Siman 141

Since it has been explained that the man appoints an agent for delivery and the woman appoints an agent for receipt, it follows logically that when the husband sends the get via an agent for delivery, she may appoint an agent who shall receive it from the hand of the husband's agent. Nevertheless, there is a dispute in the Gemara (63b) regarding this, as one forbids and one permits. The reason of the one who forbids is either due to the disparagement of the husband, so that he should not say, "I have become light in her eyes," in that she does not receive it herself. This is not similar to every agent for receipt who receives from the hand of the husband, for he knows and is not fastidious; but through his agent, it is possible that he is fastidious (Rashi). Consequently, where he knew and was not fastidious, such as if he said to his agent, "Deliver it to her or into the hand of her agent," there is no concern at all (Tosafot). However, there is another reason: that we decree because of "her courtyard that comes afterward." That is to say, it has already been explained in siman 139 that if he placed the get in the courtyard of another and afterward she purchased the courtyard from the other, it is not a get; for at the time he gave it to the courtyard, the courtyard was not hers, and when the courtyard became hers, she did not receive it from her husband. Here too, it is similar to this, for he delivered it to his agent and afterward she appointed an agent. According to this reason, if she appointed an agent beforehand and afterward he appointed an agent, it is not similar to this. But according to the reason of the disparagement of the husband, even in this case the concern of disparagement applies when he did not know of her agent. Accordingly, when he knew of her agent and she appointed her agent beforehand, there is no concern according to both reasons.

And for the halacha, the Rif, the Rambam, the Rosh, and other early authorities ruled like the one who permits, for so it is proven in the Shas there (which said "if the words of Rav Chisda are so"). However, the Behag, the Rashba, and the Sefer HaTerumah ruled like the one who forbids, and so it was written in the name of Rabbeinu Tam. Therefore, it is a legal doubt, and she is divorced in doubt. Similarly, the Shulchan Aruch brought the two opinions and did not decide in this matter. Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in his great book that certainly one must be concerned for the opinion of those who forbid, and so wrote the Ran there (the Beit Shmuel, subsection 4, brought from the Responsa of the Rivash, siman 55, that it is better to rely on those who permit than to send via a gentile, but this requires further study, for the Rivash wrote this because there they were accustomed to rule in all matters like the Rambam as he wrote there; but for us, it is a dispute of the great authorities, and conversely, regarding sending via a gentile, it will be explained in this siman that we are accustomed to permit sending via the post office, and therefore this requires further study).

And one must ask a great question regarding this: even without all the concerns, how is it possible to permit her to appoint a messenger to receive it from the hand of the husband’s messenger without his knowledge? For it is forbidden to deviate from the husband’s command, as even if he said "give it to her in such-and-place," it is forbidden to give it to her in another place, as will be explained; and all the more so when he said "give it to her," how can he give it to her messenger and deviate from his command? And they answered this: that certainly if he said to his messenger, "Give this get into the hand of my wife," it is certainly forbidden to deviate, and the permission is only when he said "Give this get to my wife," for the intention is not specifically to her hand (Beit Shmuel subsection 3 and the Gra subsection 5). And it is true that it is so in the Responsa of the Rashba (siman 1,207), yet all the early authorities did not mention anything of this, and the Rashba himself hesitated there, but wrote that by necessity one must say so. However, the reasoning is astonishing, for even in one who says "give to my wife," it implies to her specifically. And that which appears correct in my humble opinion is that in the Yerushalmi (beginning of chapter 6) it is stated: "'And he shall give into her hand'—I only have 'into her hand'; from where do we know 'into the hand of his messenger,' 'into the hand of her messenger,' 'from his messenger to her messenger,' 'from her messenger to his messenger'? The verse teaches, 'and he shall give,' 'and he shall give,'" see there. And perforce, the essence of the derivation is only regarding from messenger to messenger, for the concept of agency itself we derive from "and he shall send" and "she shall be sent," as written at the beginning of siman 140. And certainly the derivation is when he said "give to my wife," for if he said explicitly "to my wife or to her messenger," why would a verse be needed for this? For we would know this from logic, as written in section 1. Rather, certainly the Torah included that even if he said "give to my wife," the messenger may give it to her messenger. Nevertheless, the distinction between saying "into her hand" and saying "to my wife" is also true, for from where would we have the basis to include it even in such a case?

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 1: If the woman said to her agent to receive the get from the hand of her husband, he may not receive it from the hand of his agent; however, if she said, "receive a get from my husband," he may receive it from the hand of his agent. Thus far his words. And this is only according to the opinion of those who permit that her agent receive from the hand of his agent, but according to the opinion of those who forbid, even in this case it should be forbidden in any manner due to the degradation of the woman, so that she should not say, "I am light in his eyes, for he does not give it himself into the hand of my agent," and perhaps in such a case she did not appoint him as an agent for receipt (Taz and Beit Shmuel subsection 4). And when she said "from the hand of her husband," it is forbidden even according to the opinion of those who permit, as has been written.

And even according to the opinion of those who permit it, it is only to appoint another agent who will receive it from the agent of the husband, but she may not make the agent of the husband also her agent for receipt, such as if she says to him, "Behold, you are an agent to receive the get for me." And some say even if she did not say "for me" but only "receive it," it also implies as if she said that he should be her agent for receipt. Or even if she said to him, "Let this get be a deposit with you," it is also like saying "be my agent for receipt," for the husband did not give it to him as a deposit, and presumably her intention is that he should receive it on her behalf and it should be in his hand as a deposit, and she does not have the power to do so. And the sages, of blessed memory, explained (ibid.) the reason is because the agency did not return to the husband; that is to say, the agent does not have the power to detach himself from the agency of the husband to the agency of the wife as long as he has not finished the agency of the husband, and before he has delivered it into her hand, his agency is not yet finished (the Maggid Mishneh). For any agent who then becomes an agent for the one to whom he was sent is detached from the agency of the first, so that he had no time to return to his sender and say, "I have performed your agency," and an agency that is not fit to return and report is not an agency (Rashi). And the sages, of blessed memory, ruled there that it is a matter of doubt, and if the husband dies before she received the get from the hand of the agent, she performs chalitzah and does not undergo yibbum. But if the get reached her hand, she is certainly divorced, and we do not say that since she made him an agent for receipt, the agency of the husband was nullified, such that it would not be effective even when he delivers it to her hand; for the agent did not intend to nullify the agency of the husband, but rather he thought it was effective when she made him an agent for receipt, and when it becomes known that it is not effective, he completes the agency of the husband.

Some say that the fact that the Gemara ruled that it is a doubtful get is not because they were in doubt whether we require that the agency return to him or not, for certainly we require it; and if from the beginning of the agency it was not fit for the agency to return—for example, if the husband said to the agent, "Be my agent for delivery until the halfway point, and afterward she shall appoint you as an agent for receipt"—it certainly is not effective, and something similar to this will be explained in siman 142 (see there in the Beit Shmuel, subsection 23). Rather, the doubt is that here, at the time of the beginning of the agency, it was fit to be returned, and perhaps we only require this at the time of the beginning of the agency (Rashba in his novellae ibid.).

And it appears to me regarding the reason for this matter, that we require in agency that he return to the sender, for since a person’s agent is like himself, and just as he himself would not have the ability to be made an agent of receipt from his wife—as it is necessary that the get leave his domain—likewise his agent whom he appointed, who stands in his place, it is impossible that before he completes his agency the wife should make him an agent in her place, for if so, it has not left his domain at all. Therefore, in a case where at the beginning of the agency it was appropriate that he be entirely in his place, there is a doubt whether we require this until the completion of the agency or not. And it appears from the sugya of the Shas that this is not specifically regarding a get, for the same applies to all matters. And according to this, if Reuven wants to give a gift to Shimon and made Levi an agent and said to him, "Take this object to Shimon," and Shimon made Levi an agent to receive it on his behalf, it is not effective.

The sages taught in the Mishnah (64b): A betrothed young woman, she and her father receive her get; meaning, she or her father. She, because she is an adult; and her father, for as long as she has not married or has not reached full maturity, she is still under the authority of the father (Rashi). And even though she herself can receive her get, nevertheless, it is not within her power to appoint a messenger for receipt, and only her father can appoint a messenger and not she (Kiddushin 44b), for her power is not strong enough to appoint a messenger. And the reason for the matter is that she herself, in the receipt of her get, is nothing but like a messenger of the father, for in truth she is under the authority of her father, and she does not have the power to receive kiddushin without the knowledge of the father, as has been explained in siman 37. Rather, regarding a get, the Torah descended to the depth of the father's mind, that he is not particular if she receives it since a get is given against one's will (Ran ibid.). And this is only regarding the delivery of the get, but that she should appoint a messenger for receipt of her own will, certainly the father's will is not for this. And it appears that with the permission of the father she can act, like the receipt of kiddushin which she can receive with the permission of her father, as has been explained there.

When she is married, even if she is a na'arah, she appoints an agent for receipt, she and not her father, for through marriage she has departed entirely from his authority. And so too when she reaches adulthood, even while she is still an arusah; and so too if the father died, she can appoint an agent, for she is an adult and has departed from his authority through the death of the father. In what case are these words said? Regarding a na'arah. But a ketannah, even if she married and the father died, does not have the capacity to appoint an agent, for a minor cannot appoint an agent. Therefore, a ketannah who married has no remedy through an agent for receipt; rather, the husband or his agent must deliver the get into her hand specifically, and not into the hand of her father, since she married. But when she is an arusah, the father can appoint an agent for receipt even though she does not have the capacity. And see what I wrote in section 15, and it requires great further study in siman 173, section 34.

Regarding a minor who is betrothed, when the husband or his agent delivers the get into her hand, our teachers differ on this. For some say that even though a betrothed maiden may receive a get herself or her father may, and a minor as well, when the father has died or she has married, she receives her get—nevertheless, a betrothed minor whose father is alive, only her father receives her get and not she. This is the opinion of the Rif and the Rambam, and it is likewise explained in the Yerushalmi (chapter 6) which says there: a minor, her father and not she. However, our teachers the Tosafists (64b) hold that she too can receive her get. Also Rashi, of blessed memory, previously thought that only her father and not she, and afterwards he retracted, see there. For so it appears, since a maiden is also under the authority of her father, and this minor, when she has no father or has married, has the power to receive her get; why then, when she has a father, should her law be different from a maiden? And the reason for the first opinion, it can be said, is that as long as there is an adult, it is impossible for a minor to perform any act.

And more than this, some say that even if the father gives her permission to receive her get, it is of no avail, for as long as there is an adult, we do not leave anything to the minor (in the Beit Shmuel in the name of the Ra'avad and the Ritva). And some say that even for those who forbid it, it is only without her father's knowledge, but according to her father's knowledge, even the minor receives her get (ibid. in the name of the Ramban and the Rashba). And the proof for this is that regarding kiddushin she certainly has no agency, yet a man may say to his minor daughter, "Go out and receive your kiddushin." And the first opinion would hold that specifically regarding kiddushin of money, where benefit comes to her hand, he can say so, but not regarding kiddushin of a document, and certainly not regarding a get where she returns to him. However, we have already explained in siman 37 that even regarding kiddushin of money there are those who disagree and hold that he does not have the ability to tell her to receive her kiddushin, see there. And the matter is simple that in all these disputes it is a case of doubtful divorce, and if she received kiddushin from another, she requires a get from both of them if the kiddushin of the second was through the father, and if the husband dies, she performs chalitzah and does not perform yibbum (see Beit Shmuel subsection 6, where it implies that he holds the primary ruling is that she has agency, but it requires further study since in the Yerushalmi it is explained to the contrary, as well as all these authorities, and therefore it appears to me that it is a doubt as I have written).

That which has been explained, that a ketannah who married or whose father died receives the get herself, does not refer to a complete ketannah who possesses no daat at all, for the Torah said, "and he shall send her from his house," and not when he sends her and she returns. Therefore, a shoteh has no divorce at all (Yevamot 113b), and she must have the daat to guard her get. Thus the sages taught (Gittin 64b) that anyone who is unable to guard her get is unable to be divorced. Our sages, of blessed memory, explained there that the measure is anyone who distinguishes between her get and another object; that is, she possesses the daat that if they give her a nut she takes it, and when they give her a pebble she throws it. And some say that this is from the time she reaches the age of peotot, like a girl of six or a girl of seven, each according to the sharpness of her daat, as written in Choshen Mishpat siman 235, see there; for with this measure she knows how to guard her get and does not return to her husband's house. But with less than this measure, she does not have the capacity to receive her get and is not divorced at all.

And some say that any ketannah who has not reached this measure, even the father cannot receive her get, for she has not yet reached the state of divorce for reasons that have been explained. And some say that the father can always receive her get, for the father will guard the get and will not allow her to return to his house, and he will also guard her from promiscuity; and so it is implied from the Yerushalmi (chapter 6, end of halakhah 2). And as for the law, it is a case of doubtful divorce. And any ketannah who has the capacity of "hand" to receive her get also has the law of "courtyard," such that if he placed the get in her courtyard, she is divorced. And even though a courtyard also has the law of agency, and a ketannah cannot appoint an agent, nevertheless regarding the courtyard of a ketannah, the sages of blessed memory said (Bava Metzia 10b) that it was included by extension because of "hand," see there. And she also has four amot; even though it is only a rabbinic enactment, nevertheless, since she has a courtyard, she is also included in the enactment of four amot. And see what I wrote in siman 139.

Some say that regarding a minor girl who is divorced through her father, the husband must write the get as if speaking directly to the father and in the third person regarding the daughter. How so? That he should write: "I have released, etc., your daughter, so-and-so, who was my wife." And some say that one should not change the formula from all other gittin, for her father stands in her place. Therefore, in practice, one should be stringent and write two gittin, as is written in the Seder HaGet in siman 154, and so the great authorities instructed. And post facto, if he wrote only one get like all other gittin, it is valid (Beit Yosef in Bedek HaBayit).

And know that that which we wrote in section 9, that a ketannah does not appoint a messenger, is a simple law throughout the entire Shas, that a minor does not appoint a messenger. And the reason is because regarding agency it is written "man" regarding the Pesach offering and regarding a get (Rashi Bava Metzia 10b, d.h. vechi), or from that which is written regarding terumah, "you also," just as you are possessors of intellect, so too your messengers must be possessors of intellect (Ra'avad Chapter 6, Halacha 9). And according to this, the words of the Rambam there are very puzzling, for he wrote, and this is his wording: And a ketannah does not appoint a messenger for reception, even though her courtyard acquires her get for her like an adult woman, because a messenger for reception requires witnesses, and one does not testify regarding a minor who is not a complete possessor of intellect. Thus far his words. And the Ra'avad, of blessed memory, already challenged him (and that which the Maggid Mishneh wrote requires great study, as the Lechem Mishneh wrote). And that which appears to me is that his reason is clear and he was compelled to this, for while it is true that in all agency one specifically requires an adult, nevertheless, regarding a woman being divorced, since regarding a get it is written "and she shall send," and we derive from this that the woman appoints a messenger as mentioned at the beginning of siman 140, and a woman being divorced can also be a ketannah when her father received kiddushin for her, it is as if the Torah explicitly wrote that a ketannah who is being divorced can appoint a messenger, just like "and he shall place in her hand" which is written there, which includes even a ketannah. And even that which we derive from "her hand" regarding her courtyard also includes a ketannah, which is why the Sages said that a ketannah has a courtyard; it follows that the entire passage speaks also of a ketannah. If so, also the verse "and she shall send" also includes a ketannah, and the Torah permitted that a ketannah should appoint a messenger for a get. And why did the Sages say that there is no agency for a ketannah even for a get? For behold, even regarding the matter of a courtyard, it is mentioned in the Gemara (ibid.) that there is an opinion that only regarding a get does she have a courtyard and not in any other matter; if so, regarding agency we should also say so, that only regarding a get does she have agency and not in any other matter. And even according to the one who holds there that we derive other matters from get, and so we rule as the Rif wrote there, let us say also regarding agency so, that we should derive from get for all matters that there shall be agency for a ketannah. And for this, the Rambam, of blessed memory, explained that regarding agency, perforce it is impossible to say that the intent of the Torah was for a ketannah as well because of the witnesses (and with this all his words are precise, and all the difficulties of the Lechem Mishneh are answered; see there and examine carefully).

It has already been explained in siman 140, section 5, that a shaliach kabbalah requires two sets of witnesses: two who shall be witnesses at the time she appointed him as an agent, and two at the time he receives the get from the husband. And even if the witnesses of the agency are the witnesses of the receipt, we do not say that they are liars—questioning how it happened that they were present at both matters. And similarly, if one of the witnesses testifies regarding the agency and the receipt, and the second witness regarding the agency on its own and the receipt on its own—such that there are three witnesses: one for the agency, one for the receipt, and the third joins with the one for the agency and with the one for the receipt—the reason is that the entire matter is one testimony. Nevertheless, when there are two sets of witnesses, we do not say that they are testifying regarding a "half-matter" for the reasons explained there. Regarding a shaliach holachah, it was explained there that according to the Rambam, witnesses are not required at the time of the agency, while according to the Rosh, witnesses are required; in practice, we rule according to the Rosh. However, at the time of the delivery of the get into her hand from the hand of the agent, witnesses are certainly required, and more than this, three are required, as will be explained in siman 142.

And behold, regarding the reason that witnesses are required at the time of appointing the agent for receipt, we have explained there; and the reason for the dispute between the Rambam and the Rosh we have also explained there. And the reason that witnesses are required at the time the agent for receipt receives the get from the husband is simple, for we hold that the witnesses to the delivery effect the severance, and just as at the time of giving the get from the hand of the husband to the hand of the wife witnesses to the delivery are required, so too at the time of giving it into the hand of her agent (64a, "Whose [view] is this? Rabbi Elazar"). And consequently, according to this reason, following the system of the Rif and the Rambam which was explained in siman 130—that when there are witnesses signed on the get, the absence of witnesses to the delivery does not invalidate ex post facto, and only ab initio are witnesses to the delivery required—here too it does not invalidate ex post facto. However, according to the system of Rashi, Tosafot, and the Rosh, that without witnesses to the delivery it is nothing, it invalidates even ex post facto. However, there is another reason for this: that there must necessarily be witnesses to the receipt so that they may testify later regarding the receipt of the get, for if not so, who would believe them that he received the get from the hand of the husband? Indeed, according to this reason, there is a distinction between when the get was lost from the hand of the agent, where certainly witnesses are required, and when the get is in his hand, for then witnesses are not required, like a wife who brings a get signed by witnesses who does not require witnesses to the delivery, for this was the enactment of Rabban Gamliel that witnesses should sign on the get for the sake of the order of the world, as written in siman 120 and siman 130. And so too regarding an agent for delivery, when he delivers into the hand of the wife, witnesses are also required for the reasons that have been explained. And in this there is another reason, for behold, he must say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," which requires a beit din, as written in siman 142.

It is a simple matter that when the husband delivers the get into the hand of the shaliach kabbalah, he should not deliver it to him until the shaliach clarifies that he is a shaliach kabbalah from his wife. However, it is not a hindrance if the clarification is after he gave the get into his hand, for this is nothing more than a mere disclosure of the matter. Yet, ab initio, it is proper that he should not deliver the get to him until he first clarifies that he is a shaliach kabbalah. The manner of clarification is either by way of witnesses or by way of a deed of shaliach kabbalah, as will be explained before us with the help of Heaven. But a shaliach holachah who brings a get does not require witnesses to testify that he is a shaliach from the husband, since the signed get is in his hand; and even to testify that it was written and signed lishmah, the sages believed the shaliach, as was written in siman 142. Nevertheless, the simple custom is that he also brings a validated authorization from a beit din that the husband made him a shaliach, as will be explained with the help of Heaven; but ex post facto, the authorization is not a hindrance.

In all these cases where two witnesses are required, one may also join the messenger as one witness, and he and the witness with him are two for the testimony—whether regarding the execution of the agency for delivery, or for receipt, or for the delivery of the get from the husband to her messenger, or for the delivery of the get from his messenger to the woman. For we establish that a messenger may become a witness (Kiddushin 43a), as written in Choshen Mishpat siman 121, and likewise above in siman 35 regarding kiddushin; see there. And this is if the messenger is fit for testimony, such as being neither a relative nor disqualified, and not a woman, for all are fit for agency as will be explained. And this is the opinion of the Tur and the Ittur. However, the Rosh, of blessed memory, wrote (beginning of chapter 4) that the messenger does not become a witness in these matters, except in the case of a messenger for delivery when he delivers a get to his wife and requires three, as written in siman 142, then the messenger is one of the three (see Rosh chapter 1, siman 4). But if two are sufficient, he is not one of the two. And the reason is that the messenger stands in the place of the man or the woman, and he is like a principal party. And that which in monetary laws a messenger becomes a witness is because a person's money is not like his body (Sanhedrin 10a), but in a matter of prohibition, it is impossible for the messenger to be a witness. And that which for kiddushin he becomes a witness, and likewise for divorce the sages said (Kiddushin 43a) that a messenger becomes a witness, this is when two are messengers. And this is the wording of the Gemara there: If he said to two, "Go out and betroth the woman for me," they themselves are his messengers and they themselves are his witnesses; and likewise in divorce, see there. For since he sent two, his intention was to make them witnesses, for why would he need two for agency alone? But when he sent one, his intention is that he be like his own body, and he cannot be a witness. And what the sages said there, "a messenger becomes a witness," which implies even one messenger, this is in monetary laws for the reason we have written. And that which was explained there in the Gemara, that the one who holds "a messenger becomes a witness" does not hold this reasoning that he is like his own body, see there, that is regarding matters of money.

That which we have written according to the opinion of the Rosh, so it appears in our humble opinion; for if it were not so, the words of the Rosh would be puzzling, for the source of his law is from the Yerushalmi (beginning of chapter 4) which holds that the agent does not count toward the number of the two [witnesses], see there. And why was he concerned for the words of the Yerushalmi since in our Talmud they ruled explicitly that an agent becomes a witness? And in truth, there is one who interpreted the Yerushalmi regarding another matter (see Rashba there), but according to the Rosh it is difficult. And there is one who says that this is a stringency of rabbinic origin and not from the essence of the law (Bach), and I wonder how we should concern ourselves with a stringency in a place where the Gemara was not concerned for it. Furthermore, if so, also in kiddushin we should concern ourselves with this stringency. Therefore, it appears to me that the Rosh holds this distinction that we have written, for in our Talmud this law is not found in Gittin and Kiddushin except regarding two agents; and in truth, the Rosh at the beginning of the second chapter of Kiddushin did not write this law there except regarding two agents, see there.

That which the Rosh, of blessed memory, was compelled to this is because the Yerushalmi itself ruled at the beginning of the second chapter of Kiddushin that a shaliach becomes a witness, and here it ruled that he does not count as a witness; therefore, one is compelled to distinguish thus. And there is a proof for this from the Yerushalmi itself, and this is its wording there at the beginning of the second chapter of Kiddushin: Beit Shammai say the shaliach does not count as a witness, and Beit Hillel say the shaliach counts as a witness. And the Yerushalmi asks: How is this possible? And it answers: He sent two, etc. And there is no explanation for this (see there in the commentators). And in my humble opinion, its question is this: How is it possible to say that a shaliach counts as a witness, for the Yerushalmi holds at the beginning of the fourth chapter of Gittin that the shaliach does not count as one of the two? And it answers: He sent two, meaning that with two shlichim they become witnesses (and regarding the cancellation of a get, it is stated there that he counts as one of the two, see there, and the reason is simple, for even he himself can cancel it).

Regarding the law, most poskim disagree with the Rosh, and even according to the Rosh, of blessed memory, it is possible that it is merely a stringency (as the Bach wrote). Nevertheless, Heaven forbid to transgress his opinion in practice. According to what I wrote, in kiddushin as well one must be careful that the agent is not one of the two [witnesses]. When he appointed two agents, the Acharonim agreed that according to everyone we say they become witnesses (see Beit Shmuel at the end of subsection 11), whether in gittin or in kiddushin, and it is an explicit Gemara as I wrote. Similarly, when the husband's agent delivers the get to his wife and requires three, the agent is one of the three, for the reason that three are required is for the sake of the establishment of a beit din, and it is only rabbinic; and regarding a rabbinic matter, we say that he becomes a judge, and so it is in the Shas (5b). Regarding the nullification of the get, it is also stated in the Yerushalmi there that he is of the count of the two, for the reason I wrote in the previous section.

And regarding this, that an agent for receipt requires witnesses at the time he delivers it to her agent, the Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote: In what case does this apply? When the get was lost or torn. But if the get was produced from the hand of the agent for receipt, he does not require witnesses, whether the husband gave it to him privately or whether it was delivered to him with witnesses; its production from his hand is like its production from the hand of the woman. Nevertheless, he should not give it to him initially without witnesses of delivery, just as with the woman herself. Thus far his words. And he follows his reasoning that post facto it is valid even without witnesses of delivery when there are witnesses of signature, as he wrote in section 17. And according to the second reason mentioned there, so that they may testify afterwards regarding the receipt of the get, this also does not apply when it is produced from the hand of the agent, just as when it is produced from the hand of the woman. But according to our teachers who hold that witnesses of delivery are a requirement, here too one requires witnesses of delivery at the time of giving, and it is only to bring witnesses that he received the get with witnesses of delivery that is not required, since the get is produced from the hand of the agent.

This is what the Tur wrote: that if the signatures of the witnesses on the get are authenticated, there is no need to bring the witnesses of delivery before us, only that the agent must state that he received it before two, etc. Thus far his words. And similarly, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 10, only transcribed the beginning of the words of the Rambam: that if the get was produced from the hand of an agent of reception, there is no need for witnesses of reception. Thus far his words. That is to say, it is sufficient for the agent to state that he received it before witnesses of delivery. However, regarding the witnesses of the verbal appointment, that she appointed the agent of reception in their presence, these are always required even if the get is produced from the hand of the agent (Maggid Mishneh, Beit Yosef, and Chelkat Mechokek subsection 12). And more will be explained regarding this with the help of Heaven.

And according to this, according to the opinion of the Rosh, who requires witnesses even for a messenger for delivery, it would also appear that the messenger must bring witnesses that the husband appointed him as a messenger, for what distinction is there in this between delivery and receipt? And this we have not found in any place; on the contrary, from the words of the Rosh at the beginning of Gittin, it is explicitly explained that he does not need to bring witnesses for this, except if the husband contests it and it is a place where the messenger does not need to say "in my presence it was written," see there. And indeed, there are some of our teachers who hold that when the get is in the hand of the messenger, even witnesses of the declaration are not required (Rashi 64a, s.v. "ve-amai" and Ran ibid.). However, it can be said that they are not comparable; for certainly the messenger is believed for everything, but regarding a messenger for receipt, in the matter of her being divorced immediately upon the receipt of the messenger, he must necessarily bring witnesses to this. For granted that he is believed because the get is in his hand regarding the husband—that he certainly gave it to him—and likewise he is believed when the get is already in the hand of the woman, nevertheless, as long as the get is in his hand and we establish her as a divorcee, by what presumption do we establish her as such as long as the woman is not before us and admitting that she appointed him as a messenger? And even if she admits that she appointed him as a messenger, he would be believed from the time of her admission, but not from the time the get came into his hand. And one cannot say that he should be believed by a migo that if he wanted he could have given it to her, for this is not a migo at all, for perhaps she does not wish to receive it from him without the husband's knowledge. Therefore, to establish her as a divorcee from the time of his receipt, he must necessarily bring witnesses that she appointed him as a messenger (and the Ran also wrote there that he is not believed that she is divorced from the first moment, see there; and according to this, it can be said that they do not disagree at all, and see Beit Shmuel subsection 12, and delve into this).

And know that from the words of the Tur that we brought, it is explicitly implied that when is it unnecessary for witnesses to have the get delivered in their presence? When the signatures have been authenticated. But without authentication, it implies that witnesses are necessary even when the get is in the hand of the messenger. However, from the words of the Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch it does not imply so, for the Rambam did not require authentication except when the husband contests, saying "it is a forgery," as he wrote in chapter 12, see there. And here in chapter 6 he does not deal at all with an authenticated document, and so it is in the Shulchan Aruch. And also from the sugya of the Gemara it implies so. And also regarding the Tur himself one must wonder, for later in this siman he wrote that authentication is only required when he contests. This is his wording: If she appointed a messenger for receipt before witnesses and the get is produced from his hand, and the husband says "it is a forgery," it must be authenticated by its signatories or by witnesses of delivery. Thus far his words. And how can he require here witnesses of delivery even without a contest, even though the get is produced from the hand of the messenger? And also our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in his book under the heading "The Tur wrote," questioned him, for he himself wrote in siman 142 that authentication is not required as long as the husband does not contest. And the Ra'avad holds so at the beginning of chapter 12, that authentication is always required when the messenger did not say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed." But the Rambam holds in chapter 7, law 24, that without a contest authentication is not required, and the Tur there holds like the Rambam. Why then did he write here that authentication is required? Furthermore, his wording is not well-ordered (ibid.).

Therefore, it appears to me that the Tur introduced a different law to us, and the measure of his words is as follows: first he wrote the law of the Mishnah, that for a messenger for receipt there must be two sets of witnesses; and afterward he brings the words of the Rambam, that this is specifically when the get was lost, but when the get is in the hand of the messenger, there is no need for witnesses of delivery. And he wrote that this is according to the Rambam, but according to us, witnesses of delivery are always required, except that there is no need to bring them before us since there are signed witnesses, for the law regarding her messenger is like that of the woman herself. And afterward he wrote: However, that which we require that she must bring two witnesses that it was delivered to her in their presence refers to when they do not recognize etc., but if they were verified etc., she does not need to bring witnesses of delivery before us etc. Thus far his words. And he means to say: even if the get was lost, if the signatures were already verified, there is no further need for witnesses of delivery, just as with the woman herself, if she lost her get, if she only verified the signatures once, they permit her even if we did not know if there were witnesses of delivery; for since we knew that witnesses signed, they presumably acted properly, as this was the primary enactment of Rabban Gamliel. The same applies to her messenger. And that which will be explained regarding a lost get where there are no witnesses who saw it in her hand—that even the husband's admission is of no avail (and in the Shulchan Aruch it is in section 56)—this is truly when the signatures have not yet been verified.

All these matters apply when the husband does not contest, but if he comes and contests, saying "it is a forgery," even if she appointed her agent with witnesses and there are witnesses testifying to this and the get is in the hand of the agent, nevertheless it requires authentication, either to authenticate the signatures or to bring the witnesses of delivery before whom it was delivered. For even if the get were in the hand of the woman and the husband says "it is a forgery," it requires authentication; for this reason the sages enacted regarding an agent for delivery that he must say "in my presence it was written" so that if the husband comes and contests we do not heed him, as the rabbis believed the agent, as I wrote in siman 142. And in a place where it is not necessary to say "in my presence it was written," if the husband comes and contests, it must be authenticated by its signatories. Consequently, regarding an agent for receipt, for whom the saying of "in my presence it was written" is never relevant, it always requires authentication when the husband contests, whether the get is in the hand of the woman or whether it is in the hand of the agent (and see Beit Shmuel subsection 74).

And if the husband does not challenge with a claim of forgery, as he admits that he wrote it, but rather he says that he did not deliver it into the hand of the agent for the purpose of divorce but only as a mere deposit, and the agent says that he gave it to him for divorce so that she would be divorced by his receipt, the Rambam ruled in chapter 12, law 11, that the agent is believed. And he wrote further: And so too if the get was produced from the hand of the woman and she says, "This agent gave it to me," and the agent says, "Yes, I gave it to her, and he (the husband) gave it to me for divorce," and the husband says, "I only gave it to him as a deposit," the agent is believed and she is divorced. Thus far his words. And he does not distinguish between when the man and the woman are not in the same city and when they are in the same city, for in such a case it would seem that the husband should be believed, for if he were giving it for divorce, why would he have to deliver it to an agent? Let him give it to her himself. And there is in the Shas (64a) one who holds thus because of this reason; nevertheless, he ruled like the one who holds there that the agent is believed (like Rava there, according to the ruling of the Rif).

The reason for the matter is that the law of the agent is like the law of the trustee, who is believed forever as long as his trusteeship is in his hand, as is written in Choshen Mishpat siman 56. However, his credibility is not by virtue of a migo—that he could have delivered it into her hand—for this is no migo at all. First, perhaps she would not want to receive it from him without the husband's knowledge. Furthermore, even if he delivers it to her, if the husband says that he did not deliver it for the purpose of divorce, by what would she be believed? Furthermore, perhaps he delivered it to him before witnesses as a deposit, and there is no migo here to contradict witnesses. Rather, his credibility is from the fundamental law that a trustee is believed, for when one delivers the trusteeship into his hand, he delivers it to him on this condition: that he shall be believed in whatever he says, and if he says it is for divorce, it shall be for divorce (Tosafot ibid. s.v. shalish). And he does not rely on the fact that witnesses might contradict him, for perhaps the witnesses will die or go to a province overseas (ibid.). However, it appears to me that if witnesses came and contradicted him, saying that in truth he gave it only as a deposit, he is not believed and she is not divorced. For it has already been explained there in Choshen Mishpat that a trustee is believed only against one witness and not against two witnesses; rather, this is what we are saying: that as long as witnesses have not come to contradict him, he is believed and she is divorced according to the opinion of the Rambam.

However, according to what the Rambam himself wrote in chapter 16 of Malveh, law 8, this is his wording: A document that was in the hand of a third party etc. and he said "it is paid," he is believed even though the document is validated, for had he wanted, he could have burned it or torn it. Thus far his words. Behold, it is explicit that we require it to be within his power to fulfill his words, and so wrote several of the Rishonim, and so it is proven in the Shas (at the end of the chapter Zeh Borer). And if so, if we say as I have written, that it was not within his power to deliver it to the woman, in what way is his power great that we should believe him? Therefore, one must say that the Rambam holds that he was able to deliver it to the woman, for since witnesses testify that she made him an agent for receipt, she certainly would have received her get. And he holds that she would be believed when her get emerges from her hand and he does not claim it is forged. And one cannot say that we should believe him with a mingo that if he wanted he could have said "it is forged," for one, this is not a good migo, as she is able to find witnesses of validation; and furthermore, anyone against a third party is not believed even when he has a migo. And one should look into this, and it requires further study regarding the halacha; and see what I wrote in section 45.

And there is a question regarding this: for is it not explained in Hoshen Mishpat there that the third party is only believed when the litigant admits that he is a third party, and without this he is not believed? And if so, according to the opinion cited there that when the litigant says "I gave it to you for safekeeping" he does not have the status of a third party (Shach ibid. subsection 5); and here the husband says "I gave it to you for safekeeping." And in truth, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch there ruled that even when they contradict him he is believed, but according to those who disagree, it is difficult. And it can be said that the safekeeping of a get is not similar to the safekeeping of money; for regarding the safekeeping of money, there is no status of third-party mediation at all, but regarding the safekeeping of a get, why did he write the get and why did he deposit it in his hand? Rather, it is certain that even the husband admits to the essence of the matter, that he desires to divorce her, but he says that there was some condition between them or the like, and the messenger contradicts him in this. Therefore, even according to the words of the husband, he has the status of a third party (ibid.).

And that which the Rambam wrote, that if the get is produced from the hand of the woman, and she and the shaliach say that he gave it to her for divorce and the husband says "I gave it as a deposit," that the shaliach is believed—even though a third party is only believed when the object of the trust is in his hand, nevertheless here the husband is not believed, whether the shaliach was for receipt or whether he was for delivery. For since he is able to place it in his hand, it is as if it is in his hand (Beit Shmuel, subsection 83). And in this it is not similar to a trust regarding money, where when the object of the trust leaves the hand of the third party he is not believed; for here, he and the woman are considered as one person, for the essence of the get belongs to the woman and not to another, and when he took it, he took it to deliver it to her. And also when he is a shaliach for receipt, his hand is like her hand, and he delivers it to her to be as proof for her. And that which the husband is believed regarding a shaliach for delivery when he did not say "in my presence it was written" to challenge the get, this is when he says "it is forged," for then she must authenticate it, and not with a claim of "deposit" or any other claim, such as when he claims that the get was lost or stolen. For in this, the law returns to the law of a third party, who is believed whether the get is in his hand or whether it is in the hand of the woman, since the husband admits to the essence of the get (as appears to me).

All this is the opinion of the Rambam and the Rif, but many of our teachers disagree with them and hold that the agent is only believed if the husband and wife are not in the same city, for then he has the status of a trustee as has been written. However, if both of them are in the same city, the husband is believed because there is proof that he did not hand it over for divorce, for if so, he would have given it into her hand (like Rava there). And even though in every place a trustee is believed, nevertheless, with such a deficiency, it is as if witnesses contradict him. According to this, even regarding an agent for delivery when both are in the same city—even though he said "in my presence it was written"—the husband cannot say "it is forged" because the sages enacted thus; nevertheless, when he says "I gave it for safekeeping," the husband is believed because of the reason that has been explained, that he would have given it into her hand (as is evident in Tosafot, beginning with the word "Ba'al," that according to Rava he is believed, see there; and so wrote the Ran in his first answer, and so wrote the Rashba in his Novellae). And it is not logical to say that just as the sages enacted that by saying "in my presence it was written" he cannot claim "it is forged," so too he should not be believed when he says "I gave it for safekeeping." For it is impossible to say so, as even regarding forgery, if witnesses came and contradicted the agent, the agent is not believed, for the sages did not enact against two witnesses, as has been written in siman 142. And this logic of "he would have given it into her hand" must be considered like two witnesses, for if not so, why is the agent not believed? Behold, against one witness a trustee is believed, as has been written in Choshen Mishpat siman 56. Rather, it must be that it is like two witnesses (as appears to be the reason of the Tosafot and the Rashba, for if not so, what compelled them to say so; and examine this carefully).

Therefore, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote that for this reason it is proper to be careful not to divorce via a messenger for delivery when the husband and his wife are together in one city, as it is possible to come to a mishap; for if the husband claims that he did not give it to the messenger for divorce, he would be believed because of this reason—that he would have given it into her hand—since according to this logic there is no difference between a messenger for acceptance and a messenger for delivery, as I have written. However, according to our custom, that every messenger for delivery has an authorization confirmed by witnesses and by a beit din that the husband appointed him as a messenger, this concern is removed, and he may appoint a messenger even in one city, and so we practice.

And aside from this, some say that this flaw—that he gives the get to the messenger instead of to her—only applies to a messenger for receipt, for since the hand of the messenger is like her own hand such that she is divorced immediately, why did he not give it into her hand? However, regarding a messenger for delivery, this is not a flaw at all, as he did not want to deliver it into her hand so that she would not be divorced immediately, and therefore he gave it to a messenger so that perhaps it would occur to him to annul the get before she receives it (Ran). And according to this resolution, there is no need to be careful at all regarding appointing a messenger for delivery in the same city.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 55 that even according to those who disagree with the Rambam and hold that in one city the husband is believed, this is specifically when he claims "I gave it as a deposit," but if he claims that he made him an agent for delivery and wishes to retract before it reaches her hand, he is not believed. Thus far his words. And the reason is that in this case the logic does not apply that "if it were so that it was for divorce, he would have given it to her," for even according to his own words, he gave it into his hand for divorce. And this is only according to what I wrote, that there is no difference according to this opinion between an agent for receipt and an agent for delivery, for even regarding delivery it is relevant to say that he would have given it to her. But according to the "there are those who say" in the previous section, that regarding an agent for delivery we do not say this because he did not want her to be divorced immediately, it follows that even when saying "I gave it for delivery," the husband is believed; for specifically regarding receipt do we say that he should have given it to her, but not regarding delivery, and the claim "for delivery" is like "I gave it as a deposit" (Beit Shmuel, subsection 77).

Regarding the second law of the Rambam, when the get is produced from the hand of the woman and she and the messenger say it was given for divorce while the husband says it was for safekeeping, that she is divorced—it would seemingly appear that according to the opinion of those who disagree, they would also hold in this law that when they are in the same city, the husband is believed (and so wrote the Beit Shmuel in subsection 83). However, from the arrangement of the wording of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, it does not appear so, for the first law he wrote in section 55 and wrote there the opinion of those who disagree, yet this law he wrote plainly in section 56 and did not bring the opinion of those who disagree. Therefore, it appears that when the get is produced from the hand of the woman it is much better, and there are some among the Rishonim who intended to say so: that when the Sages said that if he were giving it for divorce he would have given it into her hand, the intention is not that the husband would have given it into her hand, but rather the intention is that the messenger would have delivered it immediately to the woman so that it would be in her hand as proof. Therefore, if it is indeed in the hand of the woman, the husband is not believed (Ran there in the third resolution, that in such a case even Rav Huna admits). However, from all the Rishonim it does not imply so, and even the one who stated this reasoning did not state it as halacha (for he provides other resolutions). Therefore, it appears that he was not exacting in this and relied on the opinions of those who disagree that he brought previously (and although the proof of the Beit Shmuel from section 57 can be rejected, as there the woman herself does not know clearly, see there, nevertheless his words are correct and so appears to be the primary view; and delve into this).

The Rambam further wrote there in chapter 12: If the get was lost, even though the husband says "I gave it to the agent for the purpose of divorce" and the agent says "I gave it to her," she is in a state of doubtful divorce, for she was established as a married woman and there is only one witness and the husband. And even if the woman said "He gave it to him in my presence for the purpose of divorce and the agent gave it to me," since the husband and the agent support her, it is possible that she would be emboldened, and perhaps she was not divorced. Thus far his words. And he teaches us through this that even though when the get is physically present, either in the hand of the woman or in the hand of the agent, she is permitted even when the husband denies it, yet when the get is not before us, even if the husband also admits it, she is not divorced, for she has nothing with which to leave the status of a married woman since there is neither a get nor witnesses here. But when the get is physically present, the get itself removes her from the status of a married woman and the husband is not believed, as has been written.

He further wrote there: An agent for receipt who received a get for a woman and sent it to her before two witnesses, and the get reached her hand and she took it, and behold the get is produced from her hand, but she does not know if her husband sent it to her or her agent for receipt or the husband's agent—behold she is divorced, as we have explained. If the husband comes and contests, saying that he did not write it or that it is a void get, it shall be verified by its signatories, for behold witnesses testify that the get they gave her was produced from the hand of her agent, whose hand is as her hand; and even though she does not know, behold the witnesses knew. And if it was not verified, she is not divorced. Thus far his words. And he informs us in this how great is the power of a get when it is before us, for if the get is lost, even if everyone admits, it is nothing, as I have written; but when it is before us, even if the woman herself does not know how she was divorced and the agent is also not before us, nevertheless, as long as the husband has not come and contested, nothing is required, since there are witnesses that the agent sent it to her. And even if the husband comes and contests, nothing is required but the verification of the signatures, that they signed on this get, and witnesses testify that this get was produced from the hand of her agent. Therefore, even if the husband says "I gave it for safekeeping," he is not believed according to the method of the Rambam; and according to the method of those who disagree, he is believed when they are in the same city. However, as long as the husband has not come and contested, we maintain her in the status of being divorced even according to the opinion of those who disagree. And there is one who says that according to the opinion of those who disagree, she is not in the status of being divorced even without the husband's contestation, and the great Rishonim inclined toward this opinion more than the first opinion (the Rosh holds like the first opinion, and the Ritva and the Maggid Mishneh disagree, as the Beit Shmuel wrote in subsection 88).

It is a simple matter that everything that has been explained—that the agent is trusted, and likewise the woman—is only when we have witnesses before us that she made him an agent for receipt. And even if the husband does not know that he is an agent for receipt, nevertheless, he gives the get into the hand of the agent in a manner that if he is an agent for receipt, she is divorced immediately upon his receipt (Beit Shmuel subsection 12 and subsection 78). For this is the power of a third party, because they trusted him according to the opinion of the Rambam even when they are in one city, and according to those who disagree, when they are in two places as I have written. And likewise, it is specifically necessary that the agent say that they delivered it to him before witnesses according to those who hold that without witnesses of delivery it is nothing, and according to the Rambam there is no absolute necessity for witnesses of delivery ex post facto, as I have written several times. And this—that we require witnesses that she made him an agent—this is regarding an agent for receipt; but regarding an agent for delivery, nothing is required, and once the get reaches her hand she is divorced (Beit Shmuel subsection 78), as long as the husband has not come and protested. And if he protests, it shall be validated by its signatories. And if the agent is in a place where he must say "it was written in my presence," the husband cannot protest, and it will be explained in siman 142 with the help of Heaven.

And know that according to logic, it appears that in every place where we said that the agent is trusted when the get is in his hand or in the hand of the woman, that the law is the same even if the get is not currently in his hand, provided there are witnesses who saw the get in his hand; his law is also like the get being currently in his hand, for witnesses are trusted in everything. And so it implies explicitly from the words of our teachers, the authors of the Tosafot (64a, s.v. tinah), who wrote that we only require witnesses who saw the get in his hand whole and not torn, see there. However, our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 55 and in section 57 that there are those who say specifically when the get is produced from under his hand, but if the get is not in his hand he is not trusted, even if he had witnesses who saw it under his hand. Thus far his words. And the reason can be explained since the entire essence of the agent's trustworthiness is based on the law of a trustee, and we hold that a trustee is only trusted when his trusteeship is produced from under his hand; but when it is not under his hand, even though we knew by way of witnesses that it was in his hand, the trustworthiness of the trustee has departed. And only if it is in the hand of the woman is it like being in his hand for the reason we wrote in section 33. But if it is not in the hand of either of them, it is not according to the law of a trustee. And regarding the words of the Tosafot, it can be said that their intention was as long as the husband does not deny it, for in this we do not need the trustworthiness of a trustee; but when he denies it, it does not avail that there are witnesses that the get was in his hand (and so it appears from the Beit Shmuel, subsection 79, who agreed with the Rema, and therefore even though the Gra, subsection 107, rejected his words, nevertheless the law appears like the words of the Rema, and examine this carefully).

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 11: A messenger for delivery does not require witnesses if the messenger and the sender both admit to it; but if the sender denies it, this is a matter of doubt. And some say that a messenger for delivery must be appointed with witnesses. In what case does this apply, that the messenger of the man does not require witnesses? When he delivered a get to her in which witnesses are signed. But if witnesses are not signed in it, and the messenger went and delivered it to her before witnesses, she is doubtfully divorced. Thus far his words. And behold, these two opinions we have already explained in siman 140, section 6, that the Rambam holds that witnesses are not required for a messenger for delivery, and the Rosh, based on the Yerushalmi, holds that witnesses are required. And we explained there the reasoning of the two opinions with the help of Heaven. And that which he wrote, that without signed witnesses it is a matter of doubt, so wrote the Rambam, of blessed memory. And the reason for the matter we explained there in section 8, that when there are signed witnesses, they are as those testifying that it was written for its specific purpose; but without signed witnesses, who is it that testifies to this? Even though they believed the messenger when he says "in my presence," this is all when there are signed witnesses, or at least that he was made a messenger with witnesses, for then certainly the witnesses acted according to the law. But without witnesses at all, upon whom do we rely regarding the primary writing of the get, that it was according to the law? And he did not decide upon a complete invalidation, but rather a doubt, for perhaps the messenger alone is trusted even regarding the primary writing, and we rely upon the scribe that he wrote it for its specific purpose, as our sages, of blessed memory, said at the beginning of Gittin: ordinary scribes of the beit din are well-versed.

However, regarding that which he wrote, that if the sender denies it, it is a case of doubt, his words are puzzling. In what case are we dealing? If the sender says it is forged, she certainly must verify the signatures, or when the messenger said "in my presence it was written," for then the husband is not believed to say it is forged. And if the husband claims "I gave it to you as a deposit," it has already been explained that when the get is in the hand of the messenger or in the hand of the woman, he is not believed to say "I gave it as a deposit." And if we say his intention is when the husband and the wife are in the same city, for in this there is a dispute between the Rambam and the Rosh whether the husband is believed when he says "I gave it as a deposit," as we have explained, and our teacher, the Beit Yosef, himself wrote this dispute in section 55 regarding a messenger for receipt, and the same applies to a messenger for delivery as is proven from his words there—in such a case, he should not have written opaquely but rather should have specified. And it is possible to say that we are dealing with a case where the get was already given to the woman in the presence of witnesses, and now the get is not in her hand, only the witnesses saw it previously in the hand of the messenger and when he gave it to the woman; and we explained in section 42 that there are two opinions in this, whether its law is as if it is now in the hand of the messenger or not (and so it appears in the Ba'er Heitev, subsection 14, who explained the words of the Beit Yosef in this way, see there).

However, this too is not clear to me, for how could he state the matters without elaboration? Therefore, it appears to me that the matters are according to their plain meaning; for although we have already explained that even with a messenger for delivery, when the get is in the hand of the messenger, the husband is not believed according to the Rambam even when both are in one city, and according to the Rosh when they are in two places, nevertheless, this requires investigation: why should the husband not be believed with a migo that if he desired, he could annul the get? It is understandable regarding a messenger for reception, which is explained in the Shas, for when the get is in the hand of the messenger she is already divorced and the husband has no migo; but with a messenger for delivery, behold, she is not yet divorced and it is within his power to annul it. And it is true that we explained in section 31 that anyone opposed by a trustee is not believed even with a migo, and this is the opinion of several of the Rishonim, that the law is the same regarding a messenger for delivery—that the husband is not believed when the get is in the hand of the messenger—nevertheless, this is not explicitly explained in the Shas or in the Rambam. Certainly, one must have doubt regarding this. Therefore, even though from the words of the Shulchan Aruch in section 55 it implies that he holds even with a messenger for delivery the husband is not believed, nevertheless, he did not write so explicitly. Therefore, he wrote here that if the sender denies it, it is a doubt even though the get is in the hand of the messenger, for perhaps in a case of migo the messenger is not believed. And here we are dealing with a case where the get is still in his hand and not in the hand of the woman, for if he had already handed it to her, there would be no migo here, just as with a messenger for reception (and although its source according to the explanation of the Beit Shmuel there and the Gra in subsection 25 is from the Hagahot Maimoniyot, chapter 3 of Ishut, and there he wrote "after the woman received it," and so wrote the Be'er HaGolah, and the Gra raised a difficulty against him, see there; nevertheless, it appears to me his intention is as I have written and he did not intend that source, and delve into this).

And know that regarding this opinion which requires witnesses for an agent of delivery, our teacher, the Rema, wrote: However, the agent is believed to say that he appointed him with witnesses and there is no need for testimony regarding this, and we are accustomed to requiring a power of attorney and witnesses for the power of attorney that he was made an agent. Thus far his words. And certainly such is the opinion of the Tur and several of the Rishonim, that the agent is believed to say that he appointed him with witnesses. However, in my humble opinion, there are those who disagree on this, as will be explained in the section after this with the help of Heaven.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 13: There is one who says that a messenger for delivery and a messenger for receipt do not need to be appointed with witnesses, and there is one who disagrees. Thus far his words. Our teacher, the Rema, wrote that this is a duplication of matters, as it was already written in section 11. Thus far his words. However, it is almost impossible that he would write the same law twice, one after the other. In my humble opinion, a different intention is hidden in his words, and his intention is not regarding the appointment of the messenger, but rather his intention is that even according to the opinion that requires witnesses, and even according to the Rambam who does not require witnesses—nevertheless, when there are no witnesses signed on the get he requires witnesses, as has been explained—nonetheless, if the messenger is trusted to say that he appointed him with witnesses, there is also a dispute in this. For the Tur and several of the Rishonim ruled that he is trusted to say that he appointed him with witnesses, as I wrote in the previous section. But in the Responsa of the Rosh, Klal 45, Siman 10, it implies explicitly that in a place where the messenger does not need to say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," the messenger is not trusted to say that he appointed him with witnesses unless he brings proof for this; see there (so wrote the Mishneh LaMelech, Chapter 6, Halacha 4, and in the Beit Shmuel, Siman 142, subsection 7). Therefore, he was precise in section 11 to say "to appoint him with witnesses," and here he wrote "to make him with witnesses," meaning to make him based on witnesses who will testify that he appointed him as a messenger with witnesses.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 13 that some say regarding a delivery agent, if he delivered the get to her between him and her alone and it is impossible to go back and give it to her in the presence of two, she is divorced since the get emerges from her hand with its signatures; and some say it is invalid. However, if the get is verified by its signatures in her hand, she does not need to bring witnesses of delivery before us, only that she says she received it in the presence of two as is proper; and the same applies to a reception agent from the husband. Thus far his words.

An explanation of his words: Above in siman 133 it was explained that the Rif and the Rambam hold that witnesses to the delivery are not indispensable, and if the husband gave it to her hand between him and her, it is kosher since there are witnesses signed on the get. However, Rashi, Tosafot, the Rosh, and the Tur disqualify it without witnesses to the delivery. Now, according to this view, it is obvious regarding an agent of delivery that if the agent gave it to her not in the presence of witnesses, it is disqualified. But even according to the view of the Rif and the Rambam, it is worse in the case of an agent, for so wrote the Rambam in chapter 6, law 15. This is his wording: If the agent transgressed and gave her the get between him and her, he should take it from her and return and give it to her in the presence of two, etc. Thus far his words. And regarding the husband himself, he did not require that he take it from her and return and give it to her in the presence of two (the Maggid Mishneh). And he wrote further: And if he died, since the get emerges from her hand authenticated by its signatories, behold this is a kosher get. Thus far his words. And this is what our teacher, the Rema, wrote, that it is impossible to return and give it to her, such as if he died or the like. And the first view is the view of the Rambam. And the view of "some say" that it is disqualified, it appears to me that this is the view we brought there in section 6, that even though only witnesses to the delivery effect the severance, nevertheless it is kosher also with witnesses to the signature when he gave it to her between him and her, because we consider the witnesses to the signature as witnesses to the delivery, since the get emerges from her hand with these witnesses and it is known that the husband delivered it to her; see there. And according to this, this is only when the husband himself gave it to her, and not when the agent gave it to her, for it is not known with certainty that the husband delivered it to her. Therefore, even according to the view of the Rif, it is disqualified in the case of an agent (and so it appears somewhat from the Ran, chapter 9, see there. And he who marks in the Rema the two views as being in the Tur is in error, for it is not found at all in the Tur. And from the Vilna Gaon, subsection 29, it is explained that this is the dispute in siman 133, and it requires further study, for if so, what novelty is there in this? Therefore, it appears to me as I have written). And that which he wrote, that she does not need to bring witnesses to the delivery before us and it is sufficient that she says she received it in the presence of two, this is according to all views, just as when the husband gave it to her. And that which he wrote, "and the same applies to an agent of receipt from the husband," his intention is also that when the get is in the hand of the agent, he is believed to say that he received it from the husband in the presence of two, and witnesses are not needed for this, and it was explained in section 24.

The Tur and the Shulchan Arukh wrote in section 14 that regarding both a messenger for receipt and a messenger for delivery, it is not necessary that they hear from their mouths that they are appointing him a messenger. Therefore, both the man and the woman can appoint, before witnesses, a messenger who is standing in another place, and the witnesses write and sign that he appointed so-and-so as a messenger. Thus far their words. And so all the Rishonim agreed, and so it is proven in the Shas in many places; and we say explicitly (30a) regarding a messenger of the beit din, which will be explained in siman 142, that one can appoint a messenger whether in his presence or not in his presence (Beit Yosef). And that which was explained in siman 120, that he cannot command a scribe and witnesses to write and sign not in their presence, and we require that they hear it from his mouth, this is because of the reason that "words cannot be handed over to a messenger." However, the delivery of the get is not "words," and also there are opinions there that if he appointed them not in their presence it is fine (Ran, end of chapter HaTikabel), but we do not rule accordingly, as I wrote there.

And according to this law, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 35: One who sends a get by means of a Kuti to deliver it to a certain person, and the husband appointed that certain person in writing as an agent to bring the get to his wife, it is valid, because the Kuti is doing nothing more than the mere act of a monkey. Thus far his words. And the Rosh and the Tur wrote that such was the custom in Ashkenaz and France according to the ruling of our teacher Tam, of blessed memory. And this is for the reason that has been explained, for behold, the husband can appoint an agent not in his presence. And our teacher, the Rema, wrote on this, and this is his wording: However, there are those who disagree and hold that one may not appoint an agent for delivery by means of writing; furthermore, I have not seen this practiced. Thus far his words. And he was very brief, and the matters must be explained:

And behold, the Rosh, the Rashba, and the Ran brought in the name of the Gaonim (at the end of the second chapter of Gittin, see there), and this is the wording: The Ba'al HaHalachot Gedolot wrote that the rabbis asked before Rav Chaninai Gaon: Since a Kuti cannot be an agent to receive the get or to deliver the get, what is the law regarding wrapping the get in a vessel and saying to the Kuti, "Take this vessel to a certain Israelite, and let him give it to his wife"? And he said to them: No. It must be placed in her hand or in the hand of her Israelite agent, but in the hand of a Kuti, no; for when the get leaves the hand of the husband, we require that it reach the hand of the wife, or the hand of an Israelite agent who stands in the place of the husband, or the hand of an agent appointed by the wife herself who stands in the place of the wife. And the rabbis of now say: Even though a Kuti brought the get, if he gave it to an Israelite and that Israelite gave it to the wife in the presence of witnesses of delivery, we do not allow her to marry ab initio because a Kuti is not subject to the laws of divorce; but if she married, we do not remove her, because of the view of Rabbi Shimon, as we learned in a Mishnah: Rabbi Shimon says all of them are valid. And Rav Zera said: Rabbi Shimon followed the reasoning of Rabbi Eliezer, who said that the witnesses of delivery effect the severance, and we hold that the halacha follows Rabbi Eliezer. Thus far his words.

The Rosh wondered at their words, and this is his wording: And they are words of wonder, for certainly if the husband made the Kuti an agent and said to him that he should appoint the Israelite in his place, it would be invalid, as there is no agency for a Kuti and he is also not a party to the laws of divorce; but here, since the Kuti did nothing but the act of a mere monkey, and the husband appointed in his writing the Israelite who is in that place as an agent, why should the get be invalidated? And so they practice in Ashkenaz and in France according to the words of Rabbeinu Tam, to send a get and kiddushin by means of a Kuti, and he appoints in his writing the Israelite who is in that place as an agent. Thus far the words of the Rosh, of blessed memory. And the Rashba, of blessed memory, transcribed the words of the Geonim and did not object to them. And the Ran, of blessed memory, also did not object, but only wondered what the relevance of Rabbi Eliezer is to here; see there. And the Maggid Mishneh also brought their words in chapter 6, law 6, and did not object to them at all; see there.

And it appears to me that these teachers of ours did not grasp in their intention the explanation of the Rosh, of blessed memory, but rather this is the explanation: that the husband did not write to the Israelite and did not inform him through witnesses that he is making him an agent to receive the get from the Cuthean, and also did not make the Cuthean an agent to deliver it to the Israelite and that the Cuthean should make the Israelite an agent; rather, he says to the Cuthean, "Give this thing to the Israelite," and presumably the Israelite will deliver it to my wife. And the husband's intention is to make the Israelite an agent, but he did not explicitly inform him that he is making him an agent. Therefore, the Gaon did not validate it, for since he did not appoint the Israelite as an agent in writing, this is like making the Cuthean an agent and having the Cuthean make the Israelite an agent. But the rabbis of now validate it because the Israelite will also understand that the husband is making him an agent, since he knows that there is no agency for a Cuthean. And I found this reasoning explicitly in the Mordechai, chapter 2, and this is his wording: In a responsum of Rashi, of blessed memory, he wrote regarding an incident where one wanted to send a get to his wife via a Cuthean or to make him a receiving agent, and he said that it is not effective unless he says so to an Israelite. And the Raviah wrote that this is specifically where the Cuthean delivers or receives etc., but a Cuthean bringing it to the hand of an Israelite is permitted ab initio. And this matter is similar to that which is said in the chapter HaMekabel: A person knows that one cannot make a receiving agent and therefore concludes and gives for the purpose of delivery; and here too, a person knows that there is no agency for a Cuthean and will not err. And all the more so where he explicitly specified that he appointed an Israelite as an agent. Thus far his words. Behold, this is explicitly according to our words.

And that which the Gaon wrote, that a Cuthean is not a factor at all and he placed it in her hand or in the hand of her Israelite agent, this is all in an ordinary case; but when he informed the Israelite that he is making him an agent to deliver to his wife, certainly even the Gaon admits. And there is clear proof for this, for in the Halachot Gedolot he wrote after this, and this is his wording: And an agunah who comes to beit din and says, "Be witnesses for me that so-and-so, who is in a province across the sea, I have made him an agent for reception to receive my get for me from my husband," and the beit din of the province across the sea writes, and the husband then makes that agent an agent for reception and writes a get and gives it to him—if after the get fell into the hand of the agent it was torn or burned, this agunah is divorced. Thus far his words. And he means to say that she requests the beit din of this place to inform the beit din of the husband's place that she is making so-and-so an agent for reception, and they did so, and the husband delivered it to that so-and-so under the category of agency for reception, she is divorced upon his reception. Behold, it is explicit that by means of a writing she has the ability to make an agent for reception, and all the more so an agent for delivery by writing. Rather, it is certain that the Gaon is dealing with a case where he did not inform the agent, as I have written (and it is difficult to say that this law which the Halachot Gedolot wrote is according to the Rabbis of now).

And regarding that which the Ran, of blessed memory, wondered, what the matter of R. Elazar has to do with here—according to our words and according to what the Mordechai wrote, their words are very precise. For behold, in the Mishnah: All documents that are produced in gentile courts, even though those signed upon them are Cuthites, are valid, except for bills of divorce for women and manumissions of slaves; and R. Shimon validates even in these. And they explained in the Gemara that R. Shimon holds like R. Elazar, and also the First Tanna holds like R. Elazar, but they disagree regarding distinct names (9b). And Rashi explained that the First Tanna invalidates by rabbinic decree even with witnesses of delivery, lest they come to rely upon the witnesses of the signature; and R. Shimon holds that since they are distinct names, everyone knows they are Cuthites and they will not come to rely upon them, see there. And this is the reasoning of the rabbis now, that certainly ab initio we do not marry her off, for a Cuthite is not a "son of cutting" [divorce]. And according to the plain meaning of the words of the husband who commanded the Cuthite to deliver it to an Israelite and he should deliver it to his wife, it appears that he makes the Cuthite an agent, and he is not a "son of cutting" and is not fit for agency. Nevertheless, we do not remove her if she married, for just as R. Shimon said regarding Cuthite signers that it is valid because with distinct names they will not come to err and rely upon them, and they will not come to permit without witnesses of delivery; therefore, even according to the rabbis of R. Shimon, we rely [on the view] that she shall not go out, because everyone knows that the Cuthite is not fit for the agency of a get, and presumably the intention of the husband was that the Israelite should be his agent, and the Cuthite is merely performing the act of a monkey, as the Rosh wrote. And this is exactly the wording of the Mordechai that we brought.

And there are those who wish to bring proof that it is forbidden to send via a Kuti from the Yerushalmi (chapter 3, halacha 3) on the Mishnah: one who brings a get and it was lost from him, if he found it immediately it is valid, and it explains "as long as no person passed there," and it was asked there: if a Kuti passed, what is the law? And it brings there that it is valid, see there. Consequently, we are not concerned that a Kuti would transport a get. But this is no proof at all, for certainly the majority of gittin are sent via a Yisrael, and since therein it is a remote concern that we should suspect that the found get belongs to another whose name is like his name and her name is like her name, therefore to be concerned for the minority in such a remote concern, certainly there is no concern. Furthermore, in truth the Yerushalmi rejects it, for it is valid for another reason; and on the contrary, there are some of the poskim who held that the conclusion of the Yerushalmi is that even if a Kuti passed it is invalid (Bach in siman 132), and as we explained in siman 132, section 11, see there, and see what I wrote there in section 13.

And there are those who wish to be concerned about this on the grounds that it is like "take your get from upon the ground," but these are only words of wonder, for this disqualification is only when the woman takes it from the ground, because the verse writes "and he shall give into her hand" and not that she should take it herself, as the Rambam wrote in the first chapter and as was explained in siman 139. However, regarding his agent who delivers it into her hand, why should we care from where he takes it? For his agent is like himself, and it is as if he himself takes it and gives it into her hand. And it is true that in the Tashbetz this reasoning was mentioned, but afterwards he rejected it for other reasons (see there, part 3, siman 326). And there are many proofs for this, and there is no need to explain, for it is self-evident that this is not in the category of "take from upon the ground" at all (and so wrote the Pitchei Teshuva).

And behold, in practice, Rabbeinu Tam and the Rosh explicitly permitted, and also the Rashba and the Ran and the Maggid Mishneh who cited the words of the Behag according to our interpretation—this is not relevant at all to this law where he specified in his writing "so-and-so who is in such-and-such a place" as a messenger. And even without this, is it not the conclusion of the Behag that if she married she does not leave? And the Mordechai in the name of the Raviah explicitly permitted as I have written. And the Tur and the Beit Yosef and the Radbaz and the Tashbetz, and likewise the Yam Shel Shlomo at the end of the second chapter, all permitted with one voice. And the Radbaz and the Tashbetz performed an act in practice, as is explained in their responsa. And only our teacher, the Rema, wrote that there are those who disagree and hold that one may not appoint via writing, and his intention was for the words of the Behag; but according to what I have written, it is not relevant at all to this. And as for what he grasped in the words of the Geonim, that their reason was because one may not appoint a messenger via writing—behold, we have brought from the Behag himself that he permitted via writing regarding a messenger for reception, and what difference is there between a messenger for reception and for delivery? On the contrary, from the perspective of logic, a messenger for reception is more stringent, as in the matter of the agency itself, for according to the Rambam, for delivery one does not need witnesses and for reception one does need them. And if it is due to the reason of "pick up your get from the ground," we have already rejected this reason.

Furthermore, how is it possible to say that agency via writing would not be effective? Firstly, writing is like speech, as is proven in the Shas in Gittin (71a) and in Tosafot there. And even for the writing of the get, writing is effective according to several poskim. And even according to those who forbade the writing of a get via writing, it is not due to the laws of agency—for according to several poskim agency is not required for the writing—but rather it is a mere stringency, as we explained in siman 120, section 64; see there. And behold, regarding agency it is proven that there is no need at all to hear from his mouth; rather, once we know that it is pleasing to him, he becomes his agent, for we maintain that one may acquire a benefit for a person in his absence, and according to most poskim, acquisition is based on the law of agency. And regarding a get itself, our Sages inquired (at the end of the fifteenth chapter of Yevamot): One who acquires a get for his wife in place of a yavam, what is the law? And the doubt is whether it is a benefit or a disadvantage; see there. It follows that regarding a benefit, one can acquire on her behalf based on the law of agency even though she did not speak and did not write, and all the more so that writing is effective.

Furthermore, since it is explicit in the Gemara that they may appoint a messenger for the delivery of the get, whether in his presence or not in his presence (30a), how is it possible to forbid something that is explicit in the Gemara as permitted? Therefore, it appears to me that the opinion of our teacher, the Rema, is as follows: since regarding gittin we are stringent in several matters beyond the core of the law, we should not permit something that is not found explicitly in the Gemara. And that which we brought, that the Gemara ruled "whether in his presence or not in his presence," there it is dealing with a beit din, see there; and the power of a beit din is effective so that he will not be able to deny it and say "it is a forgery." And that which he wrote, that one should not appoint a delivery messenger in writing, this refers to his own handwriting without the authentication of a beit din, for afterward he may deny it and say "I did not write it and it is a forgery." Furthermore, he is able to say "it was merely a casual act," and this reasoning is found in the Yerushalmi, chapter 1 of Terumot, halacha 1, see there. However, by means of a beit din, he certainly admits that one is able to appoint a messenger in writing.

And he further wrote that I have not seen this practiced, thus far his words. And certainly this is so, for it is possible to appoint an Israelite agent. However, even in the generation before us, when due to our many sins the people of the House of Israel have been scattered from one end of the world to the other and across the great sea, and it is almost impossible to send an agent for delivery to the location of the woman, and because the sages of the generation saw that the daughters of Israel would remain agunot, they permitted sending a get via the post office. And now in these days of ours, it is a simple custom in all the dispersions of Israel without anyone opening his mouth or chirping. And this is the custom: that first the beit din in the location of the woman writes to the beit din in the location of the man that they should call the man and arrange a get for him according to the law of the Torah, and that he should appoint so-and-so son of so-and-so in the location of the woman as an agent for delivery to hand over the get to his wife, so-and-so daughter of so-and-so. And he says before a beit din before the writing of the get and also afterward: "I hereby appoint so-and-so son of so-and-so in such-and-such a place as an agent for delivery to hand over a get to my wife so-and-so daughter of so-and-so, and let his hand be as my hand, etc., and I hereby give him permission to appoint an agent in his place, etc." And he says this before two witnesses. And they write an authorization that before two witnesses so-and-so son of so-and-so appointed so-and-so son of so-and-so as an agent for delivery, etc., according to the text of the authorization that will be explained. Except that in the place where it is written in the authorization "so-and-so handed over a scroll of severance to so-and-so," one must write "appointed," for he is not handing the get into his hand. And the witnesses of the authorization sign, and the beit din validates them. And automatically, since this agent cannot say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," the get must be validated by its signatories. And the beit din in the location of the woman must recognize the signatures of the beit din in the location of the man. And this is the benefit of what we wrote, that first the beit din in the location of the woman should write to the beit din in the location of the man, so that the beit din will answer them first regarding their letter and inform them that they will do so. And this letter will reach the beit din in the location of the woman before the get and the authorization reach their hand. And automatically, they will afterward recognize the signatures of the beit din when they compare their validation on the authorization to their signature in their letter, and this is a complete validation in which there is no concern of forgery. And the husband shall send the get and the authorization to the hand of the agent in the location of the woman, and they shall write distinct signs on the get, such as a hole on the side of such-and-such a letter. And there the agent shall hand it over to the hand of the woman before a beit din of three and before witnesses, as will be explained in the order of the get, siman 154. However, several questions explained ibid. are not relevant to ask, since the agent did not see the writing of the get and the signatures. And the rabbi arranging the matter will understand all that is relevant to ask and that which is not relevant, for it is difficult to specify everything in writing.

And know that I have seen one who wrote that it is better for the husband to appoint a messenger at the place of the writing, in the manner of all messengers, to deliver the get to his wife, and to transport it to her location and deliver it to her, and he gives him permission to appoint a messenger and a messenger of a messenger in the manner of all agency. And afterwards, this messenger shall appoint the man who is at the location of the woman as his messenger in his stead. We would gain through this that when the first messenger, before a beit din at the location of the man, appoints so-and-so who is at the location of the woman as a messenger in his stead, he will be able to state "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed." And he will appoint that so-and-so as a messenger not in his presence, and he will not be required by the law to say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," but rather he shall say "I am a messenger of the beit din." And they shall write the second authorization in the manner that they write from a first messenger to a second messenger, and they shall also write in the document that this messenger appointed so-and-so who is at the location of the woman as a messenger in his stead.

And it is not at all clear to me, for since the husband knows clearly, and his agent also knows, that he has no intention at all to bring the get to the location of the woman and deliver it to her, you have no greater appearance of falsehood than this. This is nothing but a mere artifice. Behold, even in monetary laws we follow a proven assessment, as is written in Choshen Mishpat siman 246; all the more so regarding a get, when there is a proven assessment that what he speaks he has not resolved in his heart, and he has no will for this at all, nor is it in his power to travel to the woman's location. How can we rely in a get on mere chatter that he speaks with his mouth, when he has no intention at all to do what he speaks with his mouth that he will do? And this is not like "matters of the heart," which are not considered matters, for that is only when his intention is not known to all; but when his intention is known at the time of the act, it is not "matters of the heart" (so wrote the Tosafot at the beginning of the fourth chapter). Furthermore, whenever we can know his intention on our own even without a disclosure of intention, it is not like "matters of the heart" (ibid.). And here, everyone knows that he has no intention at all to go across the sea or on such a long journey. And that which we established that "disclosure of intention regarding a get is of no consequence," this is regarding the husband with respect to cancellation, but not regarding an agent. Furthermore, this is not like a disclosure of intention, but like an explicit matter known to all, and a matter revealed to all is as if there are witnesses to it (Beit Shmuel siman 26, subsection 1). Furthermore, regarding an oath, where the Torah made it dependent on the "expression of the lips," even so the sages, of blessed memory, said (Shevuot 26b) that when his heart contradicts his mouth—such as one who swears not to eat wheat bread but in his heart it was for barley—the oath does not take effect at all, as is written in Yoreh Deah siman 210. All the more so regarding agency, where we are witnesses that in his heart he has no will at all to go far away to his wife's location, such that his words that he speaks with his mouth are not considered at all. Furthermore, we learned in Terumot (chapter 3, mishnah 8): One who intends to say "terumah" but said "ma'aser," or "ma'aser" and said "terumah," etc., has said nothing until his mouth and heart are equal, for it is written, "That which is gone out of your lips you shall keep," and it is written, "Whosoever is of a willing heart." How is this? We require that he resolves in his heart and expresses with his lips (the Bartenura). And in our case as well, it is simple that he must resolve in his heart what he says, for if not so, what kind of agency is this? Behold, we are witnesses that he did not resolve in his heart at all. Therefore, one should not do such a thing; rather, the husband shall appoint an agent who is in the woman's location. There is no need here for the statement "In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," since there is a certified authorization, and the beit din in the woman's location will recognize the signatures of the beit din who certify the authorization via an exchange of letters before they send the get, as we have explained with the help of Heaven (however, the custom is via two agents).

All are fit for the agency of a get, whether a man or a woman, whether for delivery or for receipt. And even though a man is not subject to the receipt of a get and a woman is not subject to the giving of a get, nevertheless, a man receives a get for his minor daughter, for just as the Torah granted him the right to receive her betrothal money, so too he receives her get from betrothal. And as for a woman, also, sometimes the husband sends her get through her and says to her, "Be my agent for delivery until the beit din in such-and-such a place, and they shall appoint an agent for you to deliver this get to you," as will be explained in siman 142. It follows that a man is also relevant to the receipt of a get and a woman to the delivery of a get (beginning of chapter Ha-itkabel). And if his wife receives a get on behalf of her rival wife, see what I wrote at the end of siman 136.

And these are those disqualified from agency for a get, whether for delivery or for receipt: a deaf-mute, a deranged person, a minor, a Kuti, and a slave. Similarly, a blind person is disqualified from bringing a get in a place where it is necessary to say "in my presence it was written" and "in my presence it was signed," for he is unable to see the writing and the signatures, and how can he say "in my presence it was written" and "in my presence it was signed"? This will be explained in siman 142. The reason these are disqualified is because they are not eligible for agency, as I wrote in Choshen Mishpat siman 182. And a slave, even though he is fit for agency in other matters—since he is obligated in mitzvot like a woman and is a member of the covenant as I wrote there—nevertheless, regarding matters of gittin and kiddushin, he cannot be an agent because he is not within the legal framework of gittin and kiddushin (23b), for kiddushin does not take effect upon him. And that which a woman is divorced by means of her slave, as I wrote in siman 139, this is not by way of agency, but rather by way of the law of chatzer (Tosafot ibid.).

And know that the opinion of most poskim is that a slave is disqualified both for delivery and for receipt. However, there are some of our teachers who hold that he is disqualified only for receipt and not for delivery; for since he is included in the law of agency, and his disqualification is only because he is not included in the law of gittin, he is disqualified only for receipt because through his receipt she is divorced, but for delivery he is merely like a general agent, and he is indeed included in the law of agency (the opinion of the Ri Migash as written by the Ran and the Maggid Mishneh in chapter 6). And even though from the sugya of the Shas there it also seemingly implies this, see there, nevertheless we do not rule accordingly and it is a minority opinion, and also in the Yerushalmi (end of chapter 2) it is explained like the first opinion. Nevertheless, in practice one must be stringent and it is a doubtful divorce (Beit Yosef). And so it implies in the Shulchan Aruch, section 31, where he wrote: "And there is one who says that if the slave is an agent for delivery it is a doubt." Thus far his words. For the Rashba ruled accordingly to be concerned for the opinion that validates it, and therefore she becomes disqualified from the priesthood, and if she received kiddushin from another, she requires a get from him.

In siman 17 it was explained that there are five women who are not believed to say her husband died, because we suspect them that due to their hatred they lie in order to ruin her, and these are: her mother-in-law, the daughter of her mother-in-law, her co-wife, her yevamah, and the daughter of her husband. And similarly, they are not believed to bring her get because perhaps their intention is to ruin her, so that the husband will come and protest, and in the meantime she will marry and be forced to leave this one and that one. In what case does this apply? In a place where one does not need to say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed." But in a place where one must say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," they are able to bring her get; for since after the saying of "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" the husband is not believed to protest, as I wrote in siman 142, it is impossible to say that their intention is to ruin her, for she will no longer be ruined (Gemara ibid.). And there it will be explained further regarding this with the help of Heaven. And regarding her co-wife if she was made an agent for reception, see what I wrote in section 65 (see Tosafot Gittin 77b, s.v. yadah).

And so too all relatives are fit for the agency of the get, whether for delivery or for receipt, for an agent is not a witness and his agent is like himself, and so too her agent; and if so, what difference is there between a relative and a non-relative? Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 33, and this is his wording: And there is one who wrote that in a place where it is possible, ab initio the agent should not be a relative to the man, nor to the woman, nor to the judges before whom they give the get. Thus far his words. And we do not practice now to be careful in this, because in this there is sometimes a remedy for agunot, for when she cannot pay the fee of agency properly, one of her relatives volunteers to be an agent, as has occurred several times. However, in a place where there is no delay due to a monetary matter, it is certainly a mitzvah to heed the words of our teacher, the Rema, if it is possible to do so.

Regarding those disqualified from testimony due to their wickedness, the Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote in chapter 6, law 7, that those disqualified by the words of the scribes due to a transgression are valid for the agency of the get. However, those disqualified due to a transgression from the words of the Torah are disqualified for bringing the get, and if they brought it, it is disqualified. In what case does this apply? When the get was authenticated by its signatories. But if it relied only upon the words of one disqualified due to a transgression from the Torah, it is not a get. Thus far his words. And all the Rishonim wondered about him: if it was authenticated by its signatories and there was no need to say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," why is it disqualified when he brought the get? And likewise, even when they relied upon him, why is it not a get at all? It should be enough that she may not marry based on it because he is not believed in his statement, but how can we say that it is a void get? For it is only a doubt that perhaps he is lying and it is impossible to rely upon him, but perhaps it will be authenticated by its signatories and be valid (Rashba 5b). The commentators (the Maggid Mishneh and the Kesef Mishneh) explained that his intention is also that as long as it is not authenticated, it is not a get at all; nevertheless, if she received kiddushin from another, she requires a get. However, from his wording it does not imply so (Beit Shmuel, subsection 46). Therefore, the opinion of most poskim is that if it was authenticated by its signatories, it is completely valid, for what do we care if he is wicked? He is a member of the covenant and is valid for agency. And when it is not authenticated, it is a doubtful divorce, for we fear forgery; and if she received kiddushin from another, she requires a get from him (ibid.).

And the Rambam, who disqualifies it entirely such that it is not a get at all, must be said to be dealing with a case where no authentication was found upon it, and regarding a rasha such as this, authentication is required by Torah law, and as long as it has not been authenticated, it is merely like a shard of clay, and therefore it is not a get at all (see Beit Shmuel at the end of subsection 46). Or it is possible that it is dealing with a case where the husband protests, saying "it is a forgery," and he follows his reasoning in chapter 7 that when the husband protests and no authentication is found, and in a place where one is not required to say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," the get is void by Torah law, and there as well many disagree with him, and it will be explained in siman 142. But in any event, he follows his reasoning that regarding a rasha by Torah law, his saying "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" is nothing, and therefore he wrote that it is not a get (Mishneh LaMelech ibid.). Or it is possible that it is dealing with a case where there are no witnesses that he made him an agent, and it has been explained that the Rambam holds that he is believed to say that he made him an agent, and a rasha by Torah law has no credibility at all, and therefore it is not a get at all (the Gra subsection 71).

This is the wording of the Rambam in the Commentary on the Mishnah (at the end of chapter 2): And anyone disqualified from testimony due to a transgression of the Torah's prohibitions is disqualified from bringing the get that has not been authenticated by its signatures, and we do not rely even on his statement "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed." But if it was authenticated by its signatures, behold, it is kosher. Thus far his words. From this it is explicitly clear like the first resolution in the previous section. However, in that which he wrote that when it is authenticated by its signatures it is kosher, he contradicts his words here where he wrote that it is disqualified. And it appears to me regarding his intention that this is what he meant: that if he brought it authenticated, such as with the authorization customary among us and the like, it is completely kosher. But if when he brought it, it was not yet authenticated, and he was disqualified by Torah law according to his system as I have written, therefore even though it was authenticated afterwards and by Torah law it is kosher, nevertheless it is disqualified by rabbinic law because it was not rendered kosher at all at the time he brought it. And this is precise in his wording where he wrote, "In what case is this said? When the get was authenticated," meaning when it was authenticated afterwards. And in the Commentary on the Mishnah, it is implied from his wording that he brought it authenticated. And so it is explicitly clear from the wording of the Bartenura (and this is his wording: And if the get is authenticated by its signatures, they are kosher to bring it. Thus far his words). And it is possible that all the poskim would agree with him in this, that whenever he brought it without authentication it is disqualified by rabbinic law even if it was authenticated afterwards, because it was disqualified at the time of its delivery to the woman. And the Rosh, of blessed memory, is among those who disagree with the Rambam as the Tur wrote, and he wrote in this wording (chapter 2, siman 26): And if they were disqualified by Torah law, they are disqualified from bringing the get outside of the Land of Israel, etc., and if it was authenticated, even if they did not repent, it is kosher, etc. Thus far his words. It is explicitly implied that he brought it authenticated (and according to this, that which he wrote there "and not like the Rambam," according to our words they do not disagree at all, as is proven from his words in the Commentary on the Mishnah).

This is the wording of the Shulchan Aruch, section 33: And even those disqualified by the words of the Scribes due to a transgression are fit for the delivery of the get, but those disqualified due to a transgression by the words of the Torah are disqualified for bringing the get unless the get was validated by its signatories; and there are those who disqualify even if validated by its signatories. Thus far his words. And his intention is regarding the Rambam, and according to what we have explained, it can be said that even the Rambam admits when he brought a validated get, as is proven from his words in the Commentary on the Mishnah. And the giants of the world have already permitted it in practice in a time of pressing need with a get validated by a rasha of the Torah (Pitchei Teshuva, subsection 31, in the name of the Responsa of the Geonei Batrai). And according to our words, the permission is simple even according to the opinion of the Rambam, of blessed memory. However, what one person wanted to permit—to deliver it to her ab initio without validation and to validate it afterward due to some reason he had for this (ibid.)—does not seem correct to me at all, for according to what I wrote, all the poskim would agree with the Rambam that it is disqualified in such a case, and it is a compelling logic because it was delivered in disqualification. And when he has an authorization in his hand, it is a complete validation (Beit Shmuel, subsection 44). And one should be stringent by the letter of the law to recognize the signatures, and without this, one should not permit it at all even according to those who are lenient regarding the recognition of signatures, as will be explained, for with a rasha of the Torah there is concern for forgery. And it is also proper to be stringent regarding him to have distinct signs in the get, such as a hole next to such-and-such a letter; and without validation it is nothing according to the Rambam by the Torah, and according to the rest of the poskim due to the doubt, as I wrote (the difficulty raised by the Beit Shmuel there regarding the Rosh requires further study, for the Rosh certainly also admits that with a validated get he is believed to say that he is the agent).

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote there that the law of one who leaves the religion is like the law of those disqualified from testimony by Torah law. Thus far his words. For he is a member of the covenant and is fit for agency. However, there are some of our teachers who hold that he is not a member of the covenant and his law is like a Cuthite (Tosafot Sanhedrin 72b). And so it implies is the opinion of the Rambam (Beit Shmuel, subsection 47). According to this, it is forbidden to send a get through him, and if they sent it, it is invalid even when the get was verified. And if so, one who desecrates the Shabbat publicly, even regarding rabbinic prohibitions, is completely disqualified for the agency of the get, for everywhere we judge one who desecrates the Shabbat publicly as one who leaves the religion, and one must be very careful in this. (And the Magen Avraham in siman 189, subsection 1, wrote that one who leaves the religion is like one who acts provokingly, but without provocation he is not disqualified, see there. And according to this, it is possible to be lenient regarding one who desecrates Shabbat not out of provocation, and so it implies in Korban Netanel at the end of the second chapter of Gittin, letter 78, see there. And one must deliberate on this, and look closely):

It is a simple matter that in all testimony we require its beginning and its end to be in a state of fitness. Therefore, if the messenger was a minor when they gave him the get, even if he reached majority afterward at the time of its delivery, or a deaf-mute who gained hearing, an imbecile who became sane, or a slave who was emancipated, it is invalid. And if its beginning and its end were in a state of fitness, even though in the middle he became disqualified, it is valid; for example, if he gave him the get when he was of sound senses and he became a deaf-mute and returned to being of sound senses, or was sane and became an imbecile and returned to being sane, it is valid. And regarding a minor, a slave, and a Kutite, this is not applicable. But regarding a blind person, in a place where it is necessary to say "in my presence it was written" and "in my presence it was signed," it is not so; for only if he was not blind at the time of the writing is it valid, even if he is blind at the time of the delivery of the get, for a blind person is not disqualified except that he cannot say "in my presence it was written" and "in my presence it was signed," and since at the time of its writing he was not blind, he is completely fit. And regarding disqualification due to transgression, it is the opposite: for if his end is in a state of fitness, such as if he repented before the giving, even though he was a wicked person at the time they gave him the get to convey it, it is valid; for a wicked person is fit for agency, rather we are concerned that he is lying, and since he repented, there is no concern at all (Beit Shmuel, subsection 48).

The agent may receive whatever payment for his agency that he desires, for even the witnesses of the get—though a witness is forbidden by Torah law to take payment to testify—nevertheless, we explained above in siman 130 that since he does not take it for his testimony but rather for going to the beit din to be prepared for testimony, it is permitted to take payment. And all the more so an agent who is not a witness, for even a relative is fit as we have written, and his exertion is great to go to the location of the woman and deliver the get to her, or an agent for receipt who must go to the location of the husband to receive the get, that he is permitted to take as much as he desires. However, it is proper that he should make the bargain with the husband or with the woman beforehand for such-and-hersuch an amount for his agency, and not rely on afterwards, for perhaps they will not agree between them and the husband will say, "Had I known that I must pay such-and-hersuch, I would not have sent him," and it turns out that he nullifies the agency. And so too the woman regarding an agent for receipt, when she says thus, she turns out to be as one nullifying the agency. And so too the agent, if he says, "Had I known they would not give me such-and-hersuch, I would not have consented to the agency," and it turns out that he nullifies his agency. Therefore, it appears to me that if a cause arose where they did not hire the agent for a fixed price beforehand, they should not speak at all afterwards regarding the matter of the price until he delivers the get into the hand of the woman, and regarding an agent for receipt, until he receives the get from the husband; for after the completion of the get, there is no concern of nullifying the agency. However, even this is an ugly thing, that they should say, "Had we known, we would not have consented to this," and this is like a form of a slur. Therefore, the obligation is to make a bargain before he is appointed as an agent, and all the more so when they made a fixed bargain with him, that he should not request more upon his arrival at the location of the woman for the reason we explained. And there is one who was concerned in this for an "interested party," and an interested party is disqualified for testimony (see Pitchei Teshuvah subsection 30). And although this is not testimony as we have written, nevertheless, when he must say "In my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," it is like testimony where the sages trusted the agent when he testifies that in his presence it was written and signed. And the great later authorities disagreed whether an interested party is fit in this or not, and when he requests more than his payment, you have no greater interested party than this. And it appears to me that certainly if the primary reliance is upon him according to the law of the Gemara, certainly when he is an interested party in a monetary matter, it is difficult to rely on him, for perhaps for the reason that he wants to add to his payment, he will lie. But according to the custom that there is a power of attorney, the primary reliance is upon the power of attorney, and the saying of "In my presence..." does not invalidate by law, and there is no concern in this when the power of attorney is validated (see Noda BiYehudah siman 129 and Pitchei Teshuvah there). But for the reason we wrote, that there is concern for the fear of nullifying the agency, one certainly must be careful in this.

Agency does not require a kinyan; nevertheless, it is the custom that the husband performs a kinyan sudar, and this is a notification that he has resolved in his heart to do this thing. Therefore, if he says, "With a whole heart I have spoken and I have resolved to do this thing," no kinyan is necessary. So too is the custom among us, that the agent performs a kinyan sudar and says, "With a whole heart I have spoken and I have resolved to be an agent to deliver a get to such-and-such a woman," and the husband also performs a kinyan sudar and speaks. All of this is to strengthen the matter, even though according to the law there is no basis for a kinyan. This is certainly so regarding an agent for receipt, where the woman and the agent must perform a kinyan sudar and say that with a whole heart they have spoken and resolved to do so. Do not be surprised that we are so stringent, for behold, even regarding matters of finance, the Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote in chapter 5 of Laws of Sale, law 12, and this is his wording: Most places have the custom to effect a kinyan etc. and they say, "and we have acquired from so-and-so that he made so-and-so an agent" etc. This kinyan that they are accustomed to effect etc. is of no use at all except to notify that he does not say these things as one who plays or mocks, but rather that he resolved in his heart and afterwards spoke. Therefore, if he said, "With a whole heart I have spoken and I have resolved to do this thing," he needs nothing else at all. Thus far his words. Certainly, then, one should be stringent and perform a kinyan and speech in matters of gittin, and such is the widespread custom and it must not be changed.

If the husband or the agent is tender in years, it is good to investigate them to see if they have produced signs, for a minor cannot appoint an agent nor be made an agent. If they have a beard, there is no concern at all. Behold, regarding an agent, certainly by the letter of the law one must investigate, but regarding a husband, it is not necessary by the letter of the law, for in any event, if he has not produced two hairs, his kiddushin are nothing. Nevertheless, it is good to require and to investigate him as well. Also, by the letter of the law there is some concern that perhaps the giving of the get will be delayed and he will grow up and seclude himself with her afterward before the get (Darkhei Moshe). And even though when he secludes himself with her he is unable to give her the get for the reason that they should not say "her get preceded her son," nevertheless, this is only a rabbinic concern, and from the Torah it is a valid get; even rabbinically, if he divorced her with this get, she may marry ab initio, as will be explained in siman 148, see there. And regarding a woman who appoints an agent for receipt, by the letter of the law one must be careful and investigate that she be an adult in years and that she has produced signs, for the kiddushin of a minor girl by the father are Torah kiddushin. And if her years are not known to others, and we only know her years by the word of the father, there is a need for a plurality of black and large hairs, such that their tops can be bent to their roots; more will be explained regarding this in the matter of halitzah in siman 169, see there. Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 25, and this is his wording: But one does not need to investigate so much regarding the witnesses of the signature, for the witnesses of delivery effect the severance, and it is common for many adults to be present at the giving of the get; and according to what we practice, to designate witnesses of delivery, one must investigate them to ensure they are adults. Thus far his words. And all the more so according to our custom, where the witnesses of the signature are the witnesses of delivery, that one must investigate them to ensure they are adults in years and that they have produced signs.

And even though according to the law the agent is trusted as has been explained, nevertheless, the custom even from the time of the early authorities is to make a validated authorization as is written in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch. The text of the deed of authorization and the order of a get via an agent will be explained, with the help of Heaven, in siman 154 in the Order of the Get. The matter of the authorization is that witnesses testify to the agency and the beit din validates their signatures. And when the husband and the wife are in the same city, according to the law an authorization is required according to several poskim who hold that the husband is trusted when he says "I gave it as a deposit," as has been explained (Beit Shmuel, subsection 31). And there is also a benefit in the authorization, for according to the law it is impossible for an agent to appoint an agent in his place unless he is under duress, as will be explained, and in the authorization it is written that he gave him permission to appoint an agent and an agent of an agent even without duress.

Since by law the authorization is not indispensable, therefore if the authorization was lost or ruined and damaged, and it is a time of pressing need, the get is given without the authorization, and the agent is trusted to say that he was made an agent before witnesses, just as he is trusted to say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed." However, ab initio, the authorization is written with precision, and care is taken not to write abbreviations in it, and also not to change anything from the matters written in the get. For example, if the name Zanvil is written in the get with a bet, one should not write it in the authorization with a vav, and so too with anything similar to this. The witnesses of the authorization should not be related to one another, nor to the man, nor to the woman, nor to the witnesses of the get. And even though ex post facto it is possible that it is not to be disqualified if they are related to the witnesses of the get, as they have no connection to one another, for the witnesses of the get testify regarding the get and the witnesses of the authorization testify regarding the agency (Beit Shmuel, subsection 34), nevertheless, several great authorities did not wish to permit this (Knesset HaGedolah).

And if the witnesses of the harsha'ah were found to be disqualified, our teacher, the Rema, ruled in section 24 that the entire agency is void, for they are testifying to the essence of the agency and that the husband appointed him as an agent in their presence. This is not similar to other disqualifications of a harsha'ah. And even though when he does not have a harsha'ah in his hand he is believed to say that he appointed him as an agent, nevertheless, when it was done before disqualified witnesses it is worse (Beit Shmuel, subsection 35). And at first glance it appears that only the agency is void, and if he returned and brought another harsha'ah it is valid; however, in his book Darkhei Moshe he wrote that the get is disqualified. It is possible that his reason is that it is proven that the arrangers of the get were ignorant people and it is impossible to rely on them regarding the entire get (ibid.). And if it became clear that the disqualification became known afterward and the beit din did not know beforehand, and there is no concern regarding them that they are not Torah scholars, nevertheless, he must be made an agent anew; since the first agency was with disqualified witnesses, he must be made anew, and he appoints him anew before valid witnesses. Thus ruled the great Acharonim, and it is correct (Atzei Arazim and Gevurat Anashim and in Pitchei Teshuvah, subsection 14).

And they write in the harsha'ah the name of the city with its rivers as in the get, and similarly they write all the nicknames of the man and the woman as in the get. And some say that they also write the nickname of the shaliach. And some say that one should not be lengthy in the harsha'ah with matters that are not necessary. And some say that one need not be concerned about being lengthy in a matter upon which the essence of the shlichut depends, since anyone can write according to the eloquence of his tongue and it is not a formal enactment of the sages. Nevertheless, the wording of the harsha'ah has already been printed in the Seder HaGet, and from it one should not diminish nor add, and so have all the beit din in Israel practiced, and there it will be explained with the help of Heaven.

The custom is that the rabbi who arranges the get validates the authorization, and some say it must be validated by three, and such is the simple custom and one should not deviate. However, if in the place of the woman they only recognize one signature of the three, it is sufficient, and some are lenient ex post facto even if no signature is recognized there (Beit Shmuel subsection 36). And also, even if the authorization is not validated it is kosher (ibid.), for witnesses signed on a document are as if their testimony was investigated in beit din. But it is difficult to rely on this, except that one may rely on the poskim who hold that the validation of a beit din does not require validation (Tuv Gittin). According to this, one should not declare it kosher except when the authorization is validated by a beit din, but in the place of the delivery they do not recognize the signatures; however, if it is not validated at all, one should not rely on it (ibid.), unless it is a time of pressing need, for then by the letter of the law the agent is trusted even without an authorization. Therefore, regarding a get sent via the post office where the agent does not say "in my presence it was written" as has been explained, and by the letter of the law requires authorization and validation, they must recognize the signatures of the judges of the validation, or at least one of them. And we have already written in section 62 a suggestion for this, that through an exchange of letters beforehand they will recognize their signatures, see there. And our teacher, the Rema, wrote there that some have the custom to write in the script of the place of delivery to make known if there is a change in any matter in the authorization. Thus far his words. And he means that the authorization is not written in Ashurit script but in our script, and therefore if the writing is different in the place of delivery from the place of writing, they should write the authorization in the script of the place of delivery so that they will recognize if perhaps there is some change from the get to the authorization.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 30: A delivery agent who brings an authorization and it is written therein that he is a receipt agent—if the agent does not contradict the authorization but says that he was made an agent for both delivery and receipt, then the agency is valid and he becomes a delivery agent and gives the get to the woman. But if the agent says that he was never made a receipt agent, behold the authorization contradicts him and the entire agency is void, and the get itself is also invalid since it is proven that those who arranged the get were ignorant and did not know that the husband cannot appoint a receipt agent; there is concern for several types of disqualifications. And so too in any similar case where it is evident that those who arranged the get were laymen. Thus far his words. And there is one who questioned him, for if so, even when he says that he was also made a receipt agent, in any event those who arranged the get were ignorant, for they did not give him an authorization for the delivery agency and they also should have made known that he is also a receipt agent. And it can be said that we judge them favorably, that their primary intention was for a receipt agency, and for this they wrote the authorization and thought that the husband would agree to the receipt agency and nothing more would be needed, and therefore they did not trouble themselves further. Therefore, even though the husband did not agree to this, they did not want to trouble themselves further with a delivery authorization and they established it according to the law that the agent is believed. However, all this is only when this agent was from the woman, for if not so, what relevance is there to a receipt agency? And even this is very forced, for how can this be imagined, since an authorization for a receipt agency must be from the place of the woman, so how did they write this authorization? And it is possible to say that he was not precise in the language, and his intention is not for an authorization but rather a deed of receipt agency that we wrote of in siman 140, section 4, see there. But this too is difficult, for this is written after the receipt agent received the get from the husband, and it requires further study in all this. And there is one who answered that in truth he was only an agent for delivery, and that which they wrote "for receipt" they only wrote for legal empowerment (Beit Shmuel, subsection 42), but the words are not settled at all, for what relevance does legal empowerment have in this? Therefore, all this requires further study and it is difficult to rely on this in practice.

Since we do not practice the agency for receipt for the reason that will be explained, and it is not explained in the Order of the Get, we will therefore explain the entire order of this here: When the woman desires to appoint a shaliach for receipt, she shall appoint the shaliach before two kosher witnesses who are not related to one another, nor to the woman, nor to the man. She shall say to him in their presence: "You, so-and-so son of so-and-so, receive my get for me from the hand of my husband, so-and-so son of so-and-so, and let your hand be as my hand and your receipt as my receipt, and acquire it for me, and receive it for me; and immediately when the get reaches your hand, I shall be divorced from him and permitted to any man." And the shaliach says, "So I will do." And both of them perform a kinyan sudar and say, "With a whole heart we have spoken and we have resolved to do this thing," to strengthen the matter as has been written in section 77. And afterwards the witnesses write a deed of authorization in this version:

A record of testimony that took place before us, the undersigned, on such-and-such day, of such-and-such month, in such-and-such year from the creation of the world, according to the count that we count here in such-and-such city situated on such-and-such river: how Mrs. So-and-so daughter of So-and-so, currently residing in such-and-such city situated on such-and-such river, appointed before us So-and-so son of So-and-so to be an agent to receive her get from the hand of her husband So-and-so son of So-and-so. And before us she said to this So-and-so son of So-and-so: Be my agent to receive my get for me from the hand of my husband So-and-so son of So-and-so, and let your hand be as my hand, and your receipt as my receipt, and acquire it for me and receive it for me, and immediately when the get reaches your hand I shall be divorced from him and permitted to any man. And that which was done before us, and which we heard and saw, we have written and signed as proof of the appointment of the agent for the receipt of her get, and everything is valid and established. The words of So-and-so son of So-and-so, witness, and the words of So-and-so son of So-and-so, witness. And the Mordechai wrote in the chapter "Ha-itkabel" that even if there was a kinyan, one should not write the kinyan in the authorization (Darkhei Moshe, letter 24, and see the Beit Yosef in the name of the Ittur).

The witnesses who sign on this document must be known people whose signatures are recognizable in the place of delivery. If not, the beit din in the woman's location must validate their signatures and write a validation (hanpek) stating that they recognize the signatures of the witnesses or that they signed in their presence. However, the signatures of the beit din must also be recognized in the place of delivery, for the validation itself requires validation. In this matter, according to the law, one should be stringent, and it is not comparable to an authorization of delivery where we were lenient in a place of impossibility, for there the agent is believed because the get is in his hand, which is not the case regarding a shetar kinyan (Beit Shmuel, subsection 38). The commentators wrote that in this matter one should be stringent, requiring that they recognize the signatures of all three (Levush, and Drisha u'Prisha, and Bach). However, some are lenient even in this because the validation of documents is rabbinic (Beit Shmuel ibid. in the name of the Rashbatz). To validate the signatures, specifically three are required, according to the law of a beit din (ibid.):

When the agent arrives at the location of the husband and the husband consents to the agency of receipt, he shall write a get in the manner of all gittin with the nullification of protests, and they shall be careful not to write the location of the woman's standing, and the witnesses shall sign. Afterward, the husband shall convene a valid beit din who are not related to one another, nor to the husband, nor to the woman, nor to the agent, even though according to the law there is no concern regarding the kinship of the agent. The beit din shall recognize the signatures of the authorization or recognize the signatures of the beit din that authenticated the authorization, as has been written, and they shall read the authorization. Afterward, the husband shall bring the get and they shall read it and return it to the husband, and he shall nullify all protests and disqualify witnesses who would testify to anything that causes the nullification of the get, as has been written in siman 134. He shall give the get into the hand of the agent before witnesses of delivery and say to him: "Receive this get for my wife, so-and-so daughter of so-and-so, and behold she is divorced from me and permitted to any man." The agent receives it into his hand, lifts it, and hides it under the garment over his heart like the woman herself. Afterward, the beit din shall receive the get from his hand and read it with the witnesses according to the law that it must be read also after the giving. The Tur wrote in the name of the Raf that he should be careful not to place any condition in the get. The reason is that perhaps there are witnesses who will know of the get but will not know of the condition, and they will go and testify before the woman that she was divorced and she will marry, and the condition will not be fulfilled, resulting in a void get and her children being mamzerim (Beit Yosef). This is a weak reason, for behold the woman will not marry until the arrival of the agent, and he knows of the condition, and also behold he brings a document from the beit din as will be explained. Some say the reason is because the woman can say, "I only appointed an agent if he receives it without a condition, and to a condition I did not consent." Therefore, if she said that he may receive it upon a condition, it is permitted to place a condition in it (Bach and Taz). However, the custom among us is not to place any condition in a get.

And after the agent has received the get, the beit din shall write their testimony and deliver it into the hand of the agent, and we have already written its formula in siman 140, section 4, see there. And also the husband shall write beneath the signatures in this wording: I, so-and-so son of so-and-so, the undersigned, standing today in the city of such-and-such which sits upon the such-and-such river, have divorced my wife, so-and-so daughter of so-and-so, and I divorced her in such-and-such city which sits upon the such-and-such river, by the hand of so-and-so son of so-and-so, her agent, before the beit din of so-and-so, so-and-so, and so-and-so, who are signed on the document above; and I have divorced her with a complete divorce, with the nullification of all protests and without any condition, according to all that is written above; and their document and their signature is true, and because everything is the truth I have also written this document to be for her also my handwriting as proof and merit, so that I shall have no opening of the mouth to appeal this matter, and everything is valid and established. And he signs with his handwriting: the words of so-and-so son of so-and-so. And they shall deliver everything into the hand of the agent. And also the signatures of the dayanim in the place of the husband must be recognizable to the beit din in the place of the wife, or two witnesses must testify that they saw that the agent received the get from the husband. However, by the law, the agent is trusted when the get is in his hand, as has been explained already regarding when the husband claims "I gave it to him for safekeeping." But for a claim of forgery, witnesses are required, for only regarding an agent of delivery when he says "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" did the sages trust him, and not regarding an agent of receipt.

And because it is known that the validation of signatures is not an easy matter to recognize them from one place to another, and especially since it has been explained that they must recognize all three signatures, therefore the Tur wrote in the name of the Ri"f that it is proper to avoid divorcing through a shaliach kabbalah entirely. And so wrote the Shulchan Aruch in section 29, and such is the custom. Nevertheless, if it is impossible in any other way, she may appoint a shaliach kabbalah if only they recognize the signatures of the three dayanim (Bach and Taz and Be'er Sheva subsection 40). And they permitted it in practice in a case of one who was at times a shoteh and at times healthy, and through a shaliach le-holachah it is impossible because perhaps at the time of the shaliach's delivery to her hand he is a shoteh; and they permitted that the woman appoint a shaliach kabbalah in the place of the husband during his time of health and return to her place, and during his time of health he shall deliver the get into the hand of her shaliach kabbalah (ibid.). And this fact, that she did not receive the get from the husband himself during his time of health, was because his time of health was a short duration and the time was not sufficient at the moment of the act (this must be the explanation, for if not so, why did they do this? Rather, it is certainly as we said, and the woman was unable to remain there and left it to her agent so that when the time was sufficient he would receive the get from him). And even though his mind became impaired between her appointing the shaliach kabbalah and the get, we have no concern, for even if it became impaired between the writing and the giving, we explained in siman 121 section 16 that it is kosher, and all the more so in a case such as this.

And behold, the Bach, of blessed memory, in a responsum, cited in the name of the sages of France that the woman can appoint a shaliach kabbalah in her place, provided that two witnesses go with the shaliach to testify regarding the agency. And behold, regarding ordinary people, certainly we have no concern with this, as it has already been explained that even a shaliach who is in another place she is able to appoint in his absence. However, regarding one who is at times sane and at times a shoteh, many have challenged this, for perhaps at the time she made him a shaliach she was a shoteh (see Pitchei Teshuvah, subsection 22), and some forbid and some permit. Therefore, it appears to me that now in our times, when iron wires have been stretched across the whole world such that in one hour people speak with one another from a distance, this can be easily rectified: that first the rabbi in the place of the husband should speak with the rabbi in the place of the woman regarding the status of the matter, and she shall appoint a certain man who is in the place of the husband as a shaliach kabbalah and designate that specific man. And this is possible to do at a time when she is sane, and during her time of sanity they shall arrange the get and the shaliach kabbalah shall receive it on her behalf. And there is no concern in this for any forgery, for they shall inform one another via the iron wires that she appointed so-and-so as a shaliach kabbalah before two witnesses, and afterwards they shall inform that the shaliach received the get according to the law of the Torah. Nevertheless, in practice, one must deliberate on this, and it must be done according to several authorities who will agree to this and understand according to the status of the matter, and that everything shall be according to the law of the Torah.

A husband who appoints an agent for delivery must say to the agent, "Give this get to my wife," and according to the law this is sufficient. However, it is customary to add and say, "And let your hand be as my hand, and your action as my action," etc., as will be explained in the Seder HaGet. It is within the husband's power to appoint an agent for delivery alone, or to appoint an agent for writing, signing, and delivery, as we learned in the Mishnah (65b): One who says, "Write a get and give it to my wife," these people shall write and give; meaning, that he says to three people that they should write, sign, and give, such that one writes and two sign, as I wrote in siman 120. And one of them serves as the agent for delivery, for his intention is not that all of them should be agents unless he said "all of you," as will be explained. Furthermore, it is not a disqualification that the scribe or one of the witnesses serves as the agent, for all are fit for agency, as I wrote.

And not only this, but even if he was brief in his words and did not mention the language of a get customary among people—for example, if he said to them "divorce her" (gairshuha), which is the language of divorce, or "send her away" (shallchuha), the language of "and he sends her from his house," or "leave her" (shabkuha), the language of a document of leaving (iggeret shebukin), or "drive her out" (tarkuha), the language of a book of driving out (sefer terukhin), or if he said "write a document (iggeret) and give it to her," for this too is the language of a get as they write "and a document of leaving" (Rashi), and regarding the language of "document" it is necessary to say "write and give," for if not so, this is no language at all—in all these languages, when he spoke with them previously regarding the matters of her get, they write a get for her and give it to her. For if he did not speak with them regarding the matter of the get, from where would they know what he is saying? And even the language of divorce can be interpreted as driving her out from his house, as it is written, "Drive out (garesh) the handmaid" (the Maggid Mishneh and the Beit Shmuel, subsection 20).

But if he said to them: "Release her," "Sustain her," "Do for her according to the law," "Do for her according to the custom," or "Do for her as is proper," he has said nothing. The Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote in chapter 2, halacha 10, that if they wrote and gave it to her, this is a void get. Thus far his words. For he holds that these expressions do not imply at all a language that indicates a get. However, Rashi, of blessed memory, explained there that one must be in doubt regarding these expressions, such as "Release her"—whether it is the language of release of a get or release of debts; and similarly "Sustain her"—whether it is the needs of a get so that she will not be bound to yibbum, or actual sustenance, meaning providing for her needs; and similarly "according to the custom" and "as is proper"—whether it is the statute of a get or the statute of maintenance. (And so wrote the Ran and the Bartenura). According to this, it appears that if they gave it to her, it would be a doubtful get (Beit Shmuel, subsection 21). But from the language of the Mishnah, "he has said nothing," it implies explicitly that there is no doubt in this. And so it implies in the Yerushalmi, and so it implies from the sugya of the Shas which says that there are expressions that are a doubt, as will be explained, and it implies that in these there is no doubt at all. And the truth is indeed so, for even though they can also be interpreted as the language of a get, nevertheless, since the flow of the language implies another matter, even if his intention was for a get, this is nothing but "matters of the heart." And even though he spoke with them previously concerning the business of her get, this is not similar to kiddushin when he gives into her hand, where he does not need to specify, or similarly when he spoke with her concerning the business of the get and gave her the get without specification, for that is sufficient since there he gives her an object and the matter is proven. But in his speech when he says to others, if the language leans more toward another matter than toward a get, it is like "matters of the heart," even when he spoke with them previously concerning the business of the get. And the expressions that will be explained as being a doubt, this is because they frequently indicate the language of a get, as will be explained. (And in the Gemara there is a distinction between "Pitruha" and "Pataruha," but for us there is no distinction; see Beit Yosef).

And if he said to them "leave her," "expel her," "release her," "abandon her," or "benefit her," this is a doubt, as it is a query in the Gemara. For "leave her" is exactly like the language of the document of abandonment (shevukin), as they have one intent and it indicates the language of a get; yet nevertheless, since the language of "leaving" is not written in the get, perhaps it is not effective (Rashi). And so too the language of "expel her" is like the language of the verse, "and she departs from his house," except that there is a doubt that in the language of the Scripture it is a departure of her own accord and not that they should expel her (ibid.). And so too "release her" is the language of "behold you are permitted (muteret) to any man," but nevertheless it can also be interpreted as the release of vows and is not a clear language (ibid.). And "abandon her" is like "release her." And so too "benefit her" also implies more the language of the get, to benefit her so that she shall go free from her marriage, but nevertheless this is not a clear language and it is a doubt.

One who says, "Write a get for my wife," and did not say, "Give," they shall write it and give it into his hand, but they shall not give it into her hand, for he only made them agents to write and not to divorce. And if they gave it to her, it is not a get, for if he had wanted them to give it to her, he would have said to them, "Give," and his intention was only that the get be ready in his hand so that when he desires, he may divorce her. In what case does this apply? To a healthy person, and also where there was no alarming cause. But if he was a sick person for whom three days of his illness have passed, or a dangerously ill person whose illness overtook him quickly even before three days, or one who is led out in a collar having been seized by the government even over monetary matters, or those who come and lead him away and he cannot delay, or one who is anxious to set sail at sea or to depart in a caravan to the deserts, and likewise if a fear of death fell upon him due to the absence of his health and he made a will because he fears death—in all these cases, even if he only said, "Write a get for my wife," they write and give it to her, for the matter is known and understood that his intention was to write and give it to her, but because of his anxiety and concern, he did not finish by saying, "Give."

And sometimes even regarding a healthy person the law is so, and thus the sages taught in the Mishnah (66a): It happened with one healthy person who said, "Write a get for my wife," and he went up to the roof and fell and died. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: If he fell of his own accord, this is a get; but if the wind pushed him, it is not a get. For when he falls of his own accord, it is evident that this was his intention, and his end proves his beginning, and he is like a dangerously ill person or one departing with a caravan and is very distraught. But if the wind pushed him, behold, his intention was not for this from the beginning, and his law is like a healthy person. And in a case where he fell of his own accord, even if they had not yet written it, they write and give it as long as there is life in him, provided only that they examine him to see that he is of sound mind, as I wrote in siman 122. And if there is a doubt whether he fell of his own accord or the wind pushed him, if he fell immediately, this is a sign that he fell of his own accord and it is a get; but if he did not fall immediately, it is a matter of doubt. However, if he certainly fell of his own accord, even if he did not fall immediately, it is a get, and we do not say that previously it was not in his mind to fall. However, from the language of the Rambam, chapter 2, halakhah 13, it is explained that specifically if he fell immediately it is a get, see there. And if he fell immediately, we hang the matter on him falling of his own accord until it is known to you that the wind pushed him, see there (and see Kesef Mishneh and Lechem Mishneh and Beit Shmuel subsection 26 and the Gra subsection 41, and I do not know why they rejected the words of the Beit Yosef, and delve into this).

And so we learned there: One who was cast into a pit and said, "Whoever hears my voice shall write a get for my wife," behold, these shall write and give, provided that he specified his name and his wife's name, the name of his city and the name of her city, for he has designated for the agency whoever hears his voice. And if he did not speak with this phrasing, but rather said, "Whoever wishes to write, let him come and write," it is a legal doubt whether it is effective or not (Beit Shmuel, subsection 27). And even according to the poskim who hold that we do not require agency for the writing, nevertheless, he must command the scribe to write (ibid.), and all the more so regarding the giving, for we require clear agency. However, the phrasing "Whoever hears my voice" constitutes clear agency for whoever heard his voice.

The Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote there: And this is provided they knew him, see there. And there are those who explained that this is what he meant: And this is provided they know that this person whose name is such is the husband of the woman whose name is such (Lechem Mishneh and Kessef Mishneh in the Ran, see there). And there are those who explained that this is what he meant: And this is provided they knew him to be a person (Hagahot Maimoniyot, letter kaf). And the Rambam concluded that even though they brought him up from the pit and did not recognize him, this is a kosher get, for this is like a time of danger where they write and give even though they do not recognize. And know that in the Gemara there it is stated that specifically if they saw a shadow of a shadow, meaning the shadow of his shadow, for otherwise we are concerned that perhaps it is a demon; and therefore when they saw a shadow of a shadow this concern is removed, for demons do not have a shadow of a shadow. And so ruled all the poskim, but the Rambam, of blessed memory, did not mention this at all. And the commentators wrote that he holds that according to the conclusion of the Shas, that it is considered like a time of danger, this is not necessary. However, most of the poskim do not hold so, for only regarding another matter did the Shas say so there, but forever they must see the form of a person and see that he has a shadow of a shadow; for if not so, we are concerned that perhaps it is a demon, as it is the way of demons to be found in pits even in the city, and likewise it is their way to be found in fields and forests. And according to the second explanation that we wrote regarding the words of the Rambam, it can be said that the intent of the Rambam is also so. And for the halacha now, it is impossible to rule this in practice, for it has already been explained in siman 17 that we are not experts in a shadow of a shadow, see there. And all the more so we must know that they gave her the get while he was still alive and was of sound mind, and this is not common at all; for one way or another, if when they brought him up from the pit he was still alive and of sound mind, he could command afterwards, and if he is not alive or not of sound mind, it is not common that we would know that he was alive and of sound mind during the entire time of the writing of the get and its giving.

It has already been explained in siman 120 that when one says to ten people, "Write a get for my wife," his intention is not that all of them should write, but rather one writes on behalf of all of them, unless he said, "All of you write," in which case one writes in the presence of all of them; see there. And such is the law regarding what has been explained concerning one cast into a pit who said, "All who hear his voice," that even if there were many people there, it does not require the presence of all of them, but rather one writes and two sign. For even though he said, "All who hear," it is not like saying "All of you," and his intention is only that if there be anyone who hears his voice, he should do this, and not that all of them specifically must do so.

And so too regarding the delivery of the get, if many people were standing together and he said, "Deliver a get to my wife," his intention is not that all of them should deliver it, but rather whichever of them desires may deliver it on behalf of all of them. However, if he said, "All of you deliver it," it is not a get until all of them deliver it—meaning that one delivers it in the presence of all of them, such that all of them go with him (Gemara at the end of chapter 6). Therefore, the sages ordained (ibid.) that one who tells many people to deliver a get to his wife should explicitly say, "Each and every one of you may deliver a get to my wife," so that no mishap occurs through the statement "all of you," for if one is missing, the get would be void. And so it was explained in siman 120 regarding the writing of the get; see there.

If one said to three people, "two of you shall sign the get," and among the three were a father and his son who cannot sign together, and likewise other relatives, the father may sign with the other or the son with the other. We do not say that he certainly intended only for the father because one does not accord honor to a son in the presence of a father; rather, he intended for both of them. And so our sages, of blessed memory, said (66a): The halacha is that a person makes a son an agent in the presence of the father, see there. And likewise regarding the delivery of the get, when he said to three, "two of you shall deliver this get to my wife," and among them were a father and his son, the father and the other or the son and the other are able to deliver it. And only regarding delivery can the father and son deliver it, for relatives are not disqualified from the delivery of the get. Nevertheless, some say that the father and the son should not deliver it, and not because of a disqualification, but because we say the intent of the divorcer was certainly that he did not want to trouble both of them together (see Be'er Sheva subsection 30 what he wrote in the name of Maharshal), and so it is implied from the language of the Tur, see there.

It is a simple matter that when the messenger brings a get to the woman, he must recognize her as the wife of the divorcer who sent him. If he does not recognize her, he should give it to her based on two witnesses who testify before him that this is the wife of his sender. For even a blind man may be a messenger when he is not required to say "in my presence it was written," even though he cannot see her and his recognition is only through the recognition of the voice (23a). Certainly, one may rely on witnesses who recognize her. In siman 142 it will be explained, with the help of Heaven, in section 49.

If one said to a messenger, "Take this get to my wife," and the messenger said to him, "I do not recognize her," or if he said to him, "I am ashamed to give it to her," and the husband said to him, "If so, give it to so-and-so who recognizes her and let him give it to her," the first has not been made a messenger for the delivery of the get and he may not deviate from his mission; he can neither give the get into her hand nor appoint a messenger in his place. Rather, he shall deliver the get into the hand of that so-and-so, and he is the messenger for the delivery of the get and gives it to her or sends it by the hand of another if he became ill or was under duress, as will be explained. And if the first gave her the get or sent it to her via his messenger, it is a case of uncertain divorce; for even though it is certain that any messenger who was not appointed for the delivery of the get cannot deviate from his mission as I have written, nevertheless, since the husband indeed desired that he should be the messenger for the delivery of the get but he did not consent at the time of the act, therefore when he also consented later, there is a doubt that perhaps he is called a messenger who was appointed for the delivery of the get (for so it is according to the version of Rabbeinu Tam in Tosafot 29b, starting with the words "This is the version," see there). And know that this rule, that a messenger who was not appointed for the delivery of the get cannot appoint a messenger, applies when it is without the knowledge of the husband, but with the knowledge of the husband, he can appoint a messenger.

If one is made an agent for divorce for a later time, it is called "from now it is given for divorce," and he may appoint an agent since it is given for divorce. Therefore, if he sent a get via an agent and said to him, "Do not give it to her until after thirty days," if he became ill or was constrained within the thirty days, he may appoint an agent who shall give it to her after thirty days, according to the law of any agent who has the power to appoint an agent in such a case. And if he has an authorization in his hand, even if it is not written therein that he may appoint an agent even without constraint, nevertheless he may appoint one even without constraint, for presumably the primary purpose of the authorization was for this, since for constraint an authorization is not necessary (Beit Shmuel, subsection 51). And there are those who are stringent that he should not hand over the get to the second agent immediately, for we fear lest he deviate from his agency and hand it over to the woman immediately; rather, he makes him an agent to hand it over to her after thirty days and the get shall be placed in beit din until that time, or he shall hand over his agency to the beit din and they shall appoint an agent after thirty days (Ramah in the Tur, and it appears to me that regarding placing it in beit din he also agrees, as I have written, for go after the reasoning). And this is according to the system of Rashi that will be explained, that for "cancel from her a desire," he may not appoint an agent due to the concern lest the second one deviate from the husband's command, for whenever there is some condition in the agency, there is this concern, as will be explained. And know that anyone who delivers a get for a later time, the husband must say and stipulate that the woman shall be believed by him to say that he did not come within the time and appease her and cancel the get, as will be explained. And if so, one who delivers a get to an agent for after thirty days must stipulate thus. And this is only with a married woman and not with a betrothed woman, for with a married woman the sages said it is the nature of people that since she is dear to him, he will certainly seek to cancel it, and therefore he needs this condition; and when he stipulates thus, this concern is removed, as will be explained with the help of Heaven.

One who sends a get by means of a messenger and said to him, "No one else shall give it to her but you," and he gave it to another and he gave it to her, it is obvious that it is not a get, for he explicitly stated that no one else should give it to her. However, even if he said to him "carry it to her" without specification, and certainly when he said to him "you carry it," he should not send it by the hand of another as long as he is able to carry it. But if he became ill or was prevented by circumstances such that he cannot carry it, he may appoint a messenger, even if he said to him "you carry it," and certainly if he only said "carry," since he did not explicitly state that another should not carry it. And if he explicitly stated to him that he may appoint a messenger and a messenger of a messenger, he may appoint a messenger even if he did not become ill and was not prevented by circumstances, even if he did not explicitly state to him that he may do so even without such circumstances, for perforce this was his intention, since for illness or being prevented by circumstances he does not require his authorization. And there are some of our teachers who hold that when he said to him "carry" without specification, he may send it by means of another even if he did not become ill and was not prevented by circumstances; but if he said to him "you carry it," he shall not send it by the hand of another unless he became ill or was prevented by circumstances, or he explicitly stated to him that he may appoint a messenger (this is the opinion of Rabbeinu Chananel in the Tur, and most of the poskim agreed with the first opinion, see there).

The reason for this law is that certainly, from the perspective of logical reasoning, an agent would not have permission to appoint an agent in his stead without the authorization of the principal, for who gave him this power? Rather, since the Torah decreed that an agent can appoint an agent, as written at the beginning of siman 140, it must be that the intention of the Torah refers to an unspecified case. For if he gave him permission to appoint an agent in his stead, it would be a simple matter and would not require a verse for this; and similarly, if he told him explicitly that he should not appoint an agent in his stead, it is simple that he cannot do so. Rather, it is certain that the Torah is dealing with an unspecified case, and by Torah law, every agent can appoint an agent in his stead even if he did not fall ill and was not under duress, for by Torah law there is no logical reason to differentiate in this. And that which we said, that without falling ill or being under duress he should not appoint an agent in his stead, this is by rabbinic law, because there are people who are particular about this, and when they hear that he appointed an agent in his stead, they will cancel the entire agency; but in a case of falling ill or being under duress, a person is not particular (Ran, chapter 3). And the second opinion holds that in an unspecified delivery, a person is not particular even without falling ill or being under duress.

According to what has been explained regarding "you go" or "go" without specification according to the first opinion, when he appointed a messenger in his place when he was not ill and not under duress, and the second messenger delivered the get to the woman, the get is not void by Torah law but is invalid by rabbinic decree. However, there are those who say that this is also the intent of the Torah, for when can a messenger appoint a messenger? When we know that the husband is not particular; but where he is particular, he may not appoint a messenger. According to this, when we say that when he is not ill and not under duress people are particular, the get is void even by Torah law (see there in the Ran for two reasons). Accordingly, in practice, one must be stringent according to both reasons. Our teachers, the authors of the Tosafot (29a, s.v. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel), hold like the second opinion, see there. According to this view, even if the husband did not explicitly state that he may appoint a messenger in his place, but rather revealed his mind that he is not particular, he may appoint a messenger in his place even without being ill or under duress (Beit Shmuel, subsection 54). One should not do this in practice; however, according to our custom where we write an authorization, it is explicitly stated therein that he may appoint a messenger in any case, as will be explained in the Seder HaGet in siman 154 (what the Beit Shmuel questioned in subsection 55 is not a difficulty at all, for in the Gemara it is explicit what the sender said to him, and it is not similar to the difficulty of the Ran, see there and delve into it).

Just as the first agent can appoint a second agent, so too the second can appoint a third agent, and so on forever. For since the Torah gave permission to an agent to appoint an agent in his place, what difference is there to me between the first and what difference to me between the second and the third? And the law of the second agent is like the law of the first agent, in that he cannot appoint an agent unless he became ill or was under duress, or that the husband explicitly stated that he may appoint an agent. And even if he only explicitly stated this to the first, nevertheless the second is also included, for behold, they all come from the power of the husband, as will be explained (it appears to me):

And behold, from the perspective of logic, it would seem appropriate to say that the second agent can appoint a third agent even without falling ill or being under duress. For while regarding the first agent we require that he fall ill or be under duress, this is because the husband appointed him, and it is possible that he desires him more than another as long as he has not fallen ill or been under duress; but regarding an agent of an agent, since the husband does not know them, what does it matter to him if it is the second or the third (the Ran there). And indeed, there is one who holds this view (the Ramah in the Tur). However, most of the poskim do not hold this way, because it is impossible to make the power of the second greater than that of the first (the Ran there). And so they ruled without qualification in the Shulchan Aruch, section 39; see there.

When the agent appoints a second agent, if it is in a place where he must say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" as will be explained in siman 142, he must do so before a beit din and say before them "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," for this is in place of authentication, and authentication requires a beit din; and the second agent shall say "I am the agent of the beit din," as is written there. And if it is in a place where he does not need to say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," or when it is authenticated, where he also does not need to say it as is written there, he does not need to do so before a beit din. Nevertheless, the Rosh and the Tur wrote that he should do so before witnesses, see there; and they follow their own reasoning that an agent for delivery must be appointed before witnesses. According to this, for the Rambam, who holds that he does not need to appoint him before witnesses, it is possible that here too he may appoint him privately; and so wrote the great later authorities (Beit Shmuel subsection 57 and the Gra subsection 83).

And in my humble opinion, it appears from the fact that our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote without qualification in section 40 that witnesses are required, it appears that according to the Rambam as well witnesses are required. For even if the agency itself does not require witnesses, that is the husband himself when he appoints an agent; but an agent who appoints an agent, upon whom does the second agent rely that the first is the agent of the husband? And how is the first believed alone? For even if the Sages, of blessed memory, believed the agent, this is at the time of its delivery to the woman at the completion of the get and we rely on the get itself. But at the time of appointing the second agent, when the get is not completed, there is no logic to rely on the get neither at the time of its writing nor at the time of its giving. Therefore, when he appoints him with witnesses, he relies upon the witnesses. However, in the Rambam chapter 7, law 21, it is explicit that he can appoint him between themselves; see there.

Every agent stands in the place of the husband, for they come from the power of the husband. Therefore, a first agent who appointed a second agent, and the second died before he delivered the get, the first may take the get from the heirs of the second and deliver it to the woman or send it by means of another. We do not say that as soon as he delivered it to the second his agency was terminated, for just as the husband would have been able to take it from the heirs, so too his agent (Taz, subsection 25). And even if the second agent is alive, the first may take it from him and deliver it to another or to the woman (ibid.), for since the husband said to him that his hand shall be as his hand, he is literally as if in the place of the husband. And more than this: even if he already delivered it to the woman but omitted saying "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," he may take it from the woman and return and give it to her and say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," as was written in siman 142 (see there in Beit Shmuel, subsection 25). The general rule of these matters is that as long as the get has not been completed according to its regulation into the hand of the woman, his agency has not yet ended. And such is the law with the second agent with the third, and the third with the fourth, and so on forever, for they all have one law and they all come from the power of the husband.

Even though we have said that the power of the first remains intact as long as the second has not delivered it to the woman, nevertheless, if the first agent died, we do not say that the agency of the second is nullified. For since the husband is alive and the first transmitted his power to the second, the second stands in the place of the husband. And so too when the second appoints a third, the third stands in the place of the husband, and so on forever. Rather, this is what we are saying: that when the first is alive, it is within his ability to return the power to himself because he stands in the place of the husband; but when he has not returned it to himself, the second stands in the place of the husband. Therefore, if the husband died before the giving, all of them are nullified and they are not permitted to deliver the get into her hand, for all of them come from the power of the husband, as has been explained.

Whether a shaliach kabbalah can appoint another shaliach in his place as with a shaliach holachah, the Tur brought three opinions: In the name of a Gaon, he wrote that without the woman's command, he cannot appoint a shaliach in his place, but if she commanded him that he has the power to appoint a shaliach in his place, he may appoint a shaliach. In the name of the Ittur, he wrote that in any case, a shaliach may appoint a shaliach. And in the name of the Ramah, he wrote that in any case, he may not appoint a shaliach even if she gave him permission, because it is "words," and "words" are not handed over to a shaliach. The Tur wondered about him, for if she gave him permission, it is not "words," as in the case of "say that they should say" in siman 120, see there. The commentators wondered about the Tur, see there. Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in his great book that the Ittur, who permits appointing a shaliach in his place in any case, does not mean that he should receive the get from the husband and she should be divorced thereby, but rather that he appoints a shaliach in his place to receive it from the husband and to give it into his hand, and as soon as the get reaches his hand, the woman is divorced, see there.

And behold, the opinion of the Ramah is clear, as he holds that this is like "matters," since there is nothing in the agency but mere words, and it is exactly similar to that which is in siman 120 regarding one who commanded a scribe to write a get, that he is not permitted to command another to write, for "matters" are not handed over to an agent. And that which the Tur questioned, that regarding "say to them" the concept of "matters" does not apply, and if so, when she commanded him why should he not appoint an agent, this is not a difficulty at all; for the Tur follows his own reasoning above in siman 120 and in Choshen Mishpat siman 244, that regarding "say to them" the concept of "matters" does not apply, and several of our teachers hold thus, for such is the plain meaning of the sugya at the end of the chapter "Ha-itkabel." However, we have already explained in siman 120, section 52 and 53, that the Rif and the Rambam hold that even regarding "say to them" the reasoning of "matters" applies, based on the sugya of "Mi She-achazo," see there. And the Ramah, of blessed memory, was concerned for their reasoning, as is proven from the words of the Tur himself in siman 120, who wrote that the Ramah ruled regarding "say to them" that it is a case of a doubtful divorce, see there. And if it were simple to him that regarding "say to them" the reasoning of "matters" does not apply, there would be no doubt regarding the divorce here, but rather a rabbinic invalidation due to the decree of "the signature of the scribe and a witness," as we explained there in section 50; rather, the Ramah was concerned for the reasoning of the Rif and the Rambam (and see the Bach).

Regarding the reasoning of the Gaon, it can be said simply that he also holds that it is "words," and regarding "saying 'say,'" he holds like the majority of the poskim that "words" do not apply. Therefore, he ruled that without her command, he may not appoint an agent, but with her command, he may appoint one. The reasoning of the Ittur appears to be that he holds this is not a matter of "words" at all, for indeed the matter is puzzling: behold, we derive "and she shall send" — teaching that a woman may appoint an agent; "and she shall send" — teaching that an agent may appoint an agent (at the beginning of the second chapter of Kiddushin, see there). According to the previous opinions, one must say that this refers to a man, or when she appoints an agent for delivery and the husband also makes him an agent, for then an agent may appoint an agent, but not regarding an agent for receipt. However, the Ittur holds that it is only called "words" when he commands to write, for that is like mere words; but when she commands him to receive something, this is not "words" at all, for there are many types of agency in such a manner. The primary case of agency is regarding terumah, where he does not give him anything but rather sends him to separate his terumah, and here too, she sends him to receive her get. This is also implied by the words of the Rashba, of blessed memory, who wrote (Gittin 29a): And we rule like Rava who said "words" cannot be handed over to an agent; that is to say, since he told them to write, these words that were handed over to them cannot be handed over to others. Thus far his words. Behold, he was precise to speak only regarding writing (though from his words at the end of chapter "Ha-itkabel," as cited in the Beit Yosef, it appears otherwise, see there). This is also explicitly explained in the Mordechai at the end of chapter "Ha-itkabel" in the name of Sefer HaChokhmah, that receiving a get or receiving kiddushin is not "words," for this is a complete act, see there. In the Shulchan Aruch, section 44, this opinion was not brought at all. For the halakha, one should follow the stringency of all opinions. According to the opinion of the Gaon who permits it with her command, he is able to appoint an agent even without an extenuating circumstance, and he does not need to appoint him before a beit din, but only before two witnesses; and when the second agent receives the get from the hand of the husband, she is divorced immediately (see the Beit Yosef who brought a responsum of the Rashbash who permitted it in practice like the opinion of the Ittur, and it is also explicitly explained there that as soon as the second agent receives the get from the hand of the husband she is divorced immediately, and the Beit Yosef requires further study).

There is one who says that if she made two agents for reception one after the other, the second nullifies the first; and likewise when the husband made two agents for delivery one after the other, unless their intention was revealed when making the second that they still desire the first (Ramah in the Tur). However, the Rosh and the Rashba, of blessed memory, ruled that even if she made ten agents, whether she made them at once or whether she made them one after the other, as long as the get reached the hand of one of them she is divorced, for it was not her intention to nullify the previous one, but rather her intention was that perhaps the agency will not succeed with this one, it will succeed with that one. And such is the established law, and so they ruled in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch section 44, and the same applies to the husband regarding agents for delivery.

And more than this, Rashi, of blessed memory, ruled regarding a woman who appointed an agent for receipt, and the agent was negligent in his agency, and she appointed another agent, and this other one received an invalid get; and when the first heard, he strengthened himself in his agency and went to the husband and received a valid get—and Rashi, of blessed memory, permitted her to marry on the grounds that the agency of the first was not canceled because of the agency of the second. For we do not find the cancellation of agency through a disclosure of intent, and even if there were a disclosure of intent, we maintain that a disclosure of intent regarding a get is of no consequence. And all the more so since there is no disclosure of intent here at all, but rather she is striving to obtain a get, and we are witnesses that it is pleasing to her wherever she may be divorced, for she is striving for the divorce. And more than this we find regarding the matter of the Pesach sacrifice, that when they appointed an agent and then strove to perform it by themselves, nevertheless the agency was not canceled from the agent (end of chapter 9 of Pesachim). And all the more so with an agent after an agent, that the agency of the first was not canceled (Mordechai, beginning of chapter HaSholeach).

And similarly, regarding the appointment of several agents at once, this is not a matter of bereirah such that we would say the matter has been clarified that she intended for this specific agent, for there is no bereirah here at all, as she intended for all of them—for anyone who receives a valid get from her husband. However, the Rashba, of blessed memory, wrote that if she said, "Whichever of you the husband desires to give it to shall be my agent for kabbalah," it is possible that we would say regarding this that there is no bereirah (Beit Shmuel, subsection 61). Since she made the agency dependent on the husband's consent to him, this is bereirah like all instances of bereirah in the Shas where we say the matter has been clarified retroactively that she appointed this one as an agent, and we establish that regarding Torah matters there is no bereirah, as I wrote in siman 140, section 17; see there. And even though in truth it could be said that this is not a matter of bereirah, for we do not require the retroactive clarification of a matter, since if we know that it is a benefit for her, one is able to acquire a get on her behalf not in her presence and without her knowledge (Yevamot, end of chapter 15). And since she says that whoever the husband desires shall be her agent, he shall then be her agent for kabbalah and acquire it for her without her knowledge, for she says that such is her will and it is a benefit for her. Nevertheless, it can be said that by the reasoning of "one may acquire a benefit for a person not in their presence," she cannot be divorced, for perhaps at that time she did not maintain her previous intent such that it would be considered a benefit for her, and perforce we require her previous appointment of agency, and there is a concern of bereirah in this.

It has already been explained in Choshen Mishpat siman 182 that an agent who deviated from his agency, his agency is void. And all the more so regarding the agency of a get, whether with an agent for delivery or an agent for receipt, if he deviated in any detail from the words of the sender, his agency is void and it is not a get. Therefore, the agent is obligated to be very, very careful not to deviate from his agency in any way. It is also proper and correct to see that the sender does not impose upon the agent matters that are subject to change, so that the get does not come to a state of invalidity; and also, perhaps they will not notice the deviation and she will marry based on it, and it will turn out that the get is void and her children are mamzerim. There are detailed laws regarding this as to what is called a deviation.

The sages taught in the Mishnah (65a): One who says, "Give this get to my wife in such-and-such a place," and he gave it to her in another place, it is invalid; "Behold, she is in such-and-such a place," and he gave it to her in another place, it is valid. And in the Gemara (29a) it is brought: When he said to the messenger, "Do not divorce her except in the house," and he divorced her in the attic, or if he said to him, "Do not divorce her except with the right hand," and he divorced her with the left hand, it is not a get, see there. And such is the wording of the Rambam in chapter 9, and the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch section 45. And it is explicitly explained that regarding the matter of place, it is called a deviation even if he did not say, "Do not give it to her except in such-and-such a place." But regarding a house and an attic, or right and left, it is not called a deviation unless he said to him, "Do not give it except in the house" or "with the right hand." And the reason is simple: for whenever from the perspective of logic there is no insistence regarding the deviation, such as house and attic or right and left, if he only said, "Give it to her in the house" or "with the right hand," we do not say that he insists on this, for what insistence is there in this? And it is not called a deviation unless he said to him, "Do not give it except in this manner." But regarding place, there is certainly an insistence, for regarding the matter of a get there are people who gossip about it, saying, "What did so-and-so see that he divorced his wife?" Therefore, we say that even if he did not say, "Do not give it to her except in such-and-such a place," he also speaks with insistence, and we say that in this place it is comfortable for him to be shamed and not in another place (Beit Shmuel subsection 62). And also in this, if he said, "Behold, she is in such-and-such a place," it is explicitly proven that his intention is not with insistence, but rather he is showing him the place where she is currently located. And from this one may judge for all matters. And therefore, the custom among us is to say to the messenger, "Give it to her in any place you find her," as is written in the Seder HaGet. (And know that were it not for the words of the Rishonim, it would have been possible to say that in the Mishnah it is only "invalid" and in the Gemara there it is "not a get"; but they wrote even regarding the ruling of the Mishnah that it is "not a get," see there. And it must be said that the Mishnah was not precise between "invalid" and "void," according to the principle of the Rambam in chapter 10. Nevertheless, it requires further study how we can say regarding one who gave it in another place that the get is void—perhaps he did not say so with insistence? And we should have followed the stringency. However, we do not have the power to disagree with the Rishonim even to be stringent; and delve into this.)

The Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote there: If he said to him, "Give it to her on such-and-such a day," and he gave it to her within the time, it is not a get. "Do not give it to her except on such-and-such a day," and he gave it to her either before it or after it, it is not a get, for he was particular about the day itself. Thus far his words. And the Tur wrote that it is implied from his words that when he says, "Give it to her on such-and-such a day," he may delay it, provided that he does not advance it. Thus far his words. And the reason is simple, for the matter of a get is a matter of misfortune, as is common in the Shas: a person does not advance misfortune upon himself (Gittin 18a). Therefore, it is certainly not pleasing to the husband to advance the giving of the get, but regarding delaying it, he is not particular (Beit Shmuel subsection 63). And if he said, "Do not give it except on such-and-such a day," it is a particularity in every case (the Maggid Mishneh wrote that it is a Tosefta, but I have not found it). And in siman 144 it will be explained that even regarding delaying it, there are poskim who disqualify; see there section 26, and so one should instruct.

And so too regarding a woman, when she said to her agent, "Receive my get for me in such-and-such a place," and he received it in another place, it is not a get for the reason we explained, that it is not pleasing to her to be disgraced in another place. But if she said, "Bring me my get from such-and-such a place," and he brought it to her from another place, it is valid (65a). For when she said, "Bring me my get," he is not an agent for reception; rather, the husband makes him an agent for delivery. And since she is not divorced by his reception, there is no objection when he brings it to her from another place (Ran ibid.). And furthermore, since the husband must appoint him as an agent, the matter does not depend on her. And in truth, there is no novelty in this, and it is an unnecessary Mishnah. And the version of the Rambam, of blessed memory, is more settled, as he reads in the Mishnah: "Bring me my get in such-and-such a place" or "to such-and-such a place" (Maggid Mishneh). That is to say, when the husband makes him an agent for delivery, he should deliver the get to her to such-and-such a place. And there is reason to say that in another place it is not pleasing to her to be disgraced and receive her get; it comes to teach us that since he is his agent and not her agent, there is no objection in this. However, even this is no greatness at all, for behold, this too depends on the husband. And furthermore, since she received it in another place, behold she has now consented to this, and we do not require her prior consent since he is not her agent.

Our sages, of blessed memory, said there that even in a case of "receive my get for me in such-and-such a place" and he received it in another place, it is sometimes valid, and only the effectiveness of the get does not occur until it reaches that specific place. For example, where she said, "receive my get for me in Mata Mehasya," and "sometimes you may find him in Bavel," this shows explicitly that she was not particular regarding in which place he should receive it. And one cannot say that her will was only for one of the two places, for if so, she should have said, "receive my get for me in Mata Mehasya or in Bavel." Rather, it is certain that she is not particular at all about the place. But if so, why did she specify a place? She should have said to him, "receive it for me" without specification, or "in any place you find him." Rather, it is certain that this is what she meant: the get you shall receive in any place, and only the effectiveness of the get shall not be until you reach Mata Mehasya.

And there is a question regarding this, for if so, the get should not take effect at all; since at the time the husband delivers the get to her agent the get does not take effect, how can it take effect upon its arrival in Mata Mehasya? Behold, this is exactly like "pick up your get from the ground," which is not a get, for here too, in Mata Mehasya, she does not receive it from the hand of the husband. And indeed, there are some of our teachers who wrote that it must be said that we are dealing with a case where the husband, when he gave him the get, said to him: "You shall be my agent for delivery until Mata Mehasya, and there you shall appoint another agent for delivery, and from that agent you shall receive it as an agent for receipt" (Tosafot ibid. in the first reconciliation, see there), for in such a case it is as if the husband delivers it to him in Mata Mehasya. However, since the Rif, the Rosh, the Rambam, the Tur, and the Shulchan Aruch in section 50 stated the matters without qualification, it implies that they hold that in any manner it is permitted. And the reason is that the taking effect of the get is always from the time the husband delivered it to him, but this is like a condition that she shall not be divorced until after it arrives there; and this is like one who says to a woman, "Behold, this is your get, but you shall not be divorced with it until after thirty days" (Tosafot ibid. and Ran). And it must be said that the husband also knew of this wording and consented to it, for the matter depends on him to impose a condition on the get (it appears to me, and so it is implied from the wording of the Ran, see there). And nevertheless, he does not need to say to the agent "she shall be trusted by me to say that I did not appease her," for that is only when he fixed the time, as then he can protest that his intention was that perhaps he would appease her, and not when she fixed the time, as we do not fear that he will protest (Beit Shmuel sub-section 64).

The Tur wrote: If the husband said to the agent, "Take such-and-such an object from her," if he was not particular that he take the object from her first, even if the get reached her hand first and afterward he took the object, it is a get; therefore, the agent may send it via another. But if he was particular to say that he should take the object first, it is not a get unless the object reaches his hand first; therefore, he shall not send it via another, for even if she gives the object to the hand of the second agent first, it is not a get, since it did not reach the hand of the first agent first. And even if after the second received the object and gave her the get, it comes into the hand of the first agent, it is not a get, since the get did not reach her hand for the purpose of divorce, but rather the first must take it from her hand and return and give it to her for the purpose of divorce after the object has reached his hand. Thus far his words. And this is the opinion of the Tosafot and the Rosh (29b), that when he makes the agency of the get dependent upon the object—that he should not give the get until he receives the object from her—it is not only if there was a deviation where she received the get before the giving of the object, even if she gave it afterward and even to the hand of the first, that it is not a get, since they deviated from his agency, for he intended to distress her and to discipline her by withholding the get until she removes the object from her hand; but even if there was no deviation by the hand of the second, who received the object and afterward gave her the get, it is also not a get, for since he made the get dependent upon the object, it is not his will that his object be in the hand of another besides the first agent and that it be in his hand before the giving of the get. Therefore, it is necessary that after the object comes into the hand of the first, he shall receive the get from her and return and deliver it to her. But when he did not make the get dependent upon the object, having said to give her the get first, he is permitted to send it via another; for granted that regarding the object he has no authority to deliver it into the hand of another, nevertheless this is not relevant to the get, for regarding the get he is permitted to appoint an agent as with all gittin. And so too, when he made the get dependent upon the object and the first received the object from her first, he is permitted to appoint an agent for the get (and so it appears from the wording of the Shulchan Aruch, section 51, and some say that when he said to him "Take etc." that this is the opinion of the Tosafot).

But the opinion of Rashi and the Rambam in chapter 9, law 35, is not so, and in their opinion, even if he made the get dependent on the object, if the second agent received the object first and afterwards gave her the get, she is divorced. For he was not particular that the object be in the hand of another, as presumably he is trustworthy since the first one trusted him, and his primary concern was that the object not remain with her at the time of receiving her get; and since the second agent did so, it is a get. However, initially the first agent should not appoint a second agent, for perhaps he will not fulfill it according to the husband's command because he did not hear it from his mouth, and the matter will come to ruin. And the same applies to any condition that the husband stipulates with the agent: he should not appoint a second agent for the reason that perhaps he will deviate, as will be explained. And if he did not make the get dependent on the object, in that he authorized giving her the get beforehand, there is no concern at all even initially in making a second agent. For granted that regarding the object it is possible that it is not his will that the object be in the hand of any other man, nevertheless regarding the get this is not relevant since he did not make the get dependent on the object (so it is explicit in Rashi there, and so it is explained in the Rambam there, law 37, and this is his wording: If he said to him, "Give her the get and take etc." he should not send it etc. for it is not his will that his deposit be in the hand of another, and if he sent it, it is a get whether etc. Thus far his words).

And according to this, I am very much astonished: since the husband is particular that the object not be in the hand of another, if so, when he conditioned the get upon the object, how does it become a get through the second agent? For the first agent deviated from his agency since he conditioned the get upon the object, and you have no greater deviation than this. And it must be said that the matters of being particular are not similar to one another; for granted that he is particular that he not deliver the object into the hand of another, nevertheless, since it is the way of people to entrust their objects to others, his being particular is not so great that it should be called a deviation regarding the matter of the get. But this being particular—that the object not remain in her hand at the time of the receipt of the get—is a great particularity among most people, for when he divorces her, he certainly intends to provoke her. And so it is explained from the precision of the language of Rashi and the Rambam, of blessed memory (for Rashi wrote: "and to dominate her with iggun until she gives," see there; and the Rambam, of blessed memory, regarding conditioning the get upon the object, wrote that ordinary people are particular about it, and regarding where he did not condition it, he wrote that it is not his will, etc., see there and examine carefully).

The two opinions that we brought were also brought by the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, section 51, and their intention is clear, that it is as we have written (and the words of the Beit Shmuel, subsection 65 and subsection 66, require further study, and already the Korban Netanel in chapter 3, letter 20, wondered about him, see there; also what he questioned regarding the Tur requires further study, and examine it closely). And there is yet a third opinion of the Ramban, of blessed memory (brought in the Yam Shel Shlomo, chapter 3, siman 12, and part of it in the Beit Shmuel there), and he holds that even if he said, "Give her the get and take from her the object," his intention is also that he should take the object first (like the question of the Tosafot in the heading starting "Shekul," and he does not hold like their answer, and examine it closely). However, regarding the get, this is not a disqualification since he did not make the get dependent on the object, and the practical difference is only regarding the payment of the value of the object. According to this, even if he said, "Take the object and give her the get," and he or his agent changed to give the get first, this is also not a disqualification in the get, and it is not called making the get dependent on the object unless he said, "Take the object and then give her the get," for since he said "and then give her the get," he made the get dependent on the object. And in such a case, if the agent merely sent it via a second agent, the get is invalid even if the second agent did not change, for this itself constitutes a change, as I wrote at the beginning of the previous section. And the Maharshal in the Yam Shel Shlomo there agreed with this opinion in part, see there. And for the law, it is simple that one must be stringent like all the opinions.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 52: Any condition that the husband stipulated with the messenger, such as "do not divorce her except in a house" or "in an upper room," and the like—if the husband did not authorize him to appoint a messenger, he may not send it by the hand of another ab initio, lest the second one not be precise in his mission and the get will be void. Thus far his words. And even though this concern is not explicitly clarified except according to the approach of Rashi and the Rambam, as I have written, nevertheless, he stated the matters according to everyone, for so it appears also from the perspective of logic. And our teacher, the Rema, wrote: However, if he appointed a second messenger, even if he did not tell him the condition or he changed it for him, if the condition was fulfilled, it is a get. Thus far his words. And one should not say that since he did not tell him the condition or he changed it for him, he has deviated and his mission is void, for it is not so; since ultimately it was fulfilled according to the command of the husband, the mission was not changed. To what is this comparable? To one who sent a messenger to buy him wheat, and he wanted to buy barley, but ultimately he bought wheat, for this is not a change in the mission, as the matter turned out according to the command of the sender. And also one should not say that since the second deviated from the command of the first that his mission is void, for it has already been explained that they all depend on the husband, and when the command of the husband is fulfilled, the mission is fulfilled.

He further wrote that if he stipulated that she should waive every right she has against him, even though regarding the law there is room to deliberate what is included in "every right," nevertheless, one must be stringent regarding a get that she should waive every right she has against him, and afterward she may deliberate with him what is included; and so too in any similar case. Thus far his words. The explanation of the matter is that she should not waive specifically this right and that right, nor such-and-such a right, for perhaps they will not intend the law correctly and the get will be found to be void. Rather, she should waive to him exactly according to his wording, and afterward they shall deliberate what was included in his wording. And so too one must be careful that if there remains between them any debt of this one against that one or that one against this one, or any claim, they should state explicitly that this is not connected to the get, so that even if the matter is not fulfilled, it will not be connected to the get; and so we are accustomed.

It has already been explained that if the husband said, "Do not divorce her except for you," that he cannot appoint a second agent. Therefore, there is one who says that if he said to him, "Do not divorce her except with your right hand," he cannot send it by the hand of another even if he became ill, for it is as if he explicitly stated, "No other shall divorce her except for you." Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, ruled accordingly in section 46. And there is one who says that if he became ill, he can appoint a second agent (the Ramah in the Tur), but the halacha is not so (for this is only according to the opinion of Rabbeinu Chananel that we cited in section 106, and most of the poskim do not hold accordingly, as I wrote there).

An agent who brings a get and must say "it was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence," if he did not say it, the get is invalid, and it will be explained in siman 142. And if it is a place where it is not necessary to say "it was written in my presence and it was signed in my presence," as will be explained there, he gives it to her and she is divorced with it and permitted to marry, even though they do not recognize the signatures of the witnesses. And she collects her ketubah from unencumbered property and not from liened property, unless the signatures were authenticated, like all documents where one does not collect from purchasers without authentication of the document. But for the permission to marry, authentication of the signatures is not required when the husband or witnesses do not protest to say that it is a forgery; and consequently, she collects her ketubah from unencumbered property, for such is in the conditions of the ketubah: "when you marry another, you shall take what is written for you" (the Rosh, beginning of our tractate).

The reason the sages were lenient in this matter, that it does not require authentication, is that according to Torah law, witnesses signed upon a document are considered as if their testimony was investigated in a beit din. It is the rabbis who required authentication for other documents, but regarding a get, for the sake of the regulation of agunot, the rabbis were lenient (Gemara) to believe the messenger in a place where he must say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," so that his statement should be like the authentication of two witnesses. For if we were to require two witnesses for authentication, it would be difficult to obtain them in most instances since the get comes from another place. Consequently, even in a place where he does not need to say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," they believed the messenger as well without authentication for the sake of the regulation of agunot. Furthermore, there is no concern that the husband intended to ruin her and write an invalid get, for he is not suspected of ruining her through the hand of Heaven (Yerushalmi, beginning of Gittin, see there). And also, there is no concern that the woman herself produced an invalid get and hired the messenger, for we are stringent upon her if it should be found that the get is invalid and she married based upon it, that she must leave this one and that one, and she has no ketubah from this one or that one, and the offspring is a mamzer from this one and that one. And from the stringency that we applied to her at her end, we were lenient with her at her beginning, that this get should remove her from the status of a married woman (Rosh, first chapter, section 8, and Ran ibid.), and as I have written this reasoning in siman 17, that for this reason they believed her to say "my husband died," and all the more so regarding a get where the writing proves it, and from the Torah it is as if their testimony was investigated in a beit din, as I have written.

And all this is when there is no challenge against the get, but if there is a challenge from the husband or from two witnesses—for a single witness who challenged is nothing, as there is no challenge less than two (9a), for a single witness in a case of contradiction is nothing—and if two witnesses testify that the get is forged, even if she married she must leave and the offspring is a mamzer. And even if the signatures were verified by the witnesses of the get themselves, or others testify to their signatures, it is of no avail, for it is "two against two" and she remains in the status of a married woman, as will be explained in siman 152 (Beit Shmuel subsection 69, see there). And if the husband comes and challenges, saying that he did not divorce her and the get is forged, the get shall be verified by its signatories, and when it is verified, we do not heed his challenge, for behold, witnesses contradict him. And even if only other witnesses testify to the signatures of the witnesses of the get that it is their handwriting, he is not believed to say that they signed falsely. But if the get was not verified and the witnesses were not known, the Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote in chapter 7 that she must leave and the offspring is a mamzer, and if the get was lost, she is of doubtful divorce status. And his reasoning is that even though the verification of documents is only rabbinic, nevertheless, when the husband claims with certainty that it is forged and she does not know how to contradict him, we establish her in the status of a married woman (Maggid Mishneh). And furthermore, there are opinions that hold that in a place where the litigant claims forgery, verification is required from the Torah (Beit Shmuel subsection 70), and consequently, when the get is lost she is of doubtful divorce status, for it is not known if there was verification found when the get was before us or not. And for this reason, it is of no avail even if she contradicts him with certainty (it appears to me). And nevertheless, if another came and betrothed her, she requires a get also from the second, even if the get was not lost and no verification was found, for we must be concerned for the poskim who hold that even when the litigant claims forgery, verification is not required from the Torah (ibid. subsection 71).

It has already been explained that there are five women whom our Sages, of blessed memory, established hate her and are suspected of causing her ruin, and they are not believed to say her husband died, as written in siman 17. And the same applies that they are not believed to bring her get, specifically in a place where one does not need to say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," for then we fear perhaps the get is forged and they intend to ruin her. But in a place where the agent must say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," this concern is removed, for they do not have the ability to ruin her; for when the agent says "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," the husband is no longer believed to protest, as written in siman 142. And with what would they ruin her? Behold, we will not believe the husband in his protest. And that we should fear perhaps their intention is that two witnesses will say it is forged—this would not enter their minds, for from where would they know that they will obtain two witnesses for this? (See Tosafot 23b, s.v. "Adaraba," and one must say regarding their intention that Abaye did not fear this for the reason we explained, and examine it closely.) And if it is a place where one does not need to say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" and they said it, some say they are believed, for so we establish in siman 142 that it is effective and the husband's protest does not avail. And some say they are not believed, for granted that the law is so, nevertheless women do not learn the law and they believe that their saying it is not effective in a place where it is not required to be said (both opinions are in the Ran at the end of the second chapter). But in a place where it must be said, everyone knows that his protest is not effective. And these are the five women: her mother-in-law, the daughter of her mother-in-law, her co-wife even if she was married to another (Yerushalmi Yevamot chapter 15, halacha 4) for the hatred is still suppressed between them, her yevama even if she is her sister such that the concern of yibbum is not relevant—the Sages did not differentiate—and the daughter of her husband. And it has already been explained in siman 17.

It has already been explained in siman 90 that as long as she has not been divorced, even if his intention is to divorce her, nevertheless, all the obligations of a husband toward his wife apply to them with one another. Therefore, one who sends a get to his wife, and it is not a get until it reaches her hand, is liable for her sustenance and for all the conditions of the ketubah until it reaches her hand. And she also eats terumah if she is the wife of a kohen until the get reaches her hand (65a). And if the husband dies before the get reaches her hand, the get is nothing, for there is no get after death. But with a messenger for receipt, he is liable for her sustenance and for all the conditions of the ketubah until he delivers the get into the hand of her messenger. However, she is forbidden to eat terumah immediately from the time the messenger departs from her presence, for perhaps he found him outside the city and received the get from him (Rashi ibid.). And it is merely a stringency that the sages applied regarding the matter of terumah (see there in Tosafot, s.v. "Hitkabel").

There are those who say that in this time, when there is a prohibition to divorce against her will and we maintain that "there is no agent for a sinful act," if one sent a get via an agent to divorce her against her will and he divorced her against her will, the get is void (Noda BiYehudah siman 75 and Ketzot HaChoshen). For they hold that when there is no agent for a sinful act, the act is void if it is possible to reverse the act. However, many disagree with this and hold that the act is valid, for in the Gemara they only spoke regarding the liability and not regarding the voiding of the act. In practice, it is a legal doubt, and we follow the stringent path and not the lenient one. Several great authorities were uncertain about this, and we have already explained this in Choshen Mishpat siman 182, section 13; see there.

It has already been explained in Choshen Mishpat there that an agency can be canceled with mere speech, by saying "I cancel the agency," for just as its creation is through speech, so too its cancellation is through speech. And it appears that even if he performed a kinyan on the agency, he can cancel it with mere speech. This is also implied by the plain wording of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch in section 59, for since the kinyan is not an inherent obligation, it does not avail to prevent the cancellation; and furthermore, it is a kinyan devarim. Even if he swore not to cancel it and then canceled it, his cancellation is a cancellation and he has sworn falsely. This is also clear from the early authorities who wrote that in a case of reversal they should not rely on his oath and he should appoint an agent for receipt. Our teacher, the Rema, wrote likewise in this section; learn from this that the cancellation is effective even when he swore not to cancel it (and I found this explicitly in the Mordechai at the end of the third chapter of Kiddushin regarding a kinyan, for the reason that this too is like speech; see there).

Therefore, one who sends a get to his wife and nullified it before it reached her hand, it is nullified; but after it reached her hand, he cannot nullify it, for she has already been divorced. And if it is because we see that it was his intention to nullify it even before it reached her hand, we hold that a disclosure of intent regarding a get is of no consequence, as will be explained before us. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote that even if he nullified it within the time of a speech-act from when it reached her hand, it is nothing, see there. And even though we hold that within the time of a speech-act is like the speech-act itself, nevertheless, the Sages explicitly said (Nedarim 87a, Bava Batra 130a) that regarding matters of gittin and kiddushin, within the time of a speech-act is like after the time of a speech-act, as I wrote in siman 49 regarding kiddushin. And it appears in my humble opinion that while it is true that according to the Rambam and several of the Rishonim this is so from the essential law because a person performs these matters with composure and intent, therefore he cannot retract even within the time of a speech-act (Ran ibid.); however, there are some of our teachers who hold that it is merely a stringency that the Rabbis applied to gittin and kiddushin (Rashbam and Nimukei Yosef ibid.). And according to this, it is well understood in siman 49 where we follow the stringency; but here, where we follow the leniency and say that it is a get, why should we not be concerned for the opinion of these teachers of ours? And I have already written something similar to this in siman 38, section 51, see there.

By law, he can nullify the agency even not in the presence of the agent, as is written in Choshen Mishpat there. However, since a great ruin can result from this in a get—in that the agent, who is unaware of the nullification, will deliver the get to her and she will marry based on it—therefore, Rabban Gamliel the Elder ordained that they should not do so; rather, if he wishes to nullify it, he must nullify it in the presence of the agent or in the presence of the woman (Mishnah, beginning of chapter 4). If he cannot go himself, he should send an agent to the agent or to the woman to inform them that he nullified it. Even though he ordained this, nevertheless, if it occurred that the husband nullified the get not in their presence, the nullification is a nullification (33a, according to Rabbi), and the sages did not uphold their words to say that the nullification would not be effective not in their presence.

The Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote in chapter 6, law 16: And anyone who nullifies in the presence of others must nullify in the presence of two. Thus far his words. And it is explicitly explained that when he nullifies in the presence of the woman or in the presence of the messenger, two are not required. And it is likewise explained from the words of the Tur, who wrote: And initially he should not nullify it except in the presence of the messenger he sent or in her presence, but after the fact, even if he nullified it in the presence of two others, it is nullified, and he does not need to nullify in the presence of three. Thus far his words. And it is likewise implied from the words of the Shulchan Aruch, section 60, see there. And it is likewise explained from the words of our teachers, the authors of the Tosafot (32b, starting with "And Rav Nachman etc." and "If you ask, what is the practical difference now etc."). And it is likewise explained from the words of Rashi, of blessed memory, there (starting with "In the presence of"). However, there is one of the poskim who wrote that if the messenger went to nullify the agency of the get, he must nullify in the presence of two (Rabbi Yerucham, cited in the Beit Yosef). And it is likewise explicitly explained in the Yerushalmi (beginning of chapter 4), and this is its wording: If the messenger went to nullify the get, he must nullify it in the presence of two, and the messenger counts as one of the two. Thus far its words. And perforce it is dealing with a case where the messenger nullified it in the presence of the woman or her messenger, for if not so, why did he send a messenger? He should have nullified it in his own place (and so it is implied in the Beit Yosef). And it is a wonder that all our teachers did not concern themselves with the words of the Yerushalmi.

And it appears in my humble opinion that the Rambam and all the poskim do not disagree with the Yerushalmi, and specifically when the husband himself cancels it, he does not require witnesses when he cancels it in the presence of the woman or in the presence of the agent. And this is what they wrote, that anyone who cancels in the presence of others requires two, but in their presence he does not require two. However, the agent of the husband, even when he cancels it in the presence of the woman or in the presence of the agent, requires two; for if not so, how can we believe one man when he comes to say that the husband cancelled the get? And indeed, there is one of the Rishonim who wrote that the agent of the husband, when he comes to cancel a get, requires two witnesses that the husband made him an agent to cancel it before it reaches the hand of the woman, for if not so, there is a concern of collusion (Mordechai at the beginning of chapter HaSholeach in the name of Riva). And certainly in such a case, he is like the husband himself and does not need to cancel it before two. But the Yerushalmi is dealing with a case where he has no witnesses that he is the agent of the husband, and if so, how can we believe one man? And for this, the Yerushalmi says that he must cancel it before two, and the agent is also of the count; that is to say, since the woman or the agent of the husband hear from two witnesses that the husband cancelled the get, she remains in the status of a married woman and the get is void, for by the mouth of two witnesses shall a matter be established, and any matter done before two witnesses we presume to be the truth (see there chapter 4, siman 3, who questioned the Riva, and according to our words it is well, and examine it closely) (and see Beit Yosef and Beit Shmuel subsection 92, and according to our words it is not so, see there):

The Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote in the second chapter of Hilchot Tzitzit: How is the tekhelet dyed? One takes the blood of the chilazon, which is a fish found in the Salt Sea, and its color is like the color of the sea, and its blood is black like ink, and it is found in the Great Sea. This is his wording: And one places the blood in a pot and boils it, and brings the wool and places it in it until it becomes the color of the sky, and this is the tekhelet mentioned in the tzitzit. Thus far his words. And see there that he wrote: The tekhelet mentioned in the Torah everywhere is wool dyed with a specific blue dye that retains its beauty, and this is the color of the sky that is seen opposite the sun when it is clear. And our teacher, the Beit Yosef, brought this in siman 11, see there. And our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 1: And now we have only white, for we do not know how the tekhelet is dyed. Thus far his words.

And one must ask a great question regarding this: why is it not effective when he cancels it before one person or between himself and himself? Granted, according to the opinion of the Rosh that the appointment of agency requires being before two, one can well say that its cancellation must also be before two. But according to the Rambam, that one does not need to appoint him before witnesses, why is its cancellation more stringent than its creation? And if it is because we do not believe him that he cancelled it—behold, from the Shas and the poskim it is explained that even if it became known with certainty that he cancelled it, if he did not cancel it before two, his cancellation is not effective at all. And what is explained to me from the words of the Tosafot (ibid. s.v. ve-Rav Nachman) is that certainly by Torah law his cancellation is effective, but the sages established their words so that it would not be effective because of the great ruin destined to occur; for when he cancels before one, not in the presence of the agent and not in the presence of the woman, she certainly will not know of this and will marry another, and her children will be mamzerim. And even though even before two it is not certain that it will reach her ear, as is stated in the Shas (33a) explicitly, nevertheless, in most instances it will become known, just as with one who sells his field with witnesses, where one collects from liened properties because this generates a rumor (Bava Batra 41b). However, here we are concerned that even by way of two it will not become known (Tosafot ibid.); regardless, in most instances it will become known, but with fewer than two she will certainly come to ruin, for even before the enactment of Rabban Gamliel it was not effective with fewer than two, as is proven in the Mishnah there. And this enactment was prior to the enactment of Rabban Gamliel (and this is the intent of the Tosafot who wrote: "and in this even Rabbi admits that we say 'what is the power of the beit din worth,'" thus far his words; meaning to say that this enactment had already been enacted, and the difficulty of the Maharsha is answered, see there and examine carefully; and see the Mishneh LaMelech chapter 6, halacha 18, and the glossator there, and their words were not clarified to me).

There are two types of nullification: the first is the nullification of the agency, and the second is the nullification of the essence of the get, whereby he nullifies it from being a get and it becomes like a mere paper. There is a practical legal difference between one and the other: regarding the nullification of the agency, just as the one who appoints can nullify the agency, so too the agent can nullify his agency if he does not desire to be an agent, as is written in Choshen Mishpat there; whereas regarding the nullification of the get, it is not within the power of the agent to nullify it, for it was not written by his command, and only the husband can nullify it. Furthermore, there is a practical legal difference in that with the nullification of the agency, he may return and divorce with it when he consents to the agency, for since the essence of the get was not nullified but only the agency, when they return and consent, the agency returns as before; whereas with the nullification of the get, the get is invalid forever, for he nullified it from the status of a get.

And it is true that there are some of our teachers who hold that the husband has no ability at all to nullify the essence of the get, for how can he nullify with his speech the act of writing? For we maintain that speech does not come and nullify an act (Kiddushin 59b; Tosafot ibid. and the Ran, chapter 4 of Gittin). And so too the Rosh, of blessed memory, there is in doubt regarding this. The Ramban and the Rashba, of blessed memory, are also of the opinion that he does not have the ability to nullify the get, but they wrote that in practice one must be stringent. However, the Rambam, of blessed memory, in chapter 6 wrote explicitly that he has the ability to nullify the get and the get is forever invalid, see there. And so wrote the Tosafot in Gittin (32b, s.v. "Hatam") that a get is not considered an act as long as it has not been delivered into her hand, and it is nothing but speech, and speech comes and nullifies speech. And so wrote the Mordechai in the name of the Ittur at the end of chapter 3 of Kiddushin, see there. And since it is a dispute of the great teachers, we follow the stringency in every regard, such that if he nullified it, it is forever nullified and she is a married woman; and if she received kiddushin from another after receiving this get, she requires a get from both of them. And so they ruled in the Shulchan Aruch, section 66, see there.

This is the wording of the Rambam there, law 21: One who sends a get by means of a messenger and canceled the get, he may go back and divorce with it when he wishes, for he did not cancel it from the status of a get, but rather from the status of agency. Therefore, if the get was in the hand of the husband and he canceled it, such as if he said, "This get is canceled," he may never divorce with it, and it is like a broken shard; and if he divorced with it, she is not divorced. And likewise, if he specified at the time he canceled it while it was in the hand of the messenger and said, "The get that I sent is hereby canceled from being a get," he may never divorce with it. Thus far his words. And so wrote the Shulchan Aruch there. It is clear from his words that when the get is in the hand of the messenger, even though he said, "I cancel the get," his intention is not regarding the get but regarding the agency, unless he said explicitly, "I cancel it from being a get." And this is explicitly proven in the Shas (at the beginning of the fourth chapter). And this fact, that we attribute it leniently, is because the language of "cancellation" applies more to agency than to the get, for regarding the get, the language of "valid" and "invalid" applies more; therefore, as long as he did not say so explicitly, we attribute it to the agency (so it appears to me). And know that even according to those who hold that he cannot cancel the essence of the get, this is when it was entirely written; but as long as its writing was not completed, all agree that it is nothing more than speech (as is apparent from Tosafot, chapter 8, starting with "And perhaps," and as is apparent from Rashi there, for Rashi holds at the beginning of the fourth chapter like the Ran, see there; and so wrote the Mishneh LaMelech in chapter 6, law 21, see there. Nevertheless, in practice I am in doubt, for according to the two other explanations in Tosafot there, this is not necessary, and it is only according to the first explanation of our teacher Ezra, see there and examine carefully).

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 60 that the husband is not believed to say that he cancelled it unless the agent or the woman admit to the matter, or he has witnesses that he cancelled it. Thus far his words. And it appears that this is when the get is already in the hand of the woman, for if not so, why should we not believe him? Behold, it is in his power to cancel it now. And even if we say that when the get is in the hand of the agent the husband is not believed even with a migo, as this reasoning was written in this siman (Beit Shmuel, subsection 91), this is regarding when he contradicts the agent from the outset and says, "I gave it to you for safekeeping and not for divorce." But when he admits that he gave it to him for divorce, but that he cancelled it afterwards, why should he not be believed? And this is better than a migo, for his words now are like a complete cancellation, since he says that he cancelled it and it is in his power to say "it is cancelled." But when the get is in the hand of the woman, we certainly require their admission or witnesses, for if not so, how can the husband remove her from the status of a divorcee? And if it is difficult: how can we believe the agent when he admits that the husband cancelled it, for behold, he makes himself a wicked person by delivering it to the woman after the cancellation (like the difficulty of the Beit Shmuel ibid.)? One can say that he can excuse himself and say that he did not know the law that this phrasing is a phrasing of cancellation, and similar to this. Furthermore, the reasoning that "a person does not make himself a wicked person" is only when he alone speaks about himself, and not when another says a matter that affects the other and he admits to his words; even though in this he makes himself a wicked person, nevertheless we have not found that we do not believe the words of the other for this reason. Furthermore, granted that we should not follow the lenient path in this, nevertheless for stringency we certainly must follow and believe them. And one should not say: if so, how is this rule grouped with witnesses? For when there are witnesses, it is obvious that we believe them even for leniency. For one can say that certainly it is so, for also she, when she admits, it is obvious that she is not believed for leniency, such as if he is a kohen she is forbidden to return to him and we do not believe them that he cancelled it (Beit Shmuel, subsection 92), for perhaps both of them are retracting from the get and saying that he cancelled it when in truth he did not cancel it. And so too if she received kiddushin from another, she is not believed to forbid herself to the second (ibid.). But with witnesses, perforce they are believed in every case. (And the words of the Beit Shmuel, subsection 91, were not clarified to me, and specifically that he himself cited that the Rashba wrote so, see there, and I did not find this in the Rashba; also what is noted in the Rema from the Hagahot Ashri I did not find.)

He further wrote: Some say that these two before whom he cancels the agency must be together, but one not in the presence of the other is not effective; however, if he cancels the get itself, even after it was written, it is effective even one not in the presence of the other. Thus far his words. And the reason is that the cancellation in the presence of two is like a beit din, as we learned in the Mishnah that he would convene a beit din and cancel it, and we explain in the Gemara that in the presence of two is sufficient; and since they are like a beit din, they must necessarily be together, and it is not similar to testimony where it is possible to receive testimony from one not in the presence of the other (this is the intention of the Gra, subsection 120, and so it must be said regarding the words of the Beit Shmuel, subsection 94, but his wording requires study, see there). However, when he cancels the get itself, he does not need a beit din for this, for he is the one who writes it and he is the one who cancels it, and the enactment we wrote in section 146 was only regarding the cancellation of the agency, but for the cancellation of the get itself, he only needs witnesses, and its law is like all testimony where one not in the presence of the other is effective. And the reason they did not enact this regarding this case, it can be said, is because it is not common that he would cancel the get itself, for why should he cancel the get such that he would not be able to retract, as has been written, and it is better for him to cancel the agency so that when he desires he may retract; and you should know that this is so, for according to many of our teachers, the cancellation of the get itself is not effective at all, as has been written, and therefore even according to those who hold that the cancellation is effective, nevertheless it is certainly not common, and they did not concern themselves to enact regarding an uncommon matter (so it appears to me). And there is one who explains that it refers to after the writing and before the delivery into the hand of the agent, for this is like the delivery of a moda'ah, and he can cancel one not in the presence of the other; but after he has appointed the agent, he cannot cancel except one in the presence of the other, even when he cancels the get itself (Tuv Gittin). And according to what I wrote, this is not necessary; however, for the practical law, one should be stringent according to both explanations (so it appears to me in my humble opinion).

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 61: If he sent by means of two or by means of ten, he may initially cancel this one not in the presence of that one, and those whose agency he canceled are canceled and they cannot appoint agents unless they are appointed a second time. And with ten whom he made agents, whether to write and give a get or whether he made them agents for delivery, if he canceled some of them, they are not all canceled. And there is one who says that regarding agency, if one of them was canceled, they are all canceled. Thus far his words.

The explanation of his words is that it has already been explained regarding the enactment of Rabban Gamliel not to cancel except in the presence of the messenger or the woman because of the mishap—that she might not know of the cancellation and would marry—and only post facto, if he cancelled it, it is cancelled. Therefore, when he sent via two or more, he does not need, even ab initio, to cancel in the presence of all of them, for there is no mishap here; for the one in whose presence he cancels it will no longer be a messenger, and the one in whose presence he did not cancel it is permitted to be a messenger, for by the cancellation of some of them, all of them are not cancelled, and the others whom he did not cancel are permitted to be messengers, and there is no mishap here. Consequently, this law also applies to ten whom he made messengers to write a get, for we establish that one writes and two sign; if he cancelled for three in their presence, the other three can write and give, and there is no mishap. However, to cancel not in his presence is forbidden ab initio, for perhaps this one for whom he cancelled will not know of his cancellation and will be a scribe or a witness or a messenger. To this, most of the poskim agreed, and so it emerges from the sugya of the Gemara (33b: that the halakha is like Rabbi in both, testimony etc. is not entirely cancelled, and if those go and write and give, let them write and give; and when he said "all of you write" or "all of you deliver," it is simple that even according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel he can cancel, for it will not lead to a mishap, and like the resolution of Rav Ashi, see there).

And that which he wrote, "And there is one who says that they are all canceled," this is the opinion of the Rambam in chapter 6, law 18, who wrote, and this is his wording: If he said to ten, "Write a get and give it to my wife," he can cancel this one not in the presence of that one, and even in the presence of two others. If he sent the get by the hand of two, he can cancel this one not in the presence of that one, and even if there were ten, once he canceled it in the presence of one of them, the get is canceled. Thus far his words. And the Ra'avad and the Remakh already wondered at his words, for since he ruled that by canceling in the presence of one they are all canceled, how can he cancel this one not in the presence of that one? For behold, those in whose presence he did not cancel will not know, and they will write and give, and she will marry. And one cannot say that it deals with where he said "all of you," where they are all forced to sign and give and no ruin will result, as those in whose presence he canceled know of the cancellation and will not sign and will not give; first, for behold, he does not mention at all that it deals with "all of you," and furthermore, for behold, he wrote that he can cancel even in the presence of two others, and in this, even with "all of you," it could lead to ruin as all of them would not know of the cancellation. And furthermore, that the essence of the enactment of Rabban Gamliel was not to cancel not in the presence of the messenger or the woman, and how did he write that he can cancel in the presence of two others? And if we say that his intention is that post facto, if he canceled it, it is canceled, what is this phrasing "he can cancel" that he wrote, which implies even initially? And furthermore, if such is his intention, why does he need all this lengthiness? He should have said briefly that post facto, if he canceled it not in the presence of the messenger or in the presence of the woman, it is canceled. And besides that his words are against the Sugya of the Shas that we brought, and the commentators on his words labored much to settle them with great difficulty, and his words were not settled (see there in the Lechem Mishneh).

And in my humble opinion, it appears clear that the Rambam, of blessed memory, had a different approach in all of this, for we do not find in all his words on this matter any mention of the enactment of Rabban Gamliel, who enacted that one should not cancel [a get] not in the presence of the messenger or the woman. Only in law 26 did he write: One who sent a get to his wife and went back and canceled it in the presence of two others is beaten with lashes of rebellion because he causes the existence of mamzerim, etc., see there. And this is the Gemara in Kiddushin (12b) that Rav would lash anyone who cancels a get. Rashi, of blessed memory, explained there that this applies even when he cancels it in the presence of the messenger, see there. But the Rambam was not comfortable explaining it thus, and so the Tosafot wrote there. Therefore, the Rambam did not mention at all this matter of the enactment of Rabban Gamliel, because since we establish the law like Rabbi, who said "if he canceled it, it is canceled," there is no longer a distinction between canceling it in his presence or not in his presence. And "initially" versus "after the fact" is not relevant to mention in this matter, for initially one certainly should not cancel a get even in the presence of the messenger, as Rashi explained. And even though he does not hold like Rashi in this—that one is beaten in such a case—nevertheless, it is certainly not proper to cancel gittin. And proof for this is that he himself wrote later in that same chapter, law 20, that when one writes and gives the get to his wife himself, they do not let him leave until the get reaches her hand, so that he does not go out and cancel it. Thus far his words. Behold, we are concerned with all our power not to come to a cancellation of a get, but in a get through a messenger, it is not in our power to guard it. Therefore, the Rambam did not write any distinction between one and the other, and wrote only the essential laws of how the cancellation is performed. He only wrote that one is beaten if he canceled it not in their presence, and this is from the words of Rav in Kiddushin there; or perhaps the words of Rav are based on the enactment of Rabban Gamliel, and there is no practical difference in this. And the language "he can cancel" that he wrote does not mean "initially," and it is an explicit Gemara in Bava Metzia (49a) where we say there: One who says to his fellow, "I am giving you a gift," can retract it. And [the Gemara] asks: "Can"—is it not obvious? Rather say: "is permitted" to retract it. Behold, "can" does not imply permission initially. And the Tosafot already wrote this there (37a, s.v. Rabbi) that "can" is not "initially." And that which he wrote, that when he canceled it in the presence of one, the get is canceled, even though in the Gemara it is stated explicitly that it is not entirely canceled, this also works out simply. For behold, Rabbi and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagree in two baraitot regarding two laws: regarding "if he canceled it, it is canceled," and regarding whether one can cancel this one not in the presence of that one. For Rabbi holds leniently in both, and Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel stringently. And behold, at first the Shas wanted to say that the second law is not dependent on the first; meaning, that even according to Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel who holds "if he canceled it, it is not canceled," nevertheless in this law of "this one not in the presence of that one" he would also agree, on the grounds that it is not entirely canceled and will not lead to a mishap because the others can write and give, as we explained. However, Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel disagrees in this also, and holds that it is entirely canceled, or for another reason as explained in the Shas, but it is not related to the dispute of "if he canceled it, it is canceled." And all this is according to the one who holds there that in one case the halacha is like Rabbi and in one like Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, as explained there. But according to the conclusion there, that Rav Nachman ruled the halacha like Rabbi in both, then all these reasons are no longer necessary. And the reason is simple: because "if he canceled it, it is canceled" like the first dispute, even though it could lead to a mishap, for an agency that is canceled in part is canceled in its entirety. And in truth, he is beaten as he explained later as I wrote, but he is informing us of the law, that it is a total cancellation for the entire get. Therefore, the Rambam intentionally mentioned in this law "even in the presence of two others" to inform us that this is not a separate dispute, but rather it is like the previous dispute. And do not find it difficult: if so, why did the Rambam need to write this law at all, since he already wrote "if he canceled it, it is canceled"? For it can be said that for two reasons he was forced to write this law: one, to inform us that the entire agency is canceled, so that we should not err to say the reason as at the beginning of the sugya—he informs us that according to the conclusion it is not so. And the second, because there is another setup there where we say "any matter done in the presence of ten requires ten to undo it," see there; and so that we should not err to say so, for in truth all this is only according to what we thought there, that in one case the halacha is not like Rabbi. But according to the conclusion, all this is unnecessary, and it is one dispute. And so it appears to me from the words of the Rif, of blessed memory, see there carefully.

We have already mentioned what our sages, of blessed memory, said in Kiddushin (12b), that Rav would lash one who nullifies a get and one who submits a moda'ah regarding a get. Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 67: One who sent a get to his wife and went back and nullified it before two others, and similarly one who submitted a moda'ah regarding the get, they strike him with lashes of rebellion because he causes there to be mamzerim. Thus far his words. And we have already written that Rashi, of blessed memory, explained this even regarding one who nullifies it before the messenger, but the Rambam and the Tosafot do not hold so, as has been written. However, it is certain that even according to them, they should be careful from the outset regarding the nullification of a get in any manner, for it is not logical to create a distant dispute where according to Rashi they would strike him and according to them he may do so from the outset; rather, it is certain that they also admit that one should not nullify from the outset, as has been written.

Therefore, in truth, the common custom when a person sends a get via a messenger is that we adjure the husband that he shall not issue a protest and that he shall not nullify the get, and it is explained in the Seder HaGet in siman 154, section 26, see there. And regarding a wicked person who has apostatized, some say that he cannot appoint a messenger to deliver a get to his wife, for we fear that he will nullify it; and even if he takes upon himself a prohibition and an oath not to nullify it, it is of no avail, for we fear perhaps he will transgress his oath. And some say that the early authorities found a remedy for this: that at the outset he makes the messenger a messenger for receipt, saying to him, "Acquire this get on behalf of my wife, so-and-so daughter of so-and-so, and with it let her be divorced and permitted to any man," for one may acquire a benefit for a person in their absence, as it is certainly a benefit for her, as I wrote in siman 140, see there. And afterwards, he goes back and takes the get from the messenger and makes him a messenger for delivery, and says, "Deliver this get to my wife, etc." And such is the custom. Therefore, even if perhaps he should nullify the get, we rely upon the fact that he was a messenger for receipt, as I wrote there. However, they should be careful not to make him a messenger for delivery first and afterwards a messenger for receipt, for the reason that an appointment for receipt nullifies the appointment for delivery, as we explained there with the help of Heaven.

The halacha was decided in the Gemara (34a) according to Abaye, who said that a disclosure of intent regarding a get is of no consequence. The explanation of the matter is that which has been explained, that when one cancels the get or the agency, the get or the agency is canceled; this is when he cancels it explicitly with the speech of his mouth. However, as long as he has not expressed the cancellation with his mouth explicitly, even though he disclosed his intent that he desires its cancellation, this is nothing. For example, if the agent said to him, "I have not given her the get yet," and the husband answered, "Blessed is He who is good and does good," behold, he is giving thanks for the fact that he did not give her the get, and his intent is clarified that he has reconsidered divorcing her; nevertheless, the agent may deliver the get to her, for a disclosure of intent is nothing. And not only this, but even more than this: for example, if he ran after the agent and we knew clearly that his running was to cancel the get, and he did not overtake him until the agent delivered the get to her, the get is not canceled, and it is kosher and she may marry. And similarly, if he sent an agent to cancel the get, that he should overtake the first agent to cancel it, and he did not overtake him until the first one delivered the get to her, it is kosher (Beit Shmuel, subsection 97). And specifically when he commanded the agent to cancel it and he did not cancel it himself before witnesses; for if he canceled it himself, it has already been explained that we establish: if he canceled it, it is canceled, even not in his presence. And similarly, if he says to the agent, "Return this get to me and I will give you another get," it is nothing but a disclosure of intent and the get is not canceled, and if the agent gave it to her, the get is kosher. But if he said to him, "Do not give this get," it is certainly a cancellation. And similarly, if he wrote to him, "Do not give this get," it is a cancellation, for regarding cancellation, writing is certainly like speech.

Let this law not be a wonder in your eyes, and let it not be difficult for you, for even in monetary matters we follow a proven assessment as is written in Choshen Mishpat siman 246, and all the more so regarding the prohibition of a married woman; for in truth, we have already explained in siman 42, section 8, that regarding bills of divorce and betrothals we do not follow even a proven assessment. This is because in monetary laws, witnesses were only created for the sake of falsehood, and the matter depends on the agreement of his heart to buy, sell, or give; however, regarding bills of divorce and betrothals, which are not effective between him and her except through "by the mouth of two witnesses shall a matter be established," the matter is only established by what the witnesses heard from his mouth, and we do not follow thoughts that are in the heart. However, we have already written there in section 13 that it appears to me that there is a dispute among the Rishonim regarding this reasoning, see there. Furthermore, there is a reason for this according to what the Tosafot wrote (at the beginning of the fourth chapter) that "words in the heart are not words" even in a case where it is known to us that he was coerced from expressing it, and "words in the heart" do not count as words except in a case where even without a disclosure of intent we would know his intent on our own. Thus far their words. Therefore, a disclosure of intent regarding a get is not a significant matter, for we do not know his intent on our own—that he desires and needs its cancellation—since he himself commanded to write and to give. (And it is also possible that they only wrote this according to Rava, as is evident from the beginning of their words, but it also works well according to Abaye, and so it appears from their wording that they are speaking as the final law, see there).

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 62: One who sends a get to his wife and said to the messenger, "If the woman desires to come to me, I will maintain her [as my wife], and if not, release her with a get," and the husband left that city, and afterwards the woman came with the messenger to that city, the messenger may give the get, for the woman did not come to the husband since he left the city before her arrival. And even if the husband were in the city, if he cannot be reconciled with her, the messenger may give the get, for that which he said initially, "If she comes to me I will maintain her," is nothing but mere words and is only a disclosure of intent which is nothing. Thus far his words. And it is from a responsum of the Rosh that the Tur brought, who ruled so in practice, that this is only called a disclosure of intent since he did not say, "If she comes, the get is void." See there. And this is specifically when he initially sent him ordinarily to give her the get and afterwards said to the messenger, "If she desires to come here, I will maintain her," for then it is only like a disclosure of intent. But if at the time he made him a messenger, or within the period of the messenger's mission, he said to him, "If she desires," etc., then this is not a disclosure of intent and the mission was made on this condition; and then, if he is in the city and she came and he cannot be reconciled with her, he cannot give her the get (Taz and Beit Shmuel subsection 198). Furthermore, we learned from their words that when the husband makes a condition that she come to him, and he was then in this place and went to another place, she must come to the other place where he stands now, and it does not avail that she comes to the place where he stood at the time he made the condition, for he did not say that she should come "here," but rather that she should come "to him," meaning in whatever place he may be, she shall come to him.

There is a difference in the language of bitul, and there is that which is effective and that which is not effective. The general rule of the matter is that the language of bitul must be a term that implies the future, and also that its meaning implies that he is nullifying it, and it should not be understood as if it is invalid on its own (Beit Yosef), for how is it invalid when there is no invalidity upon it and it is merely a statement? Therefore the sages, of blessed memory, said (32b): If he said, "This get shall not be effective," "shall not permit," "shall not release," "shall not send," "shall not divorce," "it shall be earthenware," "it shall be like earthenware," his words stand, for this is language of the future. But if he said, "This get is not effective," "is not permitting," "is not releasing," "is not sending," "is not divorcing," "it is earthenware," "it is like earthenware," he has said nothing, for this is language of the past. Similarly, if he said, "This get is invalid," he has said nothing, for it does not imply that he is nullifying it, but rather that he is giving it a reputation of invalidity, and that is not the case (Rashi). Similarly, if he said, "It is not a get," he has said nothing for this reason. But if he said, "This get is null [batel hu]," or if he said, "I have no desire for it," this is a bitul, for "I have no desire for it" implies "it is not my will for it to exist, but rather my will is that it be nullified." Similarly, "it is null [batel hu]," even though it also contains an implication of the past tense, nevertheless it also contains an implication of the future, and presumably his intention is for the future so that his intention may be realized (Gemara). And if he said, "This get is null [batel]" and did not say "hu," or if he said, "This get is null [batel]" with the tet vocalized with a patach and not a tzeirei, which implies a past tense verb like "passed away," this is a doubt and we follow the stringency.

The Tur wrote in the name of the Ramah: If he said "it shall be pasul," it is void, even though he cannot disqualify the essence of the get, since he said the expression "it shall be," an expression of the future, meaning it shall be pasul to divorce with it; just as it is in the case of "it shall be earthenware," even though we see that it is not earthenware, we say he meant "it shall be like earthenware" regarding the matter of divorce, so too here he meant "it shall be pasul" for divorce. And so wrote Harav Meir Cohen regarding "behold it is pasul," that it is effective, just as it is in the case of "behold it is like earthenware." But the Tur wrote that it is not comparable, for "it shall be earthenware" or "behold it is like earthenware" is different, because that name cannot be sustained upon the get at all, therefore we must interpret his words that it shall be like earthenware regarding the matter of not divorcing with it, and since it implies the future, his words stand. But "it shall be pasul" or "behold it is pasul," since this name can be sustained upon the get, meaning that it shall be pasul, and this is not a disqualification because he cannot disqualify it from now on, therefore it is nothing. Thus far the words of the Tur. And some say that even according to the opinion of the Tur it is a doubt (Bach and Beit Shmuel, subsection 101), and although from his wording it does not imply so, nevertheless, for the halacha it is certainly a doubt since there is a dispute regarding this, and we follow the stringent view.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 64: If he said, "You shall not go out permanently," it is void, and it is as if he said, "Today you are not my wife and tomorrow you are my wife." Thus far his words. And his words are perplexing, for regarding "Today you are not my wife and tomorrow you are my wife," according to the opinion of the Rosh she is divorced, and we maintain that it is a doubtful get, as written at the end of siman 137, see there. It is only according to the opinion of the Rambam that she is not divorced, as written there. If so, how did he write regarding this law that it is a void get? Since he compares it to the law of "Today etc.," he should have ruled that it is a doubtful get. And in truth, in the source of the law in the Responsa of the Ran, of blessed memory (brought in the Beit Yosef), it implies that he ruled it is a doubt, because only according to the Rambam is she not divorced, and the opinion of the Ran himself regarding that law of "Today" is that it is a doubt, as he wrote in the ninth chapter of Gittin, see there. And it is possible to say that his opinion is such: that even though when he says to her "Today you are not my wife etc." we maintain it is a doubt, but when he says before the giving "This get shall not be permanent," it is worse, for in any event he made a reservation in the essence of the get, and it is no less than a cancellation. Nevertheless, for the law it appears to me that it is a doubt. And perhaps a printing error occurred, and it should say: If he said "You shall not go out permanently" it is a doubt etc., so it should say. And so it appears to me, for the phrasing "it is void" is not the correct phrasing at all.

And regarding these expressions that are not effective to nullify the get, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote in section 65 that if he did not initially reveal his intention that he wants to nullify it, and he said expressions that are not effective to nullify the get, nevertheless it is a protest to disqualify it, and it must be authenticated by its signatories. And so wrote Rashi there and the Ramah in the Tur. And the Tur concluded: Certainly if he initially revealed his intention that he wants to nullify it and said one of these expressions, they are nothing, as they are not expressions of nullification. But if he did not initially reveal his intention that he wants to nullify it and said one of these expressions, since we can interpret his words that he wants to protest against it if it is not authenticated by its signatories, he is believed; and if the messenger gave it afterwards into the hand of the woman, it is nothing. But if it was authenticated by its signatories, it is valid. Thus far his words. And there are those who asked regarding expressions in the past tense, which are not effective to nullify, why should he not be believed with a migo that if he wanted, he could nullify it now, as this reasoning was written in section 150, see there. And in truth it is not comparable, for there he says that he already nullified it, and he is rightly believed with a migo; but here he does not say that he nullified it previously, but rather he nullifies it now in the past tense and thinks it is effective, and how does a migo apply to this? (So it appears to me, and see Beit Shmuel subsection 99).

And know that all these expressions that are effective for bitul and those that are not effective were explained according to the words of the Shas and the poskim when he nullified in the holy tongue or in Aramaic, as they spoke in the time of the sages of the Shas. And according to our vernacular languages, one must understand the matters in the translation from the holy tongue or from Aramaic to the vernacular language. However, the general rule of the matters is one: that a past tense expression is not effective unless he says that he already nullified it, for then he is believed before the giving to the woman or into the hand of her agent for receipt by virtue of a migo; and even in this we follow the stringency. And if the bitul is in the future tense or in the present tense, the bitul is effective. And it is impossible to detail everything in writing according to our vernacular language, and it is upon the beit din to understand the matter and the expression, each word in its proper place.

Any agent who brings a get, we do not fear that perhaps the husband canceled it or that he issued a moda'ah, and similarly we do not fear that perhaps he died and she is bound to a yavam if he has no children. And even if he left him an old man or ill, for every matter we establish according to the previous chazakah. And regarding an ill person, this is not against the majority, for on the contrary, the majority of the ill are for life. However, if he left him a gosses, he shall not give it to her, for the majority of those who are gosses are for death. And even if he is alive, if he is not of sound mind at the time of the giving, one should not give it to her, as I wrote in siman 121 (see Be'er Sheva subsection 5). And if he gave it to her, she is in a state of doubtful divorce. And even regarding an ill person, some say specifically one who is ill by the hands of Heaven, but by the hands of man, such as if they struck him until it appeared that he became a tereifah, his law is like a gosses. And it appears to me that all this is when no rumor arrived that he canceled or issued a moda'ah or that he died; but if some rumor arrived, even if it was not clarified by witnesses, one should not give it to her until the matter is clarified thoroughly. However, according to our custom that we cancel moda'ot and disqualify the witnesses as I wrote in siman 134, it is possible that there is no concern for a moda'ah, but for cancellation there is a concern; even though he swore not to cancel, perhaps he transgressed his oath (so it appears to me).

That which we wrote, that if they left him an old man we do not concern ourselves with death, this is an explicit Mishnah (28a). And it was stated regarding this in the Gemara: Rava said, they only taught this regarding an old man who has not reached "strength," which is eighty years old, but if he reached "strength," we concern ourselves with death. And it is a stringency that they applied to gittin due to the severity of the prohibition of a married woman; however, in other matters, such as one who sends his sin-offering from overseas, even if he reached "strength," we do not concern ourselves with death (Tosafot Yoma 55b, s.v. "ve-hatnan," see there). And Abaye challenged this from a Baraita, that even if he is a hundred years old, he gives it to her under the presumption that he is alive, and it concludes as a refutation, and the halakha is not like Rava. And so incline the words of the Rif and the Rambam, of blessed memory, who did not cite this statement of Rava, and so ruled the Rashba and the Rosh, and so it is implied in the Yerushalmi. However, in the Gemara there is another resolution: since he has diverged, he has diverged; meaning, that from eighty until one hundred we concern ourselves with death, and from one hundred, since he has diverged, he has diverged, and we do not concern ourselves with death. And so ruled the Tur in the name of the Ramah, and so ruled the Raviah (Beit Yosef). Therefore, in practice, one should be stringent. And also our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 68 brought this opinion in the name of "there are those who say," see there. However, Rashi, of blessed memory, explained that specifically until ninety years one must concern himself with death and no more. And it seems that he was compelled to this by the language of the Baraita, "even until a hundred years," which implies that all the more so beforehand. Therefore, he explained that from ninety until a hundred one also does not concern himself with death. And one may say the reason is that since it is written, "and if by strength, eighty years," it implies that more than this is not common, and until ninety, all is included in eighty, but from ninety and onward it is not common at all, and automatically, since he has diverged, he has diverged. And according to this, for Rashi, from ninety even Rava admits. Nevertheless, in practice, one should be stringent like the opinion of the Ramah and the Raviah, of blessed memory (and so it is implied from the Shulchan Aruch, who did not mention the words of Rashi).

A city surrounded by a troop from that same kingdom and they were under siege, and a ship tossed about at sea that is about to sink but has not yet sunk and they do not know what became of it, and one who goes out to be judged in capital cases—behold, these are in the status of the living. And if they were kohanim, their wives may eat terumah; and if a get of one of them was in the hand of a messenger, he gives it to her under the presumption that he is alive, and she shall be in the status of a divorcee. But a city that they have already conquered, or a city surrounded by a troop from another kingdom and they do not have mercy on the people of the city, and a ship lost at sea, and one who goes out to be executed by the laws of the nations, and likewise one whom a wild beast dragged away or a river swept away or a ruin fell upon him—we apply to them the stringencies of the living and the stringencies of the dead. The daughter of a kohen married to an Israelite or the daughter of an Israelite married to a kohen shall not eat terumah. And if a get of one of them was in the hand of the messenger, he does not give it to his wife; and if he gave it to her, behold, she is of uncertain divorce status. And if it became known that the husband died before the get reached her hand, it is not a get, for there is no get after death. And that which we wrote regarding one who goes out to be executed by the laws of the nations, so wrote the Rambam in chapter 6, for he holds that by the laws of Israel (in the time of the Temple) he is considered certainly as dead (according to the latter version, 28b). But the Rosh and the Tur ruled the opposite: that by the laws of Israel we apply to him the stringencies of the living and the stringencies of the dead, and by the laws of the nations, when the supreme judge has already signed the decree, we consider him as certainly dead (according to the first version, ibid.). And the Rashba, of blessed memory, ruled stringently in both, and so the Tur wrote in the name of the Ramah; see there. And likewise that which we wrote, that in a siege of another kingdom we apply to them the stringencies of the living and the stringencies of the dead, this is from the Yerushalmi (chapter 3, halacha 4). But the Rashba, of blessed memory, interprets the Yerushalmi the opposite: that it refers to a city they already conquered, where we apply to them the stringencies of the living and the stringencies of the dead; the Yerushalmi says that this is in the case of that same kingdom, but in the case of another kingdom, where they are afraid of that kingdom, even in such a case they are in the status of the living. And these matters are not common in our time, and also the circumstances have changed, for even at the time of conquest they protect the residents so they will not be harmed, and the kings in our days are kings of kindness. And a man standing in the battle arrays, it certainly appears that we apply to him the two stringencies. And everything is according to the matter, and not all wars are equal, and not all places are equal, and it is upon the beit din to understand the state of affairs; and if they cannot know, they follow the stringency.