Siman 80

It has already been explained in the previous siman that after one has confessed in beit din, he can no longer retract. Therefore, anyone who claims a claim in beit din, such that through this claim he becomes liable by the law—even if the beit din has not yet held him liable [Sma]—he cannot claim another claim that contradicts the first. Even if there are witnesses for the second claim, it is of no avail, for he is more believed regarding himself than witnesses. However, if it is a matter where he can say, "Previously I forgot, and now I remembered that I paid," and the like, it is effective if he brings witnesses for the second claim [Shach]. And specifically after the time of *toch kedei dibbur* he cannot retract, but within *toch kedei dibbur* he can retract from anything he claims, even if he does not bring witnesses for the second claim, for anything within *toch kedei dibbur* is considered like the speech itself, and he can cancel and contradict his first claim entirely. And specifically within his own *toch kedei dibbur*, and not within the *toch kedei dibbur* of his litigant. For example, one who confessed to his fellow in beit din that a maneh is due from him, and did not mention at all that his fellow holds a mashkon, and his litigant said to him, "Do not pay me except in the presence of witnesses," and he replied to him within *toch kedei dibbur*, "I have a mashkon in your hand," it is not considered like the speech itself, and he is not believed regarding the mashkon, for he should have mentioned the matter of the mashkon immediately after his confession. And even though it was explained in siman 29 regarding witnesses that if one witness retracted within the *toch kedei dibbur* of the second it is considered like the speech itself, this is because the two witnesses are considered as one, for both of them speak in unison; but the plaintiff and the defendant are not as one, for this one claims the opposite of that one [Sma].

Specifically, he cannot contradict his first claim, even when the contradiction concerns a matter of a shevuah, as will be explained in section 6. However, if he comes to amend the first claim and to clarify his intent, saying, "I intended such and such," as long as the meaning of the language he spoke can tolerate this explanation—even if it is somewhat forced—we listen to him. This is so even after the beit din has found him liable, for who can say to him that such was not his intent? And they return and adjudicate according to the amendment of his language, unless it is clear to the beit din that such was not his intent previously, in which case they do not listen to him. Furthermore, this ability to amend his language applies when he has not yet departed from the beit din; but if he departed from the beit din and returned and said, "Such and such was my intent," they do not listen to him in any case, for certainly other people taught him to claim thus. This is unless it is clearly known to the beit din that people did not teach him. And this rule, that they do not listen to him after he departed from the beit din, applies specifically after the beit din found him liable based on his first claim; but as long as the beit din has not found him liable, he may amend his claim even after he departed from the beit din [Shach], for before they found him liable, we do not fear that they taught him to claim thus, since the ruling was still hidden from him.

That which we explained, that he may not return and plead to contradict his first plea, this is specifically when he is fit to be found liable in judgment according to his first plea, for then he may not return and plead to exempt himself. However, if he could also win the judgment with the first plea, he may return and plead another plea by which he is exempted, even though he does not provide an explanation as to why he pleaded a different plea previously. And even if he left the beit din and returned, he may reverse his pleas from exemption to exemption until witnesses come to contradict him; for since both pleas are to his benefit, we say "what reason does he have to lie," for if he wanted, he could have stood by his first plea. And even if witnesses came after the reversal of his plea and they contradict his first plea, we do not say that he retracted because of fear of the witnesses, as I wrote in siman 79, section 12. But after witnesses have come and contradicted his plea, he cannot shift his previous plea to another intention unless he provided an explanation as to why he pleaded so previously, and also that the implication of the language includes the plea he now pleads, and also that he did not leave the beit din. But when one of these three is missing, he cannot return and change the language of his previous plea in such a case.

In all these matters, there is no difference between one who claimed initially and comes to retract, and one who was silent initially and comes to retract his silence; for since his silence obligates him, it is like speech, unless he provides a reason for why he was silent initially. However, if he does not provide a reason, he cannot retract from his silence, for the silence he maintained is considered like an admission to his litigant. However, this law only applies if the beit din already announced the verdict because they took his silence as an admission, or, for example, if his litigant said "you are witnesses" and he remained silent, for in this case as well his silence is like an admission. But as long as the beit din has not announced the verdict and the litigant did not say "you are witnesses," it is not relevant to say "silence is like an admission," for is he obligated to respond immediately? Does he not have permission to deliberate on what he will respond to the claims of his litigant? And what relevance is there here for "silence is like an admission"? [This appears to be the intention of the Shulchan Aruch at the end of section 1, and the difficulty of the Shach in subsection 8 is settled; see there].

Some say that if they wrote the claims in writing, one cannot retract and claim again, even if he provides a justification and even if he was not contradicted by witnesses, because in writing a person is precise with his claims, and therefore he cannot change even from an exemption to an exemption. There is no difference between whether he wrote it himself or whether he commanded another to write his claims [as is implied from our teacher, the Rema]. Therefore, some have written that it is proper for the beit din to request from the litigants that they provide their claims in writing, or the beit din themselves shall write the claims, so that they will not be able to retract and claim again and cause a disturbance of the law in vain, and they will be precise in their writing to speak once and not to change the claims. See siman 13, section 8.

That which was explained in section 1, that one does not have the ability to contradict the first claim if it is from a state of liability to a state of exemption, there is no difference between a liability of money and a liability of an oath. However, some say that if according to the first claim the opponent was to swear and take, and he wishes to retract from this so that he himself shall swear and be exempt, it is not called "retracting and claiming," for who says that this opponent will swear [Maharshal]. And there is one who disagrees with this [Shach]. However, it is certain that if the beit din already ruled that the opponent shall swear and take, he can no longer retract [ibid.].