Siman 79

One who claims against his fellow in beit din, "I lent you a maneh," and the other says before the beit din, "The matter never occurred," and two witnesses came and testified that he borrowed a maneh from him and repaid him, and the lender says, "I was not repaid"—he is liable to pay. The reason is because anyone who says "I did not borrow" is like one who says "I did not repay," for if he did not borrow, why would he repay? In this, it is simple that he is more believed regarding himself than a hundred witnesses; if so, their testimony that he repaid is contradicted by he himself. And regarding what he says, "I did not borrow," he was contradicted by the witnesses and established as a liar. The lender does not even require an oath. And even if he later came to beit din and said "I repaid," he is not believed, for he was already established as a liar, unless he brings witnesses that he repaid after they were in beit din. But if he brought witnesses that he repaid previously, it is nothing, since he testified about himself that he did not repay, since he did not borrow. Furthermore, if after this repayment he sued him in beit din and he said "I repaid you twice," they do not administer an oath to the lender because of his previous admission, and more will be explained regarding this in section 9. All this is specifically when he denied it to him in beit din, but when he denied it to him outside of beit din, it is not called a denial at all and he is not established as a liar, and he can later claim whatever he wishes. But when he denied in beit din, even if the witnesses who contradicted him did not contradict him in his presence in this beit din where he denied before them, but rather in another beit din, he is established as a liar [Sma]. And specifically when they testified in his presence, but not in his presence he is not established as a liar, for witnesses are not received not in the presence of the litigant, as written in siman 28. And particularly to establish him as a liar, it appears to me that even in a case of duress where for another matter they would receive them not in the presence of the litigant, as written there, nevertheless for a matter such as this to establish him as a liar, their testimony is not received not in the presence of the borrower in any case.

And specifically when witnesses testify regarding the loan and regarding the repayment, then we say that he is established as a liar, for they are believed regarding the loan and they are not believed regarding the repayment. However, if they do not testify regarding the loan but rather testify that they saw that he repaid him a maneh, we do not say that since they testify regarding the repayment, it is automatically as if they testified regarding the loan and as if they testified that he borrowed and repaid; we do not say so. For since we remove their testimony regarding the repayment because the borrower himself contradicted them, their testimony is removed entirely and it is as if they did not testify at all [Rabbi Akiva Eiger], for we are not to establish him as a liar based on the inference of the witnesses even though the inference is true. And likewise, specifically regarding witnesses do we say that when they testify regarding both of them he is established as a liar and pays. But regarding the lender himself, when the lender says "I lent to him and I was repaid by him" and the borrower says "I did not borrow," the lender cannot say, when he has seized from him, "I know that I lent to you, and regarding the repayment, behold you admitted that you did not repay me, for one who says 'I did not borrow' is like one who says 'I did not repay,' and you are believed regarding yourself." For the borrower can say to him: "Just as I am believed regarding myself, so you are believed regarding yourself, and behold you admitted that I repaid you, and in any case we both admit that I do not owe you." Therefore, seizure is not effective [Chatam Sofer]. For it is well understood that regarding witnesses the lender can say "I believe you regarding the repayment more than the witnesses," but regarding himself it is not relevant to say so, for the matter does not depend on credibility but rather on admission, and behold he himself admitted that he repaid him. And likewise, even regarding witnesses, specifically when the borrower said "the matter never occurred" is he established as a liar. But if he did not say it with this phrasing, but rather said "I did not borrow," he is not established as a liar, for he can say that my intention was that I did not remain in my state of debt and I repaid; but with "the matter never occurred" it is impossible to interpret it so [Tosafot Shevuot 41b s.v. Kol]. And some say that even when he said "I did not borrow," since his statement was in beit din, he cannot justify his words, for in beit din he should have used clear language [Mordechai, end of chapter HaKotev]. And for the law, one should not extract money against the first opinion [and the proof of the Mordechai is from orphans, and the Tosafot wrote in several places that we do not claim for orphans everything that their father could have claimed, and all the more so since there is a shtar there; see Rashi there 88a s.v. Ke-omer and see in section 14].

And so too, one who produced against his fellow a handwriting indicating that he owes him, and he said to him, "The matter never occurred and this is not my handwriting," if the handwriting was established in beit din or if witnesses came and said it is his handwriting, he is established as a liar and must pay. And even if they testified that he paid previously, they are not believed regarding the payment, as in section 1, unless they say that he paid in their presence after the denial [Sma], for it is possible that after the beit din ruled that he is liable to pay, he paid him; but before this, how could he pay since he says this is not his handwriting? And so too, if the lender admitted that he already paid him, he does not need to pay, as I wrote in section 2. And so too, if the borrower said, "The matter never occurred," and the lender produced a shtar with witnesses that he lent to him, he is established as a liar, and the lender does not even need to swear, even when there is no trustworthiness clause in the shtar. For the general rule is that when the borrower is established as a liar, the lender does not need to swear, and only a herem stam can be cast upon anyone who takes his money unlawfully. And also to make him swear after the payment is not within his power since he was established as a liar. And it has already been explained that one is only established as a liar in beit din.

And similarly, one who claims a maneh from his fellow and he replied to him, "It is possible that you owe me the same sum of money that you are claiming from me," there is one who says that it is like saying, "It is possible that you owe me, and consequently I do not owe you." Therefore, if witnesses came that the claimant does not owe him, the defendant is established as a liar and as one who says, "I did not pay," and his law is that even if they testified that he borrowed and paid, they are not believed regarding the payment; for how could he pay him since, in his opinion, the claimant owed him a corresponding amount? It is as if he admitted that he did not pay him, and his law is as in the previous seifim. And this phrasing depends on the understanding of the beit din regarding the style of the language he spoke [it appears to me].

Regarding all that has been explained, that he has been established as a liar and that the witnesses are not believed to say that he paid, even if the defendant says afterward, "I remembered that I borrowed and paid," or "I remembered that it is my handwriting but I paid," or "I remembered that I do not have a claim against you but I paid," and the witnesses testify according to his words, nevertheless he is not believed at all and must pay. For anyone who says "these things never happened" and is contradicted is established as a liar, and it is as if he admitted that he did not pay [see Shach, subsection 9].

But one who admitted in beit din that he owes this claimant a maneh, and afterwards said, "I remembered that I paid him this debt that I admitted to," and brought witnesses that he paid him—behold, this testimony is effective and we act according to them. For behold, he did not contradict the testimony, as he only admitted that he borrowed, and it is possible that he paid; it is not like one who says, "I never borrowed." And this is specifically when he claims that he paid before the witnesses came; but if the witnesses came first, he is not believed, for perhaps the witnesses are mistaken and think that he paid, and the payment they saw was perhaps for another debt, and it is because he heard from the witnesses saying that he paid that he turns and says, "I remembered that I paid." And why do we concern ourselves with this? Because it is certain that everyone is precise with his speech in beit din, and when he admitted that he owes him, the plain meaning of the language implies that he has not yet paid, for if it were not so, why did he not say then that he paid? Nevertheless, it is not among the impossibilities that he forgot to mention the payment then; therefore, if he says "I remembered" before the testimony of witnesses, it can be said that the truth is so, but after their testimony, we do not accept it from him.

If he said to him, "I lent you a maneh in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so," or "in the presence of witnesses" without specifying, and he said to him, "The matter never occurred," and witnesses came and testified that they saw him count out money to him—even though they do not know if he gave it to him as a loan, or as repayment, or as a gift—he is established as a liar. And if he later claims that it was as repayment or as a gift, he is not believed. And all the more so if he says later, "I paid," he is not believed; for since he said to him that he gave it to him in the presence of witnesses, he should have taken it to heart and answered him that that maneh was a gift or repayment of a debt, and since he did not answer so, it appears that his intent was to deny, and he is established as a liar. Therefore, if he answered immediately in beit din, "It is true that I received a maneh from you, but it was not a loan but rather another matter," he is believed even if witnesses came later, since he does not contradict the witnesses, and he takes a shevuat hesset and is exempt. And similarly, if he sued him in beit din without specifying, "I lent you a maneh," and did not say that it was in the presence of witnesses, and he answered him, "The matter never occurred," and afterward the plaintiff brought witnesses that he counted out a maneh to him in their presence, we listen to him when he says afterward, "That maneh was not as a loan, and therefore I answered you 'the matter never occurred' because you said to me 'loan' and you did not say to me that it was in the presence of witnesses; I did not take it to heart to answer you that that maneh was not as a loan" [Sma]. And there are those who say that there is no difference whether he said to him "in the presence of witnesses" or without specifying, but rather there is a difference: if the plaintiff said to him, "I counted out a maneh to you," even if he said it without specifying and he answered him "the matter never occurred" and witnesses came that he counted it out to him, he is established as a liar, for when he said to him "I counted out a maneh to you," he should have taken it to heart and answered him that that maneh was not as a loan. But if he said to him, "I lent you a maneh," even if he said to him that he lent it to him in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so, and he answered him "the matter never occurred" and witnesses came that he counted it out to him, he is not established as a liar, for he can say, "Since you said to me the language of 'loan,' why should I have taken it to heart? Behold, I knew that I did not borrow from you, and therefore I answered you 'the matter never occurred'" [Shach and Bach].

If the claimant stationed witnesses outside in a manner where the defendant did not see them, and they heard that he gave them to him as a loan, then if he denies and says "the things never occurred" or that it was not by way of a loan, he is established as a liar and must pay. However, if he claims, "I only received it from him as payment for my debt, and because I was unable to extract it from him in any other way, I admitted to him then everything I said in order to extract my debt, and I was not concerned about admitting to him that they were as a loan since I did not see witnesses," his claim is a valid claim, and he swears a hesset oath and is exempt. And if they saw the actual loan such that the borrower also saw them, this pretext is not effective, for he should not have admitted in the presence of witnesses [Shach], and he should have said beforehand to the witnesses in secret, "Know that I am forced to admit to him." However, if he has a migo of "I paid," this pretext is effective even with actual seeing [Netivot HaMishpat].

Regarding all that has been explained, that one is established as a liar through the testimony of witnesses, even if it was disjoined testimony where the two witnesses did not stand in one place, but rather one saw from this window and one from that window and the like, he is also established as a liar. And in any place where he is established as a liar, he is only established so regarding that specific sum which he denied; for example, if he denied one hundred and was established as a liar regarding fifty, he is only established regarding the fifty, and concerning the other fifty, the claimant must swear and take, as was written in siman 75. And certainly he is not established as a liar regarding other money. And this matter is handed over to the beit din to understand in what he was established as a liar and in what he was not established, and according to what their eyes see they shall judge in this, whether to require the opposing party to swear or not. Similarly, the liar is not disqualified from an oath regarding that which he was not established as a liar, even in this same matter itself if he must swear according to the law. Only in this does the status of a liar help: that if there is a trust clause in a document and he was established as a liar regarding one detail of the matter of the document, he loses his trust status in all details of the document, and the law of this document is like one that has no trust clause, as was written in siman 71. Also, in the case of being established as a liar in section 7, the borrower can administer an oath to the lender after payment as to whether he took from him according to the law; and it is not similar to being established as a liar in the previous laws, for there he admitted that he did not pay him, and how can he swear him that he was paid twice? But in other instances of being established as a liar, such as in section 7 where he swears him that it was not by way of a loan, he is able to administer an oath to him. However, when he claims "I paid twice," he cannot administer an oath to him, for since he said "the matter never occurred" (that he did not borrow), and one who says "I did not borrow" is like one who says "I did not pay," as has been explained. And also in this, specifically when he claims "I paid once" before we came to beit din, for then he is not believed for this reason; but when he claims "I paid twice" after we came to beit din, because "I paid him once between me and him and the beit din ruled that I am not believed because I was established as a liar and I was forced to pay him another time before the beit din or before witnesses," he can administer an oath to him on this, for this could be, and therefore he is able to administer an oath to him [Shach, subsection 18].

One is not established as a liar except by the testimony of two witnesses, and not by the testimony of one witness. When he says "I did not borrow" and the witness testifies that he did borrow, he swears a biblical oath to contradict him. And if he claims "I borrowed and I repaid," he becomes one who is obligated to swear and is unable to swear, and he pays, as I wrote in siman 75. Nevertheless, he is not established as a liar, and if he claims "I repaid" afterward, he is believed with an oath [Shach]. And so too, if he claimed "I did not borrow" and became obligated in a biblical oath to contradict the witness, and at the time of the oath he says "I borrowed and I repaid," he shall swear that he repaid him. For since he became obligated in an oath, what does it matter to me if he swears that he did not borrow or swears that he repaid him? For specifically when he claims before they obligated him in the oath "I borrowed and I repaid," he is indeed obligated to swear and is unable, and he pays, for one witness regarding an oath is like two regarding payment, and since he is unable to swear regarding that which the witness contradicts him, he must perforce pay. But when he has already become obligated in the oath and they ruled the oath upon him, what does it matter to me if he swears that he did not borrow or swears that he repaid him [Taz], for behold, he is not established as a liar by the testimony of one witness. And so too regarding matters for which one does not swear a biblical oath, such as lands and documents, even if he says in beit din "I borrowed and I repaid," he swears that he repaid, as I wrote in siman 75, for regarding a rabbinic oath we do not adjudicate the law of "since he is unable to swear, he pays."

And similarly, one is not established as a liar based on his own words, such as where he claimed "the matter never occurred" and they obligated him to take a shevuat hesset, and when he came to swear, he retracted and said "I paid" or "I do not know if I borrowed from you," or if previously he claimed "I do not know" and retracted and claimed "I borrowed and I paid." Since witnesses did not contradict him, but rather he himself is meticulous with his oath to perform it properly, and both claims come to exempt him, and there is no change here from liability to exemption such that his law would be that he may not retract and claim as written in siman 80, therefore he shall swear according to his second claim and be exempt, for "why should he lie"—if he wanted, he could have stood by his first claim [Sma]. And according to this, if he claimed previously "I do not know if I paid you," where he is liable to pay as written in siman 75, and he retracted and claimed "I paid," he is not believed, for he changes from liability to exemption [Shach]. And this too is specifically if in his retraction he said that he claimed falsely previously in what he said "I do not know," but if he says that in truth previously he did not know and afterwards he remembered that he paid, he is believed and swears a shevuat hesset, for there is no contradiction here, as it is the way of the world to remember what was forgotten [ibid.]. And this has already been explained in siman 75, section 14. And one should not say that if so, even when he says that he claimed falsely, let us believe him with a migo that he could have said that he now remembered, for it can be said that even if he brought witnesses for the second claim, he would not be believed to contradict his first claim, as will be explained in siman 80, and how could he be believed by means of a migo, for witnesses are stronger than a migo? Furthermore, in a place of a strong chazakah such as this, we do not say migo, as will be explained similarly to this at the end of the siman [it appears to me].

That which we have said, that if he initially claimed "the matter never occurred" and then retracted and said "I paid," he is believed with an oath—even if witnesses came afterward and testified that he borrowed. And if so, one might say that his retraction from his first claim to say "I paid" was because he was afraid of the witnesses; and even if he saw witnesses approaching and coming to testify, where it is certainly apparent that he retracted out of fear of them, nevertheless, since he ultimately retracted before the testimony of the witnesses, he is believed with an oath and is not established as a liar. And so too if there was a rumor in the city that he borrowed, where one might say that because of the rumor he retracted, nevertheless, since he retracted of his own accord, he is not established as a liar, and he swears and is exempt. This is unless the rumor is publicized, for then it is as if witnesses had already come, and he is established as a liar and is not believed to swear that he paid him. And there is one who wishes to say that even with a publicized rumor, since one cannot extract money based on a rumor, he is not established as a liar [Shach]. And if he said "I did not borrow" and witnesses came that he borrowed and he was established as a liar such that he is not believed to say "I paid," and he said "I paid" and they did not believe him, and afterward those witnesses were disqualified and other witnesses came—even though his claim of "I paid" preceded the latter witnesses, nevertheless he was established as a liar based on the first ones even though they were disqualified afterward, and he is not believed to swear and is obligated to pay [Netivot HaMishpat]. However, if they were disqualified before he retracted and said "I paid," the establishment of his status as a liar is removed if the witnesses were disqualified, and he can afterward say "I paid" even if witnesses come later. For specifically when he said "I paid" before their disqualification, since his claim was not accepted in beit din, they do not accept this same claim from him again; but if he had not claimed it, no [it appears to me].

It has already been explained that a person is not established as a liar except in beit din. However, outside of beit din, even if he claimed against him in the presence of witnesses and he said "I did not borrow," he is not established as a liar, and he can later claim whatever he wishes, for such is the way of people, not to reveal true claims except in beit din. However, if at the time he says "the matters never occurred" in the presence of witnesses, the claimant said to the witnesses, "You are my witnesses that he claims the matters never occurred," and the defendant remained silent—if he then retracted and said "I paid previously," he is not believed. For if so, he should not have remained silent when the claimant said "You are my witnesses," and he should have answered him, "I was mocking you in this that I said the matters never occurred, and in truth I borrowed and paid." Since he did not say so, it is like an admission from him that he did not pay. Therefore, he is not believed to say that he paid previously, but he is believed to say that he paid afterwards, and he swears and is exempt. For specifically in beit din he is not believed to say that he paid even afterwards, since his disqualification is because he was established as a liar; but with witnesses, where he was not established as a liar but rather is merely not believed to say "I paid then" because his silence is like an admission that he did not pay—and behold, even if he admitted that he did not pay him, he would be believed to say afterwards that he paid him. Nevertheless, even in this he is not believed to say that he paid him afterwards except when he says that he paid him after he claimed against him in beit din. But if he claims that he paid him after he claimed "the matters never occurred" in the presence of witnesses before he claimed against him in beit din, he is not believed, for we are witnesses that as long as he does not claim against him in beit din, he will not pay him, since he said "the matters never occurred" in the presence of witnesses [Netivot HaMishpat, and perhaps this is the intention of the Ri in the Tur and they do not disagree at all, and the difficulty of the Taz from siman 146 is removed; and delve into this].

One who says to his fellow in the presence of witnesses, "I have a maneh in your hand," and he replied to him with a complete admission, "Yes," or if he said, "You are my witnesses," as will be explained in siman 81, and the next day he summoned him to beit din and said to him, "Give me the maneh"—if he said to him, "I gave it to you," he shall swear a shevuat hesset and be exempt. However, if he said to him, "You never had anything in my hand," or "lo hayu devarim me'olam," or another expression that indicates he denies the root of the loan, and the witnesses testified that he admitted in their presence, he is established as a liar (huchzak kafran) based on himself and the witnesses. For he already admitted that it was in his hand, and the admission of a litigant is equivalent to a hundred witnesses. And that which was explained, that without a beit din he is not established as a liar—behold, here too his second claim is in beit din, and the witnesses testify that previously he admitted; behold, he is now established as a liar in beit din. And if he replied to him, "You have nothing in my hand," without elaboration, and did not say "never," he is not established as a liar, for he can explain his words and say that his intention was "you have nothing in my hand because I paid you." And the same applies if he said to him, "I do not owe you," or "You are claiming falsely," or "I do not know what you are saying," for he can explain his words that his intention was that he paid him. And the beit din must understand the language of his response; if it also bears the language of payment, then he is not established as a liar. And there is no difference regarding the matter of being established as a liar between matters of loans and matters of deposits or other matters. And anywhere that one is established as a liar in beit din, he no longer has any credibility regarding that matter, even with an oath. And there is one who says further that even if he claimed a maneh that he lent him, and he said, "I never borrowed from any person," and witnesses came [and testified] that he borrowed, even though they do not know if it was from this man or from another man, nevertheless he is established as a liar against this claimant [the Gara"a according to Yerushalmi Shevuot chapter 4, halacha 5]. And certainly even according to this opinion, the claimant must swear a severe oath, for it is not logical at all that he should take without an oath in this manner. And also regarding the root of this law, it requires further study [and it appears to me that the Yerushalmi is in doubt, and also from a fine there is no proof; see there carefully and delve into it].

If he said to him in the presence of a beit din, "I lent you a maneh beside such-and-such a pillar" or "beside such-and-such a house," and he replied, "I never passed by that pillar" or "by that house," and witnesses came and testified that they saw him then passing by that pillar or that house, but they did not see or hear the loan, he is not established as a liar. For a matter that is not incumbent upon a person, he does it without paying attention; since there is no practical difference to him in his passing by the pillar or the house, he does not take it to heart and does not truly remember if he passed or did not pass, and it seems to him that he did not pass and he claimed so in beit din. And so too regarding other matters that do not pertain to the essence of the loan, even if he was contradicted in them, he is not established as a liar thereby. But if he said to him, "I paid you a maneh with such-and-such merchandise, the price of which was such-and-such," and the claimant brought witnesses that the price was not as he said, and he then said, "I know that I paid you with this merchandise and I remembered that I completed the payment to you with money or other merchandise," he is established as a liar, because it is the way of people to pay attention to remember the purchase. Therefore, the claimant collects from him what remains of the debt without an oath. And so too if he claimed that he received nothing from a certain man on the account of this claimant, and afterwards it became known through witnesses that he did receive, he is established as a liar and is not believed to say, "I returned it to this man from whom I received it." For regarding any matter of money or merchandise, it is upon a person to remember, and since he was contradicted in this, he is established as a liar. But a matter that is not of money or merchandise, it is not upon a person to remember, and he is not established as a liar thereby. And if he said, "I paid you in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so," and they came and said, "it never happened," it was explained in siman 70.

It has already been explained in siman 39, section 14, that an admission, even before a beit din, if the borrower did not command to write a deed and did not perform a kinyan sudar, its law is only like an oral loan, and the beit din does not write a deed for the lender. Even if the borrower gathered the beit din and seated them and admitted before them and said to them, "Be judges over me that I owe so-and-so a maneh," they do not write a deed for the lender. But if a beit din of three sat of their own accord in their fixed place, and the claimant came and complained before them, and the beit din sent a messenger after the defendant, and he came and admitted before them, behold, these judges write his admission and give it to the claimant, and the defendant is not believed to say "I paid," for since he stands in judgment, it becomes like a loan with a deed which is revealed to all. Therefore, two who came to judgment of their own accord, where the beit din did not send after the defendant, even if the beit din sat in their fixed place and one of them claimed against his fellow and said to him, "I have a maneh in your hand," and he said to him, "Yes," and he left the beit din and afterwards said "I paid," he is believed and shall swear a hesset oath that he paid him. And there is no difference between when the beit din said to him, "Go out and give to him," or when they said to him, "You are obligated to give to him." Even though this wording only implies that it appears to us that you are obligated to give to him and they have not yet decided to tell him "Go out and give to him," nevertheless, he is believed to say "I paid," for it is not the way of most people to be so precise with the wording of the judges, and even when they say "You are obligated to give to him," it seems in their eyes as if they said "Go out and give to him," and therefore he is believed to say "I paid." Therefore, if the claimant afterwards returned to the beit din and said, "Write his admission for me," they do not write it for him, for we fear perhaps he paid him and he will come to collect from him a second time. And even a verdict the beit din is not compelled to give him; and even according to that opinion explained there that he can claim "I paid" against a verdict, nevertheless, the beit din is not obligated to trouble themselves to write a verdict when it can be said that he paid him. But if it is known to the beit din that he has not yet paid, they give him a verdict, as I wrote there in section 15, and if they wish, they write it for him in the language of an admission, and there it was explained with the help of Heaven.

And even though we have said that there is no difference between the phrasing "Go out and give to him" and "You are liable to give to him," nevertheless, regarding the matter of being established as a liar, there is a difference in this. For example, two who came to beit din and one was found liable to the other, and the beit din said to him, "Go out and give to him," and he went out and returned and said, "I have paid," and witnesses testify against him that he did not pay—for example, that their hands did not move from his hand—he is established as a liar regarding that money, and he is not believed even afterwards to say, "I have paid." He must pay him in the presence of beit din or in the presence of witnesses, or receive a receipt from him. But if the beit din said to him, "You are liable to give to him," and he went out and returned and said, "I have paid," and witnesses testify that he did not pay, he is not established as a liar, for we hang it on the possibility that he did not wish to deny the debt, but rather that he evaded payment until he would hear clear words from the beit din that they command him to give to him. And even though we have said that most people do not distinguish between the phrasing "Go out and give to him" and the phrasing "You are liable to give to him," nevertheless, there are a few people who do distinguish in this, and we should not establish him as a liar in this manner. Therefore, if he returned another time after the witnesses contradicted him, and the beit din said to him, "Go out and give to him," and he went out and returned and said, "I have paid," and there are no witnesses contradicting him, he takes a shevuat hesset that he paid him and is exempt. And even with "Go out and give to him," he is only established as a liar when they said that he certainly did not pay, for example, that their hands did not move from his hand, as has been explained. But if they did not say so, but rather said that he claimed it before them and he did not pay him, we do not say that presumably afterwards he also did not pay him, for there is no proof, as it is possible that then he did not have with what to pay and afterwards he paid him, and he is believed with an oath to say, "I have paid." And the Rambam, of blessed memory, wrote [Chapter 7 of Toen]: Therefore, the experts of mind in Spain used to do, when the borrower would admit to the lender or when he was found liable for an oath in beit din, the plaintiff would say to him before beit din or before witnesses, "Be witnesses for me that he shall not pay me or shall not swear to me except in the presence of witnesses," and then he would not have the ability to claim, "I have paid" or "I have sworn." And that which we said, that he is believed to say "I have paid," this is specifically when he accepted the judgment from beit din to fulfill according to the command of the beit din. But if he went out from before beit din in refusal and the beit din rebuked him, he is not believed afterwards to say, "I have paid." And the beit din writes a document of liability for the lender even without the knowledge of the borrower, and we do not fear that perhaps he will pay him and he will return and claim it from him with it, for since he went out from before beit din in refusal, he certainly will not pay him unless his mind settles upon him and he comes once more to beit din to ask, and then the beit din will tell him that they gave his plaintiff a document of liability, and automatically he will not pay him until he takes from him his document of liability. And the lender collects with this document even from purchasers who bought afterwards from the borrower, for every act of beit din has a voice. And so too, one who accepted before beit din to pay his fellow, and afterwards came and said, "I remembered that he also owes me according to what is due to him," he is not believed, for if it were so, he would not have accepted upon himself in beit din to pay him. And even though he has a migo of "I have paid," nevertheless, in a place of a strong presumption such as this, he is not believed with a migo. However, if he shows to the beit din proofs that previously he did not know of this debt, or that due to a reason he forgot it and now it became known to him, the beit din accepts his words, and everything is according to the matter.