquire for another; for the exclusion of a minor from shlichut is because "man" is written regarding all matters of shlichut, such as with a get, terumah, and Pesach, and this is specifically to acquire for another through his shlichut. However, regarding the kiddushin of a minor girl where she acquires for herself through the shlichut of her father, her shlichut for herself is effective as if her father received the kiddushin for her, for a minor possesses the power of acquisition when there is the mind of another transferring it to him [the Rosh there]. And so it is implied from the wording of the Rambam in chapter 3, law 14, that this law is based on the principle of shlichut. And this is not a wonder that a minor is included in the principle of shlichut, for in truth this is not complete shlichut but rather a type of acquisition, and behold, acquisition is also related to shlichut. Nevertheless, a minor acquires through the mind of another who transfers it to him, and here too the father grants her the kiddushin and makes her a shaliach so that she may acquire for herself. And this reason almost amounts to the reason we wrote in section 26 [and proof for this is that the Rosh himself in siman 25 on this matter wrote like the words of the Tosafot and combined them with his previous words in siman 15, see there; and according to this, what the Beit Shmuel wrote—that according to the Rambam and the Rosh a minor becomes a shaliach for anything that is for his benefit—is gone, see there; and according to what I wrote, this is only regarding acquisition for himself, and examine this closely]. And according to the reason of shlichut, he must say it to her before witnesses, for shlichut for reception requires witnesses as is written in siman 35. However, even without witnesses one should be stringent as is written there. And if it is revealed to all that she is preparing herself for the chupah and to receive her kiddushin, and the father is also occupied with the preparation, this itself is like saying it before witnesses [as is implied in the Rivash, siman 479]. And there is no difference in all this between a naarah and a minor girl, and so is the primary ruling. And even though there are those who disagree and say that a minor daughter cannot receive her kiddushin but rather the father himself must receive them, and only with a naarah is it within the father's power to tell her to receive the kiddushin, nevertheless, the halacha is not so, and the vast majority of the poskim do not hold so. And so it is explained from several sugyot of the Shas [see Beit Shmuel subsection 8, and certainly according to this opinion all the sugyot refer to a naarah, as the Ran wrote according to the words of the Ramban, and that of Rav Nachman on page 19a is specifically according to Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda].

Nevertheless, since there are those who disagree regarding a minor, our teacher, the Rema, wrote that in order to remove oneself from dispute, the father should hold the hand of the minor at the time she receives the kiddushin, or he should stand next to her when she receives them, for it is as if he received them himself. Thus far his words. And this way is better even according to the one who holds that a minor has the power to receive her own kiddushin, rather the reason is because she is like the courtyard of the father, and as was written in section 27, he must also stand next to her as was written there; and according to the reason of "courtyard," it is effective even for kiddushin of a document [and in section 32 we cast doubt on this]. Our teacher, the Rema, concludes that this is more preferable than if he were to receive them himself, for behold, there are those who say it is forbidden to betroth his minor daughter, as will be explained shortly. Thus far his words. For the prohibition is lest this be against her will, but when it is her will to be betrothed, there is no prohibition [see Beit Shmuel, subsection 11], and consequently, when she receives them herself, behold, her will is in this.

What is the wording of the kiddushin? When the ketannah receives the kiddushin by the command of the father, he says to her, "Behold, you are betrothed to me," and he can also say, "Your daughter is betrothed to me" if the father is standing next to her, even though he gives her the kiddushin, for the power is from the father. And even if her father is not next to her and he said, "Your daughter is betrothed to me" – it is kiddushin, for she stands in place of her father, and even though there is one who hesitates regarding this, and certainly the wording is not proper, nevertheless, there is no hindrance to the kiddushin in this. And all the more so when the father said to the one betrothing, "Give my daughter the kiddushin money and she shall be betrothed to you," for then according to all opinions she is permitted to receive her kiddushin not in the presence of the father, for when he says to her "your daughter is betrothed to me" it is kiddushin, for it refers back to his command to him. And if the father receives the kiddushin of his daughter, it is obvious that he must say "your daughter is betrothed to me" and not another wording when she is a ketannah or a naarah. However, if she is a bogeret and the father is her agent, he can also say "Behold, you are betrothed to me," for one speaks with the agent as with the principal, for a person's agent is like himself. However, certainly this is not proper wording at all, and there are those who hesitate in all this when the wording is not correct.

And regarding kiddushin by document, when she receives it during her minority or her girlhood according to the one who holds that she is also permitted to receive kiddushin by document by her father's command, the one performing the kiddushin must write in the document specifically "your daughter is betrothed to me," and at the time he gives it to her, he says to her "behold you are betrothed to me." However, to write in the document "behold you are betrothed to me" is not correct, for just as with a get via a messenger one must write in the get in the name of the woman, so too regarding the kiddushin of a minor where the father is the one who delivers her for kiddushin, one must write specifically in his name [Ran], and our teacher, the Rema, ruled accordingly. However, there are some of our teachers for whom it is obvious that even in a document, if he wrote "behold you are betrothed to me," it is complete kiddushin [Ramban], for it is not similar to a get via a messenger where the messenger has no connection to the get; whereas in kiddushin, on the contrary, she is the primary one, except that the Torah gave authority to the father. In practice, this opinion appears to be the primary one [see the Gra, subsection 22], and also our teacher, the Rema, only ruled thus ab initio, for he concluded his words that if he deviated in these matters, she is betrothed. Thus far his words. And if he performs kiddushin with a document and the father receives the document, if she is a minor or a girl, he must write "your daughter is betrothed to me," and if she is a bogeret and the father is her messenger, he must write specifically "behold you are betrothed to me" so that he speaks with her as with a get, and if he deviated, it is not kiddushin; and when he delivers the document to the father, he should say "your daughter is betrothed to me" [Bach, subsection 10]. However, some say that even with a minor, if he wrote in the document "behold you," it is also kiddushin [ibid. in the name of the Re'em], and so it appears to be the primary view. Nevertheless, as a matter of law, one should be stringent regarding kiddushin in accordance with all the opinions.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 7 that when they send young daughters to another place and the father is not with them when they receive the kiddushin, since he prepared her to enter the huppah and for kiddushin, it is as if they are holding her hand at the time of receipt. Thus far his words. And it is no worse than if he consented prior to the kiddushin, which according to everyone constitutes kiddushin [the Gra]. And this is only if she is betrothed with money, but with a document the matter is difficult if not for the reason of agency, for according to the reason of "courtyard" we require that he stand next to her as is written in section 29, and even this is not settled, for behold it is a courtyard guarded without his knowledge when she is awake and not asleep, and she is also a "walking courtyard" [Makneh], and explicitly we say in the Shas [44b] that she does not have the status of a courtyard for this reason, [and see there in the Rif and delve into it].

Our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, wrote in section 8: It is a mitzvah that one should not betroth his daughter while she is a ketanah until she grows up and says, "I want so-and-so." And there are those who say that we are accustomed in this time to betroth our daughters who are ketanot because we are in exile and we do not always have sufficient means for the needs of a dowry; also, we are few in number and do not always find a suitable match, and such is the custom. Thus far their words. However, in our time, we do not betroth ketanot, and we have never heard of anyone who betroths a ketanah. And this is proper, for in the Shas [41a] it is stated that it is forbidden to betroth her while she is a ketanah, and granted that when she consents there is no prohibition [Chelkat Mechokek]—nevertheless, this is not proper, and such is the simple custom in our time in our lands.

A father who gave permission to his agent to betroth his daughter, and he himself went and betrothed her to one person and his agent betrothed her to another—whichever of them preceded, those are the kiddushin. And if it is not known which preceded—she is forbidden to both of them and requires a get from both of them. And if they desired, one gives a get and one enters into marriage, and she requires new kiddushin, for perhaps the kiddushin of the other preceded and the kiddushin did not take effect, as I wrote in siman 36, section 9 regarding the agency of the woman. And likewise, if the betrothers are relatives of prohibited relations to one another, she is absolutely forbidden to both of them, as I wrote there.

If after he sent a messenger to receive the kiddushin of his daughter, he appointed another messenger to receive her kiddushin and did not explicitly cancel the first mission, and each of the messengers went and received kiddushin on her behalf – she requires a get from both of them even if we knew who received them first, because it is a doubt whether his intention was to cancel the mission of the first or not. And there is one who says that if it is known that the kiddushin of the second preceded, she does not require a get from the first in any case, for if he canceled the mission of the first, behold his kiddushin are nothing, and even if he did not cancel it but rather thought perhaps the first would not find someone who would betroth her to him, and behold since those of the second preceded, the first indeed did not find anyone and automatically the kiddushin of the second took effect [Bach]. However, it can be said that he only appointed the second as a messenger on the condition that the first would not find anyone at all, but if he finds someone even after the act of the second, the act of the first shall be upheld and not that of the second, and according to this the doubt returns as before [Chelkat Mechokek subsection 16], and one should not reject this by saying that if we state this reasoning, then regarding what was explained that if he himself betrothed her before his messenger that his take effect and not those of the messenger, let us also say that he did not betroth her himself unless the messenger would not find anyone at all, but when he finds someone the messenger's shall take effect, for it can be said that against his own act we do not state this reasoning [Beit Shmuel subsection 13]. And even if the second did not betroth her at all but only the first – it is a case of doubtful kiddushin, lest he canceled his mission [ibid.]. And one should not say why regarding messengers for a get, even if he appointed several messengers, we do not say that he canceled the previous ones as written in siman 141, for it is not comparable, as there all the messengers are for one matter – to receive a get from a specific person, and so too here if all the messengers are for one man to receive kiddushin from him we do not say that he cancels the mission, but here he appointed the messengers to receive kiddushin generally from whomever they see fit and perforce it is impossible that they all be messengers [ibid.]. And know, that this law of two messengers applies also to a man who appointed two messengers to betroth on his behalf, or a woman who appointed two messengers to receive kiddushin on her behalf, for these doubts also exist as to whether they canceled the mission of the first or not.

A daughter in her bogrut leaves the authority of her father, and the time of her bogrut is six months after the days of her naarut, which begin when she has brought two hairs at the completion of twelve full years; from then she is called a naarah until six full months have passed. The Rambam wrote in the second chapter of Ishut that from the beginning of the day the six months are completed and onward she is called a bogeret. Thus far his words. It is implied from his words that in less than six months she can never reach the days of her bogrut, and several of our teachers agreed, and so it is proven according to our versions in the Shas [Kiddushin 79a and Ketubot 39a]. There are some of our teachers who hold that sometimes even in less than six months she becomes a bogeret when she brings signs of bogrut [Rashi], and they also hold that that which the sages said [Niddah 47a] regarding signs of the breasts, they are signs of bogrut. There is a dispute there and the halacha was decided in the Gemara there that the halacha is like the words of all of them to be stringent, that whichever of the signs she brings, she is a safek bogeret. However, the Rambam, of blessed memory, holds there in halacha 7 that all of them are signs of naarut, and regarding bogrut he did not write signs at all, and according to his words there is no doubt in the world regarding bogrut. But all of our teachers disagree with him, and so is the version before us in the Gemara [ibid.] and in the Tosefta of Niddah [chapter 6] that there is a dispute regarding signs of bogrut, and so wrote the Rif, of blessed memory, in the thirteenth chapter of Yevamot [and it is a great difficulty on the Maggid Mishneh there who wrote that such is in the Halachot, see there], and according to this there is a doubt regarding bogrut as well, and all of this is a practical difference for the law that will be explained before us with the help of Heaven.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote in section 5: If her father betrothed her in the morning and she betrothed herself in the evening, and both occurred on the day that completed the six months of the days of naarut, and they examined her and found her to be a bogeret—we maintain her status as a bogeret and the kiddushin of the father are nothing. And there is one who says that this is even if she does not contradict him by saying that the signs appeared in the morning. And there is one who says that specifically if she contradicts him, but if she does not contradict him, she requires a get from both of them. Thus far their words. And the explanation of the matters: For our teachers hold that on this day when the six months are completed for her, she can bring signs of bagrut in the morning or in the evening, and on that day she has neither a chazakah of naarut nor a chazakah of bagrut, and it is not necessary to say that if the father received the kiddushin in the morning and she did not receive them at all that there is no substance to the kiddushin of the father, for we establish her in the chazakah of being unmarried; but even if she also received kiddushin in the evening, such that in any case she is a married woman, nevertheless, since she now has signs of bagrut, we do not concern ourselves with the kiddushin of the father, and we say that since she is now a bogeret, in the morning she was also a bogeret. And we do not follow a stringency in this to say that in any case it is a doubt, because we follow the present, and this itself is like a chazakah to follow the present time and to say that since it is so now, presumably it was also so previously when there is no other chazakah contradicting it. And so it is proven in the Gemara, and furthermore, it is common for the signs to come in the morning.

And according to this, if she herself received kiddushin in the morning without her father's knowledge, and her father did not receive kiddushin at all, and in the evening she is found to be a bogeret—it is possible to say that they are only a case of doubtful kiddushin, and we do not say that we should follow the present status; for on the contrary, let us follow her status of being an unmarried woman and say that it is only now that she brought signs and not in the morning [and so wrote the Beit Shmuel]. However, according to the reason we wrote, that they usually come in the morning—even in such a case it would be kiddushin [and see Yam Shel Shlomo chapter 4, siman 17, and there is a printing error there].

And all this that we have written is according to the first opinion, that even if she does not say clearly that she brought the simanim in the morning, we also follow the present state; nevertheless, if she says clearly that she did not bring them in the morning – we are concerned for her words and it is a case of doubtful kiddushin, and such is the primary ruling. For even though by law we follow the present state for the reasons that have been explained, nevertheless, since she claims with certainty against this, how could we not be concerned for her words? For a claim of certainty is a significant claim, and only against a presumption of monetary possession do we not account for a claim of certainty; and all the more so regarding a stringency, how could we not be concerned for a claim of certainty. And also the father, if he were to claim with certainty that she did not bring simanim in the morning, we would certainly be concerned for his words. And the language of "contradiction" written by the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch does not mean that this one claims thus and that one claims thus, for certainly for everyone it is a doubt; and they employed the language of the Gemara regarding that which we do not rule accordingly according to this opinion. And the second opinion holds that this is not a complete presumption to follow the present state, and it is a doubt, unless she claims with certainty that she brought the simanim in the morning, for then it is like a complete presumption; but when she does not claim with certainty, we follow the stringency.

And know that the Rambam, of blessed memory, omitted all these laws, and his reason appears to me to be that he follows his consistent view which we wrote in section 36, that there are no signs in a bogerut, and there is no doubt in the matter that from the beginning of the day she is a bogerut, as he wrote explicitly at the beginning of chapter 2. According to this, all the legal deliberation in this matter is set aside, for it is impossible to be any other way. He holds that in this very point they disagree in the Gemara there, and the halacha was ruled accordingly [to explain that which Rava said, "Since she is now a bogerut etc.," it is not because of some reason, but rather that the truth is so; meaning, since she is now a bogerut, which is the day that the six months are completed, perforce in the morning she was also a bogerut. And Shmuel does not hold so. And the difficulty of Tosafot in the heading starting "And Shmuel" is answered, for all the legal deliberation of the sugya is according to Shmuel and not according to Rava, and therefore the Gemara was required at the end of the sugya to rule like Rava, see there. And everything that they questioned against the Rambam, of blessed memory, is answered].

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch further wrote in section 6 that if within the six months of naarut her father betrothed her without her knowledge and she betrothed herself without her father's knowledge and signs were found on her, it is a doubt and she requires a get from both of them. Thus far their words. And this law is only according to the one who holds that even within six months she can reach bagrut as I have written, but according to the one who does not hold so, this law is not relevant at all. However, it can be said that according to everyone there is a place for this law, and we say that when one of the signs of her bagrut was found, she had been a naarah six months prior and we did not notice. And proof for this is that several of our teachers hold that there must necessarily be six months between naarut and bagrut [Tosafot Ketubot 39 and Kiddushin 79] no less and no more; if so, regarding that which the sages investigated concerning the signs of bagrut [Niddah 47, and the Tosafot hold like Rashi in this, see there], what doubt is there in this? Rather, the doubt is that when we found signs of bagrut, we say that in truth she brought signs of naarut six months prior to this, and even if there were not two hairs then, we say they fell out. But according to this, it is impossible for the doubt to be less than twelve years and six months, for before twelve years the signs of naarut are not effective. However, it appears explicitly that our teachers the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch hold that there can be signs of bagrut even within six months [like the system of Rashi, and what the Beit Shmuel wrote in subsection 5 that the Rif also holds so, according to what I wrote there is no proof].

And according to this, if within the six months her father betrothed her alone or she betrothed herself alone – it is also a case of doubtful kiddushin when a sign of the signs of bogrut is subsequently found on her, and the reason is that even though one could say regarding her father betrothing her alone that it is absolute kiddushin due to the chazakah of naarut that she has within this time, nevertheless, against this she has a chazakah of being unmarried. And when she betrothed herself alone, even though we should have said that they are not kiddushin at all since these two chazakot assist in nullifying the kiddushin, nevertheless it is doubtful kiddushin because the chazakah that we follow the present state contradicts these chazakot and these chazakot are weakened, just as we say regarding tumah that all cases of tumah are as at the time of their discovery, as the Rambam wrote in the eighteenth chapter of Avot HaTumot, see there [and Tosafot in Eruvin 35b hold that this is only for terumah and kodashim, but the Rambam does not hold so, and in Kiddushin there in the dispute of Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Nachman, and we rule like Rabbi Yehuda that we do not follow the present state, this is because of the chazakah of money that is against it as it says there according to Rav, see there; and the Rambam would explain that which it says there "but here shall we say establish the body etc." meaning that here a chazakah is not relevant for it is obvious that from the morning she was a bogeret as it is impossible to be otherwise, and examine this carefully].

The Rambam wrote in chapter 3, law 14: Any girl who is a doubtful bogeret, whether her father betrothed her alone or whether she betrothed herself—she is betrothed out of doubt; therefore, she requires a get out of doubt. Thus far his words. And the doubt is whether she is twelve years and six months old or not, or even if she is much older and there is a doubt if she brought two hairs prior to the six months, for according to the Rambam regarding the essence of bogerut there is no doubt here as I have written. And the reason she requires a get out of doubt and we do not establish her status based on a chazaka—such as if signs of bogerut are found on her now, and according to the Rambam there is no need for signs at all but rather that she reached the time of her bogerut—the reason we explained in the previous section. And if signs of naarut appeared on her a month or more after twelve years, we say that presumably at the completion of twelve years she also had signs of naarut, and consequently she is now a bogeret; and there are those who disagree on this [see Beit Shmuel, subsection 5].

Since according to most of the poskim, aside from the Rambam, there are signs of bagrut, it is necessary to explain them. We learn in Niddah [47a]: Our Rabbis taught, these are the signs of bagrut: Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Tzadok says, when the breasts become firm; Rabbi Yochanan ben Beroka says, when the tip of the nose becomes flat; Rabbi Yose says, when the crown encircles; Rabbi Shimon says, when the mound is depressed—and the halacha is according to all of their words to be stringent. And if she produced one of these signs but did not produce all of them, she is a doubtful bogeret [Rashi]. The Rif, of blessed memory, wrote in the thirteenth chapter of Yevamot that if she produced one of any of the signs and betrothed herself during the lifetime of her father—her betrothal is a valid betrothal and she requires a get, and her father cannot annul her vows; and if her father betrothed her without her knowledge, she requires a get. Thus far his words. And according to the Rambam, all of these are signs of naarut, as has been written.

One who betroths his daughter without specification, such as if he said to him, "My daughter is betrothed to you," and did not specify which of them, or if the one betrothing said to the father, "One of your daughters is betrothed to me," and similarly if the one betrothing said, "Your daughter is betrothed to me," and the father said, "One of my daughters is betrothed to you" – the bogerot are not included. Therefore, if he has only two daughters and one is a bogeret – the ketannah is betrothed. The reason the Sages, of blessed memory, said this is that it is not only necessary to say that if the bogeret did not give permission to the father to receive her kiddushin, for it is obvious that there is no concern regarding her since she is not in his hand to betroth her; but even if she gave him permission to receive her kiddushin, and even if she said that the kiddushin money should also be his – she is not included. For a person does not leave a mitzvah that is cast upon him, which are the ketannot and the naarot, and perform a mitzvah that is not cast upon him, for a bogeret is not cast upon him as she is not in his domain to betroth. And this is specifically when she made him an agent to receive kiddushin without specification and did not say "from so-and-so," but if she said "from so-and-so" and he received it from him – she is also possibly betrothed, and the rest of the bogerot are not included. And if he has two ketannot or more, and similarly naarot – they are all forbidden and they all require a get, and even though they are kiddushin that are not suitable for intercourse – we establish that they are kiddushin, as I wrote in siman 41.

And there is a question regarding this: why do we say that the bogurot are not included even when she made him an agent, because it is not a mitzvah cast upon him, whereas for ketanot it is a mitzvah cast upon him? On the contrary, it has already been explained that there is no mitzvah to betroth a ketanah, and there is even a slight prohibition as I wrote in section 33. And Jeremiah the prophet who said (29:6), "give your daughters to men," did not say this regarding ketanot, for he also said there, "and take wives for your sons," and the kiddushin of a katan is nothing and he is not under his father's authority for kiddushin; rather, its meaning refers to the exertion. And thus the sages, of blessed memory, explained in Ketubot [52b, and see Rashi, Kiddushin ibid. and it requires further study]. And regarding a bogeret, when she has made him an agent, there is certainly a mitzvah to betroth her, so how can we say that the bogurot are not included? Furthermore, it is not the way of people to marry off the younger before the elder, and Laban said so, so how can we say the opposite? And in truth, one of the great ones among our early teachers wanted to say that when he said "your daughter is betrothed to me," his intention was only for the eldest for the reason we explained [Rabbeinu Tam in Tosafot 52b], but the sages of his generation did not agree with him and he also did not rely on this in practice, and a reason is needed why [and the Ritva wrote that it does not refer to ketanot, and it requires further study how this is found, and examine it closely].

The answer to this is—since we see this man who betroths when he said plainly "your daughter is betrothed to me," or this father when he said plainly "my daughter is betrothed to you" and they did not specify the name of the daughter, they have departed from the category of ordinary people whose way is not to do so, and it is an act of madness not to mention which of the daughters he is betrothing to him. Perforce, we must descend to the depth of the Torah law according to what is understood from this language and not look at matters of common decency, for this man has departed from the category of common decency. Perforce, the minors and the naarot are included in this language, and we judge his language like the language of the verse, "I gave my daughter to the man," where the bogrot are not included, for the passage of the slanderer does not apply to bogrot. And since minors and naarot are included, even if we were to say that the bogrot are also included, he would have done her no favor, for it would be a betrothal that is not permitted for cohabitation. Therefore, we say that this man only intended that which the Torah gave him permission—those who are in his hand to betroth—and he did not think of the bogrot. However, when she made him an agent to receive betrothal from this man, it is obvious that his intention was also for her; therefore, she is also included, and all of them are forbidden and require a get. Nevertheless, other bogrot, if he has them, are not included and they are permitted for the reason we explained. We do not say that his intention was only for this bogret according to an assessment of his intent, since he departed from the category of people as I wrote, we have no assessment of intent regarding him [it appears to me]. And if he had a prior engagement with her, it will be explained before us with the help of Heaven.

The Tur wrote: If he betrothed his eldest daughter and he had other daughters, and the suitor said to him, "Your daughter is betrothed to me," and she had made him an agent to receive the kiddushin—his intent is not for the others and she is certainly betrothed with certain kiddushin. And even if he did not betroth her previously and he said to him, "Your eldest daughter is betrothed to me," and he has no daughters except from one wife—certainly his intent is for the eldest and she is certainly betrothed. Thus far his words. And there are those who disagree even in this case when he said plainly, "Your daughter is betrothed to me," for since he did not specify, we concern ourselves that perhaps his intent was for the one he did not betroth and it is a case of doubt, but in a case where he said "your eldest daughter," there is no one who disagrees, for this is explicitly specifying, unless he has two eldest daughters from two wives, as will be explained in section 54; see there.

It was taught in the Tosefta of Kiddushin: Two brothers who betrothed two sisters, this one does not know which one he betrothed and that one does not know which one he betrothed—both are forbidden due to the doubt. If they were occupied with the older sister for the older brother and the younger sister for the younger brother, I say—the older sister was only betrothed to the older brother and the younger sister was only betrothed to the younger brother. Thus far his words. We have learned from this that being occupied with that matter is considered like specifying, and even according to the one who disagrees regarding one who arranged a match as I have written, nevertheless, when they are occupied regarding this daughter and he betrothed without specification, it certainly is effective. And there are those who are stringent even in such a case and hold that the kiddushin take effect on all of them and they all require a get, for even if it is clear to us that the intention of the one betrothing was for the older sister, his thought does not nullify the speech that he uttered with his mouth, for matters of the heart are not matters since he changed the language from the common language that clarifies her kiddushin, and from the Tosefta there is no proof, for there it deals with a case where initially each one betrothed one of them specifically and now they became mixed up, and therefore we follow what they were occupied with initially, but in one who betrothed without specification, it is possible that we do not follow the assessment of their intention.

This is the opinion of our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, in section 16, who wrote: One who has two daughters, even if both are minors, and he betrothed one of them to someone, and after some time he received kiddushin from him and he said, "Your daughter, unspecified, is betrothed to me," even if they were occupied with that matter—both are forbidden to him and require a get from him. And even if he retracted within the time of a speech and specified "your daughter so-and-so"—it is of no avail. And in any such case where it is kiddushin that cannot lead to intimacy, we compel him to divorce. Thus far their words. [And the conclusion that the adults are not included requires further study, for it is redundant; see there].

And it appears to me to be a simple matter that what was written, that even being occupied with her does not avail, the intention is not being occupied with that very matter, for it is obvious that in such a case it avails, as even with silence she is betrothed when they are occupied with that very matter, as was written in siman 27; rather, it means that from a prior time they were occupied with the matter of her kiddushin. And it also appears to me that this point, that having arranged a match [shiddich] does not avail, this is when he arranged a match with mere speech, but if they wrote the shidduchin in a document of tenaim as is our custom and publicized the matter according to the custom—certainly his intent was for her and not for another, and nevertheless in practice the matter requires further study since our teachers were very stringent in this matter. And also that which they wrote, that a retraction does not avail even within the time of a continuous utterance [toch kedei dibbur], this is when he explains that his intention was for a specific woman and he did not stumble with his tongue when he spoke generally but only explains his intention; but if he said that he stumbled with his tongue and wanted to say "your daughter so-and-so" but only erred with his tongue—certainly he is believed to say within toch kedei dibbur that he erred [Chelkat Mechokek subsection 36]. [And with what I wrote regarding being occupied with that matter, that which the Beit Shmuel labored over in subsection 9 is well-settled, and what the Ran wrote as a proof from the law of being occupied, he wrote it as a proof and not that it deals with such a case, and so it appears from the language of the Mordechai at the beginning of Kiddushin and brought in the Beit Yosef, see there and examine carefully].

There is one who says that if Reuven said to Shimon, "One of your daughters is betrothed to me," and afterward said that he betroths based on the mind of the father, that whichever daughter the father desires, that one he betroths, and the father said, "To this one I intended"—he is believed. And it appears to me that all of them are forbidden; and it is not only necessary to say if he spoke indefinitely and afterward explained his intention, for that would be "matters of the heart" and is worse than all that has been explained, but even if he said at the time of the act, "One of your daughters is betrothed to me—the one that you desire," and the father said, "This one I desired," it is also "matters of the heart." Furthermore, there is a concern of bereirah in this, and even without this, our sages, of blessed memory, were stringent even regarding adult daughters when she made him an agent, and the poskim were stringent also regarding a shidduch, and how is it possible to be lenient in this.

Reuven who betrothed one of his daughters, specified by her name, to a minor, and afterwards Shimon came and said, "one of your daughters is betrothed to me," some say that even this one who was betrothed to the minor is also included in the prohibition because the betrothal of a minor is not a betrothal. And some say that only those who are completely unattached are included in this, but anyone who has the name of betrothal upon her, even though according to the law this is not a betrothal, nevertheless she is not included in the doubt, and so it appears primary. And also the Beit Yosef did not write it as the law, but only regarding the responsa of the Rosh, see there, and the versions are not precise as is proven there.

One who has two groups of daughters from two wives, in a manner where the eldest of this one and the eldest of that one are not equal in years, and likewise the youngest of this one and the youngest of that one are not equal in years—such as if he married the second after the first had already given birth, or the first died before the marriage of the second [and this is the intent of Rashi 64a]—and all the daughters are still minors or maidens such that all of them are under the authority of the father to betroth them: if he said to the betrother, "I have betrothed one of my daughters to you," all of them are forbidden. And if he said, "I have betrothed my eldest daughter to you," if he said so at the time of the betrothal, even though there are doubts regarding this phrasing as well—for it could be interpreted as the eldest of his first wife, who is the eldest of the eldest, and it could be interpreted as the eldest of the second, who is the eldest of the youngest, and it could also be interpreted as the youngest of the first if she is older than the eldest of the second, such as if the eldest of the second was born after the youngest of the first and he calls her "eldest" relative to the daughters of the second, and in this doubt are included all the daughters of the first who are all older relative to the daughters of the second—nevertheless, the sages of blessed memory said [ibid.] that all of them are permitted except for the eldest of the eldest, who is the eldest of the first. And the reason is that a person does not place himself into a state of doubt by saying something that would lead him to a question for the sages; and when he said "eldest," he meant the eldest of the eldest [Rashi].

And so too if he said, "I betrothed to you my minor daughter," and I do not know if it is the minor of the minors, who is the minor of the second [wife], or the minor of the adults, who is the minor of the first [wife], and if the adult of the minors, who is smaller than the minor of the adults—all of them are permitted except for the minor of the second, who is the minor of the minors, because of the reason that will be explained. And all of this deals with a case where at the time he betrothed the adult or the minor to him, it was clear to him whom he betrothed, but afterwards he forgot; and for this we say that he certainly intended the adult of the adults and the minor of the minors, for a person does not place himself into a state of doubt by mentioning the term "adult" unless it is the adult of them all, so that if the matter is forgotten, it will not be in doubt, and so too with the minor. And so our sages, of blessed memory, inferred from the language of the Mishnah that it deals with such a case. And so it is explained from the wording of the Rambam, of blessed memory, who wrote that at the time of the kiddushin he said to the husband, "I betrothed to you my adult daughter," even though one could say perhaps it is the adult of the adults or the adult of the minors etc.—all of them are permitted except for the adult of the adults. Thus far his words. And it implies explicitly that the doubt fell afterwards. And so one must interpret the wording of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 17, who wrote: and he said to the betrother at the time of the kiddushin, "I betrothed to you my adult daughter," and he does not know etc. Thus far his words. That is to say, that now he does not know. And according to this, the matter is simple: that even if the betrother says that his intention then was for another, he is not believed.

And if at the time of the kiddushin, when he said "I have betrothed my elder daughter to you," and they ask him which elder one and he says "I did not know, and I spoke without specification," from the perspective of logic it is clear that all of them are forbidden, since he himself does not know whom he betrothed. However, from the sugya of the Shas ibid., which poses a challenge to the one who says kiddushin that cannot lead to sexual relations is not kiddushin from this Mishnah of Rabbi Meir—who forbids all the daughters except for the youngest of the young, and this is kiddushin that cannot lead to sexual relations—and the Shas answers that it deals with a case where he knew at the time of the act and afterward he forgot. It is explicitly explained that according to the one who says kiddushin that cannot lead to sexual relations is kiddushin, it would work out well for him even if the doubt existed at the time of the act. And behold, we rule that it is kiddushin, and we rule like Rabbi Yossi who disagrees with Rabbi Meir and holds that all of them are permitted except for the eldest of the elder ones. According to this, even if the doubt is at the time of the act, all of them are permitted. But this is against logic, unless he says that his intention was according to the language. Therefore, it seems to me that certainly in such a case all of them are forbidden except for the youngest of the young, and the Shas could have said "and according to your reasoning" as is the way of the sugya of the Shas in every place [and it is possible that truly this is what it says there, "it is also precise etc.," meaning that it is impossible to say it in any other way, see there and examine it closely].

A bogeret is not included among the daughters, for she is not under his authority. And some say that even if the bogeret appointed her father as an agent to receive her kiddushin and he said to the one performing kiddushin, "I have betrothed to you my elder daughter" – the bogeret is not included [Beit Yosef according to the opinion of the Tur]. And even though, on the contrary, we explained in section 48 that even in a case of shiddukhin, when he says "my elder daughter" he did not intend any other, and all the more so when she appointed him as an agent, for agency is superior to shiddukhin as written there, and even if she is a bogeret as is proven in the Tur, see there; however, this is when he has only daughters from one wife, for then the title "elder" refers only to the eldest of them all, even if she is a bogeret, for the others he would call by name. But when he has two sets of daughters from two wives, then the title "the elder" applies to the one after the bogeret and she is called "elder" relative to the second set, and therefore the bogeret is not included [Beit Shmuel, subsection 42]. But some say that certainly without having appointed him as an agent she is not included, but when she appointed him as an agent, as was explained in section 45 that she is also included, if so, here too if he said "the elder" he intended her and not the others [Chelkat Mechokek, subsection 37 and Beit Shmuel ibid.].

Since it is a legal doubt—the bogerot and the gedolah who is below the bogerot are forbidden, and thus the great Acharonim [Makneh and Avnei Miluim] agreed. And there is one who wishes to be even more stringent, that if there is even only one bogeret among the daughters, even though he did not make him an agent, nevertheless when he said the language of "gedolah," all the daughters of the first group are forbidden and also the gedolah of the second group; for since perforce "gedolah" is not precise, as there is a bogeret who is greater than her, if so, there is reason to doubt all the daughters of the first group who are "great" relative to the daughters of the second group, and likewise the gedolah of the second [Makneh], and there is some proof for this in the sugya of the Shas [from the minor of Rabbi Meir who said "except for the greatest of the great," and see Pnei Yehoshua 64: heading "Mihu," and study it well].

If all the daughters are bogrot and all of them made him an agent, if he received kiddushin for his daughter without specification—they are all forbidden and require a get. And if he said "the eldest"—the eldest of them all is betrothed and the rest are permitted, and if he said "the youngest"—the youngest of them all is betrothed and the rest are permitted. And if only one made him an agent, when he said "my daughter" without specification—she is betrothed and the rest are permitted. And if he said "the eldest," and one younger than her had made him an agent—the eldest is permitted by law for he does not have the power to betroth her, and the younger one who made him an agent requires a get, for perhaps he intended for her and called her "eldest" due to her importance [it appears to me].

If Reuven had five sons and they all made him an agent to betroth on their behalf, and Shimon had five daughters—minors, maidens, or even adults—and they made him an agent to receive betrothal on their behalf, and Reuven said to Shimon, "One of your daughters is betrothed to one of my sons," even though it is impossible to effect marriage at all, for behold, we do not know who is the betrother and who is the betrothed, and if one of the sons should cohabit with one of the daughters, it is possible that he cohabits with a forbidden relation, such as his wife's sister; nevertheless, we hold that betrothal that cannot lead to cohabitation is a valid betrothal. Therefore, each of the daughters requires five gittin, one from each of the sons. If one of the sons dies, each and every one requires four gittin and chalitzah from one of them, for perhaps she is the betrothed of the deceased, and each one stands in this state of doubt. Similarly, if two or more died, a get from each of the living and one chalitzah from one of them is sufficient, for in any case, one chalitzah is sufficient. If the five are not brothers, gittin alone are sufficient. If some of them are brothers and some of them are strangers—from the strangers a get is sufficient, and from the brothers they require chalitzah from one of them when one of the brothers dies, for perhaps she is the betrothed of his brother.

A father who said, "I betrothed my daughter and I do not know to whom," or if he does not say to whom—behold, this daughter, if she is a ketannah or a naarah, is forbidden to everyone until it becomes known to whom he betrothed her. For the father is believed to forbid his daughter who is a ketannah or a naarah, since the Torah gave him the authority to betroth her, it is within his power to betroth her; and regarding anything that is within one's power, he is believed, as with all prohibitions [and what the Tosafot wrote in Ketubot 22a, see the Ritva]. And the Torah explicitly believed him, as it is written: "I gave my daughter to this man" (Deuteronomy 22:16), and were he not to say "to this man," she would be forbidden to everyone. And if he died and it did not become known, she remains in her state of prohibition.

If after he said, "I betrothed her and I do not know to whom," or if he did not say to whom, he says, "I betrothed her to so-and-so" or "I remembered to whom I betrothed her," even though he says this after some time—he is believed. And even though after the interval of a speech he is not believed to retract, and regarding kiddushin we are stringent even within the interval of a speech, here it is not a retraction but rather he is clarifying his initial words or he remembered, for he must have betrothed her to someone, and therefore he is believed even after some time. And even if it was not known to him until she became a bogeret, or if he says after she became a bogeret, "I betrothed her to so-and-so"—he is believed. And even though once she is a bogeret he no longer has authority over her, nevertheless, why should he not be believed to clarify his initial words? For if someone else comes and says, "I betrothed her"—he is believed, as will be explained, and the father is no less than another [Maggid Mishneh chapter 9]. And even though the reason another is believed is that he is afraid lest the father contradict him, as will be explained, nevertheless, regarding the father we can also say perhaps witnesses who saw her betrothed to another will contradict him, and he is also afraid to lie; and furthermore, to clarify the matter he does not need a reason for his credibility. And it appears to me that if he did not forget, but rather did not say at the time of the act to whom he betrothed her, and after some time he says to whom he betrothed her, he must provide some justification as to why he remained silent until now from saying to whom he betrothed her.

It appears to me that the credibility of the father to say to whom he betrothed her is only effective such that if that certain man died, she is permitted to the world; however, to permit her to that certain man, why do we need the credibility of the father? For in any case – if that certain man says "I betrothed her," it will be explained that he is credible only if the father does not contradict him, and if this certain man contradicts him and says "I did not betroth her," certainly the words of the father will not be effective at all, and it is like a woman who says "you betrothed me" and he says "I did not betroth you," which will be explained in siman 48, and there is no remedy for this except to request a get from him, as is written there.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 20 that there are those who say that if the groom stood before him first and he did not recognize him, and afterward he said that he recognizes him—he is not believed. Thus far his words. And it is not specifically that he said explicitly at first that he does not recognize him, but rather since he did not say simultaneously "I betrothed my daughter to this one," he is no longer believed after the duration of a speech to say "to this one I betrothed her," but within the duration of a speech it is as if he is concluding his words. And from the precision of the wording of our teacher, the Rema, it appears to me that specifically if he says afterward that he recognized him from before, therefore he is not believed after the duration of a speech because his credibility was weakened since he did not say it simultaneously as I have written; but if he says afterward that at first he did not recognize him and now he reflected and recognized him—he is believed, for behold, there is no deficiency in this.

There is one who says that regarding what has been explained, that he is not believed after the time of a speech-interval when the groom is before us, this is only unless two came where each one says "I betrothed her," and she becomes forbidden to both of them as will be explained; but if there is only one who says that he betrothed her, what do we need the father's credibility for? Is he not believed to say that he betrothed her even if the father does not recognize him, as will be explained. And there is one who rejects this, for it deals with a case where the groom also did not say immediately "I betrothed her," for then he too is not believed to say afterwards "I betrothed her" since he did not say it immediately, and of necessity one must come to the credibility of the father. And it appears to me that specifically the father is not believed afterwards because his credibility was weakened since he did not say the matters together at the outset, but this groom who did not speak at all and they did not ask him, what weakness is there in the fact that he did not say it at the outset? However, the matter is simple that there is a practical difference regarding the father's credibility even with one groom, such as where he did not speak at all and went and died, for then if the father were believed she would be permitted to the world, and now that he is not believed she remains in her state of prohibition.

If the father does not know to whom he betrothed her, and one person comes and says before the father, "I betrothed her," and the father does not contradict him—behold, he is believed to marry her, and she is permitted to him, and he does not need to betroth her when he marries her. And even though there is no matter of ervah with fewer than two witnesses—this is to remove her from her status, but here he is the one establishing her in her status and saying, "I am the one who betrothed her." And why should we not suspect that he is lying? Because we say that a person is not so brazen as to say before the father that it was he who gave the kiddushin if the matter is not true, for he is afraid lest he contradict him and he be disgraced before all; rather, the matter is certainly true since the father does not contradict him. But if the father contradicts him—it is obvious that he is not believed to marry her, and there is one who says that he is not believed even to require her to receive a get from him, for since the father contradicts him, the presumption that he is not brazen is removed. And since this is so, there is no matter of ervah with fewer than two witnesses, for behold, it is not in her power to be permitted after he divorces her since the father contradicts him, and this get of his is only so that she should not be forbidden to another when the one who betrothed her becomes known because of this one's speech, and certainly he is not believed to forbid her based on his word alone.

If two came and each one says, "I betrothed her" – both of them give a get, and if they wished – one gives a get and one marries her, and he must betroth her when he marries her since she has already been divorced by another, for we are concerned that perhaps this one who divorced her is the one who betrothed her, and since he divorced her, she requires other kiddushin; and if he is a kohen, she is forbidden to him. And if one of them married her before the second one divorced her – she is forbidden to him, for it was a cohabitation of zenut, and to the second one she is also forbidden, for perhaps he is the one who betrothed her and there was a cohabitation of zenut, and she is forbidden to the husband and to the paramour. And one should not ask why she is permitted to the world after the divorces of both of them, for have we not seen that one of them is brazen and lies, and why should we not be concerned that both of them are lying? For it can be said that since both of them give a get to permit her to the world, a person does not sin for no benefit to himself; rather, certainly one of them knows that the second one betrothed her and she will not come to a state of sin, and the reason he gives a get is because he has no other choice since he said that he betrothed her. Furthermore, certainly the presumption that a person is not brazen remains in its force, and if it is because there is another who is certainly brazen and lies, in any case, what of it? For is it to say that if one is brazen, the second is also brazen? We say that one of them is telling the truth and one is lying, and it is we who do not know who it is. And it appears that even if afterward one of them retracted and admitted to the second, we compel him to give a get, for with what is he believed to retract, unless he gives a good justification as to why he said so; and even in such a case, it is difficult to release her without a get from him.

If one came and said, "I betrothed her," and married her, and afterward another came and says, "I betrothed her," and the father says, "I do not know," nevertheless, he is not believed to forbid her to him. For since she was permitted to the first, she possesses a chazakah of permissibility, and a single witness is not believed to remove her from her chazakah. Therefore, some say that even if he has not yet married her, but the beit din permitted her to marry—the second is also not believed for the reason we explained, for whenever a beit din permits her, she is in a chazakah of permissibility [see Yevamot 117b]. This is unless two witnesses came and contradicted him, for then even if she married she must leave, and they are believed even against the father and she is forbidden to both of them [Chelkat Mechokek and Beit Shmuel]. However, according to what our teacher, the Rema, wrote at the end of siman 17, that when she marries by the authority of a beit din in error her status is like one who was coerced, it is possible to say that here as well her status is like one who was coerced and she is not forbidden to the husband when it becomes known who he is [Avnei Miluim]. However, there are those who disagree with this as written there in section 262, and see what I wrote in siman 31, section 22.

A father who says regarding his daughter while she is a ketannah or a naarah, "I betrothed her and I divorced her," is believed to disqualify her from the kehunah. And even though the Torah only believed the father regarding matters of marriage and not regarding other matters—such as regarding a captive woman where he is not believed, as written in siman 7—nevertheless, regarding kehunah he is automatically believed. For since he is believed regarding kiddushin, she is automatically forbidden to a kohen due to the prohibition of a married woman. And that which he is believed to say "I divorced her"—this is when he says it within the time of a speech (toch kedei dibbur) of saying "I betrothed her," for he is believed by the power of a migo, since if he wanted he would not have said "I betrothed her," and she automatically remains to the kohen under the prohibition of a divorcee. But after the time of a speech, since she was established as a married woman based on his word, he is not believed to say afterward "I divorced her," for we do not say a migo retroactively, as written in Choshen Mishpat in siman 82 in the rules of migo. And it is not similar to what has been explained that he is believed to say after a time to whom he betrothed her, for there it is all part of the matter of the kiddushin where he clarifies his first words; but when he says she was divorced, he is breaking the kiddushin and is only believed by the power of a migo [Beit Shmuel]. And the same applies to anything that breaks the kiddushin, such as if he says there was a condition in the kiddushin and it was not fulfilled, or they were disqualified witnesses—he is only believed within the time of a speech for the reason that has been explained [Chelkat Mechokek]. And one should not ask: do we not maintain regarding kiddushin that even within the time of a speech it is like after the time of a speech? That is regarding the act of kiddushin, that he cannot retract; but regarding when he says something that contradicts his first words, he is believed with a migo if it is within the time of a speech, as is explained in siman 47 regarding a woman when she says "I was betrothed" and within the time of a speech says "I am unattached," see there [Beit Shmuel].

The father's credibility is only during the years of minor status and na'arut, but after she has reached bogeret status, he is not credible to say "I betrothed her when she was a minor or a na'arah." And even if he says "I betrothed her and divorced her during her minor status," he is not credible to forbid her to a kohen, for the Torah only believed him when she was under his authority. And even though we hold that the father is credible regarding the years, and as the Rambam wrote in chapter 2 of Ishut, law 23: "A father who said, 'This son of mine is nine years and one day old,' or 'This daughter of mine is three years and one day old,' is credible to make one liable for a korban for coming upon them, but he is not credible for lashes or punishments; 'This son of mine is thirteen years and one day old,' or 'This daughter of mine is twelve years and one day old,' he is credible for vows, valuations, bans, and consecrations, but not for lashes or punishments," thus far his words. And if so, when he says during her bogeret status that he betrothed her during her minor status, he should be credible through a migo, for if he wanted, he could have said that she is still a minor or a na'arah. And there is one who says that in truth this refers to a case where there are witnesses regarding the years, but otherwise he is credible through a migo. But it seems to me that in any case he is not credible, for since it has been explained that he is not credible for lashes and punishments, how can we believe him through a migo that he betrothed her during her minor status and she is a married woman, and we would obligate death for one who comes upon her intentionally, or when he says "I divorced her" and we would obligate lashes for a kohen who marries her? And one cannot say that for this he should not be credible and we should only believe him regarding an unintentional act and a korban—it is impossible to say so, for when the Torah believed him regarding the marriage of his daughter, it believed him for all matters, as is explained in the portion of the one who defames, and since it is impossible to believe him in its entirety, we should not believe him at all. Furthermore, there are those among the early authorities who said that since this credibility that the Torah granted him is a novelty, that a single witness should be credible, you have in it only its novelty, and he is not credible in any other matter to forbid her by reason of a migo.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 27: A father who said that he betrothed his daughter and afterwards he betrothed her to another and said the betrothals of the first were before witnesses disqualified by the Torah and are nothing—he is believed. Thus far his words. And in his great book he brought this from a responsum of the Rashba, and our teacher, the Rema, wrote regarding this: And it seems to me specifically within the time of a speech he is believed, thus far his words, as in the law of "I betrothed her and I divorced her" in section 69, that after the time of a speech he is not believed to nullify the betrothals. And the words of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, are truly puzzling, and there is one who says that the father is believed for everything even after the time of a speech and only regarding divorce is he not believed, and it has already been explained that it is not so and also this is against logic, and there is one who says that regarding witnesses disqualified by the Torah he is believed because this is like an amtlala for the betrothals and with an amtlala he is believed even after time, and it is not so, for every amtlala must be clarified in beit din that this is an amtlala as written in siman 46. And it is possible to say that certainly he is not believed after the time of a speech to remove her from the status of a married woman, but here where he betrothed her to another and does not remove her from the status of a married woman but only regarding the first, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, holds that he is always believed since he does not remove her from her status, or it is possible to say that certainly when he said previously "I betrothed her to so-and-so" he is not believed afterwards to nullify his words, and here we are dealing with where he said generally that he betrothed her as is clear from his wording, and afterwards when he betrothed her to another it was in his power to say also regarding the first betrothals that from this one he received them, and if so he is believed with a migo—and this is not a migo retroactively, for now when he received betrothals from the other and says that there were disqualified witnesses in the first, he had a migo to say that to the second he betrothed her.

A woman who said, "I betrothed myself and I do not know to whom," and one came and said, "I betrothed you" – he is believed to give her a get to permit her to the whole world, but not to marry her. And it is not similar to the case of the father that was explained, where he is believed to say "I betrothed her," for he is afraid of the father lest he contradict him; but from her he is not afraid, for even if he lies she will cover for him since her passion overcomes her, and there is no presumption here that he is afraid. Therefore, even after he divorced her, it is forbidden to marry her, for there is concern of a conspiracy they might make between them, that he should divorce her and then marry her. But since we forbid her to him forever, there is no further concern, and he is believed to permit her to the world, for a person does not sin for the sake of another. And since this is only a concern, if he married her even before the divorce – we do not remove her from him. And likewise, if there is even one witness that he betrothed her – it is permitted to marry her initially. And even though in a place of a presumption of prohibition one witness is not believed except in a matter that is in his power as is written in Yoreh Deah siman 127, here he does not remove her from her presumption but rather clarifies the matter [see Beit Shmuel subsection 50 and it requires further study]. Therefore, if two came and each one says "I betrothed her" – one witness is not believed to clarify, for one witness in the face of contradiction is nothing. And this that the sages believed him to permit her by giving a get, the same applies if he died before the giving of the get, for there is no difference in this [Makneh]. And some say that if two came and each one says "I betrothed her," if they wished – one gives a get and one marries [Beit Shmuel] as in the case of the father, and it requires further study as to the law.