Siman 100

A borrower who said, "Behold, I will pay, set a time for me so that I may borrow from another, or sell, or borrow against pledges and bring money," they give him a time of thirty days, whether for a loan with a deed or for a loan by word of mouth. And even if he has known property, it is necessary to give him time [Sma]. And if it appears to the dayan that thirty days will not suffice for him, they give him more time; and if he does not need thirty days, they shall reduce it for him. However, if it is not known to him how much time the borrower needs, they give him thirty days. And they do not administer an oath to the defendant that he does not have money now, for since he is prepared to pay in some time, they do not obligate him in an oath for the sake of extending a bit of time. But if his desire is to extend a long time, it appears to me that they administer an oath to him that he is forced to extend a long time. And the defendant himself should be concerned for his soul; if he has money now and postpones the time for him, he violates "Do not say to your fellow, 'Go and return, and tomorrow I will give,'" as written in siman 97. And even if the claimant says that he needs to go on his way and it is not in his power to wait for the time, they say to him that he should appoint an agent who will wait until the time, for the time that is necessary to give to the defendant when he does not have money is according to the fundamental law.

The Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch wrote that we do not obligate him to give a משכון, for if there were movable property there, the beit din would have collected from them immediately. And if the lender wished to place a ban upon whoever has money or movable property and puts him off with words, he may place a ban. And we do not obligate the borrower to bring a guarantor until he pays. Thus far their words. And the explanation of their words is that we only give him time when he does not have movable property, for if he has movable property, they collect from them immediately by law. And it implies that without this reason, the lender has the authority to demand a משכון for security. According to this, it appears to me that now that the custom has spread that even when the borrower has movable property we give him thirty days time, as the great Acharonim wrote [Urim VeTumim and Netivot HaMishpat], the lender is able to demand security until he obtains money. And that which we do not obligate him to provide a guarantor is because it is not possible to demand from him something that is not in his hand, and perhaps there is no one who wishes to be a guarantor for him, and the lender originally trusted him without a guarantor [Sma]. And in truth, the Tur and the Shulchan Aruch wrote that if it appears to the judge that there is a concern lest he smuggle or evade, they compel him to provide a guarantor. And in this time, it is known that there are many concerns, and therefore it is simple that the lender is able to demand security from the borrower until he obtains money and gives either משכנות or a guarantor for him. And nevertheless, if it is clear to the judge that the borrower is a proper man and his intention is not for trickery or artifice, they do not compel him to this. And in siman 73 it was explained that if the beit din see that the borrower is wasting his money, they have the authority to seize it even within the time.

And specifically for payment is time granted, but for an oath time is not granted, and on the first day of entry—which is Monday or Thursday—he must swear. However, if the beit din sees that through the extension of the oath the matter will be clarified and he will not need to swear [Urim VeTummim], or that through this they will reach a compromise because according to their assessment the litigants are prepared to make a compromise, the authority is in their hands to extend the oath according to their assessment. And likewise, if one obligated himself with a kenas, wherein he subordinated himself to perform a certain matter by a certain time and that if he does not perform it he will pay such and such a kenas, time is not granted to him for the performance of the matter; and immediately upon the arrival of the time he established, if he did not perform this matter, he is liable for the kenas. However, for the payments of the kenas time is granted to him, for it is no worse than a complete debt. And when one becomes liable for the kenas such that the law of asmakhta does not apply to it will be explained with the help of Heaven in siman 207.

There are those who say that one who sets a time for the repayment of his debt and the time arrives, we do not grant him another time, for since he set a time for himself, it is as if he stipulated with him that he would not delay him further, and he should have exerted effort to obtain funds before the time arrived. And there are those who say that even for this one we grant a time of thirty days, and such is the custom, whether in a loan by word of mouth or in a loan by a document. And even when the borrower has movable property, we grant him time so that he may obtain funds, and such is the primary ruling. And even if he came and claimed from him thirty days before the time, nevertheless, we must grant him thirty days from the day of the time. And the reason is because such is the way of people, that as long as the time has not arrived, it is not within their power to make a complete exertion to obtain funds. And so too in an unspecified loan, which is thirty days, we grant him a time of another thirty days even when he claimed from him on the second day of his loan [ibid.]. And so too in all types of monetary claims we grant time, except regarding a deposit we do not grant time [ibid.], for what time is needed for this? Let him hand over his deposit. Therefore, if he says that the deposit was lost from him and he must pay with funds, we grant him time to obtain funds.

If the thirty days were completed and he did not bring money, the beit din immediately writes an adrakhta on his property. If they do not find property belonging to him, they do not place him under nidui, for what can he do since he has nothing, and he did not refuse to come to the beit din [Sma]. However, if he says that he does not want to pay, they immediately write an adrakhta on his property, and if they do not find property belonging to him, they warn him on Monday, Thursday, and Monday, and afterwards they place him under nidui because he said he does not want to pay. He remains in his nidui until he pays him or until he claims that he has nothing and swears to this, as was written in the previous siman. If he remained in his nidui for thirty days and did not request to release his nidui, they place him under nidui for another thirty days, and if he remained in them, they place him under cherem [all of this is not practiced now because of the law of the kingdom]. The laws of nidui and cherem were explained in Yoreh Deah siman 334. And that which was explained in siman 19, that after the first thirty days they place him under cherem, the reason is because there was a dispute between them and he did not accept the ruling upon himself [Urim VeTummim]. Our teacher, the Beit Yosef, brought in siman 98 the words of the Rif in the name of Rav Paltoi Gaon: A person who was found liable to his fellow in beit din and refused and transgressed the decree of the beit din, they write to the communities of Israel: "So-and-so, they decreed a Jewish law upon him and he did not pay heed, and we have placed him under cherem; he shall not pray in a quorum of ten, nor shall he join for a zimun of three, and you shall not circumcise his son, and you shall not bury his dead, and remove his children from the school and his wife from the synagogue until he accepts the judgment upon himself." Thus far his words. And although we do not have permission to do so because of the law of the kingdom, nevertheless, the living shall take these matters to heart and tremble from the fear of the law against refusing a ruling of a beit din.