Siman 139

That which is written in the Torah, "and he shall place it in her hand," does not specifically mean her hand, for the law is the same when the get comes into her lap, or her courtyard, or to her messenger that she appointed, for his hand is like her hand. And so the Sages, of blessed memory, said (at the beginning of the eighth chapter): "Her hand"—I only have her hand; from where do we derive her roof, her courtyard, and her enclosure? The Torah teaches, "and he shall give," in any manner. For "hand" means domain, as it is written, "and he took all his land from his hand," as I wrote at the beginning of siman 136. And in the Yerushalmi ibid., it is derived from the fact that "and he shall give" is written twice in the passage of get; see there. And even though everything a woman acquires, her husband acquires, as he consumes the usufruct from all her property, and if so, the get is still in his domain—they already asked this in the Gemara ibid. and answered that her get and her courtyard come as one. That is to say, through the get, the domain comes to her together with the get as one. And a proof for this is that a slave also goes free with a document, and how is he liberated by receiving the document into his hand, for the hand of a slave is like the hand of his master? Rather, his get and his hand come as one, and here too, her get and her courtyard come as one. And specifically a courtyard of nichsei melog, but a courtyard that she brought to him as nichsei tzon barzel, the get is not completed, for it is still lacking collection (Beit Shmuel and Bach). And if he threw it to her in a courtyard of tzon barzel, it appears to me that she is in a state of doubtful divorce, for she can say, "take your courtyard and your get."

The Rambam wrote at the beginning of chapter 5 that whether it is a courtyard owned by her, or her rented or borrowed courtyard, it is all her domain, and once the get reaches her domain, she is divorced. Thus far his words. The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote likewise. And even though the sages of blessed memory said (Pesachim 6a) that rental is not a complete acquisition like a sale, nevertheless, regarding the matter that the place should acquire for him some object during the period of his rental days, it certainly acquires. It is an explicit Mishnah (Ma'aser Sheni 5:9) that one is able to acquire in a courtyard rented to him everything that is placed there and is transferred to him (see Rashi, Bava Metzia 11b, s.v. "u-mekomo"), and so it is proven from several places. There is one who raised a difficulty, for the Rambam ruled in chapter 6 of Laws of Rental regarding a rented courtyard that the manure in the courtyard is acquired by the lessor, see there. However, we have already explained with the help of Heaven in Choshen Mishpat siman 313, section 6, that only regarding the matter of manure is the law so, because of the reasons explained there, and not regarding any other matter. And the matter is simple, that regarding acquisitions, a borrowed or rented domain acquires everything (and so wrote the Ketzot HaChoshen there, and the words of the Shach there require further study, and with this everything written by the Beit Meir is answered, see there and delve into it).

The courtyard possesses two modes of acquisition: by virtue of "hand" and by virtue of "agency." Our Sages, of blessed memory, said (Bava Metzia 12a) that since the get is a disadvantage to her, it is impossible for it to be acquired by virtue of agency, for it is not pleasing to her that he should be her agent. Rather, it is acquired by virtue of "hand." And since the acquisition is by virtue of "hand," it must be like her hand—that she be standing next to the courtyard and it be guarded with her knowledge, similar to her own hand. Therefore, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote: To what does this apply? When she was standing in her courtyard and it is guarded with her knowledge; but if she is not standing there, even though it is guarded with her knowledge, she is not divorced. Thus far the words of the Tur. This is because we require it to be similar to her hand, as I have written. And even though when she is standing there it is automatically guarded with her knowledge, why did they need to say "and it is guarded with her knowledge"? Indeed, the Rambam there did not mention this. For it can be said that you find a case where the courtyard is large and she is in the east of the courtyard and the get is in the west, and it is not guarded with her knowledge (Beit Yosef). This applies specifically to a courtyard that has no partitions, but in one that has partitions, it is called "guarded with her knowledge" even in such a case. There is proof for this from the Gemara (Tosafot 3a, and with this the difficulty of the Taz is settled; and examine this closely).

And that which they wrote, that she was standing in her courtyard, the Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote "at the side of her courtyard," see there. And such is the wording of the Shas there, and even this wording can be interpreted as at the side of her courtyard and from within, but outside is not effective. And this opinion was cited by the Maggid Mishneh in chapter 17 of Gezeilah, law 8. Our teacher, the Rema, wrote thus in Choshen Mishpat siman 200, section 1, see there. And one must wonder about our teacher, the Beit Yosef, for there he wrote "at the side of the courtyard" and here he wrote according to the wording of the Tur; and perhaps regarding a get he saw fit to be stringent. However, regarding the halacha, since the majority of opinions hold that even from the outside at the side of the courtyard it constitutes a kinyan, regarding a get as well one need not concern oneself with the other opinion except as a stringency (and see Tosafot Eruvin 92b, starting with "A woman," and see Turei Zahav who raised a difficulty regarding this, and it is not a difficulty, see there and delve into it).

Since the reason that in a get it is considered a courtyard because of "hand" and not because of "agency," because it is a disadvantage to her as has been written, and therefore we require that she stand in the courtyard, there was room to say that when she requests the get and says that it is a benefit to her, and he threw the get to her in her guarded courtyard with her knowledge, she should be divorced even when she is not standing in the courtyard, and it should be like a gift which one acquires in this manner because in a gift a courtyard has the law of agency. Nevertheless, the Rishonim ruled that even in this manner we require her standing in her courtyard, because the essence of divorce is a disadvantage to a woman, and even though she seeks to be divorced, we fear perhaps she changed her mind (Rashba and Ran ibid.), and so it is in the Yerushalmi. However, in practice in such a case, it appears that it is a doubtful divorce.

And know that the poskim wrote that in a case involving a yabam, if he threw a get to her into a courtyard that is guarded with her knowledge but she was not standing beside it, it is a case of uncertain divorce, for it is close to saying that it is pleasing to her and it is a benefit for her, and its law is like a gift (Ran and Maggid Mishneh there). It is implied from their words that when not in a case involving a yabam, she is certainly not divorced. However, it can be said that they did not speak specifically, and the same applies to any get where there is a doubt that perhaps it is pleasing to her; and that which they specified a case involving a yabam is because in the Gemara the inquiry was raised regarding another matter (at the end of chapter 15 of Yevamot) whether we say it is a benefit for her, see there. And it appears to me that this is the opinion of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 3, who wrote: If he placed it in her courtyard without her knowledge and she was not standing beside her courtyard, this is a case of uncertain divorce. Thus far his words. And the Acharonim questioned him, for this uncertainty only exists in a case involving a yabam; but according to our words it is well-settled, for go after the reasoning, that perhaps in this get as well it is pleasing to her, and how can we be lenient regarding the prohibition of a married woman? However, if we know for certain that it is not her will to be divorced, even he admits that she is not divorced, and he is speaking of an ordinary get; therefore, one must certainly be stringent, for perhaps it is pleasing to her to have this get.

The Tur wrote in the name of the Ramah that she must be standing in her courtyard at the time he places the get into it. But if he threw the get to her into the courtyard and afterwards she came there and he said to her, "Behold, this is your get," even though the get is still lying there, she is not divorced until she takes it from there and he says to her at the time she takes it, "Behold, this is your get," for the first giving is nothing (Beit Shmuel, subsection 3); or until he takes it from there and gives it to her to be divorced with it. For we require that she be near the courtyard at the time of the giving of the get into it and at the time he says to her, "Behold, your get." And so too in a case where we said that her get and her courtyard come as one, we require that she be standing in the courtyard at the time of giving. And if she was present at the time of the giving of the get and at the time he said, "Behold, your get," even though in the middle she walked away from there and returned, we have no concern with it. And the reason for this matter is that we require it to be similar to her hand; just as her hand is with her both at the time of giving and at the time of speaking, so too the courtyard must be (Bach). But in the middle we have no concern with it, since the matters of the get are only at the time of giving and at the time of speaking.

The Rashba, of blessed memory, wrote there: if she said to him, "Throw my get into my courtyard and my courtyard shall acquire it for me," she is divorced even if she was not standing at the side of the courtyard, for a courtyard is no less than agency, and she has made the courtyard an agent for reception, and in agency it is not necessary that she stand at its side as has been written; and explicitly it is so in the Yerushalmi (first chapter). The Ran and the Maggid Mishneh, chapter 5, law 2, agreed to this; see there. He further wrote: if he already placed the get in her guarded courtyard and she was not in the courtyard, and he said to her, "Behold, this is your get," and she said, "Let my courtyard acquire it for me," she is also divorced. The explanation of his words is that certainly in such a case alone it is impossible to say she would be divorced, for at the time he threw it there, the courtyard was neither his agent nor her agent, and this is nothing other than as if he placed it in her hand for safekeeping. If so, afterwards when she said, "Let my courtyard acquire it for me," how is she divorced? Behold, he must say to her, "Behold, this is your get." Rather, his intention is that in truth he said to her afterwards, "Behold, this is your get," and it is like the first law where she says, "Let my courtyard acquire it for me," and afterwards he threw it to her and says, "Behold, this is your get" (Ran). And that which he previously placed in her courtyard is considered like safekeeping in her hand; and see what I wrote in section 11.

And behold, in my humble opinion, these words of the Rashba do not disagree with the words of the Tur, for they are not related to one another at all. For the Rashba is dealing with a case where the courtyard is the agent of the woman to receive the get, and regarding an agent, there is no requirement that she stand beside it, as has been written. But the Tur is dealing with a case where the courtyard is like an agent for delivery—meaning, that it should acquire through the law of "hand"—and we require it to be similar to her hand. Therefore, we require that she stand in the courtyard at the time of the giving of the get, since she did not make the courtyard an agent for reception. However, the Rashba is dealing with a case where she made the courtyard an agent for reception, and its law is properly that of an agent. And that which our sages, of blessed memory, said—that regarding a get, a courtyard is by virtue of "hand"—that is when she did not make the courtyard her agent for reception, in that she did not say "let my courtyard acquire for me," but rather it is like his agent and acquires by reason of her "hand."

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in his great work, brought these words of the Rashba and wrote that it is proven from his words and from the words of the Ran that they disagree with the Tur and hold that she does not need to be standing at the side of her courtyard at the time of the giving of the get into it, see there. And based on this, he wrote in the Shulchan Aruch, section 2, after bringing the words of the Tur: "And there are those who disagree," and his intention is regarding the Rashba and the Ran. And I am very much wondering what one matter has to do with the other. And also, he did not bring these words of the Rashba in the Shulchan Aruch because it seemed to him that this law was not clear to the Rashba, as he wrote in his great work, and from the Ran and the Maggid Mishneh it does not seem so, see there. And for us, there is no practical difference at all in this law, for we do not appoint a messenger for receipt, as is written in siman 141, and also we do not permit the giving of a get to her domain but only into her hand specifically, as will be explained and as is written at the beginning of siman 136, see there (and with difficulty one can settle the words of the Beit Yosef, and nevertheless it requires further study, and delve into it).

And know that regarding what the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote, that in a case where she came to her courtyard after he placed the get into it, she is not divorced until she takes it from there etc., it must be understood what her own taking accomplishes. Since the initial placing is nothing, this is like "take your get from the ground." And I found one of the commentators on the Tur who raised this difficulty. However, it appears that the opinion of the Rambam is also such, for he wrote at the end of chapter 5 regarding one who placed the get in the hand of a slave who was not bound, that it is not effective until the get reaches her hand; and this implies that if she took it from the hand of the slave, it is a get, and it is not like "take your get from the ground." (And see Beit Shmuel subsection 29, and it requires further study). And it appears to me that these, our teachers, hold that since the truth is that a courtyard also possesses the law of agency, except that regarding a get, because it is a disadvantage to her, it only possesses the law of a "hand" as I have written, therefore when she herself receives it from the courtyard—and behold she receives it of her own will—its law reverts to being like agency in the sense that when she receives it, it is like receiving from the hand of her agent and not from his ground. And so too regarding a slave. And that which the sages, of blessed memory, said, "take your get from the ground" that he has said nothing, this is on his ground and not from her ground for the reason that has been explained. However, regarding the law, since the Rashba and the Ran, of blessed memory, truly disagree regarding this case of the slave and hold that he must take it from him and give it to her, and if she took it they are in doubt that perhaps it is like "take your get from the ground" as will be explained, if so, the same applies to a courtyard in the law before us, that it is also not effective according to their opinion. And when she takes it herself, she is in a state of doubtful divorce. And I am astonished at our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, that they did not speak of this at all. (And perhaps this was also the intention of the Beit Shmuel in subsection 29, but he was very brief, and what the Turei Zahav wrote requires further study, see there and examine carefully).

If she was standing in her courtyard at the time he threw the get to her and he said nothing, and afterwards he said, "Behold, this is your get," it is effective (Beit Shmuel, subsection 2). And so it is explained from the words of the Tur. And similarly, if he gave the get into her hand as a deposit and afterwards said to her, "Behold, this is your get," she is divorced, and he does not need to take it from her and give it to her again (ibid.). But if he gave the get outside of the courtyard and the wind pushed the get into the courtyard, even if she is standing in the courtyard, it is not effective until he takes the get and gives it to her and says to her, "Behold, this is your get" (ibid., subsection 1). And if she is standing next to the courtyard and he threw the get to the courtyard without her knowledge and said to the witnesses, "See the get that I am giving to her," the Rashba was in doubt regarding this (ibid.). And his opinion leans more toward [the view] that she is divorced, for she is divorced through her courtyard even against her will (see there in the Novellae of the Rashba).

It is stated in the Gemara (Eruvin 92b) regarding two courtyards adjacent to one another, one large and one small, where the large one was breached into the small one such that the entire width of the small one is breached in its fullness into the large one, the small one is nullified relative to the large one, but the large one is not nullified relative to the small one. Therefore, when both courtyards belong to her and she is standing in the large one and her husband threw her a get into the small one, she is divorced, for it is as if she is standing in the small one, since the entirety of the small one is subordinate to the large one. However, when she is in the small one and the get is in the large one, she is not divorced, for the large one is not nullified relative to the small one, and we do not say that the woman is considered as standing in the large one, for she has no desire to acquire the get (Rashi). All the poskim did not mention this law at all, perhaps because they hold that even if she stands at the side of the courtyard and outside, it is also called standing next to the get, and therefore there is no practical difference in this law, for even when she stands in the small one, she is standing at the side of the large one. They hold that this sugya disagrees with the sugya at the beginning of the eighth chapter of Gittin, that standing at its side is sufficient (and see there in Tosafot). Furthermore, it is possible to say that certainly this law applies only if she does not intend to fence in the small one, but when she intends to fence it in, it is impossible to consider them as one courtyard, for anything that is standing to be fenced is considered as if it were fenced. And granted that regarding the other laws mentioned there in the Shas we are not exacting in this, but regarding a matter of prohibition and permission, certainly one must be exacting in this, and it is difficult to stand and clarify this matter, and therefore the poskim omitted it; and should such a case occur, she is doubtfully divorced.

The sages taught in the Mishnah (79a): If she was standing on the roof and he threw it to her, once it reaches the airspace of the roof, she is divorced. This means that if the courtyard is his and the roof is hers, her roof acquires for her by the law of a courtyard, and even the airspace of the roof acquires. And if some cause occurred to the get before its landing on the roof, such that it was erased or burned, she is divorced, for once it has reached the airspace of the roof, it is as if it has landed. And the Gemara established this specifically regarding a roof that has a parapet around it, for airspace does not acquire unless it is within partitions; for if not so, it is not guarded against the wind, which might cast it away before it lands. Or, even without a parapet, but it is less than three tefachim close to the roof, for it is considered as lavud and is regarded as if it has landed. And some say that close to three, even though it is not guarded from the wind, it is as guarded because it is considered as lavud (Maharshal). And some say that in this manner it is as guarded (Maharsha). And so it appears, for even when it is resting in a courtyard it must be guarded. And one cannot say that if so, even higher than three tefachim [it should acquire], for one can say that higher than three tefachim without partitions, the airspace does not acquire without partitions even if it is guarded. However, if we were to say that that which is not guarded from the wind is not called an unguarded courtyard since it is guarded for other things, we could have said that within less than three tefachim she is divorced even when it is not guarded from the wind (see Beit Shmuel end of subsection 5 who intends to say so). But this is no reasoning at all, for in any event it is not guarded, and also from Rashi there it does not imply so, see there. (However, from Rashi it is explained that if it were guarded from the wind, she would be divorced even without partitions, and according to this one must say that higher than three tefachim it is impossible for it to be guarded from the wind. Yet regarding what Rashi explained, that we require airspace that is destined to land, and the Pnei Yehoshua raised a difficulty that this is an inquiry in Bava Metzia 12a, it is no difficulty at all, for without partitions it is certainly not as if it has landed, and delve into this.)

And that which was explained, that when there are partitions or within three tefachim she is divorced even if it was erased or burned before it was placed, this is specifically when the get preceded the fire and it was fit to be placed were it not for the fire that came after he threw it. But if the fire preceded, it is nothing, for behold it was not fit to be placed at all. And even though within three is considered as labud, this is when it is fit to actually come to placement; then within three is considered as if it were placed, and not when it is not fit for placement at all. And such is the law regarding being erased, when the thing that caused the erasure came after he threw the get. And likewise, specifically when it was erased or burned during the get's descent to the roof; but if it was erased or burned during its ascent upward, even if it was within the partitions or lower than three tefachim, it is not a get, for during its ascent upward it is not called giving into her domain, and during its descent it is called giving into her domain (Levush and Beit Shmuel subsection 6, and this was not mentioned in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch because it is almost impossible for it to be so, and delve into this).

And if it was not erased or burned and was placed on the roof, some say that the taking effect of the get begins also from the moment of the get's ascent upward when it is within the partitions or within three tefachim (Beit Shmuel, subsection 7). And some say that even in such a case, the taking effect of the get is not by way of its ascent upward (Bach), and so it is implied from the wording of Rashi; see there.

And the Rambam, of blessed memory, there in law 3 has another approach in this, and this is his wording: If she was standing on the top of her roof and he was below in his courtyard and he threw it up to her, once it reached the airspace of the partitions of the parapet or within three tefachim close to the roof, she is divorced, provided that it comes to rest; but if it was erased or burned before it reached her, even though it was erased or burned after it reached the airspace of the partitions or after it reached within three tefachim close to the roof—for example, if the wind blew and carried it up and it was erased or burned—since it was not going to rest, it is not a get and she is not divorced. Thus far his words. And we will explain them in section 19 and 21.

We further learned there in the Mishnah: When the roof is his and the courtyard is hers, he is above and she is below, and he threw it to her—once it has left the domain of the roof, even if it was erased or burned, she is divorced. And the Gemara established this in a case where the partitions of the courtyard are higher than the railing of the roof, and immediately upon leaving the domain of the roof, it enters the domain of the courtyard; therefore she is divorced, since it is within the partitions of the courtyard. And specifically when the get preceded the fire, as was written in section 15. And it is further stated in the Gemara that this is specifically when it was erased during its descent, but not when it was erased during its ascent. Rashi, the Tosafot, and all the poskim explained that it refers to this matter; that is to say, when he stands on the roof and throws it from his hand in order to pass it over the railing, he throws it upward, and afterward, when it passes the railing, it descends downward toward the courtyard. Therefore, if it was erased while it was still in its ascent, even if it left the partition of the roof and entered the airspace of the partitions of the courtyard, it is not a get unless it is during its descent, after it has begun to descend (Tur).

But the Rambam, of blessed memory, explains that this is what it means: specifically when it was erased during its descent—meaning the case of the latter clause where the roof is his and the courtyard is hers and he threw it downward, which is its natural motion as it is its way to descend—if it was erased or burned, she is divorced even though it did not come to rest, since it was going to come to rest. However, if it was erased during its ascent—meaning in the first clause where the roof is hers and the courtyard is his and he threw it to her roof, and the husband had to cause the get to ascend contrary to its natural motion—as long as it did not ultimately come to rest, she is not divorced. And even if it was erased during its descent onto the roof, because the husband's force was not in the manner of its placement, which is in descent (the Maggid Mishneh). Therefore, the Tanna did not teach in the first clause "if it was erased or burned she is divorced," because in truth she is not divorced until it comes to rest. And perhaps you will ask, if so, for what purpose did we learn "once it reaches the airspace of the roof she is divorced"? The practical difference is if another man betrothed her while it was in the air before it came to rest, the betrothal is effective; or if the husband died before it came to rest, nevertheless her status is that of a divorcee; or if he canceled it in the interim (ibid.).

Nevertheless, it is puzzling to me, for if its path of descent is toward the roof we do not consider it the power of the husband, how is she divorced even when it rests on the roof? Behold, it did not come through the husband's act of giving. Indeed, in truth, such a case is called "the power of his power" (Tosafot Shabbat 99b, s.v. "O") and regarding the matter of Shabbat one is liable (Bava Kamma 70b). If so, when it is erased during its path of descent to the roof, why should she not be divorced? Behold, the power of his power is equivalent to his power. And even though regarding those liable for exile the power of his power is not equivalent to his power, as is proven in the Gemara (Makkot 8a) and as the Rambam wrote at the end of the fifth chapter of Hilkhot Rotzeach, see there, nevertheless for other matters it is equivalent to his power, for the liability of exile is distinct from other laws (see the end of the second chapter of Bava Kamma). It also appears to me that this "power of power" is equivalent to his power even regarding exile, and there it is a different matter, see there. And in truth, some say that the Rambam's intention is that also in the first clause, when it is erased during the path of descent, she is divorced, and the Rambam's intention refers to the path of ascent (see Ran and Beit Shmuel, subsection 7). However, the wording of the Rambam does not indicate this (the Gra, subsection 8), and many agreed with the previous interpretation, and so it is in the Shulchan Aruch, section 5, see there.

And in my humble opinion, a different intention appears in his words when we examine why he wrote, for example, that the wind blew and lifted it and it was erased or burned, etc. And what do we need to know regarding the manner in which it was erased or burned? Furthermore, that which the commentators understood, that in the latter clause of the Mishnah he rules like all the poskim, also does not appear correct to me. For this is his wording there in Halacha 4: If the roof was his and he was above on it, and she was below in her courtyard, and he threw her get to her, once the get left the partitions of the roof and reached the partitions of her place where she is standing, she is divorced. Thus far his words. And in Halacha 5 he wrote: If he threw it into her domain into the fire and it was burned, or into the water and it was erased, or it was lost, it is not a get; but if it reached her domain and rested, and afterwards the fire came and burned it, behold this is a get. Thus far his words. Behold, he wrote specifically when it rested first. And indeed, they raised a difficulty regarding this wording (Lechem Mishneh), and it is even more wondrous that he did not mention at all in Halacha 4 the law of being burned or erased, and why did he write this in a separate Halacha?

Therefore, it appears to me that the Rambam, of blessed memory, also does not distinguish between the first clause and the final clause, but rather in a different manner. He, of blessed memory, distinguishes regarding the matter of the actual erasure and burning between the way of descent and the way of ascent. The explanation of the matters is that since the fire and the water were not there previously, as he wrote in Halacha 5, but rather the wind brought them from another place, it follows that when the fire struck the get while it was still in the air, the wind lifted it upward, for such is the nature. And since it was burned by way of ascent, meaning the burning occurred during its ascent upward, it is of no avail that it was close to the ground, for from the outset it was not destined to rest due to the wind carrying it upward. Therefore, whether on a roof or in a courtyard, it is of no avail. He did not need to mention this law regarding a courtyard since he mentioned it regarding a roof. It is called "by way of descent" when the get was placed on the actual roof or on the actual ground of the courtyard, and consequently, when the wind struck it, the fire and water struck it by way of descent, for if not so, they would not have snatched the get, as is understood. Therefore, in Halacha 5, he wrote this law separately, that specifically if it reached her domain and rested, etc., and he was precise to write simply "her domain," which includes both a roof and a courtyard. And that which the Sages, of blessed memory, said, that it must specifically be by way of descent, the explanation is that the wind with the fire or the water was by way of descent, meaning that it was placed on the roof or in the courtyard and the wind with the fire or the water descended to the ground and received it. And that which we learned in the Mishnah, "it was erased or burned," is a separate matter and does not refer to the preceding; or alternatively, it does refer to the preceding, and this is what it means: even though it was erased or burned immediately after it was placed, nevertheless, the get begins from the moment it descended into her domain.

There is one who wrote that if the courtyard and the roof both belong to her and he threw it to the roof, she is not divorced as long as it is in the airspace of the courtyard; even though the airspace belongs to her, nevertheless, since its end is not to rest in the courtyard, she is not divorced (Beit Shmuel, end of subsection 7). These are astonishing words, for it is explicitly stated in the Gemara there that with her roof and her courtyard, the airspace of the roof is not required, see there. Only the Rashba, of blessed memory, wrote in his novellae that this is specifically when the get was in its way down and not in its way up, for in its way up it is not called "giving," as he wrote, see there. And know that all these laws apply when the get was not within her four amot, but within her four amot nothing else is required, for four amot acquire as will be explained with the help of Heaven (ibid.). This is according to the strict law and not for practical application, as will be explained before us with the help of Heaven. Furthermore, even according to the strict law, the airspace of four amot does not acquire the get, for it is an inquiry in the Gemara (78b) and was not resolved, see there. And there are many details in the law of four amot, as will be explained with the help of Heaven.

If the courtyard was hers and a pole was fixed in her courtyard that is higher than the partition of the courtyard, and the pole is hers, and he threw the get upon it, she is not divorced, for its end is not to rest on the ground, as the wind will cast it outside the partitions. And even though regarding the matter of Shabbat, when one threw from the public domain and it rested on the pole he is liable, for certainly the pole has the status of a private domain like the entire courtyard, nevertheless, in the courtyard itself it must be guarded, and here it is not guarded. And even according to the opinion we explained in section 14, that less than three [tefachim] adjacent to the roof is a get even when it is not guarded, it is different there because the roof is very wide and she stands there and it is called guarded (see Maharsha 79a, s.v. "ha milei" and what he wrote "if she were standing there," meaning according to Rabbi Elazar according to what the Tosafot wrote s.v. "hayeta" and see Rashba, and examine closely). But on a pole it is not guarded at all, and even if there is a basket on the pole, if it is not deep and wide enough for the get to be guarded therein from the wind, she is not divorced, and so it is implied in the Gemara there.

The Rambam wrote there in law 10: If he threw a get to her domain, and it passed through her domain in which she is standing and fell outside of her domain, even though it passed close to the ground, less than three, she is not divorced until it rests in her domain. Thus far his words. And the Tur wrote similarly, and he holds that airspace that is not destined to rest is not considered as if it has rested. And even though in the Shas (Bava Metzia 12a) there was an inquiry that was not resolved regarding airspace that is not destined to rest, whether it is considered as if it has rested or not, and for this reason there are indeed some of the Rishonim who ruled here as well that she is doubtfully divorced (the Ramban, the Rashba, and the Ran). And it is not similar to where a fire preceded the get, where she is certainly not divorced, for there it is not fit to rest at all; and likewise it is not similar to where it was burnt during its ascent upward, where it is certainly not a get, for during the ascent upward it is not called "destined to rest" at all (Tosafot). And also that which was explained in section 14 regarding less than three close to the roof, that it is considered as if it has rested, that is because by his force it was fit to rest on the roof were it not for the fire or water jumping, and within three it is considered as lavud; but here, by his force it was not fit to rest, for by the force of his throwing it fell outside of her domain, and therefore it is a legal doubt. And so it is regarding monetary laws as written in Choshen Mishpat siman 268, see there. But the Rambam, of blessed memory, holds that it is certainly not considered as if it has rested, and he ruled accordingly in the fourth chapter of Ma'aseh HaKorbanot because in Zevachim (25b) it is explained that such is the primary ruling (see Beit Shmuel subsection 9). And therefore also in monetary laws he did not bring this law as being a doubt, as the Maggid Mishneh wrote. And regarding the Tur, it requires further study, for in Choshen Mishpat there he wrote that it is a doubt. And know that regarding something rolling on the ground which then went outside of her domain, it implies explicitly in Bava Metzia there that it is considered as if it has rested. Nevertheless, the Rashba, of blessed memory, wrote that regarding a get it is not a superior giving, for in several matters get is different from monetary laws (see Beit Shmuel subsection 10). And according to this, one can also settle the opinion of the Tur, that regarding a get he agreed with the Rambam. And it is simple that in practice we follow the stringency and she is doubtfully divorced (and in Bava Batra 85b it resolves from get to acquisition the opposite, that since in get it is good, all the more so in monetary laws).

Two courtyards, one inside the other, where the outer one belongs to him and the inner one belongs to her, and the walls of the outer one are higher than the walls of the inner one, and he threw a get to her into her inner courtyard, and the get was still in the air opposite the inner one and above its walls in such a manner that if the wind came and cast it, it would fall into the outer courtyard—nevertheless, she is divorced, for the walls of the outer one always guard the inner one, and it is as if the outer courtyard is subordinated to guard the inner courtyard (Rashi 79b). And one should not ask that even if we consider it subordinated to the inner one, since if the wind pushed it, it would fall into the outer one, it should be no better than a courtyard belonging to both of them; for in truth, it can be said that in a courtyard belonging to both of them she is divorced. And in the poskim this law is not explicitly stated, but the reasoning is so, for she has permission to place her vessels there, and just as regarding acquisition it was explained in Choshen Mishpat siman 200 that a person's vessels acquire for him in a courtyard that belongs to the seller and the buyer because the buyer has permission in it, so too it appears that regarding a get it is so. Furthermore, the Rashba, of blessed memory, wrote that here we consider the partitions of the inner one to ascend upwards, and it is as if the get reached within the airspace of the partitions of the inner one; see there. And the essence of this law is that even if the get was burned or erased while still in the air, she is divorced according to most of the poskim that we explained in section 14 if it was in the manner of descent, and according to the Rambam, of blessed memory, the legal consequence is that the get begins from the moment it was in the air according to the opinions we explained in his view, of blessed memory, in section 19 and 21.

However, regarding the primary law of this case, where he threw her a get into a courtyard belonging to both of them, even regarding the matter of acquisition it is not clarified in Choshen Mishpat there, only that the vessels of the buyer acquire there, and without vessels they did not mention anything. And according to the conclusion of the Gemara (Bava Batra 84b) that in an alleyway the buyer does not acquire without his vessels, the same applies in a courtyard of partners, as the Gemara compares them to one another, and we have already written there in Choshen Mishpat, section 14, see there. If so, regarding a get as well, she should not be divorced. However, it is possible to say that since regarding the vessels of the buyer in the domain of the seller a get is more lenient than acquisition—for regarding acquisition, according to the opinion of the Rambam he does not acquire, and according to the other poskim it is a legal doubt as I wrote there in Choshen Mishpat, whereas regarding a get, in such a case she is divorced with her bed because the husband is not fastidious about the place of her bed, as will be explained before us—if so, it is possible to say that regarding this matter as well it is more lenient than acquisition. And even though we wrote in section 25 that, on the contrary, a get is more stringent than acquisition, it can be said that regarding outside of her domain it is more stringent, but regarding her domain it is more lenient than acquisition because he is not fastidious with her. Therefore, it appears to me that she is doubtfully divorced.

And our Sages, of blessed memory, said there that the law explained regarding courtyards—where the inner one is hers and the outer one is his, that she is divorced as has been written—is not so regarding baskets. Two baskets, one inside the other, and the inner one is hers and the outer one is his, and he threw it to her into the inner one; even though it reached the airspace of the inner one, she is not divorced until it rests on the floor of the inner one, for the partitions of a vessel are not made for the airspace to guard, as a vessel is only made to place within it (Rashi). That is to say, the airspace does not acquire by the law of domain, but by the law of lifting it does acquire (and the difficulty of the Tosafot from Avodah Zarah 71a is settled; and so Rashi precisely noted there, and examine it closely). And some say that from the moment it reaches the airspace of the partitions of the inner one, she has acquired it and it is a get; only before it reaches this airspace, even though it reached the airspace of the partitions of the outer one, it is not a get (Tosafot). And so wrote the Tur; see there.

However, this is specifically when the outer basket has no bottom and the inner one stands on the ground, but when the outer one has a bottom, it is not a get, for it is like the vessel of a buyer in the domain of a seller, which is a legal doubt in Choshen Mishpat there, and here too she is doubtfully divorced (Tur). For since the inner one stands within the outer one, the outer one is considered like the domain of the husband even though the baskets stand in her courtyard (see Ran there), and this is the position of most of the poskim.

But the Rambam, of blessed memory, there has another opinion in this, and this is his wording: How so? Two baskets, one inside the other, the outer one belongs to him and the inner one belongs to her, and he threw her get into them—even if it reached the airspace of the inner one, she is not divorced until it rests on the side of the inner basket. In what case is this said? When it was tilted on its side and has no bottom; but if it has a bottom, even if it rests on its base, she is not divorced, for the wife's vessel in the husband's domain does not acquire the get for her unless he is not particular about its place. Thus far his words. And he explains that the baskets are standing in the husband's courtyard, and he follows his reasoning that the buyer's vessel in the seller's domain does not acquire for the buyer, as he wrote at the beginning of chapter 4 of Sale; see there. However, if it has no bottom and the get is resting on its side, it is not considered a vessel and the husband is not particular about its place, as will be explained regarding something similar to this. And our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 9 copied only the words of the Rambam and did not see fit to write according to the majority of the poskim because it is an uncommon matter, and also the Rif, of blessed memory, omitted all these laws. However, I wonder at the explanation of the Maggid Mishneh that the baskets are standing in the husband's domain: why do we need the outer basket? It is possible that it comes to teach us that even if her basket is inside his basket, nevertheless, when her basket has no bottom, not only is he not particular about it resting in his domain, but even about it resting inside his basket he is not particular, since it is not a vessel. And in my humble opinion, it seems that even according to his explanation, it deals with the baskets standing in her domain, and when it has a bottom, it is called standing in his domain because of his basket, as according to the previous explanation.

If she was standing in his courtyard and he threw the get to her there, she is not divorced, even if the get fell near her, for in his domain she possesses nothing. And even if it fell into one of her vessels, it is like the vessel of a buyer in the domain of a seller and is a doubtful get, and according to the Rambam it is not a get at all, as I have written. Therefore, even if her bed was standing there and she is sitting on her bed and the get fell on the bed, she is not divorced until the get reaches her hand. However, regarding her small vessels, the Sages, of blessed memory, said there that a person is not fastidious about the small vessels of his wife that stand in his domain, and she is divorced when the get falls on the small vessels, for it is as if he transferred to her the ground upon which the vessel stands. And so too, if the bed was ten tefachim high, such that it divides a domain for itself and is not nullified to the domain, even though the legs of the bed stand in his domain, the Sages, of blessed memory, said that regarding the place of the legs of the bed people are not fastidious, at the very least regarding one's wife (Tosafot), even if they are fastidious regarding others, and she is divorced. And so too, if the bed is suspended in the air and it fell upon it, she is divorced, for he is not fastidious about the air regarding her vessel, and at the very least regarding her bed he is not fastidious. But when the bed is less than ten tefachim and stands on the ground, he is certainly fastidious, and the bed is nullified to the domain and is like the vessel of a buyer in the domain of a seller, and she is doubtfully divorced, and according to the Rambam she is certainly not divorced. And if the get fell into her lap, it is obvious that she is divorced, for her lap is like her hand. And even if it fell on her garments that trail on the ground, a person is not fastidious with his wife regarding the place of the garments she wears, even though they trail on the ground (Tosafot 78a). And specifically a bed ten high did we say that he is not fastidious about the place of the legs of the bed, and not regarding other vessels; and the reason is that a bed, when it is ten high, is convenient to use underneath it (Rashi) and is considered by him as if standing in the air, unlike other vessels. Therefore, if the bed is fenced in until near the ground, even with a bed it is a doubt (as is implied from Rashi there). And the measure of small vessels that he is not fastidious about their place, their measure has not been clarified; and in the Yerushalmi it is implied that all her functional vessels are included, and in our Shas it is explained like her "kaltah," which is a vessel in which women place spun yarn and needles, and so too a small vessel from which she eats dates, and from this we must learn by example. And all this is according to the essential law, but in practice, specifically in her hand and not in her domain, as will be explained. And even when it fell on her garments, we do not permit her, for sometimes she borrows garments and the lender is fastidious (Beit Yosef in the name of our teacher Peretz, see there).

It has already been explained that in a place borrowed or rented to her, when the get falls there, she is divorced. Therefore, if the husband lent her his courtyard and she acquired it through an effective kinyan, and he threw the get into it, she is divorced, as it is like hers. And our sages, of blessed memory, said (beginning of chapter 8) that one who lends a place to his fellow only lent him one place and not two places. However, a small object standing in the courtyard is not considered a place unto itself and is nullified to the courtyard, and if the get falls there, she is divorced. But a large object standing there is like a place unto itself, and if the get falls upon it, she is not divorced. And what is the definition of this matter? The Tur wrote: If there was in the courtyard a place divided unto itself that is four amot by four amot, and even if it is not ten tefachim high, or if it is not four by four but is ten tefachim high, or even if it is not four by four and also not ten tefachim high but is divided by its own name, it is considered a place unto itself and is not included in the borrowing of the courtyard. And so wrote the Shulchan Aruch. And consequently, when it falls on a chair or a table or a bed and the like that are standing in the courtyard and they are his, she is not divorced, and it is not nullified to the courtyard; only a piece of wood that is not large, and a stone that is not large, and the like.

And it is understood of its own accord that when he lent her this courtyard and he had another courtyard next to this courtyard, and the get fell into the other courtyard, she is not divorced. And the sages, of blessed memory, said there that regarding roofs it is not so, for if he had two roofs next to each other and he lent her one roof and the get fell on the roof adjacent to it, she is divorced. And the reason is that since on a roof usage is not fixed, people are not particular (79b) regarding usage from roof to roof. And from the sugya of the Shas there, it appears to me that this is specifically when there is no parapet for each roof individually, for then he is not particular if he gave permission to use this roof that she should not use the second one, since the roofs go together without interruption, it is all called one roof. But when there is a parapet separating between roof and roof, or there is an air gap, or if he said to her, "I am only lending you one roof," she is not divorced when it fell on the second. And if he lent her a place in the courtyard, he did not lend her on the roof (Beit Shmuel subsection 18). And there is reason to doubt in places where their usage is minimal, such as in a ruin, when he lent her the place, if the adjacent place is also included in it like a roof or not, and it requires further study.

All that was written in these two sections is the opinion of the Tur and most of the poskim, but the Rambam, of blessed memory, has another opinion on this, as he wrote there in Halacha 9: If the husband lent her a place in his courtyard but did not designate it for her, and he threw her a get and it reached her four amot where she is standing, she is divorced. If it rolled and fell on a beam or on a rock far from her, if the place it fell upon does not have four amot by four amot, and it is not ten high, and it does not have a distinct name, it has not divided a domain for itself and it is as if he and she are in one place. But if there is one of these three things, it has divided a domain for itself, and while he lent her one place, he did not lend her two places, and she is not divorced until the get reaches her hand. Thus far his words. And regarding roofs, he wrote in Halacha 11: If she was standing on her roof and he threw it to her and it fell on another roof adjacent to it, if she is able to stretch out her hand and take it, she is divorced; for even though dwellings are divided above just as they are divided below, people are not fastidious about a place such as this. Thus far his words.

The commentators exerted themselves over his words, and in my humble opinion it seems simple that the Rambam holds that if he lent her the entire courtyard, there is no distinction here between a large object and a small object, for even a large object is nullified to the courtyard when it stands there, since he lent her all of it. Rather, it deals with a case where he lent her a place in the courtyard for the reception of her get alone, and the standard place of a person is four amot. Therefore, wherever she stands, she has four amot, and when the get falls within her four amot, she is divorced. But when it rolled onto a beam or a rock, such is its law: if she is standing on the beam or the rock and the get is also upon it, then the get and she are in one place. But when she is standing in the courtyard and the get fell on the beam or the rock, and the get is within her four amot, but the beam or the rock extends significantly, it depends on this: if they have a name unto themselves, or they are ten tefachim high or four amot wide, then the place of the get is distinct from her place and she is not divorced. And if not, then the get and she are both in one place and she is divorced. And that which he wrote, "far from her," the intention is not far from her four amot, for if so, even without this it is nothing; rather, it means that the rock and the beam are far from her and she is not standing upon them, and they extend further than her four amot. And also regarding roofs, he holds that if he lent her this roof, how is the second roof included in its scope? For it is not logical at all. Rather, he explains that she stood on her roof and he threw the get to her there, but it fell near her on the second roof in a manner that she is able to stretch out her hand and take it. Therefore we say that this is not like "take your get from another domain," but like one who threw to her domain, for the owner of the other roof is not particular about this. And since the get is close to her such that she can stretch out her hand and take it, she is divorced. And there is one who says specifically when she is standing on her roof, but if she stood on the roof of another and he threw the get to the roof, she is not divorced (Beit Shmuel, subsection 19). And certainly it is so, for how could she be divorced when it fell on the domain of another and he intended to throw it there? It is only when he threw to her roof and she is standing there, and the throwing was not aimed exactly at her but near her and she can take it—in this it is considered like hers regarding the matter that we do not say it fell in another domain. And even this is only according to the Rambam, but according to the Tur and all the poskim, even in this it is not effective, and therefore for the halacha it is a case of a doubtful divorce.

The sages taught in the Mishnah (78a): If she was standing in a reshut harabim and he threw it to her, if it was close to her she is divorced; close to him, she is not divorced; half and half, she is divorced and not divorced. And so too regarding kiddushin. Rava explained in the Gemara that her four amot is what is meant by "close to her," and his four amot is what is meant by "close to him," for the acquisition of four amot is an enactment of the sages (Bava Metzia 10a), as has been written in Choshen Mishpat siman 243. Nevertheless, it is also effective regarding a get, for since the sages granted him ownership such that it should be like his courtyard, "the property of the court is ownerless" (Ran). And even though we maintain there that in a reshut harabim the rabbis did not enact four amot except in a simta or the sides of a reshut harabim, nevertheless regarding a get they enacted it even in a reshut harabim because of iggun (Rosh). And it appears that this is the opinion of the Tur, for in siman 30 regarding kiddushin he wrote that in a reshut harabim four amot is not effective, and here he wrote reshut harabim; and it must be said that regarding iggun they were lenient. But this requires further study, for in the Mishnah he equates kiddushin to gittin. And some say indeed that they are equal because it is written, "and she shall depart... and she shall become" (Ran); therefore, even though the primary enactment was regarding a get because of iggun, nevertheless they were compelled to equate kiddushin to gittin. However, our teachers the Tosafists wrote there (s.v. Rabbi Yochanan) that indeed here too the intention is not to a reshut harabim but to a simta and the sides of a reshut harabim, see there. And it must be said that the reason they call it reshut harabim is because it is not a reshut hayachid, and there is similar usage in the Shas. Furthermore, they wrote to distinguish that in a place where it is impossible for her to guard it, they did not enact it in a reshut harabim, but when it is possible for her to guard it, they enacted it even in a reshut harabim. And it has already been explained in Choshen Mishpat and above in siman 30 that whoever arrives first seizes the four amot, and the second who arrives after him has nothing in them.

There is another interpretation in the Gemara from Rava that "close to her" is when she is able to guard the get and he is not able, and when he is able to guard and she is not, it is called "close to him." And Rava also holds of this matter of the four amot that has been explained, except that within her four amot, even if he is also able to guard as she is, she is divorced by the law of four amot; and outside of the four amot, she is not divorced unless she is able to guard and he is not (Tosafot). However, it appears to me that according to Rava there is no necessity to say that there are four amot regarding gittin also in a public domain (but if so, it is difficult why the Tosafot were forced to their reconciliation; and examine this carefully). And this acquisition of guarding does not exist in any matter except for gittin and kiddushin, as Rava himself said there: they said this for gittin and not for any other matter. And only kiddushin cannot be separated from gittin because it is written, "And she shall depart... and she shall become," see there. And the reason that in gittin it is an acquisition is because she is divorced against her will, and since she is acquired against her will, if she is merely able to guard it, it is a get (Rashi). And some say that it is not by the letter of the law, but rather because of the regulation for agunot, and kiddushin cannot be separated from gittin for the reason that has been explained (Ran).

It is further stated there in the Gemara: Samuel said to Rav Yehuda, "Sharp-witted one, [it must be] so that she may bend down and take it; but you, do not act upon this until the get reaches her hand." From the explanation of Rashi, of blessed memory, it is clarified that "so that she may bend down and take it" was stated as the law, and he disagrees with Rav and Rabbi Yochanan; he holds that "close to her" is only called such if the get is placed literally next to her feet, in a manner that if she bends down to the ground she may take it. And that which he said, that he should not act upon this until the get reaches her hand, this is due to stringency and not from the essential law. According to this, for Samuel she is not divorced, neither by the four cubits nor by guarding. However, the Rosh explains that Samuel also admits that she acquires the get within four cubits, and that which he said, "so that she may bend down and take it," is due to stringency; see there. And the Ran explains that in an alleyway or the sides of a public domain she has four cubits regarding a get, and only in a public domain are there no four cubits, and we require by law "so that she may bend down and take it." And even according to the explanation of Rashi, it would seem that the halakha is like Rabbi Yochanan; however, it is possible to say that in a public domain even Rabbi Yochanan does not hold of the enactment of four cubits, as I have written. However, regarding guarding, according to the Rosh it is certain that by law the get takes effect when she is able to guard it and he is not, while according to Rashi it remains a dispute, as I have written.

This is the wording of the Tur: If she was standing in a reshut harabim and he threw it within her four amot, she is divorced. In what case does this apply? When the husband is not standing with her within her four amot; but if he is standing with her within them, even if she preceded him and acquired them, she is not divorced until it reaches her hand. And so too, if he threw it to her in a reshut harabim and he is far from her, and even if she is able to guard it and he is not, she is not divorced until it reaches her hand. If two say it reached within her four amot and two say it did not reach, she is in a state of doubtful divorce. Rabbeinu Chananel wrote that even if he threw a get to her in her courtyard, she is not permitted to the world until it reaches her hand. My father, our teacher, the Rosh, of blessed memory, wondered at his words, and as I have written, such is his conclusion. Thus far his words.

It is clear from his words that within four amot she is divorced when the husband does not enter into them, but when the husband enters into them, she is not divorced until it reaches her hand, and similarly, guarding is of no avail. And there is one who says that his intention is not to an actual public domain, but rather to an alleyway or the sides of a public domain, and he relied on what he wrote in siman 30 (Bach). However, that which he wrote—that when he enters within her four amot, even if she preceded him, she is not divorced, and similarly regarding guarding—his intention is not that it is no get at all, for the Rosh explicitly wrote that this is only due to a stringency and not according to the law; rather, his intention is for practical action, that we do not permit her to marry in such a case. But certainly she is forbidden to a kohen, and if another betrothed her, the kiddushin take effect, for according to the law it is a complete get. And as for the fact that regarding kiddushin he did not rule stringently for practical action in siman 30, we explained the reason there in section 11. And there in section 10, we brought the opinions of the Rishonim who hold that according to the law four amot do not avail in a "gago ve-karpifo." See there. However, the wording of the Tur, who wrote "it is no get," is very astonishing, for this wording implies that according to the law it is no get, and it requires further study.

And the words of the Rambam, of blessed memory, are very entangled, for he wrote, and this is his wording: If he threw it to her in a public domain or in a domain that does not belong to either of them, if it is closer to him, she is not divorced. If the get was halfway, or from halfway until it is closer to her, she is in a state of doubt as to whether she is divorced. If it was closer to her such that she could stoop and take it, this is a disqualified get until the get reaches her hand, and afterwards she may marry based on it ab initio. How is it "closer to him"? If he is able to guard it and she is not able to guard it, this is "closer to him." If both of them are able to guard it, or both of them are unable to guard it, this is "halfway." If he came first and stood, and afterwards she stood opposite him and he threw it to her, if the get was within his four amot, she is not divorced, even if she could stoop and take it. If she stood first and he came and stood opposite her and threw it to her, even though it is halfway, since it is within her four amot, this is a disqualified get until the get reaches her hand. Thus far his words. And the Rishonim have already labored over his words (the Rashba, the Ran, the Maggid Mishneh, and the Kesef Mishneh) and raised difficulties against him; see there. And our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 13 and section 14, transcribed his words as they are; see there.

And in my humble opinion, it appears that the Rambam holds that all these Amoraic sages do not disagree at all. A proof for this is that Rav explains that "close" is called four amot, and also in the Yerushalmi, Rav says so regarding this Mishnah, see there. And afterwards, Rav says that it depends on the extension of hands, that she can extend her hand and take it, and this is similar to our Talmud, "so that she may bend down and take it." And the Yerushalmi asks from Rav on Rav and answers: here is for the halakhah, here is for the practice. And so too Rabbi Yochanan, who says in our Talmud that it depends on guarding, says there in the Yerushalmi that it depends on the extension of hands, see there. And automatically, one must also say: here is for the halakhah, here is for the practice. According to this, all of them hold like Shmuel, that for the practice we require "so that she may bend down and take it," and he further restricted the practice until it reaches her hand, and so it is in the Yerushalmi there, and we have already explained this at the beginning of siman 136. And all the words of Rav, Rabbi Yochanan, and Shmuel are true and they do not disagree with one another, for certainly "close to her" is called when she is able to guard it and he is not, or when she preceded him in occupying the four amot. And even though in a public domain or in a domain that belongs to neither of them they did not institute four amot, nevertheless regarding a get they instituted it because it is against her will and because of the regulation for agunot, as has been explained. And automatically, since they instituted it, whenever he preceded her into the four amot, or even more than four amot, and he is able to guard it and she is not, she is certainly not divorced. And when she preceded him into the four amot, or even more than four amot, and she is able to guard it and he is not, according to the essential law she is certainly divorced, and all the more so if it was so close as "so that she may bend down and take it." And nevertheless, because of the stringency, the sages disqualified the get until it reaches her hand. And in a case of half-and-half, such as when both of them occupied the four amot together, or both of them are able to guard it, or both of them are unable to guard it—meaning each one alone is not capable of guarding it but both of them together are able to guard it—behold, she is doubtfully divorced. And this is not like what we wrote in siman 30, section 10, regarding the opinion of the Rambam, see there.

And according to this, all of his words are aligned, for initially he wrote that "close to him" she is not divorced, and in "half and half" and from "half" until "close to her"—but not including it—it is a doubtful divorce, and in "close to her," even within the distance that she could bend down and take it, and certainly in "guarding," it is a disqualified divorce. And this is what Shmuel said: "And you, do not perform an action until the get reaches her hand." And so too in the Yerushalmi: "The clearest of them all is until the get reaches her hand." And afterwards he explains what is "close to him" and explains the two paths of the law of "guarding" as I have written. And afterwards he explains the law of "four amot" when he preceded her in occupying the four amot, and in both of them it is no get at all. And afterwards he explains that when she stood first to occupy the four amot, even though by the core law it is valid, nevertheless the get is disqualified until it reaches her hand. And the same applies when she is able to guard it and he is not. And he did not need to clarify this at the end of his words because he already clarified them, for even within the distance that she could bend down and take it, it is disqualified, and certainly in "guarding." And that which he needed to clarify regarding "four amot" was to indicate that he holds like Rav, that she has four amot regarding a get, and only because of the stringency did the sages disqualify it until it reaches her hand. And even though our teachers, the Rishonim and Acharonim, did not understand his words this way, nevertheless, since according to their explanation his words are puzzling, as they all raised difficulties against him, and according to our words his words are clear with the help of Heaven, therefore we have explained according to our humble opinion. And regarding kiddushin at the end of chapter 4 of Ishut, he only mentioned "guarding," see there, because he holds that in kiddushin there were no enactments as there were in gittin; we establish it upon the core explanation of "close to him" and "close to her." And he ruled like Rabbi Yochanan, for the halacha is like him against Rav and Shmuel. And above in siman 30 we elaborated on this with the help of Heaven, see there in section 10, 11, and 12 (see Beit Shmuel subsection 22 and the second subsection 23, and according to what I have written it is not so; and examine this).

The Rambam, the Tur, and the Shulchan Aruch wrote: If her hand was sloping, meaning that she held her hand inclined and not upright like a partition nor flat in the manner that one flattens the hand to receive, and he threw the get onto her hand and it fell to the ground, if it fell within her four amot and came to rest, she is divorced. Thus far their words. And they raised a difficulty regarding this, for we do not permit based on four amot as has been explained. However, it is not a difficulty at all, for since he threw it onto her hand, therefore even though it did not rest in her hand and fell to her four amot, she is divorced (the Maggid Mishneh in halacha 13). For behold, that which we do not permit based on four amot is only a stringency, and therefore when he intended to throw it to her hand and the get touched her hand, even though it did not rest in her hand and rested within her four amot, she is divorced.

The Tur wrote: if it did not rest within the four amot but rolled immediately outside of them, it is a question whether the airspace of the four amot acquires, and it was not resolved, and it is a case of doubtful divorce. Thus far his words. And so wrote the Shulchan Aruch in section 15. And it is true that it is a question in the Gemara (78b), but I wonder, for regarding that which rolls we say explicitly that it is considered as if it has rested (Bava Metzia 12a). And it must be said that he holds that regarding a get it is different, for in that which rolls there was no giving. And we have already mentioned this reasoning in section 25 in the name of the Rashba, of blessed memory; see there. (And Rashi, of blessed memory, was precise to explain in Gittin there regarding "did not rest" that it was burned; see there. And it is possible that his intention was to exclude that which rolls; and examine this.) And the Rambam, of blessed memory, did not mention this, for we have already written there that he holds it is not considered as if it has rested (and see Beit Shmuel sub-section 25, and in my humble opinion this is not necessary, and the author was stringent regarding that which rolls).

That which has been explained, that if he threw it towards her hand and it fell within her four amot she is divorced, this is when she was standing in a place where the get is not likely to be lost. But if she was standing near a fire or on the bank of a river and he threw it towards her hand and it fell into the fire or into the water, she is not divorced, for from the outset it was destined for destruction. And even if we say that airspace that is not destined to come to rest is considered as if it has come to rest, this only applies when it is fit to come to rest but instead traveled far away; however, when it is not fit to come to rest at all, such as when it was burned or lost, it is certainly not considered as if it has come to rest, and it is like something going from the start toward destruction (and this is the intention of Rashi there, s.v. "on the bank of the river").

And for the practical halacha, we have already cited what Rava said to Rav Yehuda: "You shall not perform an act until the get reaches her hand." And it is further stated that there was an incident regarding "close to her," and the Sages required chalitza for the divorcee when he died. And in the Yerushalmi it is also stated: "The clearest of them all is until the get reaches her hand." And the Tosafot and the Rosh and all the Rishonim cited in the name of the Aruch and our teacher Chananel who wrote: "We have received from our teachers that even if he threw it to her within her courtyard, she is not permitted to the world until the get reaches her hand." And the foundation of their words is based on this Yerushalmi. And the Tosafot and the Rosh rejected this, for this is only for a public domain and not for her courtyard, for in throwing to a courtyard we permit even in practice. And even according to their words, it appears that only in throwing to her courtyard or her house do they permit in practice, but in throwing to an alleyway or to the sides of a public domain we do not permit in practice. However, the Ran, of blessed memory, wrote that this Yerushalmi refers only to the four cubits in a public domain, for by the letter of the law four cubits do not acquire in a public domain and only regarding a get did they institute this, but in that which acquires by the letter of the law, the Yerushalmi did not stringently rule; see there. And according to this, even in throwing to an alleyway or to the sides of a public domain one should permit in practice. However, he and the Rashba, of blessed memory, wrote that one must be concerned for the words of Rabbeinu Chananel, as they are words of tradition; see there.

This is the wording of our teacher, the Rema, in section 14: But if he threw it to her within her four amot and the husband does not enter within them, she is divorced. All this is according to the law, but ab initio one should not divorce even by placing the get into her courtyard or into her garments, but rather into her hand itself, and her hand should be open from the beginning of the giving until its end. And even ex post facto, one should not permit her to the world until the get comes into her hand itself. And it is further accustomed that after he has given her the get, she should close her hands and place it beneath her garments, and she should be careful that no person assists her in its reception, nor should there be any object such as a ring on her hand or the like at the time of its reception. Thus far his words. And so is the simple custom. And it is implied from his words that according to the law, even in a public domain, four amot acquire for her, for he is commenting on the words of the author who is dealing with a public domain and a domain that belongs to neither of them (see in the Nimukei Yosef, the first chapter of Bava Metzia, on the Mishnah of "one who saw a lost object," who wrote: and we establish that regarding a get there are no four amot, see there; and I do not know his intention, whether according to the law or merely as a stringency, and see what I wrote above in siman 30, section 10, and delve into it).

And it is a simple matter that only as a stringency do we say that it is not a get until it reaches her hand, and not as a leniency; and in a case where there is a dispute among the poskim, according to the law she is doubtfully divorced. However, that which there is to doubt regarding this which our teacher, the Rema, wrote—that even ex post facto she should not be permitted to the world until the get actually reaches her hand—is if it is a case of iggun where it is impossible to obtain another get, and he threw it to her into her courtyard or into her garments, whether we permit her to marry. And in the Responsa of the Rivash, siman 205 and siman 206, it is explained that one should not permit her to be married if he threw it to her within her four amot even in a side alley, and only if she married she shall not leave, see there. And in a public domain, it appears from his words that one should be more stringent because of several poskim who hold that they did not institute four amot at all in a public domain regarding a get as well. Also, the Bach wrote that the intention of the Tur is only regarding a side alley and not an actual public domain, see there. However, if he threw it to her into garments that are in her lap, it appears that in a case of iggun one should permit it, for this was not mentioned by the Rishonim and it is a distant decree lest the garments not be hers. And it appears to me in my humble opinion that in practice, if such a matter should occur, they should ask the greats of the generation who will be in those days and they will deliberate upon this.

And regarding that which we wrote in section 45, that if it did not rest within the four amot but rather rolled outside of them it is a case of a doubtful divorce, our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 15 that all this applies when she is not standing in her own domain. However, if she is standing in her own domain, even though it fell from her hand and rolled outside of the four amot, she is divorced, for it only rolled into her own domain. Nevertheless, for us, since we do not divorce by means of her domain as I have written, if the get fell from her hand, he must divorce her a second time. Therefore, she should raise her hands at the time she receives her get so that it does not fall from her hand; also, her hands should be higher than three tefachim from the ground. Thus far his words. It is clear from his words that even in such a case we are stringent in practice, and if he did not divorce her a second time, then in a situation of iggun one must deliberate on this. But for us, where it is not the practice to divorce in the woman's domain and the arrangement of the get is in the house of the Rav, it is simple that even by the letter of the law one must be stringent if it fell from her hand, for it is a domain that is not hers, as according to several poskim they did not institute four amot in such a case, as I have written, and it is simple that one should not be lenient in this.

It has already been explained in Choshen Mishpat siman 202 that a slave has the legal status of a courtyard, but he is a moving courtyard. Therefore, we require that he be bound, and regarding a courtyard we require that it be guarded with her knowledge, whereas a slave is guarded with his own knowledge; therefore, we require that he be sleeping and she be sitting next to him, such that he is guarded with her knowledge. Therefore, the sages said (78a) that when he placed the get in the hand of her slave while he was sleeping and also bound, and she was next to him, this is a get. The opinion of the Rambam in chapter 3 of Laws of Sales is that we do not require both bound and sleeping; rather, bound alone is sufficient, for then he is not a moving courtyard and is also considered guarded with her knowledge, since when he is bound it is not relevant to say that he guards himself. Furthermore, regarding sleeping alone, he holds that by the letter of the law it is sufficient, for when he is sleeping he is guarded with her knowledge and also is not a moving courtyard as he dwells in one place; nevertheless, in the case of sleeping alone it is disqualified by rabbinic decree, for we decree on account of one who is not sleeping, but in the case of bound we do not decree on account of one who is not bound because it is not common (see Beit Shmuel subsection 27). Therefore, he ruled here in chapter 5 that with bound alone she is divorced, and with sleeping alone it is disqualified even when she sits at his side. However, Rashi and the Tosafot and all our teachers hold like the first opinion that we require both (see Tosafot Bava Kamma 12a). Therefore, one must wonder at our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 16 and 17, who wrote the opinion of the Rambam as the primary view and the first opinion in the name of "there are those who say," see there. However, for us there is no practical difference in this, for it has already been explained that even with a courtyard she is not permitted until it reaches her hand, and all the more so with her slave (and the Tur had a different version of the text in the Rambam, see there).

Since it was explained at the beginning of the siman that the reason a get is effective in her courtyard, even though "that which a woman acquires, her husband acquires," is because her get and her courtyard come as one; therefore, if he placed the get in his courtyard and sold her the courtyard or gave it to her, once she has acquired the courtyard through a document, or money, or chazakah, she is divorced, for her get and her courtyard come as one. However, if he placed it in the courtyard of another person, and the other person sold her the courtyard or gave it to her, she is not divorced; for when the husband placed the get in the courtyard, it was not hers such that her courtyard should acquire it for her, and when this courtyard came into her hand, it did not come from the power of the husband such that he should be considered giving her the get and the courtyard as one (Rashi 21a). And nevertheless, we do not decree regarding his courtyard on account of the courtyard of another (Gemara ibid.).

And such is the law regarding his slave, where he placed the get in his hand while he was bound and sleeping—and according to the Rambam, bound alone, as I have written—and she is sitting beside him, and he sold the slave to her or gave him to her and wrote her a deed of gift for him; since she acquired the slave, she acquired the get and is divorced. But if he was not bound, she acquired the slave but not the get, and she is not divorced until the get reaches her hand. And some say that the husband does not need to take it from him and give it to her, and there are those who are uncertain about this, for perhaps it is like "take your get from upon the ground," since the initial giving was not a giving (Beit Shmuel, subsection 29). And the first opinion holds that it is not similar to "take your get from upon the ground," for the giving was to her courtyard, but the courtyard did not have the power to acquire; therefore, the first giving is considered a giving regarding this matter. And we have already written something similar to this in section 11, see there. And the primary rule in the law is that she is of uncertain divorce status.