Siman 90

The udder, which are the teats of the animal—whether a small one that has not yet nursed because it has not given birth to offspring, or a large one that has already given birth whose teats are full of milk, as it is written in Job (Job 21:24) "his pails are full of milk"—from the Torah there is no prohibition in this at all, since it is the milk of a slaughtered animal. It has already been explained in siman 87 that the Torah stated "in its mother's milk" and not in the milk of a slaughtered animal, see there. It is only prohibited by rabbinic decree like all meat in milk. Therefore, since the udder itself is meat, it is necessary to remove the milk from it by means of tearing it lengthwise and crosswise and pressing it against a wall; that is, one presses it with his hands against the wall so that its milk will be squeezed out (Chullin 109b). For through tearing alone the milk will also exit, but a small amount will still remain in the walls of the udder, and it is necessary to squeeze it a great deal so that no milk remains at all. And it is not specifically against a wall, but rather it means to squeeze it forcefully. And if one tears it and cuts it many times lengthwise and crosswise across its entire surface, it is better than pressing it against a wall [Rema]. And there are several detailed laws regarding it, namely: either to roast it alone over the fire, or to cook it alone in a pot in water without meat, or to cook it in a pot with meat. And there are three approaches among our teachers regarding this, as will be explained with the help of Heaven:

According to the approach of Rashi, of blessed memory, even to roast it alone over the fire it requires cutting lengthwise or crosswise ab initio [Tosafot ibid.], and this is sufficient, for since it is over the fire without a pot, if they only cut it along its length or width, the milk will flow out completely by the power of the fire; and ex post facto, even if he did not cut it at all, it is permitted, for the fire draws out the milk from within just as it draws out the blood. And to cook it alone in a pot, it requires cutting lengthwise and crosswise and striking it against a wall, for without this, the milk would exit into the water and the kachal would return and absorb from it; therefore, even in a pot without water, this is required. And if he did not do so, even ex post facto it is forbidden, unless there is sixty in the water against the kachal, for then the milk will be nullified in the water, and what remains in it would be absorbed milk, regarding which the rabbis did not decree [Pri Chadash, subsection 1]. And to cook it with meat, some say that it is always forbidden and cutting lengthwise and crosswise and striking against a wall does not avail according to the opinion of Rashi [Rashba]; however, ex post facto it is permitted. And some say that even ab initio one may cook it with meat in such a manner, for there is no reason to distinguish between cooking it alone and cooking it with meat, since through this the milk exits completely, and what reason is there to forbid it with meat [Ran], and so appears to be the primary view [Pri Chadash ibid.].

The method of our teacher Tam is that what they said in the Gemara there, that for a pot one requires tearing lengthwise and crosswise and pressing against a wall, refers to a pot with meat. However, for a pot without meat, or for roasting over the fire, it is permitted ab initio with a slight tearing. His reasoning is that they were stringent with it regarding meat because the taste of the milk enters the meat and the taste of the meat changes, and it contains the taste of meat with milk, and therefore the sages issued a decree. But when there is no meat in the pot, even though they did not tear it lengthwise and crosswise, since they tore it slightly it is permitted even ab initio, because the milk is not present in its original form as it was before. And even though the milk is emitted and returns and is absorbed within the kachal, the sages did not issue a decree regarding it, since the taste of the kachal did not change because of this absorption and one will not come to eat meat with milk; and ex post facto it is permitted even if they did not tear it at all. And there is no reason to distinguish between roasting and a pot without meat, for in roasting as well the milk drips onto the kachal from the outside and returns and is absorbed in it, and we do not say "as it absorbs, so it emits" except regarding blood whose nature is such, and until it glides it glides, but a drop of milk that fell on a piece of roast does not return and emit like the fatness it absorbed, as is written in siman 70, that even roast does not return and emit fatness it absorbed. And since in roasting, even according to the method of Rashi, it is permitted ex post facto without any tearing at all, it follows that the same law applies to a pot without meat [from the words of the Tosafot there].

And the opinion of the Rif and the Rambam in chapter 9 (Rambam, Laws of Forbidden Foods 9:12) is as follows: that for a pot, whether by itself or with meat, it requires tearing lengthwise and widthwise and striking against a wall; and ex post facto when one did not tear at all, if he cooked it by itself it is permitted, and if he cooked it with meat it is forbidden when there is not sixty. And for roasting, according to the opinion of the Rif, it requires nothing even ab initio, and the Rambam required ab initio a small amount of tearing to drain the milk within it, see there. And know that according to all the systems, in a case where it requires tearing lengthwise and widthwise and striking against a wall and it is indispensable ex post facto, such as in a pot with meat, and according to Rashi even without meat, if he omitted anything, such as if he tore lengthwise and widthwise but did not strike it against a wall, or if he tore lengthwise and struck it against a wall but did not tear it widthwise, it is nothing and is as if he did not tear at all. And although this matter is not explained explicitly, nevertheless it is explained from the wording of the Tur who wrote according to the system of Rashi that when he tore it but did not strike it against a wall and cooked it, even alone, it forbids until sixty; and all the more so according to these systems regarding one who cooked it with meat, unless he cut it many times, which is better than striking against a wall, as I wrote in section 1, see there.

And know that there are some of the early authorities who wrote according to the method of Rabbeinu Tam that for roasting or for a pot without meat, one does not need any tearing even ab initio [Sefer Mitzvot Gadol, Prohibitions 140, and Sefer HaTerumah]. However, in the Tosafot it is explicitly clear as I wrote in section 3, that ab initio one needs a bit of tearing, and the Rashba, of blessed memory, already addressed this in his novellae. And in truth, this opinion is very puzzling, for in the Gemara it is explicitly clear that there is a matter which post facto is permitted and ab initio is required; Rashi explains it regarding roasting, and according to the Rif, and also according to what I wrote in section 3 regarding Rabbeinu Tam, it refers to cooking by itself. But according to this method, there is no ab initio and post facto here at all, for with meat it is forbidden even post facto, and without meat it is permitted even ab initio. And I wonder at the commentators who did not address this, and it requires great study. [See Peri Chadash and Kereti U-Peleti subsection 1, who raised a difficulty against Rabbeinu Tam, for according to his explanation, that statement of Rabbi Eleazar who said "tear for me and I will eat," and that statement of Rav Nachman where they "pierced udders for him," both of them intended a small tearing because it was without meat; if so, why on Rabbi Eleazar does the Gemara ask "what is he teaching us? It is a Mishnah," and on that of Rav Nachman it asks "but did we not learn 'he tears it'?" and these are two opposites. And the Maharam Schiff also raised this difficulty. And they further asked why it did not ask on Rabbi Eleazar from the Mishnah, see there. However, after kissing the dust of their feet, one who examines the Tosafot will see that they had the version of the text regarding Rabbi Eleazar: "What is he teaching us? That one does not require 'warp and woof' except for a pot," and not like our version "what is he teaching us? It is a Mishnah," for there is no difficulty and resolution here, and on the contrary, it is Rabbi Eleazar who innovated this, and examine it closely]:

And behold, the most stringent among them all is Rashi, of blessed memory; nevertheless, even according to his approach, with a horizontal and vertical tearing and striking against a wall, it is permitted to cook it with meat. And according to the "there are those who say," in any event, post facto it is permitted, as I wrote in section 2. Accordingly, it is a simple matter for practical application that according to the law it is permitted to cook it with meat with a horizontal and vertical tearing and striking against a wall. For even according to the "there are those who say," since according to the Rif, the Rambam, and Rabbeinu Tam it is permitted even ab initio, we may rely upon them even according to the opinion of Rashi, since even according to him, in any event, post facto it is permitted. And so wrote the great Rishonim, that according to all interpretations it is permitted to cook it with meat in such a manner [the Semag, the Ran, the Rosh, and the Rashba]:

Nevertheless, some of the early authorities wrote in this language: The world has the custom not to cook any kakhal with meat at all, even by means of cutting it lengthwise and widthwise and striking it against a wall, even though it is permitted according to all interpretations [Beit Yosef in the name of the Hagahot]. And more than this is found in the responsa of the Geonim, that it was the custom in the academy not to cook kakhal at all, but rather they only roast it [Hagahot Ashri siman 24]. And so too is found a responsum of Rashi, of blessed memory, that kakhal that was cooked with meat is forbidden even ex post facto, even with cutting lengthwise and widthwise and striking it against a wall [Mordechai in the name of the Ra'avyah]. And from the Geonim it is implied that even by itself one should not cook it, but only by roasting. And these matters are not according to the strict law, but rather decrees and safeguards. And the reason they made many safeguards in this, it appears to me, is because we find in the Gemara (Chullin 110a) that there were places where they forbade the eating of kakhal entirely because they were lax regarding the prohibition of meat and milk; therefore the early authorities also were more stringent than the absolute law. Therefore, also in our time, we do not cook kakhal at all, but only cut many cuts, which is better than striking it against a wall, and we roast it over the fire, and afterwards we cook it in a pot. And there are women who do not use this pot for any other use but only for kakhal, and all this is a complete error, for after it has been roasted it is like any other meat and they can cook it with meat even after all the excessive stringencies, and also the pot is like all other meat pots [and in section 16 it will be explained that the Maharshal forbids cooking it with meat].

This is the wording of our teacher, the Beit Yosef, in section 1 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 90): The kachal is forbidden by the words of the scribes, for meat that was cooked in the milk of a slaughtered animal is not forbidden by the Torah; therefore, if one tore it and drained the milk within it, it is permitted to roast it and eat it, and if one tore it lengthwise and crosswise and pressed it against a wall until no moisture of milk remained in it, it is permitted to cook it with meat. And a kachal that was not torn, whether of a small animal that did not nurse or of a large animal, it is forbidden to cook it, and if one transgressed and cooked it by itself, and certainly if one roasted it, it is permitted to eat it, and if one cooked it with other meat, one measures it against sixty, etc. Thus far his words. And this is the wording of the Rambam, and this he wrote according to the primary law and not like the approach of Rashi, since many disagree with him.

However, in section 2 he wrote, and this is his wording: It is the custom not to cook it with meat at all; and to cook it without meat by frying or in a pastida, we require tearing it lengthwise and crosswise and pressing it against a wall; and for roasting, tearing it lengthwise and crosswise. Thus far his words. And this custom was established according to the system of Rashi, and according to the "some say" in section 2, that according to Rashi, ab initio one should not cook it with meat in any manner, and to cook it without meat requires tearing it lengthwise and crosswise and pressing it against a wall; and a pastida is like cooking it alone, even if the pastida is in a pan [Shach, subsection 7], for a pastida is dough without meat, and as long as there is no meat with it, even if there are other things, it is like cooking on its own. And this is why he wrote that for roasting one needs lengthwise and crosswise; although we explained in section 2 that either lengthwise or crosswise is sufficient, he required both because in some versions of Rashi it is written thus:

Our teacher, the Rema, wrote in this wording: And if one transgressed and cooked it [with meat], if he tore it lengthwise and crosswise and struck it against a wall, it may be permitted post facto in a case of great loss, but otherwise it may not be permitted; and that which they are accustomed to tear it and cut it many times lengthwise and crosswise over all of it is better and more effective than striking it against a wall. And for roasting, they are accustomed ab initio to tear it lengthwise and crosswise and strike it against a wall; however, if one transgressed and roasted it, even without tearing, it is permitted if it was roasted alone without meat with it. And if it was roasted with meat with it, if it was torn lengthwise and crosswise and struck against a wall, both are permitted, and if not, the upper one is permitted and the lower one is forbidden, and we do not forbid both lest the spit was turned, for post facto we do not presume a prohibition, but ab initio one should not roast it with meat at all. And for a pot without meat, they are accustomed to treat it as a prohibition ab initio, and the same law applies to frying even without meat, and even if the kakhal has dried. And if one transgressed and cooked it in a pot alone, post facto it is permitted if it was torn lengthwise and crosswise and struck against a wall. However, if it has dried, which is after thirty days, if one transgressed and cooked it even with meat, it is permitted post facto. And to make a pastida from the kakhal without meat, they are accustomed to permit it if they do not bake the pastida in a pan, but in a pan its law is like cooking in a pot. And there are interpretations that are stringent regarding every pastida if the kakhal did not dry first. There are those who are stringent not to bake a pastida with a kakhal of meat in a small oven, only one should place one at the mouth of the oven, and it is good to be careful ab initio for it is merely a stringency. Thus far his words.

The explanation of his words is that we have adopted all the stringencies: the stringency of the Responsa of Rashi, that with meat it is forbidden even post facto, and therefore one should not permit it without a substantial loss; and furthermore, an additional stringency was practiced to require for roasting a vertical and horizontal cut and striking it against a wall, for they hold that such is according to the view of Rashi ab initio [see Shach, subsection 10, in the name of Yam Shel Shlomo], and only post facto is it fit. And in roasting with meat, it is like cooking with meat, for the lower one absorbs from the upper one, and in this "as it absorbs, so it emits" does not apply, nor does it "slide off," as I wrote in section 3. And post facto it is permitted when one cut it vertically and horizontally and struck it against a wall, and it implies even without a substantial loss, and it is not entirely comparable to cooking; for even though the reason is the same, nevertheless they were not as stringent as in cooking. And if there was no vertical and horizontal cut and striking against a wall, even post facto the lower one is forbidden because it absorbs from the upper one, and the upper one is permitted because it does not absorb from the lower one; and even though all forbidden substances permeate upwards as well and only blood does not permeate upwards, nevertheless they were not stringent here since the core of the prohibition is merely a stringency. And one should not forbid both of them lest the spit was overturned, for we do not presume a flaw. And ab initio one should not roast it with meat at all, meaning even if it was cut vertically and horizontally and struck against a wall.

However, the essence of his words is puzzling in this matter according to the sugya of the Shas and the Rishonim. For behold, in the Gemara there, they ruled the halakha: whether the liver or the udder is beneath the meat, it is permitted; if it is above the meat, post facto yes, ab initio no. And the Tosafot raised a difficulty: how is the udder permitted post facto when placed above the meat? Is it not so that the fat of the meat drips onto the udder? And if we are dealing with a case where he tore it horizontally and vertically and thrust it against a wall, if so, even above the meat it should be permitted, for it is permitted to cook it with meat in a pot. And they answered: actually, we are dealing with a case where he tore it horizontally and vertically and thrust it against a wall, but in this case it is worse than cooking; for even though he tore it, the milk still drips from the udder onto the meat and it is recognizable as being distinct. Thus far their words. And so wrote the Rosh there. And ostensibly it is not understood: either way, if it still contains milk, if so, why is it permitted in cooking? However, this matter was explained by the Smag [Prohibitions 137], and this is his wording: And so too an udder is forbidden ab initio, for even though they tore it and all its milk exited, a whiteness like milk still exits from it and becomes entangled upon the meat and appears like meat in milk, and post facto it is permitted because this is not milk. Thus far his words. And so wrote the Maharshal in his explanation to the Shearim, siman 30, see there. And according to their approach, if it was not torn, the lower one is forbidden because it absorbs from the upper one. But the Rashba and the Ran explain that we are dealing with a case where it was not torn, and nevertheless, post facto the udder placed above does not forbid the meat. And the reason is that even though the milk drips onto the meat and becomes entangled in it, nevertheless, since most of it falls into the fire and the milk of a slaughtered animal is rabbinic, they were not concerned to forbid the meat post facto because of the small amount of milk that drips onto the meat. And if the meat is placed upon the udder, it is permitted even ab initio, because the taste of the meat's fat that is absorbed in the udder is not recognizable in the udder [Ran], and furthermore, we say "as it absorbs, so it emits" [Rashba], and it requires further study.

And according to this, it is explained that his words follow the system of the Tosafot and the Rosh, that without tearing, the bottom one is forbidden; but behold, even according to their system, with a proper tearing it is permitted ab initio when the meat is placed upon the kakhal, so how did he rule that ab initio one should not roast it with meat at all, and did not specify that this is only when the meat is below and not when the kakhal is below? And it must be said regarding his intention that while it is true that according to the law of the Gemara it is so, this applies only to their spits, but our spits which are placed lengthwise, and sometimes this end is above and sometimes the other side is above, there is concern lest it be overturned and the kakhal will be above; therefore, ab initio it is forbidden in any case, and therefore he concluded in his words that post facto one should not forbid it due to the concern that the spit was overturned [and this is the intention of the Shach in subsection 13, and this distinction is explained also in siman 73 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 73) regarding liver, and therefore the Rema was brief in his words as he relied on what is there]:

And that which he wrote, that for a pot without meat we practice a prohibition ab initio, meaning even with tearing and rubbing, this is from the decree of the Geonim in section 6. And they likewise decreed regarding frying even without meat, and likewise regarding a pashtida in a pan; but without a pan, even though in all matters we judge pashtida like cooking, such as regarding salting in siman 78 (Shulchan Aruch Yoreh Deah 78:4), nevertheless, since cooking itself is only a stringency and a decree, they did not wish to decree also regarding a pashtida without a pan, as it does not appear like cooking at all. But in a pan, it appears like cooking and they decreed even when the kachal has dried and thirty days have passed over it. And all this is ab initio, but ex post facto we establish it according to the law like the opinion of Rashi, of blessed memory, that if one tore it crisscross and rubbed it against a wall and cooked it alone, it is permitted. And if we knew that it was dry or that thirty days had passed over it, it is permitted ex post facto even when one cooked it with meat, since it has dried and the milk within it is gone. And there is one who wishes to prohibit even ex post facto in its cooking alone even when one tore it and rubbed it against a wall, for the reason that after we have accepted this stringency upon ourselves, it is like a matter that was prohibited by a quorum and requires another quorum to permit it. And likewise, there are those who wish to be stringent even regarding a pashtida without a pan, and likewise not to bake it when one made a pashtid from it with a pashtid of meat in one small oven, and all these are excessive stringencies. [See Taz subsection 8 what he wrote in the name of the Rashal that it is like a matter prohibited by a quorum, but the main point is like the Rema, for was there a decree that was decreed in public? Rather, they conducted themselves so, and the Geonim strengthened this for the reason we wrote in section 7, and it is sufficient to prohibit ab initio, and even ex post facto we have grasped the more stringent opinion, and examine carefully]:

Regarding the matter of salting a kakhal with meat: since salting is like the heat of roasting, its law is therefore like roasting, where without tearing according to the law, the bottom one is forbidden. With tearing according to the law, if the meat is on top, it is permitted ab initio; and if the kakhal is on top, it is forbidden ab initio and permitted ex post facto. However, some say that regarding this we do not say at all that salting is like heat, for salt does not act upon milk as it does upon blood, as it neither causes it to be emitted nor causes it to be absorbed. Therefore, ab initio one should not salt it with meat even when it is torn according to the law, and ex post facto it is permitted even when it was not torn at all. And there was an incident involving a kakhal and meat that were salted together in a perforated vessel and afterwards they placed it in a vessel that was not perforated, and Maharam of Rothenburg permitted both of them [Taz, subsection 13]. Similarly, the skin of the stomach, which is the meat of the stomach after its milk has been removed from within it and it has been rinsed, has the law of other meat, and it is permitted to salt it with meat, and likewise to roast it and to cook it with other meat, and it is not similar to a kakhal.

Even though we are stringent not to cook it at all in any manner, nevertheless, regarding cutting the kakhal with a meat knife, we stand by the law. That is, if they tore it lengthwise and widthwise and pressed it against a wall, it is permitted to cut it with a meat knife even while it is boiling and has not yet been fully roasted. It is not similar to cooking, where they decreed lest one cook it with meat; whereas regarding a knife, this decree is not applicable. However, if they roasted it without cutting, it is forbidden to cut it with a meat knife ab initio. And that which some have the custom that when they cook it after its roasting they do not use the pot, it is a foolish custom, for after its roasting they may cook it with meat. Maharshal already wrote that one who is stringent after it was fully roasted and torn, I call him a "pious fool" and an ignoramus [Shach, subsection 23]. However, Maharshal wrote this only regarding cutting it with a knife, but regarding cooking it with meat, he wrote in his book Yam Shel Shlomo [Chapter 8, Siman 47] that ab initio one should not cook it with meat even after the roasting, and only ex post facto is it permitted. However, from the wording of our teachers, the authors of the Shulchan Aruch, it appears explicitly to the contrary, for they wrote that after the roasting it is like meat in every respect, and so appears to be the primary view [and the Rashal follows his reasoning that this is like a matter forbidden by a quorum, and we do not hold accordingly, as I wrote in section 14].

And likewise, it is permitted to cut raw kakhal with a meat knife even though it is full of milk, and likewise it is permitted to cut meat with a knife that was used to cut kakhal, and such is the law regarding eating this in a vessel in which one ate that. The same law applies to roasting this on a spit upon which one roasted that when the kakhal was salted, for if not so, it would be forbidden because of the blood in the kakhal [Taz, subsection 9]. And the same law applies that it is permitted to place it in a bowl with roasted meat even if both are hot, for after its roasting its law is like other meat in every respect. And specifically when it was roasted according to its law, which is that they tore it first lengthwise and crosswise and struck it against a wall, or that they cut it many times, which is better than striking it against a wall. But if one transgressed and roasted it without tearing or with minimal tearing, all these things are forbidden ab initio, but post facto everything is permitted. And if they tore it according to its law and roasted it, even though they afterwards found pits full of milk, there is no concern. And the reason is that the milk of a slaughtered animal is permitted by Torah law and the sages decreed upon it as a fence for meat in milk, and since he acted according to the enactment of the sages, the milk that did not exude and remained in it is permitted, like the blood of the limbs that did not exude after roasting for which we have no concern. But when it was not torn according to its law, the collected milk is like actual milk [Taz, subsection 11]. And likewise, if one left the kakhal whole before its roasting with its milk for a full day it is permitted, and we do not say regarding it "soaking is like cooking," and it is permitted to roast it after the tearing and striking. And the reason is that since soaking even in actual meat in milk is only rabbinic as I wrote in siman 87, therefore they did not decree regarding the milk of a slaughtered animal to forbid soaking post facto. However, ab initio one should not leave it for twenty-four hours without tearing. But if it was soaked with other meat or with other milk and it was soaked for twenty-four hours, even post facto it is forbidden, not like the one who wishes to be lenient even in this [Nekudot HaKesef, and Pri Chadash, and Kreiti U'Pleiti]. And know that one who eats kakhal must wait until eating milk six hours, for it is actual meat [Levush].

It has already been explained that if one transgressed and cooked it with meat without tearing and smearing, it is forbidden according to the law of the Gemara and requires sixty against the kakhal; however, the sages, of blessed memory, were lenient in this and said that the kakhal itself is part of the count (Chullin 97b), meaning that in all prohibitions one requires sixty besides the prohibited substance, but here fifty-nine is sufficient against the prohibited substance. The kakhal itself joins to the sixty, and the reason is because it itself is not a prohibition, for it is completely permitted; therefore, it too joins to the sixty [Rashi]. And if there is sixty with it, the kakhal is forbidden and one throws it away and the rest is permitted, and if there is not sixty with it, everything is forbidden, and the pot is also forbidden. [See Taz, subsection 2, who brought the words of the Torat HaBayit who were pressed for its reason as to why the kakhal joins, and he was very pressed in this, and I wonder why he did not bring the words of Rashi, of blessed memory, which is the most simple reason]:

A kakhal that fell into a pot and there was sixty against it, or if there was not sixty against it and they threw the kakhal and it fell into another pot, it forbids that one as well. We do not say that since it fell previously and there was sixty against it, all its taste was already nullified in the first pot and why should it now forbid the second pot; for regarding all prohibitions we do not say this, and we consider it as not yet having fully discharged. This is certainly so when there was not sixty against it previously, for it is certainly considered like a piece of prohibited matter. However, the leniency we applied in the first pot to count even the kakhal as part of the count of sixty, we apply now as well in the second pot, even when there was not sixty against it in the first. Even though it is not now permitted matter, nevertheless, it is impossible to be more stringent regarding it now than the first time, so that its end should not be more stringent than its beginning. But some say that if in the first there was not sixty against it, if it fell afterward into another pot, we do not join it to the sixty, because it became neveilah in the first falling, and such is the primary view. But when there was sixty previously, even though we prohibited the kakhal, it is only because of mar'it ha-ayin, and therefore we join it even now to the sixty. And the measure of sixty is not measured except as it is at the time it was cooked and not as it was at the time it fell, whether it was larger previously than it is now or vice versa. In all measures of sixty regarding prohibitions the law is so, that we measure as it is now, and we have already explained this in siman 85. [And know that there is one who wishes to say that a kakhal is a biryah, but it is not so, for it is not called a biryah except for that which was prohibited from the beginning of its creation like the gid ha-nasheh, as written in siman 100, and as the Shach wrote at the end of subsection 5. And the Peri Chadash wanted to justify the words of the Bach, see there, and it requires further study, and see the Pri Megadim; however, it is certain that its law is like a piece fit to be served to guests, and if it was mixed with many kakhalin, it is not nullified in sixty; so wrote the Pri Megadim there.]