Siman 132

If he said to a scribe, "Write a get for my betrothed so that when I marry her I may divorce her," and he married her and divorced her with it, behold, this is a valid get. It is not like a thing that has not yet come into the world, for it is in his power even now to divorce her. And even though in the get it is written "my wife" and not "my betrothed," we hold that even in a get for a betrothed woman, if he wrote "my wife" it is valid, as has been written in siman 126, and likewise the reverse, as has been written there.

And behold, according to the Torah it is certainly a valid get, but according to the Rabbis there is a disqualification in it, for we establish in siman 148 that any get with which he was secluded with her after the writing of the get, she may not be divorced with it, as a decree lest she become pregnant and they will spread a rumor about her that she became pregnant from him after he divorced her, for those who see the date in the get will say her get preceded her son. And so too here, since she was married after the writing, behold he was certainly secluded with her. However, in truth, even with this get he should not divorce her ab initio, but if she was divorced ex post facto, it is a get (Rashi, Yevamot 52a). And so we establish in siman 148, see there. And this is the opinion of the Rambam in chapter 3. And some say that it deals with a case where he wrote in it the date that is after the marriage, which is the time of the giving (Tosafot ibid.), for this opinion holds that with this get, even if she was divorced, she may not marry (ibid.). And I wonder at our teacher, the Beit Yosef, who wrote in section 1 like the second resolution, yet in siman 148 he ruled like the Rambam, and the Rambam does not distinguish between this get and an old get, see there in chapter 3; and how did he not mention his opinion at all? (And perhaps it is because of the Baraita in Gittin 26b, see there and examine carefully).

And behold, according to the first resolution, in any case, the get is predated and invalid, and it must be said that he gives it to her via a messenger, and regarding a messenger, the issue of predating does not apply, as I wrote in siman 127. And it is also possible to say that everything occurred on one day—the get, the marriage, and the divorce—or that there was written in the get not the time of the day but rather the time of the week or the month, which is also valid, as I wrote there. And one should not ask that if so, there would be no rumor here that her get preceded her son; it can be said that we are dealing with a case where he wrote "my betrothed" in the get, and there will be a rumor regarding the child. And also regarding the second resolution, one must be precise: behold, it is a postdated get, as it was written for another time and not for the day of the writing, and according to the Rambam it is invalid, as I wrote there; however, since he does not give it to her until that day, there is no concern in this. Thus far his words.

But if he commanded to write a get for a woman in general, to divorce her with it when he marries her, it is not a get, for it is a matter that has not yet come into the world. Just as a person cannot transfer ownership of a matter that has not yet come into the world, so too he cannot betroth or divorce a matter that has not yet come into the world when it is not in his power now to betroth her or divorce her (Yevamot 52b and 93b). So ruled the Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch, section 2. And if he said, "Write a get for my yevamah, so that when I perform yibbum I will divorce her," and he performed yibbum and divorced her with this get, she is in a state of doubtful divorce. The doubt is whether her status is like a betrothed woman, since she is bound to him, or perhaps since he has not yet betrothed her, her status is like a woman in general.

The Tur wrote in this manner: If he commanded to write a get to divorce an unrelated woman with it once he marries her, the Rambam wrote that it is not a get, and for his yevamah she is a doubtful divorcee. My father, the Rosh, of blessed memory, wrote that even for an unrelated woman it is a get according to the one who says a person may transfer ownership of that which has not yet come into the world. Thus far his words. And these matters are perplexing, for it is a widespread halakhah that a person cannot transfer ownership of that which has not yet come into the world (Beit Yosef). And there is one who answered that although we establish the law thus, nevertheless it is at least a "scent of a get" and disqualifies her from the priesthood, since there are those in the Gemara who hold that a person may transfer ownership of that which has not yet come into the world (Bach). And since many Tannaim hold thus, therefore one must be concerned regarding a get (Korban Netanel, chapter 5 of Yevamot). But this is not sufficient, for if so, why was the Tur not also concerned regarding kiddushin in siman 40 regarding one who betroths that which has not yet come into the world, such as "after you are liberated" or "after your sister dies," see there. Furthermore, in all laws of the Torah, once the halakhah has been decided, we are not concerned for the other opinion, and this halakhah is simple throughout the Shas. And in truth, in the Shulchan Aruch this was omitted entirely for this reason. And I have seen further matters regarding this, but they are far-fetched.

And it appears to me that, behold, the Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote the reason is because she was not subject to divorce at the time of the writing of this get, and it is found that it was written not for the sake of divorce, see there. And according to this, it is like "not for its sake" and is not a get at all. But the Rosh and the Tur do not hold of this reason, but rather because it is a thing that has not yet come into the world. And behold, in Choshen Mishpat siman 209 there are two opinions regarding one who transfers a thing that has not yet come into the world and explicitly transfers it for when it will be in the world; for some say he acquired it and some say he did not acquire it, see there in section 4. And the two opinions are in the Mordechai at the beginning of the chapter "Yesh Nochalin." And the opinion of the Rosh and the Tur appears to me that they hold like the first opinion. And the proof is that the transfer of a thing that has not yet come into the world and a transfer to one who has not yet come into the world are equal, and the Tur wrote there in siman 210 that one who transfers to a fetus for when it is born, it has acquired, and that the Rosh holds so, see there. And according to this, it is simple regarding a get where he says to write a get to divorce her with when he marries her, that it is similar to this, and it is simple that one must be concerned for the stringency. And this is why he was precise to say "according to the one who says etc.," meaning in such a case. But in siman 40 regarding kiddushin, in a matter that is neither in his hand nor in her hand, such as with his manumission or her manumission or the death of her sister, it certainly is not effective in any case, just as with one who grants merit for when it is born and she is not pregnant, as is written there. And let it not be difficult for you, for behold it is an explicit Gemara in Yevamot (52a) that it is not a get; for one can say that the master of this statement holds like the one who says that even "for when it is born" one does not acquire regarding a pregnant woman, for it is a dispute in the Gemara (Bava Batra 142a). And the Rosh and the Tur rule like the other, and therefore they were concerned for the stringency. And therefore, in practice, one certainly must be stringent.

Two men whose names are identical and the names of their wives are identical, and they sent two gittin and they became mixed with one another, he gives both of them to this one and both of them to that one in the presence of witnesses of delivery, for in any case the get of each one will reach her hand. And if one of them was lost, the second is also void, and the remaining get shall not be given to this one nor to that one. And if it was given to one of them or to both of them, this is a case of uncertain divorce. And regarding these gittin, even according to the opinion of the Rif and the Rambam that witnesses of signing are sufficient, here witnesses of delivery are required, since the two gittin are identical in names and there is nothing proven from within it to distinguish between one and the other. And according to those who require proof from within the get even with witnesses of delivery, it can be said that we are dealing with a case where there is proof from within it of a distinction between one and the other by some sign, and at the time of giving it to the agent it was recognizable, but when the agent brought them and delivers them before witnesses of delivery, the witnesses do not know which belongs to this one and which belongs to that one (Beit Shmuel, subsection 3). And in siman 136 this will be explained with the help of Heaven.

One who brings a get from place to place and is an agent to deliver the get to the woman, and the get fell from him on the way in a place where caravans are common, where there are many travelers on this path, and therefore there is a concern that perhaps another man also lost such a get with identical names, for in the world there are those whose names are identical for the man and the woman; and even if the name of the city was written in the get, there is a concern that perhaps there is a city in the world whose name is like the name of their city, and there is a couple there with identical names to this couple. And explicitly our sages, of blessed memory, said (27a): We are concerned for two Shviri. And all the more so if it was established in the city where the get was written that there is another couple whose names are identical to this couple, for then even if caravans are not common, there is a concern that perhaps the other also wrote a get for his wife and it fell from him or from her or from an agent (the Rosh there). And one should not ask what "all the more so" this is, for in a case of common caravans where it was not established, there is a concern for the loss of many from the entire world, and where it was established and caravans are not common, there is only a concern for the loss of an individual, from this one whose name is like his name, as I have written; and there is more concern for the loss of many than of an individual. For the truth is that in the Gemara (Bava Batra 172b) we conclude that there is no difference between the loss of many and of an individual (Bach). Furthermore, there is more concern for the loss of an individual who was established than for the loss of many, and to be concerned for a city identical in name to this city and for identical names in that city to the couple in this city.

And specifically when in the place of the writing of the get another couple was established with identical names (Tur); but if it was not established there, even though in the place where the get was found a couple was established with identical names, there is no concern in this, for behold, the name of the city was written in the get and we knew that this city has another name. And it is understood of itself that if the name of the city was not written in the get, then even if a couple was established with identical names in the place where the get was found, it is called "established." (And that which Rashi explained there in the sugya, his intention was to the city where the get was written, as he wrote explicitly in Bava Metzia 18a, see there; and not like the Bach, see there. Nevertheless, the law is true, and as the Maggid Mishneh wrote):

Therefore, in these two manners—when caravans are common but they were not established, or they were established and caravans are not common, and all the more so in both together—if he found the get immediately upon losing it, such as if he saw the get a short time before, it is kosher, for there is no concern in this. What is considered "immediately"? When he saw that no person passed there from the time of the falling until the time of the finding. And if he found it not immediately, and he has a distinct siman on the get, such as a hole next to a certain letter, or if he recognizes it by tevi'at ayin that this is his get, or even if he does not have a siman or tevi'at ayin on the get but has a distinct siman or tevi'at ayin on the vessel that the get was in and he found it now also in the vessel and knows that he did not lend it to another from the day he placed the get in this vessel, or if he found it tied to his pouch or to his wallet or to his ring and he recognizes those by tevi'at ayin—and even if he does not remember if he lent them to another, we are not concerned, for people do not lend a pouch, a wallet, or a ring (Bava Metzia 27b), as they are concerned for sorcery, and with a ring they are concerned for forgery (ibid.)—or if he found it in his house among his household vessels, and even in a house where many people are common, if he were to find it on the ground there would be a concern, nevertheless among his household vessels there is no concern (Beit Shmuel subsection 9), for in all of these, even if they were established and caravans are common and he found it after a long time, it is kosher and he delivers it into the hand of the woman.

But if they did not find it immediately, such as if he does not know if a person passed there or not, and he has no siman or recognition of the object in the get or in the vessel, it is invalid, for we fear perhaps this get is not his but rather belongs to another whose names are identical and it fell. And even if witnesses testify that the other who was established with this name was not in the city when the get was written, it is invalid even when caravans are not common, since they were established with identical names. And it is stated in the Yerushalmi that even if the one passing on this path was a Cuthean alone, nevertheless it is invalid; for even though he is not fit for the agency of a get, nevertheless we fear perhaps the husband or the wife or the agent deposited it with him based on a distinct siman, or that the husband sent it by his hand so that he should deliver it to an Israelite and commanded that Israelite to receive the get from his hand, which is permitted in such a case as was written in siman 141 (Bach).

The Tur wrote: And similarly, if he saw that a person passed there, even if caravans are not common and two Yosef ben Shimons were not established, etc. Thus far his words. And his words are perplexing, for in a case where they were not established and caravans are not common, even after a long time it is kosher, as this is clear from the approach of the Shas and the poskim; see there. And also regarding our teacher, the Beit Yosef, who transcribed this wording in section 4, there is reason to be perplexed by this, and they have already been perplexed by him regarding this (Bach and Beit Shmuel, subsection 10). And there are those who answered that it is a "vav" that divides, meaning to say: or that they were not established (ibid.), but it does not imply such from the wording. Furthermore, if so, this was already explained in his previous words (and what the Bach wrote regarding what novelty is in this, this is not a novelty; see there).

Therefore, it appears to me that the Tur is stating his own reasoning because in the Yerushalmi they were very stringent regarding this, for even if two people were not established with identical names, and even if they searched the entire path, due to another concern. This is the wording of the Yerushalmi (Chapter 3, Halacha 3): For we concern ourselves that perhaps this man had two gittin in his hand, one valid and one invalid, and he lost the valid one and cast away the invalid one, and at the time he found it, I say he found the invalid one. Thus far his words. And it explains there that because of the severity of forbidden relations they were very stringent. And if so, granted that our Gemara was not concerned for this stringency, nevertheless, since in the Gemara it is also explained only that "what is immediately" is any time that no person passed through there, and the Tur explains that specifically when it is known that no person passed through there we validate in all manners, but when it is not known it is invalid if they were established or caravans are common. And this is when it is not known, but when it is known that a person passed through there, we are stringent even when caravans are not common and they were not established (and what the Rosh wrote "but if a person passed" means that it is possible that one passed, and with this one can somewhat settle the words of the Beit Yosef which the Bach wondered at, and delve into it).

And know that we have learned in the Tosefta (chapter 2): A get that was lost from him and he found it after some time, even though he recognizes its signs, it is invalid, for there is no sign for gittin. Thus far its words. And do not find it difficult regarding what I have written, that if it has a distinctive sign it is valid, for the Tosefta is dealing with a sign that is not distinctive, as is proven in the Yerushalmi there, which brings a baraita that there is no sign in gittin and explains it as when he says how many lines were in this get; but if he said that such-and-such a letter was dotted, it is a sign, see there. And it appears that the baraita is the very Tosefta that we brought.

Even if they were established and caravans are frequent, and he does not have a distinctive siman, if the witnesses to the signing of the get say, "We never signed another get where his name was like the name of this man and her name like her name," even if they do not testify regarding the signatures of this get that it is their handwriting—for example, if the get is not before us and therefore it could be that it belongs to another—nevertheless, we return it to him. The reason is that we do not suspect him of lying intentionally and causing a married woman to stumble. The fact that we do not return it to him without the details that have been explained, even if he stands and screams that it is his, is not because we suspect him of lying intentionally, but rather we say that since he knows he lost such a get, it is clear to him that this get is his, and he does not believe that another also lost such a get; for in truth, these are great stringencies that they applied to a get and not to other matters, as is written from the Yerushalmi, and therefore he says so. This is in contrast to this case, where the witnesses say they only ever signed one get; it would be necessary to say that he is lying intentionally, and we do not suspect him of this. Furthermore, there is no concern that perhaps it belongs to another and also belongs to other witnesses whose names are like the names of these witnesses, for we do not have to concern ourselves with such a remote concern (Gemara). Therefore, this is specifically when it was not established that there are witnesses with names like these witnesses; but if it is known that there are other witnesses whose names are like their names, it is not valid until they testify regarding the handwriting of this get that it is theirs, or the witnesses say, "We recognize this get by a distinctive siman that it has, a hole next to such-and-such a letter," or by a teviat ayin.

And know that the witnesses are believed based on a distinctive siman or on recognition by sight even after they saw the get with this siman and say that this was the get upon which we signed, and they are believed. However, that which we said that he is also believed based on a distinctive siman or recognition by sight is only when he found it himself, for he has a migo to say "I did not lose it." But when another found it and he gives the siman, he is not believed unless he states the siman before he saw it and not after he saw it. And this is not because we suspect him of lying intentionally, but rather as has been written, that since he is not concerned for another and he knows that he lost a get, he speaks even without precision. And one should not ask that if so, what use is a migo, for a migo is only effective when there is a suspicion that he is lying and not when we say that he is mistaken; for in truth we find that even in such a case a migo is effective since he claims with certainty (Tosafot Shevuot 45b, s.v. mitoch and Yevamot chapter 15). And according to this, with recognition by sight he is not believed at all when another found it, for recognition by sight cannot occur before seeing the get. And even though it is found in the Gemara that a Torah scholar is believed with recognition by sight, this is regarding monetary matters, but regarding a get it is a doubt in the Shas whether they believed him because of this (in this sugya regarding Rabbah bar bar Chana). Furthermore, in this time it is difficult to adjudicate the law of a Torah scholar regarding the matter of the prohibition of a married woman.

However, this is specifically when the husband himself lost the get before its delivery to his wife, or his agent for delivery lost it and receives payment for the mission, for then they are not believed with recognition of the eye or with a distinct siman after they have seen the get if another found it. But if another person who is not financially interested says that he has recognition of the eye or a distinct siman, he is believed even afterwards like witnesses (Beit Shmuel, subsection 13). And even though the husband and the agent are also not suspected of lying intentionally, as has been written, nevertheless, because the agent is concerned for his delivery fee and the husband is concerned for the scribe's fee so that he will not need to pay again, they say it based on a resemblance with little scrutiny when they do not have a migo, as has been written.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote: And if two people named Yosef ben Shimon were not established as being there, and caravans are not frequent, we return it without a siman even if it remained long enough for a person to pass there. Thus far his words. And such is the wording of the Tur. And it is not exactly so, for even after a long time it is valid, as is proven in the Gemara. And it is possible that according to their approach, which we explained in section 13, that where it is known that a person passed there we are stringent in every case, therefore after a long time, which is like it being known that a person passed there, one should be stringent. And it requires further study, for in the Gemara it does not imply so.

All that I have written is according to the approach of the Rosh and the Tur, and such is the opinion of the Rif. However, the Rambam, of blessed memory, in chapter 3, law 9, has a different approach in all of this regarding the matter of being established and where caravans are common. This is his wording there: One who brings a get and it was lost from him and he found it—if it was lost from him in a place where caravans are not common, even if he found it after a long time, it is in the presumption that the get that was lost from him is the get that was found, and she may be divorced with it. If it was lost in a place where caravans are common, if he found it immediately and no person from the passersby had yet lingered there, or if he found it in a vessel in which he had placed it and he has a distinct sign in the length and width of the get that was rolled up, it is in its presumption and she may be divorced with it. If another man whose name is the same as the name in the get was established in that place, we are concerned that perhaps this found get belongs to the other man, since a person passed there even though he did not linger. And if she was divorced with it, she is in a state of doubtful divorce. But if no person passed there, it is in its presumption, even though two people whose names are identical were established there. Thus far his words.

And he holds to distinguish between "established" and "frequent caravans," and he was more stringent regarding "established," for even if a person merely passed there; whereas in "frequent caravans," we require that a person tarry there. And similarly, he was stringent regarding one who found it in a vessel, that the recognition by sight of the vessel is not sufficient, but rather the recognition by sight of the get. And the Rishonim have already challenged him, for from the sugya of the Shas it is clear that "established" and "frequent caravans" are equal, and also why is the recognition by sight of the vessel not sufficient? And there are those who explained his words that that which he said "established" refers back to the above, to "frequent caravans," and he holds that in both of them we are stringent if a person passed through there; and in "established" alone we are not concerned at all, for even after a long time it is kosher; and in "frequent caravans" alone it is more stringent than "established" alone, only that we are not stringent if a person passed through there, but rather if a person tarried there (so explained the commentator, and it is not the Maggid Mishneh until chapter 4, as written by the Rivash, siman 117). And after this explanation our teacher, the Beit Yosef, followed and established this opinion in the Shulchan Aruch in the name of "there are those who say," see there (and so it appears from the words of the Ran, see there).

And it is impossible to say so at all, for according to their words, "frequent caravans" would be more stringent than "established status," and we have already brought in the name of the Rosh that, on the contrary, "established status" is more stringent than "frequent caravans." Furthermore, such a system is not found at all in the Gemara, for while it is true that there are some among the early authorities who ruled like the opinion in the Gemara that we require both, and this is the opinion of the Bahag and Rabbeinu Chananel as the poskim wrote, they nevertheless hold that even with "frequent caravans" alone it is valid even for a long duration, just as with "established status" alone. Furthermore, for the most part, the Rambam, of blessed memory, follows the system of the Rif, as is known; rather, certainly his intention is as I wrote, that he rules that we are stringent in either one of them. And thus the Ra'avad, the Rashba, and the Tur understood his words, as is clear from their words (and so wrote the Lechem Mishneh in the eighth chapter), except that they wondered about him regarding why he was more stringent with "established status" than with "frequent caravans," and also why the distinctive mark of the vessel was not sufficient for him, as has been written.

And it appears to me that his reasoning is as follows: for behold, the Rif brought in the name of a Gaon who ruled [that it is permitted] as long as a person did not tarry there, and the Rif wrote: And it appears to us that we act stringently [even] if a person did not pass through there, but if a person passed through there and two people with the same name were established, we are concerned, etc. Thus far his words. And the Rambam holds that only regarding "established" does he disagree with the Gaon, but not regarding "common caravans," for "established" is more severe, as I wrote in the name of the Rosh. Furthermore, the logic is so: for regarding "established," since it is known that there is another whose name is like his name, it is a great concern; but regarding the stringency of "common caravans," how can one call it "common caravans" when one man passed? For at the very least, when a person tarried there, and during this interval it is possible that several people passed during this time of tarrying, there is a basis for this stringency (and see the Bach who wrote similarly to this). And that which he wrote that we also require that he have a siman muvhak in the get, the matter is simple: for since we learned in a Mishnah "if he found it in a pouch or a case, if he recognizes it, it is valid," he explains it according to its plain meaning, that we also require recognition of the body of the get, like several things where they were more stringent in this matter than in other matters, as we brought from the Yerushalmi. And he was only stringent regarding a siman muvhak of the get in its length and width, for it is not a siman muvhak. And one can explain the reason for this, for it is inevitable that he would not recognize it by this, for presumably they are precise to place the get in the vessel in an orderly fashion, and why would he not recognize it by the manner of its placement?

The words of our teacher, the Rema, are very puzzling regarding this matter, where he wrote that there are those who say that if the name of the city was mentioned in the get one need not be concerned about frequent caravans, for we do not concern ourselves with two cities whose names are identical, Responsa of the Rosh, Klal 45. Thus far his words. Many have already wondered about him, for on the contrary, from the Responsa of the Rosh there it is explained the opposite, for he wrote, and this is his wording: And that is when caravans are not frequent and it was not established; and this is the explanation: for this the name of the city is effective, if another city whose name is such was not established and caravans are not frequent, then even in a place where it was found that another Yosef ben Shimon was established we are not concerned, but if caravans are frequent we are concerned lest there is another such city. Thus far his words. Behold, it is the opposite of his words. And more puzzling than this is that in his book Darkhei Moshe he wrote that this is implied in the Gemara, chapter Kol HaGet. Thus far his words. And in the Gemara there it is explained the opposite, that we are concerned for two Shuiris (Beit Shmuel subsection 4 and the Gra subsection 15).

And I saw one who suggested a resolution that the manner of "frequent caravans" regarding the concern of "two Yosef ben Shimons" is not comparable to "frequent caravans" regarding the concern of "two cities whose names are identical." For regarding the concern of identical names, even if caravans are only frequent from the surrounding cities, we certainly concern ourselves with identical names. This is not the case regarding the concern for another city whose name is like the name of the city of the get; there is a need for caravans frequent from a great distance, for in the nearby cities their names are certainly known (Beit Meir). And in the Gemara, where they were concerned for two [cities named] Shuviri, people were frequent from a distance (ibid.). And although regarding the law this is a reasonable matter, nevertheless this is not sufficient, for in any such case it should have been made explicit and not left vague. Furthermore, this is not explained in the Rosh at all.

In my humble opinion, it seems clear that he had a different version of the Responsa of the Rosh, for even in the Responsa of the Rosh before us, it is not like the version that the Beit Shmuel brings. And if we say so, his words are correct, for indeed, when we examine the words of the Rif, the Rambam, the Tur, and many of the poskim, we do not find any of them mentioning the concern of two identical towns; they mentioned only two Yosef ben Shimons, except for the Rashba in his novellae, see there. And this is what he said, that it is implied so in the Gemara, and certainly it is so, for that which they said there, "we concern ourselves with two Shuiris," is not a halachic ruling but rather the language of a question (Tosafot Bava Batra 172b). On the contrary, the one who says this is Rav Huna, and he asked Rava, and he resolved it for him that we do not concern ourselves unless caravans are frequent and it was established, and he mentioned there regarding that which was established only two Yosef ben Shimons and not two Shuiris. Furthermore, according to Rava, it must certainly be so, for just as we do not concern ourselves with two Yosef ben Shimons when caravans are frequent if it was not established, so too we do not concern ourselves with two Shuiris when caravans are frequent if two Shuiris were not established. If so, even the Amoraim who disagree with him and hold that we concern ourselves with one of them, from where do we have reason to create such a distant dispute, that we should concern ourselves even with a town identical in its name and that there should also be found a pair with identical names corresponding to this pair? And this is what he said, that it is implied so in the Gemara, meaning to say that we do not find in the entire sugya that one should concern himself with two identical towns, but only with two Yosef ben Shimons. And that which is at the beginning of the sugya is nothing but a question, as I wrote, and he resolved it for him that we do not concern ourselves, as mentioned above, which is clear in his intention (and the Pitchei Teshuva brought that the Chatam Sofer also analyzed his words, but the book of the Chatam Sofer is not in my hand at present).

The Tur wrote: In what case do we apply a stringency based on a single disadvantageous factor? When two people whose names are identical have been established, or when caravans are common, regarding a get, because it is possible to write another. But regarding death, where they testify about Yosef the husband of so-and-so that he died, his wife is permitted unless caravans are common and also two people with that name have been established in that city. Thus far his words. And it was explained in siman 17 at length. And there are some among the Rishonim who wrote another distinction: that regarding death, since we knew that the husband of this woman was on this path, we say "here he is found, here he was," and we do not concern ourselves with another when one has not been established. And similarly regarding a get, we only apply stringency with a messenger who brought a get from afar, where it is impossible to say "here it is found, here it was," as the get was not established in this place. But if the get was truly lost in the same place where it was written, even if it was found after some time and in a place where caravans are common, we do not concern ourselves with another unless it was further established that there is another whose name is like his name and her name is like her name, and we say "here it is found, here it was" (Nimukei Yosef, chapter 15 of Yevamot, regarding that case of Yitzchak son of Rabban Gamliel). And so wrote the Ramban there in the Milchamot; see there.

And know that everything written in this siman is only when the husband admits that he wrote a get for her, and similarly when she provides a definitive siman for the get and says that it fell from her, for then even if he does not admit—and these laws will be explained in siman 153. However, in this siman, which deals with a case where the get fell from the hand of the messenger and the concern is perhaps it is another get, it necessarily deals with a case where the husband admits. And if he does not admit that he wrote a get for her, we do not return the get to the messenger in any case. And if the husband says, "I wrote the get and placed it in the hand of this person as a deposit," and this person says, "You gave it to me for the purpose of divorce and I am a messenger for acceptance from your wife," there are many specific laws regarding this and they will be explained, if it please G-d, in siman 141, and it is not relevant to this siman at all.