Siman 124

1. Our sages, of blessed memory, said (2a): A get that was written upon prohibited items of benefit is kosher. That which is written, "and he shall place it in her hand," its meaning is not like the "placing" written regarding monetary payments, which requires that it possess the value of a perutah; rather, it is the placing of a get (ibid.). However, it is only kosher ex post facto, but ab initio it is certainly forbidden to write upon prohibited items of benefit, for one derives benefit from prohibited items of benefit (Tosafot ibid. s.v. <i>bikhtivat</i>). Such is also the wording of the Shulchan Aruch, section 1. However, the Rambam at the beginning of chapter 4 wrote: One may write the get upon anything, and even upon prohibited items of benefit. Such is also the wording of the Tur. It is implied from their words that one may write it even ab initio. It is possible that the reason is because he does not intend to derive benefit (Bach). And even though ultimately he derives benefit against his will (Pri Chadash), it appears to me that certainly when the husband himself writes it, it is forbidden ab initio, for he desires the get and derives benefit. But their intention is when the scribe writes it and does not take payment, and he has no benefit from the get (Atzei Arazim). And even though he causes the husband to benefit from prohibited items of benefit, we have not found that a cause of benefit from prohibited items of benefit is forbidden. Furthermore, even if the scribe were writing on something worth money, he would be able to transfer it to the husband as a gift and not take money from him, and there is not even a cause here. There is one who wishes to say that their intention is that from the perspective of the get there is no prohibition here, but rather the prohibition is because of benefiting from prohibited items of benefit, and they also admit that ab initio it is forbidden (Pri Chadash). But it does not imply so; for granted that in the Mishnah it is sometimes found so, but this is not the way of the poskim in this. (And from the Gemara there it also implies that it is permitted ab initio, since Rava said: "We also learned likewise: 'upon an olive leaf,'" and there it is ab initio. Rather, certainly both are true: the Tosafot are dealing with the husband himself, as is proven there where he wrote it upon the slave, and the Rambam and the Tur are dealing with a scribe. And that which they sent from there is dealing with the husband himself. According to this, there is no difficulty regarding Rava who said "We also learned etc." when it is not comparable; see there and examine carefully).

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote: However, regarding something that requires removal from the world and requires burning, if he wrote the get upon it, it is void. Thus far his words. Many wondered about him, as his source is from the Ran there, who wrote, and this is his wording: He is speaking regarding all prohibited items of benefit, and even though we say "its measure is crushed," we only say this regarding something that requires a measure, like a shofar or a lulav. However, regarding those that require removal from the world, according to the one who says "anything standing to be burned is considered as if it is already burned," it implies that it is not a get, for it is considered as if it does not exist. Thus far his words. The explanation of his words is that even though in the Gemara we do not find this concept of "its measure is crushed" except regarding an asherah and a subverted city and their like, which are a commandment from the Torah to remove them from the world, as it is written "you shall surely destroy," etc., and regarding other prohibited items of benefit we do not find this, nevertheless our teachers the authors of the Tosafot wrote (Sukkah 35a) that also regarding other prohibited items of benefit whose commandment is burning, such as orlah and the like, the reasoning of "its measure is crushed" also applies. And so wrote the Rashba there (and the difficulty of the Gra is answered). To this he says: even though "its measure is crushed," nevertheless it is valid for a get, for we only say this regarding something that requires a measure like a shofar and a lulav. That is to say, in every object there are points, a line, and a surface, and a surface is only found in a physical body that has three dimensions which are six sides (the Maggid Mishneh, chapter 17 of Shabbat). Therefore the sages of blessed memory said (Eruvin 80b) that a lechi of an asherah is valid, for even though a lechi also needs to be ten tefachim in height, nevertheless anything that does not require a measure for its dimensions but only for its length alone is like lines and is permitted with anything (ibid.). And a get is also similar to a lechi. And he says further that according to the one who says "anything standing to be burned is considered as if it is already burned"—and that is Rabbi Shimon who holds throughout the Gemara that anything standing to be sprinkled is as if it were sprinkled, and standing to be redeemed is as if it were redeemed, and standing to be burned is as if it were burned—certainly it would not be a get, for this is worse than "its measure is crushed," as it is considered as if it were burned and it is not in the world at all (and it requires further study what the Gra wrote in subsection 2, "and it is not so... everyone agrees," see there; his intention is hidden from me, for certainly everyone agrees that "its measure is crushed," but they do not hold that it is "as if it were burned").

And according to this, the words of our teacher, the Rema, are difficult, for the Ran only wrote this according to R. Shimon, but throughout the entire Shas, the sages disagree with R. Shimon, and when an individual and the many disagree, the halacha follows the many. And there is one who wishes to say that the Rambam, of blessed memory, rules like R. Shimon, but it is not so, for there are many proofs that he rules not like R. Shimon (Pri Chadash and so wrote the Gra). And the proof is that he ruled there that a lechi of an asherah is kosher, and therefore they ruled not like our teacher, the Rema (the Gra, the Chelkat Mechokek, and the Pri Chadash). However, from a lechi there is not such a great proof, for one could say that he holds that the reason a lechi of an asherah is kosher is because even though it is considered crushed, nevertheless, if one were to stick the crushed pieces to the wall, the lechi is kosher (Tosafot ibid.); but a get requires one scroll and not two or three scrolls, as is stated in the Gemara (20b):

And for the reason we have explained, it appears to me that his words are correct and another intention is hidden in his words, and not because of the principle that "whatever is destined to be burned is considered as if already burned," for we certainly do not rule like R. Shimon. Rather, this is the explanation: just as the Sages said regarding a shofar, a lulav, and chalitzah of a subverted city or of an asherah, that since the Torah commanded to burn them and to eradicate them from the world, granted that they are not considered as if already burned, nevertheless they are considered as if fragmented, for its measure is crushed, and the required measure is lacking. The same applies to a get; granted that we do not require a measure, nevertheless the Merciful One said "one scroll" and not two or three scrolls, and since this is crushed, how many scrolls are within it? And this is what our teacher, the Rema, wrote: something that requires eradication from the world and requires burning, like an asherah, as it is written, "and their asherim you shall burn with fire," and a subverted city, and offerings to idols, for in all of them the Torah decreed to eradicate them from the world and to burn them (as Rashi wrote in Rosh Hashanah 28a, Sukkah 31b, and Yevamot 103b). And he holds like the opinion of most of the poskim that regarding other forbidden benefits, even though their commandment is with burning as taught at the end of Temurah, nevertheless we do not say regarding them that its measure is crushed. (And his intention is not for the words of the Ran as per the words of those who provide references in the Shulchan Aruch; and know that what Rashi, of blessed memory, wrote in Rosh Hashanah ibid. in the heading "crushed," that behold it stands for burning and is as if burned etc., his intention is not for the view of R. Shimon, but rather regarding the matter that its measure is crushed, see there and examine carefully).

It is permitted to write a get on something that can be forged, meaning that one can erase from the writing and it is not noticeable that it was erased. And even though other documents are invalid on something that can be forged, as written in Choshen Mishpat siman 42, due to the concern that he might erase from the document whatever he wishes and write upon it whatever he wishes, nevertheless, regarding a get it is kosher. And the reason the sages, of blessed memory, stated (22b) is that we hold like Rabbi Eleazar that the witnesses of delivery effect the severance, and there is no Torah requirement for witnesses to sign on the get. For if there were a Torah requirement for signing witnesses, perforce we would require that it be evident from its contents that it is impossible to commit any forgery (Tosafot). But since the witnesses of delivery are the primary factor and he delivers it in their presence, it is impossible to commit a forgery, for behold, they read the get at the time of delivery to her, and if there were any forgery regarding some condition, would they not know of this and not allow him to give it to her? (Rashi). And also after a time the get is kosher, and even after a long time when she brings the get, we permit her to marry and she collects her ketubah, and we do not fear lest she forged it, for behold, she must bring the witnesses of delivery (ibid.), and they remember what was written in it. And even though we hold that "forged from within" is invalid even according to us, yet this is not called "forged from within," for since through the witnesses of delivery the forgery would be noticeable, this is not called forged (Beit Shmuel subsection 3).

And there is a question regarding this: behold, according to the opinion of several poskim, it is valid with witnesses of signature alone even if he delivered it to her between him and her, as will be explained in siman 133. And even according to those who disqualify in such a case, nevertheless, according to everyone, when she brings the get to beit din to marry with it, she does not need to bring witnesses of delivery, for it was for this reason that Rabban Gamliel the Elder ordained that witnesses should be signed on the get so that she would not need to bring witnesses of delivery. If so, how can we validate it on something that can be forged? For is it not possible to forge it? And the answer to this is that it is certainly so, that when it is written on something that can be forged, she is forced to bring witnesses of delivery. And this is what the Tur wrote: "and that is provided that the witnesses of delivery are before us," see there (and also that which Rashi wrote, which we cited, his intention is such, as the Tosafot wrote).

This is the wording of the Rambam in chapter 4: And they may write on a substance that can be forged, provided that they give it to her in the presence of witnesses of delivery. Thus far his words. And so wrote the Shulchan Aruch. And he means to say that the Rambam holds that even with witnesses of signing alone it is valid, as he wrote there, and for this reason he says that in this case we specifically require that they give it to her in the presence of witnesses of delivery, and it follows that when she comes to marry, she must also bring the witnesses of delivery.

From the perspective of logical reasoning, it appears that the same would apply if she brought witnesses to the signature and they testify that no forgery was committed therein, it would also be permitted; for what difference is there to me between witnesses to the delivery or witnesses to the signature? However, the Tur wrote that witnesses to the signature, even if they are before us, it is invalid, see there. And the reason must be because he holds that any get without witnesses to the delivery is invalid, and therefore here, where it was written on something that can be forged, its presumption of validity is weakened, and we fear that perhaps there were no witnesses at the time of delivery (Beit Yosef in the name of the Rosh). According to this, for the Rambam, who does not require witnesses to the delivery, this concern is removed and witnesses to the signature are also effective when they testify (ibid.). However, it is possible to say that even according to the opinion of the Rambam it is invalid here without witnesses to the delivery, for it is like "forged from within"—not actually forged, for if so, even witnesses to the delivery would not be effective—rather, regarding this matter it is like a forgery in that we do not rely on witnesses to the signature alone, but specifically on witnesses to the delivery (Chelkat Mechokek). Furthermore, here one must decree in a case where the witnesses to the signature come before us on account of a case where they do not come before us but rather witnesses who recognize their signatures, which is the standard validation everywhere; for then we certainly fear lest she committed some forgery in it, and also perhaps he forged the signatures until it appeared to those validating them that they are the signatures of the witnesses signed therein, for when it is written on something that can be forged, the presumption of fitness is weakened (Beit Yosef). Therefore, even according to the Rambam, it is not effective when witnesses to the delivery are not before us (and so wrote the Beit Shmuel, subsection 3, and not like the Chelkat Mechokek, subsection 2, who wanted to be lenient according to the opinion of the Rambam, and his inference is not understood; and delve into this).

And since they may write on something that can be forged, it is therefore permitted to write on diphtra, which is parchment whose processing has not been completed and in which one can commit a forgery. And similarly, they may write on erased paper. And it is not only if he erases the entire paper and the get and the witnesses will be upon the erasure that it is valid, as it is also in other documents, for there is no concern here that perhaps he will erase and write whatever he wishes, for if so, it would be written on paper that was erased twice and the signatures on paper that was erased once, and everyone would recognize the forgery; and it is possible that in such a case there is no need to bring witnesses of delivery at all (see Beit Yosef and Chelkat Mechokek subsection 3). Rather, even to write the get not on the erasure and the witnesses on the erasure, where now he would certainly erase the get as well and rewrite it and it would not be recognizable, as in both of them the erasure would be only once—nevertheless, since we do not permit it without bringing witnesses of delivery, there is no longer a concern here, for they will remember as has been written. And similarly, if the get is on the erasure and the witnesses are not on the erasure, it is also valid since there are witnesses of delivery (and in this, even according to the Tosafot, the Ran, and the Rosh, witnesses of delivery are required, for in documents it is invalid in such a case as has been written in Choshen Mishpat siman 45; and with this the language of the Mishnah in Gittin 21b is settled: "They do not write on erased paper," for according to their words the language requires study since it refers to the witnesses, see there in Tosafot 22a starting with "Lo," and according to what I have written it is settled; and delve into it):

And so we learned in a Mishna (19a) that one may write on an olive leaf even though it can be forged. The Tosafot and the Ran wrote that only on an olive leaf, which is a lasting thing, did the sages permit it, for that of an olive is thick and lasts many days; for although they permitted writing on something that can be forged, nevertheless we require something that can last. And so it is taught in a Tosefta (chapter 2): On olive leaves, on gourd leaves, on carob leaves, on anything that is lasting, it is kosher; on lettuce leaves, on leek leaves, on onion leaves, on vegetable leaves, on anything that is not lasting, it is invalid, etc. Thus far his words.

But the Rif, the Rambam, the Rosh, the Tur, and the Shulchan Aruch did not mention this, and it would be possible to say that it is not because they do not hold like the Tosefta, but rather since they wrote that one may write on an olive leaf, it follows by implication that on other leaves one may not write; and even though there are gourd leaves and carob leaves upon which one is permitted to write, they were not concerned with elaborating on this regarding a matter that is not common at all. However, from the Rambam there is proof that he does not hold like the Tosefta, from the fact that he validates an impression on skin even though it does not endure, and it will be explained in siman 125, whereas the Tosefta disqualifies this. Therefore, the Maggid Mishneh wrote that he rejected the Tosefta from the halacha because it was not cited in the Shas, see there (in chapter 4, halacha 7), and he rejected the Tosefta because of the Yerushalmi according to his version, as will be explained there with the help of Heaven. And also regarding a leaf, he wrote "leaves" without specification, and so wrote the Shulchan Aruch.

Furthermore, it appears to me that the Yerushalmi in this matter rejected the Tosefta, for the Yerushalmi asks regarding an olive leaf: "And is it not like that which is torn?" Rabbi Zeira said: "Even if he writes 'I, so-and-so, divorce my wife,' it is kosher." Thus far his words. And the commentators explained that his question is because on one leaf it is impossible to write the entire get and one would need to write on several leaves, and the Torah said "one scroll" and not two or three scrolls, see there. Aside from the fact that the language does not agree with their explanation, behold, this law of "one scroll and not two or three scrolls" is not found at all in the Yerushalmi, and also the Rambam did not bring it, and it will be explained at the end of this siman with the help of Heaven. Therefore, it appears to me that this is the explanation: that the Yerushalmi does not hold like the Tosefta that an olive leaf is superior, but rather it is like all leaves. Therefore it asks: "And is it not like that which is torn?" meaning, that it is destined to tear and does not endure. To this it answers that length is not required in a get, but rather with six words it is kosher, and it is not the way of a leaf to fall into tiny fragments but rather into pieces, and it will be whole in the measure of six words; and so it is with all tree leaves. Therefore, the Rambam did not write "an olive leaf" but rather "leaves" in general, but the Rif, the Rosh, and the Tur wrote "an olive leaf," see there. However, regarding the law, it is obvious that one should not deviate from the Tosefta. (And that which is said in the Yerushalmi afterward, "And it follows that which Rabbi Elazar said: If he specified it is invalid, and if he did not specify it is kosher," according to what I wrote, this is the explanation: If he specified at length "So-and-so son of So-and-so from such-and-such a place" or "who stands today etc." it is invalid, for a large piece such as this will not endure; and if he did not specify but only six words as mentioned above, it is kosher; and examine this closely).

And so too, he is permitted to write on a shard and on anything he wishes, and even on animals, except that on what is attached to the ground it is invalid, because it is written: "And he shall write... and give," and we expound: that which is not lacking between writing and giving anything but giving; this excludes what is attached, which lacks cutting and giving (21b). And therefore, even when writing on animals, he must deliver the entire animal to her in its entirety and not cut from it only the place of the writing of the get and give it to her, for if so, it would be lacking cutting (ibid.). And so too, regarding anything upon which he writes the get, one should not cut from it after the writing the place upon which the get was not written for this reason, as will be explained with the help of Heaven in section 23 and 24.

There is a question regarding this: behold, regarding a get it is written with the term "sefer," "and he shall write her a sefer of severance," and in the passage of the sotah it is also written, "and the kohen shall write these curses in a sefer." Why then regarding a get is everything valid except for that which is attached, while regarding a sotah (17a) we learned in a Mishnah that he may not write on a tablet, nor on paper, nor on diphtra, but only on a megillah, as it is said "in a sefer"—parchment (Rashi). And even though in Gittin ibid. it was taught: "sefer," I only have a "sefer," from where do we include everything? The verse teaches "and he shall write her"—nevertheless, see there; but if so, let us also derive this regarding a sotah (and see Tosafot ibid. s.v. "lo"). And even though regarding Gittin one could say it is a "generalization, specification, and generalization" because "and he gave" returned and generalized (Tosafot), in truth this derivation is not according to the halakhah but rather according to Rabbi Yose the Galilean there (as it says there, "and the Rabbis, what do they do with this 'and he shall write'?" and see Rashi, and examine it closely).

However, in truth, the Yerushalmi in Sotah there raised this difficulty and answered that regarding a sotah it is written "in a book," and perforce its meaning is to write on klaf; but regarding a get, where it is written "and he shall write for her a book," it implies that it comes for the purpose of a narration of matters (like the Sages who disagree with Rabbi Yose HaGlili, and through this the depth of the words of Rashi in Gittin there s.v. "if it wrote in a book," see there, and s.v. "and he shall write for her, what do they do with it," see there, are understood, for seemingly his words are puzzling, but according to the Yerushalmi his intention is with good reason; and the words of Tosafot in Sotah there require great study, see there, and delve into it):

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 2: And one may write upon any detached object; and some say specifically on an object that is durable, but if one wrote on a leaf of onions or vegetables and the like, it is pasul. Thus far his words. And behold, in the Tosefta that we cited, the language "pasul" is also written and not "batel." And even though according to the Tosefta it appears that it is batel from the Torah, it is possible that the Tosefta does not distinguish between the language of pasul and batel, for so it is proven in the Tosefta regarding all the laws; see there. However, regarding the poskim who were precise with this language, it appears to me that our teacher, the Rema, wrote this with precision because according to the opinion of the Rambam and the Beit Yosef, it is not specifically an olive leaf, as we explained in section 12; therefore he wrote pasul. And the practical difference is that if she received kiddushin from another, she also requires a get from him according to the opinion of the Rambam and the Beit Yosef (so it appears to me).

He further wrote that ab initio it should be written on parchment prepared for a Sefer Torah, tefillin, and mezuzot, but we do not require it to be processed for its specific sake; however, there is no absolute requirement in this matter, and even if it was written on the paper called "papier" in any script, it is kosher. Thus far his words. The explanation of his words is that the parchment should be prepared as they prepare it for a Sefer Torah (Chelkat Mechokek), for if it were processed for the sanctity of a Sefer Torah, it would be forbidden to write a get upon it, as it possesses no sanctity at all; rather, it should be processed well as they process it for a Sefer Torah. And even though it is also kosher on diphtra as has been written, nevertheless, ab initio it is better on parchment so that it is not susceptible to forgery and you will not need to bring witnesses of delivery. And that which he wrote, "in any script it is kosher," his intention was not that it is even in a script other than Ashurit, for he explicitly wrote in siman 126 that one should not validate another script except in a case of agunah or a time of pressing need; rather, this is the meaning: that one does not need to be meticulous with perfect calligraphy as in a Sefer Torah, and so he wrote explicitly in the Darkei Moshe, see there.

And behold, now in all the dispersions of Israel, they write ab initio on the paper that is called "papir." And it must be examined, for regarding gitin we are more stringent with extra stringencies, so why are we not careful to fulfill the words of our teacher, the Rema, to write ab initio on klaf? For is klaf not found among us in abundance, and this is not a time of pressing need? And the great authorities have already been awakened to this: the Maharam ibn Habib in his book Get Pashut and the Taz. This is the wording of the Maharam: And we have not seen nor heard of anyone who was concerned about this even ab initio, and the custom is widespread here in Jerusalem, may it be rebuilt and established speedily in our days, and in all the Land of Israel, and gitin that arrive from the provinces of the sea, that they are written on our paper that is called "papir." And so the Bach testified in siman 126, that all the gitin that arrive from Salonika and from Egypt and the rest of the places of Turkey are not written on klaf. And these papers of ours cannot be forged, for if any letter or word were written upon an erasure, it is immediately sensed and recognizable to the eyes of all who see it. Therefore, one should permit gitin written on paper just like those written on gall-treated klafs, and there is no need to bring witnesses of delivery before us, but rather witnesses of confirmation are sufficient, and this is clear. Thus far his words. And this is the wording of the Taz: It appears more kosher to write on "papir," for our klaf can be forged more easily by scraping from it because it is strong and thick, which is not the case with paper, where it is impossible at all to scrape it without the scraping being visible. And even though the custom in these lands was to write on klaf, nevertheless, during the times of the decrees in the provinces of Volhynia and Ukraine, when they frequently needed to give a get of mitzvah and klaf was not available, they became accustomed to writing on "papir," and from there it spread also to other places. Thus far his words. And similarly wrote several great authorities (see Pitchei Teshuvah). Therefore, Heaven forbid to change from the custom, and one should only write on good, smooth paper and not on simple paper called "bibula" or "raskhazna," which is not smooth and has many pits and the writing is not straight. And it also seems to me that one should be careful not to write on large, thick papers like klaf, for perhaps it is possible to erase on them without it being recognizable and it could be forged, and they would always require witnesses of delivery; rather, one should only write on "shreib" or "regal" paper, and so we practice in all our province.

One may write on the hand of a slave and give her the slave, or on the horn of a cow and hand over to her the slave or the cow in the presence of witnesses. However, he may not cut off the hand of the slave or the horn of the cow and give it to her. If he wrote, cut, and gave it to her, it is not a get according to the Torah because we require that there be no cutting between the writing and the giving, as we have explained. Even though regarding shechitah a tooth or a fingernail are considered attached when they are attached to the living creature, as is written in Yoreh Deah siman 6, it is different there because it is not relevant to give the entire living creature as there is no concept of giving; therefore, the tooth and the fingernail are certainly nullified to the living creature and are considered attached. This is not the case regarding a get, where he hands over to her the entire body, and the entire body is not "attached" (Chelkat Mechokek). As for the fact that we are not concerned that he might cut the horn from the cow, it is because it is not the way to cut it (Beit Shmuel), and all the more so he is not permitted to cut the hand of the slave. Also, the slave does not need to be bound, for that is only required regarding a kinyan that is effected upon the slave, which is due to the law of chatzer, and a "walking chatzer" does not acquire; but regarding a get written upon him, this is not relevant, as he gives her the entire slave (ibid.). If he engraved the get upon the hand of the woman, she is not divorced, for behold, he has given her nothing (ibid.).

The writing of a get on a person's hand is considered writing that can be forged, and it always requires witnesses of delivery; only if he wrote it as a tattoo, which is never erased, are witnesses of delivery not required (Gemara 20b). And even though there is a negative prohibition against tattooing, nevertheless the get is valid, just as when it is written on prohibited items of benefit (Tosafot). Furthermore, from the Torah there is no prohibition until he writes and tattoos with ink and blue dye, as we learned in Makkot (21b); however, there is a rabbinic prohibition (ibid.).

Some say that he must explicitly give her the slave and the cow, meaning that when he hands her the slave or the cow upon which the get is written and says to her, "Behold, this is your get," he must say to her, "and they are yours." However, in an unspecified case, when he gives her the slave or the cow and says to her, "Behold, this is your get," it is not implied that he is giving her the entire slave or cow, but rather only the hand or the horn, and the get is void (the Ran in the name of the Ramah and the Rashba). The reason is that, ordinarily, it does not appear that the entire body should be subordinate to the hand or the horn; on the contrary, the hand and the horn are secondary to the body, and he has given her nothing (as is apparent from the Ran, see there on the Mishnah). Other poskim did not mention this, and also from the Yerushalmi it does not appear so, as we say (Chapter 2, Halacha 3) regarding the Mishnah of "on the horn of a cow and he gives her the cow, etc.": The Mishnah is when he said to her, "Behold, this is your get," but if he said to her, "Behold, this is your get and the remainder is for your ketubah," she has received her get and her ketubah as one. Thus far its words. Behold, it is explicit that even when he says to her in an unspecified manner, "Behold, this is your get," the get is valid, for his intention is for the entire body, and it requires further study. Therefore, one should be stringent like both opinions. In the Tur and Shulchan Aruch this matter was not brought at all (though in the Beit Yosef he brought it).

It was further questioned in the Yerushalmi there: if he delivered the cow to her via masirah, in a manner that in a sale the cow would be acquired by the buyer, if he delivered the get to her in such a manner, is it like a sale and she has acquired the get and the get is valid? Or perhaps, since regarding a get it is written "and he shall place it in her hand," it is not valid until it is entirely in her hand, see there. And the explanation appears to me: for behold, regarding the acquisition of masirah, we hold in Choshen Mishpat siman 198 that the permission of the buyer is not required at all, and also he does not deliver from hand to hand; rather, once the buyer has grasped it in the presence of the seller or by his command, it constitutes masirah. If so, regarding a get in such a manner, there is no "and he shall place it in her hand." Or, it is possible that since she acquired it through an act of acquisition, the get is also valid. And the question was not resolved (and the difficulty of the Shach is settled, see there).

There are some of our teachers who hold that this which the Torah disqualified when it is lacking cutting between the writing and the delivery is only regarding living creatures or that which is attached to the ground, where one uproots a thing from its growth; but a detached object is not called "lacking cutting." For example, if one wrote on a large parchment and the get was written on a portion of it, and his intention is to cut the portion and take it for himself, it is not called "lacking cutting." And they wrote in the name of Rashi, of blessed memory, that such a case came before him and he validated the get (Tosafot 21b in the name of the Rashbam, and the Rosh, and the Tur in the name of Rashi, and it is apparent from his wording on 22a s.v. "shema yiktom," see there). However, all of our teachers disagree on this, and also the Bahag disqualifies it, and so all the poskim ruled without qualification. And the Tur wrote: however, specifically when it is cut from a large parchment is it considered "lacking cutting," but if he cut a small amount from it in order to beautify it, it is not called "lacking cutting." Nevertheless, the Rosh wrote in the Order of the Get that the scribe should cut the parchment to the measure of the get so that he will not need to cut further from it. Therefore, if the scribe erred in the get after he wrote part of it and begins again on that same parchment, he should first cut the small amount that he wrote. Thus far his words.

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 3: If they wrote it on a large paper and cut it after the writing before the giving, it is pasul. However, if he cut a small amount from it in order to beautify it, it is not called "cutting." As long as he did not cut from it significantly more than the writing of the get, it is considered like its beautification. But initially, they cut everything from it before the writing, even the holes that they make in order to rule lines by means of them, and other things; he shall cut everything before the ruling of lines, for the ruling of lines is a necessity of writing. Thus far his words.

And behold, regarding that which he wrote that with a large paper, if he cut it after the writing it is pasul, there is one who says that it is nullified by Torah law (Beit Shmuel, subsection 10). But it seems to me that he precisely wrote "pasul" and not "nullified," for while it is true that according to the poskim who disqualify, they disqualify by Torah law, nevertheless, since the opinion of Rashi and Rashbam is to be lenient, even though we do not follow the leniency of their words, nonetheless for stringency we certainly must be concerned for their opinion. Furthermore, in the name of Rabbeinu Tam, the Tosafot wrote there that he was stringent in the matter, which also implies that we only say this for stringency and not for leniency. According to this, he correctly wrote "pasul" and not "nullified," for if she received kiddushin from another, she requires a get from him as well (so it seems to me). And regarding that which he wrote that for its beauty it is kosher, some say it is proper to cut it into thin pieces, for then it is apparent that they acted for its beauty and not for the sake of the parchment (Get Pashut and Knesset HaGedolah in the name of Biurei HaSemag), and it is proper to do so ab initio.

The Ran wrote in the name of Rav Hai Gaon, of blessed memory, that it is not called "lacking cutting" except in a case where before the writing his intention was to cut from it, and in such a case one may not cut from it after it was written; but if his intention was not to cut, we have no concern with it. Thus far his words. The poskim did not cite this, but nevertheless it is simple that we must be stringent according to his words, for if his intention was to cut, even a small thing is forbidden to cut afterwards. For one cannot say that the Gaon's intention was only regarding a large piece and not regarding a small thing, for since it depends on his intention, what difference is there to me if it is large or what difference is there to me if it is small? Ultimately, it is "lacking cutting." And we have learned from his words that even if his intention was to cut, if he did not cut afterwards, it is not disqualified, for it is not relevant in this case that the thought should disqualify it. And upon whose intention does it depend? It appears that it depends on the intention of the husband alone, for the paper must be his. However, the later authorities wrote that whether it is the intention of the husband or the intention of the scribe to cut, it disqualifies if they cut it after the writing, even a small piece, and one should be stringent.

It is permitted to write the get on a large piece of paper even if much of it will remain blank, and we are not concerned that one might come to cut it after the writing (Ran). There is one who requires that in such a case he should write in the middle of the paper, and the remainder surrounding it is for the beauty of the margin; but if he writes at the top of the paper and much remains blank below, we decree lest he cut it (Get Pashut). However, the wording of the Ran certainly indicates the opposite, and only regarding a perforated flowerpot did the sages, of blessed memory, decree lest he clip it, as will be explained, and not regarding a detached object; and it is an a fortiori argument from the horn of a cow, where they did not decree lest he clip it, as has been written (and also the Get Pashut himself concludes to be lenient, see there, and it was brought in the Pitchei Teshuvah subsection 9). Nevertheless, it is a proper custom to write on a single sheet and not that there should be two folded sheets in the manner that paper is folded, for in such a case perhaps there is reason to concern that the scribe might cut the empty page for himself unintentionally (and the Get Pashut is lenient even in this, but it does not appear so to me as I have written). And so is the simple custom, to write on a single leaf and not on a double one, and also it should not be excessively large. This is what the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote, that it is good to cut to the measure of the get, meaning that it should not be much larger than necessary so that he does not come to cut it.

The Tur and the Rema wrote: If they wrote on a book, even though it contains other matters, and he gave her the whole thing, it is kosher. Thus far their words. The explanation of the matter is that the fact that there are other matters written on the paper upon which the get is written does not disqualify the get, provided that he gives her the entire paper, including that piece upon which the other matter is written, so that it should not be lacking cutting. However, it appears to me that this is only when the other matter is written before the get, or after the get, or on the sides, or on its back; but if another matter is written in the middle of the get, it is certainly disqualified, for it confuses the meaning of the get. On the contrary, from the source of the law there was room to say that only on its back it does not disqualify, but from the front it disqualifies, as well as on the sides of the get or before it and after it. However, there is no reason to distinguish in this, and so it implies explicitly from the wording of the Tur and the Rema. But in the middle, it is obvious that it is disqualified (for its source is from page 19b: A certain man, etc., took a Sefer Torah, etc., Rabbi Yosei said, what should we be concerned about? If because of gall-nut water, etc. And from this there is proof that it is only because one cannot write over written text, as the Beit Yosef wrote, and there Rashi explained: perhaps he wrote her a get on the outside, etc. See there and examine closely).

One may not write a get on something attached to the ground. Even if he gives her the attached item as it is and it does not lack cutting, nevertheless, "and he shall place it in her hand" is required, and there is no "placing in her hand" here, for it is impossible to give an attached item from hand to hand, but rather through the acquisition of chazakah, or money, or a document, and not a giving from hand to hand. The Yerushalmi derives this from "sefer": just as a "sefer" is detached, so too everything must be detached. The Rashba, of blessed memory, cited this reason; even though "sefer" comes to teach the "recounting of matters," nevertheless, since it was expressed with the term "sefer," it implies that it must be detached (ibid.). The Rosh, of blessed memory, wrote the first reason (Chapter 2, Section 23). An attached item is a disqualification by Torah law and the get is void. The practical difference between the two reasons concerns a perforated flowerpot, as will be explained, which is judged as attached but can be given from hand to hand; according to the first reason, its law is not like other attached items, but according to the Yerushalmi, its law is like other attached items (Beit Shmuel, subsection 11).

Just as that which is attached is invalid, so too something that was detached and one attached it to the ground and nullified it to the ground, its law is like that which is truly attached (Beit Yosef). However, when he did not nullify it, its law is not like that which is attached; nevertheless, if it took root to such an extent that it requires cutting, even if he did not nullify it, it is invalid (ibid.). And even if they wrote it and signed it while detached, and after its signing he went back and attached it (and nullified it), and afterwards detached it and gave it to her, it is invalid. And it is not only if it took root after the writing and signing, but even if it did not take root it is also invalid, since it lacks an action before the giving, for we require "and he shall write... and give" so that it shall not lack an action from the time of writing until the time of giving (Tur). And the Rashba validates in such a case (the Tur did not bring his opinion).

It has already been explained that the witnesses to the delivery effect the severance, and the primary element is the writing. Therefore, if the writing was on that which is attached to the ground, even if they detached it before the signatures and signed on that which was detached, the get is void. Even the boilerplate is forbidden to be written on that which is attached ab initio; however, ex post facto, if after writing the boilerplate they detached it and wrote the essential part on that which was detached, and signed and gave it to her, it is valid. All the more so when one wrote the boilerplate on that which was detached before cutting and afterwards cut it, it is valid (Chelkat Mechokek). And this matter, that on that which is attached it is permitted ex post facto regarding the writing of the boilerplate, and regarding a scribe who writes get boilerplates, it will be explained in siman 131 that several poskim disqualify it even ex post facto. And regarding a deaf-mute, an insane person, and a minor, it is permitted even ab initio to write the boilerplate, as written in siman 123. The reason is simple: regarding scribes, since it is a common matter that they do so to earn a profit, they forbade it even ex post facto as a decree on account of the essential part; and regarding that which is attached, which is not so common, they forbade it ab initio and permitted it ex post facto; and regarding a deaf-mute, an insane person, and a minor, which is not common at all, they established it according to the law and it is permitted even ab initio (Ran, chapter 2). However, it has already been explained in siman 123, section 9, that even regarding a deaf-mute, an insane person, and a minor, there are those who disqualify even ex post facto. And it must be said that that which is attached is more uncommon than the writing of a deaf-mute, an insane person, or a minor. Know that even regarding that which is attached, it is the opinion of the Ramah to disqualify by rabbinic enactment even in the writing of the boilerplate, just as with scribes, as the Tur wrote in his name; see there. However, it is a minority opinion and we do not rule accordingly (see Beit Shmuel, subsection 15, regarding writing the boilerplate ab initio on the horn of a cow).

In siman 123, section 9, we explained that regarding that which the poskim included the date in the toref, even though it is of rabbinic origin, nevertheless they strengthened the date as if it were from the Torah, see there. And it appears that only as a stringency do we say this and not as a leniency; for example, if he wrote the date on a connected object and the entire toref on a detached object, it is certainly invalid by rabbinic law, but it is not void regarding the matter of if she received kiddushin from another that she would not require a get from him. Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in his great work, was in doubt regarding this, and it requires further study. (And the primary reason appears to me to be because the date is included in the toref, see Rashi, Bava Metzia 7a, s.v. "shetara," and not because it has the status of the toref, and delve into this):

It is a known matter throughout the entire Shas that a perforated pot, that which is sown in it or planted in it has the status of being sown or planted in the ground, and one that is not perforated has the status of being detached. Regarding a perforated one, there is no difference whether it stands on the ground or on pegs where there is a space of air between the pot and the ground (Tosafot Gittin 7b, s.v. "dilma" and Shabbat 81a; see there). This applies to one of earthenware, but regarding one of wood, some say it does not require perforation, for even if it is not perforated it is considered as perforated (Tosafot ibid.), and some say the opposite. The primary view is that earthenware certainly requires perforation; however, regarding one of wood, some say that perforation does not help at all (Tosafot Menachot 84b). This point, that with perforation it is considered like the ground, applies only to the thing sown or planted in it, but the pot itself always has the status of being detached. Therefore, one may write a get on the pot itself even if it is perforated, and he hands her the entire pot, and we are not concerned that perhaps he will break off the place of the get—in which case it would be "lacking cutting"—for he certainly will not ruin the pot and it is not the way to break it (Tosafot 21a).

But if they wrote the get on the leaf of a perforated flowerpot, the get is void according to the Torah. And it is not only necessary to state this if he delivers the get to her in its place and the nourishment from the ground has not been severed, for it is completely attached; but even if he lifts the flowerpot from the ground and delivers it to her, whereby its nourishment is severed and it is like something detached, nevertheless the get is invalid. For granted that it is not void according to the Torah—since regarding a get this is not called cutting from that which is attached, and it is not called lacking detachment because that detachment is not noticeable at all and requires no other action except an action like that of all detached things (Ran ibid.)—nevertheless, it is invalid by rabbinic decree. For we decree lest he pluck the leaf from the flowerpot, which would be lacking detachment, as it is common to cut the leaf; and when he plucks it, it is certainly void according to the Torah. and it is not only necessary to state this according to most poskim who invalidate even in a detached state if it lacks cutting, but even according to those who hold that the invalidity of cutting applies only to that which is attached, nevertheless here we decree lest he pluck it while it is still on the ground, and it is lacking cutting from that which is attached (Beit Shmuel subsection 12).

There is one who says that according to the first reason we explained in section 29, that the disqualification of attached growth is because of the requirement of "and he shall give into her hand," as we require that he give from hand to hand—if he wrote on a leaf of a perforated pot and gave her the entire pot without severing the nourishment, and she performed an act of chazakah, she is divorced. This is because the pot is something that can be given from hand to hand (Beit Shmuel, subsection 12). And even though the giving of the pot is nothing since the nourishment has not yet been severed and it is like attached growth, nevertheless, the acquisition is through chazakah, and even so we call this "and he shall give into her hand" since they lift it and it is given from hand to hand. However, this does not seem correct, for regarding a get we require that the acquisition be through the giving from hand to hand (and so wrote the Tuv Gittin). And all the more so according to the one who holds that the disqualification of attached growth is because it is not similar to a "book," for certainly the get is void.

Some say that the same applies to an unperforated pot, which is treated as detached; nevertheless, if he wrote on its leaf and gave her the entire pot, it is also invalid according to the poskim who hold that even with something detached, the Torah invalidated it due to "lacking cutting," for even with it we decree lest he pluck it. And it is not similar to one who writes on a large paper where we do not decree lest he cut the part, because the plucking of a leaf is done easily and it is common to pluck leaves; therefore, we decree (Chelkat Mechokek subsection 13). And some say that when it is unperforated, it is like all detached things and we do not decree lest he pluck it, and therefore if he wrote on the leaf and gave her the entire pot, it is valid (and see the Beit Yosef). And it implies that the primary view is like the first opinion, for the author of the second opinion is the Rashba in his novellae (21b) and he himself is in doubt regarding this, see there. And know that regarding writing on a shard, which we validated in a perforated pot and certainly in an unperforated one, she must always bring witnesses of delivery before us when she comes to marry with this get, for a shard is something that can be forged, and in such a case, witnesses of delivery are required, as I wrote in section 5.

It has already been explained in section 2 that a get written on the hand of a slave requires witnesses to the delivery, as it is writing that can be forged; but if it was written as a tattoo, it does not require witnesses to the delivery, for when it is tattooed it is impossible to forge. It was also explained there that such writing involves a prohibition from the Torah or from the rabbis, as is written there. Nevertheless, the get is kosher, for we are not concerned with the scribe being wicked except in the case of one who desecrates the Shabbat, as is written in siman 123. However, the witnesses signed upon it also as a tattoo must have acted inadvertently, for if they acted willfully the get is invalid, as even with a rabbinic disqualification the witnesses are disqualified (Beit Shmuel, subsection 16). And so too, even if the witnesses signed normally without a tattoo, since the get is written as a tattoo, the get is disqualified without witnesses to the delivery for another reason: for it is like a get written on an erasure with its witnesses on the paper (Bach and Chelkat Mechokek, subsection 18). And there are those who hesitate regarding this, for it is well and good that with writing on an erasure and its witnesses on the paper we fear lest he forge the get, but when it is written as a tattoo, it is impossible to forge it (Beit Shmuel, ibid.). And there is one who says the reason is that we fear lest the get was also written normally and he forged it and tattooed it (Bach); but from where do we have the basis to fear such a concern, since now when the get comes before us there is no fear of forgery (Beit Shmuel). And also there is no fear lest he erase the signatures and forge and write some matter in the get, for this he certainly would not do, as if so, he would not be able to validate the signatures (ibid.). Therefore, the law requires further study, and from the Tur it is explained according to the first opinion; see there.

When is she divorced with a get written on the hand of a slave? In the case of a slave who is established as hers, and the get is written in a tattoo, and she says that she acquired him before the get and afterward he acquired her. However, in the case of a slave who is established as his, and a get is written on his hand, and she says that he gave her the get with this slave, and the husband is not here, and also there are no witnesses to the delivery before us—and since it is written in a tattoo, there is no need for witnesses to the delivery as I have written—nevertheless, it is a doubtful get. And the reason for the matter is that if they were coming to litigate over the slave regarding monetary laws, where she would say, "You sold to me" or "You gave to me," and he would say that the slave entered on his own, the law would be with him; for we maintain that living creatures that are able to walk are not governed by the law of other movable objects where the possessor can say, "You sold or gave to me," but rather they return to their owner, as I have written in Choshen Mishpat siman 135. And since regarding the money we cannot establish her possession of the slave when the owners are not here and admitting to this, how can we permit her by means of this get? (Gemara 20b). Therefore, it is a doubtful get. And the same applies to one written on the horn of a cow in such a case; it is a doubt. And this is specifically regarding one established as his, but without this, even if it is not established as hers, since the husband has no established claim to the slave and the cow, we establish them in her domain, and automatically she is divorced. And so too in a place where a claim of possession is effective, such as after three years and the like when possession is effective, as is explained there in Choshen Mishpat, she is also divorced. For the principle of this law is that when the claim of monetary laws is removed from it, automatically we have nothing with which to take the get out of her hand.

And there is one who asked a great question regarding this: that if so, even when it is not established as his, and even when it is established as hers, how is she divorced? For of necessity, prior to the get, it must belong to the husband, and if so, it is as if it is known to us that it is his (Beit Shmuel, subsection 17). And the answer to this is that since even if the husband were to claim so—that she had transferred the slave to him and he wrote the get upon him but did not deliver it to her—he would not have the ability to remove the slave from her hand. For she would be believed to say, "It is true that I transferred him to you, but on the condition that you divorce me with him," and she would be believed in any case to remove the slave from his hand on the grounds that living creatures do not have a presumption of possession. According to this, it follows that the get is also valid since the slave is in her possession, and only if the husband comes and says that he did not give her the get would she not be divorced, and the slave would remain with her; and as long as he does not come and contradict her, we maintain her in the status of being divorced (Tuv Gittin). And likewise, there is one who asked regarding what we wrote, that after three years she is divorced: behold, a wife has no presumption of possession in the property of her husband. And the answer to this is that if so, with any type of get that she brings, how do we maintain her as divorced? For behold, she has no presumption of possession in the object upon which the get is written when we establish that it belongs to the husband. Rather, certainly since in any case there is a dispute between them—for we see in any case that he wrote a get—such a woman has a presumption of possession in the property of her husband that he does not entrust to her (ibid.).

Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, wrote in section 7: If the get was engraved on a tablet and the witnesses are on it, and it emerges from her hand and she says that she gave it to him and he returned and gave it to her, even though they are established in the knowledge that the tablet is hers, she is divorced, for the woman herself may write her get. Thus far his words. And so wrote the Rambam in chapter 4 and the Tur, and its source is from the Gemara (20b). And there is no novelty in this at all except to inform us that we should not say that a woman does not have the legal capacity to transfer ownership of an object to another in a manner that the other will transfer it back to her immediately; for it might have been possible to say that her transfer of ownership which she transferred to him is not a valid transfer, and it would turn out that he divorced her with an object that is not his. It comes to teach us that she knows how to transfer ownership even in such a case. And one should not ask: behold, the Rabbis transferred to him the fee of the get from her property, as was written in siman 120, and if so, why do we need her transfer of ownership? For we have already written there in section 27 in the name of the Ramban, of blessed memory, that the Sages, of blessed memory, only transferred it to him if she gave money, but when the parchment is hers, the Rabbis did not transfer it to him; see there.

It appears to me that regarding what the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote, that she says she gave it to him, it is not that she must explicitly say so, that she gave it to him, for indeed the Rambam did not mention this, and from the wording of the Tur it also appears so, see there. Logic dictates this as well, for does her statement add or subtract anything? Rather, certainly we say that they presumably did so, for otherwise the witnesses would not have signed upon it. And that which they used the expression that she says, they used it as a common manner of speaking. And it is possible that because of this they wrote that the witnesses are signed upon it, for behold, regarding the essence of the get, it is kosher even without signing witnesses, as was written in siman 133; rather, certainly they wrote this for the reason we explained, for otherwise we would indeed not believe her (it appears to me). However, from the words of the Tur it is clarified that even without witnesses we say that she presumably transferred ownership to him, for the Tur did not write that the witnesses are signed, but rather that she must bring witnesses of delivery, and if the witnesses are engraved in a manner that cannot be forged, even if there are no witnesses of delivery before us, she is divorced. Thus far his words. Nevertheless, one could say that even though he did not mention previously that the witnesses are signed on it, nonetheless his intention is like our words, and this is what he means: that one way or the other, if she brings witnesses of delivery before us, it is kosher because the witnesses of delivery would not have allowed the get to be delivered to her if she had not transferred ownership to him; and if the witnesses are engraved and it cannot be forged, we rely on the signing witnesses as we have written (it appears to me). And that which the Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch conclude, that the woman herself writes her get, it means to say that this is a Mishnah in Gittin (22b), for from this the Gemara there brings proof that a woman knows how to transfer ownership, see there. And the Rambam concludes further that there is no confirmation of the get except through its signatories if there are no witnesses of delivery there. Thus far his words. And he was required to say this because otherwise, behold, it would be possible to ask the witnesses of delivery if she transferred ownership to him, if we required that she must always bring witnesses of delivery. But because when there are signing witnesses we do not require her to bring witnesses of delivery, and the signing witnesses are not before us that we might ask them, therefore we must rely on the assessment that she certainly transferred ownership to him (it appears to me).

If he engraved the get on a tablet of gold and gave it to her, if he gave it to her without specification, he cannot calculate the ketubah for her from the value of the gold of the tablet, for he gave this to her for the sake of a get, and what he owes her for the ketubah he must pay aside from this. But if he said to her, "This is your get and your ketubah," she is divorced and has also received her ketubah to the extent of the value of the tablet. And one should not say that if so, the letters of the get are flying in the air, for the entire tablet is the payment of her ketubah and we require that the object upon which the get is written be his, and this is not his; for it can be said that it is as if he said, "Receive your get and forgive me my debt of your ketubah" (Chelkat Mechokek and Beit Shmuel). And specifically when she received the get willingly, for if not so, how can he force her to forgive him the ketubah (ibid.), unless she says explicitly that she forgives (Atzei Arazim). And there is one who says that specifically when he speaks with this wording, but if he said to her, "This is your get and you shall be paid your ketubah with the gold that is in it," it is not a get, for it is impossible to interpret this wording as forgiveness (Get Pashut). And there are those who disagree on this (Turei Zahav), and so it is explained from the Tur who wrote the wording of payment, see there. And the reason is that even this wording means: "This is your get on the condition that you are paid with the gold that is in it," meaning that you return to me the lien of your ketubah, and this is also like the matter of forgiveness (Atzei Arazim). And in a case where he gave it to her without specification, even if there is a large portion of the tablet upon which the get is not written, nevertheless it does not enter into the calculation of her ketubah, for it is the space of the get (Gemara 20b).

He should not give her the get while the writing is still wet, until the writing and the signatures dry well, lest it be called writing that can be forged. And it is not for this reason alone, for behold, we may write on something that can be forged and she must bring witnesses of delivery, as has been explained. However, there is another reason: that it is as if he wrote with something that is not lasting (Chelkat Mechokek and Beit Shmuel), for while it is wet, one can remove the writing, and this is a hindrance even ex post facto, as will be explained in the next siman. Therefore, if he gave it to her while it was wet, there is reason to doubt whether the get is invalid or not, for in truth it is not appropriate to call this "not lasting" since it will immediately become lasting. And it requires further study for the law (see Beit Shmuel subsection 21, whose opinion tends toward invalidating, and the Chelkat Mechokek, whose opinion is to validate). And ab initio, we are careful also that the witnesses should not sign until the writing dries, as written at the end of siman 130, and it is merely a stringency. Regarding the signatures, it will be explained at the end of siman 133 that there is no hindrance even ex post facto; see there.

There is one who says that if one threw sand upon the writing in the manner that they do in order to dry it, or if one threw gold dust upon it, the get is disqualified because it is like writing upon writing (Ginat Veradim). However, if one threw sand and removed it and the writing remained as before, it is kosher, as is written in Orach Chaim siman 32. And there are those who hesitate regarding the essence of the matter and hold that this is not within the category of writing upon writing, and the throwing of gold dust mentioned in Orach Chaim there refers to where one placed so much upon it that the ink is not recognizable at all; but with the placement of sand, where one places a small amount, there is not such a concern (Pitchei Teshuva). However, all soferim are careful not to place sand or other types of dust upon the get, but rather they dry it in the sun or before a light.

And know that in the Gemara (2b) it is a fixed halacha that the Merciful One said "one book" and not two or three books, and if he wrote the get on two papers it is not a get. And that which we learned in the Mishnah in Gittin (87b), "if he left over part of the get and wrote it on the second page it is kosher," there it is dealing with one parchment in two columns like the sheets of a Sefer Torah (Tosafot). And that which we learned in Sotah (18a), "if he wrote it on two pages it is invalid because the Merciful One said 'one book' and not two or three books," this is with two separate parchments (ibid.). And even though we hold that "book" comes for the telling of matters, and therefore we do not specifically require parchment as in Sotah, as I wrote in section 15, nevertheless we also derive this derivation (ibid.) because a verse does not depart from its simple meaning, as "book" is written in the singular form.

And according to this, I am greatly astonished at the Rambam, the Tur, and the Shulchan Aruch, who did not mention this law in any place, aside from our teacher, the Rema, in siman 130, section 7, who wrote that joining two skins together by means of glue renders the get invalid due to doubt, see there, and his reason is because of "two books." And how could they omit an explicit law in the Shas without any disputant? And it is difficult to say that they hold like the explanation of Rashi in Sotah there, that even on one piece with two columns it is invalid in Sotah because of "two books," see there, and consequently from the Mishnah in Gittin there it is proven that this law does not exist, and we would have to say that the words of the Gemara are according to Rabbi Yose HaGelili (21b), who does not derive "sefer" for the "recounting of matters" as is explained there, while we rule like the Rabbis that it comes for the "recounting of matters." For if so, how could the Shas there ask so simply: "And let him derive it from the fact that the Merciful One said 'one book' etc."? This requires great study.