Siman 127

The sages ordained to write the date in a get. How so? On such-and-such day of the week, on such-and-such day of such-and-such month, such-and-such year according to such-and-such era. And for what reason did they ordain this? For it is not a document of collection (Rashi 17a) such that you would need to know when to collect, for regarding the collection of the ketubah a date is not necessary, as immediately upon producing the get she collects her ketubah. And if it is because of maintenance, that she should extract from him what she borrowed and consumed prior to the date written in the get, and if there were no date in it he would say she was already divorced and she has no claim of maintenance against him—for this reason a date is not necessary, as she can bring witnesses of delivery to the beit din and they will testify as to the time of her divorce (Ran and Tosafot ibid.), or they could write her a separate document stating that she was divorced today (ibid.). And also, one cannot say that the ordinance of the date was regarding the three months she must wait before remarrying, and if there were no date in it she would marry earlier and say she was already divorced—for this reason it is obvious that it is not necessary, as when she wishes to remarry we say to her: "Bring proof of when you were divorced" (it appears to me). And similarly, one cannot say that the ordinance of the date was so she would know when to take from him the usufruct of her properties that were in his possession, for without a date he would seize and consume them, and when she summons him to judgment he would say "I have just now divorced you"—for this reason a date is not necessary, as we established that the husband is entitled to the usufruct until the moment of the delivery of the get into her hand, even if he wrote the get a long time prior; and if so, what he consumes until the moment of delivery he consumes by right, and so that he does not consume after the delivery a date is not necessary, as she is able to come immediately after the delivery to the beit din and extract from him everything of her property in his possession (see Ran ibid.), or she could request the witnesses to write for her when she was divorced (Tosafot); for regarding anything that is for her benefit, a date is not necessary for the reasons that have been explained.

However, the enactment was, as the sages, of blessed memory, said (ibid.), because of a fence against immorality; for there are times when a man is married to his relative and she commits adultery while under him, and he wishes to protect her, so he gives her a get after the adultery and does not write the time in it, and she will say "I was divorced before the adultery." And so it is found in the Yerushalmi, chapter 4 of Gittin (halacha 3): Why did they enact a time in a get? Because of an incident that occurred; an incident occurred with one who was married to his sister's daughter and she committed adultery while she was a married woman; he went and predated the time in his get, saying "it is better that she be judged as an unmarried woman and not be judged as a married woman." Thus far his words. And the Rif and the Rosh brought it, see there. And this is the explanation: before they enacted to write a time in a get, the witnesses did not pay attention to the time, and he was able to write even a predated one, and she would agree to this since it is for her benefit. But after they enacted a time, he cannot write a predated one, for the witnesses will not sign it, and likewise the witnesses of delivery will not allow such a get to be given. And in truth, before the enactment, he did not need to make it predated, for he could write her a get without a time and give it to her, and when they would testify in beit din regarding her adultery, she would produce her get and say "I was divorced and an unmarried woman at that time" (Rashi). And we do not say "establish her in the presumptive status of a married woman and it is only now that she was divorced," since she is divorced before us; and on the contrary, establish her in the presumptive status of fitness, that she did not commit adultery while she was a married woman (Ran). (And it requires further study regarding what the Rishonim wrote in the name of the Ittur, that the Yerushalmi does not hold the reason of "lest he protect her," for it is true that in chapter 2 it says the reason of produce, but in chapter 4 it says the reason of "lest he protect her" as I have written; and one must say that his intention refers to Rabbi Yochanan, who in our Talmud says the reason of "lest he protect her" and in the Yerushalmi says the reason of produce):

And one should not ask: this is well when the Beit HaMikdash existed and they would judge capital cases, but in this time, what is the practical difference? For in truth, even in this time, it would be his desire to protect her so that the child would not be a mamzer, and furthermore, so that she would not be forbidden to him if she committed adultery before the divorce; but after the divorce, if she committed adultery, she is permitted to return to him (the Rosh, ibid.). And one should not ask that according to this, why do we need the reason of saving her from death? For it can be said that without the reason of saving her from death, they would not have instituted a date, for even without a date, when he wishes to take her back, we would say to him: "Bring proof that she committed adultery after the divorce," and when the son wishes to marry a woman, we would tell him to bring proof. Therefore, the primary institution was in order to save her from death, and since they decreed because of this, we maintain the institution because of the reasons that were explained as well (ibid.).

However, there is a great question regarding this: how is it possible that the essence of the enactment was in order to save her from death? For behold, one is not put to death without a warning, and regarding the witnesses who warned her, whichever way you look at it: if they know that she is still a married woman, his trickery of giving her a get will not avail, since the witnesses know she is still a married woman. And if they do not know, even without this they do not put her to death, for it would be a "doubtful warning" for the witnesses. For one could say that the concern is always lest the witnesses did not know; and if it is because of a "doubtful warning," behold we hold that a "doubtful warning" is considered a warning, as the Rambam wrote in the sixteenth chapter of Sanhedrin, see there. Furthermore, the master of this teaching in our Talmud who states this reason is Rabbi Yochanan, and he holds that a "doubtful warning" is considered a warning (Makkot 15b). Furthermore, the truth is that this is not a "doubtful warning," for it is only called a "doubtful warning" when the doubt exists also for the one performing the transgression; but when it is clear to the one performing the transgression, even though the witnesses who warn him do not know, it is called a "certain warning," for warning was only given to distinguish between an unintentional act and a willful act, and since the transgressor knows, it is a good warning (Tosafot Pesachim 63b; and with this it is settled why it was said according to Resh Lakish in Gittin ibid. that "promiscuity is not common," and why did he need to say this? Behold, he holds in Makkot ibid. that it is not considered a warning; but if it were a "certain warning," he was forced to this reason, and examine this carefully).

And if she was divorced with a get that does not contain a date, she should not marry; however, if she married, she shall not leave, even if she does not have children from the second husband, for this is one of the three disqualified gittin (page 86a) regarding which we learned in a Mishnah that if she married, the offspring is kosher. And they ruled in the Gemara there that if she married, she shall never leave, see there. And one should not ask that, according to this, what did the sages achieve with their enactment, for when he wishes to save her from death, he will write her a get without a date and she will say that she committed adultery afterwards; for even though this is a deficiency compared to other gittin, nevertheless we would not be able to put her to death when she says she was divorced prior to the adultery (Beit Shmuel, subsection 1). However, the benefit is that since she is forbidden to marry ab initio, the scribe will not want to write and the witnesses will not want to sign (Rashi). And in this time, it is obvious that even if he obtains such a get, nevertheless we would not believe them so as to allow him to take her back, and also we would not validate the offspring due to the deficiency compared to other gittin, in that it was not written according to the enactment of our sages, of blessed memory (Beit Shmuel).

And know that there are some of our teachers who hold that according to what we establish like Rava that "witnesses of delivery effect the severance," the get is kosher without a date. For just as they ordained that witnesses should sign on the get for the "tikkun olam," and nevertheless it is kosher even without witnesses of signature as written in siman 133, so too the date which they ordained also for the "tikkun olam" is also kosher even without a date, and she may marry with it ab initio, for the witnesses of delivery will testify regarding the get and regarding the time (Rashbam Bava Batra 172b and Tosafot ibid. and Hagahot Maimoniyot chapter 1 letter 50 in the name of the Ittur). However, all the Rishonim did not write so, and one does not compare the decrees of the sages to one another. Furthermore, here the "tikkun olam" is due to the concern of mamzerut, and it is not similar to the "tikkun olam" of signatures which is for the benefit of the woman. And in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch this opinion was not brought at all (see Beit Yosef and Beit Shmuel). And there is one who says that when there are witnesses of signature it is certainly invalid according to the opinion of most poskim, but when there are no witnesses of signature at all on the get, it should be validated in a case of agunah, because it is impossible to come to "covering up," for she must perforce bring witnesses of delivery when she wishes to marry as written in siman 124, and they will ask them when she was divorced (Tumat Yesharim and Get Pashut). However, from the plain meaning of the language of the poskim it does not appear so, and the law requires further study. Also from the Yerushalmi it does not appear so (for it says in chapter 2 halacha 2 that according to Rabbi Shimon who validates when it was written by day and signed at night, and he holds like Rava that "witnesses of delivery effect the severance," there is a distinction between whether he wants to have witnesses sign or not; this implies explicitly that according to the first Tanna it is invalid in any case; see there carefully).

And there is one who asked a great question according to the approach of the poskim that once he has set his eyes upon divorcing her, he no longer inherits from her (this is the approach of the Rashbam in Bava Batra 146b regarding that case of the Tutranit). If so, why did the sages ask for what reason they instituted a date in gittin? Behold, it could be said it was in order that if the woman dies between the writing of the get and its delivery, he should not inherit from her; and if he sent a get from overseas and the woman died before the get reached her hand, if there were no date in it, he would say she died before the writing of the get, and through the date it is clarified that she died afterward. And certainly we are concerned for the possibility that she might die. Rather, it is certain that we do not hold according to this opinion (Getaot Pashut, subsection 2). And according to this, one must raise a difficulty against our teacher, the Rema, in siman 90, section 5, who ruled that one who rebels against his wife does not inherit from her when he does not conduct himself with her according to the custom of marital relations, see there. And consequently, from the time of the writing he does not conduct himself with her according to the custom of marital relations, as is written there in section 24; if so, there is a practical difference regarding the matter of inheritance. However, according to what we explained there, that this is only when he does not obey the beit din or when the beit din does not attend to this, it is well; for in such a case it is not common, and the vast majority attend to the beit din and obey the law, and he inherits from her until the delivery.

Since a get without a date is invalid, all the more so if the date was predated it is invalid. And thus we learned in the Mishnah: If it was written by day and signed at night it is invalid, but if it was written at night and signed by day it is valid (17a), for the night follows the day. The Rambam ruled in chapter 1, law 25, that even if they were occupied with that same matter it is invalid. And even though regarding contracts and a ketubah when they are occupied with that same matter it is not called predated, as is written in Choshen Mishpat siman 43, nevertheless regarding a get it is invalid. For regarding other contracts it is valid because when they are occupied with that same matter the report emerges from the time of the writing (Rashi 18a), but regarding a get the matter does not depend on a report, and until he delivers it to her she is a married woman, and there is concern for the covering up of zenut (see Beit Shmuel subsection 3). However, the Rosh (chapter 2, section 7) disagrees with him and holds that when they are occupied with that same matter it is valid even regarding a get, for so it implies from the plain meaning of the Gemara's sugya that it also refers to a get, for whenever they are occupied with that same matter it is considered as one day (and also the Rashba there and the Yam Shel Shlomo chapter 2, section 9, challenged the Rambam; and furthermore, some have the explicit version in the Gemara there: They only taught that a get which was written etc. when they are not occupied with that same matter etc., see there).

The Rambam further wrote there that just as a predated document is invalid, so too a postdated get, where they wrote the time for the future, is invalid. All the Rishonim disagreed with him, for regarding a postdated document the concern of covering for zenut is not relevant, since on the contrary, it extends the time of her marriage. Some say that the Rambam's reasoning is that we decree regarding a postdated document on account of a predated document (the Meperesh), but this is difficult, for how can we issue decrees of our own accord? Others say that his reasoning is because the woman will lose the fruits from the time of the giving of the get until the time written in it (Kessef Mishneh), for the husband will consume the fruits even afterwards, and when she sues him in beit din, he will say to her: "Show me your get, for you were divorced at such-and-such a time."

Furthermore, one must also be concerned regarding the covering up of zenut in a post-dated document, as the Ran, of blessed memory, wrote: that he might write the date of the get for several days later, and she will produce her get and say, "I was divorced prior to the zenut," and the date of the get does not prove otherwise, for we must see that it is post-dated, and it is like a get that has no date. And there is a proof for this from Yevamot (116a, where it says there: we are concerned perhaps he flew on a camel, etc., and why did it not say we are concerned lest it is post-dated? Thus wrote the Kesef Mishneh, see there).

And regarding the poskim who validate a postdated [get], some say it is valid to marry with it immediately and she does not need to wait until the time of the get (Ra'avad there), and only the fruits he consumes until the time of the get, and likewise her ketubah she shall not collect beforehand (ibid.). And some say that the divorce does not take effect until the time (Tosafot 17a, s.v. Resh Lakish), and according to this opinion the Rosh, the Tur, and the Shulchan Aruch in section 9 ruled. And one must hold as the law according to both opinions stringently regarding if she received kiddushin from another (Beit Shmuel subsection 15). And it is simple that as the law one must be concerned also for the opinion of the Rambam that a postdated [get] is invalid, and we do not allow her to marry except with another get; and perhaps in a case of iggun one may rely on the opinion of the majority of the poskim who disagree with the Rambam and validate a postdated [get] for the time written in it. And know that that which we wrote according to the first opinion, that she has no fruits or ketubah until the time of the get, this is when they wrote it postdated with her knowledge, for she agreed to this and it is as if she waived it to him until the time of the get. But if he wrote it without her knowledge, she takes the ketubah immediately and he does not consume her fruits immediately (Rosh siman 5). And this is according to the first opinion that the get takes effect immediately, but according to the "some say," certainly she does not take her ketubah before the time written in the get, for how could she take her ketubah when the divorce has not yet taken effect? And also the fruits he consumes until the time written in the get (ibid.). And according to this, the concern of fruits in section 9 is removed. And also regarding the concern of zenut that we wrote in the previous section, it can be said that there is no concern in this, for since it is known that they postdated the time, they will investigate well if she committed zenut before the divorce, and it is not similar to [a get] that has no time in it, where they would not pay attention at all (see Beit Yosef and Beit Shmuel).

Regarding that which an antedated document is invalid, some say that this specifically refers to an antedated document where the date of the get precedes the signatures, such as if it was written and signed in Marcheshvan but "in Tishrei" was written in it. And likewise a postdated document according to the Rambam, which was written and signed in Tishrei but "in Marcheshvan" is written in it. However, if he was standing in Tishrei and wrote the get lishmah according to its law, and the date of Marcheshvan is written in it, and the witnesses signed it such that the get was written in their presence on that very day written in the get, it appears that it is valid; for we do not consider it antedated or postdated since the date written in the get and the signature are all on one day. And this is what the Rambam wrote, "until they sign it at the time of its writing," meaning at the time written in the get, and he did not say "on the day of its writing." And that which we say, "written by day and signed at night is invalid," specifically refers to where a date was written in it and it was signed at night after the date. Thus far the words of the commentator to the Rambam there (and the Beit Yosef brought it in Bedek HaBayit and there is an omission there, see there; and know that this is not the Maggid Mishneh, for the Rivash already wrote at the end of siman 117 that the Maggid Mishneh is missing on the first three chapters of Gerushin, and the language also proves this).

The explanation of the matter is that we are not particular about the actual writing itself—that it should not precede the signatures—but rather about the date written in it. Therefore, if they wrote it beforehand and the date was written for several days later, and the witnesses signed on the day that the date was written in the get, it is kosher. Now, according to those who hold that a post-dated get is kosher, there is no novelty in this at all. It is only according to the Rambam, who disqualifies a post-dated get, where there would have been room to say that only if they wrote it for a later date is it disqualified; it comes to teach us that since the witnesses signed on the day of the date, it is not called post-dated. And even though we hold like Rabbi Eleazar that "and he shall write for her" refers to the writing of the get and not to the signatures of the witnesses, nevertheless, since regarding the signatures there is no post-dating here, there is no flaw here.

And behold, the Rambam wrote concerning a predated get the language of "pasul," and likewise concerning a postdated one according to his approach. He established a general rule in chapter 10 that wherever he wrote "pasul" and not "batel," it is pasul by rabbinic decree, and she is disqualified from the priesthood by Torah law, and she may not marry ab initio; but if she married, she does not leave, and he writes another kosher get and gives it to her, and the offspring is kosher, see there. And there is room to doubt if its law is exactly like a get that has no date—where even if she has no children she does not leave—or not. And some say that in this case it is more stringent than one that has no date, and if she has no children she must leave (Ran in chapter 9, s.v. "ve-get mukdam"). And some say there is no difference, and even if she has no children she does not leave (ibid. in the name of "there are those who say").

But the Tur wrote, and this is his wording: My father, our teacher, the Rosh, of blessed memory, wrote in a responsa: If she was divorced with a postdated get and its invalidity was not known until another man betrothed her, the betrothal of the second does not take effect upon her, and she does not require a get from him and is permitted to return to the first. Thus far his words. And his words are astonishing; from where did he derive to be so lenient? For its invalidity is only rabbinic, and even though we consider the time from the toref as the Tur wrote in siman 123, nevertheless it is simple that this is only for stringency and not for leniency, as is written there. And our teacher, the Beit Yosef, already wondered at his words in his great book; see there. And there is one who says that his reasoning is that since its invalidity was not known until after the second betrothed her, it is a mistaken betrothal, for had the second known that the get was not valid, he would not have betrothed her (Bach). But it is impossible to say so, for mistaken betrothal is only in a case of a condition, such as where he betrothed her on the condition that she has no blemishes and the like, where he spoke explicitly, but not in a matter where he did not speak (Taz). And is this prohibition any better than those liable for a negative commandment, where even if he did not recognize that she is among those liable for a negative commandment, the betrothal takes effect and she requires a get? And all the more so regarding secondary forbidden relations, as is proven from what was explained in siman 116, see there. And all the more so regarding a postdated invalidity which is rabbinic. And there is one who wishes to say that his reasoning is because the witnesses are disqualified, as they signed their names to a postdated get (Get Pashut in the name of Gidulei Terumah).

However, this is only if the witnesses knew that it was predated and they themselves were the witnesses of delivery, for if they did not know, they are not disqualified; and even if they knew, if the witnesses of delivery were others who are valid, this is only a rabbinic disqualification. All of this is not clarified in the words of the Rosh (ibid.). And there is one who wishes to distinguish between if she was betrothed or if she was married (ibid. in the name of Rabbi Yehuda Mintz), but there is no basis for these words, as is proven from several places (ibid.). And there is one who wishes to state a correct reason for this: that it is certain that since the disqualification was not known until after the betrothal of the second, we must say that it was not done intentionally by the husband, but rather from an error of the scribe; and the husband certainly told him to write a valid get according to the way of the world, and consequently, this is a deviation from the husband's agency, and his agency is void, and it is as if it were not written with the husband's permission and is not lishmah, such that the get is void from the Torah (Gett Pashut at the end of subsection 6). (And the Yam Shel Shlomo, chapter 2, siman 12, rejected this responsum with both hands and wrote that they are words of error, see there; and according to what I have written, there is a good reasoning in this):

According to this, it is possible to say that the rest of the poskim would agree to this, and all the laws they explained regarding a postdated get, that its invalidity is rabbinic, apply when the husband knows of the invalidity; but if he does not know, then the scribe has deviated from his agency. However, according to the words of the Rambam in chapter 2, law 9, that whenever one did not appoint an agent for the completion of the get to deliver it to the woman, but only for the writing and the signatures, they do not write another get even if it is found to be void or invalid, and we say that his agency has ended, see there, it is impossible to sustain this law. And even though in siman 122 we explained the opinion of the Rambam in a different manner, see there what I wrote in section 6, nevertheless, it is impossible to establish this law as halacha since all the poskim did not mention this, and even the Rosh himself did not explain this reason. Our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, rejected it from the halacha, as our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 2. This is his wording: And a postdated get, even though it is invalid, if she was betrothed to another, she requires a get from the second and is forbidden to return to the first. Thus far his words. And he did not distinguish between whether the husband knew of the invalidity or did not know. The great later authorities also rejected this law; therefore, we do not rule accordingly. And for the law, even if he did not know of the invalidity, nevertheless she is forbidden to return to him after she was betrothed to another and requires a get from the second. One can explain the reason for this: since the husband did not concern himself to see at the time of the delivery of the get to his wife if it was valid or not, we say that he was satisfied and accepted everything the scribe did in his writing, and it is called having fulfilled his agency. (The Get Pashut also did not agree to the law accordingly, see there, and therefore, Heaven forbid one should rule according to this responsum).

The Tur wrote: If she was divorced with a get that does not contain a date, she should not marry, but if she did marry with it, she does not leave, even if she does not have children. And if they predated the time, it is pasul. Nevertheless, if it was written during the day and signed on the following night, or even from then until ten days later, my father, our teacher, the Rosh, of blessed memory, ruled that it is kosher in a case of pressing need where it is impossible by means of another get. And the Ramah wrote that it is pasul. Thus far his words. And according to this, the opinion of the Rosh differs from the opinion of all the poskim, for he distinguishes between a complete predating—which is when they predated the time, such that they wrote it and signed it in Marcheshvan but wrote the time in it as Tishrei, and he was very stringent in this, that if the husband did not know, the get is null from the Torah, and if she was betrothed to another, she does not require a get from him, as he wrote in section 15—and a predating where it was written during the day and signed at night or after ten days, where he was very lenient, that it is kosher in a case of pressing need. And this is according to the sugya of the Shas (19a), where there was an incident where all the witnesses did not sign until after some time, and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi validated it and said: Rabbi Shimon, who disagrees with the law of "written during the day and signed at night," is worthy to rely upon in a case of pressing need, such as when this one went on his way or she already married (Rashi). And his reason for distinguishing between a predating written with an earlier time and a predating written during the day and signed after some time is that what is written with an earlier time is written with a falsehood, while what is written during the day and signed after some time is written with truth (Beit Yosef). And there are those who say that the reason for the distinction is between when the witnesses know that it is predated, where it is kosher in a case of pressing need, and when the witnesses do not know, where it is null from the Torah (Maharam Mintz, 69). And this distinction does not seem logical (Beit Shmuel, subsection 4). And there is one who distinguishes between when the husband knew that they predated it, in which case we validate it in a case of pressing need, and when the husband did not know, in which case the get is null from the Torah (Beit Shmuel, ibid.). And his reason is that when the husband did not know, there will be a mishap regarding the produce, for she would seize from the purchasers the produce that he sold from the time written in the get; but when he knew that they predated it, by law she should seize it, for he holds that since he set his eyes on divorcing her, he no longer has rights to the produce (ibid.). But this does not seem so, for because of this reason, the Rosh should not have nullified the get from the Torah. Furthermore, it clearly appears from the wording of the Tur that the Rosh's validation in a case of pressing need does not refer to "predated the time." Therefore, the main point seems to be as I wrote: that when it is written with a falsehood, it is null from the Torah because he deviated from his agency, but when it is written with truth, it is kosher in a case of pressing need.

And according to this, in the opinion of the Rosh and the Tur, there are three divisions of laws regarding a predated document: for when it was written truthfully and the signatures or the delivery were afterwards, it is valid in a case of pressing need; and if it was written with an advanced date, it is disqualified even in a case of pressing need. However, when the husband knew of this, it is not void according to the Torah, and she requires a get from the second if she received kiddushin from him, and she is forbidden to return to the first; and when the husband did not know of this, it is void according to the Torah. And we have already written that the poskim disagree with him on this (and so it may be said regarding the intent of the Beit Shmuel, subsection 4, that he spoke regarding the law and not regarding the words of the Tur; see there and examine closely).

And behold, regarding this law where it was written in truth but the signatures were delayed, which the Rosh and the Tur validate in a case of pressing need, several poskim agreed to this (as written in the Beit Yosef). Only from the Rif and the Rambam does it not appear so, and therefore their opinion was brought in the Shulchan Aruch, section 2, in the name of "there are those who say." Certainly, in a case of pressing need, one may rely on these teachers of ours:

And according to this, the law is as follows: that with a truly predated document, even in a pressing situation it is invalid and is not void by Torah law, whether the husband knew of the invalidity or whether he did not know. And if another man came and betrothed her, she requires a get from him and is forbidden to return to the first. However, if the second does not wish to divorce her, he may maintain her (see Beit Shmuel subsection 5 and examine carefully). Its law is like all rabbinic invalidations that the Rambam wrote in chapter 10, that if she married she does not go out and the offspring is kosher, and they write another kosher get for her while she remains with her husband, see there, and it will be explained in siman 150. However, this is specifically when the husband knew of the invalidity; but if he did not know, we remove her from the second as well, for we must be concerned for the opinion of the Rosh that we cited, that when he did not know, the get is void by Torah law and she is forbidden to both of them. And so the great Acharonim agreed (Get Pashut and Be'er Mayim, not like the Beit Shmuel subsection 5; and so it is implied from our teacher, the Rema, in section 2, who wrote that she requires a get from the second and did not write if she is forbidden to him or not, because in this there is a distinction between whether he knew or did not know).

And when he knew of the disqualification that we mentioned, where we said that if she married she shall not leave, some say that this is even if she does not have children, like a get that does not have a date; and some say specifically when she has children, and it has already been explained in section 11. And regarding that which was written by day and signed at night, or after several days, or where the giving was after several days—according to the opinion of the Rif, the Rambam, and the Ramah, its law is like a predated get that was written with the disqualification we explained. And according to the opinion of the Rosh, the Tur, the Ittur, the Hagahot Maimoni (chapter 1), and Rabbeinu Yerucham, and so it appears is the opinion of Rav Hai Gaon (see the Rosh there), it is kosher in a time of pressing need.

But what is called an exigent circumstance? The Tur wrote: when it is impossible to obtain another get. And Rashi, of blessed memory, explained (19a): that this one went on his way, or that she has already married. Thus far his words. And it can be said regarding his intention that when she has married, even if the first husband is in the city, there is no need to give another get so that she does not become disparaged in the eyes of her husband (Gett Pashut, subsection 9). And in this it is more lenient than other rabbinic disqualifications because we rely on Rabbi Shimon, who holds that this is a valid get. And there is a doubt if the get is through an agent and the husband has already gone to a distant land, whether this also is called an exigent circumstance and we give her the get ab initio or not. And the great authorities agreed that this also is called an exigent circumstance, and we tell the agent to give her the get (ibid. in the name of the Maharit and the Rahesh). However, if it is only possible to obtain another get, even from afar, we do not permit her to marry with this get (ibid.), even if it has already been delivered to her, if she has not yet married. And the matter is simple that when she has entered into an engagement with another, this is nothing to be considered an exigent circumstance for this reason alone.

If it was written during the day and they did not manage to sign it until the night, if they wrote in it before the signatures, "This get was written on such-and-such a day and the witnesses did not manage to sign it until night," and the witnesses signed afterwards, it is kosher. For behold, there is no longer any concern, neither regarding zenut nor regarding fruits, since it is explicitly stated that it was signed the next day. The same applies if it was signed after several days, since they explain before the signatures that it was signed on such-and-such a day, for also in other shetarot it is kosher in such a case, as is written in Choshen Mishpat siman 43. The same applies if one witness signed his name on the day it was written and the second did not manage to sign until night, and they wrote between one witness and the other, "This get was written and signed on such-and-such a day and the second did not manage to sign until night," it is also kosher, as is written in Choshen Mishpat siman 44; see there. Certainly, it is only kosher ex post facto, and ab initio one should not do so, for more than twelve lines will be added to the get. However, in the case of a shekhiv mera, when they see that there is not enough time to write another get at night and she will remain bound to a yavam, they may do so ab initio (Get Pashut and Tuv Gittin). It is possible that also in a case of iggun, such as when they estimate that afterwards he will not agree to give the get and she will remain an agunah, they may also rely on this ab initio; however, this is an uncommon matter that his mind would change in a short time. Certainly, it is much better to write and sign at night, even though it is not the custom to give a get at night, than for them to sign on a different day from the time of writing, even if they write "This get, etc."

And they asked in the Gemara (18a): Gittin that come from overseas which are written in Nisan and do not arrive until Tishrei, what did the sages benefit by their enactment? Meaning, how did the sages disqualify an antedated document, for a get sent via a messenger from afar is perforce antedated, as its delivery is distant from the time of the writing and the signatures? And there is concern for the covering up of zenut and for the produce that she might seize from purchasers who bought from him until the delivery, for she will produce her get and say, "I was divorced at the time written in the get," when in truth the husband has the produce until the time of delivery, as has been written, and she will thus seize unlawfully. And they answered in the Gemara that gittin that come via a messenger have a kol, for there is a rumor regarding the matter that the delivery is after the time of writing, and they will investigate to know the day of delivery, and there will be no mishap in the matter. And perhaps you will ask, if so, why is it necessary to write a date in a sent get? For in truth, by means of the date it has a kol, because they see by means of the date within it that the delivery is not on the day of writing (Tosafot). And if there were no date in it, there would be no perception of the matter. And one should not ask, if so, why is an antedated document disqualified, for surely the witnesses know that it was not delivered on the day of writing and this has a kol? For this is no question, as the sages did not rely on the kol except in a sent get where it is impossible otherwise (Ran), and in a sent get the matter is more publicized than in a get written in its own place.

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 5: A get that was not delivered on the day of writing, there is no remedy to validate it except that he should send it to her by means of a messenger. Thus far his words. And this remedy was written by our teachers, the Rishonim. There is one who wishes to say that according to what we wrote—that the reason is that the sages, of blessed memory, did not want to rely on the rumor except in sent gittin where it is impossible otherwise—he does not agree with this remedy since it is possible to give another get (Beit Shmuel, subsection 6). But this is not a compelling reason to disqualify it post facto, for certainly ab initio one should not do so, as our teacher, the Rema, wrote, that they were accustomed to be stringent and to write another get. Thus far his words. But post facto one should not disqualify it since he sent it by means of a messenger. And that which we said, that they did not want to rely on the rumor except in sent gittin, certainly it is so, for the sages, of blessed memory, did not want to establish this remedy for all antedated documents. And if there were no necessity from sent gittin, the sages, of blessed memory, would not have validated it in any case. But since because of sent gittin they were forced to establish it so and to rely on the rumor because it is impossible otherwise, it follows that this remedy is effective for any get that is by means of a messenger, and it is impossible to disqualify it since it is from the enactment of the sages, of blessed memory. Rather, ab initio one should not do so since it is possible to write another, but post facto it is simple that it is valid (and so wrote the Be'er Mayim).

And know that this law applies only to a predated document that was written in a valid manner but its delivery was delayed; however, a truly predated document, where they wrote it for an earlier time, this remedy of sending it via a messenger is of no avail. And even regarding gittin sent from afar, if they predated the time of writing, it is invalid like any predated get, for the sages, of blessed memory, did not establish a remedy for those who write falsehoods. And so the great later authorities agreed (Bach, and Beit Shmuel subsection 6 at the end of his words, and Get Pashut, and Be'er Mayim, and Tuv Gittin). This is the wording of the Ran, of blessed memory: And if you say, if so, why is a predated get invalid? Behold, since its time is prior to its delivery, it has a rumor, etc. Therefore, it seems to me that specifically regarding gittin coming from overseas they rely on the rumor because of an agunah, and similarly regarding one who deposits a get for his wife and goes on his way. Thus far his words. And his intention is regarding a completely predated document that was written with an earlier date. And so wrote one of the great authorities (Tuv Gittin), and this is his wording: And the essence of the law is that a completely predated document, or one written by day and signed at night, is invalid and has no remedy. But a predated document that was delayed between writing and delivery in the hand of the husband has a remedy to be sent by the hand of a messenger. And if it is easily possible to give another get, he should write another get. Thus far his words. And this is as I have written.

Nevertheless, there is yet another detail in this matter, as one of the great Achronim wrote (Getaot Pashut, end of subsection 13). This is his wording: And in my humble opinion, it appears regarding the halacha that if this postdated get is one that was written on the tenth of the month and they wrote in it the fifth of the month, and the like, where they advanced its date intentionally and it contains signatures of witnesses, one should not validate this get by means of a messenger because the get is invalid due to the signatures of the witnesses who signed falsely, and they are thus disqualified, etc. However, if there are no signatures of witnesses on that get, or even if there are signatures of witnesses but the advancing of the date in the get was not intentional at all—such as if they erred regarding the intercalation of the month, or they wrote the day of the command when the husband instructed them, etc., in a manner where the signatures of the witnesses are not disqualified—in such a case, even though it is a completely postdated get where it was written on the tenth of the month and they wrote in it the fifth, one may validate it and deliver it by means of a messenger, for everything done by means of a messenger has a public voice, and there is no concern for either zenut or for the produce, etc. Thus far his words. And perhaps one may rely on this in a case of iggun, and so one should rule in a time of pressing need (so it appears in my humble opinion).

And they asked in the Gemara (17b) regarding the enactment of the date: If he wrote it and placed it in his pocket, what of it? And they answered: A person does not bring misfortune upon himself prematurely. See there for the explanation of the matter, for what did the sages achieve with their enactment? For we hold that one may write a get for a man even if his wife is not with him, and since this is so, he is able to delay the get in his pocket and give it to her after some time, and he could cover for her zenut. And they answered that it is not the way of people to do so, to bring forward a matter that is not good before the time, and if he does so, presumably he will give it to her immediately after the writing (Tosafot s.v. ad, see there). And if the matter is indeed drawn out, there is an enactment to send it via a messenger, as has been written:

According to this, one must wonder about the Rambam, of blessed memory, at the beginning of chapter 2, who wrote: And so too, if he said to a scribe, "Write a get for my wife," and said to the witnesses to sign, they write and sign and give it to him, and he divorces with it at any time he desires. Thus far his words. This implies explicitly that he permitted, ab initio, to divorce with it after a period of time. And how is it possible to say so, for is there not the concern of zenut? And this is the primary reason for the enactment of the sages regarding the writing of the date. However, I found one of the Rishonim (Nimukei Yosef, first chapter of Bava Metzia) who wrote in this wording: That even in a case where they certainly wrote it in Nissan and he placed it in his pocket and did not give it until Tishrei, it is kosher. And so wrote the Rambam, of blessed memory, and the Ramban, of blessed memory, agreed with him, for it is not similar to a document of debt. Firstly, because with a get it is not common that one predates, because a person does not predate misfortune for himself. And for this reason we learned in a Mishnah that ab initio they write a get for a man even though his wife is not with him, and we are not concerned that he will predate it. And if so, if it happened that he did this, it is not disqualified, which is not the case with other documents where a person is likely to predate and write. And furthermore, the primary writing of a get is for divorce, and for divorce it is completely kosher, and because of an uncommon concern, we do not disqualify it for divorce; but a document of debt, etc. Thus far his words. And the intention of the Rambam is explained, that he interprets what the sages said, "a person does not predate misfortune for himself," that this means it is an uncommon matter, and therefore if it occurred by chance, we are not concerned for it (and there is no need for the forced explanation of the Beit Shmuel, subsection 7, and the prince did not remember Yosef, see there and examine carefully).

And according to this, it is a dispute of the Rishonim: if it occurred that one wrote a get for his wife and it remained with him for several days, according to the Rambam, the Ramban, and the Nimukei Yosef, he himself is permitted to give it to her, because since it is an uncommon matter, the rabbis did not decree upon it. But according to the Tosafot, the Rosh, and the Tur, there is no remedy for this except to deliver it via a messenger. And since our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, brought only this opinion, so we hold. And it is possible that in a case of iggun where it is impossible to give it via a messenger, one may rely on the opinion of our teachers who permit giving it himself (and so wrote the Be'er Mayim, see there). And similarly, a person can deposit a get for his wife with a third party so that the third party will give it to her after a period of time, and there is no concern of "mukdam" in this (Gemara ibid.), for in such a case, the matter has a voice.

From the commentary of Rashi (17b, s.v. "ad") it is implied that a woman who comes to seize property from purchasers who bought from her husband after the time of the get must bring proof as to when the get reached her hand. However, all of our teachers disagree regarding this, for we only say this regarding a found get, which contains a flaw in that it fell from its owner and he did not guard it properly. But regarding any woman who brings a get, we say that it was presumably delivered on the day it was written, and she does not need to bring proof unless there was a flaw in it. And so they ruled in the Tur and Shulchan Aruch, section 5.

Some say that just as the sages permitted a get sent via a messenger to be given after some time, so too if the husband himself brings it to the location of the woman, we are not concerned about it being predated, for the matter has a voice just as it does via a messenger, and there is no concern of predating in this (Yam Shel Shlomo chapter 2, siman 5, and so wrote the Mahari). And it is an explicit Baraita (5a): If he himself brought his get, he does not need to say "in my presence it was written and in my presence it was signed," see there. Behold, it is explicit that the husband may bring his get, and presumably it is not on the day of the writing of the get; evidently we are not concerned in this for predating (ibid.).

If he said to two or to three to write a get and to sign and to give it to his wife, and the matter was delayed such that they did not write it on the day he commanded them, and even if it was delayed a long time and they went to another place, or if they wrote it on that day and it was found that it was not written according to its law and they need to write another get, they shall not write the time that the husband commanded them—meaning that day he commanded them—or that place where he commanded them. Rather, they shall write the time of the day they are writing it now, and likewise the place. How so? If he was in Jerusalem when the husband spoke to them and they were standing in Tishrei, and it was delayed until Nisan and they are now in Lod, they write the time from Nisan and in Lod. And such is the law regarding other documents, except for documents of acquisition, as I have written in Choshen Mishpat siman 43. And even though a get is the language of the husband, and how can they write in Nisan in Lod "I, so-and-so" when he was not in Lod in Nisan? For it is well-understood regarding other documents, which are the language of the witnesses, that it is appropriate since they are standing then in such-and-place; but a get is the language of the husband. For it can be said that they are agents from him, and a person's agent is like himself, for if it were not so, how could they write "I, so-and-so"? And since they are like him, they properly write in Nisan in Lod where they are standing now. And this is the explanation: that the husband commanded them to write a get on his behalf to his wife, and it is as if they are writing "in Nisan in Lod we have come on the mission of so-and-so," except that the version of the get is not so because "and he shall write" refers to the scribe, that he should write on the mission of the husband and in the language of the husband (and so it is proven explicitly in Yevamot 116a regarding a get that was found in Sura and it was written in it "In the city of Sura, I, Anan bar Chiyya, etc." and he was then in Nehardea, and the Gemara says there "he delivered words," see there and examine carefully).

And know that regarding other documents, there are those among the poskim who required mentioning in the document the place where the matters were delivered as well (Rashbam Bava Batra 172a, and Nimukei Yosef and Mordechai ibid.), and they write "In such-and-such place we wrote what we saw in such-and-such place." According to this, there is one who says that it is necessary to write at the end of the get before "according to the law of Moses and Israel" in this language: "This get, the husband so-and-so commanded us in such-and-such place at such-and-such time that we should write a get for his wife so-and-so, and its writing was delayed until such-and-such day in such-and-such city according to the law of Moses and Israel," and the witnesses sign. And if they did not do so, there is reason for concern and to disqualify it because it appears like a falsehood according to the opinion of those poskim whom we cited. And in a time of pressing need, where it is a case of iggun such that it is impossible to obtain another get that would have this version written in it at the end of the get, one may be lenient and rely on the reasoning of those who permit it, who hold that one writes plainly "in Nisan and in Lod."

And in my humble opinion, it appears that one should not write so even ab initio, and it is close to a defect. There is a clear proof from Yevamot which we brought, for there it was a standard get like all gittin, as is proven there. And it is not similar to legal documents, which are the language of the witnesses; when they write a record of testimony that "it was before us on such-and-such a day in such-and-such a place that so-and-so said to us," there is certainly reason to be concerned that it appears like a falsehood, for he did not say it to them on that day in that place. But in a get, which is the language of the husband, and the scribe writes as his agent that from that day he releases his wife, how could they write in the get, "this get he commanded us, etc."? For are they the ones writing the get? Is it not the husband who writes the get, and the scribe is like the husband himself? And the presence of the scribe in such-and-such a place on such-and-such a day is like the presence of the husband. Furthermore, he does not write in the get, "on such-and-such a day in such-and-such a place I am here," but rather, "on such-and-such a day in such-and-such a place I release my wife." And the truth is so, that on such-and-such a day and in such-and-such a place he releases her, for today in this place the scribe writes the get as his agent. Therefore, all the poskim did not mention this (so it appears in my humble opinion).

And if they did not do so, but rather wrote the place that the husband told them and the time that he told them, it is like all the rabbinic disqualifications that were explained in siman 150. And so it is implied explicitly in the Gemara (80a), and so wrote the Rivash (siman 382), and that the Ramban and the Ra'ah, of blessed memory, wrote similarly; see there. And the reason is that it appears like a falsehood; and even though we hold that we are not concerned with "appearing like a falsehood" (Ketubot 85b; Gittin 26b), not all falsehoods are similar to one another (ibid.). However, if they did not change their place and only delayed the writing, and they wrote the day that the husband commanded them, since it was delivered by a messenger, it is kosher post facto (Get Pashut, subsection 20), for this is not a complete antedating, as the husband truly commanded them on that day. But when they are standing in a different place, since they are automatically required to write the place where they are standing now, it is impossible to validate it when they wrote the day the husband commanded them; for if they write the place of writing and the time of the command, you have no greater change than this, and it is disqualified. But when they did not change their place and are standing in the same place where the husband commanded them, certainly ab initio they must write the day of writing, but post facto, when they wrote the day of the command and it was delivered by a messenger, it is kosher (ibid.).

It has already been explained that ab initio one must write all the details of the time: the day of the week, the day of the month, and the year. However, the day of the week has no primary source for this, as it is not found anywhere in the Tanakh; therefore, if they did not write it, there is no hindrance in the matter at all (Beit Shmuel, subsection 11). Furthermore, the Rambam in chapter 1, law 26, and the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch, section 7, wrote: A get in which the name of the day was not written, but rather he wrote "in the first or second week of such-and-such month," or "in such-and-such month," or "in such-and-such year" and did not mention the month, or even if he wrote "in such-and-such shemittah cycle," it is valid. Thus far their words. And this is stated explicitly in the Gemara (17b). And they asked: If so, what did the sages accomplish with their enactment? And they answered: The benefit is for the preceding shemittah cycle, so that if she committed adultery they could judge her; for if not so, even if they write the day, there is still a concern that perhaps she will commit adultery in the morning and in the evening he will write her a get, and she will say that she was divorced in the morning. Rather, the benefit is for the preceding time.

And one should not ask, ultimately what benefit is there in the enactment? For if she commits adultery, he will write her a get in such-and-such a year, or even more than this, in such-and-such a shemittah, and her adultery will not be clarified. For it can be said that presumably the adultery is not known to the husband in the near future, as she certainly committed adultery in secret; and even if it becomes known, he is not concerned that it will be revealed to the beit din, and most often months and years will pass until it becomes known to the beit din. Therefore, in most instances, there is benefit from the time (Maharam Schiff). And the sages did not want to be overly stringent in their enactment, and as long as there is some time indicated, it is sufficient. And it appears to me that nowadays the time of shemittah is not applicable, for this is only during the time when they counted shemittot and jubilees, and they wrote "in the third shemittah of the jubilee" (and so it appears from Rashi), but nowadays this is no sign at all. And more than a shemittah is never a sign; for example, if he writes "for such-and-such a jubilee," it is nothing. Furthermore, it appears to me that a month without a year is nothing, and even if he wrote the day of the month and the week, for it is not recognizable at all which year it is (and so it appears from the commentary of Rashi, who explained "he wrote the month and did not write the week," see there).

And there are some of our teachers who hold that even initially one may do so, to write "the second week of such-and-such month, such-and-such year," or the year alone (Rashi and Rashba). However, from the wording of the Rambam it is implied that only ex post facto is it valid, and there is reason to doubt his intention—whether his intention is that once it has already been given it is valid, or even once it has been written they may give it (and so it appears in the Beit Yosef, see there; and see the Beit Shmuel subsection 12). The Rif and the Rosh omitted this law, and I do not know why.

The Rambam, of blessed memory, further wrote: And so too if he wrote in it "today I have divorced you," it is kosher, for its meaning is this day on which the get was issued. Thus far his words. And so wrote the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch there, that "that day" implies the day on which this get was issued (Bava Batra 172b), and we consider it like a complete date (Rashbam). And since witnesses see it in her hand and "today" is written in it, behold, a date is written in it (ibid.). And even if the year was not written at all, it is kosher (Beit Shmuel subsection 13). And there are some of our teachers who hold that "today" without specification is nothing, for it contains no clarification of the date; rather, this is the explanation: that it is like a matter of a condition, that the get shall not be effective until the day it is clarified in beit din that it was in her hand (Ramban ibid.), or that the day it was delivered into her hand shall be clarified by the witnesses of delivery (Shiltei HaGibborim in the name of the Riaz, chapter 2 of Gittin). And according to this, the beit din or the witnesses must write for her in writing that it was clarified before them that on such-and-such a day he divorced her, and then she is divorced (see Beit Shmuel subsection 13 and see Turei Zahav).

The Rambam further wrote that if one cut the date from the get and gave it to her, it is valid. Many disagreed with him, for if so, what did the sages achieve with their enactment? Certainly, this law is like all rabbinic invalidations, such as a get that does not contain a date. The Rambam, of blessed memory, holds that since it is an uncommon matter, the sages did not decree regarding it. He follows his reasoning regarding a get in the husband's possession, which he may give to her whenever he wishes, and we are not concerned about the date because it is an uncommon matter, as we explained in section 30. So too in this law, since it is not common, therefore when it occurs that one did so, we do not forbid her. However, most of the poskim disagree on this, and one must wonder about our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 8, who wrote the opinion of the Rambam as the primary ruling, and so the Acharonim challenged him. (The Rambam explains that which our sages, of blessed memory, said on page 17b: "he cut the date etc. we do not concern ourselves with a deceiver," meaning that it is an uncommon matter, and when it occurs we are not concerned about it and we permit her):

In the days of the sages of the Talmud, they would write in contracts and in gittin the years of the kings in the country for the sake of the peace of the kingdom, and if one deviated, the get was invalid. Now that the nations also do not count in their contracts by the years of the kings, this custom has already been nullified for many hundreds of years prior, and the whole world counts by other reckonings. All Israel, from one end of the world to the other, count from the creation of the world. Therefore, all the poskim wrote that if the scribe omitted "to the creation of the world," it is valid, for everyone knows that our reckoning is from the creation of the world. And so they ruled in the Shulchan Aruch, section 10 (see Tosafot, Avodah Zarah 10a, s.v. Safra).

The Rambam wrote in chapter 1: All Israel have already accustomed themselves to count in gittin either from the creation or from the reign of Alexander the Macedonian, which is the counting of documents; and if he wrote it in the name of the reign of that time in a province that is under the authority of that kingdom, it is kosher. Thus far his words. And behold, the counting of documents has already been nullified, and if one wrote it now in a get, it appears that its law is like that which the Rambam wrote there previously: If he wrote it in the name of a kingdom that is not the kingdom of that province, or for the building of the Temple or for its destruction, if it is the way of that place to count by it, it is kosher, and if it is not their way to count by it, it is pasul. Thus far his words. And since now it is not the way to count by the counting of documents, it is pasul. However, there is no proof from this, for if so, why does he validate it if he wrote it in the name of the reign of that time in the province? Behold, it is not the way to count so now. Rather, certainly the reason for the disqualification is because we fear that the government will be particular about this; for even though now they do not write to their years, nevertheless, in writing that which is not the kingdom of that province, or for the building of the Temple and its destruction, they will be particular, whereas for the counting of documents they will not be particular (and so it appears in the Beit Yosef, see there). And similarly, regarding that which the people of the place are accustomed to write, they will not be particular (ibid.). And there is one who hesitates, saying that now, since they are not particular, no disqualification is relevant due to the reason of being particular (ibid.). And from this it appears that if they wrote it now according to the counting that the nations count by, it is kosher, and it requires further study. And the poskim did not speak of this at all because now everyone counts from the creation of the world.

In the counting of the creation, there are four counts: the thousands, the hundreds, the tens, and the units, such as now when they write five thousand six hundred and forty-five. Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote: If one omitted the thousands and the hundreds, only writing such-and-such for the minor count, it is valid, and even if one also omitted "the creation of the world." Thus far his words. He further wrote: If one omitted "five" and wrote only "thousands," it is valid. Thus far his words. He further wrote: If one wrote the general count and the minor count but omitted the middle count, such as if one wrote "five thousand and forty-five" and omitted "and six hundred," it is invalid; but if she married, she need not leave. And there is one who says that we require for her a valid get from the first husband and she may remain with the second. Thus far his words. And similarly he ruled in Choshen Mishpat siman 43, see there.

And behold, regarding that which he wrote that if he skipped the thousands and the hundreds it is kosher, the reason is simple, for the intention is known to all. And the proof is that even in letters, when writing the year, they do not write the count of the thousands at all; therefore, even with the omission of the hundreds, everyone will know the intention. And some say that even if he omitted the number of the tens, such as if he wrote "the year five," it is kosher (Beit Shmuel subsection 18). And in my humble opinion, there is reason to doubt this, for our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in Choshen Mishpat there in the Shulchan Aruch omitted this, and also in his great work there where he wrote that his mind inclines toward declaring it kosher, nevertheless he remains in doubt regarding this and did not write this in the Shulchan Aruch. And how can we declare this kosher in a get? Logic testifies that this has no meaning to the readers. And so wrote one of the Acharonim, that in such a case it is invalid (Tuv Gittin), for in this case one could certainly cover up her zenut, as he might say it was from ten years prior.

And that which he wrote, that if he skipped "five" it is kosher, the reason is simple, for everyone understands that the meaning of "thousands" refers to "five thousand." For one cannot say "two thousand," as if so, he should have written it with two yods, "alpayim." And even though in the Torah it is written with one yod, nevertheless, in the writing of men, an additional yod is required (Beit Shmuel). And furthermore, one cannot err to think that it was written three thousand years prior.

And that which he wrote, that if he skipped the middle digit it is pasul, the reason is that in such a case people are not accustomed to writing, and it appears like a literal antedate. One should not compare this to what was written in siman 126, that when the day of the week contradicts the day of the month it is kosher, for that is because from the day of the week it is proven that he erred by one day in the month, which is not the case here. And even though it is certain that if we calculate this digit for six hundred years prior, the day of the week will also not align with the days of the month, this is not proven from within it, for the majority of people do not know the calculation of hundreds of years prior (Beit Yosef):

And regarding that which he wrote, "if she married, she shall not leave," it appears that even if she has no children she shall not leave, and she also does not require a get from the first husband. It is not similar to a complete mukdam or to any of the rabbinic disqualifications where she requires a get even if she married, as I wrote in siman 150. This is because, in truth, there are several reasons to validate it: first, since in the name where the thousands are missing there is no disqualification, why should the count of the hundreds be any worse? Furthermore, everyone will understand that the hundreds were omitted, for it would not enter anyone’s mind that it was written many hundreds of years prior. Furthermore, since they see the tens and the ones of this year, it is like "proven from within it" that it is not mukdam. In any event, it is no worse than a get that has no date, where she shall not leave even if she has no children. And the "there is one who says" is stringent, as with all rabbinic disqualifications where they require her to have a valid get from the first husband and she may remain with the second (and so wrote the Beit Shmuel). And it is a simple matter that if he omitted the ones, it is a complete mukdam (Levush and Beit Shmuel subsection 21), for it certainly appears clearly that it was written some years prior, and its law is as I wrote in section 21; see there.