Siman 81

In the previous simanim it was explained that since one admitted that he owes a maneh to so-and-so, he can no longer retract it. Therefore, it is necessary to explain what is called an admission, for it is well known that the way of people is sometimes to speak words not with a whole heart, and their mouths and hearts are not equal for various reasons they have. For example, many times they speak by way of jest and mockery. Similarly, there are some people who do not wish to be held as wealthy, and say "I owe so-and-so and so-and-so," and this is without truth. Therefore, one who says to his fellow, "I have a maneh in your hand," even if he said this to him before witnesses and he answers him "yes," and the next day he says to him "give them to me" and he answers him "I was mocking you"—for just as you mocked me by claiming something I do not owe you, so too I mocked you—he is believed. And he shall swear a hesset oath that it is as he says, that he owes him nothing, and that which he answered "yes," his intention was to mock him. And even if he does not claim "I was mocking you" but rather says "the matter never occurred," he is exempt, for people do not remember idle matters, and we say that he intended to mock him and therefore does not remember this. And he shall swear a hesset oath that he does not owe him. And this is specifically when he himself claims "I was mocking you" or "the matter never occurred," but if he does not claim it, we do not claim it for him, and we tell him to pay him. But if he died and he claims from his heirs, we claim on behalf of the heirs that perhaps their predecessor intended only to mock. And the heirs shall swear that their father did not command them to pay him [so it appears to me]. And what is called a complete admission? If at the time he answered "yes" he added, "you are witnesses to this admission," or if he said to the witnesses, "write on a document that I owe him a maneh" [Shach, subsection 48]. Or even if the claimant said "you are witnesses" and the defendant remained silent, silence is like an admission, and he cannot claim a plea of mockery. Only "I paid" can he claim, for even if one lent to him before witnesses, he does not need to pay him before witnesses, as written in siman 70. But another plea he is not believed. And even if he claims "I erred in my admission," he is not believed unless he clarifies through witnesses or through accounts that he erred; for a plea of "I erred" he cannot claim except in a place where he has a migo of mockery and the like, and without this he is not believed, because every person is very precise when he admits a complete admission. And when is "you are witnesses" effective? Specifically when he initially answered "yes." But if the defendant did not answer him at all—for example, the claimant says "I have a maneh in your hand and you are witnesses" and this one did not answer him anything—this is not an admission at all. For specifically when he answered "yes" and the claimant said "you are witnesses," if his intention was not for a complete admission, he should have said to the witnesses "do not be witnesses in the matter, for I intended to mock." But when he did not answer him at all, silence is not like an admission in this case, for he can say "I did not care to answer you, and what do I care for your words?" But when he answered "yes," the speech of "you are witnesses" is effective even if the claimant himself did not claim from him, but another claimed from him. For example, Reuven who said to Shimon "Levi has a maneh in your hand" and Shimon said "yes" and Reuven said "you are witnesses." And all the more so if Shimon said "you are witnesses," it is a complete admission even if Levi is not before us, and it will be further explained in section 18. And even if no person claimed from him, but the borrower himself says "I have a maneh belonging to so-and-so in my hand and you are witnesses," you have no greater complete admission than this. And not specifically "you are witnesses" is the language of a complete admission, for the same applies to another language. For example, if he says before two people, "Behold I admit before you," or "I admit that so-and-so has a maneh with me," and he said so by way of a complete admission and not by way of conversation, even though he did not say "you are witnesses" and even though the claimant is not with him, behold this is complete testimony and he pays based on them. and he is not believed to claim neither a plea of mockery nor "the matter never occurred." Only "so as not to appear wealthy" can he claim, as will be explained. The general rule of the matter: the admission depends only on the things we explained; rather, if it is known to the witnesses that he admitted with a complete admission, not by way of mere conversation, it is an admission. As the Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote in the seventh chapter of Toen: This is his wording: One who admits before two people that so-and-so has a maneh with him, and said it to them by way of admission, not by way of conversation, even though he did not say "you are my witnesses," and even though the claimant is not with him, behold this is testimony. Thus far his words.

When one admitted before witnesses with a complete admission, and at the time of the admission there were other people present, they are able to testify even though they were not designated as witnesses. Since they came and testified that he admitted before witnesses, he is liable, for an admission is like a loan; and just as regarding a loan, when they testify that they saw the loan, even if he designated other witnesses, we obligate based on their word, so too regarding an admission. And such is the law regarding one witness, for just as if one witness were to testify regarding a loan, he would obligate an oath upon the denier, and when he admitted to the witness he is liable to pay, so too regarding an admission. When one witness testifies that before him he admitted with a complete admission, it is an admission, whether to swear based on his word if he contradicts him, or whether to pay if he admitted that he admitted before him. And even though there are those who disagree on this and hold that one witness regarding an admission is nothing, nevertheless, the primary law is that it is an admission [Urim VeTummim]. And there is a proof from what was explained in siman 30, that an admission after an admission combine, and the plain meaning of the language is that he admitted only before one witness, and not that the witness testified that he admitted before two [see Shach, Siftei Kohen 22].

A claim of mockery is only effective when he sued him and he admitted without a complete admission, but when he did not sue him and he admitted on his own, he cannot say "I was mocking you." For it is understandable that when he sued him, he can say to him: "Just as you mocked me by suing me for nothing, so too I mocked you and admitted in order to jest with you." But when no person sued him, what relevance is there to mockery? Rather, it is certain that he truly admitted to him. And some say that even without a lawsuit, he can say "I was mocking you," for there are some people whose way is to mock even without a lawsuit; and several of the poskim hold like this opinion, and the one in possession can say "I hold like this opinion" [Shach]. And the claim of "not to make oneself appear wealthy" is the opposite: for when he sued him and he admitted, he cannot say that he admitted in order not to make himself appear wealthy. But without a lawsuit, even when he admitted a complete admission, he can say that he admitted in order not to make himself appear wealthy. And the reason is that it is certainly the way of people, in order not to appear wealthy, to say that he owes so-and-so and so-and-so. But when the other party sues him and he admitted, even if not with a complete admission, you have no person who would do this to give an opening to the one suing him to say that he admitted to him; and if his desire was not to appear wealthy, he should have said "I owe others" and not "you." It follows from this that according to the first opinion, the law of a claim of mockery is the exact opposite of the claim of not making oneself appear wealthy; for mockery is only specifically when the other party sues him, and not making oneself appear wealthy is only specifically when the other party does not sue him. And one should not ask: according to this, let him be believed regarding mockery even when the other party does not sue him via a migo that if he wanted, he could have claimed "I admitted in order not to make myself appear wealthy"; and regarding the claim of not making oneself appear wealthy, let him be believed even when the other party sues him via a migo that if he wanted, he could have claimed a claim of mockery. For it can be said that this is like a migo in the presence of witnesses, for we are witnesses that when one sues him, a person will not admit in order not to make himself appear wealthy, and when one does not sue him, we are witnesses that it is not the way to mock according to the first opinion. However, regarding a claim of "the things never happened," he is believed both when he sues him and when he has no suitor; for when he sues him, he is believed via a migo of mockery, and when he does not sue him, via a migo of not making oneself appear wealthy. And that which he said "the things never happened" is because empty words are not remembered by people, and he did not take the admission to heart because he mocked him or said it so as not to appear wealthy, and he forgot what he admitted. According to this, a person cannot be obligated based on an admission except based on a lawsuit where he admitted a complete admission; for in this case he cannot claim a claim of mockery because he admitted a complete admission, nor a claim of not making oneself appear wealthy because he admitted based on a lawsuit, and automatically he also cannot say "the things never happened" since he has no migo. And there is no difference in admission between a poor man and a rich man; even the poor man can claim a claim of mockery and also a claim of not making oneself appear wealthy, for even though even without this he is not presumed to be rich, nevertheless he can say that his desire was that they should consider him even poorer, and all the more so a rich man can say this claim [Sma].

There is a further distinction between the claim of jesting and the claim of "not wishing to appear wealthy" regarding a shechiv mera. For with the claim of jesting, he is only believed when he was healthy; but if he was ill and cast upon his bed, he cannot claim regarding his admission, "I was jesting with you," because a person does not jest at the time of his illness while lying in the anxiety of death [our teacher, the Beit Yosef and Urim VeTummim], unlike the one who disagrees in this. And all the more so, if he died, we do not advance this claim for the heirs. However, the claim of "not wishing to appear wealthy," which is stated without a prior claim, even a shechiv mera can claim, for this is a common thing; just as a person does not want them to perceive him as wealthy, likewise it is not his will that they perceive his sons as wealthy. Therefore, if he claimed so, he is believed. But if he died, we do not advance this for his heirs [Urim VeTummim and Netivot HaMishpat]. And the claim of "not wishing to appear wealthy" can be claimed even regarding a known object that he said was a deposit in his hand; he can afterwards say that it is his, and his intention was not to appear wealthy [ibid.].

And there is a further distinction, for regarding the claim of jesting, if he claims it, he claims it, but we do not claim it for him, as I wrote in section 1. However, regarding the claim of "not to appear wealthy," we do claim it for him even if he does not claim it himself. And some say that even regarding the claim of "not to appear wealthy" we do not claim it for him, just as with jesting [Shach]. But when he dies, we claim for his heirs even the claim of jesting, as I wrote there. And this is specifically if he was healthy when he admitted, but if he was then a shekhiv mera, we do not claim for his heirs even the claim of "not to appear wealthy," as I wrote in the previous section. And the reason is because with a shekhiv mera, the claim of "not to appear wealthy" is also not so common, and only if he claimed himself that his intention was "not to appear wealthy" to his heirs do we listen to him, but we do not claim it for them. And all the more so the claim of jesting, for even he himself cannot claim it regarding himself when he was a shekhiv mera [as mentioned above, for with a shekhiv mera we do not claim for him even the claim of "not to appear wealthy," for if not so, why would we not claim this for his heirs].

And there is a further distinction, for the claim of mockery applies only when he did not make a complete admission, as I wrote in section 1, whereas the claim of "not wanting to appear wealthy" is effective even with a complete admission, as I wrote there. The reason is that when he made a complete admission, it is clearly evident that he did not say this by way of jest or mockery; however, if his intention was that they should not consider him wealthy, he intentionally made a complete admission so that they would believe he is not wealthy. And there is a further distinction, for regarding the claim of mockery, we explained there that it is applicable even in the presence of the claimant, but regarding the claim of "not wanting to appear wealthy," some say it is not effective when it was in the presence of the one to whom he admitted he was indebted. This is because it is not the way of people to act so, for if he desired that they not consider him wealthy, he should have said that he owes those who are not present; but in his presence, why would he say so if the truth is not so? For why would he "place a finger between his teeth" to admit to him that he is indebted to him? And just as we explained this reason also regarding why we do not say the claim of "not wanting to appear wealthy" when the other party claimed from him, so too this reason applies even without a claim. And there are those who disagree on this and hold that without a claim, even in his presence, the claim of "not wanting to appear wealthy" is applicable, for he imagined in his mind: surely this person will not claim from me based on my admission since he has not claimed from me. And the primary view is like the first opinion [Shach]. And even when he did not make a complete admission, he cannot claim the claim of "not wanting to appear wealthy" since he admitted in his presence, unless the other party claimed from him and he admitted without a complete admission, in which case he can claim "I was mocking you," as has been explained.

The claim of "not to appear wealthy" can be claimed even if he admitted at the time that people said to him, "You are a great debtor," and he answered them, "I am only indebted to so-and-so and so-and-so." For even though the words appear that, on the contrary, his intention was the opposite—that they should not consider him a great debtor—nevertheless, he is believed when he claims thus, for he can say that his desire was that they should consider him neither wealthy nor a great debtor [Sma].

And there is a further distinction, for regarding the claim of jesting, we explained in section 1 that one must swear regarding this; but regarding the claim of "not appearing wealthy," since it is not by means of a claim, one does not need to swear. Therefore, if he claimed from him, "Give me the maneh that you said in the presence of witnesses that you owe me," and he responds to him, "I admitted in order not to appear wealthy," he does not need to swear, since he claims from him only based on his admission and not based on his own claim. Therefore, if he says to him, "Give me the maneh that you owe me, and if you wish to deny it, behold so-and-so and so-and-so are those in whose presence you admitted," and he responds to him, "I admitted in order not to appear wealthy," he must swear that he does not owe it to him and that he admitted only in order not to make himself appear wealthy. For since he now claims from him with certainty, behold he is obligated to swear a shevuat hesat even without his previous admission, and automatically, by means of a gilgul, he rolls upon him in his oath that he should also swear this: that the admission was only in order not to make himself appear wealthy.

According to the second opinion that we explained in section 6, that even when the admission was in the presence of the one to whom he admitted he can claim that he admitted in order not to appear wealthy, some add further that according to this opinion, even if the one to whom he admitted said "you are witnesses" and he remained silent, he can also claim "in order not to appear wealthy" since it was not by means of a claim. And there are those who disagree on this, for with "you are witnesses," even according to this opinion, he is not believed to claim "in order not to appear wealthy." However, it has already been explained there that the primary view is like the first opinion, that in his presence this claim is not applicable:

These claims of jesting and of not wishing to appear wealthy are only when the admission was before witnesses and not before a beit din of three, for before a beit din one cannot retract except within the time of a continuous utterance. But after the time of a continuous utterance, one cannot retract even without a complete admission, for a person does not jest before a beit din. And similarly, if his intention was not to appear wealthy, he would not have said so before a beit din. And there is one who says that when one claims "I erred in my admission," he can retract even in a beit din even after the time of a continuous utterance, for specifically regarding jesting and appearing wealthy it is not relevant to say so in a beit din, but regarding an error, what could he have done since he erred [Shach]. However, according to what I wrote in section 1, that the claim "I erred" is not believed except when he has a migo, if so, in a beit din where he cannot claim jesting or appearing wealthy, automatically he is not believed to claim "I erred" after the time of a continuous utterance [Urim VeTumim and Netivot HaMishpat]. And such is the primary ruling, unless he has a claim of "I paid," for then he is believed with this migo, or if he clarifies his error through witnesses or through accounts. And similarly, a beit din that announced regarding anyone who holds property of orphans and the like, that he should inform the beit din by himself or through his agent, and one admitted even before witnesses by himself or through his agent, he cannot say afterward "I admitted in order not to appear wealthy," since he did not admit of his own accord but rather through an announcement, it is like a claim. And also he will not be able to say "I was jesting," for there was no claim there from the litigant himself. And even according to that opinion in section 3 that the claim of jesting is effective even without a claim, nevertheless the claim of jesting is not relevant in this case since the announcement was by a beit din [ibid.], for just as a person does not jest before a beit din, so too with an announcement that is made by a beit din. And therefore, when the announcement was from the litigant himself, he can certainly claim the claim of jesting, but not the claim of not wishing to appear wealthy [it appears to me]. And specifically when he admitted before witnesses, but if he admitted before a beit din even through his agent, he cannot claim any claim, for a person's agent is like himself [see Shach subsection 40].

All of this which we have explained, that one can claim the claim of jesting or of avoiding the appearance of wealth, is specifically regarding mere words. However, if he admitted in his own handwriting that he owes a maneh to so-and-so, or admitted with a kinyan or in the presence of all three, he cannot exempt himself with these claims. And even though he has a migo of "I paid," nevertheless he is not believed, for it is like a migo in the place of witnesses, as we are witnesses that he would not have done so—to sign or to accept a kinyan or to be in the presence of all three—in order to avoid the appearance of wealth or in order to jest. And specifically a document in his own handwriting that is in the hand of his fellow; but if there was found in his possession a shtar of so-and-so, even if it is like a complete shtar, or if the name of so-and-so is written on a certain object, it is possible to say that he did so in order to avoid the appearance of wealth, as I wrote in siman 65, see there. But if it is written in his ledger, he cannot claim that he did so to avoid the appearance of wealth, for who knows what is written in his ledger [Shach]. And certainly the claim "I am jesting with you" is not relevant at all even when it is written in his possession not in his ledger, or when the name of so-and-so is written on the object, for what jesting is relevant in this? And even when the handwriting is not in the formula of a complete shtar, he cannot claim these claims [Sma]. And specifically jesting and avoiding the appearance of wealth he cannot claim, but "I erred" he can claim even when it is written in the formula of a complete shtar, for behold he has a migo of "I paid" [Shach], since the shtar is in his possession. And that which we said, that when a shtar of so-and-so is found in his possession he can claim the claim of avoiding the appearance of wealth, this is specifically when he did not admit before witnesses; but if he also admitted, he cannot claim that "in order to avoid the appearance of wealth I wrote and admitted" [Sma], for he would not do both. And according to what has been explained, that regarding a shtar that he handed over to his fellow the claims of jesting and avoiding the appearance of wealth are not relevant, therefore one who hands over to his fellow a shtar in which it is written that he owes him a maneh, even though he did not say "you are witnesses," and even though he handed it to him between themselves and said nothing, he collects with it unless he claims "I paid." And if the writing and the signature are not in the handwriting of the one obligating himself, it is not effective if he handed it over between themselves; but when he handed it to him before witnesses, even though he did not say "you are witnesses," it is an admission [Shach], and he is not believed to claim neither the claim of jesting nor the claim of avoiding the appearance of wealth. And that which was explained, that he can claim "I erred" with a migo of "I paid," this is specifically a shtar in his own handwriting; but regarding a shtar that witnesses are signed upon, he is not believed to say "I erred," for behold he does not have a migo of "I paid." But if the matter was clarified that he erred, and similarly one who admits to his fellow a complete admission under the assumption that he owes him, in a manner that he cannot claim jesting or avoiding the appearance of wealth, and the matter was clarified that he erred, he is exempt [see Sma subsection 46 and Shach subsection 50, and see what I wrote in siman 40]. And just as we said that if the shtar is in his possession it is nothing, so too if he died and there was found in his possession a shtar that he owes a maneh to so-and-so, or if it was found written in one of his documents "this shtar, half of it belongs to so-and-so," that so-and-so did not acquire it, for we say perhaps he wrote so to avoid the appearance of wealth; and see what I wrote in siman 65.

That which was explained in section 1, that a complete admission before witnesses is an admission, this is specifically when the witnesses are before them. But if the one who admitted did not see the witnesses at all, such as where the claimant hid witnesses for him behind a fence and said to him, "I have a maneh in your hand," and he said to him, "Yes," and he said to him, "Is it your will to admit to me before witnesses?" and he replied to him, "I would admit to you, but I am afraid perhaps you will force me to pay you immediately," and the witnesses hear all of this—he is exempt if he claimed, "I was mocking you." And even if when he said to him, "Is it your will to admit to me before witnesses?" he said to him, "Yes," he can also claim this, for since he did not see witnesses, he was not concerned at all with his words. And there is one who says that when he replied to him "Yes," he can no longer claim this, but the first opinion appears more correct [see Shach, subsection 24]. And if it was for the one admitting to bring to mind that there are hidden witnesses here according to the words of the claimant—such as where the claimant said to him, "People shall be witnesses against you," or where he said to him, "The awake and the sleeping shall be witnesses against you," for the one admitting should have brought to his mind according to this phrasing that there are listeners here—then if he replied to him "No," it is not an admission, and he does not even need to claim a plea of mockery regarding the "Yes" that he said to him previously [Shach]. But if he remained silent, and all the more so when he said "Yes," it is an admission. And the same applies if they stood near a cemetery and he hid witnesses for him in the cemetery, and when he replied to him "Yes," he said to him, "The living and the deceased shall be witnesses against you"; even though people are not accustomed to be in a cemetery, nevertheless, when he said this phrasing to him, he should have brought to his mind that not for nothing did he say to him "the living and the deceased." But when he did not have to bring to mind according to his phrasing that there are people hidden there—such as where he said, "You are witnesses"—his admission is nothing, for after he saw that there are no witnesses here, he attributed his words to jesting and replied to him as one joking. And only when he said a hidden phrasing should he have brought it to mind, and not when he spoke in the second person while this one sees nothing before him. And all this is regarding an admission, but regarding a loan, there is no difference in this whether he knew of the witnesses or not; even if he hid witnesses for him and he did not know of them at all, since they saw the loan, they testify that they saw that he gave him money in the language of a loan and he received them as a loan.

In all these matters where one can claim a plea of jesting or a plea of appearing wealthy, such as one who says to his fellow in the presence of witnesses, "You have a maneh of mine in your possession," and he says to him, "Yes," or in a case where he admits on his own and witnesses hear him, or in a case of hiding witnesses, and as all the details of the laws were explained regarding where one can claim jesting or appearing wealthy—nevertheless, the beit din does not plead on his behalf. Rather, the beit din says to the defendant: "Why do you not pay him?" If he says, "He has nothing with me," they say to him, "But did you not say such and such in the presence of these people, or admit on your own?" If he pleaded, "I was jesting with him," or "I intended not to appear wealthy," according to the details that were explained for each and every plea, or if he pleads "these things never happened," he is exempt and swears a shevuat hesset. But if he did not plead on his own, they do not plead on his behalf, and they command him to pay. Only according to the first opinion in section 5, in a place where a plea of not appearing wealthy is applicable, they plead this plea on his behalf; and since he said "I owe him nothing," the judge exempts him and attributes what he admitted to him to the reason of not appearing wealthy, even though he did not plead so himself.

The claim of jesting or of not appearing wealthy is only relevant regarding an individual who admits, but regarding a community that admits to some monetary admission, they are not believed with these claims, for it is not the way of a community to jest, and likewise it is not relevant for them to not appear wealthy [it appears to me]:

Even though it was explained at the beginning of this siman that we do not plead the claim of "I was mocking" on his behalf if he does not plead it himself, and also that it is only relevant specifically when he sues him, nevertheless, sometimes even without a lawsuit and even if he does not plead it, we plead it for him. For example, one who said to his son or to his son-in-law, "Study with your son and I will pay you for this," he is exempt. For since the father is obligated to study with his son if he is not poor but simply did not want to, he had the right to deceive him by what he said to him, "I will pay you," and he can say, "I was mocking you." And even though he did not plead it, we plead it for him, even though in other cases of mocking the law is not so. And the reason is that specifically when he admits that he was already indebted to him, we require that he plead that his intention was to mock and that there be a plaintiff, for otherwise he certainly spoke the truth; but in this case, where it is known that he is not indebted to him and only now by his speech does he obligate himself, and since by law he is obligated to study with his son, we attribute the obligation of the father or the father-in-law to the fact that he deceived him and mocked him. And so too in other matters where he is not already indebted to him but only becomes obligated by power of his speech, we must look according to the matter and plead on his behalf. For example, one who was fleeing from a robber and there was a ferry before him, and the price for crossing the ferry is a ma'ah, and the ferryman who saw that he is fleeing did not want to transport him until he promised him a dinar, and he promised him—he is not obligated to give him a dinar and can say, "I was mocking you," as will be explained in siman 264. And so too when one does not want to give chalitzah to his yevamah and she said to him, "Perform chalitzah on the condition that I give you two hundred zuz," she does not need to give him even one perutah, since he is obligated by Torah law to perform chalitzah for her, and she can say, "I was mocking you," as is written in Even HaEzer siman 169. and similarly in other things like these. And even if he said, "You are witnesses," he is exempt [Shach], for the obligation has nothing upon which to take effect. But if he became enslaved through a kinyan, it appears that he is liable unless he submitted a moda'ah or the duress was public, for then the kinyan is void [see Shach, subsection 6].

A shekhiv mera who made a will, and people were sitting with him, and he wrote in the will that from Reuven such and such is owed to him and from Shimon such and such, and they sat and heard and remained silent—our teacher, the Rema, ruled that silence is like an admission, and they cannot say that they remained silent so as not to anger him in his illness. However, the great later authorities disagree on this, for it is certainly a good reason that they did not want to cause him pain in his illness. This applies specifically when they remained silent; but if they admitted and said "yes," it is a complete admission, for the claim of "jesting" is not applicable here regarding a sick person, as it is not logical at all that they would jest with a sick person. Also, the claim of "not wanting to appear wealthy" is not applicable here, even if he admitted on his own without the sick person's demand, for we are witnesses that if that were his desire, he would have admitted to others who are not here, as was written in section 6. And even according to that opinion that says this claim is effective even in his presence, nevertheless, regarding the sick person, it is obvious that he would not have admitted to him for this reason.

Reuven who claimed against Shimon that a certain object is in his possession and it is his, and Shimon replied to him, "The object is not yours, but rather it belongs to Levi," even if he said so before a beit din, it is not an admission to Levi such that he would be able to claim the object from Shimon. For since that which he said—that it belongs to Levi—is superfluous speech, as he only needed to reply to him that "the object is not yours," one cannot establish a case based on such words and they are merely casual conversation. However, if Levi was then in the beit din, or even not in the beit din but rather before witnesses, when Reuven claimed a certain object from Shimon and he replied, "It is not yours, but rather it belongs to Levi," and Levi is standing there, it is a complete admission [Shach]. For in his presence, if the truth were not so, he would not have said it. And even in such a case, if Levi claimed it from him afterwards, even though he cannot claim "I was joking" or "I was teasing," nevertheless he can claim "I erred in my admission and it belongs to another" with a migo of "I returned it to you." And even though it is a migo of audacity, for this one knows that he did not return it to him, nevertheless we say the migo, as we hold that we say a migo of audacity, as will be explained in the laws of migo in siman 82 [ibid.]. But he cannot say "I erred in my admission and they are mine," for the admission of his own mouth is like witnesses against him, and he cannot say so even when he has a migo. And specifically in an admission before a beit din, or even before witnesses if they performed a kinyan from him and he obligated himself; but in an admission before witnesses and without a kinyan, he can say "I erred and they are mine" when he has a migo of "I paid" [ibid.]. But if he does not have a migo, such as when it is within its time or the hands of the witnesses did not move from him, he is not believed to say "I erred" even when he says it belongs to others. And from the words of our teacher, the Rema, in section 23, it is explained that he cannot say "it is mine" in any case because of his first admission. And all this is regarding an admission, but regarding an account in his ledger, and the ledger is in his possession, he can say "I erred" even though he has no migo at all. But when the ledger is in the possession of a third party, he is not believed without a migo [ibid.]. And see what I wrote in siman 126.

Reuven who said to Shimon, "Levi has a maneh in your hand," or "You owe a maneh to Levi," and Shimon said "Yes," and Reuven said "You are witnesses" and Shimon remained silent, it is a complete admission even though Levi is not before us, as I wrote in section 1. And when Levi comes to claim from him, he cannot claim a plea of "I was joking," since he remained silent at the time Reuven said "You are witnesses," nor a plea of "not to satisfy myself," since it was by means of a claim, and even though Reuven did not come with the authorization of Levi. Furthermore, even if Reuven did not say "You are witnesses," he cannot say to Levi "I was joking with you," for Levi did not claim from him such that he could say to him, "Just as you joked with me, so too I joked with you." And likewise he cannot claim "not to satisfy myself" since it was by means of a claim. And specifically without authorization, but with authorization he can claim a plea of "I was joking," for his agent is like himself, and he can claim "I was joking with you" [Taz]. And according to the second opinion in section 3 that he can claim "I was joking" even without a claim, it is not effective here either without "You are witnesses." And there are those who further say that it is possible that even a plea of "not to satisfy myself" he can claim here, for specifically when the claimant himself claims from him it is not relevant to say "not to satisfy myself" as I wrote there, but when the claimant is not here, even though another claimed on his behalf, nevertheless he can say that he did not concern himself with this and his intention was "not to satisfy myself" [Shach]. However, when he remained silent at the time Reuven said "You are witnesses," certainly he cannot claim even "not to satisfy myself," for he would not have done all this [it appears to me]. And it has already been explained in section 1 that a complete admission is like "You are witnesses," see there.

Reuven who said to Shimon and Levi, "I have a maneh in your possession," and Shimon replied "Yes" and Levi remained silent—if Reuven said to the witnesses, "You are witnesses," and Shimon remained silent, it is an admission regarding Shimon. And if they are partners, Shimon is obligated to pay the entire debt, as I wrote in siman 77. And Levi does not need to pay anything, since he remained silent from beginning to end, and one does not become obligated through the admission of his fellow even when they are partners.

That which has been explained in this siman, that he can say "I was mocking you," this is specifically when the claimant does not have the defendant's money or his objects in his hand at the time of his admission. However, if the claimant is holding some of the defendant's property at the time of his admission, even if the seizure occurred long ago and the claimant did not say to him at the time of his claim "I am seizing you for my debt" [Sma and Urim VeTumim], and even if there are witnesses that the money or the objects belong to the defendant and they testify that he has not yet returned them to him—and there is no migo of "the matter never occurred" nor a migo of "I returned it"—nevertheless, he cannot claim the claim of mockery. For we are witnesses that he would not have admitted to him, even by way of mockery, when this one is holding his money or his objects. And this is specifically when he was holding his property at the time of the claim, but if he seized it after the claim, this is nothing, unlike the one who disagrees on this [Urim VeTumim], for we consider the claim of mockery to be a good claim and the claimant cannot seize it afterwards [see there, subsection 11]. And even if he was holding it at the time of the admission, it is specifically when the defendant knew that this one was holding his money, but if he did not know at all of his seizure, he can claim [ibid.]. And so it appears to me also regarding the claim of "not to appear wealthy," which is not through a claim and not in the presence of the claimant: if the one to whom he admitted was holding his money, he cannot claim this claim, for who forced him to admit to one who is holding his money? Rather, it is certainly the case that the truth is so. And as we said, when he was holding it, the defendant cannot claim; if he was only holding an amount corresponding to half of his debt, regarding the seized half he cannot claim, and regarding the second half he can claim. And so too, one who says to his fellow in the presence of witnesses, "You have a maneh in my hand, here is fifty of them," and he did not say "you are witnesses," he can claim these claims regarding the fifty that he has not yet given. And we do not say that since regarding the half that he gave there was no mockery, presumably the second half is also so; for on the contrary, there is reason to say the opposite: since he did not give more than half, there is proof that he does not owe him more. And although from this there is no clear proof, nevertheless, since there are reasons for both sides, he is able to swear and be exempt.

In everything that has been explained, that he is able to claim these claims—if at the time he admitted and said, "I owe a maneh to so-and-so," or if he said "yes" to the claim of the plaintiff, he swore upon this, and afterwards when the plaintiff sued him, he said to him, "I was mocking you," or "so as not to appear wealthy," and "my oath was a lie," he is not believed and we do not listen to him. And even if he says that at the time he swore he forgot that he had paid him and "I was of the opinion that I owed him, and now I have remembered," we do not listen to him, for there is a presumption that a person is precise regarding an oath. And likewise, a handshake has the law of an oath. And specifically when he admits to the oath and the handshake, or there are witnesses to this; but if he denies the oath and the handshake, or if he says that he swore on such-and-such a condition, he is believed via a migo, for if he wanted, he could have denied the hearing. And likewise, regarding any oath in a matter of money that affects his fellow, such as where he swore that he would pay him, he is not believed to say that he erred in his oath unless he clarifies with absolute clarification. See in siman 163.

And all that we have said, that he is able to claim claims of jesting or not wishing to appear wealthy, this is specifically regarding an admission of debt. However, regarding an admission of receipt or a waiver, such as one who admits to his fellow before witnesses, "I have received from you such and such of the debt that I have against you," or who waives his debt before witnesses, he does not need to say "you are witnesses," whether regarding a debt with a contract or an oral debt. And regarding these, these claims are not relevant at all, and the admission is the completion of the act in this matter, for behold, he does not need to give anything to his fellow such that it could be said that he jested with him or that he did not wish to appear wealthy. And behold, even regarding a debt, when the claimant was in possession of his property, he cannot claim [these claims], as I wrote in section 20, and all the more so in this case. And it appears to me that in this, even if the one who admitted is in possession of that which belongs to the opposing party, he also cannot claim [these claims], since with his admission the act was completed. And likewise, he does not need to tell the witnesses to write this. [And see in the Tumim].

One who deals with the money of his fellow and gives him profit every year, and ultimately claimed that there was not that much profit and wishes to reckon what he gave him toward the principal: if he gave him the profit in the presence of witnesses, even if he did not say "you are witnesses," or if he admits himself that at the time he gave it he told him that he was giving it for the sake of profit, he is not believed to reckon it now toward the principal. And even though when the giving was between them privately he has a migo, for if he wanted he would not have admitted that he gave it toward the profit, nevertheless he is not believed, for it is like a migo in the place of witnesses, as we are witnesses that it is certainly so that there was profit since he performed the act of giving [Shach]. However, if he can clarify that he erred, his claim is a valid claim. But if when he gave, he gave it without specification, he shall swear that there was not that much profit in it and it shall be reckoned toward the principal according to what he says. And even though the opposing party does not claim with certainty that there was profit in it, nevertheless this one is obligated to swear, for it is no worse than the oath of partners that will be explained in siman 93, that they swear even on a doubt. And there is one who says that even if he gave the profit in the presence of witnesses, if he did not say "you are witnesses," he shall swear now that there was no profit and reckon what he gave toward the principal, just as we explained in section 20 regarding one who admitted to his fellow concerning a maneh and gave him fifty, he can say regarding the other fifty "I was mocking you" because he has not yet given them to him; so too here, he can say "I was mocking you" regarding the matter of being able to retain what is under his hand [ibid.], since he still needs to produce it from under his hand, and automatically what he gave him will be reckoned toward the principal. And if he gave him a document in his own handwriting, then regarding the remainder he certainly cannot claim a claim of mocking, and only "I erred" can he say with a migo of "I paid" [ibid.]. And see in Yoreh Deah siman 177.

An incident occurred regarding Reuven, who gave a maneh to Shimon and Levi to do business with, and they drew up a document regarding them and swore to give him half the profit. After some time, Reuven requested his money, and they gave him the maneh. He asked them for the profit, and they said to him: We earned such and such, and no more. Reuven said to Shimon: Did you not tell me that you earned fifty? Shimon said to him: I did not say anything to you. Because of the power of the document he held against them, in which no payment was recorded, they were compelled to give him what he said. Now Levi comes and claims from Reuven that he took profit from them unlawfully. The Rosh, of blessed memory, ruled that the law is with Reuven, since they paid him of their own will. As for Levi's claim that they were coerced because of the document, it is not a valid claim, since they did not deliver a moda'ah before witnesses before they paid him. Regarding Shimon's denial of Reuven, claiming he said nothing to him, Reuven must swear that Shimon told him so, since he possesses a document and is believed with his oath that Shimon told him there is such and such profit. He cannot claim "I was mocking you," as I wrote in the previous section. Even according to the second opinion, since they gave him the maneh and did not write it upon the document, and he is the possessor of his document, he therefore cannot say "I mocked you" [it appears to me]. It seems to me that even the oath was not required of Reuven by the Rosh, of blessed memory, and the incident was that Reuven swore of his own accord, as is written in the Tur, for there is no obligation of an oath upon him at all, even against Shimon who denies it. For granted that he did not say to Reuven that there was profit, nevertheless, now that they paid him and did not deliver a moda'ah, they do not have the power to extract it from Reuven, and it is a sign that there was profit, for otherwise they would have delivered a moda'ah [and the Shach at the end of subsection 80 and the Urim VeTumim subsection 90, who wrote that against Shimon he must swear, require further study; see there].

There was another incident involving Reuven who claimed from Shimon profit from the debt that he owed him for several years, and Reuven says that Shimon stipulated with him to give him profit, and Shimon says that he did not stipulate. And it appears according to the matter that even according to the words of Reuven, this stipulation was not at the time that Shimon became obligated in the debt when he took the money from him according to a heter iska, but rather that he said to him afterwards. And the Rosh, of blessed memory, ruled that Shimon is exempt even from an oath, for even if he said so to him afterwards, they are mere words and he does not become obligated without a kinyan and he can retract. And even though in siman 292 it will be explained regarding a deposit, when the depositor claims his money to profit with it and the bailee withholds it, that he is obligated to give him the profit from then on, this is only regarding a deposit; but regarding a loan, one cannot obligate him so because of ribbit [Shach].

Regarding conditions that a person stipulates with his fellow in any business matter, the claim of "I was mocking" is not relevant at all, for if it were not so, no condition between a person and his fellow would ever be upheld, as he would say, "I was mocking you." Furthermore, our teacher, the Rema, ruled in section 7 regarding one who stipulated with another to study with his fellow's son for such-and-such a wage in the presence of the son's father, and the son's father remained silent, that silence is considered like an admission, even though the father said nothing. The father becomes obligated according to the agreement that this person stipulated with the teacher, for the reason that if the father's will were not so, he should have protested; and since he did not protest, he was satisfied and accepted it. And even though one could raise a difficulty regarding this, for in a case of one who is silent from beginning to end we do not say silence is considered like an admission, as has been written in section 1 [Urim VeTummim], nevertheless, since he performed such a significant act as the teacher studying with his son and he remained silent, it is certainly pleasing to him, and he becomes obligated through this even with complete silence since he stipulated in his presence. And likewise, one who says to his fellow, "I am hereby taking your object for this amount, and I am hereby performing meshikhah to acquire it for this amount," and he performed meshikhah and the other remained silent, it is like an admission and the one who performed meshikhah acquired it [Netivot HaMishpat], and similarly in other matters involving such a significant act. In any event, we have learned from our teacher, the Rema, that regarding a business condition, the claim of "I was mocking" is not relevant at all, since he ruled even regarding one who is completely silent during a significant act that silence is considered like an admission, all the more so regarding an admission that he is obligated and cannot claim "I was mocking" or "I was jesting" in the details of a business matter.