Siman 125

It is a known and agreed-upon matter that one may acquire on behalf of a person in his absence, for "acquisition on behalf of" (zekhiyah) is based on the principle of agency, as we are witnesses (anan sahadei) that it is the will of this man on whose behalf they are acquiring that the one acquiring should be his agent. Zekhiyah has more power than agency, for even for a minor, who lacks the capacity to appoint an agent, one may acquire on his behalf. It is only for a gentile that one may not acquire on his behalf, nor may he acquire on behalf of an Israelite, because he is not subject to agency at all; however, a minor is included in the category of agency when he grows up, and this will be explained in siman 243. Therefore, when Reuven says to Shimon, "Acquire this on behalf of Levi," since Shimon received that object on behalf of Levi, Levi has acquired it as if it had come into his hand, and the giver cannot retract. This applies to a gift, and all the more so to a matter that is not a gift, such as a deposit of Levi's that was deposited with Reuven, or if Levi lent to Reuven and [Reuven] said to Shimon, "Acquire this deposit or this debt on behalf of Levi," he cannot retract. There are wordings that are also like zaki, though not in all matters for reasons that will be explained in section 2; for example, if he says, "Bring (holekh) this deposit" or "Bring this debt to so-and-so," it is like zaki. Similarly, when he said, "Give (ten) this deposit" or "Give this debt to so-and-so," it is like zaki. But regarding a gift, "bring" and "give" are not like zaki, and until it comes into the hand of the recipient of the gift, he does not acquire the gift, for such is the implication of the wording "bring to his hand" and "give to his hand"—when he receives it, he shall acquire it. And even if the recipient of the gift made him an agent for receipt, and the giver said to him, "Bring to him" or "Give to him," it is not like zaki, for he uprooted the agency of the recipient and became the agent of the giver [Sma subsection 23]. However, if he said to him, "Receive (hitkabel) for him," he acquires immediately, for such is the law regarding a woman's get, as is written in Even HaEzer siman 140. Similarly, regarding "give to him" when she had made him an agent for receipt, some say there that he did not uproot her agency, and likewise regarding a gift in such a case, he acquires immediately. And some say that "give" is always like zaki, even when the recipient did not make him an agent, specifically when he gives him the object now into his hand and says to him, "Give this object to so-and-so." But if initially it did not come into his hand with the intent to acquire for this person, and afterward he said to him, "Give it to so-and-so," he does not acquire except in the presence of the three of them (ma'amad sheloshtan), as will be explained in siman 126. And even if the messenger is holding the object in his hand at the time he says to him "give," since it did not come into his hand initially for that purpose, it is not like zaki. But if he said to him, "Acquire (zakeh) this object for so-and-so," even though it did not come into his hand initially for that purpose, or even if the object was not in his hand at all at the time he said to him "acquire for him," but rather he lifted it afterward in order to acquire for so-and-so, so-and-so has acquired, even if he lifted the object not in the presence of the giver and not in the presence of the recipient. Or even if it did not come into his hand at all, but rather into his courtyard or his domain, his courtyard acquires for him even though he did not lift it for that purpose [Sma], since the giver said to him that he should acquire on his behalf and did not retract, the domain of the messenger acquires for the recipient. But if he did not say to him "zaki" but rather "ten" or "holekh," the domain does not acquire even regarding a debt or deposit; even when the deposit is lying in the courtyard of the messenger, he has not acquired, for with "ten" or "holekh" he does not acquire unless he delivers it from hand to hand [Shach subsection 28, and this is the intention of the Tur and Shulchan Arukh at the end of siman 7, and the difficulty of the Shach in subsection 32 is resolved, and that which the Shach wrote there was rejected by the Urim VeTummim, and according to what I have written it is resolved; and study this]. But if the object was in his hand previously, he acquires only with the wording "zaki," or if he receives it from him and delivers it into his hand and says to him "ten" or "holekh." And according to the first opinion, "ten" is not like zaki in a gift even when he delivers it from hand to hand, and he can retract as long as it has not reached the hand of the recipient. And regarding "holekh," according to all opinions it is not like zaki. Similarly, when he said both wordings together, "holekh" and "ten," it is not like zaki. Therefore, if he said, "Bring (holekh) a maneh to so-and-so which I am giving to him as a gift," even if he delivers the money from hand to hand, he can retract. This is specifically when the recipient is wealthy, but if he is poor and needs to receive it as charity (tzedakah), his statement to the Most High is like his delivery to a commoner, and he cannot retract. And even though charity is not like consecrated property (hekdesh) according to many poskim, nevertheless regarding this matter the vow takes effect upon him by the utterance of his mouth alone, as it is written: "That which is gone out of your lips you shall observe and do, according as you have vowed," etc. And even though with a mere statement one may request annulment of his vow, as is written in Yoreh Deah siman 258, nevertheless when he delivered it to a messenger to deliver to the recipient, he cannot annul his vow, for it is like terumah in the hand of a kohen, for which one does not request annulment [Sma and Shach]. And although there is one who is uncertain about this and holds that only when it comes into the hand of a charity collector is it like coming into the hand of the poor person, and this is similar to terumah in the hand of a kohen, but with another person it is as if it is still in the hand of the giver and he may request annulment for this; and furthermore, even this law of terumah in the hand of a kohen is not agreed upon—nevertheless, it appears to me as the primary law as I have written, for most poskim agreed that for terumah in the hand of a kohen one does not request annulment, and when he designated it for a specific poor person, the messenger is like a charity collector for this matter. And regarding a collector, even if he did not designate it for a specific poor person but rather gave it to charity, his hand is like the hand of the poor and they acquired immediately [and the difficulty of the Tummim in subsection 8 is resolved]. And with the wording "zaki," he acquires in all matters if the object is lying in the domain of the messenger; but if it is not in his domain, he does not acquire, for with what would he acquire? Even regarding a debt or deposit it is not effective. However, even if it is not now in his domain, when it comes into his domain, the domain acquires for him if the giver does not retract before then. Even regarding a gift, since he said "acquire for so-and-so," immediately when the thing comes into the domain of the messenger, the domain acquires on behalf of the recipient, even when the messenger does not say "let my domain acquire on behalf of so-and-so," for the statement neither adds nor subtracts [as is evident from Bava Metzia 10b]. And when he says, "Carry (sa) this maneh to so-and-so," "Take (tol) this maneh to so-and-so," "Let this maneh be for so-and-so," they are all like the wording "holekh" and are like zaki regarding a debt or deposit. But if he said, "Return (hachzer) to so-and-so his debt or his deposit," or "Go out and pay (tze u'fara) so-and-so my creditor," it is not like "holekh" and is not like zaki [Shach and Taz]. And some say that "hachzer" is like "holekh" [Sma and Urim VeTummim]. And the main point is like the first opinion, and this is the view of our teacher, the Rema. And when he gave the messenger a deed of gift (shtar matanah) to acquire with it for so-and-so, if the entire acquisition of the gift is via the deed, its law is like a gift; but if he acquired the gift through another act of acquisition, such as through kinyan sudar or chazakah, and the deed is only for proof, its law is like a debt, regarding which we say "holekh" and "ten" are like zaki [Netivot HaMishpat].

The reason for these expressions—"give," "go and give," "carry," and "take"—and "let it be" regarding a debt or a deposit, is that they are like "acquire on his behalf," whereas regarding a gift it is not like "acquire on his behalf." This is because a debt and a deposit, since they belonged to the acquirer previously, are easily seized on his behalf; but a gift, which he now comes to acquire, requires a clear expression [Later Authorities]. And according to the "some say" in section 1, even regarding a gift "give" is like "acquire on his behalf," because they hold that "give" is a clear expression like "acquire on his behalf," for "give" is an expression of a gift and his intention is that he should acquire this gift on his behalf. Furthermore, it appears to me regarding the reason for the distinction between the expressions, that all these expressions have two meanings: for we could say "go and give this to so-and-so and immediately acquire it on his behalf," or "go, and when it reaches his hand he shall acquire it." And since there is a doubt in the matter, we establish it upon the initial presumption. Therefore, regarding a debt and a deposit, it is in the presumption of the lender and the depositor, and regarding a gift, it is in the presumption of the giver. But when he said "return" or "go out and pay," his intention is clear that when he returns it or when he pays it, the recipient shall acquire it, for "returning" and "payment" are only called such when it has been returned and when it has been paid. And for this reason, we wrote that the primary view is like the first opinion mentioned, that "return" is not like "go and give."

From the general principles of what has been explained, we have learned regarding Reuven who owed a maneh to Shimon and said to Levi, "bring," or "give," or "carry," or "take," or "receive," or "let this maneh be for Shimon," and he handed the maneh to him: if he comes to retract and take it back from him, he cannot, for "bring" and all these expressions are considered like "acquire," and immediately when it reached the hand of the agent, he acquired it on his behalf. And even if Reuven the debtor died before he delivered it to Shimon, the heirs do not have the power to say that his agency is void because the money is theirs and they did not make him an agent, because he already acquired it through his receipt for the sake of Shimon. And likewise, if Shimon the creditor died, they shall give it to his heirs, and the debtor cannot say, "I only gave it to you so that you would deliver it to Shimon himself," for since he acquired it for Shimon through his receipt, his heirs automatically inherit from him.

And even though the debtor cannot take them back from the agent, nevertheless he is responsible for them until the money reaches the hand of Shimon or his agent, for it is impossible for them to be under Shimon's responsibility since Shimon did not make Levi an agent. And should we say that they should be under the responsibility of the agent, surely we do not have the power to obligate him more than other guardians who are not liable for unavoidable accidents. And the debtor cannot protest and say: in any case, if I am responsible for them, why should it not be within my power to take them from him? For certainly it is so, that by the law he is indeed responsible until they reach the hand of the lender or his agent, and to protest against the agency to take them back from the agent is not within his power, for he himself chose him to send through him.

And also regarding a pikadon the law is such, that the bailee is liable for responsibility, and if he comes to retract, he may not retract. However, in one matter there is a distinction between a loan and a pikadon: for in a loan, in any case he cannot retract and take it from the hand of the agent, but in a pikadon it is only specifically when the bailee was established as a denier. But without this, he can retract and take it from the agent. And the reason is that since the primary reason that the agent acquires on their behalf is because it is a benefit to them, and one may act to the benefit of a person in his absence, as has been explained; therefore, in a loan, which was given for expenditure and the loan was only for the benefit of the borrower, therefore even when the borrower is a trustworthy man, it is also a benefit to the lender to return his loan to him so that the money shall come in its entirety to his hand. But a pikadon, which the bailee is forbidden to use, and the depositor deposited it in his hand for his own benefit and trusted the bailee until such time as he should demand it from his hand, the depositor has no benefit in its return such that we should say "one may act to the benefit of a person in his absence," unless the bailee is not a trustworthy man, for then it is certainly a benefit to him. But when he is trustworthy, he has no benefit in that they should remove it from his hand; and on the contrary, it may be that it is not his will to remove it from his hand, and it is not pleasing to him that his pikadon should be in the hand of another. And granted that the bailee is permitted to send it by means of his agent at his own responsibility, for he is not obligated to return it specifically himself, nevertheless the depositor has no benefit in that it left the hand of the bailee. And therefore, he has the ability to take it from the hand of the agent, and even if the agent wants to accept upon himself all responsibility, he can receive it back if he wishes [Shach]. And if the depositor made an agent to receive it from the bailee and he delivered it to him, he cannot retract and take it from the agent, and he is also exempt from responsibility since he is the agent of the depositor. And not only that, but even in the case of "providing him an agent" which was explained in siman 121, where the bailee is not exempt from responsibility as written there, or even if he did not provide one to him either, but rather it is known that the agent is trusted by the depositor, for several times he deposited with him—and in this it will be explained in siman 291 that the bailee is exempt from responsibility for the pikadon as well—if he comes to retract and take it from his hand, he may not retract since he has removed himself from responsibility. And even if the bailee consents to accept responsibility, it is forbidden for the agent to return it to him [Sma]. And in the case of "providing him an agent," even though the responsibility is still upon him, nevertheless since the lender provided him the agent, it is certainly pleasing to him that he should receive it from his hand and it is a benefit to him, and it is like a loan. And in a gift, when he said to him "acquire," certainly he cannot retract and take it from him, for regarding a gift responsibility is not relevant. And even if he consents to receive it from the agent and to accept upon himself responsibility as well, it is forbidden for the agent to return it to him, for perhaps he will retract the gift [It appears to me].

From what has been explained, it appears to me that if the loan was also for the benefit of the lender, such as if he lent it for half-profit or the like, the law of returning in this case is like that of a deposit. And so too the opposite regarding a deposit: when the bailee is permitted to use them, such as when one deposited with him coins that are not bound, this deposit reverts to having the law of a loan, for in this case the benefit of the bailee is greater than the benefit of the depositor. And although there is room to hesitate regarding this, nevertheless, this appears to be the primary rule for the law.

If in a case where the agent was not permitted to return [the object] and he transgressed and returned it to the sender, and the sender subsequently became poor and had nothing with which to pay, the agent is liable to pay, for he was negligent in his returning. There is no distinction in this matter between a gift and a debt or a deposit, for even regarding a gift, since he acquired it on his behalf, it is his, and when he caused its loss through his negligence, he is liable to pay. However, if he was under duress to return it, such as if the sender threatened him with something that was in his power to do to him and forced him to return it to him, he is exempt, for the Merciful One exempts one under duress. And even though it is forbidden to save oneself with the money of one's fellow, as will be explained in siman 388, this is specifically when the extortionist is not coercing him regarding the money of his fellow that he should give it to him, but rather is coercing him regarding another matter and he is able to save himself by means of the money of his fellow—this is certainly forbidden. But when he coerces him regarding the money of his fellow to give it to him, and it is in his power to give it, certainly one under duress is exempt, and he is compelled to give the extortionist what he demanded from him [Shach and Taz]. And even if the creditor made him an agent to bring it to him, he is exempt [ibid.], and just as if they were taken from him by force he would be exempt, for an agent is not liable for accidents, so too when he gave them by way of duress, for it all falls under the category of duress. Therefore, there is one who says that if the agent was liable for accidents, such as if he gave him permission to use the money whereby he has the status of a borrower, he is liable even when they coerced him to return them, for he is liable for accidents [Netivot HaMishpat]. But it appears to me that this is not part of the liability of the safeguarding of guardians such that we should say he is liable for accidents, for this is not in the category of safeguarding, but rather the cancellation of the agency; and when he was under duress, his agency was cancelled. See what I wrote in section 8. And there is no distinction regarding the duress between whether it was physical duress or monetary duress [as is implied from the poskim].

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in section 1: Reuven had money in the possession of Shimon and told Levi to receive them from Shimon, and Levi went and received them. Afterward, Shimon said to Levi that he should return the money he received on behalf of Reuven because he paid him in error, and if he does not return them, Shimon will deny a debt he owes to Levi from another source. Now Levi says to Reuven: "I did not receive them on your behalf so that I should lose my own property," and he wants to return them. Reuven says that he should not return them since he already performed his agency and acquired them on his behalf. The law is with Reuven. Thus far his words. The great Acharonim questioned: what is the difference between this law and the law explained in the previous section? And in whatever you wish to answer, there is room to hesitate. There is one who says that in the previous section, where the agent is liable for accidents, it is possible to say that here it deals with a case where he gave him permission to use the money and therefore he is liable for accidents. However, from the source of the law it does not imply so, for he wrote there that the reason is because he already acquired it on his behalf, and that which Levi says, "I did not acquire it for you on the condition that I lose my own," are matters of the heart and are not words [Mordechai at the end of the first chapter of Gittin]. And it implies explicitly that were it not for the reason of "matters of the heart," he would be exempt. However, one must wonder: why are these matters of the heart? Is there no greater assessment than this, that it was not his will to lose his own property through this agency? And in a proven assessment, we do not say "matters of the heart are not words," as is written in siman 207. And it appears to me that certainly if the accident occurred to him before the completion of the agency in its entirety, he would certainly be exempt—for example, if he received from Shimon and was going to deliver them to Reuven and they seized him on the way and coerced him, he is exempt. Our teacher, the Rema, deals with a case that was after the completion of the agency, and had the agent not delayed for his own matters, he would have already delivered them to Reuven. And this is why the reason is due to "matters of the heart," for certainly it did not enter his mind that over the course of time a loss would reach him, and this is not common, and he should have made a condition; since he did not make a condition, it is "matters of the heart."

When the agent returned the money and it is still in the hand of the borrower, nevertheless, if the lender wishes, he may collect from the agent, and he [the agent] shall collect from the borrower. For since he returned it, both of them are liable for the responsibility—the borrower and the agent—and if he wishes, he collects from the borrower, and if he wishes, he collects from the agent. And even though there are those who say that when the money is still intact he should claim from the borrower and not from the agent, nevertheless, the primary law is as I have written [Shach]. And also, if the money was lost through an unavoidable accident from the hand of the borrower, the agent is liable; and even though he is exempt from accidents, nevertheless, its beginning was through negligence in that he returned it to the borrower. And there are those who exempt the agent in such a case, for just as if it were lost through an accident in his own hand he would be exempt, so too if it was lost through an accident in the hand of the borrower he is exempt. And this is not like a bailee who handed over to a bailee, for behold, the borrower is trusted by him. For only when the borrower was negligent, such as if he spent the money and became impoverished, is it complete negligence on the part of the agent and he is liable; but when they were lost through an accident from the borrower, the agent is exempt, and the lender has nothing to claim except from the borrower [Urim VeTummim].

If the agent of the debtor said to the creditor, "Here is your money that so-and-so sent to you for your debt in my hand, but I wish to withhold them for a debt that I have against you," if the creditor admits to the agent that he owes him and he has no other assets from which the agent could collect his debt, and the time for his loan has arrived, the creditor has no power to protest against the sender and say, "You have caused the loss of my money by delivering them into the hand of one from whom I cannot extract it." For the sender may say to him, "Even if they were still in my hand, the beit din would extract them from my hand by the rule of Rabbi Nathan, since you have no other assets," as has been explained in siman 86. However, if he has other assets, the sender compels the agent to deliver them to the creditor, and the agent then returns and collects them from the creditor for his debt; for as long as he has not given them to him, the sender is not discharged from the debt. And even though the agent has a migo against the creditor, in that he could say, "I paid you," nevertheless, now the legal dispute is not between the agent and the creditor, but between the agent and the debtor; and against the debtor he has no migo of "I returned them to you," for he is not supposed to return them to the debtor, as has been explained. Therefore, if he truly has a migo against the debtor, such as if he delivered them to him without witnesses and could claim "the matter never occurred," he need not return them to the creditor [Sma]. And one cannot say that he always has a migo of "they were lost by accident," for this is not a good migo since an accident is uncommon; and granted that if he claimed it he would be believed, nevertheless it is not a good migo, as with orphans in siman 108 [and the difficulty of the Taz is resolved]. And even though the lien of Rabbi Nathan applies even when the first debtor has assets, as has been explained in siman 86, and at any rate it is no worse than a full guarantor, and behold, even at the end of siman 105 it was explained that when a bailee returned to one to whom the depositor is indebted that he is exempt, nevertheless here he is obligated to return. For certainly, if the debtor of his own volition had done so, what he did is done; but without his consent, beit din does not force him to do so in a case where he has some loss, as has been explained there. Therefore, the debtor is able to say that he has a loss in this, in that the creditor is angry with him, "and you have no damage, for you will return and collect from him; therefore I can compel you to return to the creditor." And beit din is not obligated to enter into the depth of the matter of whether damage will reach him from this or not, since for the agent there is certainly no damage. Therefore, if according to the sight of the judges the agent will not be able to collect from the creditor when he returns it to him, such as if he is a violent person or the like, the debtor has no power to compel him to return it to the creditor [so it appears to me, and that which they questioned is settled]. And if the creditor does not admit at all to the agent that he is indebted to him, and it is not in the agent's power to clarify, he is certainly obligated to give them to the creditor even when he has no other assets; and there is no distinction in this between a loan and a deposit [Shach].

And even if the sender died, if he left assets, the law is also thus, and the heirs of the sender can compel him to return them to the creditor, since the creditor is able to collect from the assets of their testator. But if he did not leave assets and the heirs are not interested parties in the matter, since he has nothing from which to collect from them, the law returns to being between the messenger and the creditor to whom they were sent. Therefore, even if the messenger received them from the sender before witnesses, since against the creditor he has a migo that he could say "I paid you" and would be believed with a shevuat hesset, he is also believed with this oath to say to him "I am seizing them for my debt that you owe me," since the sender and his heirs are not suing him. And even if the creditor does not admit that he owes him, he is believed with a migo to say that he owes him, as with all movables as will be explained in siman 133, and he swears a shevuat hesset that it is due to him from the creditor and is exempt. And there is one who disagrees with the essence of this law and holds that if the messenger comes to take possession of them because of a debt that he has against the creditor or the depositor, he cannot. And the reason is that even though "give and deliver" is like "acquire," this is regarding retraction, that the sender cannot retract from this, but the messenger is obligated to give to the one to whom it was sent, for it is as if he says "acquire for him on the condition that you give it to him or deliver it to him," and as long as he has not fulfilled his condition, they are still in the domain of the sender. And this is specifically with "give and deliver," but when he said to him "acquire," he immediately acquired for him and there is no condition here [Ktzot HaChoshen]. And also, even with "give and deliver," there is no practical difference except regarding the heirs, for even though he has a migo against the creditor or the depositor, he is obligated to give to him; but when the creditor admits that he owes him, there is no practical difference in this, for ultimately the creditor is obligated to pay him [Shach]. And all this is if there are no other debts upon the creditor or the depositor, but if there are other debts upon him and he has nothing with which to pay them all, even when the creditor admits that he owes him, they must divide among all the creditors, for since the reason is because of the lien of Rav Natan, it is liened to all the creditors equally [ibid.]. And even though with movables seizure is effective as written in siman 104, that is from the debtor himself, but not from the debtor of the debtor [Netivot HaMishpat]. And according to this, when the borrower died and did not leave assets, where the law is only between the messenger and the creditor, if he has a migo or if he admits that he owes him, his seizure is effective, for this is like a seizure from the debtor himself [it appears to me].

There is one who says that once the term of his loan has concluded and the lender is not present, the borrower can exempt himself from accidents by transferring ownership of the money to him through another person via the mechanism of "deliver" or "acquire," similar to a borrower of an object who is exempt from accidents after the term of his borrowing has concluded, as was written in siman 340. However, others disagreed with him, for it is not comparable to a borrower of an object; for regarding a borrower who returns the object itself, immediately when the term of his borrowing concludes, it is in the domain of the lender. But regarding a loan, he is always liable for accidents until he brings them into the hand of the lender or his agent, and even with "deliver" or "acquire" he is liable for their responsibility, as has been explained. Therefore, the borrower is always liable for all types of accidents, even the accident of the currency being devalued, until he returns them into the hand of the lender or his agent [Shach, subsection 8].

Reuven who said to Shimon, "Take a maneh to Levi, for I am giving it to him as a gift," and Shimon went to give them to Levi and found that he had died, he shall return them to Reuven; for "take" regarding a gift is not like "acquire on behalf of," and he only sent it to Levi and not to his heirs. And if Reuven also died, if Reuven was healthy at the time he sent it and died during the lifetime of Levi, he shall give them to the heirs of Levi, for it is a mitzvah to fulfill the words of the deceased, as is written in siman 250, and the recipient acquired them during his lifetime when the giver died, and his heirs inherit him afterwards when he dies. And if the recipient died during the lifetime of the giver, even if the giver also died afterwards, he shall return it to the heirs of the sender, for the recipient never acquired them; since he died during the lifetime of the giver, the words of the giver were nullified during his lifetime.

And if the giver was a shekhiv mera at the time he sent it, and the words of a shekhiv mera are considered as written and delivered, as is written there; if at the time he gave them to the messenger the recipient had already died, he shall return it to the heirs of the sender, for it was never fit to be acquired, and even if he said "acquire it for him," it is nothing [Shach], as it is an acquisition in error. But if the recipient was alive then, he acquired it immediately and he shall give it to his heirs. And even if the recipient died during the lifetime of the giver, and we hold that a gift of a shekhiv mera does not take effect until after death, as is written in siman 248, nevertheless, since he removed the money from his hand and delivered it to the messenger, his intent was that he should acquire it immediately [ibid.]. And even if the heirs of the recipient were born after the death of the giver, because his words are considered as written and delivered, the recipient acquired it retroactively from the time of giving and bequeathed it to his heirs [Tur]. And the giver cannot retract as long as he has not recovered from his illness. And although regarding every gift of a shekhiv mera he can always retract, nevertheless here, where he removed it from his hand, his intent was that the recipient should acquire it immediately. And nevertheless, if he recovered, he may retract even if it already came into the hand of the recipient, for it is an assessment of intent that he only gave because he thought he would die [Sma]. And there are those who disagree on this [Shach]. And nevertheless, as long as it has not been clarified that he was healed, even according to the first opinion, the messenger must fulfill his mission and shall not refrain from giving to the recipient out of concern that perhaps he will recover from his illness and retract, and it will be difficult to extract them from the recipient; for since he delivered them to him, the messenger is obligated to give to the recipient. And if the giver dies, it shall remain with the recipient and his heirs, and if he recovers and retracts, the recipient shall return it to him. And the detailed laws of a shekhiv mera and the commandment to fulfill the words of the deceased will be explained in their place with the help of Heaven.