Siman 131

The writing of the get and its signing must be for the sake of the man being divorced and for the sake of the woman being divorced, as it is written: "And he shall write for her a scroll of severance and place it in her hand." And this "for her" is superfluous and comes to teach "for her sake." And even though it is needed for the exposition "not for her and her fellow," as was written in siman 130, section 25, "and he shall write for her" is written twice (Tosafot 21b). And automatically, since it is required for her sake, it is obvious that it is also required for his sake, and an exposition is not needed for this, for the plain meaning of the verse is so, as "and he shall write" refers to the husband, and when he himself writes, he surely writes for his sake. Therefore, throughout the entire Shas we only say "for her sake." Therefore, when the scribe writes by the command of the husband, he must write for his sake and for her sake and for the sake of divorce, not for the sake of mere writing. And so it is in all the orders of divorce, and so too the signatures must be for his sake and for her sake and for the sake of divorce.

And a get that was written not for his sake or for her sake, the get is invalid by Torah law, and she is not even disqualified from the priesthood by such a get, and the kiddushin of another do not take effect upon her at all (Beit Shmuel). And if it was written for his sake but signed not for his sake—even if one witness signed for his sake and the second not for his sake—the get is invalid by rabbinic decree in any case, even when there were witnesses to the delivery, for this is like a forgery from within (Gemara 4a). And one should not ask what pitfall could result from this—for it is understandable that with disqualified witnesses there could be a pitfall in that we might rely upon them, but regarding "not for its sake," what concern is there even if we rely upon them, for they are valid witnesses and the get is valid by means of the witnesses to the delivery? For it can be said that we decree regarding the signing on account of the writing; for if they do not perform the signing for its sake, we decree lest they also not perform the writing for its sake (Tosafot ibid.).

Furthermore, it is not only according to the Rif and the Rambam, who hold that even according to Rabbi Elazar it is valid with only witnesses to the signature—there is no greater forgery than this, for that which is written "for her sake" refers also to the signatures of the witnesses. Rather, even according to those who disagree and hold that without witnesses to the delivery it is nothing, and witnesses to the signature have no primary status from the Torah, nevertheless, since this get is established by its signatories—for by means of the signatures we say it was certainly done in a valid manner, as this was the primary enactment of Rabban Gamliel that witnesses should sign on the get—and since they make it a get, they are certainly included in the writing of the get. Therefore, since they signed on it, if they did not sign for her sake, we call it a forgery from within. (The Rashba ibid. and this is what is written in the Shulchan Aruch section 6: "If he gave it to her without witnesses to the delivery etc." this is according to the system of the Rif and the Rambam):

There are some of the Geonim who hold that whenever the signatures are not in order, such as if they signed not lishmah, or if one of the witnesses is disqualified, or even if only one witness signed it, the get is void according to the Torah even if it was written lishmah and delivered in the presence of valid edei mesirah. The Rambam, of blessed memory, disputed them in chapter 3, law 8, and this is his wording: This does not appear to me to be anything other than like a forged document, not a certainly forged document, and since it was delivered in the presence of valid edei mesirah, it is disqualified by the words of the sages. Thus far his words. The Rif also in chapter 9 brought the opinion of this Gaon and ruled not in accordance with him; see there. And it appears that the opinion of the Gaon is this: that according to Rabbi Eleazar, either edei mesirah or edei hatimah effect the severance, like the opinion of the Rif and the Rambam, and he holds that since he had witnesses sign the get, he revealed his intent that his desire is to validate it with edei hatimah alone, and even though he subsequently also takes edei mesirah, it is merely for preference. And since his desire is to make the get with edei hatimah, the get is disqualified according to the Torah when the signatures are not according to the law of the Torah. And even though Rabban Gamliel instituted edei hatimah for the sake of the order of the world, it could be said that the Gaon holds that Rabban Gamliel instituted that there should be edei hatimah and not edei mesirah because they are superior regarding authentication, and then the signatures become required by the Torah. And even though it is explicitly proven in the Gemara that when he had Cutheans sign, the disqualification is only rabbinic—and therefore there is one who holds that with distinct names it is valid (10b)—this is certainly so, for since he had Cutheans sign, who are known not to be eligible for testimony, certainly his intention was not to validate it with edei hatimah. But when he began to have Israelites sign, his intention was to validate it with edei hatimah, and since they are disqualified, or they did not sign lishmah, or only one witness signed it, he disqualified the get. (And the difficulty of the Gra, subsection 8, is answered; and also what he wrote there, that even if there are no edei mesirah it does not require lishmah according to the Torah etc., requires great study according to the system of the Rif and the Rambam).

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 6 brought the opinion of the Gaon in the name of "there are those who say," see there, and he was concerned for his words as a stringency regarding "not for its sake." As for why he was not concerned for his words in siman 130 regarding one valid witness and one disqualified witness—where he wrote there in section 17 that the get is invalid and did not bring the opinion of the Gaon that it is not a get at all—and there is one who raised this difficulty against him (Beit Shmuel, subsection 7), it appears to me that according to what I wrote it is well-settled. For whenever a disqualification is found in the witnesses, or in one witness who is not fit for testimony, he was not concerned for this opinion; since he is not fit for testimony, certainly the husband's intention was not to validate the get with only a single witness. And even if he does not know of the disqualification, nevertheless, had he known, it would not have been his will. But regarding "not for its sake," where the witnesses are valid, it certainly could be that the husband desired to make the get valid according to the Torah based on the signatures, and they disqualified it. Therefore, as a stringency, he was concerned for this opinion. And we have already explained there in section 3 that when only one other valid witness signs upon it, it is not invalid even rabbinically (and so wrote the Beit Shmuel, subsection 7), and that there are those who disagree on this, see there.

Since the essence of the get is "lishma," therefore all the poskim wrote that one must be very careful when the husband commands the scribe to write the get, that he should say to him in the presence of the witnesses of the signature: "Write a get for my name, [name] son of [name], and for the name of my wife, [name] daughter of [name]." And likewise, when he tells the witnesses to sign the get, he should say to them that they should sign for his name and for her name and for the sake of divorce. And it is the custom that they answer, "So shall we do," and this is not indispensable. And likewise, the scribe should say with his mouth when he begins to write, that he is writing it for the name of [name] the wife of [name] and for the name of [name]. And likewise, each of the witnesses should say when he begins to sign, that he is signing for his name and for her name—and he should specify their names—and for the sake of divorce. And thought is not effective, and there is an indispensability in this even ex post facto (Beit Shmuel, subsection 8). And some say that the verbal utterance is not indispensable, and thought in the heart is sufficient ex post facto (Tuv Gittin). And behold, regarding a Sefer Torah, it is explained in Yoreh Deah, siman 274, that one must express it with his mouth; and so he wrote in Orach Chaim, siman 32, regarding the tanning of tefillin, see there. And there are some among the Rishonim who were uncertain regarding the writing of a Sefer Torah whether it requires verbal utterance or if thought is sufficient (Beit Yosef, Yoreh Deah, ibid.). However, it is certainly so that when the husband commands them to write and sign for his name and for her name, even if they did not express it verbally, they presumably acted according to his intent. But if the husband did not command them, it is a legal doubt, even if he commanded them to write a get for his wife; since he did not say explicitly that they should write for his name and for her name, the get is a doubt, for a woman does not stand for divorce, or perhaps since he said to them "write a get," presumably his intent was according to the law (so it appears to me). And furthermore, it appears to me that if the husband said to them generally, "write a get for my wife," and they wrote and signed explicitly for his name and for her name, this is sufficient.

And know that in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch and in the Seder HaGet it is explained that the husband, when he commands the scribe and the witnesses, says to them: "Write a get for the sake of such-and-such, my wife," and likewise to the witnesses; and it is not explained that he must say: "Write a get for my wife, such-and-such, and for my name." And regarding the scribe, when he begins, he must say "for his name and for her name," and likewise the witnesses when they sign. And it must be said that when the husband commands, he does not need to say "for his name" as well, for behold, he is commanding to write a get for the sake of his wife, and automatically it is included in this also "for his name." However, it is better that the husband also explains his words clearly as I have written, and such is the simple custom. And a proof for this is that in the Seder HaGet at the end of siman 154, section 16, in his command to the witnesses, it is written also "for his name," see there. And they further added there that he should say to them: "Be witnesses and sign this get that the scribe, so-and-so, is writing," see there. And such is the custom to mention the scribe, and it is not indispensable.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 7 that when the scribe writes, he should write continuously and not intermittently, so that they are written for his sake and for her sake as he began. However, post facto, if he wrote it intermittently, it is valid. Thus far his words. For ab initio, we are concerned that when he pauses, perhaps afterward he will not state that he is writing for her sake, and we would need to rely on what he said at the beginning of the get; ab initio, it is certainly not proper to rely on this, but post facto, we rely on it. He further wrote that there are those who say that the preparation of the parchment and the cutting of the quill, and likewise the scoring, must all be for their sake. However, if he did these things not for their sake, it is not disqualified. Thus far his words. For the obligation of "for her sake" applies only to the writing and the signatures, and it is only ab initio as a mere enhancement so that the matter of "for her sake" shall be strengthened.

He further wrote in section 9 that if the witness began to sign a portion of his name and did not say "for his sake" and "for her sake," and afterward he remembered and said it, there are those who permit it. Thus far his words. But if he finished his name and did not say "for his sake" and "for her sake," there is no remedy (Beit Shmuel, subsection 10). Even though "son of Yaakov, witness" is written properly, nevertheless, when his name is written improperly, it is like a forgery from within. This is not the case with a portion of his name, to which the term "forgery from within" does not apply since it is not a complete word; and granted that his entire name is not proper, nevertheless, it is also not like a forgery and is validated by "son of Yaakov, witness." Therefore, it appears to me that if he only signed "Reuven, witness" and signed a portion of his name not for its sake, the get is invalid (so it appears in my humble opinion; and see Beit Shmuel and Tuv Gittin, and according to our words there is no dispute; and examine this). However, what is "not for its sake"? Either he explicitly intended not for its sake, or in an unspecified manner which is like not for its sake, or even if he intended in his heart for its sake when he did not express it with his mouth and the husband did not explicitly tell them to sign for its sake. But if he explicitly told them to sign for its sake and he intended in his heart, it is sufficient; or perhaps even in an unspecified manner he acts based on the husband's intent, as I wrote in section 6. And one should be stringent in practice except in a case of great need, for then one may rely on what I wrote in section 6, since there are witnesses to the delivery it is not a Torah invalidation but rather a rabbinic concern.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 8: The two witnesses of the signature should be there at the time he begins to write the get, so that they will know it was written lishmah and will recognize it at the time of the signature. Thus far his words. And it is explained that it is sufficient if they stand there only at the beginning of the writing of the get. And the wording of the Tur is: The witnesses who sign must be there at the time the scribe writes it, and they must recognize that this is the get that the scribe wrote lishmah; however, even if they are only there at the beginning of the writing and heard that he is beginning to write lishmah, it is fine. Thus far his words. And from the Shulchan Aruch it is implied that even lechatchilah it is only necessary to be there at the time of the beginning. But in the Seder HaGet in section 21, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in this wording: And they must stand during the writing of the line of the name of the man and the woman and the time, and hear that he is writing it for his sake and for her sake. Thus far his words. And they do not contradict one another, as will be explained with the help of Heaven.

For behold, in the Gemara we do not find at all that the witnesses must stand during the writing of the scribe, and this is only found regarding an agent who must say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed." And even regarding an agent, the Sages, of blessed memory, said that he does not need to stand except during the writing of one line; once he has heard that they wrote it for its sake, he needs no more (5b). And Rav Ashi said there that even if he only heard the sound of the quill and the sound of the parchment, he can say "in my presence it was written." The Rif rules accordingly, though there are those who are stringent to rule specifically for the first line. However, Rashi, of blessed memory, explained regarding the first line that it contains the name of the man, the woman, and the date (15a). And all these matters pertain to an agent and not to witnesses. However, it is certainly so that the witnesses must know that the scribe wrote it for its sake, for if not so, upon what are they signing? Furthermore, they must recognize that this is the get that the scribe wrote for its sake.

Therefore, ab initio, it is proper that they stand during the writing of the get, but post facto, it is not at all a hindrance, as the Mordechai wrote in Seder HaGet. This is his wording: And if there are no witnesses there at the time of the writing of the get, it appears that it is kosher, for presumably, since the husband commanded the scribe in the presence of witnesses to write it lishmah, he presumably wrote it lishmah and properly; and even if he does not recognize the scribe's handwriting, for the majority are experts. And the sages did not require presence at the time of the writing of the get except for one who must say "in my presence it was written," so that the husband does not cast aspersions on the get. But when the husband himself gives it, there is no concern that perhaps he did not write it lishmah. Nevertheless, it is a good thing for witnesses to be present at the time of the writing of the get, and such is the common practice. Thus far his words (cited in the Beit Yosef). And with this, the words of the Tur are clarified. And our teacher, the Beit Yosef, because we saw in the Gemara that even regarding an agent they were careful that he should not stand over the writing for more than one line so as not to cast aspersions on earlier gittin, see there; therefore, he did not want to be more stringent regarding witnesses, since for witnesses there is no source at all in the Shas. And on the contrary, he did not want to write explicitly "the first line," but rather the language of "beginning," so as not to completely liken it to the law of the agent in the Gemara, except that it is understood of itself that the beginning is the first line. And in Seder HaGet, he was concerned for the opinion of Rashi that we brought. And all these matters are stringencies and not the essence of the law (and see Beit Yosef).

He further wrote in section 5: A get that was written not for its sake, even if one passed a quill over it for its sake, it is not a get, and some say that we are concerned for it. Thus far his words. The explanation of the matter is that we hold that writing over writing is not considered writing, for so we hold regarding the laws of Shabbat as the Rambam wrote in chapter 11 of the laws of Shabbat. And so too regarding the sanctity of the Name, when one did not sanctify it, passing a quill over it for its sake is of no avail. And so the sages said that this is not of the choice way (Gittin 20a), and the intention is that it is invalid. And that which they said, that it is not of the choice way—which implies that it is at least valid—they said according to the words of the one who disagrees with them, meaning that even according to you it is not of the choice way, but according to us it is completely invalid, for so it is found in the Yerushalmi (Shabbat chapter 12). And I wonder at the poskim who did not bring this law in the laws of writing a sefer Torah, tefillin, and mezuzot in Yoreh Deah and in Orach Chaim (only the Beit Yosef in his book in the heading of Yoreh Deah siman 276 brought this, see there, and it requires further study). And some say that we are concerned for this to be stringent and not to be lenient, because in the Shas (Gittin ibid.) there is a reasoning to distinguish between the sanctity of the Name and other matters, see there. Therefore, in practice, it is obvious that one must be stringent regarding the prohibition of a married woman (and see Tosafot Shabbat 104b, heading "Amar").

The Tur wrote: The writing of the get and its signing must be for the sake of the man and the woman, whether the tofes or the toref. Therefore, the scribe should not write tofes forms of gittin so that they will be available to him whenever he desires, so that when they come to divorce, he writes the toref for his sake. And even post facto, if he already wrote it, the Ramban wrote that it is invalid to divorce with it, and so wrote the Ramah, and even if she married, she must leave. But the Rambam validates it even ab initio to divorce with it if he already wrote it, and so wrote my father, our teacher, the Rosh. This is the wording of the Tur: And it seems to me that it is not invalidated except ab initio, but post facto, if he already wrote it, it is valid to divorce with it; nevertheless, it is good to be stringent and divorce her with another get if the husband is before us. Thus far the words of the Tur.

Behold, those who hold that post facto it is valid, this law is like the law of the writing of a deaf-mute, a deranged person, or a minor in siman 123, and the law of that which is attached to the ground in siman 124, for post facto we do not decree regarding the formulaic part on account of the essential part; see there. However, before us the version in the Rambam chapter 3 is that even ab initio they permitted scribes to write the formulaic part and leave the essential part, and they did so because of the enactment for scribes; see there. And those who disqualify even post facto hold that this is worse than that which is attached and a deaf-mute, deranged person, or minor, which are not common at all; but regarding a scribe, if we permit it post facto, they will do so constantly. And so it implies from the sugya of the Shas (26b, that Rav ruled like Rabbi Eleazar, and those who validate hold that even Rabbi Eleazar disqualifies only ab initio, and the Rambam rejects this entirely because of the sugya at the end of chapter 2 that we do not decree regarding the formulaic part on account of the essential part). And also regarding the writing of a deaf-mute, deranged person, or minor, there are those who disqualify even post facto, as I wrote in siman 123; see there. But that which the Tur wrote, that according to those who disqualify, even if she remarried she must leave, is not according to what I wrote later in siman 150, that regarding all rabbinic disqualifications, if she married she does not leave (see Beit Shmuel subsection 2). And perhaps in this they saw fit to be stringent because it is a common matter, or that the proponents of this view hold so regarding all rabbinic disqualifications as well, for there is one who holds so as I wrote there (and in the Shulchan Aruch these laws were not mentioned at all, and perhaps they hold that this is like the law of a deaf-mute, deranged person, or minor and that which is attached, and they did not need to repeat it a third time).

It is a simple matter that even regarding a portion of the toref, if he wrote explicitly not lishmah, it is not a get. And there are those who are in doubt regarding "behold you are permitted to any man" when they wrote it not lishmah, for prior to this there is phrasing like this, and in the ancient get templates there are those who did not write this version at all (Tosafot 26a, s.v. "v'tzarich"). However, in the Gemara (85a) it is explained that the essence of a get is "behold you are permitted to any man," and one must follow the stringent view (Beit Shmuel, subsection 1). And it has already been explained in siman 123 that we also consider the date as the toref of the get regarding stringency; see there.

How many manners of "not for its sake" are there in a get? The first is when it was not written for the sake of divorce at all; and the second is when it was written for the sake of another; and the third is when it was written for the sake of this man but for the sake of his other wife; and the fourth is when he said to the scribe, "Write, and with whichever one I desire I will divorce." And in the first three, the get is null from the Torah, and in the fourth, according to the opinion of the Rambam, it is a case of uncertain divorce, as will be explained.

The first case: how so? A scribe who wrote for himself gittin in order to learn the craft or to practice, and he specified there the name of a man, the name of a woman, and the name of a city. And one came and found this get with him, in which the name of the husband was written like his name, the name of the wife like his wife's name, and the name of the city like his city's name, and he took it and divorced with it—it is not a get at all according to the Torah. For behold, it was not written at all for the sake of divorce. And even if this scribe intended for the sake of this man and his wife, since the husband did not command him, it is not considered lishmah at all (Tosafot 22b, s.v. "ve-ha"), but rather it is considered unspecified and is invalid according to the Torah, for a woman does not stand for divorce (ibid.). And more than this was explained in siman 120, that even if he commanded Reuven to write a get and Reuven commanded Shimon, it is not a get because words cannot be handed over to a messenger, see there; and all the more so when he did not command at all.

The second case: how so? Reuven, who wrote a get to divorce his wife and wrote it for his name and for her name, and then reconsidered divorcing her, and a resident of his city found him and said to him, "My name is like your name and my wife's name is like your wife's name, give me this get," and he gave it to him and he divorced with it—even though it was written for the purpose of divorce, it is not a get at all from the Torah, for it was written for the sake of another and not for his sake. And one should not ask that even the first one could not have divorced with it, as we maintain that two Yosef ben Shimons in one city require identification in the get by some sign between one and the other; for in truth, in the Gemara (24b) it is established that since there are witnesses to the delivery and they know that this one handed it to that one and she is his wife, it is sufficient. And even though it will be explained in siman 136 that they must divorce in the presence of the second, nevertheless, what of it? At the time of the divorce he would have done so. The details of this law will be explained there with the help of Heaven.

And the third case: one who has two wives whose names are identical, and he wrote to divorce the elder and retracted regarding the elder and divorced the younger with it, it is not a get according to the Torah; for even though it was written for the sake of the man who is divorcing, it was not written for the sake of this one who was divorced with it. And here too it must be said that when he desired to divorce the elder, he would divorce her in the presence of witnesses so that they would know that it is she for whose sake the get was written (Gemara). And there is one who says that initially, even in the presence of witnesses, it must be evident from within the get whom he is divorcing (Beit Shmuel, subsection 3). And so too in the previous law, the difference between this Yosef son of Shimon and the other must be evident from within the get, and it will be explained in siman 136 with the help of Heaven.

The fourth manner is where he had wives whose names were identical, and he said to the scribe, "Write, and whichever I desire I will divorce with it," and the scribe wrote with this intent and he divorced one of them. Our sages, of blessed memory, said that there is no bereirah in Torah matters, for they must say afterward that the matter has been clarified that the get was written for the sake of this one, and we hold that we do not say there is bereirah in Torah matters (beginning of chapter 3). And behold, according to what we truly hold that there is no bereirah in Torah matters, and so the Rambam, of blessed memory, ruled in several places, it appears that here too the get is void by Torah law. Nevertheless, the Rambam, of blessed memory, ruled that she is doubtfully divorced and he disqualifies her from the priesthood, and if she received kiddushin from another, she requires a get from both of them. And one must say regarding his reasoning that he was concerned with the prohibition of a married woman, for perhaps it is not so clear that we hold in Torah matters there is no bereirah, for indeed there are those among the early authorities who ruled there is bereirah even in Torah matters (the Ran and the Rosh in the fifth chapter of Nedarim in the name of Rabbeinu Yitzchak, the author of the Tosafot). However, there are those of our teachers who hold that even if we generally hold there is bereirah in Torah matters, here there is no bereirah, as it is written "and he shall write for her" — for her sake — implying that it must be clarified at the time of writing (Tosafot ibid. starting with "To whichever"). Nevertheless, the Rambam was concerned to be stringent, and so the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch ruled in section 4. And the same law applies if he said to the scribe, "Write a get for whichever one shall exit the doorway first," for he made it dependent on the will of others; it is also a doubtful divorce, for out of doubt it does not leave [the status of marriage], even though making it dependent on the will of others is more lenient regarding the matter of bereirah than making it dependent on his own will; nevertheless, it remains a doubt. And in the Gemara, there are those who compare them to one another, and there are those who distinguish because of the distinction we have written.