Siman 142

The sages taught in the Mishnah at the beginning of Gittin: One who brings a get from overseas must say, "In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed." And "from overseas" refers to outside of Eretz Yisrael (Rashi), for the Mishnah was taught in Eretz Yisrael. And why did they institute this? We establish in the Gemara that it is because witnesses are not commonly found to verify the signatures of the get, and if the husband should come and protest, saying that the get is a forgery, she will not obtain witnesses for verification and will remain an agunah. Therefore, they instituted that the messenger must say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," and the Rabbis established this as a verification so that the husband would not be believed afterward to protest and say it is a forgery, for the Rabbis believed the messenger like two witnesses. And the Rabbis strengthened this institution such that if the messenger did not say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," the get is invalid, as will be explained before us with the help of Heaven; for if they had not strengthened this institution, it would not have been maintained, and many women would have remained agunot due to the lack of verification. Therefore, our sages, of blessed memory, were compelled to strengthen the institution. However, in Eretz Yisrael, where witnesses are commonly found to verify it, they did not require this, for in any case, if he comes and protests, she will obtain witnesses for verification. Nevertheless, if even in Eretz Yisrael the messenger said "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," it is effective just as it is outside of Eretz Yisrael, as will be explained.

And one should not ask that if we come to be concerned for the husband’s protest, what did they achieve with their enactment? For the agent’s statement is only effective if the husband protests that it is a forgery; the rabbis believed him like two witnesses when he says that in his presence the scribe wrote it and the witnesses signed it and it is not a forgery. But what shall we do if the husband protests, saying that it is true that the witnesses signed, but he intentionally had disqualified witnesses sign, such as relatives or other types of disqualified persons, in order to cause her to stumble? And they asked this in the Yerushalmi (at the beginning of our tractate, see there), and thus they said there: that he is not suspected of causing her to stumble before Heaven, and only in a beit din is he suspected of causing her trouble. And since he knows that if he comes and protests, his protest is void, he too will have it signed by valid witnesses. And it means to say that in this, no son of Israel is suspected of causing her to stumble before Heaven so that she would come to a state of mamzerut; he is only suspected of this: to cause her distress in a beit din so that they will not permit her to marry, by saying it is a forgery, because he knows she will not find confirmation. And the claim of forgery must necessarily be accepted from him, as is the practice with all legal documents, for if we do not accept a claim of forgery, the entire world would be filled with forgeries. Therefore, naturally, when they enacted that the agent's statement stands in place of confirmation, and he knows they will not accept a claim of forgery from him, he will naturally not come and protest that he caused her to stumble before Heaven, for he is not believed to cause her to stumble before Heaven, and we are witnesses that if it is not a forgery and he had the witnesses sign, he had valid witnesses sign (as mentioned above in the explanation of the Yerushalmi).

And one also should not ask: if the reason is for the purpose of authentication, why must he say "in my presence it was written," for is not the authentication of a document only according to its signatories, as in all authentications of documents where they testify only to the signatures of the witnesses? They answered this in the Gemara at the beginning of Gittin: because this authentication is different from other authentications of documents, for in every authentication two witnesses are required for authentication, but regarding a get the sages, of blessed memory, believed the agent as two witnesses. Therefore, they enacted that he must also say "in my presence it was written" as a distinction, so that they should not come to confuse it with the authentication of general documents, whereby they might say that the authentication of a document is sufficient with one witness. And why, in truth, did they believe the agent alone as two? Because of the enactment for agunot, so that she should not need to trouble herself with the authentication of two witnesses.

And if it is difficult: by what power did the rabbis believe a messenger like two witnesses? Thus the Sages, of blessed memory, said there: that from the Torah no authentication is required at all, for witnesses signed on a document are considered as if their testimony was investigated in beit din, as Israel is not suspected of forging documents. It was the rabbis who required authentication for all documents, and therefore they said to require authentication and they said that the messenger is trusted in this like two witnesses, for in their enactment they can enact that he shall be trusted like two witnesses. And why did they enact thus? Because of the enactment for agunot, as has been written. And we have already explained this matter in Choshen Mishpat siman 29; see there. Therefore, one should also not ask: how can one witness remove her from the status of a married woman? For since the get is in her hand signed by witnesses, she is removed from the status of a married woman based on the signed witnesses, because from the Torah it is considered as if their testimony was investigated in beit din. Consequently, since she no longer has a status of prohibition, one witness is trusted as has been written in Yoreh Deah siman 127. It is only that because of the matter of authentication of documents two were required, and the rabbis enacted that also regarding the matter of authentication one would suffice, just as regarding the matter of the prohibition itself.

And since the reason is for the sake of authentication, because witnesses are not commonly found to authenticate it, therefore, whether one brought a get from outside the Land to the Land of Israel, or from the Land of Israel to outside the Land, or from one province to another province outside the Land where caravans are not common, one must say "In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed." But within the Land of Israel, from one province to another, one does not need to say it. And the reason is that caravans are common there, for during the time of the Temple, caravans of festival pilgrims were common, and after the Destruction as well, since there are batei din established in the towns according to the enactment of Ezra—that they sit on Monday and Thursday to judge (beginning of Ketubot)—caravans are common that go to the place of assembly to litigate with one another (3b). And similarly, within the same province itself outside the Land, one does not need to say it, for caravans going from place to place are common (Hagahot Maimoniyot chapter 7). And the rivers that are in the Land of Israel, and the islands that are in the Great Sea of the Land of Israel—and it is not the Ocean, but rather that which is called the Middle Sea of the world and goes from Jaffa to Spain—and all the islands in this sea that belong to the Land of Israel, their law is like the Land of Israel regarding the matter of saying "In my presence it was written" (8a). And the Rambam explained them in the first chapter of Terumot; see there. And similarly, Babylonia's law is like the Land of Israel for gittin because there are many yeshivot there and caravans go from one to another and are available to authenticate it. And from Babylonia to the Land of Israel, or from the Land of Israel to Babylonia, one does not need to say it for the reason that has been explained. And this is according to our situation in the time of the Shas (6a):

All of this is according to the law of the Gemara, and so wrote the Rambam in chapter 7. However, now in our time, since even in Eretz Yisrael caravans are not common, and certainly in Bavel, even in Eretz Yisrael from province to province one must say by law "in my presence it was written." And so wrote our teacher, the Beit Yosef, at the end of section 1, see there. Furthermore, now in all places, even in the same province from place to place, and even in one city from neighborhood to neighborhood and from house to house, the messenger must say "in my presence it was written." The reason is that we find in the Gemara there that Rava would require in his city, Mechuza, to say "in my presence it was written" from house to house, and he stated the reason is because the people of Mechuza wander, meaning they are busy with commerce and do not remain in their houses, and they do not recognize the signatures of their fellows, and it is considered that witnesses are not common to confirm it. The Tosafot wrote there that from here Rabbeinu Tam rules that now, in this time, one must say in every place "in my presence it was written," for nowadays in all places people wander and are busy like the people of Mechuza. This is what our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 1, and this is his wording: And in this time, one who brings a get even from house to house in one city must say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed." And see above, siman 141, that it should not be given while the husband is in the city. Thus far his words. And he means for the reason that the husband can say "I gave it as a deposit," and we have already explained this there in section 35, that for us, who write an authorization, there is no concern regarding this, see there.

And it is found that for us there is no place where one does not need to say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed." However, when the get is authenticated according to the law in a beit din, certainly one does not need to say "in my presence it was written," since the declaration is in place of authentication and it has already been authenticated. According to this, some say that when the agent has a power of attorney and it is written therein who the witnesses of the get are, this is called "authenticated by its signatories," and if so, the agent does not need to say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed." And so wrote the Responsa of the Rashba and in the Mordechai (beginning of chapter 6). And our teacher, the Rema, wrote that there are those who disagree and say that a power of attorney is not called authentication, and so we practice, that an agent says "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" even when he has a power of attorney, and one should not change. Thus far his words. And the later authorities wrote that those who disagree are only a mere stringency (Beit Shmuel siman 141, subsection 44, and so wrote the Noda BiYehuda Tinyana siman 128, cited in Pitchei Teshuva subsection 5).

But in my humble opinion, it appears that our teacher, the Rema, and the great later authorities were brief in this matter, and there is no dispute here at all. For they understood that the reasoning of those who permit is because they hold that when there are two witnesses signed on the authorization who testify regarding the witnesses of the get, it is like two people who brought a get, who do not need to say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," as will be explained. And the "some who disagree," which is the Ribash in siman 318, disagrees with this; and certainly it is so, that he disagrees with this. This is his wording there: That this is neither regarding the validation of the get nor regarding the enactment of the sages, see there. And this is the opinion of the Ramah in the Tur; even though he holds that this is like two who brought it, nevertheless, this is only when the agent delivers the get to the woman in the presence of these witnesses so that it should be a complete matter, for they are the ones testifying on the delivery of the get into the hand of the agent and on the delivery by the agent into the hand of the woman. But when there are other delivery witnesses at the delivery of the agent to the woman, it is "half a matter." And in the Shulchan Aruch itself, they ruled so in section 12, and it will be explained before us with the help of Heaven. And according to this, I say that also the Rashba and the Mordechai, who are those who validate, also do not disagree with this. This is the wording of the Rashba in the Responsa, siman 561: That anyone who brings a get, even though it is not validated, is trusted to say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," and he does not need witnesses that the husband made him an agent; rather, as long as he brings a get, that is sufficient for him. Know, that if he needed witnesses, he would not need to say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," for since he has witnesses, it is like it was brought by two, etc. Thus far his words. And it can be said that his intention is when the witnesses are before us, like the opinion of the Ramah, but with witnesses in writing, it is not effective. And the Mordechai is dealing with witnesses in writing, but they were validated with the validation of a beit din, which is the essence of the validation of legal documents, and this is the "henpek" mentioned throughout the Shas; even the Ribash would admit to this, as is explicitly clear from his wording that we brought, for this is "it shall be validated by its signatories" that we learned in the Mishnah. This is the wording of the Mordechai at the beginning of the chapter "HaTikabel": Furthermore, if you have the signature of a beit din and witnesses, etc., why must he say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed"? For even if the husband comes and protests, etc., behold there is the signature of witnesses and a beit din. Thus far his words. And it is from a response of Rabbeinu Tam, of blessed memory, see there. And who would disagree with this?

Therefore, it appears to me that when they stated without elaboration that there is a dispute in this matter, the intention was not regarding the establishment of a beit din when there is an authorization, for in this no posek would disagree. Their intention is when there are only the signatures of witnesses alone, as they hold that even with this alone it is sufficient, for it is like two who brought it. In the Rashba, they explain his intention that even with two witnesses in writing it is effective. Furthermore, regarding the reasoning of the Ramah based on "half a matter," they do not hold this to be the law, but only as a mere stringency, as is proven from the words of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 17, who wrote at the end of the section: "And there is one who requires in this that he deliver it before the witnesses of the agency themselves." Thus far his words. This is the opinion of the Ramah, and he was concerned only as a stringency. Also in section 12 he was concerned for this opinion, but as a matter of law he does not hold accordingly, as will be explained with the help of Heaven:

And according to this, it appears to me clear as a matter of law that although the common custom is that even when the agent brings an authorization with witnesses and it is authenticated by a beit din, he says "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," and Heaven forbid one should change this, nevertheless, if it happened that he did not say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," there is no concern at all and the get is valid since it has an authentication of documents. And the sages explicitly said (15b): Either entirely through the authentication of the get or entirely through the enactment of the sages, meaning the saying of "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed." And since there is an authentication of the get, there is no need for the enactment of the sages. And the intention of our teacher, the Rema, is only when there is no authentication of the beit din on the authorization but only witnesses alone; however, the custom that he wrote is certainly in all cases, even when there is an authentication of the beit din, and one should not change it. And as a matter of law, the primary ruling is as I have written. And particularly when they do not recognize the signatures of the judges in the place of the delivery, one should certainly be stringent if it is not a case of iggun, but in a case of iggun one should be lenient, as our teacher, the Rema, wrote at the end of this siman; see there.

And also that which was explained in section 6, that nowadays in every place one must say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" because nowadays everyone moves about like the people of Mechuza, it also appears that this is only a mere stringency. And you should know that this is so, for the Rif, the Rosh, and the Rambam in chapter 7 did not cite at all this matter of the people of Mechuza who move about (see Hagahot Maimoniot there, letter 1 and letter 2, and it requires further study; and it appears to me as the Rambam wrote in the Commentary on the Mishnah at the beginning of chapter 4 of Rosh Hashanah, that "medina" is a city, and examine this closely). And only for another reason does it appear to me that nowadays, by absolute law, one must say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" even in one city. For our writing in documents and in letters is in cursive script, not in Ashurit script, regarding which it is relevant that there are those who recognize the signatures—that this is the writing of so-and-so and this is of so-and-so. But regarding a get, where the custom is that the witnesses sign in Ashurit, there is no one who recognizes their signature except for the Rav in whose presence they sign, and how is it relevant in this case to say "witnesses are available to ratify it"? Therefore, it appears to me that nowadays, by absolute law, one must say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" even in one city when there is no ratified authorization, as has been explained.

And know that there is in the Gemara another resolution, one who holds that the enactment of saying "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" was because of two things: one because of the authentication, as I have written, and the second because in the diaspora they are not experts that they must write the get for its specific sake and for her specific sake, because they are not people of Torah (Rashi). Therefore, they required that the agent say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," and automatically we ask him if it was written for its specific sake (ibid.). And the reason they did not require him to say explicitly "in my presence it was written for its specific sake" is because they feared if we increase words upon him, perhaps he will forget to say the "for its specific sake" and he will be changing from the formula that the sages established regarding gittin (3a, Rashi there). And therefore they only required him to say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," and the beit din asks him automatically if he knows that it was written and signed for its specific sake. And furthermore, even if they do not ask him if it was written for its specific sake, presumably he is testifying for its specific sake (Tosafot 2b, s.v. lefi). And that which they feared regarding "for its specific sake" more than other disqualifications, there is a reason for this (ibid.). And in truth, in the Yerushalmi it is stated "because they are not experts in the minutiae of gittin," see there, for they feared all disqualifications; and our Talmud seized upon the disqualification of "for its specific sake" because this is the primary one and is common, whereas other types of disqualifications like "attached" and the like are not common. And there are further resolutions regarding this (see Ran at the beginning of Gittin and Rashba).

And behold, all our teachers, the Rishonim, maintained according to the sugya of the Shas that this reason was rejected from the halacha, and the reason is only for the sake of kiyum alone. However, one of our teachers holds that the halacha follows this reason as well (the Ra'avad in Sefer HaZekhut, and the Ran and the Rashba cited him), and he has proofs for this, but the Rishonim rejected them. Yet there is one proof from the Gemara (5b) where Rabbah bar bar Hanah brought a get where half was written in his presence and half was not written in his presence; he came before Rabbi Eleazar to ask if he could say "before me it was written," and he said to him: even if he wrote in it only one line lishmah, he no longer needs to. Meaning, even if the agent stood there only during the writing of the first line and heard that he wrote it lishmah, he no longer needs to stand there, for we assume they finished it lishmah (Tosafot). This implies that the reason is due to lishmah. However, there is no proof from this, for this is what he meant: that if he only stood during the first line, which is the essential part that requires lishmah because it contains the names of the man and the woman and the date, he can say "before me it was written," for it is as if the entire get was written in his presence, because this is the toref of the get, and the primary lishmah is required in this line; but the reason is not due to a concern of lishmah (Ran). However, this works well according to the one who holds that in the first line is the entire toref of the get and he must stand during it (Rashi, beginning of chapter 2), but most of the poskim do not hold so, as will be explained with the help of Heaven. And one could say that, on the contrary, from this there is a proof to the opposite when we examine why regarding the signatures one must stand for the entire signature, while regarding the writing it is sufficient with the first line, as will be explained. Rather, it is certainly because the primary reason is for kiyum, and "before me it was written" is so that one does not come to confuse it with the kiyum of general documents as I have written, and therefore they were lenient regarding the writing. Nevertheless, how can he say "before me it was written" when only the first line was written before him? Rather, it is certainly because the declaration of lishmah is in the first line, as the scribe at the beginning of the writing says, "Behold, I am writing for the sake of so-and-so [male] and so-and-so [female]," and therefore it is considered like a complete writing. And according to this, that which he says "one line lishmah" is not due to a concern of lishmah, but rather he is stating a reason why one line is sufficient: because it is lishmah, meaning the first line in which the writing is lishmah (it appears to me).

And according to this, that which has been explained in the orders of divorce, that the agent must hear how the scribe writes for her sake and that the witnesses sign for her sake, and that upon the delivery of the get to the woman the beit din asks him if it was written and signed for her sake, as is written in siman 154, this is a mere stringency to satisfy this opinion which holds that the enactment was also because of the requirement of "for her sake." However, according to most of the poskim, there is no need to ask the agent at all regarding "for her sake," and consequently, the agent also does not need to concern himself that perhaps they did not write or sign for her sake. And thus our sages, of blessed memory, said at the beginning of Gittin: ordinary scribes of the judges are well-learned and know that it requires "for her sake." And only according to the one who holds that the enactment was because of "for her sake" do we concern ourselves with this; but since we rule that the reason is because of authentication, we do not concern ourselves at all with the concern of "for her sake," for everyone is expert that it requires "for her sake."

And specifically a messenger for delivery must say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" (Rashi), but a messenger for receipt does not need to. The reason for the matter is that since the concern is lest the husband come and protest, we only fear his protest when he gives it to a messenger for delivery, because at the time the get leaves his hand, he does not yet complete the divorce; therefore, we fear lest he reconsider and protest. But when he gives it into her hand or into the hand of her messenger for receipt, behold, at the time the get leaves his hand, he completes the divorce, and there is no concern lest he come and protest. And the woman is permitted to marry even though the get was not authenticated, for wherever there is no reason to fear the protest of the husband, there is no need for the authentication of the get. However, if the husband comes and protests, it shall be authenticated by its signatories, and it is like that which we learned in the Mishnah: One who brings a get in Eretz Yisrael does not need to say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," and if there are challengers against it, it shall be authenticated by its signatories (Ran).

And since the agent must say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," he must therefore stand at the time of the scribe's writing and at the time of the witnesses' signatures and see how they write and sign for his sake, for her sake, and for the sake of divorce. Afterwards, when he delivers it into the hand of the woman, he says before two people, "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," and immediately upon his statement he shall deliver the get to her in their presence and she is divorced by it. And his statement is like the validation of a beit din for all documents, for if the husband comes and protests, saying "it is a forgery," we do not pay him heed. And even though the witnesses of the get are not known to us, nevertheless we rely on the agent as on two witnesses who testify to the validity of the signing witnesses. And know that this which we wrote, that the delivery is before two, is because the agent joins with them for a third, as a beit din is required; and if the agent is a relative or a woman, he must deliver it before three, and more will be explained regarding this with the help of Heaven.

The Rambam wrote there in law 5: An agent who brought a get from place to place outside of Eretz Yisrael, or from Eretz Yisrael to outside of Eretz Yisrael, or from outside of Eretz Yisrael to Eretz Yisrael—if the agent was standing at the time of the writing of the get and its signing, he says before two people, "In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," and afterwards he gives it to her in their presence and she is divorced with it. And even though its witnesses are not known to us, and even if the names of its witnesses were like the names of Kutim, we are not concerned about them; and if the husband came and stood and protested, we do not pay him heed. Thus far his words. And so wrote the Shulchan Aruch in section 1. And the matters are puzzling in what he wrote, that if the names are like the names of Kutim we are not concerned about them, for in the Gemara (11b) it is explicitly explained that this is only regarding gittin coming from outside of Eretz Yisrael, because the majority of Jews who are outside of Eretz Yisrael have names like the names of Kutim and we are not concerned about them that perhaps they are Kutim, but not in Eretz Yisrael. And if so, the Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch, who are dealing also with gittin coming from Eretz Yisrael, how did they write that we are not concerned about this? (And so the Lechem Mishneh questioned, and his answer is forced; see there). And conversely, I have a difficulty, for when the agent says "In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," the Rabbis believed him like two witnesses, and if so, it is as if two witnesses testified about the witnesses of the get that they are valid. Therefore, it appears clear to me that the Rambam interprets the sugya as dealing without the saying of "In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," such as where the agent did not stand at the time of writing and signing; but when he says "In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," there is no concern here. And for this reason he was precise to say "he says etc. and even etc.," meaning that in such a case we are not concerned about disqualifications of testimony. (And one should not object that the Shas says "gittin coming from overseas" and perforce it must be with "In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," for one can say it deals with a woman who came with her get or with an agent of reception who does not need to say "In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," as has been written).

There is one who says that the credibility of the messenger is only when the husband contests after some time, and not when he contests immediately at the time of his saying "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" (Beit Shmuel, subsection 2). The reason is that since the credibility of the messenger is because from the Torah it is considered as if their testimony was examined in beit din, as I have written, and there are some of the poskim who hold that this is only when there is no contestant, but when there is a contestant, it requires verification from the Torah, and we have already mentioned this opinion in Choshen Mishpat at the beginning of siman 46, see there. And if so, it is understandable if at the time of the giving of the get there was no contest and he already said "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," she has already been established as unmarried, and the husband is not believed in his contest until two witnesses come. But if the husband contests at the time of the act and it requires verification from the Torah, the messenger is no longer believed in his statement until two witnesses of verification come (ibid.). However, there is almost no reality to this law, for either way: if the husband comes a moment before the giving into her hand, why does he need to contest? Behold, it is in his power to cancel it, and perhaps in the language of the contest, matters regarding cancellation are included. And if he comes after the giving, behold, he already said "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," for the statement is adjacent to the giving as I have written, and she was established as unmarried, for what difference is there between a short hour and several days? And if we say that he came within the time of a speech, behold we maintain that in matters of gittin and kiddushin it is as after the time of a speech, as I have written in the previous siman. And it is only possible to say, for example, that he did not say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" at the time of the giving, and he must take it from her hand and say "in my presence it was written" as will be explained, and in the meantime the husband came and contested (Atzei Arazim). And one should not ask according to the opinion of the Rambam, of blessed memory, in the third chapter of Hilkhot Edut, that all documents are rabbinic, how is it possible to say regarding this that from the Torah it is as if their testimony was examined in beit din? Behold, according to him there is no testimony at all from the Torah in a document. But we have already explained in Choshen Mishpat at the beginning of siman 29 that this is only regarding documents of evidence, but regarding documents of acquisition, gittin, and kiddushin, the Rambam admits that from the Torah it is testimony in a document, see there.

It is a simple matter that when the agent says "it was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence," she collects her ketubah even from the purchasers. And even though in a place where it is not necessary to say "it was written in my presence" she does not collect from purchasers—for the reason that the husband is able to contest it, and she may not collect from purchasers until there is a legal validation, and she only collects from unencumbered property by virtue of the "condition of the ketubah" which is written therein: "when you marry another, you shall take what is written for you"—nevertheless, when the agent says "it was written in my presence," she collects even from purchasers, for the husband will not be able to contest it afterwards. However, this is all regarding the Torah-mandated ketubah, but she shall not collect the additional ketubah from purchasers, for the addition is not included in the "condition of the ketubah." And it is possible that even from the husband himself she shall not collect the addition if he contests it until witnesses of validation arrive, as with all legal documents, and the credibility of the agent is possible only for the ketubah itself and not for the addition (the Maggid Mishneh, chapter 7, law 7, in the name of the Ramban, and so wrote the Ran; and see Be'er Sheva, subsection 2). But when there is a validated power of attorney, it appears that she collects everything even from purchasers, for this is a complete validation (ibid.).

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 3: Just as there is no need to validate the get when he says "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," so too there is no need to validate the witnesses of the agency; rather, he is trusted to say that the husband made him an agent before witnesses, even though they do not recognize the signatures of the witnesses of the agency, or even if he has no witnesses at all regarding the agency but says that the husband made him an agent properly, he is trusted. Thus far his words. For just as the sages trusted him to say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," they also trusted him to say that the husband made him an agent, since the get is produced from his hand and he cannot be contradicted. And so it appears to me from logical reasoning, for if he were not trusted to say that he is the husband's agent, it would turn out that the agent must validate his deed of agency; and if so, why did they find it necessary, because of igun, to trust the agent regarding the validation of the get? Just as the agent would validate the deed of agency, let him validate the signatures of the get! Rather, it is certainly because witnesses are not commonly found to validate it that the sages trusted him regarding everything (Rosh). And know that all this is only necessary if we say that a delivery agent does not have the status of a trustee, and only a receiving agent has the status of a trustee (Beit Shmuel siman 141, subsection 80). But according to what we established in the previous siman, that there is no distinction and in every agency he is trusted because a trustee is trusted, and as our teacher, the Rema, wrote there in section 55, the matter is simple: that the agent is trusted by virtue of being a trustee. And even if the get is currently in the hand of the woman, he is also trusted, as written in the Rambam, Tur, and Shulchan Aruch there in section 56 (see what the Beit Shmuel wrote in subsection 7, and it requires further study, but in my humble opinion the matter is clear as I have written, and examine it closely).

In a place where the agent must say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," even one of the five women who are not trusted to say her husband died may be an agent to bring her get, because we suspect them that their intention is to cause her to stumble; but when she must say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," she may be an agent. The reason for this matter we explained in the previous siman, section 137, see there. And in a place where it is not necessary to say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," if the agent said "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," it is effective regarding the matter that the husband cannot challenge it afterwards. We do not say that since in this place the sages did not institute that he should say it, his statement is not effective and it requires validation like all legal documents; we do not say so, for since the rabbis instituted that the agent is trusted like two witnesses with his statement, there is no reason to differentiate in trustworthiness from place to place. This is when the agent stood at the time of writing and signing, but if he did not stand, it is impossible for him to say it. In a place where it is not necessary to say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," he gives it to her as is, and if the husband comes and challenges, it shall be validated by its signatories, and the agent may also be one of the three for the validation of the get. In a place where one must say "in my presence it was written," he shall not give it to her until they validate the get, and if he gave it to her without validation, it is pasul until it is validated, since he cannot say "in my presence it was written." If the husband comes and challenges and it is impossible to validate it, according to the Rambam in chapter 7 the get is void, and if she married she must leave and the offspring is a certain mamzer, and according to the Tur it is a doubtful mamzer; and we have already explained this as well in siman 141, section 136 (see Beit Shmuel, subsection 5). If the get was lost, she is doubtfully divorced, as we have already explained there. It is also a simple matter that this which the sages trusted the agent with the statement "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" is to reject the challenge of the husband, but if the husband brought witnesses and they testify that this get, about which the agent said "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," is forged, then this get is void, and if she married she must leave and the children are mamzerim. If two say it is forged and two say it is not forged, its law is like two who say she was divorced and two who say she was not divorced, and it will be explained in siman 152 with the help of Heaven (and in this, an agent is not similar to complete validation).

Since the agent's declaration "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" is like a validation, and all validation of documents is in a beit din which consists of three, therefore when the agent delivers the get to the woman and must say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," he must give it to her in the presence of three. However, nevertheless, our sages, of blessed memory, said (5b) that in the presence of two is sufficient, for the agent himself is counted as one of the three, as we maintain that an agent may become a witness, and similarly regarding rabbinic matters a witness may become a judge, as written in Choshen Mishpat siman 7. And validation of documents is a rabbinic requirement, as has been written, and therefore the agent joins with the beit din. According to this, if the agent is a woman or a relative or disqualified such that they are not fit for a beit din, he must give it to her in the presence of three qualified individuals (ibid.). And there is one who wishes to say that here the sages were lenient even if the agent is a relative, that he may join the three (Ran ibid. in the name of "some say," and therefore they only mentioned a woman there), but it is not the primary view, and it does not appear so from all of our teachers (see Tosafot ibid. starting with "this is the version," etc., and one of them is taken to mean that the same applies to a relative).

The Tur wrote in the name of our teacher, Peretz, and our teacher, the Rema, ruled accordingly in section 4, that one should be stringent even when the messenger is not a relative or disqualified, to give it to her in the presence of three others, and such is the custom. Thus far his words. And there is a basis for this stringency even according to the Shas (ibid.), as there is one who holds so for the reason that we fear if a woman brings a get they will give it in the presence of two and it will not occur to them to differentiate; and the Shas rejects this, that when a woman brings it, they certainly know and do not rely on her, see there. And now, in our many sins, in this time of ours, we all know that the arrangers of gittin are few who know the laws from the source of the Shas and the poskim, and even the Maharshal in his generation complained about this, and all the more so in our generation, and they will not sense that if the messenger is a relative the law changes; therefore, Heaven forbid to change from this.

He wrote further that there are those who are even more stringent to take two others as witnesses of delivery, and they should not be related to the judges, nor to the man, nor to the woman. Also, the three who sit should not be related to the witnesses of the get nor to the agent. Thus far his words. And the reason for this may be said: that even though the judges themselves can also be witnesses of delivery, for hearing should not be greater than seeing, and furthermore, in matters of rabbinic law a witness may become a judge as has been written; nevertheless, since according to the custom that they give it before three for the reason that has been explained, it is not recognizable at all that they are witnesses of delivery. This would lead to a mishap, for in a place where a beit din is not required for validation—such as in a place where one does not need to say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," or if the get is already validated—they might err to say that even two witnesses of delivery are not required. Therefore, the custom is that two witnesses of delivery should always be present even when there are three. Furthermore, perhaps these three will not be precise in seeing the giving into her hand, knowing that they are a beit din for validation, and they will be precise to hear what he says, "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," but regarding the giving they will not pay attention. Therefore, we require two others designated as witnesses of delivery, and they shall see the giving of the get from the hand of the agent to her (it appears to me):

He further wrote that there are those who are stringent and say that the Rav who takes a fee for arranging the delivery of the get should not be one of the three sitting as judges; rather, he should seat three others, and the Rav asks all the questions and arranges the delivery. Thus far his words. And the reason is simple, for we maintain that one who takes a fee to judge, his judgments are void, and since his statement is for the authentication and requires a beit din, it is like a legal ruling, and one should not take a fee for this. Therefore, it is good that the arranger who takes a fee should not be one of the beit din. And it is not similar to an ordinary get, where we are also stringent initially not to give it at night and that there should be three, and nevertheless he himself wrote in the Seder HaGet that it is a simple permission to take a fee, see there; for it can be said that there it is truly a mere stringency, as in a time of pressing need they give it at night and do not require a beit din. This is not the case regarding a messenger, where by the law of the Gemara it requires authentication by a beit din, as I have written. Furthermore, there the Rav takes a fee for the exertion of instructing the scribe and the witnesses how to write and sign, and not for the delivery itself. This is not the case for a messenger who brought a written get before us, where there is only the exertion of the delivery, and it is not proper to take a fee. And what I wonder about this is why our teacher, the Rema, did not mention this later in siman 154 in the Seder HaGet, and it seems to me that this is not the practice. Perhaps because now there is great exertion for the arranger in asking the questions to the messenger and to the woman, and in reading the authorization and its scrutiny, as will be explained there; therefore, regarding the taking of a fee, it is possible to say that it is for the exertion and not for the delivery itself and the statement of "in my presence it was written," and it requires further study.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote in section 5: Those to whom he gives it in their presence do not need to sit, and when the agent says "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," he must stand. And there is one who says that initially those to whom he says "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" must sit, and initially they should give it to her by day and not by night. Thus far their words. And certainly it appears that initially they must sit, since this is according to the law, as has been written, that the judges are in a sitting position. And the first opinion perhaps holds that this is like the conclusion of the judgment and not like the beginning of the judgment, for for this reason it is valid post facto even at night, as has been written in Choshen Mishpat siman 5. Therefore, even initially they do not need to sit. Furthermore, since the essence of the law is for the purpose of authentication, and regarding authentication itself we are lenient in several matters, as has been written in Choshen Mishpat siman 46, see there. And it appears more likely to me that they do not disagree at all, for the first opinion holds that since the judges are also witnesses to the delivery, and the delivery is more essential than the saying of "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," therefore it is good that they conduct themselves like witnesses and stand. And the "one who says" perhaps holds like the stringency that was explained in section 24, that they take two witnesses for the delivery aside from the three, and the three remain as a beit din alone; and certainly it is proper that they sit according to the law of a beit din. And such is the common custom among us, that the three sit and the agent and the witnesses to the delivery stand, and one should not deviate.

The great Acharonim wrote that a woman who has been divorced requires a document from a beit din stating that she was divorced, and the Rav is not trusted to testify to this alone, for he is removing her from the status of a married woman; therefore, she requires an act of a beit din so that she can show in every place she comes that she is divorced (Taz and Beit Shmuel subsection 8). And this is the custom, that when a woman receives her get and travels to another place, she receives a document from a beit din stating that she was divorced, and this is called a p'tur. And it is obvious that this is in a place where she was established as a married woman, but in a place where she is not established as a married woman, she is trusted herself to say "I am a divorcee." However, in a place where she is established as a married woman, she should not be permitted to marry without a beit din of three signed on her p'tur. And even though there are those who are lenient to rely on the signature of the Rav alone, Heaven forbid to rely on this. And even with the signatures of two, whom we could judge as witnesses testifying in writing—and it was explained in Choshen Mishpat siman 28 that there are those who are lenient to accept testimony from a document, see there—nevertheless, one should not rely on this in practice regarding the prohibition of a married woman. And especially nowadays, when the mail goes throughout the entire world every day and it is possible to clarify through the confirmation of a beit din of three, one should not be lenient at all (and regarding the recognition of the signatures of the beit din, one may rely in a time of pressing need on the words of our teacher, the Rema, at the end of this siman, see there).

We have already written in section 16 that the agent says "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" and immediately delivers the get to her. And so wrote the Rambam, chapter 7, law 5, and this is his wording: He says "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" and afterwards he shall give it to her in their presence. Thus far his words. And such is the wording of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 1. And it is simple that what he wrote, "and afterwards," means immediately and instantly within the time of a speech-utterance, for it is explicitly proven in the Gemara (5b) that it is required specifically at the time of giving; see there. However, the wording of the Tur is as follows: And he shall say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" at the time he gives it into the hand of the woman, or immediately adjacent to it within the time of a speech-utterance. Thus far his words. And our teacher, the Beit Yosef, copied this wording in section 6 (and see Beit Shmuel, subsection 9). And it appears to me that it is all one, and the main point is this: that if it is possible to synchronize the speaking and the giving at once, how good it is, and this is what the Tur wrote, "says at the time he gives it." However, not every person is able to synchronize, and therefore at any rate he should see that they are successive to one another, and there is no concern whether the speaking is first or the giving is first. Therefore, the Rambam took the common way of the matter, that he speaks his words and afterwards gives. And the Tur, who wrote "or adjacent to it," his intention is whether before it or after it, and the words of the Shulchan Aruch do not contradict one another. And that which we find our teachers the authors of the Tosafot (5b, s.v. "yitlenu") and the Rosh there who are in doubt whether speaking is effective before giving, their intention is before the time of a speech-utterance. And the doubt is that even though it is proven in the Gemara that it is required specifically at the time of giving, perhaps the intention is in one standing even after the time of a speech-utterance, or perhaps specifically within the time of a speech-utterance. And the poskim do not disagree at all on this matter (so it appears to me), and so it is implied in the Mordechai; see there.

And one should not ask, since the declaration is in place of the authentication, why indeed did the sages act stringently in this matter? For behold, the authentication can also take place after a long period of time, and even regarding the get itself, if it requires authentication, it is valid if he authenticates it after a long period of time. The answer to this, it can be said, is that since they were lenient—that the declaration of the messenger should count as two witnesses—because of the concern of a deserted wife as has been written, and she becomes unmarried upon the receipt of her get, they therefore acted stringently in this, that the declaration must be truly adjacent to her receipt, to recognize that by virtue of her receipt they were lenient regarding his declaration to be considered as two witnesses (it appears to me):

Therefore, if he gave her her get and did not manage to say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" before he became mute, behold the get is invalid and has no remedy until it is ratified by its signatories. And even if he is able to write that it was written and signed in his presence, it is of no avail. And even though in every place writing is considered like speech, here the enactment was specifically that he must speak with his mouth. And the reason for the enactment is because of the leniency they granted—that he should be considered like two witnesses—they were stringent in other matters. And so, if the agent is able to speak, his writing is of no avail. Although regarding testimony there are opinions in Choshen Mishpat siman 28 that as long as one is fit to speak, his writing is also effective, nevertheless in this matter they were not lenient. And so it is explained from the words of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in his great book; see there. And that which they were lenient regarding the enactment for the sake of abandoned women concerning testimony that her husband died via writing, as explained in siman 17, this is because it is impossible in another manner, for this one who testifies in writing will not come here to testify with his mouth. But an agent who brings a get and stands in the place of the woman, why should he not speak with his mouth? And if it is because perhaps he will become mute, this is an uncommon matter. And that which they were lenient in siman 121 regarding one who became mute that he may write "write a get for my wife" according to the opinion of the Rambam there, it is because it is impossible in another manner; furthermore, there it is not testimony but merely a revelation of intent that he is of the mind and will to divorce. And even though our teacher, the Rema, was lenient in Choshen Mishpat siman 46 section 7 regarding ratification in writing, this is regarding a complete ratification and not regarding the saying of "in my presence it was written," where the sages were lenient for his statement to be like two witnesses, and therefore they were stringent that he must testify specifically with his mouth (see Chelkat Mechokek subsection 11 who wrote that the Rivash in siman 240 contradicts himself with what he wrote in siman 413, but there is no contradiction here, for he distinguishes between a complete ratification and an agent, as I have written). And know that even though one of the Rishonim wrote explicitly that it is effective for a mute to say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" in writing (Ran, first chapter), nevertheless from all the Rishonim it does not appear so, and so it appears explicitly from the words of the Rambam and the Tur, and so our teacher, the Beit Yosef, decided (see Rosh, chapter 1, section 9, and in Tosafot 5a, beginning with the words "Ilima," it is explained explicitly that it is not effective in writing, and so it appears from the Maharsha and Maharam there).

This is the wording of the Shulchan Aruch, section 7: If he delayed saying it for more than the time it takes to say a greeting, or if he did not say it in the presence of the woman, or if he gave it to her privately between him and her, even if she has married, he takes it from her and gives it to her again in the presence of two and says in their presence "befanay nikhtav" and "befanay nehtam." And if he did not take it from her, it is pasul until it is validated by its signatures. Therefore, a mute cannot bring a get even though he can write "befanay nikhtav" and "befanay nehtam," for he must say it with his mouth. And some say that he must say it in the holy tongue, which is "befanay nikhtav" and "befanay nehtam," and if he is an ignoramus, they prompt him word for word and inform him of the meaning in a foreign language; however, post facto, if he said it in a foreign language, it appears to me that it is kosher. And if the messenger did not say "befanay nikhtav" and "befanay nehtam" and the husband died, there is no remedy to take it from her and return and give it to her and say "befanay nikhtav" and "befanay nehtam," and there is no remedy for this except to be validated by its signatures. Thus far the words of the Shulchan Aruch.

And behold, that which they wrote that the declaration is effective even after a period of time, so it is explained in the Tosefta, chapter 2, as it is taught: One who brings a get from overseas and did not say to her "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," he takes it from her even after three years, etc. Thus far its words. And that which is explained in the Gemara (5b): What should he do? He should take it from her and return and give it to her and say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," this is even after a long time. And consequently, even if she married, it is valid, for this stands in place of a confirmation, and a confirmation can occur even after a long time. It is only necessary to take it and give it to her because such was the enactment, that the declaration must specifically be at the time of the giving, and it is not similar to a complete confirmation as we have explained. Therefore, when the husband dies, there is no remedy for this even if she did not marry, because it is necessary to say it at the time of giving, and how can he give it to her when the husband has already died? And it would appear like a get after death. But when he is alive, even if she married, nevertheless regarding the husband, a giving of the get to her hand is now applicable. Therefore, when he dies, there is no remedy except through a complete confirmation, for in that case we do not require taking it from her and returning and giving it to her, as I have written (it appears to me). And furthermore, when the husband dies, the agency is voided and he is not believed to say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" (Beit Yosef in the name of the Rivash).

And that which they wrote "or if they did not say it in the presence of the woman" is not because she needs to hear the saying of "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," but rather it means that since he must say it within the timeframe of a "speech-act" of the giving, perforce he must say it in her presence, for if not so, it would certainly not be within the timeframe of a "speech-act." And this is the explanation: that when he did not say it in her presence, it is certain that it was after the timeframe of a "speech-act" (see Atteret Zvi subsection 5 and the Gra subsection 24, and according to what I wrote it is well-settled, and delve into it). However, that which he wrote "or if he gave it to her between him and her," this is only according to the system of the Rif and the Rambam in siman 133, that ex post facto it is sufficient even without witnesses to the delivery, and therefore only because of the saying of "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" must he take it and give it in the presence of two. But according to our other teachers, even without this the get is nothing, as I wrote there. And according to this, they should have explained that this which they wrote "even if she married etc." is not according to the other poskim, for she married in prohibition, and it requires further study. And perhaps they relied on what was written in siman 133 and there is no need to explain here.

And that which they wrote, that for a mute it is not effective through writing, we have already explained this in section 30; and it is not specifically a deaf-mute, for the same applies to one with hearing that it is not effective, as I wrote there. However, that which they wrote, that one must say it specifically in the holy tongue, there is no reason for this; for are these words of sanctity? And even regarding words of sanctity, many things are valid even in a foreign tongue, as we learned in Sotah, chapter 7. And that which they noted that it implies as much from the Rosh, certainly his intention is for what the Rosh wrote in the first chapter (section 3) that one should only say the language that the sages established, see there; certainly it is so, that one should not say a different formulation, such as "I know that this is the writing and the signature" and the like, but in which language—what concern is there in the matter? And it is true that our teacher, the Rema himself, in his book Darkhei Moshe (letter 7) also hesitated regarding this, and therefore wrote in the Shulchan Aruch that if he said it in a foreign tongue it is valid. But nevertheless, he who said so, that it is required only in the holy tongue, for what reason did he say it? And it seems to me that he spoke well, for behold, in the Shas (3a) they asked according to the one who says the reason is because of "lishmah," why did they not establish to say "it was written lishmah and it was signed lishmah"? And they answered that he might come to clip it—meaning, if we increase words upon him, he will not say it according to the enactment of the sages, see there. Behold, it is explicit that the sages estimated that with more than four words a mistake could fall into his speech. And it is a known thing that the holy tongue is a language where the small contains the great, which is not the case with all foreign tongues. Therefore, if he says "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" in a foreign tongue, it will be more than four words and there could be a mistake. And according to this, he spoke well that one should only say it in the holy tongue (and even though this is according to Rabbah, nevertheless, in the reasoning they do not disagree).

And know that there are some among the Rishonim who hold that when he did not say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," it is not specifically necessary to take it from the woman and return it to her in the presence of two and say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" unless the witnesses of delivery are not before us. However, when the witnesses of delivery are before us, it is sufficient that he says before them: "The get that I gave in your presence to woman so-and-so was written in my presence and signed in my presence" (the Rosh and Mordechai in the name of Ri of Chinon). And there are those who are even more lenient to say that even if there are other witnesses who stood at the time of delivery, even though they were not designated as witnesses of delivery, the agent may also say in their presence: "The get that I gave to woman so-and-so in the presence of witnesses so-and-so and so-and-so was written in my presence and signed in my presence" (the Tur in the name of the Ramah). But from the majority of our teachers it does not appear so, and also in the Shulchan Aruch this opinion was not brought. And the proof that he brought from the Yerushalmi is not conclusive at all, see there (for the proof of Ri of Chinon is from what is written there, "in order to establish her as a divorcee in the presence of two," and it can be said that this is what it means: that it is necessary to establish her through the repeated giving of her get into her hand; see there and examine carefully).

If the messenger did not say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," and they did not take it from her to return it to her and say "in my presence it was written" as has been written, and also the get was not authenticated by its signatures, even if there is no protest from the husband, the get is invalid because it was not done according to the enactment of the sages. She may not marry with it, and even if she already married, she must leave (Tur). However, the offspring is not a mamzer (ibid.). And even though Rava holds (5b) that without the statement of "in my presence it was written" the offspring is a mamzer, for so said Rava: Anyone who deviates from the formula that the sages established for gittin, the offspring is a mamzer, and in the Yerushalmi it implies that the halacha is like him, nevertheless in our Talmud it implies that the halacha is not like him in this. So too it implies from the Rambam and all the poskim. On the contrary, according to the principle that the Rambam generalized in chapter 10, and it will be explained in siman 152, that whenever we say a get is invalid, if she married she does not leave, we should have said also in this case that if she married she does not leave (see Beit Yosef). Rather, regarding this enactment, it is explained from the Talmud and the poskim that the rabbis strengthened the enactment such that if she married she must leave. And from the words of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in his great book, it is explained that according to the Rambam she does not leave, see there, and it requires further study. But if the husband came and protested and it was not authenticated, the Rambam wrote in chapter 7 that it is not a get, and if the get was lost, the offspring is a doubtful mamzer. And from the words of the Rosh and the Tur it is explained that even if the get was not lost, and the husband came and protested and it was not authenticated, she is doubtfully divorced and the offspring is a doubtful mamzer, see there. And one should be stringent like all the opinions regarding if she received kiddushin from another, that she requires a get also from the second, and we have already spoken of this (see Beit Yosef).

It has already been explained that the authentication of the signatures is equivalent to the statement "it was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence." However, we are accustomed that even though there is an authenticated power of attorney, the agent nevertheless says "it was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence." But according to the law, this is not a requirement. How the authentication is performed was explained in Choshen Mishpat siman 46, where five methods of authentication are detailed; see there. It was also explained there that even when there is an authentication of the beit din on the signatures, it is nevertheless necessary to recognize the handwriting of the beit din. In a get, we are lenient even with the recognition of one of the judges, as our teacher, the Rema, wrote in siman 141, section 24; see there.

And know that at the end of this siman he was even more lenient, that even without recognizing the handwriting of the judges at all, it does not invalidate ex post facto, and even without the statement of "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed." This is his wording: Some say that if the messenger brought the get authenticated by its signatures, even though they do not recognize the signatures of the judges of the authentication, nevertheless, in a case of pressing need and iggun, one should be lenient and rely upon it even though the messenger did not say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed." Since it is impossible to return and say it, one may rely on the signatures, for according to the Torah, witnesses signed on a document are considered as if their testimony was investigated in a beit din. Thus far his words. And he means to say that according to the Torah, no authentication is needed at all, and the authentication is only of rabbinic origin. Therefore, we are lenient in this when there is an authentication even though they do not recognize the signatures of the judges of the authentication, and we rely on the poskim who hold that it is not necessary to recognize the signatures of the judges of the authentication (Beit Shmuel, subsection 42). According to this, it appears that this is specifically when there is no protest from the husband, but when there is a protest and he claims that everything is forged, it is necessary to recognize the signatures of the judges of the authentication. And perhaps in such a case, even in a situation of iggun and pressing need, it is of no avail until they recognize the signatures of all the judges of the authentication, for it has already been explained that when there is a protest, it is the opinion of many poskim that authentication is required according to the Torah.

It has already been explained in siman 140 and 141 that an agent may appoint an agent if the first agent fell ill or was under duress, and by the husband's command even if he did not fall ill and was not under duress. And how do they proceed when it is necessary to say "In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," given that the second agent is unable to state this, as the get was not written in his presence? Thus the sages taught in the Mishnah (29b): One who brings a get from overseas and fell ill appoints an agent in a beit din and sends him, and he says before them, "In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," and the final agent does not need to say "In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," but rather says, "I am an agent of the beit din," and we presume the beit din performed the matter properly (Rashi). And when the second agent falls ill and appoints a third, he also appoints him in a beit din and says, "I am an agent of the beit din," and so on forever. And when the final agent delivers it to the woman before a beit din, he also says, "I am an agent of the beit din." And all the declarations must be at the time of the delivery of the get to the second agent, and the second to the third, or adjacent to it within the time it takes to speak a greeting, as has been explained regarding the delivery by the agent into the hand of the woman; for such was the enactment, that when the first agent removes the get from his possession, whether he delivers it to the woman or delivers it to a second agent, he must say adjacent to it, "In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed."

And why is a beit din required? Because even the agent, when he delivers it into the hand of the woman, requires a beit din. And that which he gives to her before two has been explained because the agent also joins to the beit din. Therefore, also in this law, if the agent is fit for a beit din—that he is not a relative or disqualified and is not a woman—here too, before two is sufficient and the agent joins as the third. And so too the second when he appoints a third agent, and so on forever, even up to a hundred agents. Therefore, according to what I wrote in section 23, that we are stringent not to join the agent to the beit din, in this too one should be stringent and we seat a beit din of three, and also witnesses of delivery separately aside from the beit din, as I wrote in section 24. And such is the common custom, and one must not change it.

And even though regarding the statement "it was written in my presence and signed in my presence" one may not change the wording from the enactment of the sages, as I wrote in section 34, nevertheless, regarding this wording of "I am the agent of the beit din," one may say it however he wishes, provided that the substance of the matter is that he was made an agent by the first agent in a beit din, or that he says "I was made the agent before a beit din," and the like. For regarding this, there was no enactment concerning the wording that it should not be changed. And it is explicitly proven in the Gemara there that the beit din does not appoint him as an agent, but rather the agent appoints him as an agent before a beit din (the Gra, subsection 31).

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 9 that even if the second agent said nothing, if he has an authorization and it is a case of agunah, one should be lenient. And thus each one shall say to his fellow: "I, so-and-so son of so-and-so, appoint you, so-and-so son of so-and-so, to be an agent in my place and in my stead, and your hand shall be as my hand, etc., to divorce so-and-so daughter of so-and-so, the wife of so-and-so son of so-and-so, in any place you find her; and I hereby give you permission to appoint an agent and an agent of an agent, etc., and immediately when the get reaches the hand of so-and-so daughter of so-and-so, the wife of so-and-so son of so-and-so, she shall be divorced, etc.," in the manner that will be explained further on in the Order of the Get. And an agent of the beit din does not require an authorization like the first agent, but it is customary to have an authorization as with the first agent. And even if only two were signed on the authorization and they wrote in the language of testimony and not in the language of judges, the second agent is believed to say that there were three or that he was with them, and the principle "a witness cannot become a judge" does not apply to this, nor do we fear an erring beit din unless we recognize those who arranged the get as not being experts, for then even if it is written properly, we are concerned about them. Thus far his words.

And behold, regarding that which he wrote, that when he said nothing and has an authorization in his hand one may be lenient in a case of iggun, according to what I wrote in section 8, there is a great distinction between whether the authorization is authenticated—for then, simply, one may be lenient even not in a case of iggun—and when it is not authenticated, where one must certainly be stringent except in a case of iggun and a time of pressing need; see there in section 10. And that which he wrote, that the agent of the beit din does not require an authorization like the first agent, the reason is simple: just as the sages believed the first agent to say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" because the get is in his hand, so too the second is believed to say "I am the agent of the beit din" since the get is in his hand. However, nevertheless, the custom is that this one also has an authorization like the first one, for they followed the custom of authorization even though it is not required by the strict law.

But regarding that which he wrote, that even if only two were signed and it is written in the language of testimony, the messenger is believed to say that there were three or that he joined with them, etc., I do not know what kind of credibility is relevant to this, for perforce there were three—the two who were signed and the messenger. And so it is explained in the source of the law in the Rivash (siman 318, see there). And it can be said that his intention is that perhaps they intentionally did not join him with them and there were only two, and this is not a beit din; he comes to teach us that we are not concerned for this, for why should we be concerned about a matter where we know there were three with the messenger? And if it is because it is written in the language of witnesses, they have already said in the Shas regarding similar cases that it makes no difference if it is written in the language of witnesses and signed by judges or the reverse (Gittin 33a). And the primary reason is that since the messenger is believed without the writing, as I have written, because the get is in his hand, therefore as long as we can say that the writing does not contradict his words, we say it. And know that from his words we learned that the second messenger also joins to the beit din, not like the one who hesitates regarding this (according to Pitchei Teshuva, subsection 16).

It has already been explained in siman 141 that agency does not specifically require being in his presence, and therefore the first agent can appoint a second agent in a beit din even not in the presence of the second agent. He says before the beit din: "I hereby appoint so-and-so to be an agent in my place," and this first one goes on his way. When the second one arrives, the beit din hands him the get and informs him that so-and-so, the first agent, appointed him as an agent. With this, the second one can say upon its delivery into the hand of the woman: "I am an agent of the beit din." And more than this, even to appoint the second one, the first one does not need to do so; rather, he can hand over his agency to the beit din so that they shall appoint another agent. The beit din can appoint a second agent not in the presence of the first, and this is what is found in the Gemara (29b): "Hand over your words before us," etc., meaning: say before us, the beit din, "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," and leave the get with us, and we will appoint a second agent in your place, and he shall be an agent of the beit din. For the power of the beit din is effective in this, that they can appoint an agent in his place when he so commands.

However, our teacher, the Rema, is hesitant regarding this, for in such a case the second cannot say "I am the agent of the beit din" since he did not hear "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" from the first, for this was only instituted when he himself heard "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" from the first. This is his wording in section 10: And some say that it is not effective for him to say "I am the agent of the beit din" since he did not hear that the agent said "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," but rather he must have an authorization or it must be validated by its signatures. Thus far his words. For in the authorization it is explained that he said "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," and when there is a validation, "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" is not required. And he follows his own reasoning that the authorization alone is not called a validation, and we have already explained that this refers to an authorization that is not validated, as I wrote in section 8 and section 43. And regarding the essence of this stringency, one may hesitate, for it is not explicitly implied as such in the Shas there, and they have already wondered about this (see Be'er Mayim).

One who is blind in both eyes cannot bring a get, for he must say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," and he is unable to do so since he does not see. And even according to what will be explained, that hearing the sound of the pen is sufficient, nevertheless, how can he say "in my presence it was written" when he does not see the writing? And if he says "I heard the sound of the pen," this is not according to the enactment of the sages (the Rosh). Therefore, if it was written and signed in his presence when he was not blind, and afterwards, before he delivered it to the woman, he became blind, it is kosher, and he says "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed." And he is required by the law to give it in the presence of three, for he does not join them since he is disqualified from judgment, as is written in Choshen Mishpat siman 7. And one should not ask: behold, a blind person is disqualified from testimony as well, as is written there in siman 35, and even if he became blind in the middle of the testimony he is disqualified, as is written there; and if so, how is he kosher for agency and to testify "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed"? For it can be said that here, even those disqualified from testimony, such as a woman or a relative, are kosher, as we have already explained. Therefore, he too is kosher, and his disqualification is only because of his saying "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed"; therefore, when he saw at the time of writing, it is kosher (Tosafot 23a, s.v. ve-hu ha-din).

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, section 11, wrote that a blind man must recognize the woman by recognition of her voice, and if he does not recognize her by recognition of her voice, it is of no avail that others tell him that she is this one, even though for one with sight it is of avail. Thus far their words. And the reason is that regarding a blind man there is more concern lest they mislead him (Tosafot 23a). And know that according to the sugya of the Shas there, it is not necessary to say so according to the conclusion, see there. Nevertheless, it appears from the Rishonim that they grasped this reasoning even according to the conclusion. And there is one who was concerned that nowadays we do not rely on recognition of an object even for a Torah scholar (see Sma, end of siman 262), and also regarding a lost get there is one who was concerned not to rely on recognition of an object (Beit Shmuel, subsection 18). And what is the difference between recognition of an object and recognition of a voice? However, in truth, they are not related to one another, for is it that there is no recognition of an object now? Rather, that they do not believe him regarding recognition of an object, and this is only in a matter where there is reason to suspect him, such as a lost object where he desires the item, and similarly regarding a lost get he says it out of imagination because he knows it was lost. But here, of what shall we suspect him? Furthermore, here, besides the recognition of voice, does he not give it to her in the presence of witnesses, and for the most part they know her, as do other people from her place who recognize her.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 11 that regarding one who is not blind, when he does not recognize her, we require two kosher witnesses who are not relatives and not disqualified. Thus far his words. And these matters are astonishing, for we explicitly established above in siman 120 that recognition is effective even through relatives, and it is an explicit Gemara in Yevamot (39b) for the reason that regarding a matter that is likely to be revealed, people do not lie. Furthermore, if it is with kosher witnesses, why should the blind man not rely on them? For is there any matter where we would not rely on two witnesses? And it is simple that that which the Rishonim said, that the blind man should not rely on others, this is when they are not kosher witnesses; but with kosher witnesses, what logic can be said that he should not believe them? And it is true that the author of the Terumat HaDeshen wrote so in siman 238, and added to say that regarding a blind man, even with two kosher witnesses one should not rely, see there. And this is even more astonishing, as I have written. And several of the great authorities challenged this and wrote that they only said this ab initio (Taz and Beit Shmuel subsection 19), but it does not imply so, and even regarding ab initio the matter is astonishing. Therefore, it appears to me that their intention is not that they testify as formal testimony, for in such a case it would be effective even for a blind man, and for one who is not blind it would be effective even with relatives when they testify as formal testimony for the reason of a matter that is likely to be revealed; rather, their intention is that they speak with mere words and not as formal testimony. And all this requires further study.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 12: If there are witnesses that the husband handed this get to this blind man for the purpose of divorce, it is valid, for since there are witnesses he does not need to say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," and he gives it to her in the presence of those same witnesses; and if it was verified by its signatures, it is valid in any case. Thus far his words. And it is from the Tur in the name of the Ramah, and he wrote that therefore these same witnesses are required so that it should not be a "half-matter," see there. And this is according to the opinion of the Rif and the Tosafot (Bava Batra 56b) that we explained in Choshen Mishpat siman 30, that whenever there is no utility in this testimony it is called a "half-matter." And here too, in the handing of the get to the blind man, no matter was completed. And it is not similar to a woman who appointed an agent for receipt, who requires two sets of witnesses—one that says "in our presence she spoke" and one that says "in our presence he received"—and it is valid when they are not one set, as written in the previous siman, for there the witnesses of the statement do not need the witnesses of the receipt, since the get is in his hand and she is already divorced upon his receipt (Tosafot Gittin 63b). This is not the case with an agent for delivery, where there is no utility in his receipt as long as he has not handed it to her (however, according to the resolution of the Nimukei Yosef there, that they testify regarding the agency, they are equal, see there and examine carefully). But according to the opinion of the Rashbam there, that whenever it is not at the same time it is not called a "half-matter," as written in Choshen Mishpat there and in siman 145, see there, it is not called a "half-matter" here, for they saw everything they were able to see. And it appears that the Ramah does not hold like this reasoning (see Chelkat Mechokek subsection 21, and there is a printing error there).

One must wonder about our teacher, the Beit Yosef, for in this section he ruled anonymously according to the opinion of the Ramah, yet in section 18 regarding when there are two agents or one of them where he does not need to say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," and the opinion of the Ramah there is also that he must deliver it in the presence of those same witnesses due to the principle of "half a matter" as is explained in the Tur, he did not rule anonymously like him there, but only wrote it in the name of "and there is one who requires etc.," see there (and see Beit Shmuel subsection 39). But in truth, his words are precise when we examine them closely: for how could they write regarding this law that when there are witnesses that the husband delivered it for divorce, he does not need to say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed"? From where do we say this? For there is neither the validation of the get through the verification of the signatures nor the rabbinic enactment of the declaration of "in my presence it was written." And it is not similar to the law further on regarding two who brought a get, for there it is because he made both of them or one of them an agent; but when the agent is not one of these two, it is obvious that the agent must say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," for so wrote explicitly the Rashba at the beginning of the second chapter and the Maggid Mishneh, chapter 7, law 14, see there. And so it is clear from the words of the Tur and all the Rishonim that in any event one of these two must be an agent, and not when the agent is another man. Therefore, it seems clear to me that certainly in such a case he must say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," rather, if those two are the witnesses of delivery as well, it is called a "complete matter" regarding the fact that the agent does not need to say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," since there remains no room for the husband to protest because they saw the entire matter of the get. According to this, that which our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote, "and he gives it in the presence of these same witnesses," is not because of the law of "half a matter" regarding testimony, for in this he does not agree with the Ramah and on the contrary disagrees with him (in Bedek HaBayit where he wondered about him, for are not the witnesses of agency separate? See there, and it is the opinion of the Nimukei Yosef in Bava Batra there), but rather regarding the fact that the agent does not need to say "in my presence it was written"; for this, one needs a "complete matter," for otherwise he would have to say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," and this blind man cannot say it. And where the signatures were validated, it is obvious that nothing is needed, and a blind man can be an agent, provided that he recognizes the husband and the wife by their voices. And in the case of one who became blind before the delivery, we did not require that he recognize by voice except for the wife, but when he was blind from the outset, it is obvious that he must also recognize the husband.

The sages taught in the Mishnah (23b): The woman herself may bring her get, provided that she is required to say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed." The Gemara asks: How can this be found? For as soon as the get reaches the woman's hand, she is divorced. It answers: For example, where the husband gave her the get and said to her, "Be an agent for delivery until you reach such-and-such a place, and there you shall appoint an agent for delivery or deliver the get to a beit din, and the beit din will appoint another agent, and you will receive the get from that agent." Consequently, she also has the status of an agent for delivery, and upon her delivery to the agent or to the beit din, she must say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" like other agents. And seemingly, there is no novelty in this law, and what does it come to teach us? And if it is for this law itself, there is not such a great novelty in this, for it is in the power of the husband to stipulate whatever he wishes, and consequently, when he makes her an agent, she must say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" (and one could say it teaches us that she is not called an agent that was not intended for divorce, as the Tosafot wrote there and similar to this, but it is forced).

And from the words of the Rambam at the end of chapter 7 and the Ra'avad in chapter 12, we have learned a resolution to this: that according to the Rambam, it comes to teach us that specifically when the husband stipulated this condition upon her, she must say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed." However, an ordinary woman who brings a get before us requires nothing; even if the get is not authenticated, we permit her immediately, and when the husband comes and contests it, we will require her to provide authentication. And according to this, the Mishnah comes to teach us a further novelty: that this woman—even though if she had wanted, she would not have said anything and merely shown her get before us and we would have permitted her like all women who bring their gittin in their hands, and if so, even when she says that the husband made her a messenger as we have written, why should we require her to say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," let her be believed through a migo—it comes to teach us that we do not say so, and she must say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" (and so wrote the Ran at the end of chapter 2).

This is the wording of the Rambam there: A man who gave a get to his wife, and it was written and signed in her presence, and he said to her, "Behold, you are my agent for delivery until such-and-such a beit din, and they shall appoint an agent and give this get to you and you shall be divorced by it," she is believed to say before them, "In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," and they take it and give it to an agent to give to her according to the statement of the husband. In what case does this apply? When the husband stipulated this condition upon her. But if he did not stipulate upon her, but rather gave her her get and the get is produced from her hand, she does not need to say anything, and behold, she is in the status of a divorcee, since the get in her hand is written according to its law and the witnesses are signed upon it. And even though we do not recognize the handwriting of those witnesses and it has not been verified, we do not suspect her that perhaps she forged it, for she would not ruin herself. Furthermore, the witnesses signed on the get are as if their testimony was examined in a beit din until there is a challenger. Therefore, we establish the get in its status and she may marry, and we do not suspect that perhaps it will be found to be a forgery, just as we establish the get in the status of validity when the agent brings it until the husband challenges it or until he brings proof that it is forged or void. For if we were to suspect these matters and their like, we would have to suspect a get that the husband gives in our presence, perhaps he nullified it and afterwards gave it, or perhaps disqualified witnesses signed it and it is like a forgery from within, or perhaps it was written not for its own sake. And just as we do not suspect this and its like, but rather establish it on its status until it becomes known that it is void, so too we do not suspect neither the agent nor the woman herself when the get is produced from her hand, for the laws of prohibitions are not like the laws of monetary matters. Thus far his words.

And the Rambam wrote likewise at the beginning of chapter 12, that a woman who was established as a married woman is not believed to say "I am a divorcee," but if she brought a get, she is believed even if it is not authenticated; see there. And we have learned from his words a great principle regarding the matter of prohibitions: that even regarding a matter that was established with a status of prohibition, if one brought a written proof that this matter has left the status of prohibition, even though the writing is not authenticated and there are several concerns to invalidate it, nevertheless, we do not invalidate it as long as its invalidity has not been clarified, and the matter has left the status of prohibition. And even though in monetary matters, if one brought a promissory note, we do not extract money from his fellow in his absence until he authenticates the document, even though we do not know if it is forged or not—as is proven from the words of the Rambam in chapter 13 of Laws of Creditor and Debtor, and in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Choshen Mishpat, siman 106, see there—this is why he was precise in his words, that the laws of prohibitions are not like monetary laws, because in monetary matters the second party is the possessor, which is not the case regarding prohibitions. And even though with a get one also extracts money, as she collects her ketubah, this is due to the conditions of the ketubah, in which it is written: "When you marry another, you shall take what is written for you," just as when she says her husband died, she collects her ketubah; but the essence of the matter is a matter of prohibition (and see Yoreh Deah siman 118, section 9, and in the Shach, subsection 31, and reflect on this).

And even though one might hesitate regarding the essence of this matter, for we do not require trustworthiness according to what I wrote at the beginning of this siman in the name of the Yerushalmi, that the husband is not suspected of causing her to stumble before Heaven, and she also will not cause herself to stumble, as the Rambam wrote; for due to the stringency we placed upon her at the end, we hold in siman 17 that she is trusted to say her husband died, and here too it is similar. Nevertheless, were it not for the trustworthiness of the writing, it would be impossible to rely on this, for perhaps she relies on the forgery that she will deny through false witnesses. Rather, it is certain that the essence is the trustworthiness of the writing. And know that regarding what he wrote, that if we were to concern ourselves with these matters, we should have concerned ourselves etc. perhaps he cancelled it, thus far his words—one should not question this, for the Rambam himself wrote in chapter 6, law 100, that in truth we do concern ourselves with this and we do not allow him to leave until the completion of the get, see there. For certainly it is so, that in a place where it is possible to rectify this, we certainly must concern ourselves and rectify it, such as if he gives the get to the woman in our presence. And here, this is what he means: that if it would enter your mind that we must concern ourselves with this by the letter of the law, we should have instituted that one may not give a get through a messenger due to the concern of cancellation. Rather, it is certain that by the letter of the law we do not concern ourselves with this; but when he is before us and we have the ability to rectify this concern, it is certainly proper to rectify it, as he wrote in chapter 6.

But the Ra'avad, of blessed memory, there in chapter 12 wrote, and this is his wording: I say that it must be confirmed by its signatories even though no protest has been issued against it. Thus far his words. And according to this, he holds that the Mishnah regarding "a woman herself brings her get" comes to teach us a leniency: that even though when a woman brings her get we do not allow her to marry until she performs a confirmation of the signatures, nevertheless, if she said "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," it is sufficient and the husband cannot protest, just as with an agent. And regarding this the Shas asks: Once the get reaches the woman's hand she is divorced—meaning, what benefit is there in her saying "in my presence it was written," for she is already divorced? And just as it does not benefit an agent when he did not say "in my presence it was written" at the time of delivery until they take it from her and he returns it to her and says "in my presence it was written," as has been explained, because the enactment of saying "in my presence it was written" only benefits at the time of delivery; and if so, this woman who is already divorced, what benefit is there in saying "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed"? And perforce she requires a confirmation. And it answers: For example, where she was not yet divorced, as the husband said to her that she should go to a certain place and become an agent, as I have written; and therefore her saying "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" is effective. (I learned this from the words of the Rivash, siman 385, and the Lechem Mishneh at the end of chapter 7 toiled over this in vain). And according to this, the husband intended for her benefit so that she would not require a confirmation. And we learn from the words of the Ra'avad that he holds that regarding any presumption of prohibition, one does not remove it from the presumption of prohibition based on a document until the document is confirmed. And one must say according to his words that the enactment of Rabban Gamliel, who enacted that the witnesses should sign on the get, the benefit of the enactment is that through the signatures one will find witnesses of confirmation, which is not the case if she would require witnesses of delivery. But according to the Rambam, of blessed memory, it is simply settled, for nothing is required until the husband protests.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 13 wrote the opinion of the Rambam, and therefore wrote that she is in the status of a divorcee even without ratification etc., and even if he said to her, "Do not be divorced with it except in such-and-such a beit din," it is merely a condition, and when she comes to that beit din and the get is in her possession, she is divorced by her initial receipt, and there is no need to say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" unless he commanded her to deliver it to the beit din and that they should appoint an agent, as has been written. And in section 14 he wrote the opinion of the Ra'avad, that without ratification one should never permit [her to remarry] even when there are no challengers against it, and he concluded there: And we have never heard of anyone who practiced leniency in this. Thus far his words. And perhaps it is also because of this that the custom among us is not to deliver the get into the hand of the woman but rather a release from the beit din, and this is like a ratification, for what benefit would the get be to her if we require her to ratify it.

It is stated in the Gemara (5a) that if the husband himself brought his get, which was written in another place, and brought it here to divorce with it, he does not need to say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed." For since the reason for saying "in my presence it was written" is so that the husband shall not come and protest, and here he himself is bringing it and giving it and is not protesting. And even though it was already written and is predated, there is no invalidity in this, just as with a messenger who brings a get, for this has a public voice (Tuv Gittin). Nevertheless, our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 14 that at the time he gives the get to his wife, his law is like a messenger and he must say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" so that we do not come to err also with another messenger, since now they are not scholars of Torah. Thus far his words. And these are astonishing words, for who can innovate such a decree? On the contrary, for several matters our law is as scholars of Torah, and regarding a get this reasoning is not found in the Gemara except regarding the matter of "for its sake," and we hold according to the reason of authentication (and see Beit Shmuel subsection 27).

Since the agent must say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," he must therefore stand over the writing of the get and its signing. However, the sages, of blessed memory, were lenient with him, ruling that he need not stand over the writing of the entire get. Since the primary requirement is the validation of the signatures, and the writing is only so that it should not be confused with general documents as has been written, they therefore were lenient that even if he only stood there during the writing of the first line, he no longer needs to do so (5b). Furthermore, even if he only heard the sound of the quill and the sound of the parchment (ibid.). Rashi explained: the first line, which contains the name of the man, the woman, and the date. According to this, in our gittin where the first line contains only the date, he would need to stand for several lines. However, from the Rambam and all the Rishonim it does not appear so, for in the first line at its beginning, which is the primary part regarding the scribe needing to say he is writing for her sake, and upon this statement he writes the entire get—even if it does not contain the essential part of the get, we have no concern. It is proper ab initio to be stringent like Rashi (Beit Shmuel subsection 28). Regarding the sound of the quill and the sound of the parchment, Rashi offered two explanations: the first, that he heard when he prepared the quill and the parchment for her sake; and the second, that he heard the sound of the quill when writing and the sound of the parchment, for when one writes upon it, a sound is heard. It appears that the Rambam also explained thus, and so it is implied in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch section 15. They further said there that one should not be stringent to stand over the writing of the entire get, so as not to cast aspersion on earlier gittin where they did not do so. Even though in several matters they were not concerned with aspersion on the earlier ones, in this the sages were concerned, and one must not change it.

Therefore, our sages, of blessed memory, said (at the beginning of the second chapter) that the essential part is the first half of the get, and when he says, "In my presence the first half was written," or even the first line, it is sufficient. And even if the scribe went out to the marketplace after writing a portion of the get and returned and completed the get, we are not concerned that perhaps another found him and told him to write it, and he wrote it for the sake of another woman. However, the last half is nothing. Yet regarding the signatures, the agent must stand over the writing of both signatures from their beginning until their end, for they are the essential part. Therefore, if he said, "In my presence it was written, but not in my presence was it entirely signed," or "In my presence it was signed, but not in my presence was it written at all," it is nothing. And even if he said, "In my presence the last half was written," it is nothing, for the essential part is the first half, and the first line is sufficient, as has been explained.

Therefore, if he said "it was entirely written in my presence" and "one witness signed in my presence" but not the second, and even if he said "I am the second witness, and the first signed in my presence, and this second signature is mine"—meaning he was one of the witnesses of the get—it is nothing. And even though this is the primary authentication of a document when one says "this is my signature," why should it be inferior to "it was signed in my presence"? For thus the Sages, of blessed memory, said: either entirely through the authentication of the get or entirely through the enactment of the Sages (ibid.). Therefore, in such a case, it must be authenticated through its signatories, both signatures. And the reason for the matter is that since he says "I am the second witness," he testifies regarding the essence of the get, whereas regarding that signature where he said "it was signed in my presence," he testifies only regarding the signature; that which he testifies for this, he does not testify for that, and the Rabbis did not enact to believe a single individual for halves (Ran). However, two are believed in such a case. Therefore, if two others testify regarding the second signature that it is his signature, it is effective. And even if he and another testify regarding the second signature, it is valid, for there is no logic that if he alone said "it was signed in my presence" it would be effective, yet when two testify regarding his signature it would not be effective. And even though in such a case the get is authenticated three-parts by his word and one-quarter by the second, and in the authentication of documents in such a case—when he says "this is my handwriting and this is the handwriting of the second" and another witness testifies with him regarding the second—it is not an authentication, as is written in Choshen Mishpat siman 46, here it is effective. And we are not concerned for this, for even without the other it would have been validated by his word, as the Rabbis believed him as two (Rashi).

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote in section 17: If there were three witnesses signed on it and two signed in his presence, even though the one signed not in his presence, it is nothing. Thus far their words. For example, that at the signing of the one, he went from there and did not see at the time that he signed, even though all the witnesses of the get do not sign one without the other when he said "all of you sign" because of the witnesses, and they must all sign on one day and one in the presence of the other as was written in siman 120, nevertheless, in this which is like the validation of documents, they were lenient, and it does not require validation except for two witnesses (the Gra subsection 52 and see the Beit Shmuel subsection 34).

The Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote in chapter 7, law 14: Two who brought a get in chutz la'aretz, even though it was not written and signed in their presence, since the husband gave it to them to give to his wife, they may give it to her and she is divorced. For the husband cannot contest this get even though it is not authenticated, as his agents are his witnesses; for if the two said "she was divorced in our presence," she would be divorced even if there were no get there. Thus far his words. And it appears from his words that this is specifically when both of them are agents to deliver the get, but when only one of them is an agent, even though there are two here and witnesses are available to authenticate it, nevertheless it is not effective. And so wrote Rashi, of blessed memory (16b): That two who brought a get do not need to say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed." For what is the reason they required saying it? Because witnesses are not available to authenticate it, and here witnesses are available to authenticate it, and therefore the get is valid even though they said nothing. And if it is difficult: since ultimately there are two, what difference does it make to me if both are agents or if only one of them is, for witnesses are available to authenticate it? The sages did not distinguish between one who comes with a group of people and one who comes alone, for one does not discern or examine these, as the matter is not evident; and if you come to validate this one, they will validate that one. But when two brought it, it is an evident matter and it is uncommon, and the sages were not stringent regarding it. Thus far his words. Behold, it is explicit that it is specifically when both of them are agents.

But the Tosafot, the Rosh, the Rashba, the Ran, and the Tur ruled that even if the agent is only one, but the second testifies regarding the agency—that in his presence the husband gave this get to the first to bring to his wife—it is like both of them are agents and he does not need to say "in my presence it was written" and "in my presence it was signed," for this is like both of them are agents since he testifies regarding the agency. And they wrote that it is possible even the Rambam would agree to this, and his intention was only to exclude when the second comes in his company and has no connection to the agency; but as long as he testifies regarding the agency of the first, the husband can no longer protest (Rashba and the Maggid Mishneh there). And it is possible that even Rashi would agree to this, and so it is implied from the wording of the Tosafot and the Rosh, that they did not come to disagree with Rashi, of blessed memory, on this; see there. And there is one who holds that when both are agents, or when one is an agent and the second testifies regarding the agency, they must also be the witnesses to the delivery so that it should not be a "half-matter" (Tur in the name of the Ramah). And our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in his book in the paragraph beginning with "I wonder" wondered at this, for this is not a matter of a "half-matter," since they are testifying regarding the agency; see there. And there is another reason that this is not a "half-matter," because they saw everything they were able to see (as the Rashbam wrote in Bava Batra 56b). Nevertheless, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, was concerned for this opinion and wrote it in section 18, and this is his wording: And there is one who requires in this that he deliver it in the presence of the witnesses of the agency themselves. Thus far his words. And that which he wrote in section 12 without qualification according to this opinion, we have explained with the help of Heaven in section 51; see there.

And regarding that which the Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote, that when two are agents the husband can no longer protest, the Tur did not write so. This is his wording: And if two are agents to bring it, he does not need to say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," rather it shall be given to her even though it is not authenticated by its signatures, and she may marry with it; nevertheless, when the husband comes, he can protest and say it is forged, and it must be authenticated by its signatures. Thus far his words. And our teacher, the Beit Yosef, already wondered at this opinion of his, for how can he say it is forged when these two contradict him? Therefore, he omitted his opinion in the Shulchan Aruch. However, our teacher, the Rema, wrote: And there are those who say that if the husband comes and protests, it must be authenticated by its signatures. Thus far his words. And this is the opinion of the Tur, and they explained his intention (Beit Shmuel, subsection 37) that he protests that he intentionally gave them a forged get in order to cause her to stumble. And even though we wrote in the name of the Yerushalmi that he is not suspected of causing her to stumble before Heaven, that is in a general case where we do not need to concern ourselves with this; but if he protests and claims that he caused her to stumble, his claim is a claim. Yet, besides the fact that the language of a "protest" in an unspecified sense implies like all protests where he claims it is forged, also from the language of the Yerushalmi that we brought at the beginning of this siman, it is implied that the husband is not believed at all to say that he caused her to stumble before Heaven. Furthermore, if we believe the husband in everything he says, what shall we do with him if he says that he canceled the get, or that it was written not for her sake, and the like? Rather, certainly without proof he is not believed to say anything after the get has come into her hand, except that it is forged, which requires authentication like all legal documents, for as long as the signatures have not been authenticated, he can claim it is forged. And know that the Tur is not alone in this opinion, for Rashi, of blessed memory, also holds so (as he wrote at the beginning of Gittin, s.v. "that two brought it," and both of them were made agents etc.: according to Rava they do not need to say [the declaration], for they are two, and if the husband protests, they are available to authenticate it. Thus far his words. And see Tosafot ibid.).

And it appears to me that they do not disagree at all, and the matter is as follows: for certainly when two brought a get and said, "Behold, we are agents from your husband who sent you this get," the husband can no longer protest. And it is regarding this that the Rambam is dealing, as is proven from his wording where he wrote, "that if the two said, 'she was divorced in our presence' etc.," which implies explicitly that here too they say something. And granted they did not say "in our presence it was written and in our presence it was signed," however, that they are agents of the husband to divorce her they certainly said. But the Tur did not mention this at all, and Rashi explained explicitly (16b): even though they say nothing, see there, but rather they merely delivered this get to her. Therefore, as long as the signatures have not been authenticated, the husband can protest and say it is a forgery. For to what is this comparable? To two who brought a promissory note in which Reuven is signed that a maneh is due to Shimon, and they said nothing; is it not within Reuven's power to claim it is a forgery? For we have not found this distinction anywhere, as it is a great principle: as long as the signatures have not been authenticated, and two witnesses did not testify that so-and-so the borrower sent it, this is not an authentication. And here too it is similar, for this is a simple matter, that the credibility of witnesses depends on a statement, as it is written, "if he does not tell," and not when they remain silent even if it is proven from their actions. (And see the Turei Zahav who answered that if he protests and it is clarified that there were two, his protest is void, see there; but it does not seem so, for if it were so, the Tur should have said so, and it would not be authenticated by its signatories. And what he wrote, that they themselves must come, I do not understand, for what does it matter to me if they themselves or others testify that there were two? And also what he wrote, that they must specifically come to beit din, requires further study. And what I have written is the most clarified.)

Two who brought a get, and one says "it was written in my presence" and one says "it was signed in my presence"—if both are agents, or even if only one of them is an agent and the second testifies to the agency, it is valid, for we do not require their declaration at all, as has been explained. But if only one of them is an agent and the second does not testify to the agency, it is invalid, and it shall not be given to her until it is authenticated by its signatories; for our sages, of blessed memory, believed the agent and not another, and he must say both things: "it was written in my presence" and "it was signed in my presence." Furthermore, even if two who are not connected to the agency say "it was written in our presence" and the agent says "it was signed in my presence," it is also nothing, and it shall not be given to her until the authentication of its signatories. And even though the credibility of the agent is not greater than two, and here two testify to the writing, nevertheless it is invalid for another reason: since the agent testifies only to the signatures, one might come to confuse this with the authentication of general documents, such that they will say one witness is sufficient, and they will not realize that here there are two others testifying to the writing. But if two say "it was signed in our presence" and the agent says "it was written in my presence," it is valid, for since two testify to the signatures, the get is authenticated, and this is the authentication of a document, and the declaration of the agent is not needed at all (Tosafot 17a, s.v. "echad"). And know that the Tur wrote regarding this, and this is his wording: But if only one of those saying "it was signed in my presence" is an agent, it shall not be given until there is another with him. Thus far his words. And the commentators wondered about him, for since two testify to the signatures, this is a complete authentication, and why do we need the other? And there are those who wrote that it is a scribal error and it should say: "But if one says 'it was signed in my presence' etc." But this does not seem so from the arrangement of his wording, and it is superfluous; see there.