Siman 140

We maintain throughout the entire Torah that a person's agent is like himself, as we have explained this at length in Choshen Mishpat siman 182 with the help of Heaven. Regarding a get, the Torah wrote this explicitly, and thus our sages, of blessed memory, expounded (at the beginning of the second chapter of Kiddushin) that regarding a get it is written, "and he shall send her [v’shillachah] from his house," and it should have written, "and he shall divorce her." This comes to teach that the husband may appoint an agent. And from that which is written "v’shillachah" with the letter heh, we expound that the woman may appoint an agent; and we expound "v’shillachah" without a mapik heh, as if it says that she shall send. And it is written there once more "v’shillachah" to teach us that an agent may appoint an agent. The agent of the husband is called an agent for delivery, for he stands in place of the husband to deliver the get to the woman, and it is as if she received it from the husband. It is not a get until he delivers it to the woman, such that the get reaches her hand; therefore, the husband may retract before the get reaches her hand. When he delivers it to her, he says to her: "Behold, this is your get which your husband, so-and-so the son of so-and-so, sent to you, and receive this your get, and behold you are divorced by it from your husband, so-and-so the son of so-and-so, and you are permitted to any man." Every law of the giving of the get and its reading when the husband gives it to her, so is the law with his agent. The scholar who arranges it joins with himself two more for a beit din, and it will be explained in siman 141. They examine the get to ensure it was written properly, as will be explained in the Order of the Get in siman 154 with the help of Heaven.

And the agent of the woman is called an agent for receipt, and he stands in her place, for as soon as the husband delivers the get to her agent, she is divorced from him and permitted to any man. His law is like the law of the woman in every matter regarding whether he threw the get into his courtyard or into his four cubits. And there is one who wishes to say that just as the woman cannot appoint an agent to receive her get from the hand of the husband's agent because of the husband's honor—so that he should not say she is shaming him by not wishing to receive it herself from his agent, as will be explained in siman 141—so too there is a concern for the woman's honor, that she should not say the husband is shaming her by not giving it into the hand of her agent but rather into his courtyard (Taz). And these words are not compelling at all (Beit Shmuel, subsection 2). For us, there is no practical difference in this, as we do not practice with an agent for receipt, as will be explained there. And as for the law, it remains a doubt, for it is an inquiry in the Yerushalmi (chapter 6, halacha 2; and see Mishneh LaMelech at the beginning of chapter 6, who also wrote thus).

When the husband delivers the get to her agent, he shall say to him: "Receive this get for my wife, so-and-so daughter of so-and-so, and let her be divorced by it from me from now, and permitted to any man." And in the get he shall write, "Behold you are permitted to any man," for in the writing of the get one must speak in the second person, as we consider her agent like herself. It is only in his speech that he is forced to clarify his words as to whom he is divorcing, for how could he say to him, "Behold you are divorced"? But in its writing, it is like all gittin, just as with an agent of delivery the language of the husband is written as if speaking in the second person. Also, the parchment and the ink do not need to be given to his agent, for a person's agent is like himself (ibid. subsection 1).

And there was found among the early authorities (Sefer HaTerumah and Hagahot Maimoniyot chapter 6) a version of a document that they would write for a delivery agent in this wording: We, the beit din, were in a session of three, and there came before us so-and-so from such-and-such a city that sits on such-and-such a river, and he divorced his wife so-and-so, who appointed in the presence of witnesses her agent to receive her get from the hand of so-and-so her husband, and he said to him, "Receive the get for so-and-so my wife and behold she is permitted to any man." And before its giving, he nullified before us any protest that he had, that if he delivered any protest it shall be nullified, and he did not place any condition on the get, but rather divorced her with a complete divorce. And we read the get and saw it to be valid and according to the halacha. And because we saw so-and-so divorced, daughter of so-and-so, from so-and-so son of so-and-so her husband, who gave a get into the hand of her agent for receipt, we wrote for her this document to be in her hand for merit and for proof, firm and established, on such-and-such a day, etc. So-and-so judge, so-and-so judge, so-and-so judge.

The Rambam wrote in chapter 6 that a shaliach for receiving needs to be appointed in the presence of two witnesses, and she also needs two witnesses to testify that the get reached the hand of her shaliach; and also the first ones in whose presence she appointed him as a shaliach may be witnesses to his receiving it from the hand of the husband. And it is an explicit Mishnah (63b): A woman who said "receive my get for me" needs two sets of witnesses—two who say "in our presence she spoke" and two who say "in our presence he received," etc. And this is not a "half-matter," since they saw everything they were able to see at that time (Rashba). Furthermore, since she appointed him as a shaliach, his hand becomes like her hand, for when the husband gives it to him she is divorced as if she received it herself, and therefore those who saw that the shaliach received it have seen that she received it from her husband (ibid. in the name of the Ramban) and it is a "complete matter." And all the more so if the witnesses in whose presence she spoke are the witnesses to the receiving of the get from the hand of the husband to the shaliach, it is perfectly fine, and we do not say that they are liars—for how could they have been present at the time of the woman's statement to the shaliach and afterwards be in another place at the time of the husband's giving to the hand of the shaliach (Tosafot).

But regarding a messenger for delivery, the Rambam wrote that witnesses are not required at the time he appoints him as a messenger, for it has already been explained in Choshen Mishpat there that agency requires neither witnesses nor a kinyan. However, the Rosh, of blessed memory, wrote (at the beginning of the chapter "HaSholeach") that in the Yerushalmi there it is stated that a messenger for delivery must be established in the presence of two, and the messenger does not count as one of the two. Thus far his words, see there. And in the Yerushalmi before us it is not so, see there. And regarding the law, it can be said that they do not disagree, for the Rambam explained in chapter 9, law 32, that specifically when witnesses are signed on the get, witnesses are not required for the agency, but without this, witnesses are required, see there. And according to this, it can be said that the Yerushalmi is dealing with a case where there are no signature witnesses on the get. However, from the Rosh it is clear that in any case witnesses are required, and also the Tur in siman 141 wrote that the Rambam disagrees with the Rosh, see there. And also in the Shulchan Aruch there, section 11 and section 13, they brought two opinions on this, see there.

And behold, the reasoning of the Rosh is simple, for even though it is true that all agency does not require witnesses, nevertheless, in matters of ervah, nothing is done without witnesses. However, according to the Rosh, it is impossible to say so. For while it is true that this is the opinion of the Ra'avad in chapter 3 of Ishut and the Ran at the beginning of chapter 3 of Kiddushin, who ruled thus even regarding agency for Kiddushin—that just as the Kiddushin requires witnesses, so too their agency requires witnesses—the Rosh there agreed with the words of the Rambam there, that regarding the agency of the man, one does not require witnesses, and regarding the agency of the woman to receive Kiddushin, one requires witnesses. And even regarding the agency of the woman, he also hesitated, saying that one does not require witnesses, as the Tur wrote above in siman 35, and he wrote the reason: that specifically for the completion of the matter one requires witnesses, and not for the agency; see there. If so, why did he require witnesses for a get, both for the agency of the man? And also regarding the opinion of the Rambam, one of the great authorities (Pnei Yehoshua, Gittin 63b, s.v. Ha'ishah) toiled greatly: since the get is before us in the hand of the agent, and the woman admits that he is her agent for reception, why should he not be believed with a migo that if he wanted, he could have handed it to her? And that which the Mishnah required witnesses was because it deals there with a case where the get was torn, as is explained there, such that there is no migo here; but in a place of migo, why should he not be believed? For behold, in the Sugya of the Shas (Gittin 64a) it is explained that whenever there is a migo, he is believed; see there. And one cannot say that because we hold "witnesses of delivery effect the divorce," the witnesses must know at the time of the delivery of the get to her agent that the divorce is being completed, and if there are no witnesses of the verbal appointment here, how would the witnesses of delivery know that this woman is being divorced? For it is impossible to say so, as if so, we would require that the witnesses of the verbal appointment also be present at the time of the delivery of the get, for if not, the witnesses of delivery still do not know. And no posek wrote this matter. Also in the Shas (at the beginning of chapter Hatakbel) it is proven explicitly that it is not required, and so the Mordechai wrote explicitly there. Perforce, one must say that the witnesses of delivery only need to know from the delivery of the get. If so, why are witnesses required for the agency? And in truth, there are some of the Rishonim who wrote so: that as long as the get is in the hand of the agent, one does not require witnesses at the time of her agency (Ran according to Rashi's explanation in the Sugya of "The husband says it was for safekeeping," and so wrote the Maharsha there similarly; see there). But all the poskim did not make this distinction, and it is explicitly implied from the Rambam, the Tur, the Shulchan Aruch, and most of the poskim that one always requires witnesses for an agent for reception (Pnei Yehoshua ibid.).

However, we, with the help of Heaven, clarified in siman 35, section 17, the reasoning of the Rambam, of blessed memory, for it is certainly true that witnesses are not relevant at all to agency, even in divorce and betrothal, like the logic of the Rosh that we wrote, that only at the conclusion of the matter are witnesses required. And that which he required witnesses for her agency, whether for divorce or for betrothal, there is another reason for it: since this person was initially forbidden to the whole world and afterwards became permitted, and in betrothal it is the opposite, how is it possible that this person should transition from a state of prohibition to permission, and from permission to prohibition, without witnesses? And granted that her agent is like herself, nevertheless, in the end, witnesses did not hear anything from her mouth. But regarding the agency of the husband, nothing is needed, for his person did not change at all, as both before and after he is permitted to all women, and his matter of ervah is only at the time of the betrothal and the divorce, for then she becomes forbidden to the whole world or permitted to the whole world, and witnesses are required at the time of the conclusion of the act; but his agency is like all agency, which does not require witnesses. And that which he required witnesses when there are no signatures of witnesses on the get is for another reason, for behold, the primary validity of a get depends on its being written for its specific purpose and other matters, and who testifies to this? Therefore, when there are signatures of witnesses, they are the ones who testify; but without signatures of witnesses, it is proper that witnesses are needed at the time he delivers the get to his agent, and they know that it was written with validity. And there in section 19, we wrote that regarding a get, even the Ra'avad holds like the Rambam that witnesses are not required for his agency, because his get proves it; but the logic of the Rosh, of blessed memory, requires further study as to what difference there is between agency for betrothal and agency for divorce (and the Rosh in the second chapter of Kiddushin, siman 7, wrote, and this is his wording: And if we can distinguish between a get which comes to permit and betrothal which comes to forbid, etc., it requires further study. Thus far his words. And he did not explain a reason to distinguish).

It appears to me that according to the opinion of the Rosh, it must be said that since the entire essence of why the husband is not believed to deny [the agency] when the get is in the hand of the agent is because of a migo—that if he wanted, he could have handed her the get—how can we remove her from the chazaka of a married woman through a migo? For a migo in the place of a chazaka is a question that was not resolved in the Gemara (Bava Batra 5b). If so, even if he does not deny it, she would be permitted only based on his admission, and it turns out that the permission depends on him and not on witnesses. How is it possible to permit a married woman through permission that depends on him and not on witnesses? Therefore, witnesses are required for his agency as well, so that he cannot deny it, as the witnesses would contradict him, and it turns out that the permission depends on witnesses. But regarding kiddushin, on the contrary, she brings herself into a state of prohibition, and she is believed regarding herself to prohibit [herself], just as if she says "you betrothed me" and he says "I did not betroth you," she is prohibited to the entire world by her admission. And even though in the sugya (64a) it is proven that when there is a migo he is not believed, the Rosh wrote there (siman 8) that it deals with a case where the get is in the hand of the woman, see there, and automatically she has already left the chazaka of a married woman (and what he wrote there, that it is possible that even in the hand of a third party he is not believed, he wrote because she might say that the get was in her hand, see there). And so it must be said for the rest of the poskim, that in any case a migo is effective; and even though it is a migo in the place of a chazaka of a married woman, since there is already a written and signed get, it is as if she has already left the chazaka of a married woman when we can say that she has already been divorced by the agent, for her chazaka of a married woman has been weakened and the migo is effective. The core of these laws will be explained, with the help of Heaven, in siman 141.

What is the wording for an agent for receipt? For example, she says to her agent in the presence of witnesses: "Receive for me my get from my husband, so-and-so," or "Take for me my get from my husband, so-and-so," or "Carry for me my get," etc., or "Acquire for me my get," etc., or "Let my get be in your hand for me from my husband, so-and-so." And in all of these, she must say "for me," and without "for me" it is not sufficient for an agency for receipt. However, "Receive my get" is effective (Beit Shmuel, subsection 3), as this is the primary wording of receipt. And it appears to me that the same applies when she speaks in a vernacular language; a wording that is effective is effective. And on the contrary, it is necessary to explain it to her in the vernacular language so that she says it in the language she understands, for when she does not understand the matter, it is nothing (and the Yam Shel Shlomo is in doubt regarding "Carry for me," see there).

And just as the woman can appoint a messenger for receipt, so too can she appoint a messenger for bringing, such that she says to the messenger, "Bring me my get," and his status is like the status of a messenger for delivery of the husband, in that it is not a get until it reaches her hand. And one should not ask "from what of it": if his status is like hers, let her be divorced upon his receipt, and if his status is not like hers, how is she divorced, for he is neither his messenger nor her messenger? For it is well understood if the husband truly makes him his messenger for delivery, but if the husband says that it is not his will for his messengership that he be his messenger but rather her messenger, how is she divorced? For in truth, he is the messenger of the woman, but she does not desire that the get take effect at the time of his receipt, but rather at the time of her receipt (ibid. subsection 4).

But the husband cannot appoint a messenger for receipt—meaning, that he should say to another, "Here is this get, and acquire it for my wife, so-and-so"—for behold, the get is a disadvantage for her, and one may not act to a person's disadvantage except in their presence, and it is impossible to be her messenger for receipt without her knowledge. And more than this is found in the Jerusalem Talmud, chapter 1 of Gittin: that even if her husband is afflicted with boils, where according to the estimation it is certainly an advantage for her to be divorced, nevertheless it is nothing, for a woman is satisfied with any [husband]. And so it is found there at the beginning of chapter 6: that even if there was a quarrel between them and she screams to be divorced, nevertheless, as long as she did not appoint a messenger for receipt herself, I say perhaps she was appeased and recanted. And this is the opinion of the Rosh and the Tur. And there are those who say that in a case of a quarrel where she screams to be divorced, she is of uncertain divorce status (Ran, chapter Ha-Mitkabel).

And know that the Tur brought in the name of the Ittur that when we know it is her desire to be divorced and the husband said to someone, "Acquire it for her," she is divorced through his receipt even if she did not make him a delivery agent, for he wrote in the name of the Geonim: If he said to him, "Acquire for her this get," and he came to retract, he cannot. And he explained their words: since he said to him, "Acquire for her," and it is her desire for it, she is divorced; but against her will, she is not divorced. And the Tur challenged him, see there. And these are astonishing matters, for granted that he was not concerned for the words of the Yerushalmi, but even in our Shas (at the end of the fifteenth chapter of Yevamot) there was an inquiry regarding one who acquires a get for his wife in a place of strife, and according to most poskim the inquiry was resolved that it certainly is not effective, and according to some it remains in doubt as has been written. But how can we say certainly that it is a get? And it must be said that he explains that since the Shas did not say that she cries out to be divorced like in the Yerushalmi, hear from this that the inquiry was thus: that we knew there was strife between them, and nevertheless we did not hear from her mouth that it is her desire to be divorced; but if we heard it, she is divorced, for it is a benefit for her. And this is a solitary opinion, and all the poskim hold that even if we heard from her mouth even afterward that it is pleasing to her that he received her get for her, it is not effective as long as we do not know at the time of the receipt of the get that it is her desire now to be divorced (Nimukei Yosef ibid.), and explicitly it implies thus in the Yerushalmi, see there. And in any event, she is doubtfully divorced.

And so too, regarding one who acquires a get on behalf of his wife in the place of a yavam, so that she should not be bound to the yavam after his death, it was a question that was not resolved, for perhaps she loves the yavam and it is pleasing to her to undergo yibbum (ibid. in Yevamot). And there was an incident in the house of Rashi, of blessed memory, regarding a certain student who fell ill and had a betrothed in a distant place, and he beseeched Rashi, of blessed memory, that they should receive a get on behalf of his betrothed, and Rashi, of blessed memory, did not want to, because it is a question in the Gemara (Mordechai ibid.). And even in a case where the yavam is a minor and she would need to wait for him many years so that he may perform yibbum with her, there is a dispute among the early authorities whether they can acquire a get for her without her knowledge (ibid.).

And it appeared to me in my humble opinion that since the doubt in the Gemara is perhaps she loves the yavam and it is pleasing to her to undergo yibbum, if so, in our times in our country where they do not allow yibbum at all and practice only chalitzah, it is certainly a benefit for her, and one may acquire a benefit for her in her absence. And I found that the Maharshal, of blessed memory, ruled accordingly in Yam Shel Shelomo, Yevamot, chapter 15, siman 21. And he also wrote there that if the yavam has a wife, since in our country it is forbidden to marry two women, there is certainly no logic—even if they practiced yibbum—that she would wait for the yavam's wife to die so he could marry her, and it is a benefit for her. And even though initially he wavers somewhat according to what he ruled, that if both of them desire yibbum we do not prevent them, nevertheless he ruled that ex post facto, if they received a get on her behalf, she does not require chalitzah; see there. And it is simple for us, as we have not heard of yibbum at all, that it is a benefit for her, and in a time of pressing need, it appears to me that one may rely on this.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 5: And if her husband turned into an idolater and we know that she is seeking a get, some say that the one who turned can acquire a get on her behalf, and there are those who disagree even in this. And likewise if the yavam turned and the husband acquires a get on her behalf so that she does not fall before the yavam. And if his wife turned, he shall acquire a get on her behalf through another, as I wrote above in siman 1, and even though she recanted afterwards, she does not require another get. And the same applies to a woman who is forbidden to her husband, he acquires a get on her behalf through another, and there are those who are stringent in this. Thus far his words.

And behold, that which he wrote that there are those who disagree even regarding a case where his mind was changed, his intention refers to the Ran in a responsum, who wrote that even if she demands to be divorced, we nevertheless fear that perhaps she changed her mind. And one of the great authorities elaborated to prove that regarding a case where his mind was changed, he does not disagree at all, and only regarding one who demands to be divorced do we not rely on saying that this is her will in a matter of a quarrel and the like, but not in a case where his mind was changed, for it is certainly a merit for her even if we have not heard from her. And so ruled Rashi, of blessed memory, as a practical halachic ruling (Taz). And so ruled the Maharshal in Yam Shel Shelomo there. And that which he wrote regarding a woman who becomes forbidden to her husband, that there are those who are stringent regarding acquiring a get for her in section 1, he did not bring this opinion at all; and it must be said that there, regarding a case where his mind was changed, he was not concerned for this opinion, but here, regarding one who becomes forbidden, he was concerned (Beit Shmuel subsection 7). However, in truth, it is very wondrous to be concerned for this opinion, for the reason for this opinion is to be concerned for the view of the Rif, of blessed memory, in the first chapter of Gittin, that even in a place where it is a merit to acquire on his behalf, this is only regarding the matter that the husband cannot retract, but the completion of the get and the manumission is specifically when the get and the manumission reach her hand or the hand of the slave (Maharik, root 141). And it is truly a minority opinion, for besides the fact that most poskim disagree with the Rif, even the Rif would not hold this in a case where his mind was changed and her mind was changed, which is a complete merit (Atzeret HaTzvi who elaborated on this, and his words appear primary for the law).

It appears to me that regarding the laws that have been explained, such as one afflicted with boils, or in a place of strife, or in the case of a yavam, or in a case of reversal, where the primary doubt is perhaps she did not consent at the time the other person acquired it on her behalf—and even if she cried out previously to be divorced, perhaps now she changed her mind, as is found in the Yerushalmi—according to this, in our times, when iron wires have spread throughout the whole world which are called telegraph, through which they speak with one another from a distance, if the rabbi in the place of the husband asks the rabbi in the place of the wife if it is the wife's will that they acquire a get on her behalf, and he responds that she consents and requests it, they are able to acquire a get on her behalf, for she is like one who stands before us and requests to acquire a get on her behalf. However, the rabbi in the place of the husband should not allow the arrangement of the get until the following day, so that the concern returns to its place that perhaps she changed her mind; and if it was left until the following day, he should ask once more via the iron wires. And so it appears (according to what the Beit Shmuel wrote at the end of subsection 5) that even if he acquired a get on her behalf and afterwards they ask on that same day if it is pleasing to her and she responded that it is pleasing to her, it is perfectly fine; but nevertheless, it is better to ask beforehand. And it appears to me in my humble opinion that in a case of iggun one may rely on this. And the better and more correct way is that she should respond that she appoints a specific man to be her agent for receipt. And the reason for this is what they cited in the name of the Rashba, of blessed memory, who was in doubt if she says "whoever the husband desires to give it to shall be my agent for receipt," for perhaps there is a concern of bereirah in this (Beit Shmuel in siman 141, subsection 61). Therefore, it is better that she specify a particular man.

If an apostate sends a get to his wife via a messenger for delivery, and there is a concern that perhaps he will cancel the get or the agency, they shall adjure him with every stringency and with all the curses in Torat Kohanim and Deuteronomy that he accept upon himself not to cancel neither the get nor the agency. Aside from this, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 11 a beneficial enactment to satisfy every concern and protest: that beforehand, this messenger shall be a messenger for receipt to acquire the get on her behalf, and to rely on our teachers who permitted acquiring a get for her in the case of an apostate as has been written. The apostate shall deliver the get into the hand of the messenger and say to him: "Acquire this get for my wife, so-and-so daughter of so-and-so, and she is hereby divorced from me and permitted to any man." Afterward, the Rav shall say to the apostate: "Your wife is already permitted to any man, but I request of you for the sake of extra caution that you take the get from the hand of the messenger and return and deliver it to him so that he shall be a messenger for delivery, and say to him in this language: 'Deliver this get to my wife so-and-so daughter of so-and-so, and your hand shall be like my hand, and your mouth like my mouth, and your action like my action, etc., and she shall be divorced from me and permitted to any man.'" Thus far his words. Consequently, he will not be concerned to cancel it since he knows she is already divorced, and even if he cancels it or dies, she will not be bound to a yavam, and we will rely on this, that he was a messenger for receipt and she was already divorced. And specifically that the messenger shall first be a messenger for receipt and afterward a messenger for delivery as has been written, but the reverse is not so, because the agency of receipt cancels the agency for delivery, for he himself cancelled the delivery (Beit Shmuel and the Gra), and it will be explained in section 28.

It is a simple matter that if she appointed a messenger for reception and he came to the husband, and the husband said to him, "I do not want you to be a messenger for reception, but rather that you be my messenger for delivery," and the messenger consented, that the mission of reception is uprooted from him and he becomes a messenger for delivery, for it depends upon the will of the husband. Furthermore, even if he did not say, "I do not want," but rather handed him the get and said to him, "Deliver this get to my wife, so-and-so, and give it to her, and let your hand be as my hand," etc., wherein he clarified to him that the get shall not take effect until it reaches her hand, he has automatically uprooted the mission of reception and become a messenger for delivery. And it remains to clarify what are the expressions of delivery and what are the expressions of reception:

And behold, in section 10 the language of kabalah was explained, and behold if the husband said to the agent these expressions, or if he said to him "acquire it for her" or "here is this get for you," this is also considered like acquisition (Gemara 63b). And in the Gemara the expression is "take," and this is like "here is for you." But if he said to him "bring and give to her," the Rambam, the Tur, and the Shulchan Aruch ruled that he uprooted it from kabalah and he becomes an agent for transmission, and if the get did not reach her hand she is not divorced, for "bring" is certainly not like acquisition. And even though regarding the payment of a debt we hold (at the end of the first chapter) that "bring" is like acquisition, nevertheless regarding a gift and a get we hold (at the beginning of the fourth chapter) that "bring" is not like acquisition, for a thing that one gives of his own free will, his intention with "bring" is not that the agent should acquire on her behalf, and only regarding a debt or a deposit that he is obligated to give is "bring" like acquisition. And so ruled the Rambam in the fourth chapter of Laws of Acquisition regarding a gift, that "bring" is not like acquisition. And behold, if he said "give to her" alone, it would seem appropriate to say that he did not uproot the agency for kabalah, for regarding a gift the Rambam, of blessed memory, ruled there that "give" is like acquisition, and since the Gemara compares a gift to a get, also in a get it should be like acquisition. And the Rambam here only wrote when he said "bring and give to her" and not "give to her" alone, see there. But the Tur wrote explicitly "bring" or "give to her" that he becomes an agent for transmission, and they have already raised a difficulty against him, for he himself in Tur Choshen Mishpat siman 125 ruled like the Rambam that in a gift "give" is like acquisition, see there (Beit Shmuel subsection 9, and see Lechem Mishneh chapter 6 halacha 10, and the Gra subsection 18, and examine carefully).

But in my humble opinion, it appears that the words of the Tur are clear, and also the intention of the Rambam in what he wrote, "Go and give," means "Go" or "Give." And it is likewise explained from the Tosefta (beginning of chapter 4 in the words of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel) and from the Yerushalmi (chapter 6, halacha 1 in the words of Rav Nachman) that "Give" is not like "Acquire" regarding a get. And there is likewise proof from our Gemara (see Lechem Mishneh there). And that which they said in the Gemara, that a gift is like a get regarding "Go" being not like "Acquire," it is certainly so that a gift is like a get regarding "Go"; but a get is not like a gift regarding "Give to her," for a gift is a complete benefit and a get is not. And on the contrary, this is the intention of our Sages of blessed memory there: We maintain that an agent for a gift is like an agent for a get regarding "Go" being not like "Acquire," meaning that even though regarding "Give" they are not similar to each other for the reason we wrote, nevertheless, regarding "Go" they are similar to each other. And the reason is simple: for the expression "Give" is itself an expression of a gift, but regarding a get the expression of a gift is not applicable; and "Go," since he did not say "Give," even in a gift his intention is to bring it to the hand of the recipient of the gift, just as with a get his intention is to bring it to his wife.

However, there are some of our teachers who hold that with "bring to her" or "give to her," it is a doubt whether it is like "acquire for her" or not. Therefore, if the husband dies before she receives the get, she is bound to the yavam due to the doubt, and she performs chalitzah but does not undergo yibbum (Rashba and Ran at the beginning of chapter 6, and Rabbeinu Yerucham). For so it appears from the plain meaning of the sugya there, and this is the opinion of our teacher, the Rema, in section 6; even though he only mentioned "give," certainly the same applies to "bring," as is explained from the source of the law (and so wrote the Beit Shmuel in subsection 10). And know that all these expressions apply only if he said to the agent only these expressions alone; but if he concluded his words with "and let your hand be as my hand," etc., in any expression he said, it is obvious that he uprooted it from "acceptance" and he becomes an agent for "bringing" (ibid.).

The husband does not have the ability to appoint a shaliach for kabbalah without her consent. Therefore, when he appointed a shaliach to deliver a get to his wife, even if he used the language of kabbalah to him, such as saying, "Receive this get for my wife," we say that his intention was for delivery. Once the get reaches her hand, she is divorced. This is a Mishnah at the beginning of the chapter "Hatkabbal." We do not say that it is not a get at all even when it reaches her hand because he did not make him a shaliach for delivery and erred in his thinking that he has the ability to appoint a shaliach for kabbalah; for a person does not err in this, and certainly his intention was for delivery, and this is what he meant: "Receive and deliver it to her." The shaliach also knows this and consented to be a shaliach for delivery. Similarly, when she appointed a shaliach for kabbalah and he said to the shaliach, "I do not desire a shaliach for kabbalah, but rather receive this get for her," we say that his intention was also for delivery, and "Receive and deliver it to her" is what he meant (Beit Shmuel, subsection 8). Perforce one must say so, for it is impossible that in one moment his mind would be reversed. There is one who wishes to say that it is a retraction of what he said, "I do not desire" (Lechem Mishneh, chapter 6, halakhah 10), but it does not appear so. Nevertheless, in practice, one should be stringent (see there, where he questioned the wording of the Rambam and from this inferred his ruling, but it is not a difficulty at all, as it is known that the Rambam always adopts the wording of the Shas).

An agent of the woman who comes to receive a get from the husband and says to him, "I am an agent for receipt," and [the husband] says to him, "Here it is, according to what she said," meaning, "I am not uprooting your agency; rather, whether she made you an agent for receipt or whether she made you an agent for delivery, you are as she said," and he brought the get and she said to him, "I only appointed you as an agent for delivery"—even if the get reached her hand, she is not divorced. For he uprooted the agency that she performed, and he did not consent to the exertion of delivery, and since she did not appoint him as an agent for receipt, and for delivery he [the husband] does not desire, even though he delivered it into the hand of the woman, it was settled afterwards; however, at the time he received the get from the hand of the husband, he did not consent to delivery.

But in the opposite case, where the messenger comes to the husband and says to him, "I am a messenger of bringing from your wife," and the husband says to him, "Take it as she said," and its meaning is as above, and he brought the get and she said to him, "I have appointed you a messenger for receiving"—once the get reaches her hand, she is divorced. For he did not uproot the agency she stated; rather, on the contrary, he diminished it, for she said for receiving and he said for bringing, and receiving is lighter in its burden than bringing, and behold he consented even to bringing. And if before the get reached her hand the get was burned, or she accepted kiddushin in the meantime, it is a case of uncertain divorce. For perhaps his intention was specifically "as she said," and immediately when the messenger received it she was divorced. For in the Gemara, there is a doubt regarding this language, if his intention in saying "Take it as she said" is "that I believe you that she said so," and according to this, before the arrival of the get to her hand she is certainly not divorced, for he made him a messenger for bringing; or if his intention was specifically "as she said," and he is a messenger for receiving. Therefore, when it reaches her hand she is certainly divorced, and before this she is uncertainly divorced. And so ruled all the poskim, and even though the Rambam did not mention this, perforce his intention is so (and so wrote the Lechem Mishneh).

And regarding that which was explained in section 25, that she appointed him for bringing and he said for receiving, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote in section 8: If the husband did not say "take" as she said, but rather gave him the get and said to him "bring to her" or "acquire for her," once the get reaches her hand she is divorced. Thus far their words. And these matters are very puzzling, for since the messenger said to him that he is a messenger for receiving, and the husband said to him "acquire for her," which is a literal expression of receiving, certainly his intention was only for receiving; and since she did not appoint him for receiving, she should not be divorced at all. And there is one who answered that since he said "acquire for her," his intention is for whatever is a merit for her, and since if we say he is not a messenger for bringing she will not be divorced and it is her will to be divorced, therefore we say his intention was for bringing (D.P.). And this is not understandable at all, for certainly the husband's words are as they sound, and from where do we have the right to interpret his intention for leniency? And also even with "bring to her" there is room to doubt according to the opinion of the poskim that there is a doubt whether "bring" is like "acquire" or not like "acquire," as I wrote in section 22, perhaps his intention was for acquisition since he relied on the words of the messenger (Beit Shmuel, subsection 11). And "bring" is explicitly stated in the Gemara as being effective (63a, which answers "No... and bringing for receiving"), and so wrote all the poskim; but regarding "acquire for her," in truth there are those who disagree (see Beit Shmuel, subsection 12, and delve into this). However, in the Gemara it deals with when he said "bring and give to her," see there, and in such a case it can certainly be said that his intention is clearly for bringing since he told him to give the get into her hand. Therefore, it seems to me that also the intention of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch is when he said "bring and give to her" or "acquire and give to her," but they shortened the wording, and in such a case it appears explicitly that his intention is for bringing. And in practice, she is in a state of doubt whether she is divorced. (And with what I have written, one can also answer the opinion of the Ittur brought by the Ran and the Maggid Mishneh there, who wondered about him, see there and delve into this). (And according to this, it can be said that those who are stringent regarding "bring" or "give," but regarding "bring and give to her" they agree that it is not like "acquire," and this requires further study).

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 10: If she made him an agent for receipt, and the agent said as much to the husband, and the husband gave the agent a document of delivery and afterward gave him a document of receipt—if he gave him the get when he gave him the document of delivery, he has nullified the agency of the woman, and afterward when he returned and gave it to him for receipt, the agency of delivery was nullified, and a husband cannot appoint an agent for receipt; thus there is no agency here at all, and she is not divorced through this agency, but rather he must go back and give it to him for the sake of the agency of the woman's receipt. However, if he did not give him the get until the moment he handed him the document of the agency of receipt, she is divorced immediately upon the get being given into his hand, for since he did not give him the get at first, the agency of the woman was not nullified. Thus far his words.

The explanation of his words is that even though the agency depends on his will, nevertheless he cannot nullify the agency of the woman. For even if he makes him an agent for delivery, and the get does not take effect until the get reaches her hand, behold, receipt is included within delivery, for the agent must receive the get from him and deliver it to her. Therefore, even if at the time of giving the get he made him an agent for delivery, and afterwards he retracted and made him an agent for receipt, certainly the get does not take effect at all even when the agent hands it to her. The reason is that he himself nullified the agency for delivery, and for receipt it is not in the power of the husband to act, and the agency that the woman performed has no utility because in the giving of the get to the agent, he did not give it for the purpose of an agent for receipt. But if he received the get back from the hand of the agent and gave it to him for the purpose of the agency for receipt that she performed, she is divorced immediately upon his receipt. For her actual agency was not nullified, as I have written, and there was only lacking the giving of the get for the purpose of receipt. Even though initially he specifically desired delivery and wrote a deed of delivery, this is nothing; since he did not give the get then to the agent, and the giving of the get was for the purpose of receipt, she is divorced immediately and there is no need to go back and take it, for the primary matter depends on the time of giving the get into the hand of the agent (as above according to the words of the Gra, subsection 22). And some say that when he handed him the get initially for the purpose of delivery, it is of no use at all when he went back and made him for receipt, even if he goes back and takes the get from him and gives it to him, for immediately when he made him for delivery, the agency for receipt was completely nullified (Taz and Beit Shmuel, subsection 16), and so it is implied in the source of the law in the Rivash, siman 329, see there.