Siman 359

It is forbidden to rob or to withhold wages even in the slightest amount, whether from an Israelite or from an idolater, as has been explained in siman 348. And if it is a matter regarding which there is no one who is particular, it is permitted, such as taking from a fence or from a bundle to pick one's teeth. And even regarding this, it is stated in the Yerushalmi [Demai, chapter 3] that from the attribute of piety one should be concerned even for this, for the reason that if everyone were to do so, they would destroy the fence. And in our days, it is the custom that when one comes to the house of his fellow and his fellow is inhaling bitter leaves [tobacco] in his nostrils or in his mouth, that he also takes without asking the owner; and similarly to take sulfur sticks [matches] to light with them; and similarly when they drink hot water from an antichi with sweets, he takes a flask and drinks as well, for the reason that people are not particular about this. However, from the attribute of piety it is certainly proper to be careful, and all the more so when he knows that the owner is a particular man, then it is forbidden by the letter of the law. And similarly, one must be careful when a guest comes to the house of Reuven and he honors him, and in the meantime Shimon, who is not a guest, arrives, and out of etiquette Reuven asks Shimon to drink and eat—if he does not know clearly that his desire is sincere, he should distance himself from this. And similarly in all such cases. And see what I have written in siman 228.

It is forbidden to steal even on the condition of paying for a more beautiful object than the stolen item, as it is written: "If the wicked restores the pledge, pays for the robbery," even though he pays for the robbery, he is called "wicked." This is so even if his intention from the outset is to pay. Some say that this is specifically if the payment is not currently present, but when it is present and is more valuable and more beautiful than the object he is taking from him, and it is known to him that the owners would sell the object he is taking—that the object is not designated for his household use [Tur]—it is permitted, for it is a benefit to the owners; and he should grant ownership of the other object to the owners through another person, for one may acquire a benefit for a person in his absence. It is a simple matter that if the owners are present and protest against him, it is forbidden for him to do so even in such a case. Likewise, if the beautiful object is not currently present, it is forbidden for him to do so in his absence, for at the moment he is a thief, and furthermore, perhaps the beautiful object will not come into his hand. If the object is for household use, it is forbidden for him to do so without the knowledge of the owner in any case, for perhaps his current usage is more pleasing to him than the more beautiful exchange. And even in all the details where their permission was explained, he should not do so except for a great need, in a manner where we are witnesses that it is pleasing to the owners [Taz].

Anyone who robs his fellow, even of the value of a perutah, it is as if he takes his soul, as it is said: "So are the ways of everyone who is greedy for gain; it takes away the life of its owners." And even one who takes as a loan without the knowledge of the owners is called a gazlan. And even if he is in danger and comes to rob his fellow in order to save his life—for he is permitted to do so because of pikuach nefesh—nevertheless, he must not take it except on the condition to pay. But when he takes on the condition not to pay, he is a gazlan, for it is forbidden to save oneself with the property of his fellow even in a place of danger if he does not intend to pay.

It is forbidden to practice deception regarding theft, such as one who goes to a shopkeeper and says that his desire is to buy fruit, and he tastes a bit of them and makes himself appear as if he cannot agree with him on the price, and afterwards he also goes to the second and the third and does so; behold, this person is a thief. Except for one matter which the sages, of blessed memory, permitted because of danger: that if one let blood and his cure is to drink wine, and his hand cannot afford to buy it and he is ashamed to ask for it for free, he should take a coin that is not good and go to a wine seller and taste a bit, and afterwards go to the second and the third and more, and they will not agree to sell to him for this coin, and in the meantime he will drink a revi'it of wine [Shabbat 129a].

One who seizes a mashkon from the hand of his fellow who owes him money, since he acted without the permission of the beit din, he is a gazlan even though the fellow owes him; and it goes without saying if he entered the house of the borrower and took a mashkon from him, as written in siman 90. And every gazlan is disqualified from testimony and from an oath, as written in siman 34, except for one who takes a mashkon without the permission of the beit din, because it is not perceived by people as a prohibition. And even this is only when seizing in the marketplace from the hand of the borrower, but if he entered his house to take a mashkon from him, he is disqualified, for it is an explicit verse: "You shall not enter his house to take his pledge," and presumably every am ha'aretz knows of this prohibition. However, if it is known that the lender does not know this prohibition, he is not disqualified [Beit Yosef and Shach, and that which was questioned against him is settled].

It is written: "You shall not oppress and you shall not rob." What is oppression and what is robbery? Robbery is when one takes a person's money or his objects from his hand or from his domain by force, such as if he snatched from his hand, or entered his fellow's domain against the owner's will and takes from there money or the equivalent of money, or if he seized his fellow's slave or his animal and performed work with them or made use of them, or if he went down into his fellow's field and ate the fruit or took them, and anything similar to this; when one takes from the outset with violence, this is a robber.

And what is oshek? This is when the money of his fellow comes into his hand with the owner's consent, and once he demanded that he return his money, he suppressed it in his hand and did not return it; for example, if his fellow held a loan or wages and he demands it from him, and he has it but cannot extract it from him because he is a violent and difficult person. And our sages, of blessed memory, said that one who commits oshek regarding the wages of a worker also violates the negative commandment of "do not rob" [Bava Metzia 61a]. And see what I wrote in siman 339.

It is written "do not covet" and "do not desire," and the intention is not regarding the desire of the heart alone without an action. We derive this from what is written in Parshat Ekev, "do not covet the silver and gold that is on them and take it for yourself," for the prohibition of "do not covet" applies specifically when one performs an action [Mekhilta]. And even though it is of the measure of piety not to covet at all, even in the heart, that which belongs to one's fellow, nevertheless, one does not transgress the prohibition of "do not covet" except when performing an action. Regarding the prohibition of "do not desire," even though desire is in the heart, nevertheless, one does not transgress by the desire of his heart alone unless he calculates in his heart how to obtain it from his fellow; and once he concludes this matter in his heart, he transgresses "do not desire." And the proof that desire is not in the heart alone is that regarding the complainers, when they desired meat, the Torah called them "the people who desired," and they indeed exerted effort to bring about their desire; and such is the prohibition of "do not desire."

This is the wording of the Rambam in the first chapter of Laws of Robbery: Anyone who covets the slave or the maidservant or the house or the vessels of his fellow, or anything that it is possible for him to purchase from him, and he pressured him with friends and entreated him until he took it from him, behold, he violates "do not covet." And anyone who desires the house or the wife or the vessels of his fellow, and anything similar to this, once he thought in his heart how he might acquire this thing and his heart was enticed by the matter, he violates the negative commandment of "do not desire," and desire is only in the heart. Thus far his words. And so wrote the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch.

And that which he wrote, "anything that it is possible for him to acquire from him," it appears to me that he intended that which they expounded in the Mechilta: "'Do not covet' is a general statement; 'house, field, manservant, maidservant, ox, and donkey' is a specification; 'and all that belongs to your fellow' returns and generalizes. Thus, it is a general statement, a specification, and a general statement: just as the specification is something that one acquires and transfers, so too the general statement is something that one acquires and transfers." Thus far his words. And the explanation of the matter appears to be that if Reuven learned some wisdom or some craft, and Shimon coveted this wisdom or this craft in his heart and exerted effort and increased friends upon Reuven until he taught him—I might have said that this too is included in the general prohibition of "do not covet." For this, the Torah excluded it, specifically to something that is subject to acquisition, for when it is with Reuven it is not with Shimon; this excludes wisdom and craft, which are not subject to acquisitions. [See Sma subsection 18, and in the Tur the version is thus.]

They further expounded in the Mekhilta there: Just as the specific detail is explicitly stated regarding something that does not come into your possession except with the consent of the owner, so too everything that is impossible to come into your possession except with the consent of the owner; this excludes where you covet his daughter for your son or his son for your daughter [so it should be said]. And the explanation of this appears to be that this is certainly when a person desires to marry an unmarried woman with a chupah and kiddushin, which is permitted, for she is not the "wife of your fellow." However, regarding inciting the father of the daughter to betroth his daughter to his son, or inciting him to command his son to betroth his daughter, I might have said that this is included in "and all that belongs to your fellow," for the sons and daughters belong to their father and they are also subject to acquisitions, as a woman is the acquisition of her husband. For this, the Torah excluded it, because this does not require the consent of the owners; for if his son desires to betroth her with her consent, he does not require the consent of the father. And similarly, if his daughter agrees to receive kiddushin, she does not require the consent of her father. And even regarding his minor daughter who is in the possession of the father, nevertheless, when she grows up she is no longer in his possession, and it is not similar to lands and movables which are forever in the possession of the owners [see Arachin 28a].

Desire leads to coveting, and coveting leads to robbery; for if the owners did not wish to sell, even though he increased the price for them and entreated through friends, he will come to robbery, as it is said: "And they covet fields and rob them" [Micah 2]. And if the owners stood before him to save their property or prevented him from robbing, he will come to bloodshed; go and learn from the incident of Ahab and Naboth. Thus you have learned that one who desires violates one negative commandment, and one who acquires through the entreaty that he entreated the owners violates two negative commandments; therefore it is said: "Do not covet" and "Do not desire." And if he robbed or stole after the exertion, he violates three negative commandments [and with this one may answer the difficulty of the Tosafot in Bava Metzia 61a, s.v. "la'avor," and examine it carefully].

Regarding the prohibition of "do not covet," one is not disqualified from testimony or from an oath, for "do not covet" is understood by people as referring to taking without payment, as I have written in siman 34. And know that from the words of the Rambam that we brought, it is explained that one violates the prohibition of "do not covet" even when he gave money and the seller consented. Therefore, a person should be careful not to purchase from someone other than a shopkeeper, unless the seller requests of him that he purchase [see Tosafot Sanhedrin 25b, s.v. "Me'ikara"].

Since the matter of the prohibition of "do not covet" has been explained, it is understood automatically that all the more so one who coerces his fellow to sell his property and gives him its value, it is a Torah prohibition, and this is a "chamsan." Nevertheless, to disqualify him for testimony and for an oath, he does not have the status of a "gazlan" to be disqualified by Torah law, but rather by rabbinic law, as is written there. And for the prohibition of "do not covet," he is not disqualified even by rabbinic law, for the reason that has been explained [and see there in Sanhedrin].