Siman 130

It has already been explained at the beginning of siman 120 that we rule like Rava who said the witnesses of delivery effect the severance, and from the Torah there is no need at all for witnesses of signing; it is only from the enactment of Rabban Gamliel for the sake of the order of the world. Post facto, if the get was given with witnesses of delivery alone, it is kosher, and it will be further explained in siman 133. However, ab initio, one should not validate it without witnesses of signing, for in any event the sages enacted it. And even though we wrote there that according to several of our teachers the enactment was not such that it would be disqualified without this, nevertheless, since they are accustomed to having witnesses sign on all gittin, if they give this get without witnesses, there is no greater cause for rumor than this. If so, as long as she has not remarried and there is no reason to be concerned for iggun, they should write another get (Yam Shel Shlomo chapter 4, siman 41, and so wrote the Be'er Mayim).

And even though the signatures of the witnesses are only due to the enactment, nevertheless there must be two completely valid witnesses as in all Torah testimony, and even one disqualified witness disqualifies the get. As the Rambam wrote in chapter 1, law 17: If its witnesses from within it were disqualified, even if one was disqualified and one was valid, and he gave it to her before two valid witnesses, this is disqualified, for it is found to be as if forged from within. Thus far his words. And so wrote the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch in this siman, section 17. And so our sages, of blessed memory, said (4a): Rabbi Eleazar admits in the case of a document forged from within that it is disqualified. And the reason is lest one come to rely upon them (Tosafot), and it is disqualified by rabbinic law. And see what I wrote in section 49.

And there is reason to doubt if only one valid witness is signed on it, whether it is called "forged from within" because it does not have two witnesses. From the perspective of logic, it would seem that it is valid ex post facto, and it is no worse than if it had no witnesses on it at all. In this case, we do not apply the concern "perhaps one will come to rely upon it," for everyone knows that one witness is nothing. I have seen one who ruled accordingly (Beit Shmuel, subsection 31). However, from the words of the Rambam, chapter 3, law 8, it appears not so, for he cited in the name of one who holds that in a case of "forged from within," the get is null from the Torah, and he disagreed with him, saying that its invalidity is only rabbinic. He also counts there a case where it has only one valid witness; see there. This implies that, in any event, it is invalid rabbinically. I have seen one who holds accordingly based on these words of the Rambam (Lechem Mishneh, chapter 1, halacha 17). Nevertheless, it seems to me that the primary view is like the first opinion, for there is no reason to invalidate in this case. Also from the words of our teacher, the Kesef Mishneh there, it appears so, as he wrote that the Rambam holds that wherever its invalidity is not recognizable, such as if they signed not for its sake, it is invalid rabbinically; but where its invalidity is recognizable, such as in the distancing of two lines, it is valid with witnesses of delivery; see there. And behold, with only one witness, its invalidity is certainly recognizable. Therefore, it seems to me that certainly according to the one who holds that its invalidity is from the Torah, this too is certainly invalid from the Torah since it has only one witness. But according to the one who holds that its invalidity is only rabbinic, the invalidity is only when there is a concern for mishap. The Rambam did not write this among the invalidations except according to that opinion which holds its invalidity is from the Torah, and he did not concern himself with explaining that according to his own view there is no invalidity here at all. However, in practice, one should be stringent, for the plain meaning of his words does not indicate so (and it requires further study regarding the Beit Shmuel, who did not mention the words of the Rambam nor the words of the Lechem Mishneh).

The laws of disqualifications for testimony were explained in Choshen Mishpat siman 33 and 34, and regarding Gittin we are even more stringent ab initio not to sign as a witness even if he is fit according to the law, due to his kinship, such as a second degree relative to a third degree, and even a relative more distant than this we do not allow to sign ab initio. And similarly, a relative who became distanced, who is fit according to the law, or general in-laws who are fit for testimony, we do not allow to sign on a get. And it is good to seek out a sofer who is not a relative to the man or the woman, for according to the poskim who validate the writing of the sofer and one witness, he is considered like a witness, and certainly it is proper to be careful that he not be a relative to them. And all this is where it is possible, but where it is not possible, there is no concern in the matter. They also practiced that the sofer should not be a relative to the witnesses, for since the witnesses testify that the husband commanded the sofer to write, even though they are testifying about the husband and not about the sofer (Beit Yosef), nevertheless it appears as if they are testifying about a relative, and all the more so if he takes a large fee for the writing (see Beit Yosef). And none of them should be relatives to the Rav organizing the get, and similarly that one of the witnesses should not be a person with a physical blemish. And it is good to be concerned for all this ab initio if it is possible, for in general the Maharil, of blessed memory, was exacting after proper witnesses and a proper sofer, and in a time of pressing need he was not concerned about the sofer (Darkhei Moshe, letter 18). And if one witness is a relative to the second witness, he is disqualified according to the law. And it is proper to distance oneself from a witness who is a mamzer, or a petzua daka, or a kerut shofkha, or an uncircumcised man whose brothers died due to milah, even though they are fit for testimony according to the law as is written there. And one who is suspected regarding forbidden sexual relations, who is accustomed to being in seclusion with them and a rumor goes out about him and there is no clear testimony in this, it was explained in Choshen Mishpat there that he is disqualified according to the law for testimony regarding a woman, because due to the intensity of his inclination he wants her to be unmarried and she is available to him. And although this is only relevant to testifying that her husband died or divorced her (Rashi, Sanhedrin 26b), where suspicion is relevant, and not to signing on a get before us, nevertheless certainly one should not have him sign on a woman's get, and even in a time of pressing need it appears to me that one should distance from this witness.

And behold, all that we have written are stringencies and enhancements regarding a get, and in a case of pressing need they are not indispensable. In particular, regarding the kinship of the Rav who arranges the get, it is an extra stringency, for the arranger does nothing except teach them the order of the get (and so it appears in the Darkhei Moshe, letter 17). Nevertheless, since we are stringent to require a beit din for a get, it is obvious that one should be very stringent regarding it, for a related judge is disqualified by law. Similarly, the witnesses must not be related to the judges, as is written in Hoshen Mishpat, siman 33. And even those who disagree regarding monetary matters, as is written there—because in monetary matters we do not require testimony that you are able to subject to hazamah—they admit in other prohibitions.

By law, the witnesses of delivery may be other people who were not the witnesses of signing, and one may not disqualify them based on the principle of "a matter and not half a matter" as explained in Choshen Mishpat siman 30. For just as with the testimony of a three-year hazakah, three sets of testimony are valid because it is impossible to see three years at once and they are perforce separate, as we explained there in section 16, so too the signing perforce precedes the delivery. Furthermore, witnesses of delivery do not need witnesses of signing, for with witnesses of delivery alone it is valid according to all opinions, and according to the Rif and the Rambam it is also valid with witnesses of signing alone, as written in siman 120; and if so, they are two separate testimonies (Sanhedrin 86a, and see there in Tosafot s.v. mitoch). Nevertheless, it is the custom ab initio to be stringent in this as well, as our teacher, the Rema, wrote at the end of section 1. This is his wording: It is also the custom to take the witnesses of signing to be the witnesses of delivery, and they shall see that the husband commanded the scribe to write so that everything is done before one set of witnesses. Thus far his words. He further wrote that the witnesses should only sign with the ink and quill of the husband, like the scribe, as written above in siman 120. Thus far his words. And it is simple.

From the enactment of Rabban Gamliel, the witnesses to the signature must specify their names in their signature (36a), for by the core law they need not specify their names. And thus the sages taught (ibid.): Originally, one would write "I, Ploni, signed as a witness." See there, for the intention is not "Ploni" as Reuben or Simeon, but literally "Ploni" (as is evident from Rashi). And in the Tosefta at the end of chapter 7, the version is more explicit: "I, a witness, signed as a witness." See there. And when they needed to verify their signatures, they had to search for other documents where the signature was similar to this one and had been verified in a beit din, since they did not know who the witnesses were (Rashi). And Rabban Gamliel enacted that they should specify their names for the sake of the order of the world, so that they could easily verify their signatures. And thus they would sign: "Reuben son of Jacob, witness," or even without his father's name, just "Reuben, witness," or without his name, just with his father's name, "son of Jacob, witness." And thus the Sages of blessed memory explained in the Mishnah (87b): "So-and-so, witness" is valid; "son of So-and-so, witness" is valid; "So-and-so son of So-and-so" and he did not write "witness" is valid. See there. And now we are stringent to write "So-and-so son of So-and-so, witness." But if he wrote only "So-and-so" and did not write "witness," or "son of So-and-so" and did not write "witness," it is invalid, because we concern ourselves that perhaps he did not write this for the sake of testimony at all. However, when he wrote his name and his father's name, certainly he signed for the sake of testimony. And thus all the poskim ruled, and in the Shulchan Aruch section 11. (And one should not be mistaken by the wording of the Yerushalmi on this Mishnah, that in all cases it is valid even without "witness," see there; first, because it is recognizable there that the version was corrupted, and furthermore, because the conclusion there implies otherwise, and see there in the Pnei Moshe).

This fact—that it is invalid with his name alone without "witness," and similarly with his father's name as I have written—this is specifically where there are no witnesses of delivery (Beit Shmuel, subsection 22). One should not ask that where there are no witnesses of delivery, it is anyway invalid according to many poskim, as I have written in siman 120 and siman 133; for it can be said that certainly this is so, but regarding all gittin, when she comes to marry, we permit her by means of the witnesses of signature alone, for we say that presumably there were witnesses of delivery as well, as this is the primary enactment according to the poskim who invalidate without witnesses of delivery. But in this get, when no witness is signed, we do not permit her to marry unless she brings the witnesses of delivery before us (ibid.). And it appears to me that even if he did not write his name at all, but rather signed "I am a witness" as was done before the enactment of Rabban Gamliel, it is also kosher if she brings the witnesses of delivery before us, for it should be no less than a get without witnesses of signature at all. For there is no logic at all to say that we should consider this as "forged from within," since this is not a forgery, but rather that it was not done according to the enactment, and one cannot rely on this signature. However, according to the method of the Rif and the Rambam, who validate with witnesses of signature alone as I have written there, certainly one should not validate the get when there were no witnesses of delivery at all if they did not sign according to the enactment, and the get is invalid by rabbinic law (so it appears to me). But I have seen that the Rashba, of blessed memory, wrote (in HaSholeach 36a), and this is his wording: However, post facto, it is possible that the get is not invalidated by this even according to Rabbi Meir, for they only enacted this so that witnesses would be available to verify it, and not because anything else would emerge from it, neither regarding a prohibition nor regarding monetary matters; and if so, why should the get be invalidated? Thus far his words. And so wrote our teacher Yerucham (cited in the Beit Yosef). And since according to Rabbi Meir it is kosher, all the more so for us, as we rule like Rabbi Elazar. Furthermore, the Rashba wrote that the enactment of specifying names in the witnesses was only according to Rabbi Meir and not according to Rabbi Elazar; see there. But from the words of the Rambam, the Tur, and all the poskim, it does not appear so. Furthermore, the primary enactment of Rabban Gamliel regarding the signature of witnesses is according to Rabbi Elazar, so that she would not need to bring witnesses of delivery, as is explained in the Shas, for by means of the witnesses of signature the get will be verified; and when they do not specify their names, the verification will still not be easy. And it is possible that even the Rashba only said that according to Rabbi Elazar there is no hindrance in the matter, for it should be no less than witnesses of delivery alone, and this is certainly so as I have written (see Beit Shmuel, subsection 1, who wrote: and this is the reasoning of the Rashba and Rabbeinu Yerucham who wrote that they do not need to specify their names; thus far his words. And the Be'er Mayim wondered about him, where he saw this. And according to what I have written, it is well, and the words of the Beit Shmuel are sincere. And what I said, that it is difficult except to say there is no hindrance—it does not appear so to one who examines his novellae there, but rather it implies that even ab initio it is not required).

And know that that which we wrote, that before the enactment the witness would not specify his name at all, so explained Rashi and the Rashba there, and so it is explicitly proven from the Tosefta that we cited. And I have seen that there are those who understood the opinion of the Tur to be that he explains that even before the enactment he would sign his name, and the enactment of Rabban Gamliel was to write also the name of his father (Beit Yosef). And according to this, it must be said that what is written in the Gemara there, "At first he would write: I, So-and-so, signed as a witness," this is like every "So-and-so" in the Shas, meaning his name is specified. And I am very much astonished, for it is an explicit Mishnah (chapter 9, 8) that "So-and-so, a witness" is valid. And according to this, one must perforce press and say that the Mishnah was taught before the enactment, and indeed there is one who wrote so (Lechem Mishneh, chapter 4, halacha 20). And according to this, it must be said that also the entire Sugya of the Shas there, which asks "and let it be valid with 'Yaakov, a witness'," is also according to what was before the enactment (ibid.). And the matters are very astonishing, and I do not know any place to hold so in the opinion of the Tur, for he cited the Mishnah in its form; see there.

And regarding the Rambam, one must wonder that he did not bring the laws of the Mishnah at all, but rather wrote in chapter 1, law 24, and this is his wording: Even though the signing of the witnesses on the get is by rabbinic enactment, they ordained that the witnesses should specify their names in the get. Thus far his words. And in chapter 4, regarding the text of the get, he wrote: "So-and-so son of So-and-so, witness." And why did he not clarify that with "So-and-so, witness" it is kosher, and similarly with "son of So-and-so, witness," and similarly with "So-and-so son of So-and-so" without "witness"? And more difficult than this: why did he not clarify that with "So-and-so" alone or "son of So-and-so" alone it is invalid? And I saw one who raised a difficulty against him (Lechem Mishneh, and what he wanted to say, that he follows the system of the Tur alone, it is impossible to say so, as I wrote; his words require further study, see there).

However, in my humble opinion, the matter is clear that the Rambam, of blessed memory, had a different version of the Mishnah, as I have seen in several Mishnahs where there is a version "so-and-so, witness, is valid," "the son of so-and-so, witness, is valid," and he did not write "witness is valid." And so it is explicitly proven from his words in the Commentary on the Mishnah there on the previous Mishnah, where he wrote, and this is his wording: Because a person signs his name in testimony in three ways: either he writes his name alone, such as writing "so-and-so," or he writes "the son of so-and-so" and does not write his name, or he writes his name and "he is so-and-so, witness." Thus far his words. Behold, he explicitly holds that even with his name alone, without "witness" and without his father's name, it is valid. And if so, in that which he wrote that they ordained that the witnesses should specify their names, everything is included, for in whatever way he writes, it is valid. And in the fourth chapter, regarding the text of the get, he wrote according to the custom to write ab initio in the most appropriate manner, as we do. And according to this, for those who hold that with "witness" alone it is valid, it is valid in all manners. However, if he signs his name or his father's name, even if we do not hold like the reasoning of the Rashba in section 8—for according to the Rashba it is valid even as it was before the ordinance (and it must be said that his version of the Gemara there, where it asks "and let it be valid with 'Yaakov, witness,'" he did not have the version of two answers, but rather the latter answer alone).

And there is one who asked a great question: since the primary purpose of the enactment that they should specify their names was so that one could achieve verification of the signatures, if so, now that the beit din immediately takes the get from the woman and hides it with them, as is written below in the Seder HaGet in siman 154, why do we need now to specify the names of the witnesses? And one cannot say that in truth it is not necessary, for our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, established this law even though they hold that the get does not remain in the hand of the woman (Beit Shmuel, subsection 1) and they tear it. And this is not a question at all, for had the enactment of Rabban Gamliel been only for a get of a woman, it would be well; but in truth, his enactment was for all documents (Tosafot, beginning of Gittin). And that which we learned "the witnesses sign on the get," every document is called a get (ibid.), for the "tikkun ha'olam" for the sake of the verification of the document applies to all documents. And so it is explicitly proven in the sugya there (36a), which asks from a verse in Jeremiah that deals with a document of purchase and sale (see Shach, Choshen Mishpat siman 28, subsection 14). And regarding other documents, certainly even now it is a great enactment so that it will be possible to verify it, and consequently, it is impossible to be lenient regarding a get of a woman against other documents, unless there is a "takanat agunah" in this, such as with witnesses who do not know how to sign, which will be explained in this siman. But regarding the specification of names, there is no "takanat agunah" here, for what loss do they have if they sign according to the enactment of Rabban Gamliel? Therefore, it is practiced even now.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 11 that some say since it is sufficient if he wrote "Yosef, witness," therefore "son of Yaakov" does not need to be written, and if he erred or changed it, one should not disqualify it, as I wrote above in siman 128 regarding a similar case; and one should not rely on this except in a case of great need and in a situation of iggun. Thus far his words. For indeed, we have already explained there in section 4 that this principle which the poskim wrote—that a change does not disqualify in a place where an omission does not disqualify—is only regarding a matter where the change is not revealed to all, such as the place of birth. But in a matter where the change is revealed to all, the change disqualifies; see there. However, this is only regarding the man and the woman, for they might cast aspersion on the get, as they will say that another man divorced her or another woman was divorced. But regarding witnesses, even if they say that the witness is another man, nevertheless, what of it? The other is also fit for testimony. And it is not similar to a change of the place of the witnesses' standing there, where the falsehood is revealed to all. Yet not all poskim hold so, as there are those who disqualify in any case, as I wrote there in section 45; see there. And there are also those who hold that anything that must be written ab initio, a change in it disqualifies even if the omission does not hinder ex post facto, as I wrote in siman 129, section 8 (the Gra, subsection 27). Therefore, certainly one should not rely on this except in a case of great need and in a situation of iggun. And it appears that the law is the same if he erred in his name, that it should also be validated in a situation of iggun and a case of great need, for even with "son of Yaakov, witness" alone it is also valid (Beit Shmuel, subsection 20). But some disqualify in a change of the witness's name (ibid. in the name of the Rashach). And know that in any place where the error does not disqualify, also hak tochot does not disqualify (ibid.). And so too if there was an error in the word "witness," it also does not disqualify, for this is not necessary (ibid.); for this which they instituted to sign "witness" is only in a get of a woman because the entire get is the language of the husband, therefore he writes "witness," meaning: I testify to this; and it does not hinder at all, and the error does not disqualify it, and so too hak tochot, as I wrote.

The witness shall not sign his own name or his father's name with the title "Rav" or "Sage," but rather "Ploni son of Ploni." Similarly, he shall not sign his nickname, but only his sacred name. Likewise, if he has a name in another place, he need not sign anything but his name here, as I have written in siman 129, section 79; see there. And any matter regarding which there is a slight doubt as to how it is written, it is not proper to sign it ab initio, for one should not enter into doubts ab initio without necessity. Therefore, one whose father's name was changed does not sign as a witness, and the same applies to anything similar to this. And ab initio, one is careful regarding the signatures of the witnesses in every matter that one is careful with regarding the writing of the get, whether it be that we require clear writing and being surrounded by parchment, and everything similar to this (the wording of the Rema):

The witnesses must sign below, under the last line, one beneath the other. If they signed above, before the get, or on the sides, or on its back, it is invalid. Thus the sages taught in the Mishnah (87b), and such is the law for all legal documents, as written in Choshen Mishpat at the beginning of siman 45. This is an enactment of the sages so that one cannot forge by writing whatever he wishes below. Even if he cannot forge—for example, if it is written "firm and established" and in a get "according to the law of Moses and Israel"—or if one witness signed below and only the second signed above, or from the side, or on its back, it is invalid, since it was not done according to the enactment of the sages, as written there (Tosafot at the beginning of Perek Get Pashut, d.h. Pashut, and so wrote the Shach there in subsection 1). The sages also enacted that they should sign one beneath the other and not one after the other on a single line, because of the concern that perhaps he will cut off everything above and, before the signatures, write that Reuven borrowed a maneh from him, and it would be a document where it and its witnesses come on a single line, with which one may collect, as written in Choshen Mishpat siman 44. And even though it was explained there that if the document concludes in the middle of a line they may sign one after the other, nevertheless in a get it is impossible for it to be so, for they write twelve complete lines (it appears to me).

And so too, they shall not leave a space the size of two lines between the writing and the signatures, as in all legal documents. And if they left it, the Tur wrote that the get is invalid, and even with witnesses of delivery it is invalid. And this is worse than a matter that can be forged, which is valid with witnesses of delivery as was written in siman 124, for here there is a concern that perhaps she will fill the gap with some condition for her benefit and the defect will not be recognizable at all (Beit Shmuel, subsection 2). However, the Rambam, of blessed memory, in chapter 1, validates it with witnesses of delivery. And they raised a difficulty against him, for there is a concern as was written (see Beit Yosef and Lechem Mishneh). And it appears to me that his reasoning is that it is no worse than paper that can be forged; on the contrary, here the forgery is more distant, for at the end of the get it is written "according to the law of Moses and Israel," and this is like "firm and established" in other legal documents. And if she adds a condition in the two lines, the forgery will be recognizable. And granted that she is able to write "according to the law of Moses and Israel" once more, and it would be valid like two "firm and established" as explained in Choshen Mishpat siman 44, nevertheless the matter would be strange, for ab initio one should not do so as was written there, and they would not come to rely on witnesses of delivery alone. And granted that for this reason we do not validate a distance of two lines with witnesses of signature alone when they see "according to the law of Moses and Israel" once, nevertheless when there are witnesses of delivery, why should we not validate it? But regarding what was explained when they signed from above, or from the side, or from behind it, everyone agrees that it is valid with witnesses of delivery, for it is visible before us that there are no witnesses of signature here, and of necessity she must bring witnesses of delivery, and it is like writing on a matter that can be forged (Beit Shmuel, subsection 6).

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote in section 2 that he should begin at the top of the line so that no blank space remains on the margin of the get before their signatures. Thus far their words. And it is a wonder to me, for the reason for this disqualification is only if the witnesses are signed on one line, one after the other, so that he cannot forge a document where it and its witnesses are on one line, as is written in section 15 and explained in Choshen Mishpat siman 45. And since it has been explained that the witnesses shall sign one under the other, this concern no longer exists. Regarding the Tur, it is not a difficulty, for indeed he did not write this law that they should sign one under the other; on the contrary, in the Seder HaGet of the Rosh, it is explained that they may sign on one line, see there. But regarding the Shulchan Aruch, who wrote this in section 1, it is difficult. And it appears to me that behold, even when they are written one under the other, there is still a concern if a blank space remains, for perhaps he will cut off the top and write on the blank space, "I, the undersigned, owe Reuven a maneh," and it will be a document in the handwriting of the debtor. However, this concern is regarding the witness himself, that he should not be sued based on the witness, whereas when they sign on one line, the concern is regarding another, that he should not create a document with witnesses. Therefore, regarding the concern of others, we do not rely on the fact that no blank space remains before the signatures, for perhaps they will not be careful in this, and we require a further distancing that they sign one under the other. And this law is good advice for the witness himself (and therefore our teacher, the Rema, did not comment on section 2, and delve into this).

The witnesses must be careful ab initio that whoever signs first in the get should sign first, and after him the second should sign. For if the second signs first, two lines will remain between his signature and the get, and it will be temporarily invalid. Nevertheless, ex post facto, if the latter signed first and afterwards the first, it is valid, and there is no need to write another get even when it is possible to write another get.

And there shall not be anything else written between the get and the signature of the witnesses that is not related to the matter of the get, because there is reason to fear lest the witnesses only signed on that matter. And even if nothing substantial was written, but merely a greeting, we fear lest they only intended to sign on the greeting. And thus the sages, of blessed memory, said (Bava Batra 176a): "Sha'alu" is invalid and "V'sha'alu" is valid. And the explanation of the matters is: if the greeting was written without the conjunctive vav, we fear lest their signature is only on the greeting; but if "V'sha'alu" is written with the conjunctive vav, it is valid, for the vav refers back to what is above it, and they signed on everything. And the Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote at the end of chapter 4 that if the get was delivered with witnesses of delivery, in all cases it is valid. And if he gave it to her with witnesses of signature alone (for he holds that with witnesses of signature it is also valid) and "Sha'alu" was written without the conjunctive vav, she is a case of uncertain divorce; see there. And even though one could say that since the testimony is not clarified and proven from within the get, it is as if there are no witnesses at all and it is not a get, nevertheless one must rule stringently that it is an uncertain get (Ran, chapter 9 of Gittin). However, in a place where it is explicitly proven that the witnesses do not intend for this get, and there are no witnesses of delivery here, even according to the Rambam this is not a get at all (Beit Shmuel, subsection 4).

Even when they sign at the bottom, the tops of the signatures must be toward the get; that is to say, they should sign according to the way of the writing above. But if the feet of the signatures were toward the get—that is to say, they turned the paper upside down and signed—the get is pasul. And even if one witness signed in this manner, it is pasul, for this signature is nothing, and only one witness remains. But if there were edei mesirah, it is kosher, for this is not like a forgery from within, but rather like a get without edei chatimah.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 7: If one joined two skins together by means of glue and wrote a get upon them, it is pasul due to doubt. Thus far his words. The disqualification is because the Merciful One said "one scroll" and not two or three scrolls, and so the sages of blessed memory said (20b), for the glue does not make it like one paper. And behold, we have already wondered at the end of siman 124 about the Rambam, the Tur, and the Beit Yosef, who did not mention this law in any place; see there what we wrote regarding this. Our teacher, the Rema, held according to the plain meaning of the Gemara, that with two scrolls it is pasul according to the Torah. However, in practice, if one wrote the get on two papers and gave it to her, we follow the stringent view in all cases, and it is a get of doubt, for how could we not be concerned for the opinion of these our teachers, from whom it is implied that they do not hold of this law? And all the more so since we explained there that according to Rashi, of blessed memory (Sotah 18a), it is clear that what the sages of blessed memory said is not the halacha, but is only according to Rabbi Yose the Galilean; see there. But the Tosafot held this way as the halacha; see there.

However, one must also wonder about our teacher, the Rema, for regarding tefillin we maintain that glue or sewing makes two pieces of parchment as one (Menachot 34b), and so the Tosafot wrote there (32a, s.v. "dilma"). And even though regarding shofar we maintain in Orach Chaim siman 586 that joining does not make them as one, this is because the addition is noticeable (Tosafot Sotah 17b, s.v. "katvah"). They have already wondered about him regarding this (Beit Shmuel, subsection 8). And that which we maintain in Yoreh Deah siman 288 regarding a mezuzah that was written on two skins and sewn together that it is invalid, this is when he sewed them after the writing, because the writing was done in a state of invalidity; but if he sewed them before the writing, it is valid, as is proven from the wording of the Rambam, chapter 5 of Tefillin, see there (ibid.).

But in truth his words are correct, for it was a legal doubt, as even regarding a single skin of tefillin there are some among the poskim who hold that joining and sewing are not effective (Magen Avraham siman 32, subsection 52 in the name of the Bach). And we have not found that the Rambam, the Tur, and the Shulchan Aruch wrote that the law of joining and sewing is effective. And this distinction that we wrote regarding mezuzah, between sewing after the writing and before the writing, has also not been clarified as halacha; on the contrary, in Menachot there, according to the one who permits it only through joining, he permitted it even after writing, see there (and so wrote the Be'er Mayim). However, in truth there is no proof from there, for the essence of the mitzvah is the placing upon the hand as is written in the Torah, and at the time of placing it is one, which is not the case with mezuzah where it is written "and you shall write them," requiring that at the time of writing it must be one. Similarly with a get, where it is written "and he shall write for her a scroll of severance," we require that at the time of writing it be one scroll. In any event, it is certainly a legal doubt, for from tefillin in Menachot there is no proof at all that we do not require it to be literally as one; and the proof is that in the conclusion he retracted and held that even joining is not required and merely covering with skin is sufficient, see there. And if we come to compare it to tumah, we find a dispute of the Tannaim in such a case whether it constitutes a connection or not (Kelim chapter 3, mishnah 5 regarding one who plasters a sound earthenware vessel, see there; and in chapter 1 of tractate Tevul Yom, mishnah 1 regarding the touching of loaves of bread concerning the tumah of a tevul yom).

And know that it is not called two or three books unless they are separate, and even if he joined them with glue or sewed them, it is a legal doubt. However, on one piece of paper or one parchment, if he wrote the get on two pages, it is one book, as we learned in the Mishnah (87b): If he left over part of the get and wrote it on the second page, and the witnesses are below, it is kosher; see there. And this is specifically when there is no concern that perhaps they were two gittin and he cut the end of the right one and the beginning of the left one and made them one—for example, when it is recognizable at the beginning of the paper and at its end that nothing was cut from it, and that the scribe intended to complete it on the second page so that there would be no concern that perhaps he began to write it and in the middle of the writing he recanted and canceled it, and afterward reconsidered to finish it (see Rashi there 88a and Tosafot s.v. "v'dilma," and examine this carefully). But if it is not recognizable, even though we know it was delivered to her with witnesses, she is doubtfully divorced, for perhaps they were two gittin and a portion of this one and that one was cut. However, if witnesses testify that it was one get from the beginning and it was delivered to her with witnesses, it is kosher. And even according to the Rambam, who in a post facto case validates it without witnesses of delivery, here it is invalid without witnesses of delivery, for since it is not recognizable, it is somewhat like "forged from within." Yet it is not like a literal forgery, for if so, it would be invalid even with witnesses of delivery; rather, it is like having no witnesses signed upon it.

We establish that two women are not divorced with one get, as it is written: "And he shall write for her," and not for her and her friend (page 7a). And even two women from one man are not divorced with one get, such as if he wrote: "I, Reuven, have divorced Rachel and Leah." And so it is explicitly proven in the Shas there, which compares it to a slave; and regarding slaves, two slaves from one master are not emancipated with one deed, as is proven there. And thus we establish in Yoreh Deah siman 267 section 59, see there. However, the disqualification is not if he wrote them on one paper, for even on one sheet, when he wrote "Reuven divorced Rachel and Shimon [divorced] Leah," it is also kosher. For it is not disqualified unless they wrote: "We, Reuven and Shimon, have divorced our wives Rachel and Leah." And even if they wrote thus, if they afterwards went back and specified "Reuven divorced Rachel and Shimon divorced Leah," it is also kosher, as will be explained. And this is an explicit Gemara there. And according to this, it is automatically proven that regarding two women from one man, when he wrote "I, Reuven, have divorced Rachel, and I, Reuven, have divorced Leah," it is also kosher; and it is an a fortiori argument from two men. And the general rule of the matter is that it is necessary that the man and his wife be specified by themselves and not in a mixture. (And according to this, there in the Shas regarding slaves, where it answers "And did we not establish it as two deeds," the same applies that it could have answered in this manner, but it answers the truth that due to another matter it is necessary to establish it as two deeds, see there page 42a.)

However, there are many detailed laws and disputes among the words of the poskim regarding this, as will be explained with the help of Heaven. This is the wording of the Rambam, of blessed memory, in chapter 4, law 18: Five who wrote one get for their five wives—if they wrote it collectively, for example, if they wrote: "On such and such day of the week, so-and-so divorced so-and-so, and so-and-so divorced so-and-so," and similarly each of them said to his wife, "to you, that you shall be," and the entire text of the get, and two witnesses are signed at the bottom—this is a valid get, and it shall be given to each of them in the presence of witnesses to the delivery. And if there are no witnesses to the delivery at all, whichever woman produces this scroll from her hand is divorced. But if he wrote: "On such and such day of the week, so-and-so divorced so-and-so," and completed the get, and began another get beneath it on the same scroll and wrote: "And on this day," or "On such day of the week, so-and-so divorced so-and-so," and completed the second get, and so on until he completed all the gittin, and the witnesses are at the bottom—if this scroll was given to each of them in the presence of witnesses to the delivery, they are all divorced. And if there are no witnesses to the delivery and this scroll was produced from the hand of one of them: if it was the one whose get was last, such that the witnesses are read with it, she is divorced. And if the scroll was produced from the hand of one of the first ones, she is of uncertain divorce status. If he wrote: "We, so-and-so and so-and-so, have divorced our wives, so-and-so and so-and-so," and completed the get, even though it was delivered to each of them in the presence of witnesses to the delivery, it is not a get, for two women are not divorced with one get, as it is said: "And he shall write for her," and not for her and her fellow. If he went back and specified them within the get and wrote: "So-and-so divorced so-and-so, and so-and-so divorced so-and-so at such and such time," these are valid. Thus far the words of the Rambam. And it was similarly transcribed in the Shulchan Aruch, section 9 and section 10.

The explanation of the matter is that in the Mishnah it is taught (86b) that in a "klal" all of them are valid, and in a "tofes" for each one, only the last is valid. They explained in the Gemara that it is called a "klal" when there is one date for all of them, and it is called a "tofes" when there is a date for each and every one. The intention is not different dates, for if so, it would be "predated," but rather that he repeated and mentioned that same date, such as "on the first of the week, on the first of the week," and so for all of them (ibid.). The Rambam holds that it is not specifically the date alone, for if so, what is the meaning of the term "tofes" taught in the Mishnah? Rather, it is called a date when it is the date with the "tofes" of the get; for when it is for each one individually, only the last is valid, and when there is one "tofes" for all of them, it follows that there is one date for all of them, and this is a "klal" where all of them are valid. The reason is that when there is one "tofes" for all of them, it follows that the signatures of the witnesses are on all of them. However, this is when they wrote at its beginning "and so-and-so for so-and-so" and so for all of them with the conjunctive "vav," for if not so, it is no better than the "greeting" in section 19, see there. But when there is a "tofes" for each one, even if the beginning is with a conjunctive "vav," nevertheless, since they are five separate matters at length for each one, we concern ourselves that perhaps they only signed for the last one.

And there are some of our teachers who disagree with him, for according to him, when there is one formula for all of them it is preferable, as all of them are kosher as he wrote. But those who disagree with him hold that not only is it not preferable to a formula for each one, but rather it is completely invalid, for whenever there is one formula for all of them, it is called two women being divorced with one get (the Tur and the Ramah). And that which they said, that in general all of them are kosher, refers also to a formula for each one, but that he began the second formula without repeating the date; for example, if he wrote "on the first of the week, so-and-so divorced so-and-so" with the entire matter of the get, and afterward he wrote "and so said so-and-so to so-and-so" with the entire matter of the get, and so for all of them. In such a case, all of them are kosher. But if after he finished the first get he began "and on the first of the week so-and-so divorced so-and-so" and finished the matter of the get, and afterward began "and on the first of the week etc.," in such a case only the last one is kosher (and the Beit Shmuel in subsection 10 wants to explain the opinion of the Rambam similarly, but it is not so, as is proven from his words and as is evident from the commentators, and so wrote the Bach).

And also regarding this which the Rambam wrote, that when one wrote "we, so-and-so and so-and-so, have divorced our wives, so-and-so and so-and-so," if he then went back and specified them, "so-and-so divorced so-and-so and so-and-so divorced so-and-so," it is kosher—there are some of our teachers who hold that since he began with a disqualification, it does not help that he specified them afterwards, and this is called "two women in one get" (Rashba). And although it is explained thus in the Gemara, it is not according to the halacha, for the Shas explains this according to Reish Lakish, and the halacha follows Rabbi Yochanan; see there. Most of the poskim agreed with the Rambam, for in this we do not find that they disagree.

The Rambam, of blessed memory, established a general rule that what was explained—that only the last one is valid—refers to a case without witnesses to the delivery, but with witnesses to the delivery, all of them are valid. For the reason for the invalidation is because we concern ourselves that perhaps they only signed for the last one, and when there are witnesses to the delivery, we do not require witnesses to the signature. This is consistent with his system, that when there are witnesses to the signature, one does not require witnesses to the delivery, as will be explained in siman 133. However, according to the poskim who hold that witnesses to the signature are not sufficient, one must explain in this manner: certainly when there are witnesses to the delivery before us, all are valid. And that which we said, that only the last one is valid, the matter is as follows: any get that comes before us when witnesses are signed on it, she does not need to bring witnesses to the delivery, for we say that presumably there were witnesses to the delivery, as this was the primary enactment of Rabban Gamliel, as has been explained. But regarding a get without witnesses to the signature, she is forced to bring witnesses to the delivery before us who will testify that it was delivered to her in their presence, or other witnesses will testify that it was delivered to her in the presence of witnesses to the delivery. And this get, which has a template for each one, only the last one is valid; that is to say, the last woman does not need to bring witnesses to the delivery, but the preceding ones are like those without witnesses to the signature and must bring witnesses to the delivery. And so it implies explicitly in the Tur; see there.

Regarding what we said, that with one date for all of them they are all valid and they are divorced by it, the Tur wrote: either one shall hold it for all of them, or she shall give it to each one when she needs it; see there. And it appears to me regarding his intention that certainly at the time of the divorces, each husband must give it to his wife, and afterwards the other shall give it to his wife, and so for all of them; or that one shall be an agent for all the women to acquire it on their behalf. And that which the Tur wrote refers to when they come to marry and need to show the get as proof (so it appears to me). And that which the Rambam wrote, that they are all valid since anyone from whose hand the get emerges is divorced, means that first one brings it, and afterwards she hands it to the second, and the second to the third, and so for all of them, and they are all permitted to marry (Beit Yosef). And some say that only the first one who shows the get is divorced, and she does not have the power to hand it to another (Drisha and Taz), and this interpretation is very forced; see there. However, even according to this opinion, if the woman came with the get in her hand, there is no need to ask her if perhaps the other handed it to her (Beit Shmuel, subsection 12). And that which the Rambam wrote regarding it being valid for all of them if it was given to each one in the presence of witnesses [im edim], the reason is simple: for even though according to his view it is valid with only witnesses of delivery [edei mesirah] as he wrote, that is after the fact [bedi'avad], but initially [lechatchilah], even according to his view, it requires witnesses of signatures [edei chatimah] (Beit Yosef), and as will be explained with the help of Heaven in siman 133. And that which the Rambam wrote, that it is only valid for the last one, and when the get emerges from the hand of the first ones she is of uncertain divorce status [safek megureshet], the reason is simple: for it is not clear that the witnesses did not sign for the first ones, and therefore it is a doubt. And there is one who asked: why is the last one valid? For since we say perhaps they only signed for the last one, the last one is without a date and is invalid (Beit Shmuel, subsection 16). And this question is according to the view of the Tur, that each one has a separate text [tofes] and the date is only in the first one, such as where he wrote without the conjunctive "vav," for in such a case only the last one is valid. However, it is not a question, for granted that we fear they only signed for the last one, nevertheless, from where do we have reason to fear that the writings were on separate days? For certainly when such-and-such a day is written above and many matters are written in it, presumably they were all written on one day.

The Rambam, of blessed memory, further wrote: If he wrote two gittin on two columns in one scroll, one beside the other, if there are two witnesses signed at the end of this get and two witnesses at the end of this get, it is kosher; and whenever this scroll leaves his hand, she is divorced. Thus far his words. And it has already been explained that according to him it is kosher even without witnesses of delivery, and one woman can hand it to the second, and at the time of receipt each one shall receive it, as I wrote in section 31. And according to those who hold that we always require witnesses of delivery, the practical difference is regarding the matter that she will not need to bring witnesses of delivery before us.

He further wrote: If there were only two witnesses there, coming from under this get to under that get, if it emerged from the hand of this one, such that the witnesses are read with her get, she is divorced. But if it emerged from under the hand of the second one, such that the witnesses are not read with it, it is not a get until he delivers it to her before witnesses. Thus far his words. And according to those who hold that one always requires witnesses of delivery, the practical difference is that she must bring the witnesses of delivery before us, as I have written.

He further wrote: If he wrote two gittin on two pages, one above the other, and the witnesses are between the two gittin, such that they are found at the end of the first and above the second—if it was produced by this woman for whom the witnesses are read at the end of her get, she is divorced; and that woman for whom the witnesses are read at the top of her get from above, she is not divorced. Thus far his words. He further wrote: If he joined the top of this page to the top of this page and the witnesses are in the middle, such that the witnesses are found at the top of both gittin, both are void; and if they were delivered to them with witnesses, both are valid. Thus far his words. And for those who require witnesses of delivery, the practical difference is that they must bring the witnesses of delivery before us, as I have written. And in the Shulchan Aruch they did not write any of this, because from the previous laws these are also explained.

It has already been explained that "Reuven, witness" is valid, and likewise "son of Yaakov, witness." Therefore, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote that if one wrote two gittin on two columns in one scroll, one next to the other, and the witnesses are below this one and below that one—such that the name of the witness is under the first and the name of his father is under the second, and likewise the second witness below him—that which the names of the witnesses are signed under is valid. And if he wrote "Reuven, son of" under the first and "Yaakov, witness" under the second, the second is invalid. And if he wrote "Reuven" under the first and "son of Yaakov, witness" under the second, even the second is valid. Thus far their words.

The explanation of the matter is that initially they established a general rule: that which the witnesses are read with is valid. Afterward, it explains how: for if "Reuven son of" is beneath the first, the first is valid, for we join this "Yaakov witness" which is beneath the second since it is read in order. However, the second is invalid, for we do not join "Reuven son of" the previous one to the second, as we must read from the second. This is in a case where we know that the signature "Yaakov witness" is from Reuven his son, for if not so, we hang it on the possibility that Yaakov himself signed on the second, and it is validated by "Yaakov witness" (Gemara). And also the first is valid, for we join the signature of his father to the son because it is read according to its law, as I have written. Therefore, if "son of Yaakov witness" is signed on the second, both are valid: the second by "son of Yaakov witness" and the first because of the joining of the second. All this is when there are no witnesses to the delivery, but with witnesses to the delivery, we have no concern with it. And according to those who always require witnesses to the delivery, the practical difference is regarding the matter that she must bring witnesses who were witnesses to the delivery, as I have written (and see Be'er Sheva, subsection 9).

The witnesses of the get do not sign one without the other, so that each one shall be in the presence of his fellow at the time that he signs. He does not need to see when he signs, and also that one does not need to see, but rather he must be there in the place where his fellow signs (Knesset HaGedolah). Nevertheless, our custom is to be stringent, that both of them literally stand together one next to the other; the first one who signs sits and holds the quill and says to the second: "Hear, so-and-so, how I sign the get for the sake of so-and-so the son of so-and-so and for the sake of his wife so-and-so the daughter of so-and-so and for the sake of divorce." The second sees when he signs, and afterwards the second sits and does according to the action of the first, and the first stands next to him, as will be explained in the Seder HaGet with the help of Heaven. And if they signed one without the other, it is pasul.

And the reason for this law was stated by our sages of blessed memory (10b): that we decree lest he say to ten people, "All of you write a get for my wife," where the law is that one writes and all of them sign, as written in siman 120, section 69; and certainly when he says, "All of you sign," where according to all opinions all of them must sign, as written there in section 68. And if all of them did not sign, the get is invalid, for it depends on the insistence of the husband (Rashi). Therefore, if we do not require that each one be in the presence of his fellow, it is possible that all of them will not sign and it will lead to a mishap. But when we require that all of them be in one presence, automatically all of them will sign and it will not lead to a mishap. And one should not ask: why should we suspect this, for surely when he says "all of you," all of them will sign? For it can be said: it is not only necessary according to the one who holds that "all of you" is due to witnesses, as written there in section 71, and all of them must sign on the day of the writing, and if not it is invalid—for certainly there is a great concern that it will not occur to them that all of them are obligated to sign on this day, as they will reason that only two are for witnesses and the rest are due to a condition and can sign even tomorrow or on other days according to the law of a condition. Rather, even according to the one who holds that the truth is so—that two are for witnesses and all of them are for a condition and they can sign on another day—nevertheless, not everyone is learned in the law, and they will reason that there is no necessity that all ten sign, as they know that two witnesses are sufficient. Therefore, our sages of blessed memory required as an indispensable requirement that the witnesses of the get sign in the presence of one another, and automatically, since all of them will gather, all of them will sign on that day. Furthermore, there is reason to suspect lest he say "all of you sign" to the witnesses, for then according to all opinions all of them are due to witnesses and are obligated to sign on this day, and in this they could easily err, as written (the Ran in the name of the Ramban ibid.).

And know that we only follow this law for stringency and not for leniency; for example, if we need to validate the signatures and validation was only found for one witness, we do not say that since they do not sign one without the other, it is therefore necessary that the first also signed as a witness and it is as if it were validated—this we do not say, and we are required to find validation for the second witness as well (the Rema in Darkhei Moshe, note 11).

Some say that this rule, that they may not sign except in each other's presence, applies to two witnesses or more when the husband designated them beforehand. However, if he only designated two witnesses and they signed in each other's presence, and it was not his prior intention to have more sign, and afterwards he decided to have another witness or witnesses sign, they may sign even though they were not in the presence of the first two witnesses (Tosafot, chapter 2, s.v. tze). And there are some of our teachers who disagree on this and disqualify even in such a case when the third was not in the presence of the first ones; since the husband revealed his intent that it is not his will to complete the get until he also signs, his law is like the previous two (ibid. in the name of our teacher, Elchanan). And the matter is simple that one should follow the stringent view, yet the Tur and the Rema brought only the first opinion, and the law requires further study (and see Ran, end of chapter HaZorek, and in the Gra, subsection 28, and examine it well).

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 18: One must be careful that the sofer does not sign as a witness because there are those who disqualify it. Thus far his words. It is clear that his opinion according to the halacha is not so, for in truth the Rif and the Rambam in chapter 9 qualify a case where a sofer and one witness signed; rather, he was concerned for the opinions of those who disqualify. We have already explained this in siman 120, section 50, that this law depends on the law of one who says, "Tell the sofer and he shall write, and to Ploni and Ploni that they shall sign." For if this is valid, it necessarily follows that a sofer and one witness signing is disqualified, because we fear that due to the embarrassment of the sofer—whom the husband did not designate as a witness—they might reverse the matters and command the sofer in the name of the husband to sign, and this is a disqualification from the Torah since he designated another as a witness. But if "one who says, 'Tell...'" is disqualified, then this concern does not exist and a sofer and one witness signing is valid. Therefore, the Rif, the Rambam, and the Shulchan Aruch there, who disqualified in a case of "one who says, 'Tell...'", held that a sofer and one witness signing is valid; however, he was concerned for the opinions who hold that "one who says, 'Tell...'" is valid, and consequently a sofer and one witness signing is disqualified. Furthermore, we explained there in section 51 in the name of Ri, the author of the Tosafot, that these two laws are not dependent on one another and it is possible that both are disqualified, see there. For in truth, in the Shas (66a), there is another concern regarding "one who says, 'Tell...'", perhaps she will hire witnesses who will say in the name of the husband to the sofer to write and to the witnesses to sign, and according to the essential law it is valid in a case of "one who says, 'Tell...'", see there, and consequently a sofer and one witness signing is disqualified. Therefore, regarding the law, one should be stringent in all manners (see Ba'er Sheva, subsection 29, who elaborated on this).

The witnesses who sign on the get must know how to read the get and to sign, and before they sign, they read the get and sign, for if not so, upon what are they signing? And it will be explained in the Seder HaGet. And there is reason to doubt ex post facto if they did not read it before the signatures, and it appears that since they stood at the time of the writing of the first line and heard that the scribe wrote for his sake and for her sake, they certainly know upon what they are signing, and the reading is not a hindrance ex post facto. However, since the primary witnesses are the witnesses of delivery, and regarding them it is simple that the reading is a hindrance (19b) and as I wrote in siman 135; however, it has already been explained that for us the witnesses of signature are the witnesses of delivery, and since they know that this is the get, their reading is not a hindrance ex post facto. And so it is implied from what our teacher, the Rema, wrote there, and this is his wording: And so if they testify well that this is her get. Thus far his words. Meaning, if they know clearly that this is her get, the reading is not a hindrance ex post facto. And the reasoning is so, for is the reading a mitzvah? Rather, it is so that they should know upon what they are signing. And all this is when they know how to read, but if they do not know how to read the get, their signature is nothing, except that the sages of blessed memory devised a regulation for this because of the "regulation of the world," as I wrote with the help of Heaven.

And behold, regarding other documents, it was explained in Choshen Mishpat siman 45 that ab initio it is not effective for two people to read before the witness, but rather he is obligated to read the document himself, and post facto there is a dispute among the poskim, see there. But regarding gittin, the sages permitted, because of the ordinance of agunot, that others may read the matter of the get before them and explain it to them, and they are permitted to sign. And the Tur wrote that even if one person reads before them it is sufficient. However, in practice one should not rely on this, for according to the Tosafot it is only effective with two, and so it appears is the opinion of the Rambam, and so the great later authorities decided (Bach; Beit Shmuel subsection 26).

And know that the Rambam in chapter 1 wrote: "And that is provided they recognize the language of the get," thus far his words. That is to say, even though they do not know how to read, nevertheless when one reads the language of the get before them, they understand. But if they do not understand the language and the reader must translate for him from language to language, it is not effective. However, the Tur wrote that even if they do not recognize the language of the get, the reader shall translate it before him into his language, see there. And the reasoning of the Rambam, it can be said, is that when they do not understand the language, it is like a witness from the mouth of a witness (Beit Yosef). And they brought proof for the Rambam, of blessed memory, from the Yerushalmi of Gittin (chapter 9, halacha 8), where it is explained there that the witnesses must be able to read the get, see there (Beit Yosef). But for the Tur it also works out well, as it can be said that it deals with other documents (Siftei Kohen ibid.), and of necessity one must say so, for behold from the Yerushalmi it implies explicitly that they must read it themselves (see Be'er Sheva subsection 27 who rejected this in another manner, and there is no need for this) (and the Shach in Choshen Mishpat siman 45 subsection 3 decided like the Tur).

The sages, of blessed memory, further were lenient regarding gittin in the case of witnesses who do not know how to sign, that one may mark for them on the paper with saliva or the like, with something that is not lasting, and they write over the mark. For if they were to mark for them with something that is lasting, their signature is nothing, as writing over writing is not considered writing (Tur). And some say that even with something that is not lasting, it is forbidden ab initio to mark for them the form of the letters, as this is like writing over writing, and one must decree lest they do so with something that is lasting; and only post facto is it valid if they marked for them with something that is not lasting (ibid.). And ab initio they only permitted tearing for them blank paper, such that the tears shall be according to the form of the letters, and they fill the tears with ink, in a manner where they lead the ink through the tear in the way of writing (as is implied from the language of our teacher, the Rema, in section 16, see there).

And know that in the Yerushalmi Gittin (chapter 2, halacha 3) and Shabbat (chapter 12, halacha 4) it asks on this: is it not the handwriting of the first one? And it answers: when he widened the tear for them. Meaning, that if they were to fill all the tears with ink, how would their signature be upheld (Tosafot 9a), for behold they wrote according to the shape of the tears? And it answers: when he widened the tear for them and they did not fill it entirely, and their writing has its own shape. And it requires further study why the poskim omitted this, and consequently it is explained that also with markings of saliva one must widen. (And the explanation that they tear paper means another paper to place it upon the parchment, as the Tosafot wrote there; and the Mordechai in chapter 2 explained it was on that same paper, and this is similar to the explanation of Rashi that they scratch for them, see there and examine carefully).

Regarding this leniency that they applied to gittin, the Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote in the first chapter in this wording: This is a leniency that they applied to women's gittin so that the daughters of Israel should not be agunot, since the signing of the witnesses on the get is of rabbinic origin, as I have written. Thus far his words. It is clear from his words that they only applied this leniency when there are witnesses of delivery, for in such a case their signing is of rabbinic origin; and all the more so according to the poskim who hold that it is impossible at all without witnesses of delivery. According to this, that which was written—that if they made a mark with a lasting substance their signing is nothing—means that it is like being without witnesses of signing, which post facto is kosher, as I wrote in siman 133; for it is not logical to say that this is like "forged from within." If so, it is a wonder regarding the Tur who wrote in the name of the Ramah that if they marked for them with that which the lower one wrote, it is not a get, and if she was divorced with it, she is disqualified from the priesthood. Thus far his words. But he himself holds in siman 133 that without witnesses of delivery it is nothing, and perforce there are witnesses of delivery, so why is it not a get? There is one who wishes to say that he holds it is worse than being without signatures because we decree on account of writing (Beit Shmuel, subsection 28). But it is impossible to say so, for if so, it is only a rabbinic disqualification, so how did he write that it is not a get at all and only disqualified for the priesthood? Furthermore, from where do we have the authority to decree in this, for this reasoning is not found except regarding "not for its sake" (Tosafot 4a, s.v. "Modah"), and even in that, several of the poskim disagree. Furthermore, in any such case, he should not have left it unexplained. It appears clear to me that he wrote this according to the one who holds that witnesses of signing alone are sufficient; and perhaps the Ramah holds so as the law, and since there are no witnesses of delivery, it is certainly not a get, and only regarding the priesthood is one to be stringent.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in siman 14: A get that was written in the script of one of the languages and its witnesses are signed in another script is kosher, provided that the witnesses recognize the language of the script and the writing. Thus far his words. And this is the wording of the Rambam in chapter 4. And their intention is that they must read it, and if they do not recognize the language and the script, how shall they read it? And it follows that if others read it before them, it is sufficient that they recognize only the language (Beit Shmuel, subsection 25). And according to the opinion of the Tur that we wrote in section 44, even this is not necessary; see there. He further wrote: If one of the witnesses signed in the script of one language and the second witness in the script of another language, it is kosher. Thus far his words. And even though regarding the writing we disqualify in such a case, as I wrote at the beginning of siman 126, regarding the signatures they were lenient. Furthermore, each witness is a separate writing. And know that in all matters where we are stringent by law regarding the writing, one should also be stringent regarding the signatures, and all the more so regarding "hak tochot" which is disqualified. However, regarding touching letters and the like, one may be lenient regarding signatures in a time of pressing need.

The sages taught in the Mishnah (10b): All documents that are produced in the courts of the gentiles, even though their signatories are gentiles, are valid, except for bills of divorce for women and manumissions of slaves, for they are not subject to the laws of "severance." A get that was produced in the courts and gentile witnesses are signed upon it—even if a Israelite wrote it and it was delivered in the presence of Israelite witnesses—since the signatories are disqualified from testimony, it is "forged from within" and the get is disqualified. For even one disqualified witness disqualifies the get, as I wrote in section 2. Its disqualification is rabbinic, and it is a complete get according to the law, and its disqualification is due to a decree; therefore, if he gave her such a get, kiddushin takes effect with her (Ran ibid.).

We have already written in section 3 that when its disqualification is recognizable and they will not come to rely upon it, the get is kosher. Therefore, there are some of our teachers who hold that this matter of kutim witnesses disqualifying the get in secular courts when a Yisrael wrote it and Yisrael witnesses signed it is only when the names of the kutim have a similarity to Yisrael names, for then we concern ourselves that perhaps they will come to rely upon them and it would be forged from within. However, when the names are unique to kutim—and are called in the Gemara "distinctive names"—and they will not come to err that they are Yisrael, and they will not come to rely upon them, the get is kosher (the Rosh and Rashba in the name of the Ra'avad, and he ruled like Rabbi Shimon there). And there are those who wrote that ab initio we do not validate it, and only post facto is it kosher (ibid. in the name of Rabbeinu Chananel). The opinion of most poskim is to disqualify even post facto, for we decree regarding distinctive names on account of names that are not distinctive (like the first Tanna of the Mishnah, for he too holds like Rabbi Eliezer, see there). This is the opinion of the Rif, the Rosh, and the Rashba, and thus they stated it without qualification in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch section 19. So too is the opinion of the Rambam clarified, for he states it without qualification, and such is the halacha (Chapter 6 of Laws of Servants).

There is a question regarding this for the poskim who validate with distinct names as has been written; if so, why do they only validate when it is performed in the arkaot, as is implied in the Mishnah? For even if it were performed among common Cutheans, since the script is that of an Israelite and the witnesses to the delivery are Israelites, and the signatures are distinct names, what logic is there to distinguish in a get between arkaot and commoners? However, in the Yerushalmi they stated a reason for this: because a report goes out in the arkaot. That is to say, that in the arkaot we rely that everything was performed with fitness, that an Israelite wrote it and that there were witnesses to the delivery who were Israelites, and that it was only performed in the presence of the arkaot and with their signatures. But when it is performed among commoners, we do not rely at all that it was performed with fitness, and therefore in all manners it is invalid (see the Ran and the Ramban in Milchamot). And for us, there is no practical legal difference in all of this, as has been written.

The Tur and the Shulchan Aruch in section 19, after writing the law of a get in the courts that in all cases it is invalid, wrote, and this is their wording: But a woman who brings before us a get with which she was divorced in order to marry with it, and the names of the witnesses are like the names of Cutheans, if they are names that it is not the way of Israel to be called by them at all, she may marry with it, for certainly they are Israelites, as those who oversaw the signing of the get would not have erred to have such names signed unless they knew that they were Israelites. And if they are names that somewhat resemble the names of Israel, we are concerned lest those who oversaw the signing of the get erred, thinking that they were Israelites when perhaps they were Cutheans, and she may not marry with it. Thus far their words. And so wrote several of the Rishonim in the explanation of the sugya (11a in the inquiry of Resh Lakish from Rabbi Yochanan) that he validates in distinct names. And according to their approach that it is invalid even in distinct names, it is necessary to explain thus. And the poskim who validate in distinct names explain the sugya according to its plain meaning, that when we see distinct names in a get, we validate the get even if we knew that they were Cutheans.

And it is very puzzling to me according to the approach of the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch: first, if they are distinct names, how is it possible that they are Israelites? And I found one of our teachers who answered this difficulty, that it is not absolute that an Israelite name would never be so, but rather that it is uncommon (Ritva). And second, if we come to be concerned lest it was performed with a disqualification, how many concerns are there regarding a get? For behold, the Sages, of blessed memory, were only concerned regarding writing lishmah, and even this, according to the halacha, we do not rule so. And that which they required saying "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" is not because of this concern, but because witnesses are not available to verify it (like Rava at the beginning of our tractate). And the Rashba, of blessed memory, in his novellae there, also raised a difficulty similar to this difficulty, and this is his wording: And it is a bit difficult, for how is it possible that they would stand before the husband and the scribe and they would not recognize them, whether they are Israelites or not, such that they would come to rely upon them and have them sign? Thus far his words. And he did not answer anything. And more than this is puzzling to me, for at the beginning of siman 142, our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote regarding a messenger, that when he says "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," even if the names of the witnesses were like the names of Cutheans, we are not concerned about them, and if the husband comes and protests, we do not pay him any heed. Thus far his words. And it is clear that even if they are like names that are not distinct, he cannot disqualify it, for if it were not so, he should have specified. And so it is explained there from the source of the law in the Yerushalmi, as is written there. And how, in this law, shall we be concerned for this disqualification in a place where there is no protest at all? And in truth, in the Rambam this law is not found at all. And it is clear to me that he interprets regarding the fitness of the get with distinct names, that even though he holds that even with distinct names it is disqualified, as is implied by his words in chapter 6 of the Laws of Slaves, nevertheless, in a time of great need and in a case of agunah, it is possible to render it fit and to rely upon Rabbi Shimon who holds so, similar to what the Sages, of blessed memory, said regarding another law: Rabbi Shimon is worthy to rely upon in a time of great need (Yom Tov 19a). And so I found one of the great ones who wrote this reasoning on his own authority (Yam Shel Shlomo, chapter 1, siman 25). Therefore, since this is not a fixed law, the Rambam, of blessed memory, omitted it (see the Rosh, first chapter, siman 11, who wrote so also regarding a messenger just as regarding a woman, and the words of the Korban Netanel do not seem correct).

It would appear to me that the essence of this law, according to the interpretation of these teachers of ours, is not to disqualify the get entirely, but rather to say that they are obligated to investigate this. As we say generally: wherever it is possible to clarify, we clarify. And this is what it means: that if they are distinct names, we shall validate them without inquiry and investigation, for certainly they are Israelites who did not err in this. But with names that are not distinct, there is reason for concern to the extent that they are obligated to clarify this matter. However, when it is impossible to clarify, we do not disqualify it ex post facto in a case of great agunah and a time of pressing need. Furthermore, all of this applies to the woman who brought the get before us, or to a messenger who does not need to say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed" and he does not know this matter such that he would be able to testify about it. But a messenger who must say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," since he acted according to the enactment of the sages in this, presumably all matters were in a valid state. Therefore, we are not concerned even if the husband comes and protests, as I wrote in siman 142. However, I have not found support for my words in any of the poskim; therefore, in practice, one should not rely on this reasoning that I have written. Nevertheless, it appears clear to me that only if it became known that they were Israelite witnesses, where the concern is only rabbinic, can they rely on what I wrote (see Beit Shmuel at the end of subsection 30, and his entire words require further study, and delve into this):

The sages taught in the Mishnah (86a): Three gittin are invalid, but if she married, the offspring is legitimate: he wrote it in his own handwriting and there are no witnesses on it; there are witnesses on it but there is no date in it; there is a date in it but it has only one witness—behold, these are three invalid gittin, but if she married, the offspring is legitimate. Rabbi Eliezer says: Even though there are no witnesses on it, but he gave it to her before witnesses, it is valid, etc., for witnesses only sign on the get for the sake of the order of the world. And the first Tanna is Rabbi Meir, who holds that the witnesses of the signature effect the severance. Nevertheless, in the husband's handwriting, it is valid from the Torah even without witnesses, since it is written, "and he shall write for her." And even though a matter of forbidden relations is not less than two, his handwriting is like a hundred witnesses, and the Torah increased this in gittin as in monetary matters, where the admission of a litigant is like a hundred witnesses, since it is written, "and he shall write for her," implying that as long as he wrote for her, she is divorced (Rashba, Kiddushin 65b). And in Choshen Mishpat, siman 241, we explained the reason for this; see there. And this law applies both according to Rabbi Meir and according to Rabbi Eliezer, and from the Rabbis it is invalid; but if she married, she does not leave, even when she does not have children from the second (Tur). And the invalidity of the date has already been explained in siman 127. And if there is a date in it and it has only one witness, if there were witnesses of the delivery, according to us, as we rule like Rabbi Eliezer, there is no invalidity in this. And if there were no witnesses of the delivery, such that he gave it to her between him and her, if it was the husband's handwriting, it is invalid from the Rabbis, and if she married, she does not leave, according to the first law. And if it was the handwriting of a scribe, the Rambam wrote in chapter 1 that it is not a get at all; see there.

This is the wording of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 20: If he gave her the get between him and her, and even with one witness, it is not a get. In what case is this said? When the get was in the handwriting of a scribe; but if the husband wrote the get in his own handwriting and one witness signed and he gave it to her, this is a pasul get and disqualifies her from the priesthood. Thus far his words. And it is the wording of the Rambam, chapter 1, law 13 and 14, see there. And it is dealing with a case without witnesses of delivery, and therefore in the handwriting of a scribe it is not a get at all, and in the handwriting of the husband if she married she shall not leave, even without witnesses of delivery and without witnesses of signing, for the reason that has been explained. And even without a signed witness, for one witness neither adds nor detracts, and he only wrote it on account of the first clause, for there he was forced to this so that we should not say that the writing of a scribe and one witness is like two witnesses. And that which he said "and disqualifies her from the priesthood" is superfluous, for since we hold that if she married she shall not leave, all the more so that it disqualifies her from the priesthood. And our teacher, the Beit Yosef, himself in his book Kesef Mishneh erased it from the books for this reason, see there; however, it is his way in the Shulchan Aruch to copy the wording of the Rambam as it is, even though he hesitates regarding this.

And know that that which we wrote, that if he wrote it in his own handwriting, if she married she shall not leave, this is according to both Rava and Rabbi Eliezer according to the approach of the Rif and the Rambam, for Rabbi Eliezer also holds that the witnesses of the signature effect the severance, as I wrote in siman 120 and as will be explained in siman 133. And certainly this is so, for behold, Rabbi Eliezer agrees with Rava. And even according to the approach of the Tosafot, the Rosh, and the Tur, that Rabbi Eliezer holds that only the witnesses of delivery effect the severance and not the witnesses of the signature, it would seem simple to me that just as according to Rava his handwriting stands in place of the witnesses of the signature, so too according to Rabbi Eliezer it stands in place of the witnesses of delivery. And what logic is there to differentiate in this? And so it is explained from the words of the Chiddushei HaRashba in Yevamot (31a) and in Kiddushin (65b). And so wrote explicitly the Bartenura in his commentary on the Mishnah on this Mishnah, see there. And so it is explained from the words of the Tur in his book Kitzur Piskei HaRosh, who wrote this Mishnah, that if the husband wrote in his own handwriting, if she married she shall not leave, even according to the opinion of the Rosh, see there. And so it may be inferred from the commentary of Rashi on the Mishnah (see there and examine closely), and so it is implied in the Yerushalmi.

And according to this, that which the Tur wrote at the end of this siman, and this is his wording: A get that does not have witnesses upon it, even if it is recognizable that it is the handwriting of the husband, or that has upon it only one witness, even if the writing of the get is recognizable as the handwriting of a scribe of the beit din, or even if it is the handwriting of the husband, it is invalid; however, if she married based on it, she shall not leave, even if she does not have children. Thus far his words. And they wondered about him regarding the handwriting of a scribe and one witness, why she should not leave (Beit Yosef). However, the truth is that in the sugya there is one who distinguishes between an expert scribe and one who is not an expert, for with an expert scribe, the handwriting of the scribe is like a witness from the Torah and it is invalid only by rabbinic decree, and therefore if she married she shall not leave. And this is why the Tur was precise to say a scribe of the beit din, who is an expert scribe (Bach). However, in any event, it can be said that his intention is without witnesses of delivery, for if there were witnesses of delivery, in all cases it is valid (Beit Yosef).

However, the commentators of his words explained that without witnesses of delivery, even in the husband's handwriting, it is not a get according to our practice, as we hold like Rabbi Eleazar. And according to the method of the Tur, Rabbi Eleazar does not hold like Rabbi Meir that it is also valid with witnesses of signing, but rather specifically with witnesses of delivery. Rather, the Tur is dealing with a woman who brought a get before us and we did not know if there were witnesses of delivery for it; therefore, in the husband's handwriting or with a professional scribe and one witness, if she married she shall not leave, for we say that presumably there were witnesses of delivery there (Bach). And there is one who raised a difficulty against him: that when there are not two witnesses signed, why do we assume its validity? Perhaps there were no witnesses of delivery there (Beit Yosef). However, it can be said that just as when witnesses are signed we assume there were witnesses of delivery, so too in the husband's handwriting or with a professional scribe and a witness (Bach). Nevertheless, in any case they hold that according to Rabbi Eleazar, who said witnesses of delivery effect the severance, it is not effective without witnesses of delivery even in the husband's handwriting. And such is the opinion of the Chelkat Mechokek (subsection 31; and the Turei Zahav subsection 20 made a dispute between the Beit Yosef and the Chelkat Mechokek, but it is not so, for the Beit Yosef wrote according to the method of the Rambam that Rabbi Eleazar holds witnesses of signing also effect the severance, and the Chelkat Mechokek is according to the Tur that only witnesses of delivery effect the severance).

And there is some proof for this approach from the words of the Rosh there, who deliberated regarding the fact that the Amoraim discussed this Mishnah—whether she must leave or not—asking what the practical difference is for us, since we rule like Rabbi Elazar. He answered that among the three gittin in the Mishnah, there is a get that has witnesses but lacks a date, and regarding this, Rabbi Elazar does not disagree; see there. It is implied from his words that regarding the case written in the husband's handwriting, Rabbi Elazar disagrees and holds that the offspring is a mamzer. It is also implied from what he wrote there, that the "severance" depends only on the witnesses of delivery, and without them, it is not a get at all; see there. But the essence of the matter is very puzzling—that regarding the husband's handwriting there would be a difference between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Elazar, aside from what is proven from several Rishonim who do not hold this way, as I have written. And it appears to me that from the Rosh there is no proof at all, for he was not dealing with this law of the husband's handwriting, but rather came to reject the approach of the Rif, of blessed memory, who holds that Rabbi Elazar holds that the witnesses of signing also effect "severance." He elaborated on this matter, that Rabbi Elazar holds that only witnesses of delivery effect "severance" and not witnesses of signing. And this is what he said: that only in a case where there is no date does Rabbi Elazar not disagree—meaning that in this case, even if there are witnesses of delivery, she may not marry. But in other laws, when there are witnesses of delivery, she may marry ab initio. And so wrote the Baal HaMaor explicitly in the name of our teacher, Ephraim, the student of the Rif, of blessed memory, who disagreed with him with this wording; see there. But the opposite—that we should say that according to Rabbi Elazar the husband's handwriting is not effective from the Torah—we have not heard from their words. Also, the words of the Tur are interpreted according to the plain meaning of the matter as I have written, as is proven from his words in the Piskei HaRosh that we wrote. And the fact that he did not write according to the wording of the Mishnah, but wrote "even if it is recognized that it is the husband's handwriting," which implies that the woman brought it before us—certainly it is so, for if the case is before us, we do not leave her without witnesses of delivery. And in Piskei HaRosh he wrote according to the wording of the Mishnah, but not that his intention was that we assume there were witnesses of delivery. However, for the practical law, my opinion is nullified, and when such a case occurs, one must follow the stringency in all aspects: for according to the Rif and the Rambam, she certainly does not leave, and in my humble opinion, according to the Rosh and the Tur it is also so. But according to the commentators, if she married she must leave and the offspring is a mamzer according to the Rosh and the Tur. Therefore, for the practical law, she must leave and the offspring is a doubtful mamzer, unless one can rely on the Rif and the Rambam; and it requires further study.

The witnesses of the get should not take a fee much greater than the value of their lost wages, for it is established for us that one who takes a fee to testify, his testimony is void. And some say that they stipulate with the witnesses that if they should invalidate the get, they must pay, and because of this they may take a large fee; or for the reason that they are forbidden to marry the divorcee, as written in siman 12. According to this, there are those who seek out witnesses who are not kohanim, for a kohen is anyway forbidden to take a divorcee (the Rema in Darkei Moshe). But we have not seen this practiced, and also the reason is weak, for is it because they are forbidden to marry her that they are not commanded to testify? (Tuv Ta'am V'Da'at). Furthermore, if so, let us seek out unmarried witnesses, since for us it is forbidden to marry two women. Also regarding the first reason, it is not our practice to stipulate with the witnesses that they pay if they invalidate it. However, in truth, the primary permit is that they are not commanded to go and see the testimony, and the mitzvah is that when one sees testimony, it is a mitzvah and an obligation to go to beit din and testify, as written in Choshen Mishpat siman 28. Therefore, because he invites them to go and sign on the get and to be the witnesses of delivery, they may because of this take as much of a fee as they wish. And so wrote several great authorities. And all the more so the arranger of the get may take as much as he wishes, as written in the Seder HaGet in siman 154. And behold, it has already been explained that the custom is that the witnesses of the signature are the witnesses of delivery. However, if others standing at the time of the get are the witnesses of delivery, they are forbidden to take a fee according to this, for behold, they were not invited to come and see the testimony, as they came of their own accord. And by law, even the scribe can be among the witnesses of delivery, even though he is disqualified for the signature (Beit Shmuel, end of subsection 29).

According to the essential law, it would appear that if witnesses who sign on the get have not grown a full beard, they must be examined to see if they have produced two hairs, and we do not rely on the years to say that since they have reached the years of majority there is a presumption that they have produced signs, for this presumption is only applied for stringency and not for leniency, as I have written in siman 169 regarding chalitzah. However, I found that our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in his great work, wrote in the name of pamphlets and in the name of the Semak and the Kol Bo, and this is his wording: If the signing witnesses are presumed to have reached the years of majority it is sufficient, because the witnesses of delivery effect the severance, and at the time of delivery there are many adult men. Thus far his words. And from their words we have learned that the witnesses of the get do not need to be designated such that the husband designates them for the sake of testimony; rather, since they see the delivery from his hand to her hand, they are the witnesses of delivery. Nevertheless, we are accustomed ab initio that the husband commands them to be the witnesses of delivery.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 22: There is one who says that the get must dry before the witnesses sign. Thus far his words. And there is no reason for this, and it has already been explained at the end of siman 124 that one should not give the get to the woman until it has dried, for certainly this is so, as as long as it has not dried, it is like writing that can be forged. But regarding the signatures of the witnesses, what of it? And several of the poskim wrote likewise, that there is no reason for this (Get Pashut there, and the Radbaz wrote likewise). However, since this matter emerged from the mouth of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, it has become the custom to be stringent in this as well, unless it is a time of pressing need, such as if the day will pass or similar to this, for then one does not need to practice this stringency.