Siman 126

The sages enacted that if Reuven had money in the hand of Shimon and wishes to transfer them to Levi, he can transfer ownership to Levi with mere words without any formal kinyan, provided only that the three of them are together. When Reuven says to Shimon, "The maneh that I have in your hand, give it to Levi," Levi acquires it immediately, and none of them can retract, as will be explained. And why did they enact thus? Because of the "enactment of commerce," for sometimes a person needs money in the marketplace to pay for merchandise he purchased, and there is not sufficient time to perform formal kinyanim; they enacted that he may transfer it in the presence of the three of them and transfer ownership to whomever he wishes with mere speech. The sages said that this kinyan is a "law without a stated reason," for we do not find anything similar to this where there is an acquisition through words alone, but the reason for the enactment is because of the reason we explained (Tur). In all metaltelin as well, the presence of the three of them applies, and similarly with shtarot, as will be explained. However, regarding lands and slaves, this enactment does not apply, as they are not common in loans and deposits and are always in the domain of the owners; but regarding other animals, this law applies [it appears to me]. There is no difference in this whether he had a loan or a deposit in Shimon's hand, or other types of obligations, even if he held a fine that the beit din had fined him (Shach), or if he obligated himself to give him a gift and he had already acquired it through some kinyan. Even if he had a loan by shtar against Shimon and did not hand over the shtar to Levi, Levi nevertheless acquires the body of the debt through the presence of the three of them (ibid.). Even if the time for payment has not yet arrived, he can transfer them through the presence of the three of them, since in any event, when the time arrives, he will have money with him (ibid.). However, regarding a matter that might never come to be—such as a woman who transfers the right of her ketubah to someone in the presence of the husband and the recipient—he does not acquire it, for it is possible that he will not divorce her and she will die first, and it will not come to the collection of the ketubah. Similarly, if Reuven had Shimon's merchandise, and Reuven is entitled to a maneh from the merchandise, and Shimon said to Reuven in the presence of Levi, "Whatever the merchandise is worth more than a maneh, give to Levi," and it is not known now that the merchandise is worth more than a maneh, it is not acquired through the presence of the three of them even when it turns out to be more than a maneh, since it was possible that it would not be; but if it is known that it is worth more, he can transfer ownership (ibid.). Likewise, there is no difference in what manner he gives to Levi, whether as a gift, or as payment of a debt, or for merchandise he purchased from him, or if he is lending the money to Levi. Even though the reason for the enactment was only because of the "enactment of the marketplace," nevertheless the rabbis did not differentiate. This is specifically when the giver removes himself from the money; but if he gives them to Levi so that he may buy merchandise for him, they did not enact the presence of the three of them in this, for the money is still his and Levi is nothing more than his agent, and they only enacted it when the money leaves his domain entirely for the time being. Therefore, if he deposits it with Levi and commanded Shimon, "The money I have in your hand, give it to Levi and he shall guard it," the presence of the three of them does not apply to this. But regarding a loan, the presence of the three of them applies, for a loan is given to be spent and for the time being it leaves his domain entirely (Ketzot HaChoshen); and some disagree regarding a loan (Urim VeTummim and Netivot HaMishpat). Regarding the matter of kiddushin, if she is betrothed through the presence of the three of them, there is a dispute, and it was explained in Even HaEzer, siman 28; see there.

Ma'amad sheloshtan effects a transfer even against the will of the borrower or the bailee; for even if he did not consent to give to this person whom the lender or the depositor commanded, he must give them to him against his will, as this enactment was for the benefit of the giver due to the "enactment of the market." However, there are those who disagree on this, [holding] that it is not acquired against his will, and if the borrower or the bailee says, "I will only deliver to you," the right is in his hand, and the enactment was only when all three consent to this (Shach). And even according to this opinion, this is specifically when he did not accept it upon himself, but if he remained silent, Levi has acquired (Urim VeTumim).

When Reuven said to Shimon, "The maneh of mine that is in your possession, give it to Levi," and it was in ma'amad sheloshtan, Levi acquires it immediately, and neither Reuven nor Shimon can retract, even if they are still occupied with that same matter. For although regarding kinyan sudar it will be explained in siman 195 that while they are still occupied with that same matter they can retract, however, in ma'amad sheloshtan, the one who is entitled immediately departs from Reuven, who authorized him to receive from Shimon, and Shimon enters in his place, and everything is completed and is not subject to retraction (Tur). And likewise, Reuven the giver cannot go back and forgive the debt to Shimon. And although one who sells a shetar chov to his fellow and then forgives it, it is forgiven, as written in siman 66—for there he only sold him the lien on his properties, and the personal lien remains still with the seller, and when he forgives him his personal lien, the lien on the properties is automatically canceled as well, as written there—but in ma'amad sheloshtan, Shimon's personal lien also left the hand of Reuven and became liened to Levi, and Reuven no longer has any right in this to forgive (Sma). And even if Levi was born after Reuven lent to Shimon, he acquires it, and we do not say that the reason for the enactment is because it is as if Shimon said to Reuven at the time of the loan, "I am liened to you and to anyone who comes by your power," for according to this, we would require Levi to have been born then, as a kinyan does not take effect for one who is not in the world. But the truth is that the enactment was only for the sake of the regulation of the market, and therefore even in such a case, Levi acquires it and Reuven cannot forgive it, even if he has other properties and there is no loss to Levi in his forgiveness (Shach). And there are those who disagree on this and hold that Reuven can forgive Shimon, for here too the personal lien remains with Reuven, unless Shimon explicitly said to Reuven at the time of the loan, "I am liened to you and to anyone who comes by your power," and he transferred it to one who was born then, for in such a case Shimon is liened to Levi from the beginning; see Shach. And the dispute regarding kiddushin depends on this (and examine it well).

In what case are these words said? When Reuven had a maneh in the hand of Shimon. But if he did not have a maneh in his hand, but rather said to him, "Give a maneh to Levi on my behalf and I will repay you," and Shimon agreed, Levi has not acquired it, and each of them may retract. For this enactment was only when Reuven had money in the hand of Shimon. And even if Shimon was a shopkeeper or a moneychanger, whom people rely upon their words, and even if Reuven always receives his needs from Shimon and afterwards settles with him, nevertheless, this is not within the enactment of ma'amad sheloshtan, not like the one who disagrees in this [our teacher, the Beit Yosef]. And even if Levi forgave Reuven, saying to him, "I forgive you and I will rely upon Shimon," he may retract as long as Levi did not acquire it through a kinyan, if Shimon also retracts. And even though forgiveness does not require a kinyan, it is a forgiveness in error, for certainly he did not forgive him if Shimon would retract. But when he acquired it with a kinyan, he cannot return to Reuven even if Shimon does not give it to him, for to this end he added a kinyan—to exempt him even if Shimon does not give it to him—for if not so, why was a kinyan necessary? And so too, if he said to him, "I exempt you entirely even if Shimon does not give to me," Reuven is exempt even if Shimon did not give to him, for forgiveness does not require a kinyan [Bach and Shach]. And so too, if Shimon does not retract, Levi cannot retract in any case [Shach]. And Shimon may retract; even if he paid Levi part of the debt, he may retract from the remainder. And what he gave to Levi, or if he paid him in full, he goes back and collects from Reuven since he gave based on his word, for he is no worse than a guarantor. And specifically if he gave to Levi before Reuven retracted, but if he gave to him afterwards, he has nothing against Reuven, and he shall claim from Levi, and Levi shall claim from Reuven. For a guarantor may retract before the creditor gives to the debtor, as has been written in siman 131, and even if they performed a kinyan from him. Nevertheless, it appears to me that if Shimon accepted through a kinyan sudar that he obligates himself to give Levi such and such, that he cannot retract, and it is no worse than what was explained in siman 40, see there. And even without ma'amad sheloshtan, for behold, he liened his person to this one. And perhaps since the obligation was on behalf of Reuven, it is no better than a guarantor who can retract, and it requires further study for the law. And even though we said that Shimon can retract, nevertheless, if he has not yet retracted and Levi exempted Reuven entirely or through a kinyan, Shimon is obligated to pay Levi, for he also is no worse than an ordinary guarantor. And if it is his will to retract, let him retract before he exempted him entirely. And even without ma'amad sheloshtan the law is so, as has been written in siman 129, and even if he does not have Reuven's money in his hand [Shach, subsection 19; and what the Netivot HaMishpat, subsection 3, questioned is not a difficulty; and what our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 2, "this one who has the money in his hand etc." is not exact, and the Levush omitted this, and so it appears from Tosafot, Bava Metzia 112a, s.v. "chozer," and what the Sma wrote requires further study; and delve into this].

Reuven said to Shimon without specification in the presence of the three of them, "Give a maneh to Levi," and he did not say to him, "The maneh of mine that is in your hand, give it to Levi," and Shimon admits that Reuven has a maneh in his hand, but he says that since he did not specify "the maneh of mine that is in your hand," his intent was not for his own maneh but rather that he should lend it to him—his words are of no consequence, for the matter is unspecified, his intent was for his own maneh, and Levi has acquired it. And some say that he has not acquired it, for since this enactment is a law without a stated reason, we have only that which the sages, of blessed memory, explicitly specified, where he said, "The maneh of mine that is in your hand." But when he did not mention this, it is like a guarantor not at the time of the giving of the money, who is not obligated in his guarantee [Sma]. And regarding a moneychanger or a shopkeeper, even according to this opinion he has acquired it, for with these, their unspecified statements are like explicit ones [Urim VeTumim], for aside from this, there is one who holds that regarding a moneychanger or a shopkeeper he is always liable even if his money was not with him at all. And although we do not rule accordingly, as was written in the previous section, nevertheless in such a case it is obvious that he is liable. However, if he said explicitly, "Lend me a maneh and give it," even according to the first opinion and even regarding a moneychanger or a shopkeeper, and even if his money was with him, he has not acquired it [Shach]. And some say further that when Reuven had more than a maneh in Shimon's hand and said to him without specification, "Give a maneh to Levi," he has acquired it even according to the "some say" [ibid.]. And the reason is that when he had only a maneh, it can be said that since he did not say "the maneh of mine that is in your hand," perhaps his intent was that he should lend it; but when he had more, he could not have said "the maneh of mine," for it would have implied that he has no more. Therefore, he spoke without specification, which is like specifying. And as for the fact that he did not say "from the money of mine that is in your hand," not everyone knows how to be precise in language, and he spoke without specification.

If Reuven had a kor of wheat in the possession of Shimon and said to him in ma'amad sheloshtan, "Give Levi fifty dinars in money, for I have a kor of wheat in your possession," and he agreed, and afterwards Shimon wanted to retract: if the wheat was a deposit and he specified "give him fifty dinars in money from the wheat," Levi has not acquired it, for Shimon can say, "I am not obligated to sell Reuven's wheat to pay his debts or to give his gifts." And even if Levi says, "Give me wheat worth fifty dinars," he can say to him, "Reuven did not command me to give you wheat, but rather money." But if he said to him without specification, "Give him fifty dinars from the wheat that I have in your possession," it is as if he said to him, "wheat worth fifty dinars," and he has acquired it; and the reason he did not say to him "wheat worth fifty dinars" was in order to strengthen his hand and to lien all the wheat for this [Gittin 66a], and it will be explained in siman 253. And the same law applies if he said without specification, "Give him fifty dinars, for I have a kor of wheat in your possession," it is as if he said "wheat worth fifty dinars," and he has acquired it. But if he specified that he should give him money of his own and the wheat should remain with him as a pledge, he has not acquired it [Shach]. And similarly when he said to him, "Give him fifty dinars from the wheat" [ibid.]. And all this is regarding a deposit, but if the wheat was a loan in his possession, even though he said to him "fifty dinars in money," he has acquired it, and he gives him money or wheat worth fifty dinars according to the market rate, unless the wheat is not worth fifty dinars, for then he has not acquired it at all [it appears to me]. And the reason is that since a loan is given to be spent, initially at the time of the loan he lent it to him with the understanding that he would pay him fifty dinars with whatever he would have in his possession at the time of payment, wheat or money, and initially he fixed how much the value of the wheat was. Therefore he said to him "money," and his intention was not specifically for money, for whatever he gives him as payment, the value of silver is like silver [Tur], and silver is like the value of silver; which is not the case with a deposit, where he must return that which was deposited with him.

Reuven said to Shimon, "I have a maneh in your hand, give it to Levi," and this was in the presence of the three of them, and Shimon said to Levi, "I will give it to you when I desire," and when Levi claims it from him, he says to him, "I do not yet desire," there is nothing in his words and he is obligated to give it to him at the time he was obligated to give it to Reuven, for his consent is not required at all, as has been explained in section 2. And there are those who disagree on this, for they hold like the "there are those who disagree" cited there, that it is not acquired against his will. And even according to the first opinion cited there, since he did not completely nullify the words of Reuven and Reuven remained silent, we say that Reuven consented to this [and the difficulty of the Shach in subsection 26 is resolved; see there].

Reuven claimed a maneh from Shimon, and he responded to him: "It is true, I owed you a maneh, but I paid you, for I established you with Levi and he agreed to give it to you on my behalf, and you collected part of it from him in my presence." And he brought witnesses to this, that Levi agreed to give it to him, and that Shimon said to him, "From now on, do not claim anything from me, for behold Levi will give it to you on my behalf," and Reuven remained silent then. And now Reuven says that he did not agree to collect from Levi, and that his silence then was because he did not concern himself with his words, and what he collected from Levi was from what Levi owed him, but from Shimon's debt he collected nothing. And if it is impossible to clarify whether Levi paid Reuven on behalf of Shimon or not, Shimon is obligated to pay Reuven. And he is not believed with an oath to say that he himself or another paid him, for behold he admits that he owed him a maneh, but says that he was exempted from it by establishing him with Levi and Levi agreeing to give it to him on his behalf, and he thought it was as if he paid him with this; if so, certainly he did not pay him another time. And this payment is nothing, for behold Levi did not become obligated through this, as there is no obligation of ma'amad sheloshtan here since Shimon had nothing in Levi's hand, but they are merely words, and it is like a guarantor not at the time of the giving of the money. Therefore, Shimon is obligated to pay Reuven. However, regarding Shimon's claim that Reuven collected part of the maneh from Levi in his presence, this is certainly a definite claim. And even though Levi did not become obligated by law to give to Reuven on his behalf, nevertheless, since he claims that in his presence he received payment from him, he shall swear how much the payment was that he received from Levi from that maneh, and he shall pay the remainder [Tur]. And one should not say that Reuven should swear that what he collected from Levi was from another debt and Shimon should pay him the entire maneh; for certainly if Shimon had not claimed at the time he told him that he established him with Levi, but afterwards said that he paid him himself, he would not be believed, for since he thought he was exempted from it by establishing him with Levi, it is nearly certain that he did not pay him another time since he did not claim so the first time, and he is not believed with a migo that he could have said so the first time, for we do not say a migo retroactively. But since regarding the part he claimed in one statement at the time he said he established him with Levi, and claimed then that Levi paid him the part, why should he not be believed? And even if he had claimed the first time, "I established you previously with Levi and afterwards I paid you myself," he would also be believed with a migo that he could have said only "I paid you." Therefore, he is believed regarding that part [Shach]. However, some say that since he established him with Levi, he is not believed at all to say that he paid him afterwards himself, even if he has a migo, such as when he says it in one statement; for we are witnesses that since he thought he was exempted from it, he would not pay him again himself, unless he says, "I established him with Levi, and afterwards Reuven came and told me that Levi does not wish to give it to him as he did not become obligated at all," for in this he is certainly believed with an oath.

If it was not in the presence of the three of them when Reuven said to Shimon, "The maneh of mine in your possession, give it to Levi," and Levi was not there in that assembly, Levi has not acquired it, and Reuven may retract. It makes no difference whether it is a large gift or a small gift, and even if Levi was poor and his intention was for the sake of tzedakah such that a vow is incumbent upon Reuven, nevertheless Levi does not acquire it. Unless the money was a deposit with Shimon, in which case the poor person acquires it immediately as written in Yoreh Deah siman 258, or if he gave the money into Shimon's hand to acquire it on his behalf as written in siman 125. But regarding a loan, he does not acquire it except through ma'amad sheloshtan even regarding tzedakah, as written in Yoreh Deah ibid. Therefore, if Reuven wished to retract, he may retract, and only because of his vow is he forbidden to retract; and if he asks for absolution for his vow, the vow is released since Levi has not yet acquired it [see Urim VeTummim]. And even if he transfers it through a kinyan, it is not effective, for money is not acquired through chalifin. And if this involved other movables, if they are a deposit in Shimon's hand, it is effective if Reuven accepts a kinyan that he is transferring these movables that are in Shimon's hand to Levi. But if they are a loan, he cannot transfer them, for a loan is given for expenditure, and a person cannot transfer something that is not in his possession. And there is no way to transfer them except that Shimon, in whose hand the money or movables are, accepts a kinyan by way of admission, that he admits with a complete admission that Levi has with him such and such money or such and such movables, or that he obligates himself to give. And without a kinyan, he can say "I intended to jest," as written in siman 81 [Shach]. And when Shimon has done so, Reuven cannot retract since he acted upon his word. And specifically the admission of Shimon is effective, but the admission of Reuven is not effective since they are not in his hand. And also if he transfers it with the language of a gift, such that he says "I will give such and such movables as a gift to Levi," it is not effective, for a kinyan of "I will give" is nothing, as will be explained in siman 245. And let it not be difficult for you why the admission and obligation of Reuven should not be effective, for behold in siman 40 it was explained that a person can obligate himself; for certainly it is so if he obligates himself for such and such money to so-and-so or for such and such movables it is effective, but that he should obligate himself regarding money of a loan or movables of a loan that are in Shimon's hand is not effective. And if his desire is to obligate himself, let him obligate himself, but it shall not take effect upon what is in Shimon's hand.

Reuven said to Shimon in a ma'amad sheloshtan, "I have a maneh in your hand; give it to Levi," and Shimon puts Levi off, and therefore Levi wants to go back and claim his debt from Reuven—he cannot. For as soon as he remained silent and consented to be paid by Shimon, Reuven was exempted from him, provided there was no deception in the matter. And even if Shimon does not pay him at all, he has no claim against Reuven. And some say that certainly if Levi accepted it upon himself at the time of the act, such that he said to Reuven, "I exempt you and behold I am relying on Shimon," he cannot go back to Reuven; but if he remained silent at the time of the act, even though according to the enactment of the Sages there is no difference between remaining silent and accepting it upon himself, nevertheless, when he remained silent, there still remains upon Reuven the law of guarantee if Shimon does not pay him. This is because Levi can say to Reuven, "I acted for your benefit in that I consented through my silence to receive from Shimon to ease my debt from upon you, but I did not exempt you if Shimon will not give to me," for ma'amad sheloshtan is a matter without a logical reason [Tur], and there is no reason that the Sages should cause me a loss when I did not explicitly exempt you. And it is enough that according to the enactment I am obligated to claim from Shimon, for it is obvious that even according to this opinion he cannot claim from Reuven first as long as he can collect from Shimon, even when Levi has toil and labor in his collection from Shimon, for Reuven's status is like a guarantor, and as long as it is within the power of the lender to collect from the borrower, he is not to claim from the guarantor [Rabbi Ozer and see Shach subsection 37]. But when it is not within his power to collect from Shimon, he collects from Reuven. And even according to this opinion, this is specifically when Levi was not negligent in his claim from Shimon, but if he was negligent until Shimon became poor, he cannot go back to Reuven, for he caused the loss to himself. For this is as if Reuven showed him money in a certain place to take for his debt, and Reuven diverted his mind from this money because he relied that he would collect and take it, and he was lazy in taking it until it was lost, where Reuven is certainly exempt. And regarding a gift, this entire law is not applicable. And regarding the legal ruling, it appears like the "some say," and our teacher, the Rema, also decided according to this opinion [the Shach in subsection 38 wrote that the burden of proof is on the claimant and brought many poskim who disagree, but I did not find that they say so explicitly, and in the Rambam and Sefer Mitzvot Gadol it is not implied at all, and even the Rif in HaMekabel we can harmonize with the Rosh, and the proof is that the Rosh there did not mention that the Rif disagrees on this, and the Yerushalmi can be interpreted as referring to where he was lazy, and the Shach follows his reasoning in subsection 37, but according to what I wrote it is not so, and delve into this].

Reuven said to Shimon in the presence of the three of them: "I have a maneh in your possession, give it to Levi," and it turns out that Shimon is poor and Levi has nothing from which to collect from him—he may return and collect from Reuven because he misled him. Even if Reuven did not know that Shimon was poor, since he was poor at that time, it is an error, and even a kinyan made in error is retracted, and all the more so this enactment. Therefore, it is of no avail even if he explicitly exempted him. But if Levi knew that he was poor, or if he was wealthy at that time and afterwards became poor, his luck caused it; for when he knew he was poor, he surely reasoned and accepted it, and if he afterwards became poor, Reuven was already exempted at the time of the act. And according to the "some say" in the previous section, this law only applies when he explicitly exempted him, but without this, Reuven retains the status of a guarantor and is obligated to pay if Levi was not negligent, as has been written. And even when Levi knew that Shimon was poor, Reuven cannot say, "Surely you knew, and since you did not protest against me, it is as if you waived the debt," for Levi can say, "I remained silent because I thought perhaps Shimon would exert himself to pay little by little, and I accepted the burden upon myself, but I did not accept to lose my debt" [Shach and Urim VeTumim]. And there is one who says that when Levi said to Reuven, "Assign me to Shimon in the presence of the three of them," even according to the "some say," it is like an explicit exemption and he is removed from Reuven; and this requires further study as a matter of law.

Levi claimed that Shimon was poor and it was a mistaken transaction, and Reuven says he was wealthy and became poor—if the debt that Reuven became liable for to Levi is in a validated shtar, Reuven must bring proof even when Levi claims "perhaps," because Reuven's claim is a weak claim [Netivot HaMishpat]. And if he does not bring proof, if there is a trust clause in the shtar, Levi collects his debt without an oath. And if there is no trust clause in it, Levi shall swear an oath while holding a sacred object according to the law of those who swear and take, and he shall take. And this is specifically when Reuven says "swear to me," but the beit din does not obligate him to swear, as was written in siman 82 regarding the claim "I paid" [Shach]. And if it is written in the shtar "trustworthy as two witnesses," he always collects without an oath even if Reuven brings proof, as was written in siman 71 [ibid.]. And if it was an oral loan where Reuven is believed to say "I paid," Reuven is believed with a shevuat hesset to swear that Shimon was wealthy at that time by way of a migo of "I paid." And the same applies if there was a contradiction between them where Reuven says that Levi knew that Shimon was poor and Levi says that he did not know. Also, that which is explained in this section according to the "there are those who say" in section 10 is only when he explicitly exempted him [ibid.].

If Shimon says that he paid Levi, and Levi says that he did not pay him, even according to the "there are those who say" in section 10, and also where he did not explicitly exempt him, Levi has nothing against Reuven. Since Reuven has only the status of an arev for Shimon, and behold Shimon says that he paid him [Sma and Urim VeTumim], therefore Shimon takes a shevuat hesset and both are exempt. And there are those who say that Shimon is not believed at all, and Levi swears that he was not paid and Reuven must pay him [Shach], for even though Reuven has only the status of an arev, nevertheless the primary litigant of Levi is Reuven according to this opinion when he did not explicitly exempt him, and it was explained in siman 91, section 9; see there.

Reuven who said to Shimon, "The promissory note of mine that is in your hand, give it to Levi," and this was in the presence of the three of them, as long as Reuven did not retract, Shimon is obligated to give it to Levi. However, if Reuven retracted, he is not. And if he wrote to him that he transferred it to him and all its lien, and designated him to this one in whose hand they are deposited, he cannot retract. This law was explained in siman 66, section 35, the reasoning of the matter, and that there are those who disagree on this; see there.

If after the borrower or the bailee consented to give to the recipient, he says, "I examined my accounts and he had nothing with me, and I erred in what I admitted to him," if he can clarify with witnesses that it is so, he is exempt even according to the first opinion in section 10, since it is found to be an error from the outset. Therefore, even if he set a time for him and it is still within his time, such that he has no migo, he is exempt. And the giver is obligated to give to the recipient if he gave it to him in payment of his debt; but if it was a gift, he too is exempt, as he can say, "Had I known that I had nothing with this person, I would not have given you the gift." But if he cannot clarify the error, he is not believed to say "I erred" when he has no migo, for "I erred" is a poor claim, as a person is precise in accounting. Therefore, if he authorized him in the presence of witnesses and also set a time for the recipient to give it to him at a known time, and it is still within his time, such that he is not believed to say "the matter never occurred" or "I paid," he is not believed in this claim of "I erred." And "I was teasing you," it is obvious that he cannot claim even when he did not authorize him in the presence of witnesses, because ma'amad sheloshtan is like a kinyan, and in a kinyan a claim of teasing is not applicable, as I wrote in siman 81. Furthermore, it is not relevant that he would tease Levi, for he does not know if it is not due to him from Reuven [Shach]. Similarly, he cannot claim a claim of "not to sate" [Sma]. But "I erred" he can claim when he did not authorize him with witnesses or if it is after his time, with a migo of "the matter never occurred" or "I paid," and he takes a hesset oath that he erred and is exempt. And the law returns between the giver and the recipient: according to the latter opinion in section 10, he returns and collects from the giver if it is a debt or a deposit; and according to the first opinion, the loss is to the recipient, for the giver has already been removed from him, and he only needs to swear to the recipient that he had it in the hand of this person, but that he denied it now and swore falsely [Tur]. And even though the recipient does not have a claim of certainty against the giver, for he does not know if it was not his in the hand of the one who took it upon himself, nevertheless, since he was supposed to receive from the hand of the one who took it upon himself and the other claims with certainty that he erred, we join his "perhaps" and it is like a claim of certainty [Shach]. And all the more so since this one swears that he erred, and the like of this was explained in siman 121. And there is one who says that when he admitted in the presence of witnesses, he is not believed to say "I erred" even when he has a migo of "I paid," such as when he did not set a time for him or it is after his time, because it is a migo in the place of witnesses, for it is not common that he would err; rather, on the contrary, a person is very precise when he admits in the presence of witnesses. Our teacher, the Rema, decided according to this opinion. And specifically when he admitted in the presence of witnesses, but not in the presence of witnesses, he can say "I erred," because not in the presence of witnesses it is possible that he was not so precise. And even if he gave him his handwriting, he is believed to say "I erred" with a migo of "I paid." And there is one who says that regarding handwriting he is not believed to say "I erred" [the Ri Ibn Lev]. And there is one who says that when the entire writing is his, he is not believed to say "I erred," but when the writing is of another and only the signature is his, he is believed to say "I erred" [Urim VeTummim], for with the signature alone he can still say that he signed his name for another matter and he wrote above it; but when the entire writing is his, certainly a person does not write an obligation upon himself unless he was very precise. And so it is proper to rule.

If the giver admits that the one who accepted responsibility erred, and the recipient does not know if he erred or not: if he gave it to the recipient for a debt, if the giver has assets from which the recipient can collect, the giver is believed to say that he erred; for since he only causes a loss to himself by his admission, it is simple that he is believed. But if he does not have assets, or if he is a violent person and the second party is easier to collect from, he is not believed if this one who accepted responsibility is not believed without the admission of the giver according to what I wrote in the previous section. And even if there is one witness who testifies to the error, it is nothing. And even though it was explained in siman 84 that when one witness testifies that it is paid he only collects with an oath, that is when he is able to swear; but this recipient does not know at all and takes without an oath, for this oath is not from the Torah such that we would apply the law of "since he cannot swear, he pays." And even according to the poskim who say "since he cannot swear, he loses," that is specifically when it is relevant to this oath because he should have known; but this recipient did not have to know at all, and behold, even regarding "since he cannot swear, he pays" this reasoning was explained in siman 75, and all the more so regarding "since he cannot swear, he loses" [so it appears to me, and see Urim VeTummim]. And some say that when the giver has assets and there is one witness, they are like two witnesses to exempt the one who accepted responsibility; for when he does not have assets, the giver is like one with an interest in the testimony, for perhaps they made a conspiracy, but when he has assets, he has no interest at all [Shach]. And if the giver gave a gift to the recipient, even when the giver has assets and is not a violent man, he is not believed at all, even when there is one witness; for in a gift, he will not be required to give to the recipient even if the one who accepted responsibility does not give to him. Therefore, if this one who accepted responsibility is not believed on his own by the reasoning of migo, he must give to the recipient, and he will go back and collect from the giver since he admitted to him that he erred and through his causation he was forced to give to the recipient, and this is not like gerama but like garmi. And some say that this is only gerama, for what is he liable for in this? And more so, this one who accepted responsibility should have been more precise, and therefore it is only gerama and he is exempt [Shach], and so appears to be the primary view. But when the giver paid a debt to the recipient, certainly he must pay this one who accepted responsibility when he paid the recipient, for in any case he must pay the debt, and since he admitted that he does not have it in his hand, behold he must pay from his own.

If the recipient admits that the one who accepted the obligation upon himself erred in his calculation—meaning the recipient says that he knows the calculation between them and knows that this person erred, but the giver does not admit this—the one who accepted the obligation is exempt without an oath. For immediately when he accepted upon himself to give to the recipient, the giver was removed from him and his legal standing is with the recipient, and behold, he admits to him that he erred. And even according to the opinion of the "some say" in section 10, that he can return to the giver when this person did not give to him, nevertheless here he cannot return to him, since he himself caused this through his admission, the giver is removed from his obligation [our teacher, the Beit Yosef]. And he only swears to the recipient that he does not know of the error, unless he himself would have been believed to say that he erred, such as if he has a migo, as has been explained. And some say that according to this opinion he can return to the giver, for this is not considered "causing" by saying the truth, as he can say to the giver: "Should I speak a lie for your sake?" And he is not exempted from him unless he exempted him explicitly; but without this, he collects from the giver, and the giver turns back and collects from the one who accepted the obligation upon himself, since he does not believe him that he erred and he does not have a migo. And if it is because the recipient says that he erred, behold, he is only like a single witness, and the giver shall swear a rabbinic oath to contradict the witness and will collect [Shach]. And this is specifically when he became obligated to him for his debt or his deposit, but if it was a gift, he is exempt without an oath, for it was a gift in error, even if the giver also admits that he erred, as has been explained.

Reuven said to Shimon, "I have a maneh in your hand, give them to Levi," or if he said to him plainly, "Give a maneh to Levi," and it was in ma'amad sheloshtan and he began to give to him, and afterward he said that he erred in his accounting and owes nothing to Reuven, and he has a migo of "I paid," or if it was without witnesses—nevertheless, what he gave, he gave, and he cannot extract it back. For from the side of the migo he is only believed not to give, but not to extract what he already gave. And some say that even if he clarifies the error by way of witnesses, he cannot extract what he gave, for when he comes to extract we say that certainly even beforehand he scrutinized well that it was not due to Reuven, and despite this he took it upon himself and now wishes to retract, and regarding this the witnesses cannot testify that beforehand he did not know [Bach and Urim VeTumim]. And some say since he clarifies the error with witnesses, reason dictates that he erred beforehand and thought that he owed him [Shach], for it is not common to promise what is not in his hand. And it seems to me to decide in this law that when he said, "I have a maneh in your hand, give them to Levi," and he took it upon himself, certainly he erred and thought that Reuven had it in his hand, and he can extract what he gave. But when he said plainly, "Give a maneh on my behalf to Levi," he cannot extract it from his hand [and also the Bach admits to this, for in the source of the law in the Responsa of the Rosh it does not deal with such a case, see there and examine carefully].

If at the time Reuven established Levi with Shimon through ma'amad shel sheloshtan, Shimon was indebted to Reuven and accepted upon himself to give to Levi, and afterwards the obligation was nullified—for example, if Shimon leased a certain lease from Reuven with a complete kinyan to pay him at a certain time, and during this time he accepted upon himself through ma'amad shel sheloshtan to give to Levi, and afterwards the business was nullified by Shimon's will—he is obligated to pay Levi what he accepted upon himself. Since at the time of the acceptance he became obligated, he cannot cause Levi a loss through his retraction, and he shall return to claim from Reuven. And some say that even if it was not nullified by Shimon's will but rather due to some other reason, even if the nullification was against Shimon's will, nevertheless he is obligated to give to Levi [Shach]. Since at the time of the ma'amad shel sheloshtan he became obligated, he has no exemption against Levi, and he shall claim from Reuven. And there is no difference whether that which Reuven gave to Levi was a debt or a gift [and what is written in the Shulchan Aruch, section 17, is not precise, and the case was thus, and examine carefully].

If the obligation that Shimon owed Reuven was due to rental fees for a house or an object he rented from Reuven for a known sum per day for as long as he would need, and Reuven was indebted to Levi for one hundred dinarin and established him with Shimon through ma'amad sheloshtan, and Shimon was only obligated fifty dinarin from the rental because he did not need the house or the object further: if at the time he established him he did not mention the nature of his obligation at all and accepted it upon himself without specification and said to Levi, "The one hundred dinarin that I have belonging to Reuven, I will give to you," or if Reuven said to Shimon, "The one hundred dinarin that I have in your hand, give to Levi," and Shimon remained silent and accepted it upon himself; and even if Shimon said, "The one hundred dinarin that I owe Reuven from the rent of the house or the object, I will give to you," or if Reuven said to him, "The one hundred dinarin from the rent of the house or the object that I have in your hand, give to Levi," and Shimon remained silent, he is obligated to give them to Levi. Since he admitted that he is indebted to Reuven, it is not in his power to say, "I relied on what I was destined to use for more time," for since he admitted it, he became obligated immediately to Levi by his admission [Tur]. And similarly, if he rented from him for a year and accepted upon himself at the beginning of the year through ma'amad sheloshtan the rent of the entire year, he is obligated to pay Levi. But if at the time he accepted upon himself to give to Levi, he said to him that this is for the rental that he became obligated to Reuven and told him the nature of his obligation—such as that he rented from him without a set time and his intention was to use it further, or that he rented from him for a year and it is now a half-year that he has been using it, and Levi admits to this—he is not obligated to Levi at all. And it is not only regarding that which he was not yet obligated to Reuven at the time of his establishing him that he does not need to give, but even what he was obligated for from the past time he also does not need to give to Levi, for rental is not payable except at the end, which is when he returns the house or the object to him or when the time they established concludes. Therefore, since Levi knew that Shimon did not have Reuven's money, neither as a loan nor as a deposit, but only this obligation of rental, and he was not yet obligated by law to pay, his establishing him is nothing. And there are those who disagree on this, for although it is not payable except at the end, nevertheless the obligation takes effect upon him immediately, only that the time for payment has not yet arrived; and it has already been explained that ma'amad sheloshtan is effective even when the time for payment has not arrived [Shach]. Therefore, if he set a time for his rental, he must pay Levi for the entire time, and if he did not set a time, he must pay according to the sum he was obligated until he returns the house to Reuven. And this is the primary rule [Urim VeTummim] [and proof for this is from Tosafot Bava Metzia 79b, starting with the words "You do not find etc." even though it is not payable etc. and examine it carefully].

Reuven transferred to Levi a maneh that he has in the hand of Shimon via ma'amad sheloshtan, and Shimon provided a guarantor to Levi at the time of the standing; the guarantor becomes obligated for Shimon even without a kinyan on the guarantee, for this is like a guarantor at the time of the giving of money who becomes obligated through speech alone, as I wrote in siman 129. And this standing is like the time of the giving of money, since he becomes obligated to him through this standing. And there is one who disagrees in this, that it is not comparable to a guarantor at the time of the giving of money, for the borrower actually extracted money from the lender based on his guarantee, but here, even though Shimon became obligated to Levi, nevertheless Levi did not actually extract money then; and therefore the guarantee is not effective without a kinyan, for it is like an asmakhta. And the primary rule in law is according to the first opinion [Shach].

Reuven had a maneh in the possession of Shimon and requested of Levi to receive his money from Shimon, and he went with Levi to Shimon and said to him: "The maneh that I have in your possession, give it to Levi," and he did not mention to Shimon that Levi is only his agent, but rather he transferred it to him via ma'amad sheloshtan. Afterwards, when Levi came to receive the money from Shimon, Shimon said to him: "Behold, the money is now yours, because Reuven transferred it to you via ma'amad sheloshtan; therefore, I am withholding it for a debt that is owed to me from you." If Levi admits that he owes Shimon, the law is with Shimon, for even though in truth Levi was only an agent of Reuven, nevertheless, since he transferred it to him without specification via ma'amad sheloshtan, Shimon can withhold it for his debt, and Reuven shall claim from Levi. But if Levi does not admit to Shimon regarding the debt, Reuven does not have the power to claim from Levi, for Levi was not negligent at all, and Reuven brought the negligence upon himself by not informing Shimon that Levi is only an agent. But now, Shimon can say: "I do not believe you that he is your agent; rather, I say that you transferred it to him completely via ma'amad sheloshtan because of a debt you owed him, or you gave it to him as a gift, and I am the possessor and withhold it for my debt." Therefore, Shimon swears a shevuat hesset that it is owed to him from Levi and is exempt, and Levi accepts a kabbalah upon himself that it is not owed from him to Shimon, and Reuven loses his money. And if Levi occasionally engages in the business affairs of Reuven, Reuven can administer to him a severe oath like the oath of a ben habayit that it is not owed from him to Shimon [Urim VeTumim]. And if Reuven has witnesses that Levi is only his agent, Shimon does not have the power to withhold from Levi even when Levi admits that it is owed from him to Shimon. But when there are not two witnesses here, Reuven is not believed with an oath that Levi is only his agent, for one does not extract money with an oath except in places where the sages instituted it. And even if there is one witness, there is no power to extract from Shimon based on one witness, and Shimon cannot swear to deny the witness since he does not know, and we do not say "since he cannot swear, he must pay," since he was not expected to know, as was written in siman 75 [it appears to me from the Tur, section 23, according to the explanation of the Bach]. And if Levi had money of Reuven in his possession, and Reuven said to him: "The money in your possession, hand it over to me and I will establish you with Shimon," and he established him via ma'amad sheloshtan without specification as has been explained, and Shimon withheld it on account of Levi; if Levi admits to him, he shall return to Reuven the money in his possession, and this money was owed to Levi from Reuven for a commercial transaction, and it turns out that Reuven did not lose. And if Levi does not admit to Shimon, Shimon shall swear that it is owed to him from Levi, and Levi shall swear that money is not owed from him to Shimon, and without an oath he is not exempt since Reuven's money is in his possession and he is withholding the money, and Reuven loses as he has no one from whom to collect [this is according to the explanation of the Shach, subsection 74, in the Tur]. And if Reuven did not command via ma'amad sheloshtan to Shimon that he should give to Levi, Shimon does not have the power to withhold in any case on account of Levi, even when Levi admits and there are witnesses that he owes him, for since Levi did not acquire the money, Shimon does not have the power to withhold it on his account [ibid.], unlike the one who disagrees on this.

Ma'amad sheloshtan via the agent of the giver—for example, Reuven who sent his agent and said to Shimon in the presence of Levi: "Reuven commanded me to say to you, the maneh of his that is in your hand, give them to Levi," and Shimon accepted it upon himself—nevertheless, Levi has not acquired it. For the law of ma'amad sheloshtan is a law without a stated reason, and we do not add to the enactment; and the enactment was only regarding the giver himself and not regarding his agent. And even though a person's agent is like himself, nevertheless, in this enactment which is a novelty to acquire through mere words, we do not say so. And despite this, regarding the agent of the receiver—for example, Reuven who said to Shimon: "The maneh of mine that is in your hand, give it to Levi," in the presence of Levi's agent—it is effective and Levi acquires it. For regarding the merit of the receiver, we say a person's agent is like himself, and specifically regarding the expropriation of money from the giver we do not add to the enactment, but not regarding the merit of the receiver. And specifically when the receiver made an agent for this person who stood at the time of the act; but if he did not make him an agent, but rather Reuven said to Shimon in the presence of Yehuda: "The maneh of mine that is in your hand, give it to Yehuda so that he may acquire it on behalf of Levi," Reuven can retract even if Yehuda received the coins on behalf of Levi. Since Reuven did not say to Yehuda: "Acquire these coins on behalf of Levi," Levi did not acquire them [Shach]. And some say that when the coins reached Yehuda, Reuven cannot retract [Sma and Urim VeTumim]. But when Levi made him an agent, he acquires them, whether Reuven said to Shimon: "The maneh of mine that is in your hand, give it to Levi," or whether he said: "Give it to Yehuda, the agent of Levi," or whether he said: "Give it to Yehuda so that he may acquire it on behalf of Levi." And when he was not his agent, even though beforehand Reuven established with Yehuda that he should acquire them on behalf of Levi, and at the time of the standing he did not mention the name of Levi at all but rather said to Shimon: "The maneh of mine that is in your hand, give it to Yehuda," and his intention was that he should acquire on behalf of Levi, Levi has not acquired [Shach], not like the one who disagrees in this. And an apotropos of orphans, his law is like an agent, that he cannot transfer the orphans' money via ma'amad sheloshtan, but he can acquire on their behalf like an agent made by the receiver. And ma'amad sheloshtan via writing is not effective at all, whether Reuven wrote to Shimon: "The maneh of mine that is in your hand, give it to Levi," or whether Levi the receiver wrote to Shimon that he should receive Reuven's maneh on his behalf according to Reuven's command. For ma'amad sheloshtan is only effective if the three of them stand together, or the agent of the receiver in place of the receiver. And there is reason to doubt if the agent of the one in whose hand the money is—for example, Reuven who said to the agent that Shimon made, in the presence of Levi: "The maneh of mine that is in the hand of Shimon your sender, give it to Levi"—whether Levi acquired it or not. And reason inclines that he did not acquire it, and it requires further study [see Urim VeTumim].

There is one who says that there is no difference between an Israelite and a gentile regarding the law of ma'amad sheloshtan. Therefore, an Israelite who said to a gentile, "The maneh of mine that is in your hand, give it to Levi," in the presence of all of them, and Levi consented to this, he has acquired it and can no longer return to claim from the giver according to the first opinion in section 10, for he caused his own loss by consenting to remove himself from the Israelite. However, according to the "there are those who say" cited there, he can return to claim from the giver if he did not explicitly exempt him [Shach]. And there are those who say that even according to the "there are those who say" cited there, he cannot return to claim from the giver, for specifically when the one who accepted upon himself to give to Levi is an Israelite, and it would be within the power of the giver to claim from him when the receiver returns to claim from him, in that case we certainly say that the receiver can return to claim from the giver. But with a gentile, where the giver would not have the power to return to claim from him since by their laws he is already exempt from him, the receiver does not have the power to return to claim from the giver and is forced to collect from the gentile, for he too, by their laws, can collect from him [Taz]. And if by their laws this is not a kinyan, it appears to me that even according to the first opinion cited there, the receiver can return to claim from the giver because the giver can collect from him by their laws and the receiver cannot, unless the receiver explicitly exempted the giver, which is like a mechila and does not require a kinyan, and whether he collects from the gentile or does not collect, did he not forgive him? And similarly, if the receiver is a gentile and the giver and the one who accepted upon himself are Israelites, and he said to him in ma'amad sheloshtan, "The maneh of mine that is in your hand, give it to the gentile," the gentile has acquired it.

And so too, a gentile who said to an Israelite, "The maneh of mine that is in your possession, give it to Levi" in the presence of all of them, and the bailee or the borrower said, "So I shall do," Levi has acquired it and he must give it to him. He cannot say, "I was coerced in my admission," even if the gentile is a ruler [Tur]. And even though regarding an Israelite this is not necessary—that he accepted it upon himself by saying "So I shall do," for even against the will of the bailee he acquires—nevertheless, regarding a gentile, if the Israelite remained silent it is nothing. For it is possible that he is not liable at all to the giver, and the reason he did not explicitly protest was because he was afraid of him. But when he said "So I shall do," certainly he has [assets] belonging to him, for if not so, he would not have admitted to him, and his silence would have sufficed [Sma and Taz]. Unless the giver commanded him to admit, for then we say that because of his fear and his command he was forced to admit; not like the one who says that the statement "So I shall do" is always nothing [and the proof is from Ketubot 27b: "they do not do two things," and even though in Bava Batra 47a we say "if he had not admitted to him etc.," a robber is different].

And there is one who disagrees with what was written in section 24 and holds that if the bailee or the borrower is a gentiles and the Israelite said to him, "The maneh that I have in your hand, give it to this Israelite" in ma'amad sheloshtan, the Israelite has not acquired it; for even if he had granted it to him through the gentile, he would not have acquired it, as acquisition is based on the principle of agency and there is no agency for a gentile, and ma'amad sheloshtan is no better than a complete acquisition [Tur]. And similarly, if the recipient is a gentile and the bailee or the borrower is an Israelite, and the giver is also an Israelite, and he said to the Israelite in ma'amad sheloshtan, "Give this deposit or this loan to the gentile," certainly as long as the giver has not retracted, this one may give them to the gentile; for even if he had said to him between themselves, "The maneh that I have in your hand, give it to so-and-so or to such-and-such a gentile," he must give it as long as the commander has not retracted, since he made him an agent. But if the giver retracted, the gentile has not acquired it even in ma'amad sheloshtan, for since it is a law without a stated reason, they only instituted it regarding an Israelite, and the bailee or the borrower is obligated to return it to the depositor or the lender. However, if the bailee or the borrower cannot evade the recipient, such as where by their laws he is obligated to give it to him, he shall give it to him and is exempt from the depositor or the lender, for he caused his own loss by commanding to give it to him, as he knew that he would be forced to give it to him [ibid.]. And similarly, when the bailee or the borrower is a gentile and the gentile already gave what was in his hand to the Israelite recipient, we do not remove it from his hand; for even if he had said to the gentile between themselves, "The maneh that I have in your hand, take it to so-and-so the Israelite," and the gentile gave them to him, the Israelite would acquire them, since he authorized him to act and he acted according to his words. And so too in any place where the kinyan does not take hold, if he acquired and received them, we do not remove them from him. And in siman 66, section 40, we explained the details of the laws in this matter, see there. And similarly, if the Israelite said to the gentile, "The maneh that I have in your hand, give it to so-and-so the Israelite and obligate yourself with a complete obligation to this Israelite and be exempt from me," even according to this view the recipient can extract it from the gentile, and not by reason of acquisition but because of the obligation that he obligated himself toward him [Urim VeTummim, and this is what was written in the Shulchan Aruch, section 22, "and you shall vow to him"]. And similarly, if the recipient says to the gentile, "Based on your acceptance that you accept upon yourself to give to me, I exempt this Israelite giver," the gentile becomes obligated by the law of a guarantor, and the recipient can no longer return to the giver [ibid.]. And regarding an apostate in the law of ma'amad sheloshtan, some say his law is like a gentile, and some say his law is like an Israelite.

And even according to this opinion, nevertheless, regarding that which was explained in section 25, when the giver is a gentile and the recipient and the bailee or the borrower are Israelites, and the gentile commanded via ma'amad sheloshtan to give to this one, the Israelite acquires it and can extract it from the bailee or from the borrower in beit din even according to this opinion; for since the sages expropriated the money of an Israelite via ma'amad sheloshtan, all the more so the money of a gentile [Tur]. And if the gentile giver is an extortionist and took it by force from his hand before he gave it to the recipient: if it was a loan that an Israelite borrowed from the gentile, the borrower is obligated to pay the recipient as well, for he already became obligated to him through ma'amad sheloshtan, and in this case where the extortionist extorts him for his money, the second person should not suffer a loss thereby. But if it was a deposit and the extortionist entered the house of the bailee and took it by force, he is not obligated to pay the recipient, for he is nothing but his shomer just as he was the shomer of the gentile, and he is exempt from accidents according to the law of a shomer. And even if the extortionist coerced him until he brought the deposit to his house, he is exempt, and this is not like one who saves himself with the money of his fellow, since he only coerced him regarding this deposit. But regarding a loan, which is given for expenditure, it is as if he coerced him regarding other money, and a person may not save himself with the money of his fellow [Tur]; and it will be explained in siman 292 regarding a deposit and in siman 388, see there. And even if he saved the deposit from the extortionist and the extortionist took his own objects, he takes from the deposit whatever he expended and lost through this, since the extortionist came only because of the deposit. However, if he afterwards delivered the deposit to the recipient and did not deduct from him what he lost through this, he can no longer extract it from him, for in truth, even regarding what was explained that he takes from the deposit what he lost, there are those who disagree on this and it is a legal doubt, and therefore when he delivered it to the recipient he cannot extract it from his hand [Shach]. And even if he delivered the deposit to the recipient and afterwards the extortionist extorted his objects, the law is also thus [it appears to me]. And there are those who disagree even regarding a loan and hold that even if it was a loan and the extortionist coerced him to pay him, he is exempt from giving to the recipient. And the reason is that according to the law, a gentile does not have the ability to grant acquisition to an Israelite through an Israelite, for there is no agency for a gentile, and ma'amad sheloshtan is no better than a complete acquisition; rather, it was explained that nevertheless the Israelite acquired it, and this is only that if the gentile came and asked in beit din if he has the ability to retract, they tell him that he cannot retract. But when he extorted and took his own, through what did the recipient acquire such that the borrower would be obligated to pay him? And so appears to be the primary view [that which the Urim VeTummim questioned, that it would be an expropriation of his loan, I do not know; since he accepted it upon himself, his intent then was not to expropriate, and he cannot retract since the recipient acquired it via ma'amad sheloshtan, and besides this, it is not an expropriation of his loan as written in the Ketzot HaChoshen at the end of siman 128].

A woman who brings an oral loan to her husband does not require the presence of the three of them, and similarly, one who brings a document does not require writing and delivery, and this has already been explained in siman 66.