Siman 144

In the previous siman, two types of conditions in a get were explained: one is a condition that she must perform, such as "on condition that you give me two hundred zuz" and the like; and the second is a condition that he must perform, such as "if I do not come from now until thirty days." Now, regarding the entire Torah, we hold that the Merciful One exempts one in cases of duress, and according to this, we should have said that any condition that was not fulfilled due to duress should be considered as if it were fulfilled. However, regarding a condition that she must perform, this is not applicable, as we explained in Choshen Mishpat siman 21, see there, for this party should not be obligated because of that party's duress, as the Merciful One exempts one from duress but the Merciful One does not obligate one due to it. Therefore, when he says to her, "This is your get on condition that you give me two hundred zuz," even granted that she was under duress and could not fulfill her condition, nevertheless the get is void. For how can we obligate him in the fulfillment of the get because of her duress? What is her duress to him? Ultimately, the condition was not fulfilled. However, regarding a condition that he must perform, such as "if I do not come," and he was under duress and did not come and it is a get, we should have said that it should not be a get, for behold he was under duress, and since the Merciful One exempts one in cases of duress, we should consider him as if he came. Nevertheless, the sages said that there is no claim of duress regarding gittin and it is a get, and this is from the enactment of the sages (beginning of Ketubot according to the first version of Rava, that there is no duress in gittin, for so ruled all the poskim except for the Mordechai at the end of the third chapter of Gittin in the name of the Gaon, that one should rule according to both versions stringently, and it is a solitary opinion; and see the Beit Yosef and the Gra subsection 1).

And the reason for the enactment, our Sages, of blessed memory, said, is because of the enactment for modest women and for licentious women. The enactment for the modest is because there are times when he is not under duress and it is a get, yet she will be stringent upon herself and think that he was under duress—and according to the law one need not be concerned for this since the majority are not under duress (Tosafot)—and she will remain an agunah forever, for he has removed his mind from her and she has already been divorced. And regarding the licentious it is the opposite, for there are times when she knew he was under duress and it is not a get, yet she will say he was not under duress and in the meantime she will marry another; and when he comes and clarifies that he was under duress, it will be found that the get is void and her children from the second are mamzerim (ibid. 3a). And anyone who betrothes a woman betrothes based on the understanding of the Sages, and therefore they say at the time of kiddushin "according to the law of Moses and Israel" (Tosafot). And since the Sages enacted regarding all who divorce upon a condition that the claim of duress shall not avail them, from the outset they divorce based on this understanding (so wrote the Pnei Yehoshua there; and this is what is meant by "and they annulled the kiddushin," meaning that if he should say "I did not divorce based on their understanding," they annulled the kiddushin, and consequently he will not say so since he has no benefit; and so wrote the Rashba in Responsa siman 1,163).

Our teachers, the authors of the Tosafot, wrote (ibid.) that there are three categories of ones: an ones that is very common, an ones that is common but uncommon, and an ones that is not common at all. And for the halakhah, so it is: An ones that is very common, like that case of one who said, "If I do not come from now until thirty days, let this be a get," and he came within the time but a ferry stopped him—meaning the river blocked him and the ferry was on the city side and he could not cross, and he cried out from across the river, "See that I have come! See that I have come!"—and Shmuel said it is not considered a coming (Gemara ibid.) and it is a get. For in this case, it is obvious that by law there is no claim of ones even without a takkanah, for since it is very common, he should have stipulated, "on condition that no ones occurs to me," and since he did not stipulate, he caused his own loss. And an ones that is common but uncommon, even though by law there is a claim of ones—as it did not enter his mind that he needed to stipulate since it is not very common—nevertheless, because of the takkanah for modest women and licentious women, there is no claim of ones, as has been explained. And an ones that is not common at all, such as if a house fell on him or a snake bit him, there is a claim of ones, and the takkanah does not apply here, for the modest women would never think that such an ones occurred to him, and likewise regarding licentious women. Therefore, in such a case, we hold that there is a claim of ones in gittin. And the Rosh there, and the Ran (end of chapter 3 of Gittin), and the Maggid Mishneh (chapter 9), and the Mordekhai (chapter 7) agreed to this. And if he became ill within the time or died, this is an ones that is common but uncommon (so it is explained from the sugya). Nevertheless, regarding death, one can say that the takkanah does not apply because death has a rumor (Tosafot). And captivity is also an ones that is common but uncommon, and it does not void the get because of the takkanah, and he did not stipulate "on condition that an ones does not occur." (And what our teacher, the Rema, wrote at the end of section 1, that captivity is common, he means that it is not like "a snake bit him," as written by the Chelkat Mechokek and the Beit Shmuel, subsection 3). And in my humble opinion, it appears that in this time, when the government watches over the country well, captivity is an ones that is not common at all, and it requires further study for the halakhah. (And in Shulchan Arukh section 1, he equated illness to being delayed by a river because in the halakhah they are equal). (And see Be'er Heitev subsection 3, what he wrote in the name of the Be'er HaGolah, that captivity is an ones that is not common).

Regarding that which we have said, that there is no claim of ones in a get, even if he revealed his mind that it is not his will to divorce and it is evident that had he known he would arrive within the time he would not have divorced her, and similarly regarding other conditions in such a case, nevertheless, since he did not explicitly stipulate that if an ones should befall him the get shall be void, the get remains valid, for a revelation of mind regarding a get is of no consequence.

The Mordechai wrote (in chapter 3): Rivan ruled that even by the hand of Heaven there is no claim of ouns regarding gittin. In the Sefer HaMiktzo'ot, he ruled that ouns by the hand of man is not considered ouns, but by the hand of Heaven it is considered ouns, and thus they ruled in the two yeshivot. Some bring a proof for this from what the sages, of blessed memory, said (Avodah Zarah 70a) that if a lion consumed it, there is a claim of ouns. Thus far his words, see there, for this is their intention. However, according to the distinctions that have been explained, there is no proof from this, as this is an ouns that is not common at all, and in such a case there is a claim of ouns. This is the opinion of the Rivan, and this opinion was not cited by the poskim at all. It remains to be studied why they rejected the opinion of the early Geonim of the two yeshivot.

It appears to me that even the Geonim do not disagree with all that has been explained when we examine closely, for it is implied from the words of the Mordechai that even the Geonim hold that there is no claim of ones in gittin, like the first version of Rava as is explained there. And that which they distinguish between by the hand of man and by the hand of Heaven is in order to resolve that case of "a lion consumed him." And if so, how did they distinguish in this way? For behold, illness is also by the hand of Heaven, and the core of the sugya that there is no ones deals with illness. Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, already wondered about this in his great work regarding the words of the Mordechai, and he understood the words of the Geonim as ruling like the latter version, that there is ones in gittin; see there. But his words are difficult, for if so, why must they distinguish between by the hand of man and by the hand of Heaven? Let them say explicitly that there is ones in gittin! And behold, in the Gemara it compares the halting of a ferry to illness, see there, and the halting of a ferry is by the hand of man. Rather, certainly the primary view is like the Mordechai, that the Geonim also rule that there is no claim of ones in gittin, and so it is explicitly implied from the words of the Hagahot Maimoni, chapter 9, see there. And it would be possible to say that they interpret the illness in the sugya there as one who became ill through cold or heat, and such an illness is called "by the hand of man," as the Sages, of blessed memory, said (Ketubot 30a): Everything is by the hand of Heaven except for chills and fevers. It follows that chills and fevers, which are cold and heat, are called "by the hand of man." However, even this is a forced explanation, for the Gemara said "he became ill" without qualification, which implies all types of illness.

Therefore, it appears to me that another intention is hidden in their words, for in truth, that which we say regarding the distinction between "by the hands of man" and "by the hands of Heaven," the intention is not according to its simple meaning. For certainly all occurrences that come upon a person are all by Divine providence, and as their memory is for a blessing said: A person does not strike his finger below unless they announce it concerning him from above (Chullin 7b), and it is an explicit verse: "From Hashem are the steps of a man established." Rather, the intention is that "by the hands of man" refers to a common matter that is accustomed to occur, and the matter is not recognizable as being from Heaven, such as illness or a ferry and the like. And "by the hands of Heaven" refers to a matter that is recognizable to all as being from Heaven, such as being eaten by a lion, bitten by a snake, and the like. And this is also the distinction between "common" and "uncommon," and "not common at all."

There is one who says that nowadays, after the enactment of Rabbeinu Gershom, of blessed memory, that a woman is not divorced against her will, if she stipulated a condition upon him regarding what he must do, the claim of anuss is of no avail (Beit Shmuel, subsection 1), even an anuss that is not common at all. And the explanation of the matter is that just as we wrote in section 1 regarding a condition that he stipulated upon her to perform and she did not fulfill it, that he can say, "What is your anuss to me? I did not consent to give a get except in this manner," so too nowadays she can also say this. And there are those who disagree on this (Beit Meir and other great authorities, as the Pitchei Teshuva wrote). And so it appears primary, for it appears that in this Rabbeinu Gershom, of blessed memory, did not decree, and this is not called divorcing against her will. And furthermore, even one who transgresses and divorces against her will, it is also the opinion of most of the great authorities that it is a get, as I wrote in siman 119. Nevertheless, for the halacha it requires further study. And perhaps when she stipulated upon him that "on this condition I receive the get," his intention was also that if the condition is not fulfilled it shall not be a get in any manner, even if he is a complete anuss and it is an anuss that is not common. And it is not similar to a condition that he stipulates "on condition that I do not come" and the like (and it appears to me that therefore the Beit Shmuel was precise to say that she stipulated upon him, see there and examine carefully).

The Tur wrote: And similarly, if he said, "This is your get on condition that if I do not appease you so that you are reconciled within thirty days, it shall be a get," and he appeased her but she was not reconciled, it is a get even though he is under duress, for he appeased her with many appeasements and she was not reconciled; and it is possible she would have been reconciled if he had much money, and he is under duress because he does not have it—even so, there is no plea of duress regarding gittin. Thus far his words. And this law is in the Gemara (30a). The explanation of the matter is that regarding this language he used, "if I do not appease you it shall be a get," the intention is not that it depends on her reconciliation such that if she was not reconciled it is a get, for if so, all this lengthiness is unnecessary, and he should have said briefly that since she was not reconciled, the condition was fulfilled and it is a get. Rather, this is the explanation: the condition was on his part, that if he does not do every stratagem available to him to appease her, let it be a get; but if he does everything in his power to do to appease her, the get shall be void even if she is not reconciled, since he did every stratagem available to him (Tosafot ibid. and Ran, see there). Therefore, if he truly gave her much money and she was not appeased, the condition was voided for he did everything; but when he did not give her much money to appease her, it turns out he did not do everything in his power to do, and the condition was fulfilled and it is a get. And even though the fact that he did not give her much money is not due to a lack of will but due to a lack of ability, and it turns out he is under duress, nevertheless, there is no plea of duress regarding gittin. And that which the Tur wrote, "and it is possible she would have been reconciled," this is the explanation: since it is possible she would have been reconciled with much money and he did not do so, even though he is under duress in this, it is a get. And the Rambam, of blessed memory, did not bring this law at all, and it seems to me that his reason is because this depends on the local vernacular regarding the meaning of "if I do not appease you"—whether the intention is that the condition is upon him as we have written, or that the condition is upon her, meaning if you are not reconciled let it be a get; and therefore he omitted this law entirely.

The Tur wrote: And if he did not say "from now," but rather "if I do not come within thirty days it shall be a get, and if I come within thirty days it shall not be a get," the Rambam wrote that the get does not take effect until the completion of thirty days when he did not come; therefore, if he dies within the time, it is not a get at all and she must undergo yibbum. The Ra'avad wrote that it is a get and she is permitted to the public. The Ramah distinguished and wrote that in an oral [stipulation] where he did not write the condition in the get, it is not a get at all and she must undergo yibbum, and if he wrote the condition in the get, it is a matter of doubt and she performs chalitzah and does not undergo yibbum. And some say that it is always a case of a doubtfully divorced woman and she performs chalitzah and does not undergo yibbum, and such is the opinion of the Tosafot, that she performs chalitzah. Thus far his words.

The explanation of the matter is that we have already explained in siman 143, section 28, that regarding documents we rule like R. Yose that the date of a document proves its intent, meaning that the intent is "from now" even if he did not explicitly state so, for if not so, why do we need the date? And also regarding a get we say this, and therefore even without "from now" its law is as "from now." This is the opinion of the Ra'avad, who ruled that it is a get and she is permitted to the public because this is as "from now." The Rambam did not rule so regarding gittin for the reasons we explained there, and besides this, his reason is simple: since in a get it is an enactment of the sages to write a date in the get, there is no proof from the date to say that it proves his intent is "from now" (Bach). The Ramah distinguishes between an oral condition and a written one, for when the condition is written in the get, the date proves that he means "from today," but when the condition is oral, it can be said that when he delivered it to her with this condition, he retracted from the date of the document (Rashi, Gittin 72b). And because in the Gemara (ibid.) there is one who is uncertain about this, he therefore ruled that orally it is a doubt. This is according to R. Yose, but according to the Rabbis who disagree with R. Yose, orally it is certainly not a get and in writing it is a doubt, for perhaps they only disagreed regarding an oral condition and not a written one; therefore he holds that orally it is not a get and in writing it is a doubt. The "there are those who say" and the Tosafot hold that it is always a doubt, and she performs chalitzah and does not perform yibbum because there is a doubt whether we rule like R. Yose regarding gittin and whether R. Yose spoke even regarding an oral condition. Therefore, in Shulchan Aruch section 2, they left the matters undefined and wrote that it is a doubt, see there, and they did not distinguish between an oral condition and a written one, for they hold like the Tosafot (and before the Beit Yosef there was a different version in the Tur, as the Bach wrote, see there).

However, that which we wrote regarding the opinion of the Ramah, that he ruled not in accordance with Rabbi Yosei, appears difficult. Therefore, it seems to me that he follows his own reasoning according to what the Tur wrote in his name in Choshen Mishpat siman 158, that "the date of the document proves it" applies only to one who gives after death, and regarding a get this is not applicable, as is written in siman 143 section 30; see there. According to this, regarding an oral statement, even according to Rabbi Yosei we do not say in cases of gittin that "the date of the document proves it." But regarding a document, he is in doubt, for perhaps since it is not the practice to write a condition in a get—as this is not a monetary document in which to write details, for indeed we maintain that one should not write a condition in a get as is written in siman 147—therefore, since this person had the condition written in the get, there is a doubt that perhaps in such a case we say "the date of the document proves it" according to Rabbi Yosei (and see Beit Shmuel subsection 4, and according to what I have written it is simply settled).

There is one who asked a great question regarding this law: Behold, we write in a get "from this day and forever," and we say in the Gemara (85b) that they instituted this to exclude the view of Rabbi Yose, meaning, so as not to rely on the date of the document but rather to write explicitly "from today." If so, why did the poskim remain silent regarding these laws, and how did the Tur and Shulchan Aruch rule that it is a doubt, given that it is written "from now" (Beit Shmuel ibid.)? In truth, if so, one must wonder about the Rambam and all the poskim who wrote many laws regarding such conditions where the get does not take effect until the fulfillment of the condition; why did they write this, for according to our version of the text, these laws do not exist at all? Furthermore, one must wonder about the Shas, why it did not say: "And now that we write 'from this day and forever,' she is divorced from now," as they said regarding similar matters in other documents (Bava Batra 171b).

Therefore, it appears to me that this law, that the date of a document proves its intent, only applies when he himself writes or commanded the writing of the date, as is written in Choshen Mishpat there, and we brought this in siman 143, section 29. And so I found this reasoning in the Maharik, shoresh 94, and he wrote it in the name of the Rashba, see there. And according to this, also regarding the formulation "from this day," since it is a general formulation and is not written according to the command of the husband, we certainly say that the oral condition annuls it. And even though in the Gemara the conclusion according to R. Yose is that even with an oral condition he holds the date of a document proves its intent (for Rava holds thus), this is all when he wrote it himself or commanded its writing, but not in an ordinary case. And nevertheless, for the practical law one should be stringent, even though from the plain meaning of the language of the poskim it implies explicitly that they were not concerned for it.

In the Gemara (76b) there is an inquiry regarding "from now, if I do not come within twelve months," and he died within the time; even though he certainly will not come, nevertheless, perhaps she is not permitted to marry until the completion of the twelve months. It remains as a teiku, and we rule stringently. The Tosafot wrote the reason: that we decree "died" on account of "did not die," for it is not revealed to all that he died, and they will wonder why they permit her to marry. But at the completion of the time, everyone knows that the condition was fulfilled. The Rosh and the Tur wrote likewise. However, the Rambam is of the opinion that according to the fundamental law it could be so, for as long as the nullification of the condition has not emerged into actuality, even though it emerged potentially, it is not called a nullification of the condition. We have already written this in the previous siman, section 34, and we explained there in section 37 that this is only regarding the nullification of a condition and not its fulfillment; for the Rambam himself ruled regarding "from now, if you do not give me two hundred zuz within thirty days," that she may marry immediately, see there. And there we explained the reason for the difference between one and the other (and in the Yerushalmi, chapter 7, halacha 3, another reason is explained).

This is the wording of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 3: "Behold, this is your get from now if I do not come from now until twelve months, and he died within twelve months, behold she is divorced; but if she has a yavam, she shall not marry without chalitzah until twelve months pass, and if she married, she shall not leave." Thus far his words. And it implies that according to all the poskim, if she married she shall not leave, even according to the opinion of the Rambam that it is a complete prohibition as has been written. And there is one who says that according to the Rambam, if she married she shall leave (Beit Shmuel, subsection 5), and all the more so according to the one who holds that the doubt is perhaps he did not intend to divorce her except after twelve months, for it did not enter his mind that he would die (Ran, end of chapter 7). And it appears to me that according to the Rambam, it is certainly impossible to say so, for behold he holds at the beginning of chapter 8 that even with a condition of "if you give me two hundred zuz" without "from now," also if she married she shall not leave, and we explained his reasoning in the previous siman, section 10, see there; and all the more so with "from now" regarding "if I do not come after twelve months" that she shall not leave. And it is true that in section 17 there we explained that with this condition, if she married she shall leave without "from now," and we distinguished between a condition that is upon her to perform and a condition that is upon him, see there; nevertheless, since he is lenient regarding a condition upon her even without "from now," all the more so regarding a condition upon him with "from now." And also the one who holds the reason that he did not intend to divorce her except after twelve months, it is also impossible to say it according to its plain meaning, for behold he said "from now"; rather, this is the explanation: that perhaps his intention was that at the conclusion of twelve months she shall be divorced from now, and certainly so it is. Therefore, she should not marry ab initio even when the condition certainly will not be fulfilled, because such was his intent. But in any case, why was his intent so? Because it did not enter his mind that he would die, as has been written. And it is understood automatically that if it had entered his mind that he would die, he would have divorced her immediately, for behold his intention was not to provoke her or cause her pain, and ultimately his entire intention was because of the fulfillment of the condition. And since it is so, automatically when he died and it is impossible for the condition to be fulfilled, granted that we do not permit her ab initio, nevertheless why should she leave if she married? Behold, we know clearly that he will not come, and ultimately she will be divorced retroactively. And nevertheless, in practice it is possible that one should be stringent, and the law requires further study. And nevertheless, since according to the Tosafot, the Rosh, and the Tur it is obvious that she shall not leave, one may rely on them so as not to remove a woman from her husband, and what is more, even according to the opinions that were explained, it also appears so (for his intent is only a disclosure of mind and is nothing).

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 4: If he gave her a get at night and said to her, "This is your get on condition that the sun emerges from its sheath," and he died during the night, this is a get. However, if he said to her, "If it emerges from its sheath," or if he said, "When the sun emerges from its sheath," and he died during the night, this is a case of doubt. And there are those who say that even with "on condition" we rule stringently, unless he explicitly said "from now." Thus far his words.

The explanation of the matter is that with "on condition," which is like "from now," she is divorced at night; but with "if it goes out" or "when it goes out," it is a get after death. However, the doubt is that perhaps we establish the law like Rabbi Yosei, that the date of the document proves it, and it is like "from now," and so it is stated in the Gemara (end of chapter 7). And the "some say" hold that "on condition" is not like "from now," and we mentioned this opinion in siman 38, see there. And they wondered about him, why only in this place did our teacher, the Beit Yosef, concern himself with this opinion and not in other places (Beit Shmuel, subsection 7). And it appears to me that because in this matter the language of "on condition" is not understood; for it is well and good regarding a condition that a person must do or not do, it is relevant to say "this is your get on condition that you do such and such for me," but regarding the rising of the sun, what relevance does a condition have in this? For it will certainly rise, and this is nothing other than like one who says that the taking effect of the get shall be then. Therefore, even though it is explicit in the Gemara also in this that it is considered like one who says "from now," nevertheless in this he concerned himself with the disagreeing opinion and held that according to the halacha it is not like "from now" (and do not answer me from the words of the Ran on the Mishnah of "this is your get," see there, for he did not write his reasoning regarding "on condition," see there and examine carefully).

And that which he wrote, "when the sun emerges from its sheath," is like "if it emerges" regarding the matter of the date of the document, and therefore it is a doubt. As has been written, there are some of our teachers who hold that regarding "when it emerges," even according to Rava, we do not say "the date of the document proves it," since he explicitly says "when it emerges" (Rashi at the end of chapter 7). And the same applies to any condition, such as "this is your get when you give me two hundred zuz" and the like. And certainly, for stringency, one must be concerned for this opinion, for so it also appears to be the opinion of the Rambam in chapter 9, law 15, who wrote: "This is your get when the sun emerges from its sheath," and he died at night, it is not a get. "On condition that the sun emerges," and he died at night, she is divorced, and when the sun shines the condition will be fulfilled. If he stipulated with her that if the sun shone it shall be a get and if the sun did not shine it shall not be a get, and he died at night, it is not a get, etc. Thus far his words. And it must be understood: since he holds that "when it emerges" is one law with "if it emerges," why did he divide them into two laws? Rather, it is certainly because they are not of the same reasoning; for regarding "if it emerges," according to Rava it is like "from now," and only the Rambam, of blessed memory, does not rule like him as we have explained, but regarding "when it emerges," even according to Rava it is not a get.

The sages taught in the Mishnah: If [he said], "If I do not come from now until twelve months, write and give a get to my wife," and they wrote the get within twelve months and gave it after twelve months, it is not a get, for the agents deviated from what he commanded, as he commanded not to write except after twelve months. We do not say that he was only particular regarding the giving, for certainly he was also particular regarding the writing (Ran, end of chapter 7), as it is not a person's will to hasten a get as long as it is not necessary. And even if he said, "Write and give a get to my wife if I do not come from now until twelve months," and they wrote it before twelve months, it is not a get (ibid. in the Mishnah). We do not say that since he should have said, "If I do not come, write and give," and instead he said, "Write and give if I do not come," perhaps his intention was to write now; we do not say so, for certainly his intention was to write afterward (Gemara, end of chapter 7). All of this is for the reason we explained. It is clear from the language of the Shas and the poskim that it is not a get at all from the Torah. Even though he did not stipulate according to the laws of conditions, there is no hindrance in the matter, for the laws of conditions are not required when speaking to an agent, as he is only his agent in this manner and not when he deviates from his words (Bach in the name of the Ran and Rashba). There is no difference whether they wrote the earlier time in the get or whether they wrote the time after twelve months; since they deviated from his words, the get is void from the Torah (Beit Shmuel, subsection 8).

We further learned there in the Mishnah (at the end of chapter 7): If they wrote it after twelve months and gave it after twelve months and he died, if the get preceded the death, this is a get; and if the death preceded the get, it is not a get; and if it is not known, this is what they said: she is divorced and not divorced. Thus far the words of the Mishnah. And seemingly, there is no novelty at all in these laws. And it appears to me that it teaches us much: that if only the giving of the get preceded the death, this is a get, and even if the giving was a long time after twelve months, as our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 5. This is his wording: If he did not give it to her immediately after twelve months, but rather a long time afterward, even though the delay was on the part of the woman who did not want to receive it immediately, nevertheless it is a get, provided that the husband is alive. Thus far his words. And we do not say that his intention was specifically immediately after twelve months. And so too the Tanna teaches us that in a case where it is not known, it is a doubt, and we do not say "let us establish him in his status of being alive until the get" and she would be definitely divorced; for since he is now dead, we are in doubt that perhaps he died before the get (Ran). And so too we do not say the opposite, that "since he is now dead, he was also dead previously," as this reasoning is found in siman 37: "since she is now a bogeret, in the morning she was also a bogeret," and she would be subject to yibbum. For it has already been explained there in section 38 that in any place where there is a chazakah against it, we do not say this reasoning. And here, behold, there is a chazakah of being alive and a chazakah of a married woman against this reasoning. And there, regarding a bogeret, there is no chazakah of being a naarah against it, for on the day that completes the six months, she has neither a chazakah of being a naarah nor a chazakah of being a bogeret, as I wrote there.

We learn in the Gemara (at the end of chapter 7): Our Rabbis taught: "After a week" means a year; "after a year" means a month; "after a month" means a week; "after a week [of days]" means Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday. And "before the Shabbat" is called Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday. Rashi explained: If he said, "This is your get if I do not return after this week," meaning this shemittah, we wait for him the eighth year, for every eighth year is called "after the week." Thus far his words. And if he said "after a year," we wait for him a month; and "after a month," we wait for him a week of days; and "after a week [of days]," we wait for him three days, which are Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday, for they are called "after the Shabbat." And if he said "before Shabbat," it is considered from Wednesday. And the reason for the matter is that since he used a calculation of time that is collected from individual parts—such as a shemittah which is collected from years—"after it" refers to the calculation collected from the individual parts that follow it. And the individual parts of the shemittah are the years, therefore it waits a year; and the individual parts of the year are months, it waits a month; and the individual parts of the month are weeks, it waits a week of days. And according to this, also regarding "after Shabbat," we should have said that the following day is sufficient, for the week is collected from days; however, because in the language of people, when they say "after Shabbat" their intention is until Tuesday inclusive, and "before Shabbat" their intention is from Wednesday onwards, and presumably his intention is according to the language of people. And there is no difference whether he stands at the beginning of the shemittah, in the middle, or at its end, for even if he stands at the end of the shemittah it is a year, since he mentioned the term shemittah (Tosafot), and likewise regarding a year and a month.

The Tur wrote: If he said, "Write a get and give it to my wife if I do not come after the shevua," they shall not write and give it until two years pass—this shemittah year in which they stand and the first year of the shemittah that follows. Thus far his words. And so too regarding a "year," they shall wait the entire year and a month afterward; and so too regarding a "month," they shall wait the entire month and a week of days afterward; and regarding "after the Shabbat," they shall wait the entire Shabbat and three days afterward; see there. And this is also similar to the explanation of Rashi, except that Rashi explained it in a case where he gave her the get and said this to her, and he explained it in a case where he commanded to write it, but the reasoning for both of them is the same. And he wrote further: And in all of them, they do not precede what he said, but if they delayed, there is nothing wrong with that. Thus far his words. And this is as I wrote in section 21, that his insistence was only that they should not precede the time, but regarding the delay of the time, he does not insist.

But the Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote in chapter 9, law 23: If he said to them, "Write and give a get to my wife after the week," they do not write it until a year after the week. If he said to them, "After a year," they do not write it until after a month of the second year. If he said to them, "After the month," they do not write it until after the week of the second month. If he said, "After the week," they do not write it after the week until the end of the third day. If he said to them, "Write and give it to her before the week," they write from the fourth day until the end of the sixth day and give it to her. If they delayed after the time he said and afterwards wrote and gave it to her—for example, if he said to them, "After the month," and they wrote and gave it to her after two weeks of the second month—this is pasul. Thus far his words. (See what I wrote in siman 141, section 123).

The Rosh, of blessed memory, explained his intention that they may not write until the completion of the year following the shemittah, and he challenged him, for they are certainly permitted to write throughout the year following the seven-year cycle. However, the Tur, the Ran, and the Maggid Mishneh also explained the words of the Rambam thus: that his intention was to write throughout the year following the cycle. And behold, according to the version before us in the Rambam, it is simple that it is like the words of the Rosh, for regarding "after a year" he wrote explicitly that they do not write until after a month of the second year, and he wrote similarly regarding "after a month" and "after a week." However, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in his book Kesef Mishneh that it is an erroneous version, and regarding "after a year" the version is: they write until after a month; and regarding "after a month" they write until after the week; and regarding "after a week" they write until the end of the third day. He wrote similarly in the Shulchan Aruch, section 6, see there. And that which he wrote regarding "after a cycle," they do not write except until a year, means that they write the entire year and no more. And that which he wrote if they delayed after the time he stated—such as regarding "after the month" and they wrote it and gave it to her after two weeks of the second month—it is not literally after two weeks, but rather meaning after the first week passed and the second week began (Kesef Mishneh). And that which he disqualifies if they delayed after the time, even though we wrote in section 21 that a delay does not disqualify, this is because here he limited the time of when to write, but in section 21 his intention was only that they should not write beforehand (Beit Shmuel, sub-section 9).

And according to this, it is possible that the Rambam does not disagree with Rashi and the poskim except in the interpretation of the baraita, but in this he admits: that if he said, "If I do not come until after the shevua," one must necessarily wait until a year passes after the shemittah, and he should not come to write then and not before; and if they delayed the time, it is also kosher, for his primary intention was not to write before. This is not so according to the interpretation of the Rambam, who did not make it dependent on "if I do not come," but rather said it without qualification, "Write and give after the shevua," where they write all the year after the shemittah and no more (and so wrote the Beit Shmuel). And according to this, all the poskim do not disagree in the law. And that which the Rambam ruled regarding where they delayed it, that it is pasul, meaning a rabbinic pasul, and if she married she does not leave, as is written in siman 150. And why is it not a doubt from the Torah? Because in truth it can be said that any "after," even if greatly distant, is included in the term "after," but the sages were concerned that they should not write except at a time that is understood from the language to be "after" in proximity; therefore, there is only a rabbinic pasul in this (Beit Yosef). Nevertheless, it is ruled in the Shulchan Aruch that she is a doubtfully divorced woman (see Beit Shmuel subsection 11).

The Tur wrote in the name of our teacher, Chananel, that if one said, "Behold, this is your get after the shemitah cycle," it is not a get until the first year of the eighth cycle and the first month of the second year have passed; and likewise regarding "after a year," "after a month," and "after a week." The Rosh disagrees on this and holds that she is divorced immediately after the shemitah cycle, and likewise in the others. It is not comparable to one who says, "Behold, this is your get if I do not come after the shemitah cycle," where we cannot say it should be a get if he did not come within the shemitah cycle, for if so, he should have said "if I do not come within this shemitah cycle." Rather, certainly, since he hung the time of his arrival on "after the shemitah cycle," perforce he means if he does not come during the time called "after the shemitah cycle," which is one year from the coming cycle; and regarding "after a year," one month of the months of the coming year; and regarding "after a month," one week of the weeks of the second month; and regarding "after a week," the common language for dividing the days of the week is that half are called "after the past Shabbat" and half are called "before the coming Shabbat." But one who gives a get to his wife so that she should be divorced after the shemitah cycle, why should she not be divorced immediately after the shemitah passes? For the fixing of the time was so that she would not be divorced within the shemitah cycle, and if it were his intention until the eighth year passes, he would have said "after the shemitah cycle." Thus far his words. And it appears clearly that there is a printing error, and it should say: he would have said "a year after the shemitah cycle."

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 6: There are those who say that if he said "after twelve months," it is as if he said "after a year"; if he said "after thirty days," they write "one day after thirty days." Thus far his words. And in this, the statement "after thirty days" is not similar to the statement "after twelve months." The reason is simple: regarding a month, when he mentioned the name of a month, it is after one of the count that he took, and its law is like "after a year." Therefore, regarding "after thirty days," it is also after one of the count that he took, and it follows that it is not similar to "after a month," and so too anything similar to this.

The Tur wrote that if he said, "If I do not come until after the festival," they shall not write and give until fifteen days have passed after the festival. Thus far his words. And so wrote the Rishonim in the name of Rabbeinu Chananel, and they wrote that they did not know from where he derived this. Therefore, some say that just as after the Shabbat we divide the days of the week between the two Shabbats, so too we divide the days between festival and festival between the two festivals, and "after the festival" is half the time between festival and festival. And so wrote the Rif in a response (Beit Yosef in the name of the Ran and the Ramah). However, in truth, according to this, these laws would change with every festival, for between Pesach and Shavuot the time is short, and between Shavuot and Sukkot it is longer, and between Sukkot and Pesach it is much longer. And it appears that according to the common language of people, there is no distinction between them. And the reason of Rabbeinu Chananel and the Tur seems to me to be from the Mishnah in the first chapter of Taanit (10a), that when they went up for the festival, the last one reached his home fifteen days after the festival, see there. And it is explained in the Gemara (Bava Metzia 28a) that this was during the time of the Second Temple, see there. Therefore, certainly then it was called "after the festival" for fifteen days, and automatically, when in our sins we were exiled from our land, this name did not change even afterward, for we are from the exile of the Second Temple, may it be rebuilt speedily in our days.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in his great work in the name of the Rashba and the Ran that "before a year," "month," and "week" are not defined. And ostensibly it would seem that "before" is like "after," as we say regarding Shabbat, but in the Yerushalmi it does not imply this. Thus far his words. And this is the explanation: for in the Yerushalmi at the end of chapter 7 it is stated: Rabbi Bon bar Hiyya inquired before Rabbi Zeira: "Behold, this is your get on the eve of Pesah," meaning, if I do not come before Pesah. And he answered him that even according to the one who holds that all thirty days after the festival are considered "after the festival," all thirty days before Pesah are not considered "before Pesah." Thus far his words. Consequently, we do not learn "before" from "after." And one cannot explain the Yerushalmi as referring to one who says literally "the eve of Pesah," for then the thirty days would not be included; rather, in the case of "before," it would be like "after," for it is a simple matter that "the eve of Pesah" is literally the eve of Pesah, and what would his inquiry be? Rather, certainly his intention was when he said "before Pesah." (What the Shach wrote there as a proof for the explanation of Rabbeinu Chananel which we wrote in section 27, and not like the Rosh, is not a proof, for he employed a light phrasing and his intention was "if I do not come." Furthermore, it is stated there that if he said "at the conclusion of Shabbat," there is a doubt until the eve of Shabbat. And this requires further study, for in the Shas it is implied explicitly in every place that "the conclusion of Shabbat" is called only the night after Shabbat, and in the Yerushalmi it says there also regarding the matter of nedarim so. And it is obvious that in the language of people it is not so, and it requires further study; and see Yoreh Deah siman 220).

And know that there is one who is uncertain regarding the expression "within" (tokh), such as "if I do not come within such-and-such a time," for perhaps he means in the middle of the time, as Rashi explained on the verse "and the tree of life in the midst of (betokh) the garden," that it was in the middle of the Garden of Eden, and so Onkelos translated. But there is no doubt in this at all, and it is proven from several places that until the end of the time he established is called "within." And from the tree of life there is no proof at all, for there the verse is entirely redundant, since it was written previously that the Holy One, Blessed be He, planted all kinds of trees in Eden, and it should have said that He also planted there the tree of life and the tree of knowledge; why did it need to say "in the midst of the garden" when it is already dealing with the garden? Rather, it certainly comes for a midrashic exposition of "middle." Yet regarding the impurity of an earthenware vessel, it is written "everything that is within it (betokho) shall be impure," and the impurity reaches until the walls of the vessel. And regarding the Pesach sacrifice, we learned in a Mishnah: and he places its legs and its entrails within it (beginning of chapter 7 of Pesachim), and in the Gemara there, Rabbi Yishmael calls it "within, within," and is it an obligation that he place it in its middle? (see there in Rashi's explanation).

And so there is one who is uncertain regarding one who says "from today until such-and-such a day," or "from now until twelve months," or "until thirty days," whether the final day is included or not. And the doubt is whether "until" is "until and including" or "until but not including" (Be'er Heitiv subsection 1 in the name of the Maharit). And in my humble opinion, it appears that "until" is "until and including." For even though the Tannaim and Amoraim disagree on this, whether "until" is "until and including" or not (Nazir 6b and Niddah 58b), and the Sages explicitly said (ibid.) that there are those that are "until and including" and there are those that are not included, see there, and in the common language of people "until" is "until but not including" (Ran Nedarim 61a), nevertheless, it appears clear to me that this applies to a matter that is distinct and divided from what precedes it, such as "until Pesach," "until the Festival," and the like, for these days have a different name than those preceding them. But in a matter that is not divided from what precedes it, "until" is "until and including." Therefore, the Sages ruled regarding the time of prayers, where they said "until four hours" or "until six hours," that "until" is "until and including," as is found in Berakhot (27a), because the hours are equal in their name. And also in the language of the Torah it is so, for regarding chametz it is written "from the first day until the seventh day" and it is "until and including," and regarding the leper it is written "from his head until his feet" and it is not "until and including" (Arakhin 18b) because "head" is a name unto itself and so too "feet." And from our Mishnah itself this is proven, for we learned: "This is your get if I do not come from now until twelve months," and he died within twelve months, it is not a get and the get is completely void. And we have already clarified that "within" refers to the entire time, and it implies explicitly that even if he died on the final day, the get is completely void. And if it should enter your mind that there is a doubt in this, the Talmud and the poskim would not have omitted speaking of this so as not to come to a stumbling block; rather, certainly there is no doubt in this. (And the Responsa of the Maharit is not in my hand at present to look into it, and nevertheless one must deliberate on this for the law; and the Knesset HaGedolah wrote that it is good to make the condition explicit regarding such-and-such a day, see there).

We learned in a Baraita (76b) that if he said to her, "This is your get on condition that I pass from before your face for thirty days," and he was going and coming, going and coming, since he did not seclude himself with her, this is a get, and we are not concerned for a "stale get" because he did not seclude himself with her. Thus far the wording of the Baraita. And this is the explanation: that the condition was that the get should be upheld when he does not see her for thirty consecutive days. And the Tanna teaches us two things: one, that we do not require regarding an unspecified condition that it be fulfilled immediately, and therefore even though he was going and coming and was seen by her, nevertheless, when the condition is fulfilled—namely, that he distances himself for thirty days from her presence and does not see her—the get is upheld. And furthermore he teaches us that we are not concerned that perhaps he secluded himself with her, for if he secluded himself the get is disqualified because perhaps he had relations with her and she will give birth to a son, and afterwards they will see that the date of the get precedes the conception of the son, and there will be a slur as they will say "her get precedes her son," and it will be explained in siman 148. And the disqualification is rabbinic. And here, since we did not see that he secluded himself with her, even though he was seen with her, nevertheless we are not concerned for a stale get, and when the condition is fulfilled it is a get.

The Gemara asks: and let us be concerned lest he reconciled? And it answers: in a case where he says, "she is trusted by me to say that I did not come." And Rashi explained that it asks that we should be concerned that perhaps when he came to her, he reconciled the quarrel between them and secluded himself with her, and after some time the husband comes and challenges and says, "I reconciled." And it answers that at the time of the condition he says, "on this condition I deliver the get, that she shall be trusted by me like a hundred witnesses as long as she says that I did not come and seclude myself and reconcile." Thus far his words. And similarly the Gemara asks on that which we learned in a Mishnah: "from now, if I do not come within twelve months," and he died within twelve months, this is a get. And it asks: and let us be concerned lest he reconciled? And it answers also: in a case where he says, "she is trusted by me to say that I did not come." And Rashi explained above (29b): let us be concerned lest he reconciled within twelve months, for there is much time to come, and this is not similar to one who sends a get from overseas and does not set a time for its remaining in his hand, for there one need not be concerned lest he reconciled, for the husband says to himself, "the agent preceded me and the get has already reached her hand," and he does not uproot himself based on a doubt. Thus far his words. And similarly the Gemara asks there regarding one who sent a get to his wife and said to the agent that he should not give it to her until thirty days. And it asks: and let us be concerned lest he reconciled? And Rashi explained: perhaps the husband came to her within thirty days and secluded himself and reconciled with her and cohabited, and it becomes an old get. Thus far his words. And it answers that it deals with a betrothed woman who is not yet dear to him, and he does not seek to reconcile with her, see there, for only with a married woman is there this concern.

And one must ask according to this: regarding one who places a get with an agent for his wife for a set time, and he is with her in the city, let us be concerned that perhaps he appeased her, for he does not need to uproot himself from his place. And furthermore, since he placed it for a time, for according to what has been explained, even one who uproots himself from his place might come to appease her, and all the more so when he is in the city. And the answer to this is that the Sages, of blessed memory, already said regarding something similar to this: if it were that he appeased her, it would have a voice (18b), and since there is no voice, conclude from this that he did not appease her. And why does this have a voice? For the neighbors hear the quarrel between them, and when he appeases her and they become quiet from strife, everyone senses it (Rashi ibid.). And it must be said that this reasoning is only when they are in one city, where from the beginning they hear the quarrels, and automatically they sense when he appeased her and the quarrels were quieted. But when he is not in the city, there is no sensing even if he comes in secret and appeases her, because the quarrels from before have already been forgotten, and the sensing is only when the appeasement is immediately after the quarrel. Therefore, in all these cases, the Gemara did not state this reasoning (one is forced to say this according to the explanation of Rashi, for what the Tosafot wrote there, beginning with the words "we are concerned," that when he goes from there he presumably intends for her benefit and there is no quarrel, cannot be said according to the explanation of Rashi, for he explained explicitly at the end of the seventh chapter: he appeased the quarrel between them; see there and examine carefully).

Behold, according to the explanation of Rashi, the primary concern of "perhaps he appeased her" is because perhaps he cohabited with her and it would be an old get. The Tur wrote similarly, and this is his wording: If he said to her, "This is your get when I pass from before your presence for thirty days," etc., even though he was coming and going, we do not fear that perhaps he secluded himself with her in the meantime and it would be an old get, provided that he believed her initially, etc. Thus far his words. One should not ask why we must concern ourselves with the slight concern of an old get, which is only disqualified by rabbinic law as has been written, for if we concern ourselves that perhaps he came and appeased her, then the condition that he did not pass from before her presence for thirty days was not fulfilled and the get is void by Torah law. For it can be said that we do not fear regarding the time he passed from before her presence for thirty days that perhaps he came in the middle, for we have no reason to fear this, as by Torah law, leave a matter in its established status, and one does not fear regarding a matter we have not seen, and a doubt does not remove a certainty (and the Maggid Mishneh wrote similarly in chapter 9, halacha 11). Rather, the concern is regarding the time he was coming and going, and so it is clear from the precision of the wording of the Tur that we brought.

And one should not question this resolution from the fact that regarding "from now if I do not come from here until twelve months," where we are concerned that perhaps he came in the middle and it is a get yashan, it is perforce that the get is void because the condition was not fulfilled—for in this case as well, it can be said as I have written, that certainly if he came, the get is void according to the Torah. However, in truth, there is no need to be concerned for this according to the Torah since we did not see him, as I have written. Rather, regarding get yashan, which is a mere concern that the rabbis decreed, even though according to Torah law it is not a concern, if so, in this case too we should decree. And you should know that this is so, for if not so, what benefit is there in the credibility he gave her? Ultimately, let us be concerned for this! Rather, it is certainly nothing more than a mere concern that he will spread a rumor, and consequently, when he has empowered her with credibility, he will not spread a rumor, and even if he does spread one, he is not believed (and so wrote the Tosafot there, 18b, and the Ran at the end of chapter 7, see there) (and according to what I have written, the difficulty of the Bach and the Beit Shmuel in subsection 14 is resolved).

But the Tosafot and the Rambam have another approach in all of this, for the concern that perhaps he reconciled is not because of an old get, but rather due to the concern of the cancellation of the get. This is the wording of the Rambam in chapter 9, law 9: If he stipulated with her that she should be divorced when thirty days pass from his absence, and he was coming and going, coming and going, but did not seclude himself with her, when he goes and remains away for thirty days, she is divorced. And even though he was coming and going within the thirty days, since he did not seclude himself with her, this is a valid get. In what case does this apply? When he stipulated and said, "Behold, she is trusted by me to say that I did not reconcile with her." But if he did not trust her, we concern ourselves that perhaps he reconciled with her when he was coming and going and she forgave him, and he subsequently cancelled the get when he reconciled with her. And because of this concern, the get shall be invalid after thirty days. And so too, one who says to a woman, "Behold, this is your get after twelve months," and he was with her in the province (in the city, as he wrote in the commentary on the Mishnah at the beginning of chapter 4 of Rosh Hashanah), we concern ourselves that perhaps he reconciled with her, until he says, "She is trusted by me to say that I did not reconcile with her." Thus far his words.

He further wrote: And so too regarding all conditions that depend on her will, and if she desired and waived them to her husband the get is void, we are concerned for her lest he appeased her, until he says "she is trusted by me." In what case does this apply? To one being divorced from marriage, for he is familiar with her; but regarding one being divorced from betrothal, we are not concerned for her lest he appeased her. Thus far his words. He further wrote: "Behold, this is your get from now if I do not come from now until twelve months," we are not concerned lest he came in secret, for it is not the way of people to come in private, and if the time he established ended and he did not come, behold she is divorced. Thus far his words. And according to his words, on the contrary, the concern of "lest he appeased" is only when they are in the same city; and in that case of "when I pass from before your face," the concern is only during the time he went and came, but when he went from here we do not concern ourselves lest he came in secret because of the reason he wrote (and regarding "from now if I do not come until twelve months" he ruled like the first version at the end of the seventh chapter who taught it on the Baraita, but on the Mishnah, "behold he did not come," see there; and he means to say that we do not have to concern ourselves with his coming in secret, and according to his words also the sugya on page 29b is rejected from the halacha, and the sugya follows the latter version, and most of the poskim disagree with him, and so it is implied from the Rif, see there).

And his words require clarification: what relevance is there to conditions that are dependent on her will? Is the get or the condition dependent on her will? Whether the condition is upon her to perform, such as to give two hundred zuz or to serve his father or to nurse his son, or whether the condition is upon him to perform, such as "if I do not come" or "if I do not appear before you," is it not all dependent on his will? For he can nullify the condition and he can nullify the get if it is not "on condition" or "from now," as is written in chapter 8 and as we explained in siman 143, see there. But regarding the woman, nothing is dependent. And indeed, the Ra'avad already challenged him, and this is his wording: I do not know what this forgiveness is, and what is in her power to forgive regarding conditions; and the appeasement is nothing other than that he was appeased with her not to divorce her and the get in her hand was nullified. Thus far his words. And so the Tosafot and our teacher Chananel explained, as the Rashba, of blessed memory, wrote.

And from the words of the Maggid it is explained that this is the meaning: that the Rambam is dealing with a condition of "on the condition that," which the husband cannot cancel, but when she also agrees, they can cancel. And this is the opinion of the Ramban, of blessed memory. And according to this, that which he said—that they are dependent on her will—means that she also must agree to its cancellation, and this is why he says that he appeased her and she forgave him and he went back and canceled the get; it means that since she agreed to its cancellation, he can cancel (and so wrote the Beit Shmuel in subsection 15). But it is a clear forced interpretation, for behold, the Rambam did not write that he is dealing with "on the condition that." And furthermore, how could he not write this law in chapter 8, where the core of these laws is located? And furthermore, according to their words, the Rambam holds that even regarding conditions that she must perform, we are concerned lest he appeased her, as was written in the name of the Ramban; yet they brought a responsum of the Rif that regarding other conditions, such as "on the condition that you give me two hundred zuz," we are not concerned lest he appeased her, see there. And for the most part, the Rambam follows his system (and it is true that the words of the Rif require study and need explanation, and see the Lechem Mishneh, but however his words are interpreted, so shall the words of the Rambam be interpreted).

Therefore, it appears to me that another intention is hidden in his words, for behold, when a husband divorces his wife, it is for one of four reasons: first, when he hates her; second, when she hates him and requests a get from him; third, when through quarrels and strife he comes to a state of anger and divorces her; and fourth, when he divorces her so that she will not be bound to a yavam, such as when he is ill or when he is traveling to a distant land, so that she will not remain an agunah. And the matter is understood that in the first reason, when he divorces her because he hates her, he does not stipulate any condition and does not extend the time, but rather divorces her immediately. And in the second reason, where she hates him and requests a get from him, he stipulates a condition upon her that she give him money or the like. And in the third, when he divorces her because of quarrels and strife, it is the way of the husband to write a get and place it with a third party or give it into her hand and stipulate some condition upon it to extend the time until thirty days or the like, so that within the time he may reconsider the matter.

And we have already explained that this concern that perhaps he was appeased is only a rabbinic concern, and according to the Torah, establish it upon its status quo, as the Maggid Mishneh wrote. And it is understood of itself that one should not fear the concern even rabbinically if we saw the action to the contrary (Lechem Mishneh). Therefore, regarding a condition that she must fulfill, in any case, if she did not fulfill it, it is not a get regardless, and if she did fulfill it, what should we fear? For when she fulfilled it, presumably he did not nullify the get, for if he had nullified it, who compelled her to fulfill the condition? And that we should say she gave it to him as a gift—why should we fear a strange and distant matter? On the contrary, it could be the opposite, that he was filled with mercy for her and forgives her so that the get will be upheld even without the fulfillment of the condition, and there is no stumbling block in this (and this is the intention of the Rif in his responsa). And so too in the fourth case, when he divorces her so that she will not be bound to a yavam or so that she will not remain an agunah, why would he nullify the get? And there is no reason here that we should fear this.

However, in the third case, when he divorces her due to quarrels and strife, and therefore the time is extended in this matter, there is certainly a concern that perhaps they were reconciled with one another. And since they were reconciled, naturally the act of the get becomes like a foreign thing to them, and there is reason to fear that he canceled the get. And this is what it means when it says that when he divorces her, thirty days must pass from before her presence, for we fear perhaps he reconciled and she forgave him—meaning, she forgave him for the quarrels and strife. And naturally, there is reason to fear that afterward he went back and canceled the get since the cause was removed. And so too that which he wrote: "And so too all conditions that depend on her will, and if she wished and forgave them to her husband the get is canceled, we fear for her perhaps he reconciled," thus far his words—this is the explanation: A condition that she must perform is not called "depending on her will," for behold, her will is for the get, and for the sake of this she gives money, and it depends on the will of the husband, conversely, to forgive her the condition and that the get be fulfilled without a condition, as the Rif wrote. But a get that came about through quarrels and strife is called "depending on her will," for if her will is to forgive the quarrels and be reconciled with him, and through this the cause of the get is canceled, in this we fear perhaps he reconciled, as has been written. And that which he wrote "the get is canceled," he means that the cause of the get is canceled. And therefore, in a "from now if I do not come until twelve months" case, we do not fear for "perhaps he reconciled," for there is no cause for this here. And this is what he wrote, "that it is not the way of people to come in secret," thus far his words—meaning, that there is no cause here for us to fear this. And even if it were possible that there were quarrels and strife between them, nevertheless, there is no reason to fear that he came in secret, for we do not fear regarding a matter that is not the way to do. And the essence of this fear is only when they are in one city and he divorces her because of quarrels and strife. And according to this, his words align with the words of the Rif, and he is not dealing at all with how the condition was—whether with "if" or with "on condition" or with "from now." And the matter is simple: that if the condition was with "if," he alone can cancel it, and if it was with "on condition" or "from now," both of them must agree, according to the words of the Ramban. Or perhaps he holds that even both of them cannot cancel it, for so it implies from his words in chapter 8, where he did not mention this law at all, and there are some of the Rishonim who hold so. And that which he found necessary to say regarding "from now if I do not come" that it is not the way of people to come in secret, it is not because of the cancellation of the get, but rather that the get is naturally canceled, for behold, the condition was not fulfilled since he came.

However, for the law, one must be concerned for all opinions, and in all types of conditions there is this concern of reconciliation, except in a condition of "if I die," where the condition is not dependent on their will, it is not relevant to be concerned for reconciliation, and the condition will perforce be fulfilled; and so wrote the Rashba. But in other types of conditions, even in a condition that she must perform, we are concerned lest he reconciled. Therefore, at the time they make the condition, he must give her credibility. This is the wording of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 7 at the end of the section: And so is the custom, to stipulate at the beginning that she shall be believed to say that he did not reconcile. And if when he stipulated he made his arrival dependent on witnesses—that the get shall not be voided by his arrival unless witnesses testify about him that he arrived—and the time passed and they do not testify that he arrived, according to everyone we are not concerned lest he arrived, even though he did not grant her credibility. Thus far his words. However, in these days of ours, we do not practice making any condition in a get. Nevertheless, in a time of necessity to stipulate a condition, he should say explicitly that she shall be believed to say that he did not reconcile her, and automatically he will not cast a slur, and even if he protests we do not concern ourselves with it, as has been explained. And if it is not his will to give her the credibility, he should stipulate that the get shall not be voided unless witnesses testify, as has been written.