Siman 143

Because the Rambam has regarding the laws of conditions in gittin certain perplexing matters that the Rishonim wondered about, and also the commentators on his words, the Maggid Mishneh and the Kesef Mishneh, wondered about him; and in our humble opinion he is not alone in this, for the Ra'avad also did not dispute him, and similarly the Tur transcribed his words, and therefore we shall explain them with the help of Heaven:

This is the wording of the Rambam in chapter 8: One who divorces on a condition, if the condition is fulfilled, she is divorced, and if the condition is not fulfilled, she is not divorced. We have already explained the laws of conditions in chapter 6 of the Laws of Marriage, and there it was explained that one who divorces on a condition, when the condition is fulfilled, she is divorced at the time it is fulfilled, not at the time of the delivery of the get into her hand. Therefore, the husband may nullify the get or add to his condition or stipulate another condition as long as the first condition has not been fulfilled, even though the get has reached her hand. And if the husband dies, or the get is lost or burned before the condition is fulfilled, she is not divorced. Initially, she should not marry until the condition is fulfilled, but if she married, she does not leave unless it is no longer within her power to fulfill it, for then the condition is void. And there it was explained that if he said to her, "Behold you are divorced from now" or "from today on the condition of such and such," or if he said to her, "Behold you are divorced on the terms of such and such," when the condition is fulfilled, she will be divorced from the time of the delivery of the get into her hand. Therefore, he cannot nullify the get nor add to his condition once the get has reached her hand. And if it was lost or burned, even if the husband died before the condition was fulfilled, she may fulfill the condition after his death, and she was already divorced from the time of the delivery of the get into her hand. She may marry initially even though the condition has not yet been fulfilled, and we do not fear that perhaps it will not be fulfilled, since the condition was with "from now" or with "on the terms." Thus far his words.

And they wondered about him in this, that he wrote plainly regarding a condition that if she married she shall not leave; why shall she not leave, for since the taking effect of the get is from the time of the fulfillment of the condition, and if the husband died or the get was lost she is not divorced, as he wrote himself, and if so, when she married before the fulfillment of the condition, behold she is still a married woman, and how did he rule that she shall not leave? Therefore, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 1 ruled indeed that if she married she shall leave, and did not mention the opinion of the Rambam at all. And in chapter 9, law 5, the Rambam wrote regarding one who divorces on a condition, and the get exists at the time of the fulfillment of the condition, even though it is not placed in her domain, it is a get, see there. And this is also wonderous, for since the taking effect of the get is at the time of the fulfillment of the condition, it certainly must be in her domain (and see Beit Shmuel siman 146, subsection 2).

And also that which he wrote at the end of chapter 8, and this is his wording: One who was divorced on a condition and another betrothed her before the condition was fulfilled, if the condition was fulfilled, she is betrothed, etc. Thus far his words. And it is clear that his intention is regarding a standard condition and not a condition of "from now" or "on the condition that" (Beit Shmuel ibid. subsection 5). And it is difficult: how could the betrothal of the second take effect, for is she not still a married woman? And he himself explicitly wrote in chapter 6 of Ishut regarding a condition of betrothal that without "from now" she is considered an unmarried woman before the fulfillment of the condition, and similarly regarding a condition of a get she is considered a married woman. And also that which he ruled regarding a condition of "from now" that she may marry before the fulfillment of the condition is very difficult: why do we not concern ourselves that the condition might not be fulfilled and she will be a married woman? And what is the difference between a standard condition, where we concern ourselves lest the condition not be fulfilled, and a condition of "from now," where we do not concern ourselves? And the Tur indeed ruled that she should not marry, and if she married, they are separated until the condition is fulfilled. And there are those who distinguished in this between a condition of "sit and do not act," where we do not concern ourselves that she will actively transgress, and a condition of "arise and act," where we concern ourselves that she will not fulfill it (Ran). And there are those who distinguish between a condition that is in her power to fulfill and one that is not in her power to fulfill (ibid. chapter 7). And there are those who are stringent in every case (ibid.).

Aside from this, we find regarding the Rambam in the matters of conditions in gittin an exposition of things the likes of which we have not found in other matters, for he wrote at the beginning of chapter 9: One who divorces his wife after a fixed time, she is divorced when the time he fixed arrives; and this is similar to a condition and is not a condition. It is similar to a condition in that she is divorced when the time he fixed arrives, and it is not a condition because one who divorces upon a condition has already divorced, whereas this one has not yet divorced until that time arrives. Therefore, one who divorces upon a condition must double his condition, but this one does not need to double his words nor follow the rest of the laws of conditions that we explained. How so? One who says to his wife, "This is your get, but do not be divorced with it except after thirty days," she is not divorced until after thirty days. And if the husband died, or the get was lost or burned within thirty days, she is not divorced. If she went and placed it at the sides of the public domain and it was stolen or lost from there after thirty days, she is divorced, since the get existed on the day she is divorced and she designated it in a place that is not the public domain, for the sides of the public domain are not like the public domain. Thus far his words. And behold, there is a law similar to this regarding kiddushin in chapter 7 of Ishut, and he did not elaborate on it there.

He further wrote: And similarly, if he suspended the divorce upon an action, its law is like the law of one who divorces after a period of time. How so? For example, if he said to the woman, "Behold, this is your get, but you shall not be divorced with it until you give me two hundred zuz," she is divorced after she gives [them]. And he does not need to double his condition, nor [is he subject] to the rest of the laws of conditions that we have explained, for he did not divorce upon a condition; rather, he has not yet divorced this [woman], but rather suspended the divorce upon the performance of such and such, and afterwards she shall be divorced. Thus far his words. And behold, there in the Laws of Marriage, it was not explained regarding kiddushin in this manner and with this wording; see there.

He further wrote: And what is the difference between one who divorces on a condition and one who set a time for the divorce or made them dependent on an action? For one who divorces on a condition, there is the status of divorce, but they are not finalized until the condition is fulfilled; therefore, when the condition is fulfilled, she is divorced if the get was extant, even if it is not in her domain, and she does not need to go back and take it or for it to be in her domain after the condition was fulfilled, for it initially reached her hand as a divorce. And if she married before the condition was fulfilled, she does not leave, as we have explained. But one who makes the divorce dependent on a time or an action, the get did not reach her hand as a divorce, but rather as a deposit until the time he set or until she performs the action; therefore, when the time arrives, the get must be in her domain, or she must go back and take it, or it must be in a place she designated for it even if it is not her domain, as we have explained, and afterward she is divorced by it. And if she married before the time he set arrived, or before she performed the action upon which he made the divorce dependent, she must leave and the child is a mamzer, for she is still a complete eithet ish and there is no status of divorce here. Thus far his words. And such things he also did not inform us of anywhere, aside from what is difficult regarding his view as I have written.

He further wrote: One who gives a get into the hand of his wife and said to her, "If you do not give me two hundred zuz, this is not a get," or "you are not divorced," behold, this one has not divorced at all, and there is no get here, neither on condition nor dependent on an action, and so too anything similar to this. Thus far his words. And even though its implication is that if she gives she shall be divorced, for from the negative you hear the positive, since he did not mention divorce explicitly and did not say to her "behold you are divorced" or "behold this is your get," she is not divorced. So wrote the Maggid Mishneh. And I wonder, for we maintain that when they are occupied with that matter, even if he gave it to her without specification, whether regarding a get or regarding kiddushin, behold she is divorced or betrothed even though he said nothing, as the Rambam himself wrote in chapter 1, law 11 regarding a get, and in chapter 3 of Ishut, law 8 regarding kiddushin. And perforce one must say the reason is because a condition requires a double condition, and this one did not double his condition; and if so, on the contrary, we should have said that the condition is void and the act stands (and see the Gra, siman 146, subsection 14, and it requires further study; and see Tosafot Gittin 75a, s.v. "le'apokei"). And furthermore, why did he not explain a law similar to this regarding kiddushin?

He further wrote: One who wishes to divorce on a condition, and the matter of his condition is that she should not be divorced until a certain time, he expresses this matter in the language of a condition and attaches the condition to his arrival at a fixed time or to his departure. How so? For example, that he says to her, "If I do not come from now until thirty days, this is a get, and if I come within thirty days, it shall not be a get," and he places the get in her hand. Or he says to her, "This is your get on the condition (al menat) that I do not come to this province until thirty days," and so too anything similar to this. Thus far his words. And I do not know what this comes to teach us; has he not already explained the laws of conditions in the laws of Ishut? And similarly in chapter 8 of Gerushin, he wrote that all the laws of a condition are required. And what difference is there to me between a condition that he stipulated "if you give me two hundred zuz" or "if I do not come from now until thirty days"? And similarly, that which he wrote regarding "on the condition" (al menat), and his intention was that in this case one does not need the laws of conditions, he also already explained this in the laws of Ishut, chapter 6, law 17; see there.

Therefore, it appears clear to me that the Rambam, of blessed memory, holds that the condition of a get is distinct from the laws of conditions in kiddushin, sales, and gifts. The reason is that the matter of a condition is applicable to something in which both parties have a say, such as in kiddushin, for just as the man does not betroth except by his will, so too the woman is not betrothed except by her will. Similarly, in a sale, we require the will of the buyer and the will of the seller, and so too in a gift, we require the intent of the giver and the intent of the recipient, for he cannot force him to receive a gift; and so it is in all matters in the world. Consequently, when there are two sides who must consent, they only consent upon such and such a condition. But regarding a get, where the woman has no say at all and everything depends on him—if he wishes to divorce, he divorces her even if she does not consent, for such is the law of the Torah. Therefore, we find that our teachers, the sages of the Mishnah and the Gemara, explained the condition in kiddushin regarding money in two ways: "Behold you are betrothed to me on the condition that I give you two hundred zuz" (Kiddushin 60a); "on the condition that I speak on your behalf to the authorities" (ibid. 63a); "on the condition that I work for you as a laborer" (ibid.); and similarly there are conditions placed upon her (ibid. 50a). But regarding a get, we only find conditions placed upon her: "on the condition that you give me two hundred zuz" (74a); "on the condition that you attend to my father"; "on the condition that you nurse my son" (75b). We do not find a condition that he shall give money. The matter is simple: in kiddushin, it is not her will to be betrothed to him in any other manner; but regarding a get, why would he need to give her money, behold she is divorced against her will? Conversely, "on the condition that she give him money" is applicable, such as when she requests a get from him and he says, "I do not consent except in such and such a manner."

However, this too is a matter of wonder: why is it necessary to give her a get now and make a condition? Let him not give her the get until she gives him the money, and then he shall divorce her. It is understandable regarding kiddushin, as each party is compelled to this because they fear that the other side will later regret it, and so they bind themselves from now in such-and-such a manner. But regarding a get, why is a condition necessary? Is it not so that at any time he desires, he may divorce her, and when she gives to him, he will divorce her then? Yet, it is possible that his desire is to divorce her when she gives him money, and he fears that when she has the money, a sofer and witnesses will not be available to him, and therefore he writes the get for her from now. But even in such a case, who compels him to a condition? Let him give her the get and say to her: "Behold, this is your get, but you shall not be divorced by it until after you give me such-and-such money," and who compels him to a condition?

And certainly the truth is so, and this is what the Rambam explained in chapter 8, law 4, where he made the divorce dependent on an action, as when he says to her, "This is your get and you are not divorced with it until you give me two hundred zuz," which we brought in section 6; and he does not have to fear that she might retract, for behold, it does not depend at all upon her will.

And behold, if this man did not do so and gave her a get with the language of a condition, "if you give me two hundred zuz," and he did not need this, we learn from this that his intention is such: that he is willing to do her will, that the get shall begin from the time of the giving and shall not be completed until after the receipt of the money. The practical legal difference is that if she marries another before the fulfillment of the condition, she is not considered a married woman who married, but rather she fulfills the condition and remains with him. However, since he did not say "from now," we say that he reserved for himself this power to nullify the condition, or to add to it, or to stipulate another condition, or to nullify the entire get, and that the get must be in its completeness until the fulfillment of the condition, even though it is not in her possession, for it reached her hand by way of divorce. And the reason for the matter is that since we need to give her some validity because of the condition he made which he did not need to do, we should only give her one primary validity—that she should not be considered a married woman from now—for this is her primary desire, as for this she gives him money or some other condition that he stipulates with her, such as to serve his father or to nurse his son and the like. Therefore, if she married, she does not leave, and automatically the get does not need to be in her hand. But regarding other powers, such as that it should not be within his power to nullify the get or to change the condition or to nullify it or to add to it, from where do we know that he did not reserve them for himself? Certainly he reserved them for himself, and automatically the get must be in its completeness until the fulfillment of the condition.

And if this man added to the condition for her benefit another matter that was not necessary for this, such as if he said "from now" or "from today" or "on the condition," the law of which is like "from now," presumably he resolved in his heart to divorce her from now with a complete divorce, and presumably he is certain that she will fulfill the condition, for if not so, he would not have said "from now," and he gave her all the powers. Therefore, he cannot cancel the get, nor add to the condition, nor cancel it, nor exchange it for another condition, for the get is finalized and the get does not need to be in completion until the fulfillment of the condition. And she is able to marry another, for there is no doubt that she will fulfill the condition, for if not so, he would not have said "from now"; and this is dealing with a case where it is in her power to fulfill the condition, for if not so, he would not have said "from now." And behold, regarding a condition of "from now" or "on the condition," in all conditions it is so, as I wrote in siman 38 regarding kiddushin. However, regarding a get, some say that even with "from now" he can cancel it, and our teacher, the Rema, brought this opinion at the end of section 2, see there. And the reason is that they hold that since the primary possessor of will in a get is the husband, even a condition of "from now" does not avail to prevent him from being able to retract, and several Rishonim hold so (see the Gra, subsection 17). But the Ramban and the Rashba and the Maggid Mishneh hold in this like the Rambam (ibid.) that one should not diminish a condition of a get from a condition of kiddushin. And according to what I wrote regarding the opinion of the Rambam, on the contrary, a condition of a get is superior to other conditions, since he did not need to do this and yet he did, hear from this that he gave her an improvement of powers, as we have explained.

And according to this, if he divorces her after a fixed time, such as when he says to her, "This is your get but you shall not be divorced with it until after thirty days," or if he makes it dependent on an action, such as when he says to her, "This is your get but you shall not be divorced with it until you give me two hundred zuz," there is no matter of a condition here at all, and there is no beginning to this get until the thirty days pass or until she gives the two hundred zuz. Therefore, the get must be in her possession at the conclusion of the thirty days or at the time of the giving of the two hundred zuz. And this is what was explained in chapter 9; the difference between a condition and this, where he fixed a time or made it dependent on an action, will be explained there as we have explained. And that which he ruled regarding the sides of a public domain not being like a public domain will be explained in siman 146 with the help of Heaven.

And since a get that was made dependent on an action has no beginning yet for the get, therefore the Rambam wrote correctly that when he gave the get and said to her, "If you do not give me two hundred zuz you are not divorced," this is not a get at all. And he means even if she gives him the two hundred zuz. And even though the statement "Behold, this is your get" is not a requirement when they are occupied with that matter, this is when he delivers it to her now for the sake of a get. But in a case where it is dependent on an action, this is only like a deposit in her hand, and if so, it never came into her hand as a get. And even when she gives him the money, behold, then he said nothing, and also previously he did not mention "Behold, this is your get," and it turns out that he did not divorce her. And even if we say that from a negative statement you hear a positive one, this is if he were delivering it to her for the sake of a get, which is not the case when he delivers it as a deposit (and this is the intention of the Maggid Mishneh that we cited in section 8).

And regarding that which he wrote, "one who wishes to divorce on a condition," which we cited in section 9, it appears to me that another intention is hidden in this. For behold, according to what we explained, a condition in a get is different from a general condition. For in a get, even with a condition of "if," the get begins from the time of delivery and not from the fulfillment of the condition; for this reason, if she married, she does not leave, as we explained. And this is only regarding a condition that is upon her to perform, such as that she shall give him money or nurse his son and the like, for the reason we explained: that since her consent is not required, why would he have to stipulate, as we explained. It follows that this is only relevant to a condition that is upon her to perform. But regarding a condition that he stipulates upon himself—where in truth he does not need a condition for this, but rather it is his will to stipulate by way of a condition, just as it is his will that she be divorced after thirty days, and it is his will to do this by way of a condition: "if I come," "if I do not come," and the like—certainly the law of this condition is like any general condition, that if he stipulated with the language of "if," the get does not take effect beforehand at all, and if she married, she must leave. And with a condition of "from now" or "on condition," the get takes effect immediately. And we do not say that since this condition is different in its law from a condition that is upon her to perform, there is no longer a distinction between "if" and "on condition," and even with "on condition" it would not take effect beforehand; he comes to teach us that it is not so.

And this is what he wrote: One who wishes to divorce on a condition, and the matter of his condition is that she should not be divorced until a certain time (meaning that in this case he does not need a condition at all, but rather that this is his will), he expresses this matter in the language of a condition, etc. And he means to say that since he is expressing this matter in the language of a condition in any event, it requires all the laws of conditions, namely: the positive before the negative, the condition before the act, and a double condition. But with "on the condition that" (al menat), it does not require all the laws of conditions. And this condition is like other conditions in kiddushin and buying and selling and so too anything similar to this, such as the condition of "if I die" or "if I do not die." For that which we distinguished between conditions of gittin and general conditions is only regarding a condition that she must perform, as I have written (so it appears to me). And it is also possible to say that his intention is that since this condition is for the fixing of a time, even though it is in the language of a condition and requires the laws of conditions, nevertheless, in this case even with "on the condition that" its law is not like "from now." And it requires further study. And it appears like the first explanation, that in all laws it is similar to all conditions.

And there is a proof for the Rambam regarding a condition of "if you give me two hundred zuz" when she is married from the sugya of the Shas (74a), where the Amoraim disagree regarding "on condition" whether it is like "from now" or not, both in gitin and in kidushin. And in kidushin it says the practical difference is regarding a case where she extended her hand and received kidushin from another, and in gitin it says the practical difference is regarding a case where the get was torn, see there. And from the fact that it does not also say in gitin that the practical difference is if she received kidushin from another, we learn from this that in a get, even with "if," the kidushin take effect (see Tosafot that it could have mentioned this practical difference and it is a forced answer; and in kidushin 60a they wrote another answer, that even according to Rabbi Yehuda she requires a get out of doubt, see there; and it requires further study, for there is still a practical difference between certain kidushin and doubtful kidushin, as the Maharsha wrote in gitin there regarding the intent of Tosafot, and examine this closely):

And that which he ruled that with "from now" she may marry ab initio, even though we learned there regarding a condition of "on the condition that" that she may not marry until she gives, nevertheless the Rambam rejected this from the halacha, as at the beginning of the chapter "HaMegeresh" it is explicitly explained there regarding all conditions of "on the condition that" she is permitted to marry immediately (and so wrote the Maggid Mishneh in chapter 8, law 1, see there). And it is also possible to say that the Baraita is dealing with a case where she does not have money, for we certainly concern ourselves that perhaps she will not be able to fulfill her condition.

And all this is the opinion of the Rambam, of blessed memory, and also the Ra'avad did not dispute him, and also the Tur brought his words. However, most of our teachers disagree on this and hold that even regarding a get with a condition of "if," if she married she must leave, and similarly with "from now," she should not marry ab initio. And one should be stringent in practice like both opinions, and in the Shulchan Aruch it appears that they took the opinion of those who disagree as the primary ruling.

The Tur wrote: One who divorces on a condition, this is like any other act performed on a condition, where the act is not established unless the condition is fulfilled; and if the condition is not fulfilled, there is no get here at all, and even if he is a kohen she is permitted to him, provided that it is according to its law: that it be doubled, and the condition precedes the act, and the positive precedes the negative, and the condition is in one matter and the act in another matter, and that the act can be established through a messenger, and that it be regarding a matter that she is able to perform, as explained in the laws of kiddushin; but if it was not performed according to its law, the condition is void and the act is established. Thus far his words. And we have already explained the laws of conditions in siman 38, and it was also explained there in section 46 that there are some among the Rishonim who hold that only for stringency do we require the laws of all conditions and not for leniency, and therefore one must certainly follow the stringency in every manner, as our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote there in section 4 (and so wrote the Chelkat Mechokek there in subsection 4, and see there in subsection 6). But regarding what he wrote that if the condition was not fulfilled, even if he is a kohen she is permitted to him, there is no one who disagrees with this, and it is an explicit Mishnah (81a) that she is not disqualified from the priesthood when the condition was not fulfilled, even with a condition of "from now," and so it is with a kohen who is a shechiv mera when he divorces her and does not die, that she is permitted to him.

The opinion of the Rambam in chapter 7 of Ishut is that regarding a condition of "from now," and similarly regarding "on the condition that," which is like "from now," there is no need for a double condition nor for the condition to precede the act; however, it is required to be something that is possible to fulfill. This is also the opinion of the Rif (chapter 7), and this is the opinion of Rav Hai Gaon and the Ra'avad, of blessed memory. However, the Rosh, of blessed memory, wrote (ibid.) that even with "from now," and certainly with "on the condition that," all the laws of conditions are required. This is the opinion of Rabbeinu Tam and the Ri, the author of the Tosafot (75a). The Ramban and the Rashba, of blessed memory, were in doubt regarding this, and consequently, for the law, one must be stringent. This is the simple custom, that even with a condition of "from now," we practice all the laws of conditions, such as with the condition of a person facing death who divorces her "from today if he dies." It is simple that since it is a dispute of the great authorities, one must follow all sides toward stringency (see Beit Yosef). Similarly, regarding "on the condition that," there are those who say its law is not like "from now," as was written in siman 38.

The Tur further wrote that when the condition is fulfilled, the get is validated retroactively from the time of delivery; therefore, if the husband died, or the get was burned, or it was lost before the fulfillment of the condition, it is a get. In what case is this said? When he says "from now" or "on condition," for "on condition" is like "from now." How so? If he said to her, "Behold, this is your get on condition that you give me two hundred zuz after thirty days," the get takes effect immediately, and when she gives it to him, she will be divorced retroactively, even if the get was burned. Nevertheless, she may not marry another until she gives it. And if she married, the Ramah wrote that he must put her out until the condition is fulfilled, and if she fulfilled the condition, he may maintain the marriage. And the Rambam wrote that she may marry immediately, and we are not concerned that perhaps she will not give it, since the condition was with "from now" or "on condition." But this is not clear, for it is explicitly taught in a baraita: "And she may not marry another until she gives." Thus far his words.

And behold, that which he wrote that "on condition" is like "from now," this is the opinion of the Rambam, of blessed memory, as well, and most of the poskim. However, some say that "on condition" is not like "from now," and we have already explained this in siman 38. Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in most places was not concerned for this opinion, but in siman 144, section 4, regarding "on condition that the sun emerges from its sheath" (see Beit Shmuel there, subsection 7). And it is possible that only regarding a condition that occurs on its own, such as "that the sun emerges from its sheath," where the condition is not upon the person to perform, in this case he is concerned for this opinion, because in this case the language of "if" is not so applicable, for it will certainly emerge; therefore, he speaks with the language of "on condition," meaning: on this condition I give you the get, for the time when the sun emerges from its sheath. However, our teacher, the Rema, in this siman, section 2, was concerned for this opinion in every case, and we follow the stringency in every matter.

And that which he wrote in the name of the Ramah, that he should put her out until she fulfills the condition, the intention is not to put her out with a get, but rather a mere separation (in the house). And as it is written in the Shulchan Aruch, section 2, and this is his wording: He shall separate from her until the condition is fulfilled, see there. And what he wrote in the name of the Rambam, we have already written to settle his words in section 2. And there are those who say that a condition which is in her power to fulfill and is in the form of "sit and do not act," she is permitted to marry immediately, for we do not fear that she will actively transgress. But a condition that is not in her power, even if it is in the form of "sit and do not act," or a condition that is in the form of "arise and act," even though it is in her power, she is forbidden to marry until she fulfills the condition (Ran, chapter 7). And in the Shulchan Aruch he agreed to this opinion, and such is the primary ruling. And behold, the Tur did not mention here if he can nullify the condition in a case of "from now." However, at the end of the siman he wrote the wording of the Rambam in chapter 8 which we brought and agreed to all his words, and only regarding that which he permits marrying in a case of "from now" did he take issue with him. And it appears that he also agrees with the opinion of the Rambam that in a case of "from now" he cannot nullify the condition, and if he can nullify as we explained. And so they left it unexplained in the Shulchan Aruch, section 2. And there are those who say that even in a case of "from now" he can nullify, and one should be stringent.

The Tur further wrote that if he did not say "from now" and "on condition," but rather "this is your get if you give me two hundred zuz after thirty days," it does not take effect until the time of giving, and if it was torn or lost before the giving, she is not divorced. Thus far his words. And certainly if he died. And behold, the Tur did not mention what he holds in a case where she married before the fulfillment of the condition—whether she must leave according to the opinion of most poskim, or she does not leave according to the opinion of the Rambam. And at the end of the siman he transcribed the words of the Rambam and did not disagree with him on this, see there; this implies that he holds like him. Therefore, we wrote in section 21 that the Tur holds like the Rambam. However, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, omitted the words of the Rambam in section 2, and on the contrary, wrote that if she married she must leave. And similarly in siman 148, he intentionally omitted this ruling that if she married she does not leave (and the Beit Shmuel in subsection 2 wrote that the Beit Yosef holds like the Rambam, and this requires further study, and it is not so, and so wrote the Gra in subsection 8, see there).

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote at the end of section 2 that there are those who say that even if he did not say "from now," nor "from today," nor "on condition," its law is like one who says "from today" because the date of the get proves it; therefore, we follow this as a stringency. Thus far his words. Our teacher, the Rema, wrote that there are those who say that even with a condition of "from now" he can nullify it, and one should be stringent. Thus far his words. The explanation of these matters is that Rabbi Yosei holds (Bava Batra 136a) that a deed of gift in which a date was written is like one in which "from today" was written, and so we rule, as the Rambam wrote at the end of the Laws of Acquisition and Gift, and the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch in Choshen Mishpat siman 258. It is stated in the Shas in Gittin (72a) that this is also the case regarding a get. The Rambam, of blessed memory, regarding Gittin, did not rule accordingly, and they wondered about him (Ran, end of chapter 7). However, his reason is because we say that Rav instituted writing in a get "from this day" to exclude the view of Rabbi Yosei (85b). It is true that Rashi, of blessed memory, wrote that this is merely for enhancement, but according to the law we rule like Rabbi Yosei, and so wrote several of the Rishonim. There are those who are uncertain about this (see the Rosh, end of chapter 7), and also the Tur in siman 144 is uncertain about it, see there. Also from the words of the Rif, of blessed memory, in the eighth chapter of Bava Batra, it is clear that due to the stringency of Gittin we do not rule like Rabbi Yosei, see there. It is explicitly clear that only for leniency we do not rule like him, but not for stringency (Ran ibid.). But the Rambam holds that from the enactment of Rav this was rejected from the halacha. According to the law, we certainly rule like our teacher, the Beit Yosef, that we follow this as a stringency.

And in my humble opinion it would seem to be said that behold, we have already explained in Choshen Mishpat siman 158, section 3, that this which we establish as such is when the giver commanded to write the date; and if so, why did he command to write it? Since he gives the gift after death, he should have written that it should be acquired after his death; rather, it is certainly like "from today and after death," that the body is acquired from today and the fruit after death. But when the giver did not command to write the date and the witnesses wrote it of their own accord as is the way of those who write documents, there is no proof from the date that his intention was "from today," see there. And it is a logical reason. And according to this, even regarding a get this law does not apply unless the husband commanded to write the date, and this is not the way of the world, for ordinarily the scribe writes it himself according to the enactment of the sages to write a date. And in such a case, we certainly establish the law like the Rabbis. And this is what the Rif wrote in Gittin (chapter 7): And the halacha is like the Rabbis; and this is regarding ordinary gittin. And that which was written in Bava Batra that we establish this as a stringency, this is when the husband commanded (and that which the Rif questioned in Bava Batra there, Rav against Rav, and answered that it is because of the stringency, see there, this is because it implies to him that Rav enacted so in every case, and that which they questioned him is answered; and therefore the Rambam, who deals with ordinary gittin, omitted this entirely, and delve into it).

Furthermore, the Tur wrote in Choshen Mishpat there in the name of the Ramah that specifically regarding one who gives the body of the gift after his death, in this case we say the date of the document proves its intent, for why would he need to write a date? Let him write that he gives it to him after his death. But in a gift for a set time, such as after thirty days, in this case we do not say the date of the document proves its intent, for he must necessarily write a date in order to know when the thirty days will conclude. Our teacher, the Rema, ruled accordingly there. If so, regarding a get, where it is perforce impossible for the time to be after death—as there is no get after death—we do not say the date of the document proves its intent. Indeed, the Gemara in Gittin there deals with the matter of whether he divorced "from today and after death," see there (and the difficulty raised by the Shach in Choshen Mishpat there in subsection 2 requires further study, see there). This is also explicitly implied by a precision of the wording of the Rambam at the end of the laws of Zechiyah, for he holds like the Ramah, see there, and therefore he omitted this. However, in practice one should be stringent and say that it is a legal doubt, in accordance with the ruling of the Tur and Shulchan Aruch.

And that which our teacher, the Rema, wrote, that there are those who say that even with a condition of "from now" he can nullify it and one should be stringent, thus far his words, it implies from his words that in all matters of a condition of "from now" there are those who say he can nullify it. And it is not clear to me who these disputants are. For while it is true that the Tur wrote at the end of this siman in the name of a responsum of the Rosh regarding one who gave a get with "from now" if he does not return within two years, that he can nullify the condition and she may marry immediately, and the same applies to any condition even though the condition is for her benefit, and so wrote the Ittur, see there; however, the Rosh, of blessed memory, clarified his words in a responsum (Klal 46) that specifically regarding a condition that was not to her distress, and on the contrary was for her benefit, such as this condition that if he returns within the time he shall return to her, he can nullify it and the get takes effect retroactively. But regarding a condition that is to her distress, such as "on condition that you give me two hundred zuz," if he nullified it, his words are of no consequence, for he gave the get on condition to distress her and he did not distress her, see there. And so wrote our teacher, the Beit Yosef, there in his great book, see there. And that which the Tur wrote, "even though the condition is for her benefit," he means to say, and certainly a condition that is neither for her benefit nor to her distress. And it is possible that the Ittur also holds this, for the Tur equates his opinion to the opinion of the Rosh, as has been written.

And behold, the Ra'avad also in chapter 9, law 9, wrote that regarding a condition, as long as the condition has not been fulfilled, he can nullify it; thus far his words. And it is clear that he is not dealing with "from now," for if it were not so, why was he silent regarding the Rambam in chapter 8, law 1, who wrote that a condition of "from now" he cannot nullify? And it is a general rule in the hands of the poskim that in any place where the Ra'avad, of blessed memory, did not dispute him, he agrees with him. Rather, it is certain that he only spoke regarding a condition for a later time, as is explained there, and also in this he is not dealing at all with a condition of "from now."

And so the Ramban, of blessed memory, who holds that even regarding a condition of "on the condition that you give me two hundred zuz" he can cancel it, this is when she also agrees to its cancellation, and then the get is cancelled, but he himself cannot cancel it, as the Ran, of blessed memory, wrote in his name (in chapter 7). But that it should be in his power to cancel the condition and uphold the get without the condition, we have not heard from his words. And the Ran himself holds that even both of them cannot cancel it except regarding a condition that is for her benefit, see there. And on the contrary, the Maggid Mishneh wrote that the Ramban and the Rashba decided like the Rambam, see there. And only the Mordekhai wrote (ibid.) and this is his wording: And it requires further study, for it is possible to say that "on the condition" and "from now" are only effective after the condition is fulfilled, but before it is fulfilled he can cancel it and can retract. Thus far his words. And there it deals even with a condition that she give two hundred zuz, see there. And also the Mordekhai did not rule explicitly so, but rather is in doubt about this. And since the majority of our teachers do not hold so, it seems this is the primary ruling. And nevertheless, since it came from the mouth of our teacher, the Rema, to be stringent, one should not be lenient except in a case of iggun and a time of pressing need (see the Gra, subsection 17, for it is implied from his words that the Ra'avad and the Rosh hold so, and it requires further study).

If he said to her, "On condition that you give me two hundred zuz from now until thirty days," and he died within the thirty days before she gave it to him, she cannot fulfill the condition and give it to the heirs, for "to me" implies to me specifically and not to the heirs (Gemara 74a and like the first Tanna). The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch in section 3 ruled that since it is "to me" and not "to my heirs," the divorce is voided and she must perform chalitzah or yibbum. From the wording of the Tur, it is implied that immediately upon his death the divorce is voided, and the logic is so, for it is impossible to fulfill it. However, from the wording of the Shulchan Aruch, who wrote "since the thirty days were completed and she did not give it to him, the divorce is voided," it is implied that before the completion of the thirty days the divorce is not yet voided, even though it is impossible to fulfill it. And so it is explained from the wording of the Rambam, chapter 8, end of law 21, see there. And he follows his reasoning in chapter 9, law 11, regarding one who says "from now if I do not come until twelve months" and died within the twelve months, that even though it is impossible for him to come, nevertheless, as long as the time has not passed she may not marry, for we require that the condition be voided in actual practice and not in potential as long as it has not come into practice (the Maggid Mishneh). And the Tur follows his reasoning in siman 144, that this which we are stringent regarding "from now if I do not come until twelve months" and he died, that she must wait until the completion of the twelve months, this is because we decree "died" on account of "did not die," but according to the essential law, since the condition cannot be fulfilled, the get is voided immediately and she may perform yibbum (so it appears to me).

The Rambam further wrote there: If he said to her, "This is your get on condition that you give me two hundred zuz," and he did not set a time, and he died before she gave it, she cannot give it to his heirs, for he only stipulated with her that she give it to him. Yet the get is not void, for he did not set a time. Therefore, even if the get was lost or torn before he died, she may not marry a stranger until she performs chalitzah. Thus far his words. And so wrote the Shulchan Aruch there. This too is according to his reasoning, that even though it is impossible for the condition to be fulfilled since he died, nevertheless, as long as it has not been voided in actual practice—meaning that the time he set passed and she had not yet given it—the get is not completely void. Consequently, when he did not set a time, it will never come to fruition, and therefore she may not marry without chalitzah. The Tur cited his words and disputed him with this wording: And I do not understand his words; since she can never fulfill the condition, if so, why should the get not be void? Thus far his words. And he does not hold of this distinction between potential voidance and actual voidance, since it can never come to fruition.

And regarding the core of the matter, that they ruled "to me" specifically and not to my heirs, in the Gemara (74a) there is a dispute regarding this, as Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel holds "to me" and even to my heirs, and the Rambam and the Tur and Shulchan Aruch ruled like the first Tanna. However, there are those who rule like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, that she may give to the heirs (Hagahot Maimoniot chapter 8 in the name of the Tosafot), and so it is explained from the words of our teacher, the Rema, in section 8, that regarding any delay where the delay is not caused by her, one must be stringent, and there it will be explained with the help of Heaven (and so wrote the Beit Shmuel, subsection 5). However, in this law, it appears to me that there is no practical difference, for what will she gain if she gives to the heirs? Ultimately, we will not exempt her without chalitzah due to the opinion of the Rambam and the Tur and Shulchan Aruch. Rather, the practical difference is when he set a time that she shall not be wed in yibum when the time arrives, and she always performs chalitzah and does not wed in yibum; and even this is only when she gives to the heirs. But if she does not give, then according to all opinions the get is void when the time arrives, and according to everyone she either performs chalitzah or weds in yibum. And if so, what will she gain if she gives to the heirs? And one cannot say that she would gain when it is not her desire to wed in yibum, for then if she gives to the heirs, the beit din will not allow the yavam to wed her in yibum and we would compel him to perform chalitzah for her according to her will; for one way or the other, if they wish to compel her to yibum, they will not accept the money from her and the get will be void, as a giving against one's will is not called a giving, as will be explained, unless the heir is the father and he accepts the money, and automatically the brother will not have the ability to wed her in yibum.

And know that this which we wrote according to the opinion of the Rambam, that as long as the condition has not yet been realized, even though it is impossible to fulfill, nevertheless until the time arrives she is not considered divorced; and so wrote the Maggid Mishneh. And if so, how did the Rambam write regarding "from now if you do not give me two hundred zuz within thirty days" that she may marry immediately and we do not fear lest she not fulfill her condition? Granted that she will fulfill it, but the condition has still not been realized. And it is necessary to distinguish between the annulment of the condition and the fulfillment of the condition; for in the fulfillment of a condition, even though it has not yet been realized, it is as if it were fulfilled, whereas this is not so regarding its annulment. And there is a great reason for the matter, for that which the condition annuls the act is a decree of the Torah, and therefore we require all the laws of conditions. Therefore, in the fulfillment of a condition to uphold the act, it is considered as fulfilled with "from now" because the act has already been established. This is not so regarding the annulment of a condition to annul the act; we do not say that the act is annulled until the annulment of the condition is realized. And as long as the annulment has not been realized, the act is not annulled, for it has already been done (so it appears to me):

However, the wording of the Rambam who wrote, "even though the get was lost, she may not marry until she performs chalitzah," is very puzzling. For this is no novelty at all, as it is obvious that since it is impossible for the condition to be fulfilled, the get is void and she requires chalitzah; the novelty is that she is forbidden from performing yibbum. If so, he should have said: even though the get was lost, she performs chalitzah and does not perform yibbum (Mishneh LaMelech). There are further linguistic precision issues with his wording (see there in the Mishneh LaMelech). And it appears to me that this is what he meant to say: that even without setting a time, we say "to me and not to my heirs," so that we should not say that since he did not set a time for her giving and it is within her power to give whenever she wishes, even after a long time, he certainly intended that even when he dies she should give them to his heirs—we do not say so. Rather, even in such a case, it is "to me and not to my heirs." Therefore, the get is never void, for it is within her power to give them even after a long time, and even if the get was lost during his lifetime—for it has already been explained that regarding a condition of "from now" we are not concerned with the loss of the get, and she fulfills the condition after his death. And I would have said that in such a case where the get was already lost during his lifetime, it is obvious that his intention was that she should fulfill it even after his death by giving it to his heirs, for after the get was lost, the bond between them was already released; for this he informs us that even in such a case, it is impossible for the condition to be fulfilled, and therefore she may not marry until she performs chalitzah.

From the words of the Rambam it has been explained that when he said, "on condition that you give me two hundred zuz," and did not establish a time, she is able to give even after many years. And even though above in siman 114 we hold that one who marries a woman and stipulated to support her daughter for five years is obligated to support her immediately for the first five years, as is written there, and so it is stated explicitly in the Yerushalmi Ketubot (chapter 12), it can be said that it is not comparable. For there, he betrothed her on this condition, and we are witnesses that her intention was on this condition, for her daughter needs to eat, and therefore the obligation takes effect immediately. This is not the case here, where certainly she requested the get from him, for if not so, who is forcing her to give money? And when he gives her the get on condition that she gives to him, it is dependent on her will; whenever she desires, she shall give. Nevertheless, even here, if according to the matter it appears that his intention was that she fulfill the condition immediately—such as "on condition that you serve my father for two years" or "on condition that you nurse my son for two years"—certainly his intention was for the first two years, as is proven from what will be explained regarding this with the help of Heaven. And the reason is that since the father needs service and the son needs nursing, why would he wait for a later time? Therefore, the obligation takes effect immediately, which is not the case with "on condition that you give me two hundred zuz," as I have written (and see Mishneh LaMelekh chapter 8, halakha 22, and I have written what appears correct in my humble opinion).

The Rambam wrote (ibid.): "Behold, this is your get on condition that you give me two hundred zuz from now until thirty days; if she gave it within thirty days with his consent, she is divorced; after thirty days, she is not divorced. If she gave it to him against his will and he does not want to accept it, this is a pasul get until she gives it with his consent. If he went back and said to her within the thirty days, 'Behold, they are forgiven to you,' she is not divorced, for the condition was not fulfilled." Thus far his words. And behold, that which he wrote, that with giving against his will the get is pasul, his intention is that it is pasul by rabbinic decree, because he holds that according to the essential law, giving against one's will is considered giving, and therefore from the Torah the get is kosher, but nevertheless it is pasul by rabbinic decree (Beit Shmuel, subsection 7). And in the Gemara (75a) there is a dispute regarding this, and the Rosh and the Rashba ruled that she is doubtfully divorced and it is a doubt of Torah law (and so wrote the Ran in the name of others there). And even according to the opinion of the Rambam, it appears that this is specifically when he at least accepted them; and some say that even if he did not accept them, since she wanted to give, it is considered giving according to the law for the Rambam (Beit Yosef in the name of his teacher). And some have inferred this from his wording where he wrote "and he does not want to accept" (and so wrote the Beit Shmuel, subsection 7). And they also wrote that when he accepted them, even against his will, according to everyone it is considered giving (ibid.), but this is not implied from the words of the Rosh and the Rashba, see there. Therefore, for the law, in any case she is doubtfully divorced and one should not be lenient in this; and not in his presence, it is certainly not considered giving.

And that which he wrote, that if he went back and said within the thirty days "it is unconsecrated to you," she is not divorced, and it implies that the get is certainly void, and even if he died afterward (ibid. subsection 8), for the condition was not fulfilled at all. And it has already been explained that with "on condition" and with "from now," he cannot add to his condition or void it. And we do not say that a waiver is like the fulfillment of the condition, as in one who says "I am as if I have received it," for the condition was to cause her distress, and he did not cause her distress (Gemara 74b).

The Rashba, of blessed memory, wrote (ibid.) that all this applies when he says "they are forgiven to you," but if he said to her "let this be a get" without any condition, she is divorced and he does not need to take it from her. The reason for the matter is that certainly he does not have the power to nullify the condition based on the first giving, but if he nullifies the first giving and performs another giving without a condition, she is divorced through this giving. And if it is difficult, for if so, he should have taken it from her and returned to give it to her, for in truth this is not an impediment, and this is similar to what was written in siman 138 regarding one who gave her the get while she was sleeping and she woke up, and he said to her "this is your get," it is sufficient and he does not need to take it from her, see there; for even without taking it from her, it is considered another giving. And it is not similar to a messenger when he did not say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" at the time of the giving, where he must take it from her hand and return to give it to her and say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," as was written in siman 142, for there the enactment was thus, that he should say it only at the time of giving, as was written there. And also it is not similar to what was written in siman 137 regarding one who says to her "behold you are divorced except for so-and-so," where he must take it from her hand and permit her to everyone in a second giving, for there the reason is because the first giving was effective to disqualify her from the priesthood, as was written there, and therefore it is necessary to perform a second giving. This is not the case here, for without the fulfillment of the condition she is not disqualified from the priesthood and the first giving is of no effect at all, and therefore the second statement that he says to her "let this be a get" or "this is your get" without any condition is considered like a new giving, for the first giving is considered as if he gave it to her now. (And what the Beit Shmuel wrote at the end of subsection 9 requires great study, and perhaps there is a printing error there, and this is how it should be: "nevertheless he can nullify the giving etc.") And see what I wrote in section 60, see there.

And know that we have learned in the Tosefta (chapter 5): "Behold, this is your get on condition that you give me two hundred zuz," and he then went back and said to her, "Behold, this is your get from now," he has said nothing. What should he do? He should take it from her hand and go back and give it to her. Thus far its words. It follows that another giving is required, for indeed, regarding one who gave it to her while she was sleeping and she woke up, there is a dispute in the Gemara (78a) whether another giving is required or not, see there. And we maintain like the one who says that another giving is not required, and the Tosefta maintains like the other, and we do not maintain so (Rashba ibid.).

If he said to her, "Behold, this is your get on the condition that you give me such-and-such a vessel or such-and-such a garment," and the like, and the vessel or the garment was lost or stolen, even if she gave him a thousand zuz for its value, it is not a get until she gives him that vessel or that garment that he specified. And thus the halacha was decided in the Gemara (75a, not according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel). And the reason is that the condition was not fulfilled, for money is not a garment, and we do not say "what difference is it to me whether it is the object itself or its value," for ultimately the condition was not fulfilled. Furthermore, presumably anyone who divorces does so out of hatred, therefore we say that he certainly intends to cause her distress, and his intention was only for the garment or the vessel (Rashi 74b; and that which he wrote in the language of doubt, see Beit Shmuel subsection 8). And here too, if he wishes to perform another giving, he does not need to take it from her, but only that he should say to her, "Behold, this is your get" without any condition, and it is like another giving, as was written in section 42 in the name of the Rashba (and such is the intention of the Rambam, as the Maggid Mishneh wrote).

And regarding the law that has been explained, the Rosh wrote, and this is his wording: And it appears that with his consent it is a get, and even though "they are forgiven to you" is not a get, it is different there because she did not cause him distress, but here where she gave money and caused him distress over the garment itself, he can forgive. Thus far his words. And so wrote the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch in section 6, and this is his wording: And there is one who says that if he is reconciled to the acceptance of the money, it is a get. Thus far his words. And the matters are perplexing, for if so, one must say that the dispute in the Gemara is when he is not reconciled to the acceptance of the money, and it is impossible to say so, for behold, a giving against one's will is not a giving according to everyone. And it is possible to distinguish that specifically when he retracts from his condition entirely, in that he does not want to receive according to the condition, in this we say that against one's will it is not a giving; but when he wants the fulfillment of the condition and the difference is between the vessel and its value, it is a giving (and this is the intention of the Beit Shmuel, subsection 10). And from the Rashba it is explicitly clear that even if it is his will to receive money, this is not a fulfillment of the condition, see there. And therefore, one must look further into this law, and it is a legal doubt, and several of the great authorities took issue with this (Rashi, and the Drisha and Perisha, and the Bach, and the Maharashak).

If he said to her, "on condition that you give me two hundred zuz from now until thirty days," even if she did not give them to him until the end of the thirtieth day, she is divorced. And if he said to her at the beginning of the first day of the month, "from now until thirty days," and she gave him the money at the end of the first night of the second month, she is doubtfully divorced, for we are in doubt whether thirty days means twenty-four hour periods and they have already passed, or thirty days as people say and there is no concern regarding the fact that one night passed; and she requires a second get. And if he died before he could give her a second get, she performs chalitzah and does not undergo yibbum (Tur).

The Rambam wrote in chapter 8, law 19: If he stipulated with her that she perform this action without specification, this is as if he specified one day, since he did not specify how much time she should perform it. How so? If he said to her, "This is your get on condition that you perform labor for me," "on condition that you serve my father," or "on condition that you nurse my son," if she performed labor for him or served his father for one day, or if she nursed his son for one day within the time that the son nurses, which is within twenty-four months, this is a get. If the son died or his father died before she nursed or served, it is not a get. If he said to her, "on condition that you nurse my son or serve my father for two years," she must complete the time he specified. If the son or the father died within the time, or if the father said, "I do not wish for you to serve me," it is not a get, for the condition was not fulfilled, and so too in any similar case. Thus far his words. (And he ruled according to Rav Ashi (page 75b) as the Rif wrote there, and he also ruled according to the first Tanna of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel in the Mishnah there, that even in a case of a delay that is not caused by her, it is not a get).

And even though in monetary laws when a person obligates himself indefinitely his intention is for the entire time that this matter is required, in bills of divorce this is the reason: for we established that anyone who divorces his wife intends to cause her distress, and not for his own benefit, for most divorces are due to hatred, and for her distress one day is sufficient. This is not the case in monetary laws; when he says "on condition that you serve" or "provide sustenance," certainly his intention is for the entire time that is necessary (Ran in the name of the Rashba). And so we explained in Choshen Mishpat siman 60, section 6, with the help of Heaven, see there. And one should not say: from where do we know that he only intends to cause her distress, perhaps he also intended for his own benefit? For it can be said that if so, he would have specified that she nurse or serve for such and such a time in order to cause her more distress; rather, certainly since he did not specify, his intention was only for distress, and one day is sufficient (it appears to me). Therefore, if the son or the father died before the nursing or service, it is not a get, for behold his condition was not fulfilled at all, as his intention was to cause her distress and she was not distressed; and even without this, it is necessary that his condition be fulfilled. Therefore, if he stipulated two years and they died before the time, or if the father does not want her service even though she did not provoke him and the delay is not from her, nevertheless, ultimately the condition was not fulfilled (and so wrote the Ran according to the method of the Rambam, see there). And some say that according to this method (of Rav Ashi), in an indefinite case where one day is sufficient, if they died beforehand and she did not nurse or serve at all, it is a get; since he did not specify the time, his intention was for when it would be necessary, and when it is not necessary, the condition does not impede (Tosafot and Rashba). And certainly one must follow the stringency in all cases (Beit Shmuel, subsection 15). And in truth, in the Yerushalmi (ibid.) there is a dispute regarding this, see there. And so some say if he stipulated two years and they died before the completion of the two years, or if the father does not want her service and she did not provoke him, it is also a get, for any delay that is not from her, it is a get (the Rosh in the name of Rabbeinu Tam and the Ri, and like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel). And it is simple that in this also one must follow the stringency in every matter, since it is a dispute of the great authorities.

But the Rosh, of blessed memory, and other Rishonim ruled that even if he said generally, "on condition that you nurse my son" or "that you serve my father," she must nurse for up to two years for the child, and for the father she must serve all the days of his life (like Rava ibid.), for since he did not specify the time, his intention was for the entire time they are in need. And in this, it is simple that if she began to nurse or to serve for even one hour and they died, it is a get, for the condition has been fulfilled. But in a case where he says, "I do not want her service," even if she did not provoke him, this requires deliberation. The mind leans more toward the view that in such a case, when he did not set a time and she began to serve and the father no longer wants her service and she did not provoke him, it is called a fulfillment of the condition (and so wrote the Beit Shmuel at the end of subsection 16, and so it appears from the arrangement of the Mishnah, that the dispute of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel and the Sages is only regarding the setting of a time, and so it appears from the Rishonim).

It appears to me that regarding "on condition that you perform labor for me," even the Rosh agrees with the Rambam that when he spoke indefinitely, one day is sufficient. For if not so, what limit is there to the matter? It is understandable regarding nursing, which is all the time that the child is not yet two years old; and regarding serving the father, it is all the days of the father's life; and all the days of the life of so-and-so is considered severance, as will be explained. However, regarding the performance of labor indefinitely, if we were to say that it is without limit and she would be required to perform labor all the days of her life, this is not severance at all, like "on condition that you do not drink wine all the days of your life," as will be explained. And presumably, his intention was not to stipulate a condition because of which the get would be void. Yet it is possible to say that since he said "on condition that you perform labor for me," the condition is for all the days of his life and it is severance, as will be explained, and it requires further study.

The Tur wrote that during the time period she is not permitted to marry, lest she not fulfill the condition. Thus far his words. And I do not know what this comes to teach us, for regarding all conditions the Tur holds that she is not permitted to marry prior to the fulfillment of the condition, and he already explained this; see there. And it appears to me that it comes to teach us that even according to the opinion of the Rambam, that regarding any condition of "from now" or "on condition" she is permitted to marry and we do not fear lest she not fulfill it, as he wrote, nevertheless, in a condition such as this which depends on the hands of others—such as regarding service, lest the father not desire her service, and regarding nursing, lest the child die within the time he established or not desire to nurse from her or her milk cease, and the like—the Rambam also admits that she shall not marry until the fulfillment of the condition when he established a time. And according to the opinion of the Rosh, even when he did not establish a time, as has been explained.

In that which has been explained, that according to the Rosh, even in an unspecified case she must nurse until the child is twenty-four months old, and consequently, if the child is one year old at the time of the get, she is not required to nurse for two years but rather for one year, and so too in any similar case. The Tur wrote in the name of the Ramah that this is when the condition was made before the child was two years old; we say that his intention was until the child is two years old. But if the condition was made after the infant completed two years, we say his intention was for any time that the child is fit to nurse, even four or five years. And the Rosh disagrees in this, for on the contrary, when the condition was made afterward, even if she only nursed him for one hour, she has fulfilled her condition. Thus far his words. And the reasoning is so, for in this case he certainly only intends to cause her distress and not for his own benefit, and one hour is sufficient (see the glosses of Maharalnach that there is no difficulty from the Gemara which did not answer in this manner, and delve into this).

He further wrote: It appears to me that if he said, "on condition that you nurse my son for six months," we see if there remains of the time of the nursing of the fetus—that is, until he is two years old—more than six months, then certainly he did not intend to distress her, but rather to lighten her burden so that she should not nurse until the offspring is twenty-four months old. And if so, if the son died after she nursed a little, it is a get. But if there did not remain six months for the nursing of the fetus, then certainly since he specified six months, he intended to distress her, and if he died within six months, it is not a get. Thus far his words. Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote on this: And his words are not compelling. Thus far his words. And he did not explain his reason. And it appears to me that his reason is that since we hold that even with a hindrance that is not from her it is not a get when he fixed a time and she did not complete the time, as I have written, if so, how is this law different? And it must be said that the Tur holds that since he is entitled to nurse more than six months, and he lightened her burden to only six months, presumably his intention was also that if he should not need even the six months, it should be a get (see Bach). And in truth, this is not compelling, for perhaps he did not want the offspring to nurse two full years, and from where do we have the right to be lenient in this? Therefore, it is a legal doubt (and I wonder that in the Shulchan Aruch none of these laws were mentioned at all, see there).

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 9: Some say that when we say she nursed or served for one day it constitutes a get, it is not specifically one day, for even one hour is sufficient; and there is one who says specifically one day, like the night of Shabbat and its day. Thus far his words. And his words are perplexing, for that which we said that one day is not specific is in a case of an unspecified duration, as the Tosafot and the Tur wrote, and regarding this no man would ever disagree, and this is the law that he himself mentioned previously in section 8; why then did he write this in the phrasing of "some say"? And that which he wrote, "and there is one who says specifically one day, like the night of Shabbat and its day," this is the opinion of the Ramah in the Tur when he explicitly stated "one day," and he holds that it is not effective even for a twenty-four hour period if it is not a complete night and day, as is explained in the Tur; and what relation do these have to one another? (And this is the intention of the Beit Shmuel, subsection 18).

However, his intention is clear, but he was concise in his words. For behold, from the words of the Ran it is explicitly proven that even where he specified "one day," one hour is sufficient. For in the Gemara there is an interpretation: "here it is unspecified, here it is specified," and it means to say that when unspecified, she requires up to two years, and when specified "one day," one day is sufficient (the interpretation of Rava). And the Ran wrote that according to everyone, "one day" is not literal, but rather even one hour. Thus far his words. And he means to say that according to all the interpretations it is so. And he wrote this previously regarding the entire sugya, that this is specifically where she had not begun to nurse at all, but if she had begun to nurse, in a case where she does not require up to two years, it is sufficient. And it is explicitly implied that this also refers to specifying "one day," see there. Therefore, he wrote this in the name of "there are those who say," and consequently this opinion is divided from the opinion of the Ramah in the Tur. Also from the words of the Rashba it is explicitly clear that he does not hold like the Ramah, for he wrote: regarding one who specifies "one day," even though he is lenient with her, he spoke specifically, and if he died before she nursed him, she is not divorced. Thus far his words. And it is explicitly implied that if she only nursed him a little, she is divorced, for since he said "one day," his intention was not specifically for a day, but rather meaning to nurse him a little. Therefore, as a matter of law, it is a doubtful get (and because in the Shulchan Aruch the law of specifying "one day" was not mentioned at all, the Beit Shmuel was therefore troubled by his words, as he thought that he was referring to an unspecified case).

If he made a condition with her on the condition that she pay the nursing fee, it is stated in the Yerushalmi that even according to the one who holds that in an unspecified case one day is sufficient, nevertheless, when he said "the nursing fee," his intention is for the entire two years. Furthermore, it is implied there that if the son died before the two years, she does not need to pay more, since she paid for the entire time that he was alive (see Beit Shmuel subsection 12, and he was brief in his words). But if she did not begin to pay at all, even if he died, it is not a get, for the condition was not fulfilled at all. And if he said, "on the condition that you pay two years of fees," even if he died beforehand, she must pay him in full, for in the Yerushalmi it is explicitly implied that this is as if he said, "on the condition that you nurse for two years," see there. And it appears to me that this is what we learned in the Tosefta (chapter 5): "On the condition that you serve my father for two years," "on the condition that you nurse my son for two years," the condition shall be fulfilled even after death. Thus far its words. And there is no other interpretation for this except certainly that it deals with a case where he said the nursing fee of two years or the service fee of two years, and the father or the child died before the two years, she shall pay the fee until two years to the husband.

It is stated in the Gemara (76a): Our Rabbis taught: If he said to her in the presence of two, "This is your get on condition that you serve my father for two years," and then returned and said to her in the presence of two, "This is your get on condition that you give me two hundred zuz," the latter statement did not nullify the first. If she wishes, she serves him; if she wishes, she gives him two hundred zuz. But if he said to her in the presence of two, "This is your get on condition that you give me two hundred zuz," and then returned and said to her in the presence of two, "on condition that you give me three hundred zuz," the latter statement nullified the first. Rashi explained that in the first instance, he did not deliver the get to her in their presence, for had he delivered it to her, she would have been divorced under that condition and he would no longer be able to stipulate another condition; rather, he said thus in their presence: "When I deliver it to her, I will only deliver it on this condition." Thus far his words. And in the second instance, he delivered the get to her (ibid.). We have already written this in the name of the Rambam, of blessed memory, that regarding a condition of "on condition," he can neither add to it nor nullify it, and therefore Rashi, of blessed memory, was compelled to explain thus, and so wrote the Tur; see there. And it is simple that according to the opinion we explained, that even regarding a condition of "from now" he can nullify it, the baraita would be explained according to its plain meaning.

And behold, the Rambam, of blessed memory, transcribed the language of the Gemara in chapter 8, law 18, and did not explain it. By necessity, one must say that his intention is also like the explanation of Rashi, since he holds that with "al menat" one cannot cancel, and this is a strained interpretation. It appears more likely that the Rambam is dealing with a condition of "im" (if) and not with "al menat" (the Maggid Mishneh). It appears explicitly so, for he wrote "one who gives a get to his wife on condition etc." and omitted the language of the Gemara of "al menat." He holds that the Baraita holds that "al menat" is not like "from now," and therefore he can cancel; but we rule that it is like "from now." He was forced to explain thus, for indeed, according to the explanation of Rashi it is difficult: since in the first instance he did not hand it to her, and in the second instance he handed it to her, we should only follow the second instance at the time he handed it to her. This is indeed the opinion of the Ramban, of blessed memory, as the Maggid Mishneh wrote there, and he added to say that the Gemara is dealing with a case where even in the second instance he had not yet handed it to her, and afterwards he handed it to her without specification in the presence of the two groups of witnesses. The Ran wrote similarly, see there. This is the opinion of our teacher, the Rema, in section 10, see there; however, he should not have written this upon the words of the author [the Mechaber], which are like the words of the Rambam who omitted the language of "al menat." It is possible that he holds like the first excuse, that the Rambam and the author are dealing with "al menat" and he did not hand it to her in the first instance, and like the explanation of Rashi, for so it implies in the Tosefta, see there.

However, in truth, one can say regarding the intent of the Rambam according to its plain meaning that it deals with "on condition" and he handed it to her the first time, for it has already been explained in section 42 that even though he cannot nullify, nevertheless when he performs another giving and says to her, "let this be your get without any condition," it is within his power to do so, and he does not need to take the get from her, as was written there in the name of the Rashba. According to this, it is well-settled, for here it is explained in the language of the Gemara that when he said to her the second time, "behold this is your get on condition," and she consented to this, it is like another giving (see the Ran). However, the Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch did not write according to the language of the Gemara, but rather they wrote, "and he went back and stipulated another condition," see there. And what is clarified in his words is as I wrote previously, that it does not deal with "on condition" but rather with a condition of "if" (and see Beit Shmuel, subsection 19):

And know that from the explanation of Rashi and from the Tur it is proven that they do not hold like the words of the Rashba that we wrote in section 42. For according to the Rashba, who holds that with another giving one can nullify the previous condition even in a case of "on condition," if so, what compelled them to explain that he did not hand it to her in the first giving? Rather, it is certain they hold that even in such a case he cannot nullify it, even when she also agrees to this, unless she returns the get to him and he performs an actual second giving, and like the plain meaning of the Tosefta that we brought in section 43, see there. And also the Ran, of blessed memory, wondered at this law, and this is his wording: And certainly this is a matter of wonder, for since he gave it to her "on condition," which is like saying "from now," how is it in the hands of both of them to nullify it? Thus far his words. And he is dealing there with one who says to her afterward, "Behold, this is your get on condition etc.," which is like another giving. Therefore, this law of the Rashba is a legal doubt, and one must be stringent in every case.

And we learned from the words of our Sages, of blessed memory, that when one stipulated two conditions one after the other, if they are regarding one matter, the latter canceled the former, whether the second condition adds to the first, such as where in the first he said a maneh and in the second two hundred, or the opposite, that it detracts from the first (Tur). And if the second condition is regarding a different matter, the latter did not cancel the former, and she has the ability to choose whichever condition she desires. And if they made the first condition before Reuven and Shimon and the second before Levi and Yehuda, and the second condition is regarding a different matter such that it did not cancel the first, he must subsequently deliver it before all of them, and then she has the ability to choose whichever condition she desires, and not in any other manner (as is implied by the words of the Maggid Mishneh and our teacher, the Rema, and examine this closely). And our Sages, of blessed memory, said there that one witness from the first ones and one witness from the latter ones do not join together when the second condition was regarding a different matter, and they do not join together to testify that there was a condition in this get. And as long as two from the first testimony or two from the latter do not come, the get is kosher by means of the signatures of the witnesses, and it is not within their power to establish a condition in the get (Ran there). And the reason that a witness from this one and a witness from that one do not join together, even though in all prohibitions and monetary laws they do join together, is because every condition is a truly different matter (Beit Shmuel subsection 2).

If he said to her, "Behold, this is your get and the paper is mine," she is not divorced (Gemara 20b), for since the paper is his, he has given her nothing, and it is found that the letters are flying in the air (Rashi). But if he said, "on condition that the paper is mine," she is divorced, for "on condition" is like "from now," and it is like a gift on condition of return, which is considered a valid giving. And this is specifically when she returned it in the end so that the condition was fulfilled, and then it is a get from the moment it reached her hand (Tosafot). But if "on condition" were not like "from now," and the taking effect of the get was at the time of the fulfillment of the condition, then the get would have already been returned to him, and with what would she be divorced? And it has already been explained in siman 38 that regarding "on condition" one does not require the laws of conditions, though there are those who disagree on this; see there where we have elaborated on this. And if he said to her, "Behold, this is your get and the paper between line and line is mine," and nevertheless the get would be connected so that it is one scroll, it was a question that was not resolved in the Gemara there, and it is a doubtful get.

It has already been explained in siman 38 that a condition that is impossible to fulfill is not a condition, and the condition is void while the act remains valid, for it is nothing more than an exaggeration and he says this merely as a joke, since he knows that this is among the impossibilities. Therefore, if he said to her, "This is your get on the condition that you ascend to the firmament," or "on the condition that you descend to the depths," or "on the condition that you swallow a reed of four cubits," and similar matters, it is not a condition and the get is valid. However, if it is possible to fulfill it, but a prohibition rests upon it, such as if he said to her, "on the condition that you eat pork," and similar things, it is a condition, for what does he care if she eats a prohibited item? On the contrary, it is possible that his desire is to take revenge upon her, as if saying, "If you desire the get, eat pork and let them lash you," and his intention is for a complete condition. And one should not ask how it is in his power to stipulate a condition to transgress the words of the Torah, for is it not so that one who stipulates against what is written in the Torah, his condition is void? This is not a question, for he is not forcing her to do this, and if she does not desire this, she will not be divorced; for he is not forcing her to be divorced and transgress—let her not be divorced and not transgress. And it is not similar to one who betroths on the condition that "you have no claim of conjugal rights against me," where his condition is void, for there he stipulates against himself, and how can he transgress the words of the Torah? Since he desires the kiddushin, his condition is void. But regarding a get, and similarly regarding kiddushin when the condition is upon her, the condition certainly takes effect and the choice is in her hand. And according to this, it appears to my humble opinion that in a case where it is a mitzvah from the Torah to divorce her, he does not have the power to stipulate such a condition, but I have not found this law in the poskekim, and it requires further study for the law.

This ability of his to stipulate a condition regarding a prohibition applies when the prohibition affects her alone, for the reason we have written. However, regarding a prohibition that affects another, such as a prohibited act of intercourse—for example, if he said to her, "on condition that you have intercourse with my father" or "with your father" or "with other forbidden relations"—it is not a valid condition. For he certainly knows that the other person will not listen to this, and his intention was not for a complete condition but rather to put her off with words, and the get is valid. And if the condition was "on condition that you have intercourse with so-and-so" who is not a forbidden relation to her, it is a valid condition, as will be explained before us with the help of Heaven.

If this condition was the opposite, "on condition that you do not have relations with my father" and the like, if she had relations with him, it is obvious that the get is void. However, ordinarily we do not concern ourselves with this, that perhaps she had relations with him, even if she was secluded with him, unless witnesses came stating that she had relations with him. We do not say in this case "the witnesses of seclusion are the witnesses of relations," for certainly they are not suspected of violating such a severe prohibition. Therefore, she may also marry another, and we do not fear that she will violate her condition by having relations with him, whereby the get would be voided. And it appears to me that if they were already suspected of this, even though there is no clear testimony but rather a persistent rumor, we certainly fear that she will violate her condition, and we do not allow her to marry unless he gives her another get without a condition. Why should we cause an increase of mamzerim in Israel? Such a licentious woman is certainly a duty to divorce, and therefore it is certainly proper to insist upon him to give a get without a condition (so it appears in my humble opinion). And if he said to her, "on condition that you do not marry my father," and she married him, it is a get in which he has no marriage with her.

The Tur wrote: If he said to her, "on condition that you marry so-and-so," it is a get like any other condition, and when she marries him the condition is fulfilled. However, the sages said (chapter 3): she may not marry that so-and-so, nor may she marry another. Not that so-and-so, lest they say they are exchanging their wives with one another as a gift; and she may not marry another as long as the condition has not been fulfilled by marrying so-and-so. And if she married that so-and-so, she does not leave. If she married another before she married that so-and-so, she must leave. And if she fulfills the condition by marrying that so-and-so, it is a get retroactively; and if she does not fulfill the condition, her children are mamzerim. Thus far his words. And the Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote in chapter 8, law 17, in this wording: If she married another before she married that so-and-so, the get is void and the offspring is a mamzer, and she requires a get from the second. Thus far his words. And they challenged him: why is the offspring a mamzer? Behold, when she marries that so-and-so the condition will be fulfilled (the Ra'avad), as the Tur wrote. However, his opinion appears to be that he holds the condition was that she marry that so-and-so first, and since she married another, the condition was voided and the get is void (the Maggid Mishneh). And so it appears, for certainly such was his opinion, since she is forbidden to marry another as long as that so-and-so has not married her and divorced her, and the other married her under the prohibition of a married woman. And that which the Rambam wrote, "she requires a get from the second," this is by rabbinic decree, so they should not say a married woman leaves without a get (ibid.), for even where they told her her husband died and she married, and afterwards the husband came, she requires a get from this one and from that one, as written in siman 17, and all the more so in a case like this, for not everyone knows of his condition.

Even according to the opinion of the Tur, if she married another and he divorced her, and she married that certain man and he divorced her, she is forbidden to return to the other, for it would be a case of returning his divorcee after marriage. Furthermore, even if the first husband died or gave her another get without a condition after she married the other, she is nevertheless forbidden to the other forever, and he must divorce her and never return to her; for since she married him under the prohibition of a married woman, she is forbidden to him as a perpetual prohibition, like a sotah who is forbidden to the husband and the paramour even after the death of the husband (ibid. in the name of the Ramah, and his wording is perplexing, see there). And I saw one who wrote that there are some among the Rishonim who hold that if she married another, she is permitted to that certain man even ab initio when the other divorces her, for in such a case it is not relevant to say "they give their wives as a gift," because another has intervened between them (Beit Shmuel, subsection 26, in the name of the Tosafot). And I wonder how a permission could be relevant in this matter, where the permission depends on her marrying another under the prohibition of a married woman; for behold, it is a more severe prohibition than the statement that they give their wives to one another as a gift. However, it is certainly true that when she married another and has children from him, he must necessarily divorce her and she shall marry that certain man in order to purify the children according to the opinion of the Tur. But if she has no children from the other, it is certainly not proper that she should marry that certain man (and the Tosafot did not write this according to the conclusion, as the Beit Shmuel himself wrote, and they wrote this regarding Rav Nachman, for according to the challenge of Rava it appears he held she could do so, see there).

All this applies if she married another, but if she was only betrothed to him and had not yet had intercourse, and she is not like a certain sota, she must leave and requires a get by rabbinic decree. And if the condition was fulfilled in that the specific individual married her, even if he divorced her afterward, she is forbidden to marry this other man to whom she was betrothed, for this is a case of one who remarries his divorcee from betrothal who had married another. However, if that specific individual did not marry her and the first husband died or divorced her with another get without a condition, she is permitted to return to the one who betrothed her.

From that which our Sages, of blessed memory, said, that she may not marry that certain individual so that they should not say that they give their wives to one another as a gift, our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 15 that even if he did not explicitly stipulate with her that she should marry a certain person, but rather it is evident that he divorced her because of this—for example, that certain person gave him money in order to divorce her, and he provides her with sustenance so that he may take her, and anything similar to this. Thus far his words. And certainly, if the beit din has the power to protest against such matters, the obligation is incumbent upon them, for this is among the paths close to zenut, and it is not proper for a man of Israel to do such things.

And if he said to her, "On condition that you have relations with so-and-so," it is obvious that one should not do so, for regarding this they would also say, "Their wives they give to one another as a gift," and so it is stated in the Yerushalmi. However, in this case there is a greater prohibition, for how is it possible for her to have relations with him? Behold, until the completion of his act of relations, she is a married woman, as the condition has not yet been fulfilled; and how can she have relations with him at the beginning of the act when she is still a married woman? But regarding marriage, this does not apply, for the status of marriage also exists without relations, and once she is married to him through huppah and kiddushin, the condition is fulfilled and the relations are permitted relations (ibid. subsection 24). But regarding "on condition that you have relations," behold, the beginning of the relations is in prohibition. Nevertheless, if the condition was fulfilled—that she had relations with him, whether through zenut or through marriage—behold, this is a get. And it appears to me from the sugya of the Shas (84b) that he is permitted to maintain her. And one should not ask: since there is a prohibition for that so-and-so to have relations with her, how can the condition take effect? For it has already been explained that when the prohibition also applies to another, such as "on condition that you have relations with my father," the condition does not take effect. One can say that in this case, that so-and-so can act permissibly by marrying her, and she will have relations with him permissibly (as is implied by Rashi there, s.v. "V'la'Abaye"), for marriage is included in the category of relations, but relations are not included in the category of marriage. And when he said, "On condition that you marry so-and-so," if she only had relations with him, it is not called fulfillment of the condition, and so it is implied by the poskim (so it appears in my humble opinion) (see in the Tur what he wrote in the name of the Rashba, and it requires further study).

And if the condition was the opposite, "on condition that you do not marry so-and-so," behold, according to that opinion in siman 137 that this is considered a reservation in the get, the get is nothing. However, according to most of the poskim that this is not a reservation in the get, as was written there, if he said plainly "on condition that you do not marry so-and-so," it is not a get at all, for this is not "severance" since she is bound regarding this forever, as will be explained. But if he said "on condition that you do not marry so-and-so until such-and-such a time," behold, this is a get and the condition shall be fulfilled, as will be explained.

The Tur wrote that she is permitted to marry immediately since it is in her power to fulfill it, for it is impossible for her to marry him except with her consent. There is no remedy to permit her to him unless the divorcer betroths her and returns to divorce her unconditionally. But there is no remedy to permit her by his taking it from her hand and returning to give it to her unconditionally, for it is already no longer in his possession, as he gave her a complete get, but merely placed a condition upon it. Thus far his words. And so it is in the Responsa of the Rosh (Klal 45, section 26). And one must examine this closely, for behold, many times we have explained in this siman that as long as the condition has not been fulfilled, he can perform another giving without a condition, and even without taking the get from her, as I wrote in section 42. And it is an explicit Tosefta regarding one who takes her get from her hand, as I wrote in section 43. And the Tur himself at the end of this siman wrote in the name of the Rosh regarding one who gave a get "from now if he does not come within two years," that he can nullify the condition and she may marry immediately; see there.

And it must be said that he holds that there is a distinction between one condition and another. For a condition that depends on the fulfillment of an action, such as "on condition that you give me two hundred zuz," like that of the Tosefta, or even if it does not depend on the fulfillment of an action but on the continuation of time, that he shall not come within two years, certainly it is not called a case where the get is completely finished, for it still lacks an action and lacks time. Therefore, he can cancel it or return and give it to her without a condition, for she is still bound to him. This is not the case with a condition such as this of "sit and do not act" which is in her power to fulfill, such as "on condition that you do not marry so-and-so," the get is considered finished and she is separated from him. And that which the Tur wrote regarding "on condition that you serve my father" and he went back and said to her "on condition that you give two hundred zuz," that specifically where he did not deliver the get to her the first time, for if he delivered it to her he cannot change the condition, this is a different matter; for behold, he did not come to perform another delivery but another condition, and this is not in his power according to the opinion of the Rambam at the beginning of this siman, that with "from now" he cannot cancel (see Bach and Beit Shmuel subsection 30, and the matters were not clarified to me, and it appears to me clear as I have written, and examine it). And know that if the husband died before she married any man, she is permitted to that so-and-so immediately (Beit Yosef) (and see the Gra subsection 40, and according to what I wrote all is well, and examine it).

But there is one who says that she may not marry until that certain person dies (the Rashba in the name of Rabbeinu Chananel), and our teacher, the Beit Yosef, brought these two opinions in section 16, see there; for according to this opinion, regarding all conditions, even those of "sit and do not act," she is forbidden to marry until the condition is fulfilled. Therefore, even if he said to her, "on condition that you do not drink wine" for a period of time, she is forbidden to marry within that time out of concern that perhaps she will transgress (ibid. 82b, s.v. "bekulhu"). However, the opinion of the Tur and most poskim is that regarding a condition of "sit and do not act," we do not fear that she will transgress. And so it is explicitly stated in the Tosefta (end of chapter 5), and this is its wording: "On condition that you do not go to your father's house from now until thirty days, on condition that you do not drink wine from now until thirty days, behold this is a get, and he does not fear lest she go or lest she drink." Thus far its words. And only regarding a condition of "arise and act," such as "on condition that you give me two hundred zuz," the Tur holds that she is forbidden to marry until the fulfillment of the condition; but according to the opinion of the Rambam, even in such a case she is permitted to marry, as has been explained.

And also our teacher, the Beit Yosef, even though he cited the opinion of "there is one who says," nevertheless it is clear that he does not hold accordingly as the law, for if it were not so, what is this that he wrote in section 21 regarding "on the condition that you do not go to your father's house until such-and-such a time," that one should not involve oneself in such a get because it is impossible for her to restrain herself from going to her father's house, and the get will turn out to be void and her children mamzerim. Thus far his words. Behold, according to the opinion of "there is one who says," we do not allow her to marry until the time of the fulfillment of the condition, and what concern of mamzerut is there in this? Rather, it is certain that he holds as the law like the Tur (see Beit Shmuel subsection 29 who wondered about the Shulchan Aruch for citing this opinion). And know that regarding a condition "that you shall not marry so-and-so," even if she committed adultery with that person, the get is valid, and the child, if it was from that cohabitation, is legitimate, for he only made the condition regarding marriage.

In a condition of "on the condition that you do not marry so-and-so until such-and-such a time," even if another person intervened—such as if after the get she married another and he divorced her without specification or she was widowed—nevertheless, the condition of the first remains standing, and she is still not permitted to that so-and-so until the time that the first established. And if she married him within the time he established, the get is voided and her children, even from the second, are mamzerim. And even though there is no marriage here, for if she marries him she is a married woman and there is no marriage with a married woman, nevertheless, such was the condition. And it is not similar to what was written regarding "on the condition that you do not marry my father," where marriage is not applicable, for there, even without a condition, the concept of marriage is not applicable; but in this case, the concept of marriage is applicable if not for the condition. And this is why he stipulated "on the condition that you do not marry so-and-so," meaning: since you are able to marry him and it is not my will, therefore I impose upon you that you shall not marry him, so that regarding his marriage, your law shall be like a married woman (and see Beit Shmuel subsection 31).

And know that that which we wrote, that even if she married another the condition was not voided, this is an explicit Gemara (83a) which says there: Behold, if this woman went and married one from the street and had children, and was widowed or divorced and married this one to whom she was forbidden, the get is void and her children are mamzerim, see there. However, regarding that which we wrote, that even though there is no marriage according to the law since she is a married woman, nevertheless such was the condition and it is not comparable to marriage to "Abba," so wrote the Rashba in his novellae there. But our teachers, the authors of the Tosafot there, compared them to one another and wrote that there is no status of marriage in this, just as with "to Abba" or "to your father," see there. And they wrote that when the Shas says she married this one to whom she was forbidden, the intention is that she married after the death of the divorcer, see there. And their words are puzzling, for behold, after his death we need neither his condition nor his get, and she is permitted by his death, as we wrote at the end of section 73, see there.

However, the truth is that there is a dispute of the great authorities in this matter, as some hold that even if the divorcer died, nevertheless his condition remains standing, and some disagree on this. The Tosafot hold that his condition remains standing, and this dispute is in the Bahag at the beginning of Hilkhot Gittin, and the Rashba cited it (page 83, starting with "Rather"). This is his wording: Certainly, if he said to her "all the days of the life of so-and-so" and she married immediately and had children during the life of the first husband, and the first husband died during the life of the second husband, and she had children after his death, and that so-and-so upon whom the condition was dependent is still alive, and she drank wine in his lifetime after the death of the husband, the get is void retroactively and the first children are mamzerim while the later ones are not mamzerim and she is forbidden to the second. And the Rabbis were divided on it: since during the life of the husband she did not violate his condition, and it was after death that she violated it, since the husband died, his condition is voided and the get is not voided retroactively. Thus far the words of the Bahag. Behold, it is a dispute of the Geonim regarding every condition that he stipulates with her for a certain duration of time, if the husband dies within the time: for there are some of the Geonim who hold that despite this she is forbidden to violate her condition throughout the duration, and if she violates it, the get is void retroactively; and there are some of the Geonim who hold that since he died, she does not need to fulfill her condition, for behold, she has now been permitted through his death and all the days of his life she fulfilled the condition. And the Tosafot hold like the opinion of those who forbid, and the Rashba also agreed to this and brought proof from that which our Sages, of blessed memory, said, that "all the days of your life" is not "severance" but "all the days of my life" is "severance," for even with "all the days of your life" it is possible to fulfill his condition when he dies and she is alive and she is permitted; rather, it is certainly like the words of those who forbid, see there. And that which we wrote at the end of section 73 is according to the opinion of those who permit.

The reasoning of those who forbid is simple: since he stipulated the condition for a duration of time, his intention was that it be fulfilled whether he lives or dies. Those who permit hold that anyone who divorces is not concerned at all with what will be after his death, and whatever condition he stipulates, his intention regarding its fulfillment is only for all the days of his life, and after his death she may do as she pleases. And that which the Sages, of blessed memory, said, "all the days of your life" is not "severance"—granted that she may be permitted upon his death, nevertheless, according to the language of the condition which binds her for all her days, this is not "severance." The Maggid Mishneh also cited this dispute in chapter 8, law 11, and agreed with the words of those who forbid, and wrote that the Rambam also holds accordingly, see there (and it is not definitive) (see Teshuvot Rabbi Akiva Eiger, siman 126). All of this is unrelated to what was written in section 34 regarding the opinion of the Rambam, who holds that it must come to fruition, see there, for they are unrelated to one another. Furthermore, there it concerns the nullification of a condition, for regarding its fulfillment we do not say so, as was written in section 37, and we proved this from the words of the Rambam himself, whereas here we are dealing with the fulfillment of a condition.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote in section 19: "On condition that you do not engage in relations with so-and-so," it is a get, but she may not marry until that so-and-so dies, for we concern ourselves that perhaps she will be forced into relations with him. Thus far their words. And the Rosh in chapter 9, siman 2, cited from the Tosefta: "On condition that you do not engage in relations with so-and-so," we concern ourselves that perhaps she will engage in relations with him. Thus far his words. And before us, the version in the Tosefta (chapter 4) is: "On condition that you do not engage in relations with so-and-so," this is a get, and he does not concern himself that she might go and engage in relations. Thus far its words. And it must be said that the version before us is corrupted. And one should not ask: behold, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch hold that we do not concern ourselves that she might violate her condition in a condition of "sit and do not act," as written in section 74, so why do we concern ourselves with this? For it can be said that she certainly will not violate it, but we concern ourselves that this so-and-so will overpower her by force, as has been explained in their words. And one should not ask: just as we do not concern ourselves in a condition of "on condition that you do not engage in relations with my father or your father" that she might engage in relations with them, as the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote in section 13—and we explained the reason is because there is no concern that they will violate a prohibition of ervah—if so, here too, how can we concern ourselves that so-and-so will come upon her against her will? For then the condition would be voided and she would be an eshet ish, and how could he violate a prohibition of ervah? And there is one who answered that the concern is perhaps he will engage in relations with her after the death of the divorcer (Beit Shmuel, subsection 32). And I wonder at this, for this is only according to those who hold that the condition continues even after his death, but according to those who disagree on this, as I wrote in section 78, this is no concern at all. Furthermore, even according to those who forbid it, why must we concern ourselves that the husband will die first? And it appears to me that the reason they concerned themselves with this is because certainly this divorcer, when he made such a condition "on condition that you do not engage in relations with so-and-so," she was presumably suspected with him, for if not so, what relevance does such a condition have? And since she was suspected with him, we certainly concern ourselves with the attack of the yetzer hara. But regarding "my father and your father," it is possible that he makes such a condition to provoke her or to provoke them. Furthermore, regarding arayot of kinship, the yetzer hara does not hold such sway, as is found in the Gemara (Yoma 69b); therefore we do not concern ourselves, whereas regarding an eshet ish, we do concern ourselves.

It is necessary that he does not stipulate a condition upon her that remains in effect all her days, such as "on condition that you do not eat meat" or "that you do not drink wine forever" or "all the days of your life." And thus our sages, of blessed memory, said (82b): "This is your get on condition that you do not drink wine all the days of your life"—this is not "severance," for nothing separates them but death, as until the day of her death she is bound to him (Rashi). And what benefit is the get? For after her death she does not require a get. But if he said "all the days of my life" or "all the days of the life of so-and-so," this is "severance," for after his death or after the death of so-and-so, she will be permitted to wine. And even though it would seemingly appear that since she is bound to him all the days of his life this is not "severance," just as in "all the days of your life," nevertheless, the reasoning of the Talmud is not so; rather, since it is possible for her to fulfill his condition, this is "severance." So wrote the Rashba, of blessed memory, there. And it must be said that the reason is that truly a condition is a separate matter, and we are not concerned with her being bound to him by the condition for all the days of his life. It is only in "all the days of your life," since she never has permission regarding the matter he forbade her, and until the day of her death she is bound to him in this matter by power of his marriage-tie which enables him to do so, it turns out that she is not completely severed from him all the days of her life regarding this matter. And the Torah said "a scroll of severance," that he shall sever her from him completely, and it is necessary to leave her a time in her life where she is completely severed from him. Therefore, in "all the days of my life," she will be severed from him after his death; and even though without this his death severs her from him, nevertheless, she has already been severed from her status as his wife during his lifetime from the moment of the get, and the condition is a different matter, and even in this small part she has permission during her life when he dies.

The poskim wrote that even if he is a youth and she is an old woman, or if he stated the condition for fifty years, during which she will certainly not live that long, this is a get, for we are only concerned with the phrasing—that in the phrasing of the condition there shall be a time for total severance. Therefore, there is one who wrote that even if he extended the time to more than the span of a human life, such as if he said for one hundred years or more, since it is a fixed matter, this is a get. All this is for the reason we explained, that a condition is a separate matter. According to most poskim, she may marry immediately and we are not concerned that she will violate her condition. We only cited a single opinion in section 74 that forbids her from marrying until the fulfillment of the condition; according to this opinion, when he distanced the time for her, she has no benefit from the get except that if she commits adultery, she is not judged as a married woman but as an unmarried woman. The main ruling follows the majority of poskim, for so they ruled in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch, and so it is explicitly in the Tosefta, as I wrote there.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 21: If he said to her, "on condition that you do not go to your father's house until such-and-after time," even though the get is valid and the condition is binding, no person should endeavor for a get to be given with such a condition, because it is impossible for her to restrain herself from going to her father's house, and the get will be found to be void and her children mamzerim. And if the one divorcing is among those whom we compel to divorce, and he did not want to divorce except with this condition, we compel him to divorce without this condition. Thus far his words. And it appears that the same applies if it is a mitzvah to divorce her, such as if she is licentious; even though we do not have the power to compel him, nevertheless, it is necessary to endeavor greatly that he should not give it upon such a condition. And it implies that regarding other conditions, such as "that you shall not eat meat" or "that you shall not drink wine," we are not concerned that she will transgress, and this is a wonder, for certainly one should be concerned about this as well; and perhaps his intention was indeed so, and he only cited it as a mere example. In any event, we have heard from his words that she is permitted to marry before the fulfillment of the condition, for if not so, what mamzerut is there in this? And as I wrote in section 75, see there. But if he said, "on condition that you do not go to your father's house forever," this is not "severance" (Gemara 21b), just as with "on condition that you do not drink wine forever." And even though when her father dies or sells the house to another it is no longer considered "her father's house," as we learned in Nedarim (46a): "Konam to your house that I enter," if he died or sold it to another, it is permitted—here, where he said "your father's house," it is different, for all his descendants are called "his father's house" even when he has died, as it is written regarding Tamar, "Remain a widow in your father's house," and her father had already died (Tosafot). And some say that in truth it deals with when he said "this house," which is forbidden forever as is stated in Nedarim there (Rashba, chapter 2). And even though in such a case if the house fell or was burned and they built another it is permitted, as is written in Yoreh Deah siman 216, nevertheless, it is not standing to fall or to be burned. And according to the Rambam it is settled without this, as will be explained with the help of Heaven (Ran). And regarding a sale, it must be said according to the first excuse that even when he sells it, perhaps he will buy it back from him (Mishneh LaMelech).

The Tur, of blessed memory: The Rambam wrote, if he said to her "on condition that you do not marry so-and-so," this is not severance, just like "on condition that you do not drink wine" or "that you do not go to your father's house." But this is not clear, for since it is possible that that so-and-so will die in her lifetime and the condition will be voided, it is properly severance; and it is not comparable to "that you do not go to your father's house," for even after his death she is forbidden to enter it, as it is called by her father's name. Thus far his words. And the reasoning of the Rambam is that she must not be bound by the ropes of the condition, for according to his words, it is forever. Therefore, when he stipulates that she not marry so-and-so, for all the days of his life she is bound by the condition, and after his death the condition is not relevant, for there is no marriage after death; and it turns out that with this condition she is bound forever, as long as the language of this condition is relevant. And even though after the death of so-and-so the condition is voided, behold, then the language of this condition is not relevant, and the language of marriage in the condition is forever, as long as marriage is relevant, just as it is with "on condition that you do not go to your father's house," where it is possible that when the father dies or sells it to another it is permitted to enter, but then it will not be her father's house; and it turns out that the language of the condition of "your father's house" is forever, as long as this language is relevant, and here it is the same (Ran and Maggid Mishneh). And according to what I wrote previously, she is forbidden in the house forever.

It is further possible to say that, behold, the Rambam wrote that if he said to her, "on condition that you do not marry so-and-so for fifty years," this is a get; see there. This is so even though it is possible, and almost certain, that she will not live another fifty years; rather, he holds that we follow the language of the condition. For when he stipulated "that you do not drink wine all the days of the life of so-and-so," he has set a limit to the matter—all the days of his life—and there is in his language a sense of severance, namely, after the days of his life. And so too when he stipulated for fifty years. But when he stipulated without qualification, "on condition that you do not marry so-and-so," where according to his language it implies forever, there is not in his language a sense of severance. And so too regarding "on condition that you do not go to your father's house." And you should know that this is so, for do we know regarding "all the days of the life of so-and-so" that he will die before she dies? And what shall we do if she dies first? Behold, she was forbidden for all the days of her life! Rather, we are not concerned for this, since according to the language of the condition he did not forbid her forever. And all the more so regarding the stringency, that when he forbade her in the language of the condition forever, this is not severance, even though it is possible that the condition will be annulled if he dies first (so it appears to me).

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 22 brought these two opinions and wrote: We adopt the words of both of them to be stringent, and it is simple. He further wrote in section 23: If he said to her, "On condition that you never drink this wine," or "that you never ascend this tree," or "this wall," and the wine was spilled, or the tree was cut down, or the wall fell, this is not "severance," since she was never permitted that which she was forbidden. And there are those who say that since the condition only continues as long as the wine exists, or the tree or the wall exists, this is "severance." And we adopt the words of both of them to be stringent. Thus far his words. And the first opinion is the opinion of the Rambam. And the Tur questioned him, for in the Tosefta (end of chapter 5) it is brought explicitly to the contrary, as it teaches: "On condition that you never ascend this tree," and the tree was cut down, behold this is a get. Thus far his words. However, before us in the Tosefta it is taught with a different wording, and this is its wording there: "On condition that you do not ascend this tree," and "on condition that you do not ascend this wall," if the tree was cut down or the wall was destroyed, behold this is a get. "On condition that you ascend this tree," "on condition that you ascend this wall," if the tree was cut down or the wall was destroyed, it is not a get. Thus far its wording. And the word "never" is not written. And the Rambam holds that since he did not say the word "never," and an ordinary tree and wall are destined to be cut down, there is no eternal connotation in this phrasing. This is unlike "on condition that you do not marry so-and-so," which has an eternal connotation in its phrasing since he did not set a limit to the matter. But regarding a wall and a tree, in an ordinary case, it is not eternal because they are destined to be cut down or fall. But when he says the word "never," she is forbidden even regarding a wall and a tree. And this is according to the approach we wrote regarding the opinion of the Rambam in the previous section; for according to the approach we wrote in section 84, ultimately she was forbidden by this condition of ascending the tree and wall forever, for after they fall, the term "ascent" no longer applies to them, as is understood.

However, in truth, in the Rambam the law of a wall and a tree is not found at all. This is his wording in chapter 8, law 11: Therefore, one who says, "This is your get on condition that you never eat this meat, that you never drink this wine," this is not a get, for this is not "severance"; until thirty days, this is a get. Thus far his words. And it is possible to say that only regarding a matter that involves pleasure, when he forbade it to her forever in this matter, it is called not being severed from him, for she is forced to restrain her desire because of his condition. And even if the wine is spilled or the meat is lost, ultimately she was forbidden forever by this condition, for after they are lost, eating and drinking are not applicable, as I have written. But regarding the climbing of a wall or a tree, which involves no desire, we are not concerned with this at all.